Empowerment, Reintegration, and Female Ex-Combatants: A Critical Feminist Peacebuilding Analysis of UN-led Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Programs in Liberia and Nepal
A thesis submitted to the University of Manchester for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Faculty of Humanities
2020 Michanne L Steenbergen
School of Social Sciences
Contents
Figures ______4 Index ______5 Declaration ______7 Acknowledgments ______8 Introduction ______9
Argument and Contributions ______11 Why Liberia and Nepal?______12 Chapter outline ______14 What is DDR? ______17 Liberia and Nepal ______21
Chapter 1: Feminist Critiques of DDR ______36
Feminist Critique 1: Female Ex-Combatants Are Excluded From DDR ______38 Feminist Critique 2: Inclusion in DDR Reproduces Gendered Inequalities ______42 Feminist Critique 3: The Concept of Reintegration is Problematic ______45 Economic, Social, and Political Reintegration ______50 Conclusions ______66
Chapter 2: Critical Feminist Peacebuilding ______68
Experience ______70 Narratives ______79 Hybridities ______91 Methodology ______97 Conclusions ______114
Chapter 3: Empowerment______116
What is Empowerment and why is it Useful? ______118 Power Over ______125 Power To ______129 Power Within ______133 Power With ______139 Conclusions ______144
Chapter 4: Empowerment of Female Combatants in Liberia and Nepal __ 147
Negative Experiences of Conflict ______148 Power Over ______151 Power To ______157 Power Within ______168 Power With ______175 Conclusions ______180
2 Chapter 5: Reintegration and Empowerment of Female Ex-Combatants in Liberia and Nepal ______183
Reintegration of Female Ex-Combatants ______184 Power Over ______194 Power To ______196 Power Within ______202 Power With ______213 Conclusions ______221
Chapter 6: Gendered Narratives in UN-led DDR ______224
Victims Narrative ______226 Threats Narrative ______233 Mothers Narrative______240 Wives Narrative ______246 Daughters Narrative ______251 Peacebuilders and Agents of Change Narrative?______261 Hybridities Through Narratives ______263 Conclusions ______270
Conclusion ______273
Reintegration and DDR ______274 Empowerment ______275 Towards an Emancipatory Peace ______276 Concluding Remarks ______284
Bibliography ______285 Appendices ______332
Appendix A: 40-Point Demands ______332 Appendix B: List of Interviews ______335 Appendix C: Consent Form ______337 Appendix D: Participant Information Sheet ______338
Word Count: 80338
3 Figures
FIGURE 1: MAP OF LIBERIA (NIC 2019) ...... 98
FIGURE 2: MAP OF NEPAL (RA ONLINE 2019)...... 99
4 Index
AFL Armed Forces of Liberia CPA Comprehensive Peace Agreement DDR Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration FAAFG Females associated with armed forces and groups FTR Family Tracing and Reunification GoL Government of Liberia GoN Government of Nepal IDDRS Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards ILO International Labor Organization LDDRR Liberian Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Programme LURD Liberians United for Democracy MODEL Movement for Democracy in Liberia MoPR Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction NA Nepal Army NCDDRR National Commission on Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation and Reintegration NGO Non-governmental organization NPFL National Patriotic Front of Liberia PLA People’s Liberation Army ULIMO-J United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy – Johnson faction ULIMO-K United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy – Kromah faction UN United Nations UNDP United Nations Development Programme UNDPKO United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations UNFPA United Nations Population Fund UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund UNIFEM United Nations Development Fund for Women UN-INSTRAW United Nations International Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of Women UNIRP United Nations Interagency Rehabilitation Programme UNMIL United Nations Mission in Liberia UNMIN United Nations Mission in Nepal UNSCR United Nations Security Council Resolution VMLRs Verified Minor and Late Recruits VST Vocational Skills Training
5 Abstract The participation of female combatants in conflict has increasingly been recognized in feminist literatures and in policies and programs concerned with reintegrating ex- combatants and building peace. This has illustrated that female ex-combatants often experience ‘empowerment’ through their role as combatant; however, this empowerment is ‘lost’ upon reintegration. To make sense of this apparent disappearance of empowerment, I look at United Nations-led Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (UN-led DDR) programs, particularly the reintegration aspect. This is because DDR programs are often significant interventions in terms of scope and funding, and designed as ‘social engineering’ to turn combatants into peaceable civilians. This thesis addresses the following research question: “In what ways have UN-led DDR programs, particularly the reintegration aspect, supported or undermined female ex-combatants’ empowerment in Liberia and Nepal?” To address this research question, this thesis draws on what I consider critical feminist peacebuilding scholarship. Specifically, I draw on three analytical strategies commonly used in critical feminist peacebuilding scholarship to make sense of female ex- combatants’ empowerment in relation to reintegration and UN-led DDR. These strategies include female ex-combatants’ experiences and narratives of empowerment, gendered narratives and multiple local-international interactions producing hybridities in UN-led DDR. Drawing on 77 semi-structured interviews with female ex-combatants and DDR officials, conducted over five months of fieldwork in Liberia and Nepal, this thesis argues that female combatants experienced empowerment during conflict. With reintegration, much of this empowerment is subsequently lost. This thesis concludes that UN-led DDR largely undermines female ex-combatants’ empowerment through multiple gendered narratives and hybridities in UN-led DDR. This thesis has various implications. Firstly, this thesis builds on and contributes to feminist literatures on DDR, female ex-combatants, and empowerment through the case studies of Liberia and Nepal, by highlighting gendered narratives and hybridities in UN-led DDR have undermined female ex-combatants’ empowerment. In doing so, this thesis applies insights from critical feminist peacebuilding scholarship on experiences, narratives, and hybridities and extends these to DDR. Secondly, for UN-led DDR policy and programming, and liberal peacebuilding more broadly, this thesis underscores the need to rethink how female ex-combatants are supported in liberal peacebuilding, including UN- led DDR, to contribute to an emancipatory peace.
6 Declaration
No portion of the work referred to in the thesis has been submitted in support of an application for another degree or qualification of this or any other university or other institute of learning.
Copyright Statement The following four notes on copyright and the ownership of intellectual property rights must be included as written below: i. The author of this thesis (including any appendices and/or schedules to this thesis) owns certain copyright or related rights in it (the “Copyright”) and s/he has given The University of Manchester certain rights to use such Copyright, including for administrative purposes. ii. Copies of this thesis, either in full or in extracts and whether in hard or electronic copy, may be made only in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (as amended) and regulations issued under it or, where appropriate, in accordance with licensing agreements which the University has from time to time. This page must form part of any such copies made. iii. The ownership of certain Copyright, patents, designs, trademarks and other intellectual property (the “Intellectual Property”) and any reproductions of copyright works in the thesis, for example graphs and tables (“Reproductions”), which may be described in this thesis, may not be owned by the author and may be owned by third parties. Such Intellectual Property and Reproductions cannot and must not be made available for use without the prior written permission of the owner(s) of the relevant Intellectual Property and/or Reproductions. iv. Further information on the conditions under which disclosure, publication and commercialization of this thesis, the Copyright and any Intellectual Property and/or Reproductions described in it may take place is available in the University IP Policy (see http://documents.manchester.ac.uk/DocuInfo.aspx?DocID=24420), in any relevant Thesis restriction declarations deposited in the University Library, The University Library’s regulations (see http://www.library.manchester.ac.uk/about/regulations/) and in The University’s policy on Presentation of Theses.
7 Acknowledgments
I would like to thank my female ex-combatant interviewees for taking the time to share your stories. Without you, this thesis wouldn’t exist. I hope I have done justice to your stories and experiences. Many thanks to all my interviewees at the United Nations, government offices, and NGOs who have taken their time to talk about their work and experiences. I am indebted to the UNDP Liberia, who went out of their way to find paper copies of DDR documentation in the middle of a hectic office move.
A number of people have shaped my PhD journey and have made this thesis what it is today. I would like to thank my supervisors Cristina Masters and Laura McLeod for their unwavering support over the past few years. My gratitude to Sabrina Karim, Kou Gbainter-
Johnson, Murphy Bella, Duke, and Lenin Bista for supporting me during fieldwork.
Thanks to Umesh Pokharel, who succeeded in turning every interview into a fun experience. Many thanks to Manisha Lamsal, without whom the interviews would not have been half as successful. I hope you have recovered from our travels around Nepal.
My heartfelt thanks to my coffee buddies Ana, Sabrina, Franco, and Rux, for always having an open ear.
My gratitude to my parents Hanneke and Fred and my family for your love and support through all these years (and moving me from flat to flat).
Finally, I would like to thank Ben, for being there for me through the ups and downs. I couldn’t have done this without you.
8 Introduction
Shanti (INT65)1 was a female combatant during the People’s War in Nepal, which lasted from 1996-2006. When the conflict began, many people in Shanti’s village and the region she lived in supported the Maoists. Shanti, too, supported the Maoists, as she was attracted to their agenda of ending discrimination based on caste, gender, and the region where people are born and live in. In 1998, when Shanti was 14, government forces (the Royal
Nepal Army, RNA) came to her village, and tortured suspected Maoist sympathizers.
Shanti was among those tortured. Her father was killed, leading Shanti to become a combatant in the armed wing of the Maoists, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). During her eight years in the PLA, Shanti learned military skills and became a group leader.
According to Shanti, male and female combatants were equal in the PLA, and responsibilities were divided based on capabilities and not gender. Through her role as combatant, Shanti overcame her belief that women and girls should stay at home and do chores. Instead, Shanti now feels that she can do anything. Following the Comprehensive
Peace Agreement (CPA) in November 2006, Shanti lived in a Maoist cantonment for nearly six years. During this time, Shanti married and had a child. In 2012, ex-combatants were released from cantonment. Shanti received no reintegration support, which she would have liked. Due to a bullet wound in her leg, which remains untreated and continues to hurt,
Shanti is unable to pursue employment. She is now a full-time mother, while her husband works in India to support his family. Shanti feels that the Maoists’ promises remain unfulfilled and that the situation of women who fought is worse than those who did not fight. In Shanti’s story, there thus appears to be a stark contrast between the motivated young woman who became a combatant to fight various injustices, to the woman who is now injured and unable to pursue employment.
1 Name changed for anonymity reasons
9 To make sense of stories such as Shanti’s, this thesis is concerned with critically assessing and analyzing female ex-combatants’ empowerment in the context of United
Nations-led Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (UN-led DDR) programs, with a particular focus on reintegration, from a critical feminist peacebuilding perspective.
DDR is ‘the largest intervention in nearly all of the UN’s ongoing large-scale peacekeeping missions’ in scope and funding (Munive et al 2012:361). It is far-reaching and has dealt directly with female ex-combatants in numerous post-conflict contexts. DDR therefore has had (and continues to have) substantial and significant impact on the lives of female ex-combatants. So much so that the reintegration aspect of DDR is commonly referred to as ‘social engineering’ (Pouligny 2004b:6, DCAF 2005:21, Basini 2013b:24).
This dissertation is particularly concerned with what exactly is being ‘socially engineered’?
Cynthia Enloe (2013:1) warns, “Demobilization [and reintegration by extension in DDR programs] is as gendered – and as potentially patriarchal as any other political process and will continue to be so if not assessed with feminist analytical skills.” Because reintegration is specifically concerned with ‘turning’ combatants into civilians, it warrants special feminist attention to what kind of gendered subjects reintegration is attempting to produce.
Analyzing UN-led DDR specifically through the lenses of female ex-combatants’ empowerment can advance feminist understandings of DDR in multiple ways. UN-led
DDR programs claim to empower ex-combatants (IDDRS 2006, module 4.30). An analysis of female ex-combatants’ empowerment in relation to reintegration sheds light on the extent to which UN-led DDR contributes to such empowerment. Moreover, this thesis investigated in what ways female ex-combatants in Liberia and Nepal already experienced empowerment through the role of combatant, and to what extent UN-led DDR supported or undermined this empowerment through reintegration.
10 Argument and Contributions
The question this thesis addresses is “In what ways have UN-led DDR programs, particularly reintegration, supported or undermined female ex-combatants’ empowerment in Liberia and Nepal?” This thesis focuses on two particular UN-led DDR programs, the
United Nations Interagency Rehabilitation Programme (UNIRP) in Nepal and the Liberian
Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation, and Reintegration Programme (LDDRR) in
Liberia. The central argument of this thesis is that much of the empowerment female ex- combatants in Liberia and Nepal experienced through the role of combatant was largely lost through reintegration, and undermined by UN-led DDR. To make this argument, I make three sub-arguments. Firstly, female ex-combatants in Liberia and Nepal experience empowerment through the role of combatant. This is especially the case in Nepal, owing to the explicitly emancipatory goals of the Maoist conflict. Secondly, UN-led DDR undermined female ex-combatants’ empowerment through gendered narratives of female ex-combatants as victims, threats, wives, mothers, and daughters, which have stripped female ex-combatants of their agency and have reproduced gendered inequalities. Thirdly, these gendered narratives are produced, reproduced, and adapted by local and international
DDR officials and officials working for national DDR bodies, with the effect of further reproducing gendered inequalities and undermining female ex-combatants’ empowerment.
This argument has various implications. Firstly, undermining female ex-combatants’ empowerment through UN-led DDR means that UN-led DDR has both failed to empower female ex-combatants and to build on the empowerment female ex-combatants had already experienced through their role of combatant. Secondly, different forms of empowerment are conducive to reintegration. Reintegration of female ex-combatants and turning them into peaceable civilians is the objective of UN-led DDR and of building an emancipatory peace (cf. Duncanson 2016:53, Hudson 2009:290, O’Reilly 2013). Undermining female
11 ex-combatants’ empowerment can therefore have negative implications for the peacebuilding process. Thirdly, undermining female ex-combatants’ empowerment reproduces rather than challenges gendered inequalities, particularly where female ex- combatants’ empowerment is supporting them to challenge such gendered inequalities. In short, undermining female ex-combatants’ empowerment through UN-led DDR is detrimental to female ex-combatants’ empowerment and reintegration, to gender equality, and to building an emancipatory peace.
This argument contributes to academic literature on female ex-combatants and
DDR in two ways. Firstly, this thesis makes an empirical contribution through the case studies of female ex-combatants in Liberia and Nepal, generating further insights into female ex-combatants’ experiences and narratives of empowerment, reintegration and UN- led DDR. Secondly, this thesis contributes to feminist literature on female ex-combatants and DDR by arguing that UN-led DDR in Liberia and Nepal undermined female ex- combatants’ empowerment and the building of an emancipatory peace. To make this argument, this thesis draws on critical feminist peacebuilding scholarship to highlight that female ex-combatants’ empowerment has been undermined through gendered narratives in
UN-led DDR which are produced and adapted by local and international DDR officials and officials working for national DDR bodies. This thesis therefore contributes to feminist literature on female ex-combatants and DDR by drawing on critical feminist peacebuilding scholarship to illustrate how UN-led DDR has undermined female ex-combatants’ empowerment in Liberia and Nepal.
Why Liberia and Nepal?
This research draws on two case studies of female ex-combatants’ empowerment in relation to UN-led DDR in Liberia and Nepal. A case study is an in-depth engagement with a particular phenomenon in its historical context (DeMarrais& Lapan 2004, Flick 2014,
12 George& Bennet 2005, Harvey 1990:202). I have chosen Liberia and Nepal as case studies for various reasons. Both conflicts saw a high percentage of participation of female ex- combatants, making up 24% and 38% of the demobilized in Liberia and Nepal respectively
(ICTJ 2009, Bleie et al 2012). As discussed below, it is likely that the actual percentages were higher. For researching female ex-combatants’ empowerment, Liberia and Nepal offer interesting cases in that female ex-combatants formed a substantial portion of armed groups. Secondly, the UN-led DDR programs in Nepal and Liberia had mandates specifically on the inclusion of female ex-combatants (UNDPKO 2005:31, Wamai 2011:52,
Basini 2013b:71, INT13), producing some of the highest female participation rates across
UN-led DDR programs. Specifically, the LDDRR in Liberia was the first UN-led DDR program to have such provisions in the program design, while the UNIRP has to date (to my knowledge) the highest participation rate of female ex-combatants in UN-led DDR.
Thus, Liberia and Nepal provide interesting and relevant case studies for researching female ex-combatants’ empowerment in relation to UN-led DDR.
Contrasting these two contexts has several advantages. It enables an analysis of female ex-combatants’ empowerment and reintegration and how this is shaped by their contexts. Contrasting these cases further allows for insight into the extent of the contextualization of UN-led DDR and implications thereof for female ex-combatants’ empowerment through reintegration. There are similarities between the two UN-led DDR programs. In addition to those already outlined (high female participation rates, mandates on female ex-combatants), there are further similarities between the DDR program in terms of the design and the actors working on these programs, as Chapter 5 elaborates. There are however also differences. For instance, the natures of the conflicts are different with the
Nepali Maoist-motivated conflict ensuing between the PLA and the Royal Nepal Army and police, whilst the Liberian conflicts involved multiple (splinter) factions that were less
13 committed to a particular ideology than to a common goal, often along ethnic lines. In the
UN-led DDR programs there are also differences. Chiefly, the scope of the DDR programs is vastly different. In Liberia, roughly 3.2% of the contemporary population (101,495 ex- combatants) of Liberia participated in the LDDRR, while in Nepal 2,231 Verified Minors and Late Recruits (VMLRs) participated, or 0.008% of the population. The following paragraphs shed greater detail on the respective UN-led DDR programs and the participation of female ex-combatants in the conflicts and DDR.
This thesis contributes to knowledge on the conflicts in Liberia and Nepal, female ex-combatants in these conflicts, and the respective UN-led DDR programs through five months of fieldwork in both countries. In total, I conducted 77 semi-structured interviews with female ex-combatants and DDR officials in Liberia and Nepal (Appendix B). I conducted fieldwork in September-October 2016 and April-May 2017 in Nepal
(Kathmandu, Birendranagar, and Nepalgunj) and in Montserrado County and Monrovia in
Liberia in January-February 2017. This three-stage approach allowed for a preliminary analysis of the interviews, a re-evaluation of approaches, research questions, and interview questions, as well as highlighting gaps and further opportunities in data collection. The following section provides the outline for this thesis.
Chapter outline
To reiterate, the research question addressed by this thesis is: “In what ways have UN-led
DDR programs, particularly the reintegration aspect, supported or undermined the empowerment of female ex-combatants in Liberia and Nepal?” This research addresses this question through a critical feminist peacebuilding perspective, drawing primarily on empirical data from interviews with female ex-combatants and DDR officials in Liberia and Nepal. Additionally, this research draws on UN-led DDR policy and programming
14 documentation to support my analysis. In the following paragraphs, I provide the roadmap for my thesis, including key arguments.
Chapter 1 reviews three feminist critiques of DDR: 1. Female ex-combatants are excluded from DDR; 2. Where female ex-combatants are included in DDR, this inclusion frequently fails to meet the needs of female ex-combatants and reproduces gendered inequalities; and 3. The very concept of reintegration is problematic from a feminist perspective, as it assumes a ‘going back’ to unequal gendered power relations. To illustrate how these critiques are related in practice, this chapter utilizes different aspects of reintegration, i.e. economic, social, and political reintegration.
Chapter 2 provides my critical feminist peacebuilding framework for analyzing female ex-combatants’ empowerment in relation to reintegration UN-led DDR. This chapter discusses three analytical strategies frequently employed by critical feminist peacebuilding scholarship. These include experience, narratives, and hybridities in UN-led
DDR. This chapter argues that female ex-combatants’ experiences and narratives of empowerment can highlight the agency female ex-combatants already exercise, how this changes over time, and how this agency is shaped by gender. Moreover, this chapter argues that gendered narratives and hybridities are useful analytical strategies for making sense of how unequal gendered power relations are reproduced. The aim of taking a critical feminist peacebuilding perspective is to contribute to an emancipatory peace. Lastly, this chapter reflects on the methodological considerations emerging from this critical feminist peacebuilding perspective.
Chapter 3 elaborates on this critical feminist peacebuilding perspective by discussing how empowerment is understood and why it is a useful concept to make sense of female ex-combatants’ experiences of combatanthood, reintegration, and UN-led DDR.
Specifically, this chapter contends that empowerment as understood from my critical
15 feminist peacebuilding perspective pays attention to agency in relation to structures, as well as how these change over time. In making this argument, this chapter returns to the critical, feminist, and post-colonial roots of the concept of empowerment and draws on these roots to expand Jo Rowlands’ (1997) framework of four types of power in empowerment, including power over, power to, power within, and power with.
Chapter 4 is the first of my case study chapters and draws on the framework of empowerment developed in Chapter 3 to analyze to what extent female combatants in
Liberia and Nepal experienced empowerment through their role as combatant. This chapter contends that female combatants experienced empowerment in Liberia and Nepal, although there were differences between, among, and within, female combatants in Liberia and Nepal. Female combatants in Nepal experienced overall more empowerment, which is the result of the Maoist nature of the conflict that sought to explicitly address gendered inequalities.
Chapter 5 analyzes to what extent female ex-combatants’ empowerment has been supported or undermined through reintegration. To do so, this chapter first considers the extent to which female ex-combatants in Nepal and Liberia have reintegrated economically, socially, and politically. Here, I argue that female ex-combatants on average have reintegrated poorly in all aspects in Liberia and Nepal. Drawing on the framework developed in Chapter 3, this chapter argues that reintegration undermined the empowerment female ex-combatants experienced through their role as combatant (Chapter
4). Especially those female ex-combatants who reintegrated poorly experienced a loss in empowerment. However, differences among female ex-combatants in Liberia and Nepal remain, with high-ranking female ex-combatants in Nepal reintegrating comparatively better and maintaining much of their empowerment.
16 Chapter 6 analyzes how UN-led DDR has undermined female ex-combatants’ empowerment in Liberia and Nepal. To do so, this chapter analyzes gendered narratives in
UN-led DDR. This chapter argues that UN-led DDR narrates female ex-combatants as victims in Liberia and threats in Nepal, as well as mothers, wives, and daughters in both contexts. All these narratives undermine female ex-combatants’ empowerment by stripping female ex-combatants of their agency and reproducing gendered inequalities. This chapter further argues throughout that these gendered narratives are produced, reproduced, and adapted by local and international DDR officials, as well as officials working for national
DDR bodies. The resulting hybridities in UN-led DDR design and implementation have further undermined female ex-combatants’ empowerment. This chapter therefore concludes that UN-led DDR has undermined female ex-combatants’ empowerment through gendered narratives and multiple hybridities in UN-led DDR.
The Conclusion summarizes these arguments and makes explicit their original contribution to academic literature. Specifically, the Conclusion reflects on three central themes of this thesis and how the insights regarding these themes contribute to academic literature. These themes include reintegration and DDR, empowerment, and an emancipatory peace. The Conclusion argues that an emancipatory peace will remain elusive as long as UN-led DDR fails to take seriously and to build on female ex- combatants’ empowerment. The Conclusion ends on policy recommendations and opportunities for further research with the aim of transforming UN-led DDR into a practice which supports female ex-combatants’ empowerment and the building of an emancipatory peace.
What is DDR?
Disarmament entails ‘the collection of weapons’, whereas demobilization constitutes ‘the formal and controlled discharge of armed combatants from armed forces or other armed
17 groups’ (IDDRS 2006 module 1.10:2). These first two phases (the DD phases) usually set out who is allowed to participate in the third and final phase of DDR, the reintegration phase. There is no singular understanding of reintegration. In practice, UN-led DDR approaches reintegration as a “social and economic process with an open time-frame, primarily taking place in communities at the local level. It is part of the general development of a country and a national responsibility, and often necessitates long-term external assistance.” (IDDRS 2006:2). Reintegration consists of economic and social reintegration; critical and feminist scholars have also advocated for political reintegration
(Chapter 1). There are divergences in how DDR programs are conducted across different contexts. The sequencing of these different phases remains debated, for example when
DDR should begin in relation to the broader liberal peacebuilding project (Basini
2013b:31ff). The focus of this research is on the reintegration aspect of UN-led DDR, while acknowledging differences regarding design and implementation.
Another difference is cantonment, where combatants are gathered in selected physical locations to identify ex-combatants and begin the severance of ties within armed groups, for example through official discharge ceremonies (Rabasa et al 2011:73, DCAF
2005:1, Schulhofer-Wohl& Sambanis 2010:14, Sideris 2002:52, Friedman 2018:637).
Cantonment allows for screening of ex-combatants, including HIV/AIDS screening
(Marwah et al 2010:13). Cantonment can be counterproductive, for example by reinforcing combatant ties (Knight& Özerdem 2004:508), and can contribute to recruitment and army professionalization, as was the case in Nepal (Bleie et al 2012:40, UNSC S/2007/235:26).
Of the three phases, reintegration has the largest potential to support or undermine peacebuilding (Berdal 1996, Colletta et al 1996, UNDPKO 1999, UNSC 2000, Kingma
2002, World Bank 2002b, Knight& Özerdem 2004). Nonetheless, reintegration is considered the ‘weakest link’ (De Vries& Wiegink 2011:40) and ‘Achilles heel’ of DDR
18 (Muggah et al 2009:279), raising concerns regarding its ability to support female ex- combatants’ empowerment.
Reintegration in UN-led DDR is aimed at ex-combatants and frequently conducted under supervision of various UN agencies and implementing partners. Sometimes it is conducted by national actors (government, armed forces or NGOs), and at other times, these national actors play a peripheral role. The intervention in Nepal is considered to have a ‘light footprint’ by international actors (Westendorf 2018), while national actors had little influence over the internationally-led DDR program in Timor Leste (Peake 2009). UN-led
DDR depends on cooperation of families and communities, although their role in supporting or undermining the reintegration of ex-combatants is rarely acknowledged in
UN-led DDR (Schnabel& Farr 2012:217f, Prieto 2010, Muggah 2010). Implementation of
UN-led DDR thus relies on the work of various organizations and people; who exactly these actors are is context-dependent. The main beneficiary is the ex-combatant, although there is increased attention to dependents and communities as secondary beneficiaries
(IDDRS 2006, module 4.30). There is thus considerable variation in actors and intended beneficiaries of different DDR programs.
Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) programs are designed to contribute to peace. DDR emerged in the context of liberal peacebuilding (Kilroy 2015:18) and is among the largest UN peacekeeping interventions (Munive et al 2012). DDR has been practiced by the UN since 1989 in Nicaragua, where the UN Observer Group in
Central America collected weapons and demobilized ex-combatants. UN-led DDR has since increased in scope. A key actor, particularly on the reintegration aspects of DDR is the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), who have been involved in DDR in
‘both peacekeeping and non-peacekeeping contexts’ since 1991 (UNDP 2005:9). The increasingly central role of the UNDP as development actor in DDR reflects the nexus of
19 security and development of liberal peacebuilding. This is particularly visible in ‘Second
Generation DDR’, a ‘nexus of security and development activities’ (UNDPKO 2010a:31).
This ‘Second Generation DDR’ is consolidated in the Integrated DDR Standards (IDDRS) of 2006, a document produced by a working group consisting of 15 UN agencies with experience of working on DDR. The now-1000-page document covers core DDR issues of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration, as well as cross-cutting issues, including
HIV/AIDS, SALW, children, youth, and female combatants, gender, environment, and overlaps of DDR with transitional justice and SSR. This demonstrates just how expansive the scope of UN-led DDR has become, as DDR now extends far beyond collection of weapons of earlier programs. The UN-led DDR programs I consider, the UNIRP and
LDDRR, are part of this ‘Second Generation DDR,’ and thus follow liberal peacebuilding in its nexus of security and development activities to consolidate peace.
Liberal peacebuilding theory and practice constitutes the third generation of peacebuilding theory and practice, according to Richmond’s (2010a:16f) ‘four generations’ conceptualization. 2 Liberal peacebuilding is multidimensional, merging top-down peacemaking and peacekeeping with bottom-up approaches of addressing root causes of conflict (Bellamy and Williams 2007, Paris 1997, 2002, 2004, 2010). Although Galtung developed peacebuilding as a concept in 1969 (Galtung 1969), it entered UN narratives in
1992 with Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s An Agenda for Peace. Here, peacebuilding is
2 The ‘first generation’ is conflict management, which is state-centric and assumes that conflict is biological or inherent, and its absence merely temporary. The goal of conflict management is to achieve a negative peace (Galtung 1967), i.e. the absence of widespread direct violence between armed groups, and can be achieved through mediation (Richmond 2010a:16). The ‘second generation’ is conflict resolution, which sees conflict as a consequence of failing to meet human needs (Richmond 2008b:101). Conflict resolution seeks to identify and address the root causes of conflict and envisions a bottom-up approach to peacebuilding. In this regard, a substantial contribution of conflict resolution to peacebuilding was the development of multi-track diplomacy and introducing civil society to peacebuilding (Lederach 1997, 2003). The ‘third generation’, liberal peacebuilding, combines these first two approaches. The ‘fourth generation’, largely remains a theoretical approach. It critiques liberal peacebuilding and envisions peacebuilding processes “that would not result in [the] replication [of conflict] in various forms, leading to a consensual, legitimate and discursive form of emancipation” (Richmond 2008b:99).
20 considered “action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.” (UN General Assembly 1992:21).
An Agenda for Peace was a catalyst for institutionalizing liberal peacebuilding in UN interventions (Ryan 2013:28, Hudson 2010b:122f, Richmond 2002:159, Richmond
2010a:24, Lund 1996:87, Värynen 2010:137ff, Chandler 2017:45). As Wheeler (2001:22) mentions, there was an expansion of scope of the UN peacekeeping operation in Cambodia in the early 1990s to the UN Mission in Kosovo established in 1999. It is thus in the 1990s that liberal peacebuilding as practice emerged to end conflict. This approach is however not entirely new; Paris (2002:637ff) considers liberal peacebuilding “an updated (and more benign version) of the ‘mission civilatrice,’ or the colonial era belief that the European imperial powers had a duty to ‘civilize’ populations and territories.” Underlying liberal peacebuilding are thus (neo-)colonial underpinnings that rely on an assumption that liberal peacebuilding actors presume to know what is best for a given context in terms of peacebuilding. The DDR programs this thesis engages with (the LDDRR and UNIRP) are part of this broader liberal peacebuilding ‘project’. The following section overviews these respective DDR programs, as well as the conflicts in Liberia and Nepal and the participation of female ex-combatants.
Liberia and Nepal
To make these arguments, the remainder of this Introduction provides a discussion of
Liberia and Nepal as case studies upon which this thesis is based. This section introduces the respective conflicts, the participation of female ex-combatants in these conflicts, as well as the respective UN-led DDR programs.
21 Liberia
Before colonization, tribes have inhabited the area currently known as Liberia since at least the 12th century. By 1822, these included the following ethnic tribes: Bassa, Belle,
Dan or Gio, Dei, Bandi, Gola, Grebo, Kissi, Kpelle, Krahn, Kru, Lorma, Mano, Mandingo,
Mende, and Vai. The American Colonization Society possessed a colony in Montserrado in
1822-1839, and several smaller, affiliated colonies were set up along the now-Liberian
Grain Coast. Liberian colonies were somewhat atypical in that they were primarily intended as a solution to the problem of freed slaves in the United States of America
(Moran 2011:53). In 1847, Liberia became an independent state, founded by the freed slaves, known as Americo-Liberian settlers or colonists. The Americo-Liberians governed
Liberia in a quasi-colonial way until 1964. There was particularly little interest among them in social and economic development of the hinterlands (often called ‘the bush’ by
Liberians), cultivating inequality in Liberia (Guannu 2010a:3). Citizenship was also restricted to “natives who had become educated and who had adopted one of the Western
Christian denominations and abandoned the traditional ways of life,” (Guannu 2010c:43) thereby also restricting access to political participation. Liberian women gained suffrage in
1946, but many remained excluded from citizenship. The resettlement of American freed slaves to Africa thus created new forms of inequality in Liberia.
To this day, Liberia continues to face considerable gendered inequalities. Girls on average receive less education than boys. In 2005 the adult literacy rate of women was 19% compared to 45% of men and only 31% of girls received primary education compared to
51% of boys (UNDP 2006b:38ff). Maternal mortality is one of the highest in the world, with 725 deaths per 100,000 live births in 2005 (CIA 2018). In post-conflict Liberia, women have gained increased access to political power, but continue to struggle to access
‘religious and traditional institutions outside the state and market’ (Tripp 2015:4). In
22 Liberia, as elsewhere in West Africa, women constitute a high percentage of the paid labor force (Connell et al 2015:2). This was increased by the conflict, as “women took on traditional male tasks of brick-making, building and roofing houses, and clearing farmland.
As a result of such changes, today there are more women in business than men. (Tripp
2015:84). In fact, as Fuest (2008) discusses, market women in Liberia were pivotal to the food supply across the country and particularly to Monrovia. Women throughout Liberia continue to have limited access to land. The 2003 inheritance law improved this from a legal viewpoint, but ‘community norms and practices continue to restrict women’s access to land’ (Tripp 2015:111). This is especially problematic because women in Liberia are overrepresented in agricultural labor and the lack of land ownership means that few are able to benefit economically to the same extent as men (cf. Nussbaum 2000, SIDA 2009).
These inequalities are further compounded by age (Peters 2012:885), religion (Tripp
2015:83), language (CIA 2018), and living in rural areas (UNICEF 2012, World Bank
2005). Although gender inequality is present in Liberia, it should be noted that ‘Liberian women are known as relatively strong and independent,’ and that they recognize and challenge this inequality (Specht 2006:11). In fact, Liberia has seen a ‘rich history of collective action by Liberian women,’ and they have held ‘powerful ritual, social, and political positions’ (Moran 2010:267. Cf. Fallon 2010, Abramowitz& Moran 2012, Moran
1989, Tripp 2015).
Liberia experienced what can be understood as a negative peace (i.e. the absence of widespread direct violence, Galtung 1964) until 1980, when the ethnic Krahn Samuel Doe staged a coup-d’état, killing President William Tolbert. His presidency was marked by a preference for Krahn people and repression particularly of Gio and Mano people. This repression led to the First Liberian Civil War (1989-1997) under the leadership of Charles
Taylor’s National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), with most fighters initially from Gio
23 or Mano origin, fighting against the Krahn-dominated Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL). The conflict soon affected civilians; in July 1990 AFL forces massacred 600 refugees (mainly
Mandingo and Gio) in St. Peter’s Lutheran Church in Sinkor, Monrovia, and another 200 civilians in a Sinkor supermarket (Tripp 2015:81). This set a precedent for targeted attacks on civilians along ethnic lines. After the killing of Doe in September 1990, the AFL forces and Doe–sympathizers formed the United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy
(ULIMO), which soon split into ULIMO-J under the leadership of Roosevelt Johnson
(ethnically Krahn) and ULIMO-K (ethnically Mandingo) under Alhaji GV Kromah. The
Abuja Agreement (1995) and 1997 elections, which can hardly be considered ‘free elections’, resulted in a brief reduction of violence. In 1999, the Second Liberian Civil War was launched by Liberians United for Democracy (LURD), a less-than cohesive armed group with the aim of ridding Liberia of Charles Taylor, which recruited former ULIMO-K and ULIMO-J combatants. In March 2003, the movement for Democracy in Liberia
(MODEL), consistent of Liberian refugees in Ivory Coast and Ghana, soon controlled a third of the country. The Second Liberian Civil War culminated in the siege of Monrovia by LURD forces between July-August 2003, Taylor’s resignation, and the Accra Peace
Agreement of August 2003 between the Government, LURD, and MODEL.
The two Liberian conflicts had a devastating impact on the country. According to
Agnieska Paczynska (2010), an estimated 400,000 people died and an additional 2 million
Liberians became internally displaced or refugees. The human tragedy of the conflict was thus considerable. All sides are considered responsible for human rights violations and abuses (UNSC S/2003/875:26). The conflict further destroyed much of the country’s infrastructure; for example, 75% of the educational infrastructure was damaged or destroyed (Paczynska 2010:11). The conflicts also had an enormous impact on the health sector; by 2003 only 20 medical doctors remained in Liberia and 95% of the country’s
24 health facilities were destroyed or damaged (Guannu 2010b:58, UNDP 2010:95), many of which have still not been fully rebuilt (Paczynska 2010:11). By the end of the conflict, there were only two practicing psychiatrists left in Liberia, affecting the counseling aspect of DDR (UNDP 2007). Rapid urbanization during and following the conflict put a strain on the remaining services (Herbert 2014:10). The conflict thus had a devastating impact on
Liberia and Liberians. This impact was not necessarily felt equally throughout the country.
As Utas (2005a:139) stresses, “Even during the war, in most areas people experienced long periods of relative peace and normality, suddenly interrupted by fierce battles, or a newfound intensity of skirmishing.” Fighting also was still ongoing in Nimba, Grand Bassa, and Bong Counties in December 2003 (UNSC S/2003/1175) after the peace agreement had been signed. This had implications for who fought when and for example explains the proliferation of combatants towards the end of the conflict.
The DDR program in Liberia was officially called the Liberian Disarmament,
Demobilization, Reintegration and Rehabilitation Programme (LDDRR). The ‘DD’ phases ran from April 2004- December 2004 whilst the reintegration phases ran from June 2004 until 2007. It was the first integrated UN DDR framework, and was jointly run by the
National Commission on Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation and Reintegration
(NCDDRR), United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), UNDP, and United Nations
Children’s Fund (UNICEF), with respective implementing partners (UNDP 2006a). This was not Liberia’s first encounter with DDR; the first DDR program ran between 1994-
1997, where the reintegration aspect was practically non-existent and many of the
‘reintegrated’ ex-combatants re-enlisted when conflict reignited in 1999. A second attempt was made in December 2003, which quickly broke down because of ‘logistical and infrastructural problems,’ which resulted in “rioting and nine deaths caused by individuals not immediately given a $150 initial allowance as promised” (Escola de Cultura de Pau
25 2009:88). Nor was the LDDRR the last: a Residual Caseload of 9,000 ex-combatants (29% female, 4% children, UNMIL 2007:6, Tamagnini& Krafft 2010) aimed to reintegrate ex- combatants who had not attended the reintegration component of the LDDRR, running
2008-2009. The Residual Caseload had no funding shortages, unlike the main DDR program.3 Furthermore, the Residual Caseload introduced career guidance counseling, job mapping, and improved psychosocial counseling (Basini 2013a:536ff). While I did not conduct interviews with female ex-combatants or DDR officials who participated in the
Residual Caseload, in Chapter 5 and 6 I draw comparisons to the LDDRR and the gendered challenges it reproduced for female ex-combatants to discuss how the Residual
Caseload might have improved upon this.
There has been much debate regarding the objectives of the DDR program
(Özerdem 2013). According to the specific DDR framework (UNDP 2004) on the LDDRR, the overarching objective was to ‘consolidate peace’ while the immediate objective was ‘to consolidate national security for humanitarian assistance, civil authority, economic growth and development.’ This, Chapter 1 elaborates, is in line with a liberal peacebuilding approach. The UNDP (2006a) itself recognized that reintegration and rehabilitation were never defined. Jennings (2008c:6) argues that there was a tension between the
‘transformative’ agenda of the LDDRR and its minimalist implementation, leading to
‘raised expectations, followed by frustration and dissatisfaction’ among ex-combatants.
The overall number of combatants is unknown. The LDDRR, launched in 2004, officially reintegrated 101,495 ex-combatants from government, LURD, and MODEL forces, considerably more than 35-40,000 initially expected (UNMIL 2007:2). The legitimacy of the reintegration has been questioned. Wolf-Christian Paes (2005:257) for example, stressed that UNMIL’s low threshold for DDR access led to an inflation of the
3 The Government of Norway contributed $7 million USD, UNSC S/2008/183
26 caseload compared to UN-led DDR programs in other countries. He argues that weapons and ammunition were handed in by civilians to obtain access to DDR, and that many ex- combatants were unable to use a weapon. This, I argue, is not necessarily evidence of ex- combatants not having participated. Guns were often shared within armed groups, the use of machetes, and bow and arrows was high, and the most vulnerable often were not given guns (INT56). The inflated caseload is a result of facilitating access for children and female ex-combatants, who were previously excluded from UN-led DDR, such as in Sierra
Leone (Mackenzie 2009, 2010, 2012). Furthermore, in a conflict where ‘everybody fought’
(Jennings 2008c:24) should a caseload this size actually be so surprising? As Munive et al
(2012:366) stress, “a conflict that lasted for more than 14 years lends itself to a cumulative recruitment process which possibly contributed to the increases in the number far beyond original projection.” Many combatants fought for short periods of time, as evidenced by my interviews with female ex-combatants in Liberia. This is also the result of the infrequent fighting in certain areas (see above). Challenging assumptions that over half the
DDR participants were not and had never been combatants is important, because this could lead to a narrowing of DDR access, which in the past had been exclusionary towards female ex-combatants and children (Rabasa et al 2011:73). That is not to say that corruption did not happen in DDR in Liberia, but rather that a high caseload is not necessarily evidence thereof.
The LDDRR had the broadest entry criteria of any DDR program at the time; combatants could register as adult (male) combatant (‘one-man-one-gun’ approach,
Council on Foreign Affairs 2007), or be under the age of 18, or female of any age. The entry criteria allowed up to five combatants per weapons (UNDP 2004). Notably, this was the first DDR program to have a specific mandate on female ex-combatants thanks to extensive lobbying of the Office of the Gender Advisor (UNDPKO 2010b:21f). Helen
27 Basini (2013a:544) argues this had positive and negative implications: female ex- combatants were now (at least rhetorically) included in DDR; however, funding was not increased accordingly. The United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) oversaw the
‘gender-component’ in the DD phases, but this was absent in the RR phases (Olonisakin et al 2011:55). The LDDRR introduced different DDR support and monitoring for adult and child combatants (UNSC S/2003/1175:24). The cut-off line for this was 18 years of age.
From my interviews it became apparent that this was difficult to ascertain in practice as many ex-combatants did not know their age (INT46). The average age recorded was 26
(GoL 2007:4).
The numbers of ‘reintegrated’ female ex-combatants are 22,370 women and 2,240 girls (UNDPKO 2010b:22). Few female ex-combatants initially accessed the LDDRR, although this increased throughout the LDDRR (DCAF 2011:23). These numbers are still less than the estimated 30-40% female participation in armed forces or a total of 25-30,000 female ex-combatants (Amnesty International 2008:5). Abu Sherif (2008:28) argued that
“the majority of women were forced to participate, although it is estimated that significantly more women opted to participate in the second conflict than in the first”. My own interviews indicated that many female ex-combatants joined out of their own will
(albeit often in restricted circumstances, Chapter 4). A female battalion commander for the
NPFL in the first war stated that there were at last 2,900 girls in the NPFL (INT34). Many of the female ex-combatants I interviewed had not gone through DDR (Chapter 5), highlighting that DDR still ‘missed’ considerable numbers of female ex-combatants. It can however be concluded that the participation of woman and girls in the First and Second
Liberian Civil Wars was substantive.
28 Nepal
The first form of a state recorded in the territory of present-day Nepal is that of the
Kirata Kingdom, established 1500 B.C. In 1748, Nepal became a unified state, also known as the Kingdom of Gorkha. A conflict between the Kingdom of Gorkha and the East India
Company ensued in 1814-1816, leading to the Treaty of Suguali and the recruitment of
Gorkhas into the British Indian Army and the British Army until this day. Notably, this conflict saw the participation of women in combat, on which the Maoists later drew to justify the recruitment of female combatants (Yami in Gulbrandsen& Andresen 2008).
Nepal is thus a unique case study in that it was one of the few countries in the Global
South that was never colonized. In 1962, Shah King Mahendra introduced the Panchayat system in Nepal, which outlawed political parties, ended representative democracy and effectively placed power back with the King. The 1962 constitution that entrenched the
Panchayat system declared Nepal a Hindu Kingdom, with the motto, ‘one nation, one language’. This was paramount to institutionalizing inequality in Nepal: the Panchayat system reduced political representation to high-caste, elderly men (Lohani-Chase 2008:13), and facilitated the ‘suppression of minority groups by elite groups’ (Khadka 2012:24).
Nepal is a geographically, culturally, linguistically and religiously diverse country, and the
1962 constitution marginalized non-Hindu, non-Nepali speaking communities. Social and economic domination came from Kathmandu Valley, leading to the marginalization of
Madhesis, inhabitants of the Tarai (the plains) (Sundar et al 2014:54), 1990 saw the introduction of a new constitution following the people’s movement (jan andolan I). It reintroduced multiparty democracy in Nepal but janajati (indigenous peoples) and ethnic groups remained excluded from power (Manchanda 2004:240, Tamang 2009:66). It should be noted that unlike the later Maoist conflict, this movement originated from Kathmandu and represented the interests of the people here.
29 Nepal is characterized by considerable inequality. Ethnically and religiously, it is extremely diverse. The country is predominantly Hindu (81.3%), but Buddhist (9%),
Muslim (4.4%) and Kirat (3.1%) also live in Nepal. 125 ethnic groups live in Nepal (CIA
2011). As Punam Yadav (2016:36) explains, “there is no clear distinction between caste and ethnicity in colloquial Nepali, as jat (best translated as ‘decent group’) is used for both”
(Cf. Whelpton 2005). Language also features predominantly as diversity in Nepal: next to
Nepali, 123 other languages are spoken. In the past, speaking a different language was used to justify discrimination. As Sundar et al (2014:54) argue, Madhesis have been considered non-Nepali as a result of speaking a different language, and have been excluded from citizenship rights. There is also a clear discrepancy between Kathmandu Valley and other areas of the centralization of the feudal society in Kathmandu. To give an example, in Kathmandu in 2004, the average income was five times higher than in the mid-western districts, where the Maoist conflict had started (Hutt 2004:17). The difference is even greater in the far-Western districts (Manchanda 2004). Nepal was the most unequal country in South Asia in the 1990s, with a Gini Index rating of 0.426 (Lawoti et al 2009:8).
Structured violence was extremely high, but ignored by NGOs who do not engage with caste, ethnic and gender discrimination and where predominantly active in the Kathmandu
Valley (Sundar et al 2014:120), thus exacerbating the inequality.
For a large part, gender roles and relations are more strictly defined in Nepal that in
Liberia. To some extent, this can be traced back to Manusmriti Hindu scripts, which prescribe appropriate behavior for women and their subordination (Yadav 2016:46). For example, the scripts state that, “A girl, a young woman, or even an old woman should not do anything independently, even in (her own) house. In childhood a woman should be under her father’s control, in youth under her husband’s and when her husband is d ead, under her son’s. She should not have independence.” (Doniger& Smith 1991:198). A
30 particularly dangerous practice for women is Chaupadi pratha, where menstruating women and girls are considered ‘impure’ and have to stay outside the house, usually in cow sheds, which has partially returned since the end of the conflict (International Alert
2012:10). This practice has severe health implications (Yadav 2016:49). Another practice in Nepal that particularly affects women and girls is that throughout Nepal, upon marriage, a daughter leaves her parental house and moves in with her new husband and parents-in- law (Lamb in Yadav 2016:47). Most Nepali women relocate upon marriage, except for
Magar women, among whom marriage is processual until the birth of the first child
(Molnar 1982). Patrilocal marriage practices leave newly-married women open to ill- treatment at the hands of in-laws, removes social networks and leaves them vulnerable upon widowhood or divorce (Brunson 2016:123).
Nepal’s heterogeneity is also reflected in gender roles. Janajati’s have fewer religiocultural restrictions (Manchanda 2004:245). For example, Newar, Rai, Tamang and
Gurung peoples do not follow caste-based laws and are more lax about widow remarriage.
In particular, Rai marry off daughters-in-law like their own daughters (Lohani-Chase
2008:31), removing insecurities Nepali widows often face. In another example, Magar women have access to economic opportunities not available to Hindu women, such as the sale of raksi, a distilled liquor (Molnar 1982:486, Manchanda 2004:245-254). Kham
Magar women further have long accessed education (Gautam et al 2001:223). However, janajati women have been coerced through a process of Hinduization, which has meant that enforcement of religio-cultural gender roles has been even stricter (Bhattachan
2001:161). Thus, gender roles and relations in Nepal are very complex and this is important to bear in mind for female ex-combatants’ empowerment, and emancipation through my research.
31 On 13 February 1996, the Maoists launched the People’s War in six districts:
Rukum, Rolpa, Jajarkot, Salyan, Gorkha (mid-Western region), and Sindhuli (central region) (Gautam et al 2001:219). The conflict followed increased repression of janajati protests by the Nepali police, such as Operation Romeo, which in its first month in
November 1995 alone drove over 5% of the male population into the jungle in Rolpa
(Gautam et al 2001:219), and was marked by human rights violations, rapes, arrests and disappearances (Amnesty International 1997). Just days before the conflict was officially announced, the Maoist presented their 40-point demands (Appendix A), which pushed for equality and rights, inclusive delivery of services, sovereignty and security. ‘Horizontal inequalities’ (Murshed et al 2005:132) provided the fuel for the conflict. Compared to the conflicts in Liberia, the People’s War was strategized with clearly defined goals to address these inequalities. In the districts where the People’s War started, the Maoists set up their own governments, called Jan Sarkars (Hutt 2004:5, Sundar et al 2014:121f), which were later also set up in ‘liberated’ areas. The conflict intensity was low, but began to escalate in
2000, when 14 police personnel were killed in Dolpa. This was followed by the Royal
Palace massacre on June 1, 2001, where King Birendra and his entire immediate family were killed. Between November 2001 and end October 2002, an estimated 5,000 people died, of which two-thirds were killed by state forces (Thapa 2016:91). On 22 November
2006 the Government of Nepal and the Maoist political wing signed a Comprehensive
Peace Agreement (CPA). Notably, this is a Nepali-pushed peace agreement, unlike many other recent peace agreements (Dhungana 2007:77, Upreti 2012:102). This is a negative peace, as the UN for example acknowledged that the CPA did not address the ‘root causes’ of conflict (UN et al 2011:47).
The conflict killed over 17,800 people, displaced 150-200,000 people (Gauta
2006:11), and the whereabouts of 1,530 people remains unknown (NepalNews 2012,
32 Impunity Watch 2015). According to Shobha Gauta (2006:11), Dalits particularly suffered during the conflict and were targets for abuse from both sides, and Dalit women were subject to sexual violence. Other uprisings have since taken place. Noteworthy here is the ongoing tension in the Tarai, where Madhesi protests regularly lead to violence and deaths
(UNDP 2015). To suggest that the CPA brought even a negative peace to Nepal is thus somewhat Orwellian.
The Nepali approach to DDR is unconventional as the international footprint is light, especially on the DD phases. DD was overseen by the Maoists and the Government of Nepal, with United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) only providing a monitoring role. During 2007-2013, the PLA was based at various cantonment sites around the country, including in Kailali, Surkhet, Rolpa, Nawalparasi, Chitwan, Sindhuli, and Ilam. This cantonment period is unusually long; for example for adults in Liberia cantonment lasted up to one week. As Subedi (2014:682) argues, this time allowed “the PLA to systematically reinforce command and control structures. In other words, it was remobilization by an ‘alternative system’.” Reintegration on the other hand ‘has been practiced to a very limited degree’ in Nepal (Martin Chautari 2013:4), as only six adults opted for the Government ‘rehabilitation package,’ and only Verified Minors and Late
Recruits (VMLRs)4 were eligible for the UN-led DDR, the United Nations Interagency
Rehabilitation Programme (UNIRP), which lasted from 2010-2012.
The VMLRs were not discharged from cantonment until 2010, sometimes in violation of their human rights, (UNSC S/2008/5, UNSC S/2009/1, UNSC S/2010/183).
Bleie et al (2012:39) stress that “From the beginning, the former Maoist guerilla movement disowned the DDR and the international DDR Standards. The UN became increasingly
4 Those who were under the age of 18 at the date of the CPA and those recruited after this date (Bleie et al 2012:4)
33 isolated and criticized as the only unambiguous protagonist for the fragile peace process.”5
As one SSR official (INT9) explained, different DDR/SSR phases were simply relabeled.
Cantonment became ‘supervision’, and ex-combatants either went for ‘integration’ into the
Nepali Army or for ‘rehabilitation’ into society. This ‘rehabilitation’ program, called the
UNIRP, was only open to 4,008 VMLRs. After tracing conducted by UNICEF Nepal through its CAFAAG network, the caseload of VMLRs decreased to 3,040 VMLRs, as many (male) ex-combatants had gone to India, Malaysia, and the Middle East for employment or had found employment in Nepal. Ultimately, only 2,231 VMLRs enrolled in the UNIRP (UNIRP 2012b:15, Transition International 2013:71). The UNIRP was thus considerably smaller than the LDDRR.
UNMIN conducted two verification rounds in March and June 2007, 31,318 and
19,602 (15,756 men and 3,846 women) combatants respectively (Pathak et al 2010:8,
UNDP 2008:3). Only the latter group were accepted as combatants. Tone Bleie et al (2012) argue that the initially inflated number was the result of PLA expansion between late 2005 and May 2006. However, I am not convinced that the second verification round covered all combatants. Human Rights Watch estimated a total of 3,500-4,500 child combatants (in
Lawoti et al 2009:15), whereas Transition International (2013:3) estimated a total of
10,000 child combatants. Both figures are considerably more than the 2,973 child soldiers verified by the UN. This questions to what extent the number verified by the UN in the second round is accurate, or if many were missed and consequently missed out on benefits.
As in other contexts child and female ex-combatants were more likely to be excluded from
DDR (see above), this requires further assessment. Strikingly, this is not questioned by academic literature on the Nepali verification process (cf. Bleie et al 2012, Martin 2010,
Subedi 2014).
5 Chapter 6 engages with the implications of this for the empowerment of female ex-combatants
34 The conflict saw a large diversity of participants. According to Hisila Yami
(2006:59), known during the conflicts as Maoist comrade Parvati, roughly half the Maoist forces were Tibeto-Burman, Brahmin, Chettri, and Newar made up 38.3%, Dalit 7.3% and
Madhesi 0.35%. The Maoists famously claimed 40% female presence in its ranks
(Manchanda 2004), UNMIN only verified 3,846 female ex-combatants, or 19.6% of the
Maoist forces. Maria Villellas Ariño (2008:8) agrees with the latter, stating that this lower proportion reveals “how this issue had been used by the armed groups in order to legitimize itself.” However, as argued above, the amount of ex-combatants verified by
UNMIN is debatable. Villellas Ariño’s argument is supported by the lower percentage of women among the total dead during the conflict (16.8%, Thapa 2016:104); however, the government police and army forces predominantly killed and disappeared men and recruitment of female combatants increased throughout the conflict. Michael Hutt
(2004:154) argued that towards the end of the conflict, female participation in the PLA in
Rolpa was 50%. Another reason why the number of female ex-combatants recorded by
UNMIN is likely inaccurate is, as my interviews confirmed, that many female ex- combatants left for the PLA’s political wing or its Young Communist League (YCL)
(Robins et al 2016:35, Adhikari 2016ab:117, International Crisis Group 2011:20). Other female ex-combatants who were ‘wholetimers’ of the party as ‘political, medical, cultural or administrative workers’ were also not considered for verification, even though they spent years with the PLA (Bhattarai 2016:129). This is also contrary to the IDDRS (2006), which pushes for the inclusion of ‘supporters’ during reintegration. Besides exclusion of those transferred to the political sides of the party or those engaged as supports of the PLA, other female ex-combatants were also missed during verification as Bleie et al (2012) found. The verification conducted by UNMIN thus underrepresents the number of female combatants involved in the conflict.
35 Chapter 1: Feminist Critiques of DDR
The Introduction laid out the research puzzle, highlighting that female combatants such as
Shanti frequently experience ‘empowerment’ during conflict, but that this empowerment is often ‘lost’ post-conflict. To understand this apparent paradox, I propose to analyze UN- led DDR, especially the reintegration aspect, as a practice that directly engages with female ex-combatants. Reintegration of female ex-combatants can and has occurred outside of United Nations-led Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration programs
(UN-led DDR), including female ex-combatants’ self-reintegration (cf. Specht 2006:13f,
Farr 2003:32, MacKenzie 2010:158) or other smaller DDR programs run by GiZ 6 or
USAID7 (MacKenzie 2012:71, Pugel 2009:74, Robins et al 2016:56). I focus on UN-led
DDR because DDR is one of the biggest peacebuilding interventions in scope and resources (Munive et al 2012:361), where the reintegration aspect is designed by the UN as
‘social engineering’ of ex-combatants into peaceable civilians (IDDRS 2006 module
1.10:2). The potential benefits of DDR should not be underestimated, as it provides resources, training, support, and counseling to female ex-combatants, which they would otherwise miss out on (cf. Mansaray 2000, Shikola 1998, Farr 2003:34). DDR is thus something which potentially benefits female ex-combatants. Reintegration cannot be entirely disentangled from the disarmament and demobilization (DD) phases, as these shape participation in the reintegration phase. In this chapter, I will cover feminist critiques of the DD phases insofar as they shape the reintegration phase for female ex-combatants.
This chapter maps feminist critiques of DDR. I contend that these feminist critiques can be understood as having three different yet related focal points. The first feminist critique of DDR contends that DDR has frequently excluded female ex-combatants and therefore they have missed out on its potential benefits. The second feminist critique of
6 Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit 7 United States Agency for International Development
36 DDR argues that where female ex-combatants are included in DDR, this has largely failed to support female ex-combatants and, at worst, reproduced gendered inequalities. The third feminist critique of DDR highlights that the concept of reintegration is problematic, as it is marred by a ‘going back’ to female ex-combatants’ ‘oppressive subordinate roles’ in economic, social, and political terms. These feminist critiques of DDR recognize its
‘transformatory potential’, making it a practice worthwhile engaging with from a feminist perspective.
The fourth and final section of this chapter considers these three feminist critiques of DDR in relation to different aspects of reintegration: economic, social, and political reintegration. This last section utilizes these three different aspects of reintegration to illustrate how the three feminist critiques of DDR (i.e. exclusion, inclusion, problematic concept) are related in practice. Economic and social reintegration are currently part of
UN-led DDR, whereas political reintegration remains restricted to academic literature. In applying the three feminist critiques of DDR, the last section also begins to draw out how economic, social, and political reintegration might be reimagined from a feminist perspective to realize the ‘transformatory potential’ of DDR.
This thesis will draw and build on this literature in various ways. Firstly, it will analyze to what extent female ex-combatants in Liberia and Nepal have been excluded from UN-led DDR (Chapter 5). Secondly, it will analyze to what extent inclusion in UN- led DDR has reproduced gendered inequalities for female ex-combatants (Chapter 5).
Thirdly, this thesis further investigates that concept of reintegration and underlying assumptions pertaining to it in the context of UN-led DDR in Liberia and Nepal (Chapter
6). Building on this literature, this thesis aims to demonstrate that UN-led DDR has excluded female ex-combatants, reproduced gendered inequalities where included, and relied on a problematic conceptualization of reintegration because of the gendered
37 narratives and multiple local-international interactions producing hybridities in UN-led
DDR in Liberia and Nepal, with the effect of undermining female ex-combatants’ empowerment.
Feminist Critique 1: Female Ex-Combatants Are Excluded From DDR
The first feminist critique of DDR is that DDR has excluded female ex-combatants. This exclusion is well-documented in literature on female ex-combatants and DDR (cf. De
Watteville 2002, Farr 2000, 2002, 2003, 2007, Kingma 1997, 2002, Mazurana& McKay
2003, McKay& Mazurana 2004, Nilsson 2005). This section illustrates that feminist literature on DDR has identified various reasons why female ex-combatants are excluded from DDR, including a lack of female participation in peace negotiations, reconstruction or desecuritization of female ex-combatants as ‘dependents’ or ‘bush wives’, and because female ex-combatants exclude themselves, often because conditions in DDR are inadequate. My case study chapters draw and build on this first feminist critique of DDR by analyzing the extent to which female ex-combatants in Liberia and Nepal were excluded or self-excluded from UN-led DDR, how this undermined their empowerment, and whether there are further reasons for female ex-combatants’ exclusion from UN-led
DDR.
Women have participated in conflicts throughout history, including the warrior queen Boudicca, who famously led an uprising against the Romans; the standing female regiment of the Dahomey Kingdom of West Africa; the US Civil War; and twentieth- century leftist, communist, and independence movements and conflicts in Nepal, Liberia
Guatemala, Nicaragua, Colombia, Peru, South Africa, Sudan, Eritrea, Northern Ireland,
Russia, China, Vietnam, Kurdistan, and Sri Lanka (Alison 2009, Beginkhani et al 2018:17,
Bouatta 1994, Boutron& Gómez 2017, Cockburn 2010b:106f, Ehrenreich 1997:126,
Goldstein 2001, Karamé& Tryggestad 2000:20, Mazurana et al 2013, Meintjes 2002,
38 Molyneux 1985, Porter 2007, Sjoberg 2010:58, Turpin 1998:10, Cook 1994, Waugh et al
1999, Hillstrom et al 2000, K.C. Luna et al 2018). Female combatants have been present in conflicts throughout the world. It is therefore surprising that female ex-combatants have largely been excluded from DDR programs since their introduction in the 1990s where the vast majority of participants have been male ex-combatants.
One reason for female ex-combatants’ exclusion from DDR put forward by feminist literature is because of women’s absence in peace processes. Shekhawat and
Pathak (2015:58) argue that female ex-combatants’ exclusion “happens because of women’s absence in participation on peace processes and DDR initiatives and its assessment, formulation, implementation, and evaluation.” Feminists do not necessarily agree that the absence of women at the peace table fully explains the exclusion of female ex-combatants from DDR, as not al women may want to represent ‘women’s interests’
(Porter 2007:31), nor do women, including female ex-combatants, necessarily share the same interests (cf. Shepherd 2010b:152). Moreover, several DDR programs have had mandates to include female ex-combatants, including those in Liberia and Nepal. These mandates have been negotiated without the participation of female ex-combatants in the peace processes. Notwithstanding any feminist concerns with these UN-led DDR programs in Liberia and Nepal (cf. Chapter 5 and 6), this suggests that we may need to look further to make sense of female ex-combatants’ exclusion from DDR.
A different argument is that female ex-combatants are either not considered participants in armed conflict or not considered a security threat. Mazurana and Cole
(2013:205) argue
“Gendered assumptions of DDR officials – both about who is a fighter and what those (presumed male) fighters need in a DDR program – can also work strongly against women and girls. If DDR officials believe that women and girls do not participate in fighting forces and groups, they simply turn them away from disarmament and demobilization efforts.”
39 Female ex-combatants are reconstructed as ‘supporters’ or ‘dependents’ of armed groups
(Puechguirbal 2010b:165, Mazurana& Carlson 2004:4) and not seen as security threats
(Puechguirbal 2010b:164f, Nilsson 2005:72f, Colletta et al 2004:177, Barth 2002:7).
Female ex-combatants have also been labeled ‘camp followers’ (Henshaw 2016ab), which
Enloe (1999:37) considers devaluing to women, arguing that “to ‘follow’ is not to be a part of, but to be dependent on, to tag along.” Feminist perspectives on female ex-combatants and DDR have highlighted that female ex-combatants are reconstructed through narratives in UN-led DDR in a way that limits recognition of female ex-combatants’ agency in participating in conflict.
Feminist Security Studies scholar MacKenzie further explained this through the concept of ‘desecuritization’ (Hansen 2012:544), where female ex-combatants in Sierra
Leone were excluded from UN-led DDR through their (re)construction as ‘victims’ of conflict (MacKenzie 2012:86) and their (re)construction as ‘camp followers’ (MacKenzie
2009, 2010:153). MacKenzie thus ties together the two arguments explaining female ex- combatants’ exclusion from UN-led DDR, i.e. female ex-combatants as victims and female ex-combatants as non-security threat. That is, female ex-combatants are not considered a security threat because they are considered victims of conflict through terms such as ‘bush wife,’ ‘sex slave’ or ‘dependent’ (MacKenzie 2012:46). MacKenzie argues throughout these works that dichotomous male-‘real combatant’-security threat vs. female- dependent/victim-non-security threat in UN-led DDR narratives produced such exclusions of female ex-combatants in DDR. As such, narratives pertaining to female ex-combatants determine their exclusion or inclusion in DDR.
Not only are female ex-combatants excluded from DDR by the program itself or
DDR officials working on these programs, female ex-combatants also exclude themselves.
MacKenzie (2010:158) found this to be the case in Sierra Leone. Farr (2003:32) elaborates
40 that “If women do not feel safe or welcome in a DDR process, they are likely to ‘self- demobilize’– in other words, to disappear from view without taking advantage of any of the opportunities of demobilization, such as job re-training, [and] healthcare.” Specht
(2006:13f) offers a specific example of female ex-combatants’ exclusion from DDR among girl ex-combatants aged 15-24 in Liberia. Specht stresses that girl ex-combatants were sometimes excluded by commanders, felt unable to participate because of ‘poor logistics and timeframe’ or ‘obligations to children or family,’ or chose not to participate because of a lack of trust in the ceasefire, fear of repercussions, ‘unwillingness to be confronted with their past as combatants’ or to be in camp, were reluctant to return home or wished ‘to remain with their commanders (from which they had to separate in the DD process).’ This suggests that female ex-combatants are not simply excluded, but also demonstrate agency in excluding themselves. This exclusion however means that these female ex-combatants are potentially unable to benefit economically, socially, politically, and health-wise from UN-led DDR. Exclusion from UN-led DDR (whether by the respective DDR or female ex-combatants’ own exclusion) may thus be a contributing factor to this ‘loss of empowerment’ female ex-combatants experience. The extent to which this is the case for female ex-combatants in Liberia and Nepal will be explored in detail in Chapter 5.
The first feminist critique of DDR has therefore stressed that female ex-combatants are excluded from DDR. Potential reasons for this are the reconstruction of female ex- combatants as ‘dependents’ or ‘bush wives’, which strips female ex-combatants of their agency and thereby constructs them as less deserving or needing of DDR support than ‘real combatants’, i.e. men with guns. Female ex-combatants however also exclude themselves, especially where they see DDR or aspects thereof as inadequate to their immediate needs.
The case study chapters elaborate on the extent to which female ex-combatants in Liberia
41 and Nepal were excluded or self-excluded from DDR, the extent to which this undermined female ex-combatants’ empowerment, and explores reasons why female ex-combatants were excluded or self-excluded from UN-led DDR.
Feminist Critique 2: Inclusion in DDR Reproduces Gendered Inequalities
A second feminist critique of DDR contends that even where female ex-combatants are included in DDR programs, this inclusion often fails to support female ex-combatants and their empowerment, and even reproduces gendered inequalities. As this section elaborates, there are various reasons for this according the feminist literature on DDR, including female ex-combatants abandoning the DDR program, insufficient gender mainstreaming, or because DDR is designed for male and not female ex-combatants. This thesis builds on this second feminist critique of DDR by investigating the extent to which female ex- combatants’ inclusion in UN-led DDR in Liberia and Nepal has undermined or supported female ex-combatants’ empowerment and reproduced gendered inequalities, as well as what the reasons for this might be.
Research on female ex-combatants’ inclusion in DDR has highlighted that this does not equate to retention of ‘empowerment’. Mazurana et al (2013:206) argues that female ex-combatants who participate in the DD phases still abandon the programs because DD sites “lack health care (particularly reproductive) and supplies for females, and provides no protection from sexual violence, exploitation, and harassment from other fighters gathered there.” Mazurana and Carlson (2004:26) further explain that in Sierra Leone, exclusion of female ex-combatants from DDR had “potentially negative consequences for the country’s recovery and the region’s security.” Female ex-combatants have for example participated in violent riots ‘as a means of accessing basic goods for the survival of their children’
(ibid.). The few female ex-combatants in Sierra Leone who participated in DDR were actively discriminated against; for instance, they were discouraged from pursuing
42 education, while male ex-combatants were not (ibid.:22). Therefore, UN-led DDR in Sierra
Leone has reproduced gendered inequalities and was detrimental to peacebuilding.
Helen Basini (2013ab, 2016) researched UN-led DDR and its relation to female ex- combatants in Liberia from a feminist social constructivist perspective. Specifically, her research engages with the question of ‘to what extent was the DDRR program in Liberia gender-mainstreamed?’ (Basini 2016:167). Basini (2013b:iii) argues that gender mainstreaming8 was practically absent from the reintegration phase of the LDDRR, and that “women were treated largely the same as men with a program that focused solely on economic reintegration. Issues of enhancing gender equality were sidelined.” Wamai’s
(2011:55) explanation is useful here: “the UNFPA9 took leadership for the DD phase by forming a network of gender advisors from other institutions but the same network was non-existent during the reintegration phase, consequently losing on earlier gains made.”
Basini further argues that female ex-combatants experienced empowerment through learning new skills in the LDDRR (2013a:550), although this has not largely led to employment for these female ex-combatants. Basini thus argues that the DDR program in
Liberia was insufficiently gender mainstreamed and that the DDR program was therefore inadequate to female ex-combatants’ needs and even reproduced gendered inequalities to the detriment of female ex-combatants. The potential of gender mainstreaming to challenge gendered inequalities however remains debated in feminist literature (Whitworth 2004:124,
Barnes 2006, Rehn& Johnson-Sirleaf 2002:5, Subrahmanian 2007:113, Parpart 2014ab,
Rees 1998, True& Mintrom 2001:33, Walby 2005, Mukhopdyay 2007:140, Snodgrass
2010:117). This raises the question whether ‘sufficient’ gender mainstreaming in the
8 Gender mainstreaming is understood as “the process of assessing the implications for women and men of any planned action” (UN Women 2019). 9 United Nations Population Fund
43 LDDRR would have better supported female ex-combatants and challenged gendered inequalities; a question this thesis will later return to.
Kathleen Jennings’ (2007, 2008ab, 2009) sustained work on female ex-combatants and UN-led DDR in Liberia is an example of critical feminist peacebuilding research on female ex-combatants, a perspective I also take and outline in Chapter 2. Jennings investigated underlying gendered assumptions of the LDDRR in Liberia and their implications for female ex-combatants’ reintegration. Specifically, Jennings (2009:475) argues, “the Liberian DDR was devised and justified according to assumptions that are default male, thus causing the program to overlook women except as passive victims of conflict, or as add-ons secondary to the ‘real’ purpose of reintegration [i.e. male ex- combatants’ reintegration].” This is a consequence of the ‘securitization’ of reintegration, where male ex-combatants are constructed as perpetrators of violence, as ‘women are recognized first and foremost as receivers of violence, especially sexual violence’
(Jennings 2009:484). This follows MacKenzie’s work on securitization in UN-led DDR in
Sierra Leone, although Jennings goes further by arguing that “Gendering the DDR programs ‘default male’ is problematic not just in the potential denial to women ex- combatants of the benefits received by men, but also in the signaling effects concerning the
‘proper’ perception and acceptable (inequitable) treatment of women ex-combatants”
(Jennings 2009:489. Cf. UN Women 2015:178f). This suggests that it is worthwhile considering the underlying assumptions and narratives of male ex-combatants as the ‘real’ beneficiaries of UN-led DDR while female ex-combatants are ‘add-ons’, how these assumptions shape DDR implementation and implications for female ex-combatants’ empowerment.
A second feminist critique of DDR thus stresses that female ex-combatants’ inclusion in DDR often fails to support female ex-combatants and potentially even
44 reproduces gendered inequalities. Within this critique, feminist literature on DDR has provided various explanations for why inclusion in DDR has reproduced gendered inequalities for female ex-combatants, such as female ex-combatants dropping out of DDR due to the program being inadequate to their needs, insufficient gender mainstreaming in
DDR, and designing the DDR program ‘default male’ without due consideration for the needs and opportunities for female ex-combatants in DDR. The case study chapters elaborate on this research by analyzing the extent to which female ex-combatants’ inclusion in UN-led DDR in Liberia and Nepal undermined their empowerment and reproduced gendered inequalities, as well as how this comes about.
Feminist Critique 3: The Concept of Reintegration is Problematic
A third feminist critique of DDR emphasizes that the concept of reintegration is problematic and therefore unlikely to support female ex-combatants and their empowerment. Specifically, feminist critiques of the concept of reintegration question the spatiality and temporality of reintegration, highlighting that female ex-combatants may reintegrate into contexts of which they previously were not part (e.g. political roles, resettlement in urban environments), or that the contexts into which female ex-combatants reintegrate may have profoundly changed during conflict. Additionally, some feminists critique the concept of reintegration for its gendered and imperialist implications.
Nevertheless, other feminists recognize the ‘transformatory potential’ of DDR, especially reintegration, thereby making it a concept and practice worthwhile scrutinizing and reimagining from a feminist perspective. This section contends that while DDR practices have been imperialist, DDR nonetheless has ‘transformatory potential’ if reimagined through feminist lenses. My research builds on this feminist critique of DDR by analyzing to what extent the concept of reintegration and related assumptions undermine female ex-
45 combatants’ empowerment to reimagine DDR from a feminist perspective and to realize its
‘transformatory potential’.
One feminist critique of reintegration highlights that the concept of reintegration reproduces gendered inequalities and has implications particularly for female ex- combatants. As Dahal argues, reintegration “suggests a return to the same conditions as before the war” (Dahal 2015:185. Cf. Stankovic et al 2010:1ff, Greenberg et al 2009:1,
UN-INSTRAW 2009:11f, Keen 2000:40, Puechguirbal 2010b:170). This is paradoxical, as these conditions led to conflict in the first place. Moreover, this ‘going back’ as
MacKenzie (2012:8) calls it, is problematic for female ex-combatants as ‘this order was very often discriminatory against women,’ (Puechguirbal 2010b:170). The result is a
‘political and social backlash against women (Pankhurst 2010:149), and a ‘process of remasculinization’ (Franke 2006:813ff, Kfir 2012:111), which “is not necessarily what women seek” (Chinkin 2004:32). Rita Manchanda (2010:10) further questions the appeal of reintegration for female ex-combatants, asking, “what do [female ex-combatants] go back to- to resume the oppressive subordinate roles of women?” Chapter 2 discusses why female ex-combatants’ going back to ‘oppressive subordinate roles’ is problematic from a critical feminist peacebuilding perspective and case study Chapters 5 and 6 elaborate on how female ex-combatants narrate such ‘going back’ to ‘oppressive subordinate roles’.
Furthermore, the term reintegration suggests that female ex-combatants were previously integrated, or part of certain economic, social, and political spaces before conflict. In Nepal, women played a limited political role before the conflict (cf. Yadav
2016:80ff). To speak of political reintegration is a misnomer, and it may be more appropriate to speak of political integration. In short, female ex-combatants may not have occupied certain spaces before conflict, which may differ among female ex-combatants and in different contexts. My research also considers this integration of female ex-
46 combatants into new spaces and contexts. Feminist research on DDR has therefore highlighted the importance of spatiality in DDR.
Related to this is the issue of changing contexts and spaces. As Jennings (2007:213) and McMullin (2013b) have argued, it is important to ask: ‘Reintegrate into what?’.
Conflicts often have drastic impacts on infrastructure, economies, and demographics as people are displaced, injured or killed. This was the case to different extents in Liberia and
Nepal (cf. Introduction). This can however be a localized process, i.e. conflict may have a much larger impact in areas were battles are fought, while other areas are less affected. For example, the People’s War was led by people from the hills in Nepal and reached the Terai
(the lowland region of southern Nepal) only much later in the conflict. Specific areas may also be affected in different ways. For example, in Kathmandu the infrastructure was hardly affected, but many displaced and later ex-combatants resettled here (Robins et al
2016:23). In Liberia, “many more DDR participants preferred resettlement in Montserrado
County (which includes Monrovia) than elsewhere” (Jennings 2008b:329). This is true for female ex-combatants who may have little interest in “returning to traditional communities in which patriarchal systems are entrenched” and therefore frequently choose to resettle in urban environments, where gender norms tend to be more lax (De Watteville 2002:14). Ex- combatants thus may not want to reintegrate into their communities of origin and the place of female ex-combatants’ reintegration has implications for female ex-combatants and UN- led DDR.
Beyond the changing context of female ex-combatants’ place of reintegration, feminists have also problematized the temporality of reintegration, such as its uncertain starting point. Shepherd (2010:156) for instance contends that reintegration is premised on the assumption that a given context is ‘post-conflict.’ However, Shepherd continues, a peace agreement may have been signed, but this does not mean that hostilities and
47 animosities have ceased. Reintegration may thus not be feasible in areas of a country where hostilities persist. At other times, female ex-combatants leave or escape armed groups before conflict ends, as was frequently the case in Liberia (Specht 2006:1ff).
Reintegration for these female ex-combatants therefore begins before conflict has ended.
However, official DDR programs are not run until a peace agreement has been signed. An exception to this is the government-run ‘rehabilitation’ program in Colombia, which has been in place since 2003 (Torres et al 2009), while the latest peace agreement between the government and FARC 10 was signed in 2017. My research follows the notion of reintegration as a process with an open timeframe, recognizing that the duration of reintegration may be dependent upon the context and individual circumstances of reintegrated/reintegrating ex-combatants. Therefore, it does not make sense to talk of reintegration as having ‘succeeded’ or ‘failed’ (cf. Levely 2014:142, MacKenzie 2012:46,
Abdela 2011:69, UNDP 2005:18). What can be said is whether UN-led DDR and reintegration more broadly has thus far supported female ex-combatants’ empowerment in economic, social, and political terms.
DDR has been critiqued for having a ‘Western bias’ or even being ‘imperialist’ (Ní
Aoláin et al 2011:143). The western bias is visible in numerous DDR programs. In Sierra
Leone, unlike the government, international organizations such as the UN had ‘funding, networks, and influence’. This enabled the UN to ‘selectively securitize issues and determine their priority’ (MacKenzie 2012:61). Funding for peacebuilding is usually provided by western governments.11 McMullin (2013a:390) critiques reintegration as part of UN-led DDR for its colonial overtones, stressing “DDR programs limit the boundaries of approved and unapproved activity, define ideal and deviant behavior, and proscribe
10 Fuerzas Armandos Revolucionarias de Colombia 11 Some of the biggest funders include the European Union, the USA, Germany, the UK, Norway, Sweden, and the Netherlands, for example totalling 2.4 billion USD out of a total of 3.2 billion USD spent globally on conflict prevention and resolution in 2014 (Development Initiatives 2016).
48 acceptable expectations and ‘realistic’ aspirations for ex-combatants.” As McMullin
(ibid.:406) continues, ex-combatants in UN-led DDR are frequently characterizes as criminals, posing a threat to blameless and victimized communities. McMullin argues that such characterizations shape how DDR is conducted. Chapter 6 elaborates on this by illustrating how gendered narratives in UN-led DDR have shaped reintegration support in
Liberal and Nepal and largely undermined female ex-combatants’ empowerment. UN-led
DDR, particularly reintegration, may therefore have profound implications for the lives of female ex-combatants.
Although DDR can be understood as imperialist, this does not mean that future
DDR programs also must be imperialist. Ní Aoláin et al (2011:143) argue that “the post conflict moment is, nonetheless, an opportunity to improve women’s lives,” and DDR has
‘transformatory potential’. DDR can provide an opportunity to identify and address physical and psychological health needs, provide economic, social, and political reintegration support, and contribute to peace (Marwah et al 2010:13, Berdal 1996,
Colletta et al 1996, UNDPKO 1999, UNSC 2000, Kingma 2002, World Bank 2002b,
Knight& Özerdem 2004). As Kabeer (1994:305) writes, policies and programs can have
‘transformatory potential’ depending on “the way in which [gendered] needs are identified, prioritized, and satisfied” (cf. Young 1987, 1988, 1993:156). Scrutinizing and reimagining
DDR through feminist lenses such as the critical feminist peacebuilding perspective taken in this thesis (detailed in Chapter 2) can contribute to DDR’s ‘transformatory potential’ by turning it into a process that challenges unequal gendered power relations. As this research is committed to the ‘transformatory potential’ of DDR for female ex-combatants and their empowerment, this thesis analyzes how UN-led DDR reintegrates female ex-combatants, including their behavior, and implications for their empowerment.
49 The third feminist critique of DDR discussed in this chapter has stressed that the concept of reintegration is problematic and is unlikely to support female ex-combatants’ empowerment. Feminist critiques of the concept of reintegration have drawn attention to temporality, spatiality, and gender in relation to reintegration. Specifically, these feminist critiques contend that reintegration assumes a ‘going back’, thereby reproducing gendered inequalities by returning female ex-combatants to their ‘oppressive subordinate roles’.
Furthermore, feminist critiques have underscored that female ex-combatants may integrate into new contexts or contexts that have changed throughout conflict, making the term reintegration a misnomer. Lastly, feminist critiques have emphasized the ‘imperialist’ nature of internationally-led reintegration programs. At the same time, feminist critiques also recognize the ‘transformatory potential’ of reintegration. The remainder of this thesis draws on these feminist critiques of the concept of reintegration by investigating the extent to which the concept of reintegration and related assumptions undermine female ex- combatants’ empowerment. The following section elaborates on the three feminist critiques thus far discussed in this chapter and relates these critiques to different aspects of reintegration: economic, social, and political reintegration.
Economic, Social, and Political Reintegration
This last section elaborates how these three feminist critiques of DDR apply to different aspects of reintegration, including economic, social, and political reintegration. This allows for an in-depth discussion of these different aspects of reintegration and serves to exemplify how the three feminist critiques of DDR discussed are related. These different aspects of economic, social, and political reintegration have been put forward by critical and feminist literatures on DDR. There are some overlaps with UN approaches to reintegration, as these are (at least rhetorically) committed to providing economic and social reintegration (cf. IDDRS 2006, module 4.30). Political reintegration remains absent
50 from UN approaches to reintegration due to gendered constructions of ex-combatants in
UN-led DDR, as this section highlights and Chapter 6 elaborates. I contend that from a feminist perspective, economic, social, and particularly political reintegration are in theory beneficial to female ex-combatants, their empowerment, and the broader peacebuilding process. However, in practice these aspects of reintegration have frequently reproduced gendered inequalities to the detriment of female ex-combatants. This is because reintegration practices are based on gendered assumptions about how female ex- combatants should or should not reintegrate economically, socially, and politically.
Economic Reintegration
The first form of reintegration considered here is economic reintegration. This subsection argues that whilst in theory beneficial for female ex-combatants and their empowerment, the practices and underlying assumptions and narratives of economic reintegration have been problematic for female ex-combatants, raising concerns regarding
UN-led DDR’s ability to support female ex-combatants’ empowerment. Particularly, this subsection contends that female ex-combatants’ economic reintegration is considered
‘supplementary’ to male ex-combatants’, thereby reproducing gendered inequalities.
There are various reasons why economic reintegration is beneficial to female ex- combatants and the broader peacebuilding process. The first is that economic reintegration assists female ex-combatants with employment, for example through learning new employable skills (UN PBSO 2012:40). Such support as part of DDR can prove valuable particularly where these ex-combatants failed to acquire marketable skills during the conflict, for example because they were recruited as children (cf. International Alert
2014:19, Yadav 2016:119, UNDP 2012). Income, or skills for self-subsistence, is, of course, necessary for survival and wellbeing. This may mean that economic reintegration is essential for female ex-combatants’ survival and wellbeing. Furthermore, economic
51 reintegration can be understood as a crucial step in the transition from combatant to civilian, as it involves a resumption of ‘productive responsibilities,’ signaling to others that these ex-combatants have left the conflict behind and are now focused on peace (Özerdem
2012:55f). Moreover, Colletta et al 1996:18) contend that failure to support ex-combatants’ economic reintegration can encourage “rentseeking behavior through the barrel of a gun.”
The extent to which the link between economic reintegration and peace holds is scrutinized below; however, here it can be suggested that economic reintegration is, in theory, beneficial for female ex-combatants. Returning to the first feminist critique of DDR, female ex-combatants’ exclusion from DDR and economic reintegration support may therefore mean missing out on acquiring skills for employment or self-subsistence.
UN-led DDR programs have provided support for female ex-combatants’ economic and social reintegration and there have been elements of support for female ex-combatants’ physical and mental health. This was the case in the LDDRR and UNIRP. In practice, the emphasis has heavily leaned towards economic reintegration support at the expense of support for social reintegration or physical and mental health (Ní Aoláin et al 2011:138,
Özerdem 2012:52, Alden et al 2011, Bowd et al 2013:459. Cf. ILO 2010). Underlying this emphasis on economic reintegration are the assumptions that ex-combatants are threats
(economic reintegration as keeping ex-combatants busy) or greedy (ex-combatants earn income and do not participate in criminal activities). For example, Tamagnini and Krafft
(2010:13f) and Themnér (2015:1) contend that loss of resources acquired through conflict can reignite conflict. Furthermore, there remains a widespread assumption among liberal peacebuilding actors that earning an income solves all other problems, and DDR is no exception (cf. Muggah 2009, Newman et al 2009:19, Lipschutz 1998, Collier 2004, Jeong
2005:124). Particularly, it is assumed that economic reintegration automatically leads to social reintegration, which has long been contested (Muggah 2009, UNDP 2006:17,
52 Leveley 2014, Özerdem 2012). Berdal (1996) was among the first to challenge this assumption, arguing that DDR “should be agreed during the main peace talks; that an integrated, holistic approach to the various demands of DDR is needed; that local capacity and credibility must be built; and that reintegration is linked with the development of the local economy and capacities” (Kilroy 2015:7, citing Berdal).
Despite this early advocacy for a holistic, contextualized approach, DDR programs continue to emphasize economic reintegration. This is further evidenced by Bowd and
Özerdem (2013:454), who stress that “DDR and reintegration programs to date have been evaluated in terms of economic reintegration with output indicators such as levels of employment or enrolment on training courses.” I am critical of equating outputs (e.g. training) with economic reintegration for two reasons. Firstly, enrolment in training gives little indication of the impact on ex-combatants’ employability, or its contribution to an emancipatory peace. Baaré (2004:8) critiques this ‘single objective tunnel vision’, where economic reintegration support (i.e. vocational training) is equated to economic reintegration (i.e. sustainable income and livelihood). The result is that economic reintegration support rarely contributes to sustainable employment, thereby calling into question the ability of DDR to support female ex-combatants’ empowerment.
Another feminist critique of equating training to economic reintegration is that such indicators do not account for the context of economic reintegration. Kilroy (2009:2) for example has pointed out,
“Economic reintegration may be taking place in a war-ravaged economy which has been distorted by the conflict, and in an environment where rule of law is only gradually being established. With few economic opportunities available, interventions such as vocational training to help ex-combatants find an alternative livelihood may still leave many of them unemployed and disillusioned.”
This echoes the ‘reintegrate into what?’ question (and third feminist critique of DDR) raised by Jennings (2007:213) and McMullin (2013b) respectively (see above),
53 highlighting the need to consider the context of female ex-combatants’ economic reintegration. However, as discussed, conflict does not have the same impact across a country and opportunities for economic reintegration may therefore differ throughout a country. Furthermore, economic opportunities are rarely equal before conflict. In Nepal in particular, there was considerable income inequality between Kathmandu valley and rural areas, especially the Far-Western Development region. 12 Thus, critiques of economic reintegration in DDR highlight the importance of the context of reintegration.
Additionally, economic reintegration support in UN-led DDR is often highly gendered; that is, where female ex-combatants are included in DDR they are often restricted to “supplementary income-generating activities, including soap-making, tie- dying, sewing, and other ‘feminized’ roles” (Hills et al 2017:461). Hills et al further emphasize that compared to those of male ex-combatants, “the skills targeted to women are often low paying or unpaid and less stable and valued,” thereby reproducing gendered inequalities. There is now increased recognition among DDR officials that “skills should be culturally appropriate as far as possible, although efforts should be made not to restrict women to low-paid ‘traditional’ female work” (IDDRS 2006, module 5.10:14). This points to tensions between culture and female ex-combatants’ economic reintegration. This can also be seen in the DDR frameworks of the International Labor Organization (ILO,
2010:75), which states, “Many women and girls may have acquired skills incompatible with traditional ideas of appropriate work for women and girls.” Rather than emphasize the potential value of such skills for female ex-combatants’ economic reintegration, the ILO guidelines appear to imply that such non-traditional skills are problematic, as “female ex- combatants often have difficulty in achieving economic success and long-term economic
12 The Far-Western Development Region no longer carries the same name. It was changed to Province No. 7 with the 2015 constitution (Government of Nepal 2015), although the territory is the same
54 reintegration.” Rather than challenging gendered inequalities, such approaches to economic reintegration reinforce culturally defined ‘traditional’ gender roles with regards to the kind of economic roles women can perform. This reflects the second feminist critique of DDR, namely that inclusion fails to support female ex-combatants’ economic reintegration and even reproduces gendered economic inequalities.
Emphasizing female ex-combatants’ economic reintegration as ‘supplementary’ raises three further concerns. The first is that it is based on assumptions around the nuclear family. Moser argued in 1993 regarding development that “the failure to recognize that low-income households are not homogenous in terms of family structure is still widespread.” Moser (1993:16f) emphasizes that particularly female-headed households remain invisible in development planning contexts. This may especially be the case in post-conflict contexts, where households may change drastically. People die, marry, bear or adopt children, migrate or are displaced during conflict. Maclay et al (2010:347) emphasize that ‘family is one of the greatest casualties of war.’ Applying the ‘reintegrate into what’ question posed by Jennings and McMullin (above) to social reintegration into families therefore suggests that families may change over time and may no longer exist.
Relating the third feminist critique of DDR to economic reintegration support therefore draws into question the possibility of reintegration into nuclear families, which are frequently not a reality for households in and outside of conflict. In drawing attention to gender, as well as temporality and spatiality in reintegration, feminist critiques of economic reintegration support have therefore highlighted that such approaches are frequently based around ideas of the nuclear family, which may not reflect post-conflict households.
The second concern is that such approaches to female ex-combatants’ economic reintegration as ‘supplementary’ ignore the labor female ex-combatants already perform.
55 Female ex-combatants are frequently responsible for reproductive labor (e.g. cooking, cleaning, caring, child-rearing) as with women more broadly (Kardam 1994:143ff).
Adding productive labor (e.g. paid employment, running a business) without addressing reproductive labor often creates a ‘double burden’ of productive and reproductive labor
(see Chapter 2 for a detailed discussion of the ‘double burden’). Seeing female ex- combatants’ income as ‘supplementary’ with reproductive labor as their primary role, may at once produce this ‘double burden’ while at the same time this relatively small income is likely insufficient to support female ex-combatants’ and her household. Economic reintegration support therefore reproduces gendered inequalities if female ex-combatants’ income is constructed as ‘supplementary’ to male ex-combatants’.
The third concern is that seeing female ex-combatants’ economic reintegration as
‘supplementary’ negates the fact that female ex-combatants, like male ex-combatants, are frequently economically motivated to join conflict (True 2017:139). Reproducing economic inequalities may therefore reignite conflict, as it reproduces the same conditions that motivated female ex-combatants to join conflict in the first place. This reflects the third feminist critique of DDR discussed above, calling into question the possibility and desirability of reintegration as ‘going back’ to pre-conflict conditions. Feminist critiques of economic reintegration therefore also highlight that female ex-combatants have agency in joining conflict and may be economically motivated to join, and that constructing their economic reintegration as ‘supplementary’ may contribute to renewed conflict.
In line with these feminist critiques, economic reintegration in this thesis is reconceptualized as a non-linear process, to which UN-led DDR may or may not contribute.
From a feminist perspective, economic reintegration in this thesis is understood not as equating to reintegration, but rather as one aspect of reintegration. Training does also not equate to economic reintegration, as training alone is insufficient in ensuring a stable
56 income for female ex-combatants and their families. For this reason, I refer to skills training in UN-led DDR as economic reintegration support. Furthermore, the approach to economic reintegration taken here is one that challenges rather than reinforces gender inequalities. This entails not restricting female ex-combatants to ‘traditional’ skills and low-paid occupations for women. Such economic reintegration is mindful of a potential double burden of productive and reproductive labor, and seeks to address this double burden without restricting female ex-combatants to either form of labor.
Social Reintegration
Social reintegration is another aspect of reintegration. Social reintegration is defined by Robins et al (2016:14f) as follows: “Social reintegration is the repair of relations between combatants and families potentially transformed by the conflict. It demands that ex-combatants adjust their expectations and potential status, and communities accept that returnees may appear to have been rewarded for their violence.”
Robins et al raise various aspects and issues concerning social reintegration and feminist critiques thereof that I pick up over the following paragraphs.
Social reintegration can mean the reintegration of female ex-combatants into families and communities. Reintegration into families can assist with community reintegration (McKay& Mazurana 2004, Basini 2013b:60), and can provide a support network for addressing psychological problems (Abramowitz 2014:18), thus facilitating rehabilitation. Communities can equally provide such psychological support (Özerdem
2012:64). Psychological rehabilitation in turn can assist economic reintegration by enabling ex-combatants to take on (new) responsibilities and roles (Themnér 2011:167,
Muggah& Baaré 2009:229). Such psychological rehabilitation is necessary, as “Ex- combatants and associated groups with unaddressed trauma and mental health concerns, including anxiety and stress disorders, [post-traumatic stress disorder], drug and alcohol
57 abuse, and exposure to [gender-based violence], are particularly vulnerable to developing anti-social behaviors.” Furthermore, “Psychologically distressed ex-combatants and associated groups require concerted support in the post-conflict period.” (UNDP 2012:10).
While social reintegration can assist female ex-combatants’ psychological rehabilitation, lack of social reintegration may mean psychological problems persist, or further undermine social reintegration through developing anti-social behaviors. While not reintegration, rehabilitation should be seen as something that can contribute to reintegration, and without which reintegration may fail. Social reintegration support can therefore help female ex- combatants with reintegration into families and communities, which in turn can facilitate female ex-combatants’ psychological rehabilitation. Relating this to the first feminist critique of DDR detailed above, exclusion from such social reintegration support can therefore mean missing out on crucial support for reintegration into families and communities, and therewith a support network for psychological rehabilitation.
The first point regarding Robins et al’s approach to social reintegration is that of community resentment towards ex-combatants. It is now well-documented in academic and practitioner literature that reintegration support to ex-combatants can cause resentment in communities (Özerdem 2013:233, Ginifer 2003:46, Patel 2009:248, de Greiff 2006,
UNMIL 2007:7, IDDRS 2006 module 2.20:8). While it may be true that reintegration support to ex-combatants causes resentment, McMullin (2013a:386) complicates this, arguing that such resentment narratives construct “communities as more deserving of aid than, and fundamentally distinct from, ex-combatants.” Such dichotomies between community and combatants do not reflect realities of conflict, as illustrated by Liberia, where ‘everybody fought’ (Jennings 2008c:24), nor are community-members necessarily victims or blameless bystanders of conflict (Mutua 2001:201). Moreover, McMullin
(2013a:413f) argues that the resentment narrative discourages targeted assistance to ex-
58 combatants yet has failed to produce community-based assistance. The outcome is that ex- combatants are supported neither individually nor through community-based assistance in their social reintegration. Successful social reintegration requires careful balancing of assistance to ex-combatants and communities without (re)producing dichotomies. In practice, social reintegration support has frequently offered little to support female ex- combatants’ reintegration and empowerment.
Another aspect of social reintegration is reconciliation. Reconciliation has been practiced to a limited extent in UN-led DDR. Reconciliation is, as with many peacebuilding concepts, contested. While it is sometimes equated with transitional justice
(cf. Betts 2004, Santander 2016:84), a more common approach to reconciliation understands it as peace and absence of harm in relationships among and between members of different communities (Santa-Barbara 2007:174). Underlying much social reintegration and reconciliation support is the assumption that contact with families and communities automatically leads to reconciliation over time, also called the ‘contact hypothesis’ (Allport
1954). Mac Ginty’s (2013a:1) anecdote of Catholic and Protestant secondary school children meeting in 1980s Northern Ireland under a government-sponsored peacebuilding scheme illustrates that contact between disparate communities does not automatically lead to reconciliation and improved relations (cf. Knox 2010, Steinberg 2013:38).
Reconciliation may thus require concentrated efforts beyond physically bringing together different groups, e.g. ex-combatants and communities.
The second point regarding Robins et al’s conceptualization is that of ex- combatants adjusting their expectations and, potentially, status. This may be particularly problematic for female ex-combatants. Campbell (1990) argues that female combatants often experience more radical change than male counterparts, such as increased gender equality (Hale 1999) or levels of independence comparable to male ex-combatants (Bernal
59 2000) in Eritrea. Ex-combatants generally may face stigma especially ex-combatants “who are members of an armed group that is defeated or continues to be perceived as illegitimate”
(Farr 2002:23). Additionally, female ex-combatants may experience stigma because
“fighting is seen as a male activity” (Robins et al 2016:14f) or for their (perceived) sexual activity within armed groups (consensual and rape), and are consequently ostracized
(MacKenzie 2012: Olonisakin et al 2011). As a result, DDR officials in Sierra Leone attempted to resolve this stigma by female ex-combatants to marry their rapists ‘to avoid disgracing their families and communities’ (MacKenzie 2012:111). Social reintegration here comes at the expense of female ex-combatants’ wellbeing. Aside from this intervention, little to no DDR support is provided for female ex-combatants’ social reintegration (Bowd 2008:58, Mazurana 2004). This was because DDR officials in Sierra
Leone assumed that female ex-combatants would reintegrate naturally back into families or assuming their roles as mothers (MacKenzie 2010:161). In line with the second feminist critique of DDR, social reintegration may thus have particularly negative implications for female ex-combatants, and may reinforce rather than challenge gendered inequalities.
Female ex-combatants may face stigma for having been a combatant and having transgressed gender norms, and be ostracized from families and/or communities. Social reintegration therefore potentially reproduces gendered inequalities by failing to address stigma as DDR officials assume that female ex-combatants reintegrate naturally into families and communities.
A third concern with the approach to social reintegration offered by Robins et al is that families and home communities are not static and may transform during conflict. This is stressed by Hugo De Vries and Nikkie Wiegink, who contend that “The word
‘reintegration’ seems to imply that the environment to which combatants return has not fundamentally changed since they left, as if the war was fought in another dimension” (De
60 Vries& Wiegink 2011:44). While not all communities are equally affected by conflict, changes for example may have occurred through displacement or death of families, or destruction of infrastructure. This raises the question whether social reintegration into families and communities is always possible. Applying the third feminist critique of DDR to social reintegration therefore stresses the need to consider the temporality of social reintegration.
To return to Robins et al, while they raise the issue of communities as potentially changing, female ex-combatants may choose to resettle with new families and communities. Especially in Nepal, when women get married, they move in with their husband’s family and community. Female ex-combatants’ social reintegration here is into families and communities different from their family and community of origin.
Furthermore, ex-combatants may also choose to resettle in new communities, with or without their families. For instance, ex-combatants may resettle together for various reasons, including rejection from families and communities, safety, a sense of comradery, or for economic reintegration (Themnér 2011:3, De Vries et al 2011:39). This is for example the case for female ex-combatants in Northern Uganda, “who resettled close together for emotional, physical, and socioeconomic support for each other” (Ochen
2013:212). Lastly and perhaps most significantly, female ex-combatants frequently choose to resettle in urban environments at higher rates than male ex-combatants, particularly where they are ‘emancipated,’ such as in Uganda and Eritrea (De Watteville 2002:14). It is thus not only the case that communities change, female ex-combatants may reintegrate into different communities altogether. Social reintegration is thus a misnomer, and it is more apt to speak of social integration in these cases.
Based on this, social reintegration in this thesis is considered female ex-combatants’ resettlement into a community of their choosing, whilst potentially repairing relationships
61 with their families and communities of origin, where this is desired, needed, and possible.
Female ex-combatants may experience stigma for having been a combatant and having transgressed gender norms. It is thus important that UN-led DDR addresses such stigma and combats ostracization, for instance through family counseling, sensitization, or community-based reconciliation, where desired by female ex-combatants. Social reintegration here is further understood as something that may cause tensions for female ex-combatants, particularly where they experienced changes in gender roles. From a feminist perspective, social reintegration should not mean a reinforcement of gendered inequalities for female ex-combatants, but an opportunity to realize the ‘transformatory potential’ of DDR.
Political Reintegration
Political reintegration is the third aspect of reintegration considered here. This section first discusses what political reintegration entails before arguing that political reintegration support has the largest potential of the three aspects of reintegration to contribute to an inclusive, positive peace. This subsection further points to the neo-colonial and gendered reasons why political reintegration support has yet to be provided as part of
DDR programs.
Notably, political reintegration has been practiced to a very limited extent in DDR
(Özerdem 2013:231), especially UN-led DDR, and the feminist critiques of DDR reflected here are thus largely theoretical. Political reintegration has increasingly been advocated by critical and feminist scholars (cf. Kingma 2000, Farr 2002, Özerdem 2012, Pauwels 2000,
Alden et al 2011, Berdal et al 2009:6, Pouligny 2004:17f). They advocate for political reintegration because ex-combatants frequently have political motivations, including unaddressed grievances, pushing them to join armed groups (Gomes Porto et al 2007,
Özerdem 2013:231, Subedi 2013b:434). By not providing ex-combatants with peaceful
62 ways to address their grievances (i.e. political reintegration), there remains a potential for ex-combatants to instead resort to arms to address these grievances (Özerdem 2013:231,
Özerdem& Podder 2011, Podder 2012, Jennings 2008abc). As Vanessa Farr (2003:26) summarizes, “political reintegration helps ex-combatants become responsible and peaceable citizens and influential in the decision-making processes of their community.”
More so than economic and social reintegration, political reintegration is aimed at addressing root causes of conflict and thereby contributing to an emancipatory peace. The absence of political reintegration from UN-led DDR or female ex-combatants’ exclusion can therefore be seen as problematic from a feminist perspective.
There remains disagreement regarding the scope of political reintegration. Kingma
(2000:28) for instance considered political reintegration “the process through which the ex- combatant and his or her family become a full part of decision-making processes.” This might entail voting, running for office, or participating in referendums. However, the
Democratic Progress Institute (2012:43) encountered other examples of ex-combatants addressing grievances among former prisoners from Loyalists and Republican paramilitaries in Northern Ireland, who contributed to “community organizations, housing associations, neighborhood regeneration projects, youth diversionary projects, community educations projects and many more types of organization.” In this sense, political reintegration can be understood as becoming a part of civil society, which in turn can contribute to an emancipatory peace. Such broader approaches to political reintegration are potentially more meaningful than participation in high politics (e.g. voting in elections, running for office), particularly in contexts where the democratic process is nascent, corrupt, or non-existent.
There may be different reasons why political reintegration support has been provided to a very limited extent. One reason is the reluctance of international actors to
63 engage in explicit political activity, focusing instead on supposedly ‘apolitical’ economic recovery formulas (Pugh et al 2008:3). The absence of political reintegration support from
UN-led DDR can further be understood through the neo-colonial construction of ex- combatants as ‘dangerous, apolitical, and resented’ (McMullin 2013a:390. Cf. Mutua
2001). This justifies focusing on economic reintegration support instead to distract ‘greedy’ ex-combatants from criminal activity and keep them busy, as discussed above. Another reason may be the lack of acknowledgment of female ex-combatants’ political motivations.
Parashar (2009:251) argues that in post-conflict contexts, “Women are often labeled as inherently peaceful and their violence is explained as the consequence of male victimization and maneuvering. Their agency expropriated, women are portrayed as having neither political ambitions nor nationalist/religious aspirations.” This overlaps with the desecuritization of female ex-combatants and stripping them off their agency, which encouraged their exclusion from UN-led DDR in Sierra Leone (cf. feminist critique 1). In other words, if female ex-combatants are not seen as having political ambitions or motivations, there is no need for political reintegration support to address their supposedly non-existent political grievances and ambitions. The absence of political reintegration support from UN-led DDR can thus be seen as reflecting the third feminist critique of
DDR in that it exhibits the imperialist and gendered implications of the concept of reintegration. Moreover, compared to men, women are frequently restricted from political participation (cf. IPU 2019), or their political activism and voice are not recognized or are ignored (Tripp et al 2009:162, Ní Aoláin 2016:152f). The lack of political reintegration support therefore also reflects the second feminist critique of DDR in that it potentially reproduces gendered inequalities.
Overall, political reintegration is a significant aspect of reintegration from a feminist perspective with potential to contribute to an inclusive, positive peace in post-
64 conflict contexts. My approach to political (re)integration recognizes that female ex- combatants may have had limited or no access to political participation prior to the conflicts, and that this may have contributed to their conflict participation. To challenge gendered inequalities, it is important from a feminist perspective that female ex- combatants have equal access to political participation as male ex-combatants, to provide an opportunity to have their diversity of voices hear. My approach to political
(re)integration functions at different levels, including high politics and civil society.
This last section utilized economic, social, and political reintegration as aspects of reintegration to exemplify the three feminist critiques of DDR discussed above. This section contended that economic reintegration should theoretically support female ex- combatants and their empowerment. However, in practice, economic reintegration has reproduced gendered inequalities for female ex-combatants by reconstructing their economic reintegration as ‘supplementary’ to male ex-combatants’. Social reintegration has been critiqued from a feminist perspective for similar concerns; firstly, social reintegration has been practiced to a limited extent, particularly for female ex-combatants, as it is assumed that they reintegrate naturally. Secondly, social reintegration support has failed to take into consideration that female ex-combatants’ circumstances may change even more dramatically than male ex-combatants’ and that they are likely to reintegrate into changed or new social environments. As with economic reintegration, social reintegration has reproduced gendered inequalities for female ex-combatants by failing to address potential stigma and expecting female ex-combatants to assume their ‘natural’ (and only) role as mothers. Political reintegration has not been conducted as part of UN-led
DDR; however, this section has contended that it has the largest potential to support female ex-combatants and their empowerment, as well as contribute to an inclusive peace.
Therefore, these three aspects of economic, social, and political reintegration in theory are
65 beneficial for female ex-combatants and their empowerment, but practically have frequently reproduced gendered inequalities to the detriment of female ex-combatants’ empowerment. This is because of underlying gendered assumptions held in DDR of how female ex-combatants should or should not reintegrate.
Conclusions
The purpose of this chapter was to map feminist critiques of DDR to draw and build on these for the remainder of this thesis. This thesis will tie these three feminist critiques together, arguing that because of the gendered narratives and multiple local-international interactions producing hybridities in UN-led DDR, UN-led DDR has relied on a gendered conceptualization of reintegration, which has excluded female ex-combatants and reproduced gendered inequalities.
This chapter contended that feminist critiques of DDR have three related focal points. The first feminist critique of DDR has argued that female ex-combatants have frequently been excluded from DDR, thereby missing out on potential benefits. This exclusion from DDR, some feminist literature contends, happens because female ex- combatants are desecuritized and reconstructed as victims of conflict. This thesis elaborates on this feminist critique by investigating to what extent female ex-combatants in
Liberia and Nepal were excluded from UN-led DDR and what the potential reasons for this were. The second feminist critique of DDR has demonstrated that even where female ex- combatants are included in DDR, this rarely benefits them or their empowerment, and even reproduces gendered inequalities in economic, social, and political terms. Various explanations for this are put forward by feminist literature on DDR, including inadequate set up of DDR, insufficient gender mainstreaming, and designing DDR programs for male and not female ex-combatants. This thesis builds on this research by analyzing the extent to which UN-led DDR undermined female ex-combatants’ empowerment and reproduced
66 gendered inequalities where they were included in DDR, as well as how this comes about.
The third feminist critique of DDR argues that the concept of reintegration is gendered as it implies a ‘going back’ to female ex-combatants’ pre-conflict ‘oppressive subordinate roles’.
The concept of reintegration therefore encourages a reproduction of gendered inequalities for female ex-combatants. This thesis draws on this feminist critique by analyzing the extent to which the concept of reintegration and its related assumptions have undermined female ex-combatants’ empowerment in Liberia and Nepal. This chapter further contended that these three feminist critiques apply to different aspects of reintegration, including economic, social, and political reintegration. Based on the feminist critiques of DDR, this thesis makes a distinction between reintegration and the reintegration support provided in
DDR and further recognizes that contexts into which female ex-combatants reintegration may have changed during the conflict, or that they reintegrate into new economic, social, and political contexts.
Nonetheless, this chapter has highlighted that feminists also recognize the
‘transformatory potential’ of DDR for female ex-combatants and building an emancipatory peace, thus encouraging a continued feminist engagement with DDR as a practice. This thesis also supports DDR’s ‘transformatory potential’ and elaborates on the feminist critiques of DDR by analyzing DDR and female ex-combatants’ empowerment from a critical feminist peacebuilding perspective. The next chapter details what my critical feminist peacebuilding perspective entails, as well as what the methodological implications of this perspective are.
67 Chapter 2: Critical Feminist Peacebuilding
Chapter 1 reviewed three feminist critiques of Disarmament, Demobilization, and
Reintegration (DDR) and utilized economic, social, and political reintegration as aspects of reintegration to illustrate how these three feminist critiques of DDR are linked in practice.
As noted in Chapter 1, to realize the ‘transformatory potential’ of DDR, DDR requires scrutinization through feminist lenses. I conduct such an analysis from a critical feminist peacebuilding perspective.
This chapter details what my critical feminist peacebuilding perspective entails and how this perspective helps in analyzing how UN-led DDR supported or undermined female ex-combatants’ empowerment in Liberia and Nepal, including the methodology emerging from this perspective. Throughout this chapter I contend that critical feminist peacebuilding scholarship is interested in unpacking unequal gendered power relations and in the power women exercise within structures (i.e. agency). Additionally, this chapter highlights that power is shaped by temporality and spatiality. The aim of analyzing power, gender, and agency and how these change over time and space is to contribute to an emancipatory peace.
To make these arguments, this chapter focuses on three analytical strategies commonly used in critical feminist peacebuilding scholarship on which this thesis draws to analyze power/gender/agency. These strategies include experience, narratives, and hybridities. These three strategies are utilized to highlight power, gender, and agency in different ways. A focus on female ex-combatants’ experiences and narratives of empowerment can reveal the agency female ex-combatants already exercise, and how this is shaped by unequal gendered power relations. Considering gendered narratives in UN-led
DDR can uncover how gendered inequalities are reproduced through UN-led DDR. An analysis of the multiple hybridities in UN-led DDR can reveal the agency of a diversity of
68 actors and how this challenges or reproduces gendered inequalities. The last section elaborates on the methodological implications and practicalities emerging from my critical feminist peacebuilding perspective, drawing on experience, narratives, and hybridities to highlight power, gender, and agency in relation to female ex-combatants’ empowerment and UN-led DDR.
Before diving into experience, narratives, and hybridities, I first want to briefly note how critical feminist peacebuilding scholarship is situated compared to related bodies of scholarship, because critical feminist peacebuilding draws strongly on this scholarship.
Although feminists have long engaged with peace, critical feminist peacebuilding as an intervention developed late compared to similar analyses in development studies and international relations (Snyder 2009:46). 13 Earlier feminist contributions to peace studies were made by Beverly Woodward (1976), Elise Boulding (1977), Betty Reardon (1985,
1990, 1998), Riane Eisler and David Loye (1986), Linda Forcey (1987, 1995ab), Patricia
Molloy (1995), and Birgit Brock-Utne (1985, 1989). Critical feminist peacebuilding responds to the fourth generation of peacebuilding theory and practice called Critical
Peacebuilding (Richmond 2010a:16). Critical feminist and critical peacebuilding scholarship critique liberal peacebuilding (the third generation, which includes DDR) by exploring its ‘gaps, silences, and challenges’ (Shepherd 2017:30). Critical feminist peacebuilding scholarship overlaps with critical peacebuilding scholarship. Different scholars of either ‘camp’ incorporate Critical Theory and post-structural approaches, such as the works of Habermas and Foucault (Richmond 2010:26), as others may utilize Marxist and post-colonial arguments (Richmond& Mac Ginty 2015:172). A key difference is that critical feminist peacebuilding research “is characterized by an explicitly feminist commitment,” with aims of highlighting the ‘androcentric nature’ of liberal peacebuilding
13 For overviews of the history of feminist peace studies see Confortini 2006, 2010, Weber 2006, John 2006, Tickner& True 2018, Welland 2019, Burguires 1990, Tickner 1995, 2004
69 (McLeod& O’Reilly 2019:2). Furthermore, critical peacebuilding scholarship continues to ignore feminist concerns and the importance of gender (ibid.:1)14 and has been criticized as
Eurocentric (Sabaratnam 2013:260). My critical feminist peacebuilding perspective therefore incorporates and critiques ‘mainstream’ critical peacebuilding scholarship, and this chapter highlights where differences exist between the two bodies of scholarship.
Notably, this chapter is not focused on critiquing critical peacebuilding scholarship, but draws on this scholarship in analyzing power/gender/agency over space and time through experiences, narratives, and hybridities to contribute to an emancipatory peace.
Experience
This first section elaborates on experience as a critical feminist peacebuilding analytical strategy for making sense of power, gender, and agency. I focus on female ex-combatants’ experiences of empowerment related to power/gender/agency. This section elaborates how these concepts of power, gender, and agency are understood, constituting my critical feminist peacebuilding perspective. I contend that analyzing female ex-combatants’ experiences of empowerment in relation to reintegration and UN-led DDR is beneficial for highlighting the agency female ex-combatants already exercise, and how this is shaped by structures reproducing unequal gendered power relations.
Applying the feminist insight that ‘the personal is political’ 15, critical feminist peacebuilding scholars have pushed for experience as sources of knowledge on conflict and peacebuilding (cf. Hudson& Huber 2019:374, Hartsock 1983, Young 1998, Disch
2016:604, Smith 1977, Acker et al 1983:424, McLeod& O’Reilly 2019, Daigle 2019:119f,
14 There is some recognition among ‘mainstream’ critical peacebuilding scholars of the need to integrate feminist insights on peacebuilding (cf. Newman et al 2009:64, Richmond& Mac Ginty 2015:184), although meaningful integration by non-feminist scholars remains lacking. 15 The phrase is frequently attributed to Carol Hanish ([2006] 1969), who rejects authorship of the slogan
70 Värynen 2010:143, Scott 1992).16 Experience remains a contested concept in feminist literatures. The understanding of experience taken here is as a subject’s lived history and events and how this is understood by the subject. Moreover, this experience has “‘no inherent essential meaning’ and is given meaning through ‘particular ways of thinking, particular discourses,’ constituting a specific sense of self” (McLeod 2015:53, citing
Weedon 1997:32f). These subjective experiences can further by understood as physical and emotional. Sylvester (2013:66, 106) provides examples of war as physical (e.g. injuries) and emotional (e.g. compassion, enthusiasm for war). This research is interested in the multiple and contrasting experiences of female ex-combatants from their role as combatant to reintegration and UN-led DDR. Moreover, this research is interested in how these experiences are shaped by unequal relations of power, including gender, and how these experiences differ over time and space. The following paragraphs elaborate on these concepts (power, gender, and agency), as well as why it is useful from my critical feminist peacebuilding perspective that female ex-combatants’ experiences can shed light on these concepts.
Why look at experience to make sense of female ex-combatants’ empowerment?
There are multiple reasons why considering female ex-combatants’ experiences are beneficial for understanding how UN-led DDR supported or undermined female ex-
16 Feminist literatures have produced considerable insight into how gender shapes experiences of peace and conflict. Besides literature on female ex-combatants and DDR (Chapter 1), this has generated insights into women’s multiple experiences of conflict more broadly (Garnder& El- Bushra 2004, Lorentzen& Turpin 1998, Turshen& Twagiramariya 1998, Haeri et al 2010, Rehn& Johnson-Sirleaf 2002, Pankhurst 2003:159), women refugees and displaced persons (Kinney 2013, Heideman 2013, Snyder 2009), conflict-related sexual violence (Corrin 2004, WHO 2005, Enloe 1993, Kirby 2019:216, Baaz& Stern 2009, 2013, 2014, 2016, Cohen 2013, Cohen& Nordås 2015, Zaleskwi et al 2018, Dolan 2014:1), women’s formal and informal peacebuilding (Krause et al 2018, Tickner 1992:142, Björkdahl 2012:289f, Ellerby 2019:323ff, O’Reilly et al 2015, Wilson 2005, Porter 2018:322), Security Sector Reform (Ní Aoláin 2009, Schnabel& Farr 2012, Porter 2018:330), justice (Patel 2009, O’Reilly 2016, Porter 2016b), reconciliations and memory (Hudson 2010a:266, Sideris 2002:52, Pankhurst 2007, UN Women 2015:13f, Patel 2009:250, Porter 2016:210ff, Garcia Gonzalez 2016), and landownership (Date-Bah 2003, Pankhurst 2008:40).
71 combatants’ empowerment in Liberia and Nepal. I utilize ‘experience’ as it can shed light on women as agents and subjects of power, and how this is shaped by unequal gendered power relations in a particular space and time. The aim of analyzing female ex-combatants’ experiences of empowerment in relation to reintegration and UN-led DDR is to challenge the reproduction of gendered inequalities through UN-led DDR and liberal peacebuilding more broadly, and to contribute to an emancipatory peace. This subsection elaborates on concepts of power, gender, agency, and an emancipatory peace, as well as how a focus on female ex-combatants’ experiences can shed light on the workings of these concepts in relation to UN-led DDR.
Much critical feminist peacebuilding scholarship is explicitly or implicitly interested in power and power relations. I first overview how I understand power, gender
(as shaping power relations), and agency (as exercise of power). Thereafter, I relate these concepts to experience. Power is an ‘essentially contested concept’ (Gallie 1956) and its meaning has long been debated. My critical feminist peacebuilding perspective follows
Foucault (1978:92); holding that “power is not something that is acquired, seized, or shared, something that one holds on to or allows to slip away; power is exercised from innumerable points, in the interplay of non-egalitarian and mobile relations.” Power is thus exercised rather than possessed, and power is relational. Power is exercised between people who are ‘simultaneously agents and subjects of power’ (O’Reilly 2018:64). This exercise of power between different agents and subjects of power is however a relationship of inequality (Cooper 1994:442). Giddens (1984:17) approaches the shaping of relations of inequality through the concept of structures, understood as “the properties which make it possible for discernibly similar social practices to exist across varying spans of time and space and which lend them ‘systematic’ form.” Structures are not fixed and through practice, agents “reproduce or transform [social systems], remaking what is already made
72 in the continuity of praxis” (Giddens 1984:71. Cf. Björkdahl& Kappler 2017:16). In exercising power, agents therefore either maintain structures or challenge these. Moreover, my critical feminist peacebuilding perspective sees power as ‘productive, rather than purely repressive’ and “power shapes, creates, and transforms social relations, practices and institutional processes” (Cooper 1994:436ff). Power is therefore understood as exercised through social relations of inequality and as productive of social relations, practices, and institutional processes. More specifically, this thesis is concerned with power in three related ways. The first is empowerment as the expanded scope for agency, which is discussed in detail in Chapter 3. The second is agency as female ex-combatants’ exercise of power. The third is gender as social relation of inequality, which the following paragraphs discuss.
Analyzing gender is central to critical feminist peacebuilding scholarship. Critical feminist peacebuilding scholars have stressed that feminist work should research gender and not just women (O’Reilly 2013, Shepherd 2016b, Sjoberg 2009b). In this, I subscribe to an understanding of ‘gender as a social relation of inequality’, where gender is ‘both a facet of individual identity- who we think we are- and an integral part of social relations and practices’ (Steans 2013:29). Such approaches to gender reveal that gender is flexible over time and differs across cultures and spaces (Enloe 2000, Tickner 1992, 2014, Turpin
1998, Steans 2013, Steans et al 2016, Bakker& Gill 2003). Here, I foreground gender as a
‘social power relation’, but recognize critical feminist work arguing that gender always intersects with other forms of oppression, such as caste, class, and race (Collins 2000,
Collins& Bilge 2016, Crenshaw 1989, 1992, Combahee River Collective 1978, hooks
1984, Mohanty 1984, 2003, Narayan 1997, Yuval-Davis 1997). This insight is applied to my case study chapters to investigate how intersecting oppressions further shape empowerment vis-a-vis reintegration.
73 Following my critical feminist peacebuilding understanding of power (above), gender is relational; i.e. gender shapes social relations of inequality between and among men and women and these social relations are further shaped by other intersecting oppressions. Steans (2013:26ff) explains that “Conforming to the characteristics held to be specifically ‘masculine’ and ‘feminine’ is encouraged -if not enforced- through social institutions as well as in day-to-day practices,” although “individuals do reflect on their identities and lives and might resist, challenge, and change institutionalized gender relations.” Gender as a form of power can therefore be exercised and is productive as it shapes behavior. Individuals have agency in challenging and conforming to gender relations, but this agency is exercised within social structures influencing this agency.
Paraphrasing Marilyn Friedman (2003), O’Reilly (2018:12) writes, “Agency entails the capacity to critically reflect upon one’s desires, choices, and situation and to take appropriate decisions and actions” (cf. Kabeer 1999:438, Ibrahim et al 2007:10). However, as O’Reilly emphasizes, this agency is shaped, enabled, and limited by the structures in which the agent/subject of power is situated at a particular moment in time.
Moreover, critical feminist peacebuilding scholars have pointed to gendered agency, i.e. how women’s agency is shaped and limited by their gender in particular spaces in time. To illustrate what gendered agency might entail, I turn to Björkdahl and
Selimovic’ (2015) case study of women’s agency in transitional justice in Bosnia and
Herzegovina. The article highlights that women exercise agency, which is limited and enabled by their gender, and that space and time can be enabling or disabling to such agency. For instance, Björkdahl and Selimovic find that courtrooms were disabling to women’s agency in transitional justice, while popular culture was enabling, allowing women to take control over their stories. Björkdahl and Selimovic note that women’s agency in transitional justice through popular culture was only enabled over time. They
74 find that “women’s agency may actually shrink as peace proceeds” (ibid.:176), echoing the
‘backlash’ women frequently experience post-conflict. Furthermore, Björkdahl and
Selimovic (2015:174f) stress “It is valuable to observe how women’s agency is played out over a longer period of time, how gains may go backwards, how progress may be reversed, and how windows of opportunity may open for women’s agency at unexpected moments”
(cf. Eastmond 2010). Temporality is closely related to spatiality: Galtung (2017:xii-xiii) even refers to these concepts as ‘spacetime’. Following Björkdahl& Selimovic’s
(2015:171) article, certain spaces can be enabling or disabling to gendered agency at a particular moment in time. In this thesis, women’s agency is therefore understood as shaped by unequal gendered power relations and changing over space and time.
As noted, I focus on experience to shed light on female ex-combatants as subjects and agents of power, shaped by unequal gendered power relations and structures reproducing these in a particular ‘spacetime’. Analyzing female ex-combatants’ experiences of empowerment vis-a-vis reintegration and UN-led DDR begins by taking seriously female ex-combatants as sources of knowledge on their own lives (Campbell&
Wasco 2000:775, Corrin 1999, Ramazanoğlu et al 2002:16). To illustrate this, I draw on an anecdote from Nepali female ex-combatant Sapana (INT68). Sapana explained that before the People’s War, she was discouraged by her community from studying art as she was a girl, and her artistic expression was restricted to wearing jewelry. Sapana ignored the people discouraging her and took up studying art during her time in school. Later, when the Maoists came to her village, Sapana decided to join their cultural programs, 17 where she sang revolutionary songs. In conveying her experiences through our interview, Sapana demonstrates an understanding of unequal gendered power relations (i.e. girls shouldn’t study art), and how this shaped her life (e.g. restricting her from studying art and painting)
17 These cultural programs were used to recruit more people for the Maoist cause.
75 at a particular time and space. Applying ‘the personal is political’, the experiences of female ex-combatants like Sapana can therefore be drawn on to develop an understanding of unequal gendered power relations. However, Sapana’s story also exemplifies that female ex-combatants have agency, for example in joining the Maoists, or to study art despite people discouraging her based on her gender. Sapana’s story further highlights that spaces can be enabling (e.g. Maoist cultural programs) or disabling (Sapana’s home community) to her exercise of agency to pursue art at specific moments in time (i.e. pre- conflict and during the People’s War). Experience is therefore useful for highlighting power, gender, and agency, and how these are shaped over space and time.
The purpose of focusing on female ex-combatants’ experiences of empowerment vis-a-vis reintegration and UN-led DDR is its potential contribution to an emancipatory peace, as I outline here. Most critical feminist peacebuilding scholarship is normative and envisions an emancipatory peace. Emancipation can be understood as “freeing people from those constraints that stop them carrying out what freely they would choose to do” (Booth
1991:539). In line with my critical feminist peacebuilding perspective, I am looking at
‘gender as a social relation of inequality’ producing such constraints with the aim of removing these (Tickner 1992:24, Brown 1989:472, Lather 1991:71). Emancipation from constraints imposed by gender as a social relation of inequality however requires understanding how gender constrains women’s ability to do ‘what they would freely choose to do’ in a given space and time. Critical feminist peacebuilding scholars (and feminists more broadly) have long highlighted the importance of women and their experiences of unequal gendered power relations shaping their agency as sources of knowledge for this problem (cf. O’Reilly 2013, McLeod& O’Reilly 2019:128, Väyrynen
2010). As women’s experiences are shaped by how women are situated in varied contexts, these experiences of unequal gender relations are expected to be multiple, even
76 contradictory. This may mean that “there can be no ‘emancipation’ but rather more or less emancipatory options for a given situation, i.e. options that are more or less conductive to opening up space in people’s lives so that they can decide and act for themselves” (Basu&
Nunes 2013:68). This means that emancipation cannot be prescriptive. Starting with the multiple experiences of female ex-combatants can however highlight what emancipation from unequal gender relations might entail.
For many critical feminist peacebuilding and ‘mainstream’ critical peacebuilding scholars, emancipation is closely tied to peace. Critical feminist peacebuilding scholars have stressed the need to consider the kind of peace ‘achieved’ or pursued in peacebuilding. Björkdahl et al 2016:181). The kind of peace advocated for by critical feminist peacebuilding is a positive rather than a negative peace (Brock-Utne 1985, 1989).
This draws on the influential work of Galtung (1964, 1967ab, 1969), where negative peace is the absence of direct violence, whereas positive peace also entails absence of structural violence (cf. Webel 2007:6, Brock-Utne 2000:2, Galtung 1964:2, Alexander 2019:28,
Pankhurst 2003:156, Björkdahl et al 2016:186). Critical feminist peacebuilding scholars have stressed that ‘peace’ is often a ‘gendered peace’ (Pankhurst& Pearce 1997, Brock-
Utne 1990:147), and that women often experience a ‘continuum of violence’ between conflict and post-conflict (cf. Cockburn 2004, Pankhurst 2007, Ní Aoláin 2013:42, Tickner
1992:56, Beswick et al 2015:155, Cockburn& Zarkov 2002, Handrahan 2004:430,
Meintjes et al 2002:1, Turshen 2001:87, O’Reilly 2013:62, Reardon 1993). This led some feminists to contend that ‘post-conflict’ and ‘peace’ are misnomers, particularly for women
(cf. MacKenzie 2012:8, McLeod 2019:346, Enloe 1993:3). Therefore, for peace to be emancipatory, it needs to entail the absence of structural violence, which is frequently gendered and stretches beyond the conclusion of conflict through peace agreements.
77 Considering women’s experiences highlights that the kind of peace pursued by liberal peacebuilding (including UN-led DDR) is far removed from such an emancipatory peace. Underlying liberal peacebuilding is the liberal peace, which “is based on market forces and political democracy operating within a neoliberal international economic system” (Suhrke& Berdal 2012:3. Cf. Kant 1795). Liberal peacebuilding has focused on governance and statebuilding (Richmond 2010a:23ff, Cramer 2008:121, Basini 2013b:24f,
Chandler 1998, 2006, 2008, Barkawi& Laffey 2001:14) and economic development as ways to ‘achieve’ such peace (Duffield 2005, 2007, Beswick et al 2015, Newman et al
2009:19, Paris 1997, 2002, 2004, 2010). Drawing on the multiple experiences of women as supposed beneficiaries of liberal peacebuilding has highlighted that this liberal peace rarely challenges unequal gendered power relations. Indeed, critical feminist peacebuilding scholars have stressed that “democracy, human rights, and the rule of law [do] not necessarily ensure gender equality and security” (O’Reilly 2013:62) and even take away limited funds from essential services, disproportionally affecting women and girls
(Manchanda 2005:4737, Nussbaum 2000). Starting with women’s multiple experiences of power, gender, and agency can therefore open up space for critical feminist peacebuilding research to contribute to an emancipatory peace.
Analyzing female ex-combatants’ experiences can therefore highlight the agency female ex-combatants exercise and how this is shaped by unequal gendered power relations over space and time. There are however concerns regarding experience as a strategy to analyze power, gender, and agency to contribute to an emancipatory peace. The first is that a focus on women’s experiences risks reproducing a homogenous subject
(Väyrynen 2010:138, Ramazanoğlu 2002:3f, Wibben 2016:3). Whilst I am unsure this can be fully avoided, it can at least be partially addressed by highlighting female ex- combatants’ multiple and even contradictory experiences of empowerment, considering
78 how these experiences are shaped by how these female ex-combatants are situated in varied contexts, and recognizing that the experiences of female ex-combatants in Liberia and Nepal reflected here are always partial. A second concern is how to access these experiences. Joan Scott (1992:25) has warned that experience is always constructed, shaped by discourses and history. Therefore, no unmediated experience exists, raising questions for how research can access particular experiences. Considering female ex- combatants’ narratives of empowerment vis-a-vis reintegration and UN-led DDR as detailed in the following section seeks to address this concern. A third concern of focusing on female ex-combatants’ experiences of empowerment is that it misses a consideration of how structures and gendered inequalities are reproduced. Scott (ibid.) offered such a critique, arguing that experiences “exposes the existence of repressive mechanisms [e.g. unequal gendered power relations], but not their inner workings or logics.” To contribute to an emancipatory peace, further strategies for analyzing female ex-combatants’ empowerment in relation to reintegration and UN-led DDR are needed to produce a more complex picture. To more fully make sense of how UN-led DDR supports or undermined female ex-combatants’ empowerment, I draw on two further approaches: gendered narratives in UN-led DDR and the multiple hybridities in UN-led DDR produced by the interaction of local and international actors with the DDR programs.
Narratives
The previous section on experiences has highlighted that experience is a useful way to make sense of female ex-combatants’ empowerment in relation to reintegration and UN- led DDR, and to consider how experience can shed light on power, gender, agency and how these change over space and time. As noted, there are challenges with focusing on female ex-combatants’ experiences, including the difficulty of accessing female ex- combatants’ experiences and a potential neglect of structures and unequal gendered power
79 relations in analyzing female ex-combatants’ experiences. To produce a more complex analysis, I also investigate particular narratives: 1. Female ex-combatants’ narratives of empowerment, and 2. Gendered narratives in UN-led DDR. This section first contends that considering female ex-combatants’ narratives of empowerment is useful to begin to analyze female ex-combatants’ experiences of empowerment. Moreover, this section contends that investigating gendered narratives in liberal peacebuilding (including UN-led
DDR) can elucidate how liberal peacebuilding and DDR reproduce gendered inequalities.
To make these arguments, this section first elaborates on how narratives are conceptualized, before elaborating on why analyzing female ex-combatants’ narratives of empowerment and gendered narratives in UN-led DDR are respectively beneficial from my critical feminist peacebuilding perspective.
What are narratives?
Narratives can be understood in multiple ways. Steans (2013:140) considers narratives as follows: “Narrative is the means by which we make sense of our everyday lives, the events we observe or participate in and/or what we experience and how we convey our ‘sense making’ to others in a coherent manner.” Narratives can therefore be understood as the subject’s sense-making of particular experiences and how this is conveyed to others (such as the interviewer). Female ex-combatants’ narratives of empowerment can therefore be drawn on to investigate female ex-combatants’ experiences of empowerment. There is a temporality to female ex-combatants’ narratives of empowerment. As Nordstrom (1997:22) put it, “Raw experience is now-to-now, and narrative is a now-to-then process.” Time therefore shapes female ex-combatants’ narratives of empowerment. For example, the female ex-combatants in Nepal who joined the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) as child soldiers with conviction likely had a more positive view of the PLA and their empowerment then, compared to now, where they feel
80 abandoned by the Maoist Party. Moreover, in the process of making sense of lived experiences, narratives are given particular meanings. The insights on narratives and meaning-making by Feminist Security Studies scholarship are useful here. Feminist
Security Studies has drawn on the narratives of ‘marginalized’ women to determine their multiple understandings of security (Wibben 2011:99f). These meanings, Wibben summarizes, are frequently very different to those considered by international relations scholarship. Liberal peacebuilding actors like the UN also construct particular meanings through narratives (such as about women in peacebuilding contexts), thereby shaping policies (Shepherd 2017:23). Narratives in the context of this thesis are therefore understood as sense-making of certain experiences and as meaning-making.
Why female ex-combatants’ narratives of empowerment?
As noted, the first narratives I am interested in are female ex-combatants’ narratives of empowerment. Critical feminist peacebuilding scholars have stressed that
‘stories express agency’ (Porter 2016:35f. cf. Smith 2019:2f, Parpart 2010ab, Kabeer 1999,
2010, Gilligan 1982, Gal 1991, Cornwall& Brock 2005). As discussed in Chapter 1, female ex-combatants are frequently stripped off their agency in UN-led DDR, leading to their exclusion or inclusion as mere ‘secondary’ beneficiaries. Talking to female ex- combatants highlighted that female ex-combatants narrate and understand their own experiences as an exercise of agency in joining, staying in, and leaving armed groups. This agency may however be shaped by structures, gender, time, and space. To illustrate this, I draw on the story of Natasha (INT37) from Liberia. Natasha stressed that ‘nobody forced me to join, but I joined because of disadvantage,”18 because her younger sister died as a result of conflict-rape, and Natasha wanted to protect herself from the same fate. During her time as combatant, Natasha ‘took advantage of no one’ and even ‘intervened and took
18 Disadvantage here is perhaps best translated as insecurity
81 the punishment when [her] commander wanted to do wrong’ to protect others. Natasha’s story is an example of gendered agency that is shaped by a particular time and space.
During the Liberian conflict, sexual violence against women and girls was widespread
(UNIFEM 2004:10, Jennings 2008b:338f, Specht 2006:10), and this gendered insecurity, exacerbated by conflict in Liberia, motivated Natasha to protect herself by joining government forces as combatant. She also demonstrated agency in her narrative by resisting ‘doing wrong’ [e.g. hurting civilians] and even protecting others. This highlights that agency is not always beneficial to the actor, as the result of intervening entailed physical punishment for Natasha. The narratives of female ex-combatants on their experiences of combatanthood, reintegration, and UN-led DDR can therefore highlight the agency female ex-combatants exercise in different spaces in time, and that female ex- combatants are not just passive victims to whom conflict happens.
Drawing on female ex-combatants’ narratives of combatanthood, reintegration, and
UN-led DDR also allows for investigating how female ex-combatants see the scope of their agency as changing over time, i.e. empowerment. Building on female ex-combatants’ narratives of empowerment enabled me to develop a framework of empowerment grounded in the multiple experiences of female ex-combatants as conveyed to me in interviews. This framework of empowerment is laid out in Chapter 3. Analyzing empowerment, as with much critical feminist peacebuilding research, involves “a constant shuttling back and forth between concepts and data, structure and part, past and present, theory and practice, involving a continual process of reconceptualization. The work is never done” (Harvey 1990:201). This is especially true for ‘empowerment’ as an analytical concept in this research. Early in the research process, I was concerned with the meaning of language and the problem of pre-established discourses regarding female ex- combatants’ empowerment (cf. Spivak 1998, Ashcroft et al 2000:79). This was also a
82 problem for Maria Stern (2005, 2006) in her research on the insecurity of Mayan women in
Guatemala. To resolve this issue, Stern conducted partial life history interviews. This is part of a broader ‘turn’ in Feminist Security Studies which increasingly focuses on narratives to analyze security and its meanings (cf. Baaz& Stern 2016:131, Wibben 2011,
Moon 1997, Nordstrom 1997). A similar approach has been suggested by J Blommaert and
Dong Jie (2010), who argue that asking indirect questions around certain topics yield more detailed insights. I adopted a combination of these strategies during my interviews. I began interviews by asking female ex-combatants to tell me about their lives before they became a combatant, how they mobilized and demobilized, and how they looked back on their role as combatant. I followed up with questions such as ‘How did becoming a combatant change you and your life?’, ‘Do you think you are better or worse off than women who did not fight and if so, why?’, ‘Have you managed to secure employment? Was the DDR program useful in preparing you for this job?’, and ‘Do you feel fully accepted by your family/community?’. This approach allowed for circumventing pre-established narratives
(e.g. women as passive victims without agency in their participation in conflict, Chapter 1) and to develop a framework of empowerment to highlight the complexity of power and agency, based on the voices and narratives of female ex-combatants, mediated through my interviews.
More recently, critical feminist peacebuilding scholarship has begun focusing on silence (cf. Porter 2016b, Selimovic 2018, Hansen 2000, Enloe 1996, Parpart& Parashar
2018, Parashar 2016, George& Kent 2017, Davies et al 2016). I understand silence in multiple ways: 1. Silence as not feeling able to speak; 2. Silence as not willing to speak; 3.
Silence as not being heard; and 4. Silence as statement. There is now increased recognition that ‘silence can be both expression and oppression’ (Clair 1998:162, Selimovic 2018:3) and considering motivations behind silences can help distinguish between silence as
83 expression and oppression (Porter 2016b:36ff, Selimovic 2018). Accessing these motivations behind silences is potentially more difficult than analyzing female ex- combatants’ narratives of empowerment, particularly where these silences manifest out of not feeling able to or being willing to speak. The methodology section below elaborates on this challenge in the context of my interviews. Another challenge of focusing on the narratives of female ex-combatants in (post)conflict is that a “focus on very personal stories [risks] removing structural power from the equation” (Kappler& Lemay-Hébert
2016:1). To address this concern, I also investigate gendered narratives in liberal peacebuilding, including UN-led DDR, as such a form of structural power.
Why gendered narratives in UN-led DDR?
As noted, narratives have the potential to shape UN-led DDR and therefore can have implications for female ex-combatants’ empowerment. Critical feminist peacebuilding scholarship highlights gendered narratives in liberal peacebuilding, including UN-led DDR. This subsection contends that analyzing gendered narratives in liberal peacebuilding highlights whose agency is recognized and who is given space to participate in liberal peacebuilding. Moreover, analyzing gendered narratives in liberal peacebuilding can highlight how gendered inequalities are reproduced through liberal peacebuilding, with the aim of challenging these narratives to contribute to an emancipatory peace.
Critical feminist peacebuilding scholars have argued that language is not gender- neutral, as “Language sets the framework that defines how women are seen and treated in post-conflict environments” (Puechguirbal 2010b:162, cf. O’Reilly 2018:12, Allen 2008,
Showden 2011, Björkdahl 2012:289). Language can therefore be understood as a form of gendered and gendering structural power. Shepherd (2017:23) elaborates, “within a given discursive terrain, such as peacebuilding discourse, for example, once a particular meaning
84 is attached to ‘women’, such as ‘agents of change’ or ‘helpless victim’, certain policy initiatives become ‘thinkable,’ even necessary, while others are excluded.” How female ex- combatants are narrated in UN-led DDR therefore has the potential to shape how UN-led
DDR is conducted and who is given space to participate.
Critical feminist peacebuilding scholarship on gendered narratives in liberal peacebuilding has highlighted that these narratives homogenize women, concealing women’s diverse roles and experiences of conflict and peacebuilding, reproduce gendered inequalities, and fail to contribute to an inclusive peace (Hudson 2010a). Women are narrated as vulnerable (Shepherd 2008b:87, 2016b, 2017, Haeri& Puechguirbal 2010), like children (Enloe 1989, Steans 2013, Carpenter 2005, 2006, Shepherd 2008b:115,
Puechguirbal 2010a, Hudson 2010b:50), and in need of protection from conflict-related sexual violence (Meger 2016, Shepherd 2008:123). This reproduces the male aggressor- female victim dichotomy in liberal peacebuilding narratives, excluding experiences of people who fall outside this dichotomy, i.e. male victims, female aggressors (Alison 2009,
Coulter 2008). This dichotomy is known as the ‘Just Warrior’ and ‘Beautiful Soul’, where men are protectors of non-violent, helpless women (Elshtain 1987 1994, Gentry et al
2019:1, Sjoberg& Peet 2011:176, Sjoberg 2010:53ff, Zalewski et al 2019:109ff, Welland
2019:130). The concern here is that characterizing women only as victims strips them of their agency (Elshtain 1994:116, Connell 1997:121, Utas 2005:407, Björkdahl et al
2016:188, McEvoy 2010:131, Rajasingham-Senanayahe 2001, Parashar 2009:243,
Sylvester 2010:32, Gentry& Sjoberg 2015:113). 19 Thus, liberal peacebuilding narratives have reproduced women as victims of conflict, stripping them of their agency. As noted in
19 In 2000, Azza Karam (2000:2) argued that academic literature on women and conflict was also guilty of depicting women mainly as victims, although this has since changed (Zalewski et al 2019:110).
85 Chapter 1, this lack of recognition of female ex-combatants’ agency has resulted in their exclusion from UN-led DDR and has meant losing out on its potential benefits.
There is a shift beyond the women-as-victims narrative to women-as-agents of peacebuilding, yet recognition for women’s agency is largely restricted to women’s potential contribution to peacebuilding as other forms of agency are ignored (Shepherd
2008b:87, McEvoy 2010, Pankhurst 2003, El-Bushra 2000:80). Women’s contribution to peacebuilding includes women as formal political actors (representation) and women’s informal peacebuilding (participation, Shepherd 2008b:116). Critical feminist peacebuilding literature more often highlights women’s informal peacebuilding, which often goes unacknowledged in UN liberal peacebuilding (Hudson 2009, 2010a:259,
Manchanda 2005:4743, Mazurana& McKay 1999, Mazurana et al 2005, McWilliams&
Kilmurray 2015, Pankhurst 2000, Jeong 2002). The importance of representation of women and women’s organizations in peacebuilding is recognized by United Nations
Security Council Resolution 1325 and enshrined in the UN Peacebuilding Commission
(UNSCR 1645, Preamble, Art.20). In practice, however, women and women’s organizations remain excluded from peacebuilding (Tryggestad 2010, McLeod& O’Reilly
2019:5, UN Women 2018b, Ellerby 2019:323). Even if women and/or women’s organizations participated in formal peacebuilding processes, this representation is always
‘partial and political’ (Shepherd 2013:436). Elisabeth Porter has further problematized women’s formal representation by arguing that “some women are not motivated to represent ‘women’s interests’,” (Porter 2007:31, cf. Porter 2018:332), nor do women involved in ‘peacemaking’ always want to fulfill such roles (Forcey 1995:228). Only peaceful women are thereby given access to participate (McEvoy 2010:144, Björkdahl
2012:291). UN liberal peacebuilding thus begins to recognize some women’s agency, insofar as this is agency to build peace; however, in practice this remains peripheral.
86 Again, this lack of acknowledgement of women’s diverse forms of agency shapes who is and is not given access to participate in liberal peacebuilding. The consequences for an emancipatory peace may be grave; as discussed above, women frequently continued to experience direct and structural violence post-conflict. Without an understanding of this gendered violence, little may be done to address this and to contribute to an emancipatory peace (cf. True 2017:135f). Therefore, the kind of and whose peace is recognized in liberal peacebuilding has implications for an emancipatory peace.
Moreover, critical feminist peacebuilding scholarship has stressed that liberal peacebuilding has neo-colonial overtones which reproduce gendered inequalities. This can be seen in liberal peacebuilding narratives on ‘root causes’ of conflicts in the Global South, including Liberia. Different ‘root causes’ of conflicts have been identified, such as
‘tribalism’ in West Africa (Kaplan 1994) and Collier and Hoeffler’s argument that ‘the true cause of civil war is not the loud discourse of grievance, but the silent force of greed’
(Collier& Hoeffler 1998, 2002, 2004). Such arguments have been criticized by anthropological, post-colonial, and critical peacebuilding perspectives for their neo- colonial undertones (Duffield 2000, Keen, 2000, McMullin 2013a:395ff, Richards 1995,
2005ab), and their dismissal of grievances along age and ethnic lines (Berdal& Malone
2000, Call 2010, Peters 2004, Utas 2005a. Cf. Henshaw 2013, 2016abc). Liberal peacebuilding actors characterize ‘locals’ as ‘criminals’ in need of policing by the Global
North, e.g. the UN (Richards 2005b:10). Through such neo-colonial narratives, liberal peacebuilding ignores grievances and even reproduces inequalities (Newman 2013:318,
Newman et al 2009:47, Richmond 2018b:302f). Such neo-colonial constructions of ‘the local’ in liberal peacebuilding are therefore incompatible with an emancipatory peace and thus need to be challenged.
87 These colonial overtones in liberal peacebuilding have also reproduced gendered inequalities. For example, Halberstam (2012:76f) emphasized that NGOs and grant agencies (re)produce ‘US-based models of sex and gender[…] far from stable at home’.
Moran (2010) highlights the reshaping of gender through narratives, using the example of the popular documentary, Pray the Devil Back to Hell (Disney 2008), which focused on the influential women’s peace movement. Moran remarks on the substantial history of
Liberian women’s activism, a history erased in the documentary. In another example,
Moran, who has long conducted research in Liberia, returned after the conflict, only to hear that in Liberia, ‘women are traditionally considered property,’ a narrative maintained by foreign and Liberian NGO staff. Moran emphasizes that while Liberia was ‘unabashedly patriarchal long before the war,’ Liberian women ‘had also held visible, highly authoritative positions in both rural and urban contexts’ (Moran 2010:267). Thus, neo- colonial gendered narratives in liberal peacebuilding even have the potential to rewrite history and to reproduce gendered inequalities, thereby undermining the building of an emancipatory peace.
These gendered narratives and underlying assumptions in liberal peacebuilding are reflected in liberal peacebuilding’s emphasis on economic liberalization. Economic liberalization, Selby (2008:14) writes, “reduces barriers to the movements of goods and capital, increases levels of international trade and investment, deepens global independencies and, in turn, inspires a transformation of state and societal interests away from war towards commerce and peace.” The underlying assumption is that economic growth means that people are not motivated to participate in conflict (Lipschutz 1998:9).
Economic liberalization in liberal peacebuilding is linked to World Bank and IMF funds with ever-increasing ties and requirements (Darby& Mac Ginty 2008) and premised on the
‘greed-or-grievance’ theory (above). This assumption that economic liberalization
88 contributes to ‘removing the social and economic causes of violence’ remains widespread in liberal peacebuilding (Jeong 2005:124). This has been criticized from critical peacebuilding and critical feminist peacebuilding scholarship, which argues that economic liberalization can promote and sustain conflict (Anderson 1999, 2005, Lipschutz 1998,
Millar 2016:259, Peters 2004) and can exacerbate inequalities (Pugh 2005, Millar 2015,
2016, Lipschutz 1998). Liberal peacebuilding approaches continue to see women’s market participation as inherent good and do not resist co-optation of women’s economic participation to benefit the economy (cf. UN Women 2015:168, 171, Sweetman 2005,
Gizelis 2009, World Bank 2012, Bergeron 2016:201). Moreover, economic liberalization as part of liberal peacebuilding (re)produces gendered inequalities as it ‘can widen the gap between the economies of men and women’ (Enloe 2004:214), encourages feminization of the informal sector (Manchanda 2005:4737, Duncanson 2016:58. Cf. Kabeer 2009:83f,
Karim 2011), and does not produce ‘women’s empowerment’. (Shepherd 2011, Kabeer
1999, 2005ab, 2008, Batliwala et al 2007, Pearson 2007). Economic liberalization can result in ‘cheap labor, labor exploitation, or human trafficking’ of women (Ní Aoláin et al
2011:271) or increased vulnerability (Kabeer et al 2011:19, hooks 2000). Gendered narratives regarding economic liberalization as the ‘solution’ to conflict therefore potentially reproduce gendered inequalities instead of contributing to an emancipatory peace.
Critical feminist peacebuilding scholars argue that joining the labor force can result in a ‘double burden’20, where women have productive (e.g. formal employment) and reproductive labor (e.g. unpaid housework), often derived from a gendered division of labor (Harcourt 2016:29, Izugbara 2004, Kabeer 2003, 2007, Wilson 2008, Phillips 2015,
Bergeron 2016:195ff, Boserup 1970, Waring 1988). The ‘double burden can add stress and
20 The ‘double burden’ is sometimes referred to as the ‘second shift’ (Molyneux 1981, 1995)
89 affect women’s health (Kabeer et al 2011:19), increase domestic violence or result in daughters being withdrawn from education to cope with unmet reproductive labor needs
(Mayoux 2000:6). Additionally, “men may withdraw more of their own contribution for their own luxury expenditure” (ibid.) Despite recognition of women’s ‘double burden’ in critical feminist peacebuilding literature, economic liberalization aimed at or including women continues to ignore potential negative implications. Anecdotally, during fieldwork in Nepal, I encountered examples where lighting was installed in fields to ‘allow’ women to work longer to increase revenue. This resulted in 16+ hour working days for the women, and they were still responsible for cooking, cleaning, and childcare. Smita Ramnarain
(2015) found similar concerns regarding community-based peacebuilding in Nepal. This reaffirms Amartya Sen’s (1999) premise that gendered inequalities need changing for women to benefit from economic liberalization, not vice versa, as assumed in liberal peacebuilding.
This concern becomes even more pressing given the shift in liberal peacebuilding from ‘women as victims’ to ‘women as agents of change’ discussed above. Critical feminist peacebuilding literature has highlighted ‘women’s triple roles’ of “productive
(income-generating), reproductive (i.e. unpaid domestic) and community management roles” (Kothari 2005:162, cf. Moser 1989:86, Duncanson 2016:53). Moreover, the Women,
Peace, and Security (WPS) framework and agenda begins to recognize women’s contributions to peacebuilding, including for instance these community management roles of women, and seeks to expand this third role of women in peacebuilding. Some critical feminist peacebuilding scholars have welcomed this change, as women are frequently
‘marginalized in formal political decision-making’ (Björkdahl 2012:290). Other critical feminist peacebuilding scholars such as Shepherd (2011:511) are more skeptical of women as peacebuilding in liberal peacebuilding, as it asks women to be ‘superheroines’, yet fails
90 to recognize structures limiting this ‘superheroism’. Asking women to be ‘superheroines’ potentially creates a ‘triple burden’ of reproductive, productive, and peacebuilding/political labor. My case study chapters elaborate on this debate to analyze to what extent this ‘triple burden’ affects female ex-combatants in Nepal and Liberia and implications thereof for their empowerment.
From my critical feminist peacebuilding perspective, there are thus several reasons for analyzing gendered narratives in liberal peacebuilding. These gendered narratives shed light on whose and what kind of agency is recognized in liberal peacebuilding, and who is consequently able to participate, for example in UN-led DDR. Moreover, it is important to analyze gendered narratives in liberal peacebuilding, as this can highlight how gendered inequalities are reproduced through liberal peacebuilding. Uncovering these gendered narratives allows for challenging these, with the aim of contributing to an emancipatory peace.
Hybridities
A third analytical strategy frequently utilized in critical feminist peacebuilding scholarship and that I employ is hybridity. I suggest that hybridity is a useful lens for analyzing the agency of different actors in UN-led DDR, including female ex-combatants, local and international DDR officials, and staff of national DDR bodies, as well as what the implications of this exercise of agency are for female ex-combatants’ empowerment.
Moreover, this section highlights that hybridities can undermine the building of an emancipatory peace, thereby making it imperative to analyze whose hybridities have what implications for an emancipatory peace.
91 What are hybridities?
Hybridity as a concept was developed by Homi Bhabha (1994), drawing on Edward
Said’s Orientalism (1978). Bhabha utilized the concept of hybridity to draw attention to the complex power relations between the colonizer and colonized and its implications for culture. The use of this approach, Bhabha (1985:154) stressed, is that “If the effect of colonial power is seen to be the production of hybridization rather than the noisy command of colonialist authority or the silent repression of native traditions, then an important change in perspective occurs. Following Bhabha, analyzing hybridities enables a consideration of multiple and unequal power relations by the colonizer and colonized.
More recently, non-feminist peacebuilding scholarship begun to draw on the concept of hybridity. Adapting Bhabha’s concept of hybridity, Mac Ginty (2010:397) conceptualized hybridity as a peace “whereby different actors coalesce and conflict to different extent on different issues to produce a fusion peace.” Hybridity has therefore shifted away from the post-colonial focus on the interaction between colonizer and colonized, focusing instead on ‘international’ and ‘local’ actors in the context of liberal peacebuilding. As with Bhabha, Mac Ginty (2011:72) considers hybridity a ‘gradualist, everyday process’ that happens over time. The different actors I focus on in this thesis are female ex-combatants, local and international DDR officials, and officials working for national DDR bodies.
Critical feminist peacebuilding scholarship has drawn on critical peacebuilding scholarship’s conceptualization of hybridity and has extended this. From a critical feminist perspective, hybridity as understood in critical peacebuilding is “inadequate because of its inattention to the gendered nature of power” (Ryan& Basini 2017:186f). Ryan and Basini argue that it is imperative to ask gendered questions of ‘who participates?’ and ‘how do they participate?’ to illustrate how “gendered power influences the power relations of
92 local-international processes” (cf. McLeod 2015, Partis-Jennings 2017). Ryan and Basini
(2017:186ff) for instance conclude that “international intervention relies upon a
‘feminization’ of local actors” in the context of implementing National Action Plans on
UNSCR 1325 in Liberia and Sierra Leone. Moreover, feminist approaches to hybridity draw on the insight that ‘the personal is political’: the notion that “a number of (apparently) hidden or mundane practices and processes operate alongside macro-political processes to shape the precise form of [peacebuilding]” (McLeod 2015:52). The critical feminist peacebuilding understanding of hybridity drawn on in this thesis is therefore as an analytical strategy to make visible the multiple unequal gendered power relations in UN- led DDR, operating at macro and micro-levels.
Critical and critical feminist peacebuilding scholarship on hybridities can be differentiated into ‘descriptive’ and ‘prescriptive’ hybridities. Wallis et al contend that
“descriptive accounts explain what hybridity is (or isn’t) and how it comes about,” whereas prescriptive accounts “examine how hybridity can purposefully be designed into statebuilding, peacebuilding, and governance projects” (Wallis et al 2018:6). Feminists have been particularly skeptical of ‘prescriptive hybridities’, as “the gendered restrictions of liberal peacebuilding are not easily overcome or minimized when local structures of authority or local governance practices are deliberately incorporated into peacebuilding interventions” (George& Kent 2017, cf. McLeod 2015:61). In other words, structures reproducing unequal gendered power relations are likely reinforced, not challenged, through prescriptive hybridities. To illustrate this, George and Kent (ibid.:531) draw on the case study of women in post-conflict Bougainville and Timor Leste, where hybridity shaped ‘gendered dynamics of shame and silence’. Prescriptive hybridities can therefore be particularly detrimental to women. Moreover, prescriptive hybridities can reinforce top- down implementation of the liberal peace, as it highlights potential ‘local’ resistances, and
93 enables ‘their containment, transformation, and assimilation’ (Nadarajah& Rampton
2015:49). Prescriptive hybridities can also exacerbate existing concerns in liberal peacebuilding where ‘local’ actors are blamed if peacebuilding fails to meet its goals
(Peterson 2012:17, Leonarddson& Rudd 2015:830, Richmond 2010b:666, Mac Ginty
2015:840). Prescriptive hybridities therefore potentially reinforce gendered and neo- colonial inequalities. I instead utilize hybridities in the descriptive sense; the benefits of such an approach are discussed below.
To illustrate what I mean by hybridity I turn to the Maoist engagement with the
UN-led DDR program, the UNIRP in Nepal. The Maoists were disinterested in DDR from the beginning, as they considered it a program for defeated armies, which theirs was not
(INT12). The UN responded by drawing on international legislation to assume responsibility for child soldiers (i.e. the Verified Minors and Late Recruits, VMLRs) through the UNIRP. The Maoists resisted this, discouraging VMLRs from participating
(INT77). Some VMLRs listened to the Maoists and did not access the UNIRP (rejection), while other VMLRs chose to participate to varying extends. Sita (INT6) for example actively participated in trainings and different aspects of the UNIRP (compliance), whereas my gatekeeper showed up to training only to sign his name on the attendance register and to receive his payment, leaving without any training (co-optation). This anecdote highlights various actors (UN, UNIRP officials, Maoists, different VMLRs), whose interactions within the UNIRP produce hybrid forms of peace. Specifically, the hybrid peace produced is not one where all ex-combatants participated in DDR (as the UN intended) or where no ex-combatants participated (as the Maoists intended), but a hybrid peace where only some ex-combatants could choose to participate in UN-led DDR, and those who did engaged with the program to varying extends. Chapter 6 elaborates on these hybrid processes and practices and how these undermine or support female ex-combatants’
94 empowerment. The following paragraphs explore how the concept of hybridity is useful to my critical feminist peacebuilding perspective.
Why are Hybridities Useful from my Critical Feminist Peacebuilding Perspective?
Hybridity is of interest to many critical feminist peacebuilding scholars as it highlights the agency of ‘the local’ in local-international interactions (cf. Ryan& Basini
2017, Partis-Jennings 2017, George 2016, 2017, 2018, George& Kent 2017, McLeod 2015,
Björkdahl& Höglund 2013). Analyzing hybridities moreover generates insights into how
‘the local’ (e.g. female ex-combatants) renegotiate unequal gendered power relations in their interaction with ‘the international’ (e.g. DDR and DDR officials). Critical feminist peacebuilding scholarship has critiqued critical peacebuilding scholarship for constructing
‘the local’ and ‘the international’ as homogenous. For example, critical feminist peacebuilding scholarship has emphasized that gendered differences exist among ‘locals’, which are frequently neglected in critical peacebuilding scholarship. (Björkdahl 2012:291,
Björkdahl& Selimovic 2015, 2016:181, George 2018:255, McLeod 2015, Partis-Jennings
2017:413, Hameiri& Jones 2018, Smith 2019:138ff, Peterson 2012:13, Graef 2015:2,
Wallis et al 2018:5).
This issue of homogenizing a group is even more apparent in critical peacebuilding scholarship’s engagement with ‘the international’. McLeod (2015:52) highlights that critical peacebuilding’s engagement with “hybridity seems to struggle somewhat to make the ‘international’ personal, frequently seeing the ‘international’ as a structure or organization.” Additionally, Kappler (2013:5) argues that international actors are imagined
‘as an almost friction-free community’ and that critical peacebuilding scholarship frequently fails to differentiate between different ‘international’ actors. There were for
95 example very different priorities among the different UN agencies in the UNIRP21 with each agency focusing on their own mandate with little consideration for the work of the other UN agencies (INT14). I therefore consider a range of actors in UN-led DDR (e.g. female ex-combatants, staff of national DDR bodies, local DDR officials, international
DDR officials), and how their interactions produce hybridities, and what the implications thereof are for female ex-combatants’ empowerment. Analyzing hybridities therefore provides an opportunity to investigate female ex-combatants’ agency in UN-led DDR, how other actors shape the agency female ex-combatants can exercise in UN-led DDR, and how this affects their empowerment.
Another reason why it is beneficial to consider hybridities from my critical feminist peacebuilding perspective is because hybridities have implications for the building of an emancipatory peace. There remains an underlying assumption in non-feminist critical peacebuilding scholarship that hybridities are a net good for ‘the local’, producing “a more empathetic, responsive, culturally sensitive and ultimately radical peace encompassing the local, indigenous and quotidian experiences” (Wallis et al 2018:3. Cf. Richmond&
Mitchell 2011:339, Peterson 2012:10, Popplewell 2018:3). Considering ‘who participates and how this participation takes place’ (McLeod 2019:354) in these ‘local-international’ hybridities from a critical feminist peacebuilding perspective (i.e. female ex-combatants’ and DDR officials’ engagement with DDR) gives more nuanced insight into the extent that these hybridities are contribute to an emancipatory peace. Dahlia Simangan (2018:1ff) for example argues that in Cambodia, “the quick introduction but weak implementation of international/liberal norms and institutions enabled the local elite to contextualize, negotiate, resist and reject those international/liberal norms and institutions to preserve an elite-centered status quo.” These hierarchies, Simangan argues, are gendered and reflect
21 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), and the International Labor Organization (ILO)
96 inequalities along class and age lines. Therefore, in Cambodia, this hybrid peace reinforced rather than challenged structures reproducing gendered inequalities, nor is this hybridity an emancipatory peace.
Considering gender in hybridities highlights that ‘the local’ and ‘local cultures’ are not inherently benign but can produce gendered violence that must be addressed to produce an emancipatory peace (Basu 2010:309, Ryan 2009:310, Mani 1998, Galtung 1990). I therefore approach hybridities as an effect of ‘local-international’ interactions which “can be both a site for empowerment and for domination” (Selimovic 2010:24). Analyzing hybridities can therefore shed light on the extent to which hybridities reproduce gendered inequalities and undermine to an emancipatory peace.
Methodology
This last section elaborates on the practical and methodological considerations of researching experiences, narratives, and hybridities. To do so, this section first discusses interviews and fieldwork as methods to access female ex-combatants’ experiences and narratives of empowerment, gendered narratives in UN-led DDR, and the multiple hybridities in UN-led DDR which shape female ex-combatants’ empowerment. Secondly, this section reflects on the challenges of highlighting agency, voices, and silences. Lastly, this section reflects on the multiple power relations in my research and how these power relations may have shaped the final research product presented here.
97 Interviews and Fieldwork
To research the extent to which UN-led DDR programs supported or undermined female ex-combatants’ empowerment, I carried out fieldwork in Liberia and Nepal.
Conducting fieldwork has the advantage of gaining access to interviewees to whom I otherwise would have limited or no access (e.g. many female ex-combatants) and to generate in-depth data through interviews (Sturges& Hanrahan 2004). I conducted fieldwork in Nepal in September-October 2016 and again in April-May 2017. My fieldwork in Liberia took place in January-February 2017. Although this is several years after the LDDRR and UNIRP were completed in 2007 and 2012 respectively, several DDR officials noted that now was a good time to conduct this research, as information pertaining to DDR was no longer confidential. One DDR official (INT15) mentioned he would have been unable to discuss the UNIRP before all data was officially handed over to the
Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction in 2013 and adult ex-combatants were either integrated into the army or officially discharged, making it an opportune moment to conduct interviews. In
Liberia I conducted my research in the capital,
Monrovia (see Figure 1).
Most female ex-combatant interviews took place in
Peace Island, a borough in eastern Monrovia, termed
‘540’ by its inhabitants as reference to the $540 USD
Figure 1: Map of Liberia (NIC 2019)
98 promised to adult ex-combatants during DDR. The community is a settlement of ex- combatants from all factions and their dependents. In Nepal, I conducted my fieldwork largely in the capital Kathmandu, as well as in Birendranagar (Karnali Province) and
Nepalgunj (Province No. 5) in South-West Nepal (see Figure 2).
During my fieldwork, I conducted interviews with female ex-combatants and DDR officials on empowerment, reintegration, and UN-led DDR. I ensured that female ex- combatants and DDR officials had full informed consent before, during, and after interviews (Miller et al 2002:65), information on me and the interview, and gave interviewees opportunities to ask questions at any point during the interview process, to stop or pause, or to not answer questions (Appendix C & D). An advantage of interviewing is that it “provides access to people’s ideas, thoughts, and memories in their own words rather than the words of the researcher” (Reinharz 1992:19). Interviews therefore provide an opportunity to start listening to female ex-combatants’ experiences and narratives of empowerment, reintegration, and UN-led DDR. The subsections below on agency, voice, and silences and power relations complicate this straight-forward account of ‘listening’ to female ex-combatants.
By contrast, interviews with
DDR officials are of form of ‘studying up’, i.e. studying
“those who shape attitude and actually control institutional Figure 2: Map of Nepal (RA Online 2019) structures” (Nader
99 1972:284, Cohn 2006:103). Although some feminists have been skeptical of ‘studying up’ as it potentially recenters power (cf. Lovenduski 2011:4, Prügl 2004:79), other critical feminist peacebuilding scholars have contended that ‘studying up’ can “disrupt institutional control over knowledge production” (Holmes et al 2018:16f). To do so, feminist approaches to ‘studying up’ need “to uncover how within institutions, gendered, raced and classed representations and cultural differences are produced, sustained and/or resisted by social actors” (ibid.:6). ‘Studying up’ through interviewing different DDR officials can therefore shed light on gendered narratives in UN-led DDR, as well as how different DDR officials shape UN-led DDR and therefore female ex-combatants’ empowerment. Interviewing both female ex-combatants and DDR officials thus enables me to consider female ex-combatants’ narratives and experiences of empowerment, gendered narratives in UN-led DDR, and hybridities emerging through the interaction of multiple actors in UN-led DDR and how these shape female ex-combatants’ empowerment.
Out of the total 77 interviews conducted as part of fieldwork, 31 were conducted with DDR officials. These DDR officials include international staff in the UN system, national staff from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), United Nations
Children’s Fund (UNICEF), United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), and the
International Labour Organization (ILO) in Liberia and Nepal, as well as DDR officials working for NGOs contracted as service providers for the implementation of aspects of the
DDR program in Liberia and Nepal. Some of these NGOs include Save the Children and
Search for Common Ground. For anonymity reasons, smaller NGOs are not named here.
Additionally, I interviewed DDR officials who represented the respective governments in the DDR programs. DDR official interviews were conducted in cafés and offices in Greater
Monrovia and Kathmandu valley, as well as one Skype interview with international staff in
100 the UN system. Most of my DDR official interviewees were Nepali or Liberian. In Nepal, only three DDR officials interviewed were female, whereas in Liberia I interviewed eight female DDR officials, most of whom had worked in child protection.
In total, I conducted 40 female ex-combatant interviews: 15 in Nepal and 25 in
Liberia. In Liberia, most interviews were conducted in Peace Island and all were conducted in Greater Monrovia. The female ex-combatants I interviewed in Peace Island came from all parts of the country and had fought for different factions throughout the First and
Second Liberian Civil War. Thus, while the interviews in Liberia were mostly conducted in the same place, they reflected a range of experiences on which the case study chapters build. In Nepal my female ex-combatant interviews were conducted in Kathmandu (7),
Birendranagar (5), and Nepalgunj (3). The interviewees from Kathmandu mostly originated from Province #5 and Karnali Pradesh (previously the Mid-Western
Development region), where most PLA fighters came from, but resettled in Kathmandu for professional, economic, and stigma reasons. The focus of interviewee selection in Nepal was on so-called Verified Minors and Recruits (VMLRs): those combatants under the age of 18 at the date of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in November 2006 and combatants recruited after this date. This is because, for political reasons, only VMLRs were eligible to participate in DDR. Nonetheless, I interviewed adult female ex-combatants in Nepal to support the discussion on female ex-combatants’ empowerment and contrast the reintegration of female VMLRs and adult ex-combatants in relation to empowerment.
The trends in Liberia and Nepal are the same: female ex-combatants participating in DDR were mostly children or youth at the time of reintegration, and (older) female commanders did generally not participate.
As discussed, conducting interviews with female ex-combatants who participated in
DDR by necessity means relying on UN verification of combatants. However, as this is
101 still problematic (Chapter 1), I relied on self-identification of female ex-combatants for interviewee selection. Some female ex-combatants (mostly now members of the
Constituent Assembly in Nepal or officials of the Nepal Communist Party) openly identify as ex-combatants. Female ex-combatants do face stigma in Nepal and Liberia, especially among the younger combatants, and as such, fewer openly self-identify as such. Access to these female ex-combatants was negotiated through gatekeepers and snowballing, where interviewees put me in touch with other potential interviewees (Flick 2014, King 2009:128,
Mageza-Barthel 2016:150f). In Nepal, I gained access through the Discharged PLA
Association, a network set up by VMLRs for the 4,008 VMLRs with regional heads. I further accessed female ex-combatants in Birendranagar through DDR officials. Consent was obtained in advance. In Monrovia, community leaders of Peace Island provided me with access. Not only was this an opportunity, this was essential as it is culturally insensitive to conduct research without their approval. Additionally, gatekeepers and snowballing served as verification that my interviewees had participated in conflict. DDR officials were identified through snowballing, mining networks from different initial access points. To protect my interviewees from potential harm, I chose to keep all interviewees anonymous. For female ex-combatants I opted for another, locally and ethnically sensitive name; for DDR officials, I chose to elaborate on their role during the respective DDR programs where relevant, i.e. child protection officer, gender advisor.
Where I conducted fieldwork had implications for the data collected. In Liberia, it was unfortunately not possible to conduct interviews outside of Monrovia due to time and other resource constrains. In Nepal, I conducted interviews outside of the capital, but
Birendranagar and Nepalgunj are nonetheless urban environments. In both cases this introduced an urban bias in my research. While I struck a balance between DDR officials who were based in head offices in capitals and regional offices, most female ex-combatant
102 interviewees in Liberia and Nepal originated from rural areas and had resettled in urban areas, although this is common among female ex-combatants across post-peace agreement contexts (Chapter 1). Basini (2013b:83) notes that “nearly one third of the population lives in and around Monrovia and many ex-combatants chose to stay in the capital after the war.” Paes (2005:258) noted that about 45,000 registered ex-combatants had resettled in
Greater Monrovia in search of employment, including in Peace Island. Such an influx of
(young) ex-combatants shapes supply and demand of economic reintegration opportunities.
Resettlement in urban environments may provide greater opportunity for political reintegration of female ex-combatants, as this is frequently where most networks, organizations, and access to higher levels of politics are located. The urban bias of my research has implications for my analysis of social reintegration. Many female ex- combatant interviewees relocated to urban environments from rural areas, left behind families and home communities, making it more difficult to (re)establish ties to families and communities, and missing out on their potential psychological support. However, conducting interviews in Peace Island as resettlement of ex-combatants allows for analyzing female ex-combatants’ reintegration into new ex-combatant communities and implications thereof for their empowerment (see Chapter 5 for this discussion).
In Nepal, conducting fieldwork in Birendranager and Nepalgunj has further implications for my data. During the People’s War, Birendranagar and Nepalgunj were considered Maoist-controlled, especially in the latter years of the conflict. The areas continue to be pro-Maoist. During my fieldwork in April 2017, windows, houses, and shops were draped in the Maoist party flag22 in the run-up to the 2017 local elections, highlighting continued support for the Maoists. Female ex-combatants who resettled in
Birendranagar and Nepalgunj or came from pro-Maoist areas on average reintegrated
22 The Communist Party Nepal-Maoist Centre at the time, now succeeded by the Nepal Communist Party
103 better socially, as Chapter 5 argues. It is plausible that female ex-combatants who came from anti-Maoist areas faced greater barriers to their (social) reintegration. Therefore, the data collected is the product of the ‘spacetime’ in which I conducted interviews and fieldwork.
Agency, Voices, and Silences
One challenge with listening to female ex-combatants and DDR officials is language. As discussed in relation to narratives, language is a medium through which meaning is constructed. The following paragraphs focus on jargon, translations, and language as meaning-making. The issue of language was prevalent in interviews with DDR officials. While we spoke English, it was essential for me to be fluent in relevant jargon, including familiarity with the UN system and fluency in acronyms. 23 Utilizing jargon showed my competency on the subject, and, in my experience, made interviews feel like conversations among colleagues and more natural. It may of course be, as Carol Cohn
(1987:708) discovered in her interviews with defense intellectuals, that adopting jargon shaped what can be spoken about and what remains silent. By contrast, I found the use of jargon revealing as it highlighted diverse meanings. Discussing empowerment with DDR officials frequently highlighted a limited vision of empowerment as women receiving training and earning money. Other DDR officials (INT19) suggested that while earning income was already empowerment, even more so was that it allowed earning female ex- combatants a much greater say in how money was spent and other household decisions. At other times I asked direct questions about jargon, such as ‘What is gender support?’ when
UNIRP officials brought it up. This revealed that most DDR officials understood ‘gender support’ as a shorthand for specific health-care support to women/girls, such as support for
23 For an in-depth discussion of language in peacebuilding and its reproduction of insider/outsider dynamics, see Autesserre 2010, 2014:1
104 reproductive health, breastfeeding, pregnancy, and maternity leave. As Chapter 6 details, this support was essential for meeting female ex-combatants’ basic needs and to ensure their retention in the UNIRP; however, this ‘gender support’ also obscures other gendered obstacles female ex-combatants face in their reintegration and that male ex-combatants have a gender, shaping their reintegration.
The voices of female ex-combatants form the foundation for the case study chapters. Investigating how female ex-combatants narrate their own experiences of empowerment provides a more complex understanding of their diversity of roles and experiences than DDR narratives would suggest and highlights female ex-combatants’ agency. For example, female ex-combatant interviewees often saw themselves as mothers, wives, and daughters and simultaneously in other roles. Narratives regarding empowerment as expanded scope for agency adds further nuance to understanding female ex-combatants’ roles and experiences. Chapter 3 elaborates on how I used my interview data to develop my critical feminist peacebuilding framework for analyzing empowerment.
To ensure translations were as accurate as possible, I worked together with my research assistants by explaining what my research was about, what it was trying to investigate and what the purpose of each question was. This helped my research assistants in translating questions and developing relevant follow-up questions during interviews. Even more pressing from my critical feminist peacebuilding perspective is the issue of the meaning of language. The narratives constructed through my interviews with female ex-combatants are, as noted, a ‘now-to-then’ (Nordstrom 1997:22) narration of particular events and experiences (e.g. empowerment), brought about through my interaction with different female ex-combatants at a particular space and time. In this narration, female ex-combatant construct meanings. It may very well be that I interpret female ex-combatants’ narratives of empowerment differently to female ex-combatants. One danger here is the potential
105 ‘writing in’ of agency and empowerment during my analysis of interviews (Gilbert
1994:94, McLafferty 1995:437, Rose 1997:307, Auchter 2012:122). That is, in my aim to contribute to an emancipatory peace, I may unwittingly inscribe agency where female ex- combatants saw little space to act. This issue of ‘writing in’ agency is further complicated by translations, where inevitably certain meanings and nuances are lost. Analyzing female ex-combatants’ narratives of empowerment can therefore be revealing, but these narratives are always mediated. The subsection on power relations in my research expands on how narratives are further shaped and mediated.
As noted, evaluating silences in research can be equally revealing as I elaborate in the following paragraphs. In my research, silences are multiple: silences can be a problem in interviews, interviewees can actively use silences, and silences arise from my analysis
(cf. Poland& Pederson 1998). Interviewees may for example not answer questions, which may be the result of misunderstanding the question or an unwillingness to answer (Chacko
2004:58). To probe for the first case, I asked follow-up questions and proceed if still unanswered. I made interviewees aware they could pass on questions (Appendix D), which was taken up on several occasions. Some DDR officials discussed issues they wanted to keep off the record but wanted me to know for my understanding. This created silences for my analysis; one of the ways I addressed these is through other interviews or DDR documentation.
Silences, as noted above, can also be revealing. On several occasions, I asked DDR officials a question, and interviewees simply began laughing, for example when I asked how the support provided in the LDDRR was sustainable (INT59) or how success was
‘measured’ (INT60). In the context of these interviews, this indicated that sustainability and ‘success’ perhaps have been considered to a lesser extent in the LDDRR. In another revealing example, I asked a senior Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction (MoPR) official
106 (INT73) assigned to the UNIRP if and what differences he saw between male and female ex-combatants, to which he responded that they lived far away and in cantonments, and he had had no contact with any ex-combatants. This lack of direct response to the interview question substantiated other UNIRP officials’ arguments that the MoPR remained far- removed from the UNIRP and that the resulting program was largely delivered by the
UN.24 Interviewees actively used silence, for example by skillfully avoiding my questions or providing much harsher critiques of the UN off-the-record than on-the-record. Most silences however come from me as the researcher. As noted, I sought to develop a framework for analyzing female ex-combatants’ experiences over time and spaces that explicitly built on the experiences of female ex-combatants (see above), as I have done with empowerment (Chapter 3). Nonetheless, I still introduce silences through questions I didn’t ask, interview discussions I didn’t pursue, and what I didn’t focus on for my analysis. Here, I follow Carol Cohn (2006:107), who argued, “someone else would have chosen other windows, and, even looking through the same windows, would have been likely to come up with a different analysis.” The following section elaborates on the power relations in my research which further shaped my choices and windows and Chapter 3 details why empowerment is a useful ‘window’ for analyzing female ex-combatants in relation to DDR.
Power Relations in My Research
The analysis produced through interviews with female ex-combatants and DDR officials are not simply their stories; rather, these interviews are already shaped by my initiation of this research, my questions asked during the interview, how I asked and phrased the interview questions, and by my frameworks that prompted these interviews and questions (cf. Stern 2006:185f). As such, interviews and their analysis remain a source of
24 Chapter 6 picks up on the implications thereof for female ex-combatants.
107 potential appropriation and exploitation (Blakeley 2013, D’Costa 2006, Okely 1992, Opie
1992, Stacey 1988, Doucet& Mauthner 2002, 2006:41, England 1994:249f, Glucksman
2002, Mauthner& Doucet 1998, 2003). The following paragraphs reflect on these concerns and how these play out in my research. As England (1994:250) however stresses,
“Reflexivity can make us more aware of asymmetrical or exploitative relationships, but it cannot remove them.” In this subsection I reflect on my positionality in interviews and fieldwork and how this may have shaped the data I collected, who my research subjects are and how they are situated, subjectivities in this research, and the ‘political principles’ underlying this research’.
It is now well-established in feminist scholarship that the biography of the researcher shapes their research from conception to fieldwork and analysis (Best 2003,
Arendell 1997, Fine 1992, Roberts 1981, Wolf 1996, Bourke 2014, McNay 2003). I write this thesis from a position of privilege. I am privileged through the funding of this PhD project, giving me time and resources to conduct this research, including fieldwork, over three years (cf. Chacko 2004:58, Kobayashi 1994, Gilbert 1994:91ff, Rose 1997). This privilege is furthermore shaped by my growing up in the Global North, my middle-class background, and my whiteness25. I was an outsider whose experiences of Liberia and
Nepal were limited to reading prior to commencing fieldwork. This was at times as advantage (cf. Reay 1996, Mellor et al 2014) as female ex-combatants and DDR officials explained in greater detail problems such as intercaste marriages and its cultural implications or how the challenges of DDR were context-dependent (Chapter 6). In other cases, my whiteness (or originating from the Global North) was presumed to mean that I came with money and my lack of provision thereof to ex-combatant organizations in
Liberia and Nepal meant I was denied access to female ex-combatants through these
25 Race for example shapes access to academic positions in the UK (Guardian 2018).
108 organizations. Being white therefore enabled and hindered my research. What helped with access was being a PhD candidate from Manchester. Rather than the University of
Manchester, potential interviewees recognized Manchester through its football teams, seemingly lending some degree of legitimacy to my research as interviewees and gatekeepers had heard of Manchester (unlike other places I have lived or studied). It is difficult to ascertain how this impacted my interviews, but it is plausible that this perceived legitimacy meant that interviewees gave more detailed answers than if I came from an unknown place. In any case, it provided DDR officials and female ex-combatants with a way to get to know me beyond my research, which may have put interviewees more at ease and improved the conversation, generating more detailed stories and a more enjoyable interview experience for the participants, my research assistants, and I.
Gender furthermore shaped my fieldwork and interviews. Contrary to other female researchers (cf. Abels& Behrens 2009:47, Ortbals& Rinker 2009:288ff, Boucher
2017:99ff), I felt taken seriously by the mostly male (and older) DDR official interviewees and still received detailed responses. Being female may have been an advantage in the kind of interview responses I received from female ex-combatants, for example because it can allow for rapport-building based on common experiences as women (cf. Oakley 1981,
2005, Finch 1984, Shah 2004, Roberts 1981, Manderson et al 2007, Williams et al 1993).
In Nepal, there is still a tendency towards gender-based segregation, particularly during menstruation26 in some communities and ethnicities. As a woman, I was therefore more likely to be able to talk to female ex-combatants than a male researcher would have been.
Some interviews in Birendranager were conducted within audible distance of a male gatekeeper and these interview responses were on average less detailed and personal.
26 Particularly problematic is the practice of Chhaupadi Pratha, where women and girls live in cowsheds during menstruation, with severe health implications (Yadav 2016:49, International Alert 2014:10).
109 Interviews conducted with my female research assistant were on average detailed and included very personal stories, which might further suggest that the gender of my research assistants and I shaped the stories shared by female ex-combatants. Nonetheless, I had little in common with many female ex-combatant interviewees. Many were about my age, had married and were mothers (I was neither), and came from poor backgrounds. Others were older and had obtained influential positions in their respective communities and countries
(see more on ‘elites’ below). My experiences of conflict remain limited to secondary experiences. With female ex-combatants in Liberia and Nepal, language was a barrier, although my research assistants in both countries helped address this by telling interviewees about them and me and answering their questions in detail. Nonetheless, my lived experiences (and my research assistants’) are dissimilar to those of my female ex- combatant interviewees, making it more difficult for me to relate to them, and presumably vice versa. This follows feminist literature arguing that presumed communalities such as gender do not necessarily produce more detailed insights and that other intersection identities also influence interviews (Rhodes 1994, Egharevba 2001, Hall 2004, Rabe 2003,
Bourke 2014, Cotterill 1992, Ahmed et al 2011, Broom et al 2009). Gender therefore shaped the data collected; however, this always interacts with other intersecting identities and experiences.
More so than this, fieldwork and the broader research process reflect unequal power relations, raising ethical concerns. Richmond et al (2015:25) for example argue that
“the notion of the field carries colonial baggage in terms of denoting ‘backwardness’ and conflictual practices.” Furthermore, Chandra Talpade Mohanty articulates how Western feminist scholarship on ‘Third World Women’ 27 is an act of discursive colonization.
Mohanty identifies three reasons for this: 1. Construction of a universal category of
27 The term ‘Third World’ is an outdated Cold War term and has been critiqued for homogenizing countries in the Global South.
110 ‘women’, irrespective of culture, class, ethnic or racial differences; 2. Methodologies providing ‘proof’ of universality; and 3. The ‘political principle underlying the methodologies and the analytic strategies’ (Mohanty 1984:336f). I found the first critique particularly problematic regarding the term ‘female ex-combatant’. In this research, I recognize a multitude of experiences discussed throughout my case study chapters. While this highlights the multiple experiences overlooked or simplified in DDR narratives and practices, I concomitantly commit this ‘violence’ by invoking the singular term ‘female ex- combatant’ to denote these multiple experiences. Spivak (1988) refers to this violence as
‘epistemic violence’ of the construction of the ‘Other’ (here female ex-combatants), a representation mediated through my subjectivity. The representation of female ex- combatants engaged in here is therefore ultimately my representation of female ex- combatants and these female ex-combatants may well disagree with my representations and interpretations. Ultimately, I employ what Christine Sylvester (1994:13) has described as “think[ing] of women as stick figures […] while also realizing that we cannot talk to stick figures.” As noted, experiences shaped by gender always intersect with other identities (e.g. caste, age, and ethnicity) which my case study chapters incorporate to further discuss the multitude of female ex-combatant experiences.
Another way of analyzing differences among female ex-combatants and DDR officials is by considering who is an ‘elite’. Research on interviews often distinguishes between non-elites and ‘elites’, i.e. “a group of individuals who hold, or have held, a privileged position in society and, as such[…], are likely to have had more influence on political outcomes than general members of the public” (Richards 1996:199). Blakely
(2013) also considers NGO staff ‘elites’. Thus, at a first glance, the DDR officials I interviewed are ‘elites’, while female ex-combatant interviewees are not. Elites are not a uniform category and there are often hierarchies within them (Zuckerman 1972, Smith
111 2006:645f). There were discrepancies of ‘elite status’ among female ex-combatants.
Among female ex-combatant interviewees, some had become members of Parliament in
Nepal or otherwise high-ranking officials. These women have become highly influential on a political level and within families and communities. Some of these female ex-combatants are experienced interviewees and have had public relations training. This affected how interview progressed, and likely, what their expectations were. This highlights that who constitutes an elite is not clear-cut. This diversity among female ex-combatants has implications for my analysis. The ‘elite’ female ex-combatants continue to be high-ranking officials of the Maoist Party and may have wanted to portray the Party positively. The
‘non-elites’ were mostly no longer affiliated with the Party and faced no such constraints.
Both groups of female ex-combatants however discussed their experiences of empowerment in detail, as did female ex-combatants in Liberia. These hierarchies between female ex-combatants in Nepal however highlight differences in reintegration, as Chapter
5 elaborates.
There were often discrepancies in interview responses between international, national, and regional DDR staff, with the latter two groups much more likely to raise problems with DDR. International staff were more likely to follow the official ‘script’
(Mac Ginty 2013b, Holmes 2019). I incorporate both in my analysis, especially in Chapter
6, in different ways. For example, the official ‘script’ or narrative reveals underlying assumptions regarding female ex-combatants. The national and regional DDR staff frequently elaborated on challenges of and their resistances to DDR implementation. The section on ‘hybridities’ in Chapter 6 draws on this to illustrate how DDR officials’ implementations of UN-led DDR may diverge from the official ‘script’. Both, as Chapter 6 contends in detail, have implications for female ex-combatants’ empowerment. This highlights that neither DDR officials nor female ex-combatants are uniform categories and
112 that acknowledging and incorporating this diversity within ‘categories’ in my research provides for a deeper understanding of female ex-combatants’ empowerment in relation to
UN-led DDR.
This research however remains subjective. Although I recorded interviews to accurately capture responses, I may misinterpret meaning, further complicated by translations of interviews (Rose 1997:315, Smith 1996). Readers may interpret my writing and selected quotes differently than I do (Manderson et al 2007:1331, Franzosi 1998, Rose
1997:317). Although I set out to develop a framework (of empowerment, Chapter 3) based on the experiences and narratives of female ex-combatants conveyed to me through interviews, it ultimately remained my exercise of power in choosing quotes and examples of particular arguments. In this, I painfully admit that much “human dignity has to be left on the cutting room floor” (Enloe 1996:188). To return to Mohanty, the ‘political principle’ underlying this research and these choices is my critical feminist peacebuilding perspective, with the aim of highlighting female ex-combatants’ empowerment to contribute to an emancipatory peace. As the case study chapters highlight that DDR reproduces gendered inequalities and undermines female ex-combatants’ empowerment, the question for me is not just ‘Can I speak about female ex-combatants?’ as much as it is also ‘Can I afford not to?’ (cf. Edwards 1996:83). In doing so, I recognize that the representation I engage in reflects a ‘permanent partiality’ (Haraway 1990) and is mediated through my subjectivity (Spivak 1988).
The narratives female ex-combatants and DDR officials provide are also subjective.
Interviewees may misremember things (cf. Richards 1996, Alison 2009:33f), or may be more reserved if responses are recorded (Blakely 2013:167), as I did for all but one of my interviews. At other times, interviewees may deliberately distort narratives, particularly were funding is involved. In the immediate aftermath of the 2003 peace agreement in
113 Liberia, humanitarian aid was extremely limited, and what was available to women was primarily targeted at rape victims. According to Mats Utas (2005a), this women-as-victims narrative encouraged women to openly claim to have been raped to access what limited resources were available. That is not to say that rape was not endemic during the Liberian conflict, but that humanitarian aid can shape narratives, in turn affecting interviews. It may be that interviewees misremember things, without deliberately setting out to distort events.
This is a challenge of relying on interviews and by extension on memory as a form of knowledge-production underpinning my research.
Summarizing, there are numerous unequal power relations in my research from conception to analysis and representation. This research is subjective and I exercise considerable power over the narratives and voices represented here. Nonetheless, my research is committed to highlighting multiple and contradictory female ex-combatant experiences of empowerment and DDR to contribute to an emancipatory peace.
Conclusions
The purpose of this chapter was to outline my critical feminist peacebuilding perspective and how this shapes my analysis of female ex-combatants’ empowerment and UN-led
DDR. Throughout this chapter, I contended that my critical feminist peacebuilding perspective is interested in power, particular gender as shaping unequal power relations and agency as the exercise of power, as well as how these change over time and space. The aim of analyzing power/gender/agency is to contribute to an emancipatory peace by challenging unequal gendered power relations and building on the agency female ex- combatants already exercise. To do so, I discussed three analytical strategies commonly applied in critical feminist peacebuilding scholarship: 1. Female ex-combatants’ experiences and narratives of empowerment; 2. Gendered narratives in UN-led DDR; and
3. Multiple hybridities in UN-led DDR and implications for female ex-combatants’
114 empowerment. Specifically, this chapter has contended that analyzing female ex- combatants’ experiences and narratives can highlight the agency female ex-combatants already exercise, how this is shaped by gender, and how this changes over time and space.
A focus on gendered narratives in UN-led DDR additionally highlights how gendered inequalities are reproduced. Lastly, analyzing multiple hybridities, such as female ex- combatants’, local and international DDR officials’ and staff of national DDR bodies’ hybridities with UN-led DDR can highlight multiple and complex power relations reproducing and challenging gendered inequalities.
The following chapter elaborates on how empowerment is understood from my critical feminist peacebuilding perspective. Additionally, I unpack why empowerment is a useful concept to make sense of female ex-combatants’ experiences of combatanthood, reintegration, and UN-led DDR.
115 Chapter 3: Empowerment
The previous chapter detailed what I mean by taking a critical feminist peacebuilding perspective to analyze female ex-combatants’ empowerment. The purpose of this chapter is to discuss what empowerment is, and how it relates to reintegration, as well as my critical feminist peacebuilding perspective. To do so, I draw on the story of Manisha 28 (INT2).
Manisha was born in 1980 into a Magar family29 in mid-Western Nepal. She was not allowed to go to school because she was a girl, while her brother studied in a city far away.
Democracy was reintroduced in Nepal in 1990 and with that the Maoist Party, 30 who conducted political awareness campaigns, including the need to educate daughters. This inspired Manisha to borrow schoolbooks from neighbors to study and she taught herself how to read while feeding the cattle in the jungle or by light at night in the cow shed.
When Manisha was 11 years old, her mother wanted her to get married, and her parents had accepted a dowry of 1000 Nepali Rupees. Manisha rejected the proposal, threatening to kill herself, to which her parents relented. Despite her mother’s objections, Manisha was admitted to grade 5 in 1991 and carried stones to afford her school uniform. Her mother used to say that if a daughter goes to school, she would not be respected by society. Her mother would beat Manisha and throw out her books, upon which Manisha ran away.
These books were later retrieved by her father, who allowed her to study without her mother’s interference. Through the local student union, Manisha became involved in student politics.
When the conflict started in 1996, Manisha was the first female guerilla of her district. She rose through the ranks of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), eventually becoming Brigade Commissioner. With the rise in ranks came an increased political role
28 All names have been changed for anonymity 29 A significant ethnic minority in Nepal 30 Now the Nepal Communist Party
116 for the PLA and she also gave instructions, coaching, and training to other PLA combatants, including female combatants. During this time, Manisha recalled, ‘there was total freedom, no oppression’. After the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (2006) officially ended the conflict, Manisha became an elected member of the constituent assembly for her district, a position she still holds today. Through the role as combatant, Manisha was able to ‘secure everything for herself and became a leader, which enables [her] to work for the sake of citizens’. She also feels better off than women who did not fight, as the role of combatant empowered Manisha to become a leader.
Manisha highlighted various changes in society as a result of the conflict. She explained that before the conflict, “there was a belief that women can do nothing and were just taken as instruments for entertainment and machines for reproduction who had to behave according to the male’s instructions and orders.” Manisha clarified that the Maoist conflict challenged these beliefs and showed that ‘females can fight, rule, and command.’
The conflict was a success from the viewpoint of female combatants as the current constitution accounts for a 33% female representation quota in the executive, judiciary, and legislative branches; citizenship passed on through both mother and father, and equal inheritance rights for sons and daughters. Despite these gains, Manisha acknowledged that
‘oppressive thinking’ and practices persist, including within the Maoist party, but that she and others remain committed to fighting these inequalities.
To make sense of Manisha’s story and the multiple and complex forms of power and experiences she has due to her role as combatant, I employ the concept of empowerment, reconceptualized from my critical feminist peacebuilding perspective as both draw on agency to challenge unequal power relations. I base my understandings of empowerment loosely on international development and critical feminist Jo Rowlands’
(1997) conceptualization of power over, power to, power within, and power with. These
117 four forms of power are used to demonstrate the complexities of empowerment and how they reflect an expanded scope for female ex-combatants’ agency.
The central argument of this chapter is that empowerment and its four forms of power are useful for understanding female ex-combatants’ experiences of combatanthood, reintegration, and UN-led DDR from my critical feminist peacebuilding perspective. This is because highlighting such empowerment as an expanded scope for agency can draw attention to the agency female ex-combatants are enabled to exercise through their role as combatant, including agency to challenge gendered inequalities and to contribute to an emancipatory peace. As I argue throughout this chapter, these four forms of power are related: they build on and contradict each other and can support and undermine the reintegration of individual female ex-combatants. Moreover, these four forms of power have the potential to support building an emancipatory peace. These four forms of power
(power over, power to, power within, power with) are utilized to highlight the complexities of power in empowerment. To make these arguments, I first discuss why empowerment is useful from my critical feminist peacebuilding perspective before elaborating on these four forms of power in empowerment in the following order: power over, power to, power within, and power with.
What is Empowerment and why is it Useful?
This first section elaborates on what empowerment is and why it is a useful concept from my critical feminist peacebuilding perspective. Here, I contend that there are various reasons for utilizing this ‘window of analysis’ (Cohn 2006:107) of empowerment to make sense of female ex-combatants’ experiences of their role as combatant, reintegration, and
UN-led DDR. The reasons I put forward in this section include the attention to agency through the concept of empowerment, the multiple and contradictory experiences of female ex-combatants and how these change over time. Additionally, returning to the critical,
118 post-colonial, and feminist roots of the concept of empowerment can recover its critical meaning lost during its rise in prominence in liberal development and liberal peacebuilding.
Empowerment can be understood as having critical, feminist, and post-colonial roots. According to Batliwala (2007:558), empowerment as a term “acquired a strongly political meaning in the latter half of the twentieth century, when it was adopted by the liberation theology, popular education, black power, feminist and other movements engaged in struggles for more equitable, participatory, and democratic forms of social change.” The term for example entered development narratives in the 1990s through ‘Third
World Women’s feminist writing and grassroots organizations’ (Moser 1993:57).
Empowerment has become a buzzword in liberal peacebuilding narratives (Batliwala
2007:557, Cornwall& Brock 2005:1055ff, UN Women 2015:4). To illustrate just how widely liberal peacebuilding’s approach to empowerment differs from the critical, feminist, and post-colonial roots of the concept, I first briefly focus on how empowerment is understood in the context of liberal peacebuilding before contrasting it with and elaborating on its critical meanings. As is common with buzzwords, their meanings often remain vague, and differ widely from program to program, and this is also true for empowerment (MacKenzie 2009:199ff). The discussion here attempts to capture some trends regarding the meaning of empowerment in liberal peacebuilding policies and programming whilst noting that in practice meanings may well depart from this.
Specifically, I focus on three ‘trends’: 1. Empowerment is for women (only); 2.
Empower is economic; and 3. Empowerment is only for the individual. In liberal peacebuilding practices, empowerment is frequently prefaced with ‘women’. For instance, liberal peacebuilding literature is rife with reference on women’s economic empowerment
(Shepherd 2017:118ff), the Sustainable Development Goals are committed to ‘achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls,’ and UN Women is ‘dedicated to
119 gender equality and the empowerment of women’ (UN Women 2018a, UNDP 2016). In liberal peacebuilding, empowerment is thus something that is mainly for women, with the implicit assumption that men/boys are not in need of empowerment, presumably because they already have ‘power’. This constructs men as powerful and women as powerless, in need of ‘empowerment’ (Cornwall& Rivas 2015:405). The second ‘trend’ is the close association between empowerment and economic growth. Shepherd (2017:119) for instance writes, “the logic of empowerment in UN liberal peacebuilding discourse extends only to economic empowerment,” and frequently, ‘women’s economic empowerment’.
Empowerment has become co-opted in liberal peacebuilding, being deployed to bring about a liberal peace through economic growth (Cornwall 2016:342ff, Rowlands 1998:13,
Ní Aoláin et al 2011:271, Porter 2013:4). UN Women (2015:171) for example write that
“targeting women’s empowerment in fact accelerates economic recovery.” This suggests that women’s economic empowerment is not about gender equality or helping women, but about economic growth.
Thirdly, empowerment in liberal peacebuilding has lost much of its radical origins.
As Cornwall& Harrison (2007:7) contend, empowerment “has been reduced from a complex process of self-realization, self-actualization and mobilization to demand change, to a simple act of transformation bestowed by a transfer of money and/or information.”
Critically, empowerment in liberal peacebuilding has come to be an ‘add women and stir’ approach, where women are simply added in to existing economic structures without challenging these same structures which produced their exclusion and gendered inequalities in the first place.31 Moreover, this emphasis on the individual only has resulted
31 Similar critiques have been levelled at gender mainstreaming and the Women, Peace, and Security framework, where underlying radical ideas have been diffused and diluted in the process of ‘mainstreaming’ said ideas into liberal development and peacebuilding practices (Barnes 2006, Rehn& Johnson-Sirleaf 2002:5, UN Secretary General Study 2002, UNDP 2006b, Subrahmanian 2007:113, Parpart 2014ab, Mukhopdyay 2007:140, Snodgrass 2010:117, Charlesworth 2005,
120 in supposed beneficiaries of liberal peacebuilding empowerment approaches being blamed for the lack of ‘empowerment’ results (Kesby 2005:2050f). Empowerment in the context of liberal peacebuilding has therefore come to mean women’s economic empowerment through their adding in to existing structures. Some feminists such as Srilatha Batliwala
(2007:564) have therefore advocated for searching for a new language. However, as
Cornwall and Brock (2005:1056f) write, paraphrasing Sen, abandoning the concept of empowerment because it has become less critical “would not only be giving up the battle, but also losing the war.” I return to the critical, feminist, and post-colonial roots of empowerment and further build on this through my case studies of female ex-combatants’ empowerment in Liberia and Nepal. The following paragraphs elaborate on these roots and their relevance for my critical feminist peacebuilding understanding of empowerment.
Empowerment as a concept has been taken up by critical, feminist, and post- colonial scholars since the 1970s, although its basic premises considerably predate this
(Cornwall& Rivas 2005:404, Batliwala 2007:558). In spite of this diversity in scholarship, empowerment as a concept has shared some strong commonalities across these three broad disciplines. At a first step, empowerment is about individual transformation, especially consciousness-raising of inequalities (Freire 2000 [1970], Collins 1991, Gortz 1982, Moser
1993:76, Parpart et al 2002). The point of empowerment is however not only focused on this internal transformation of the individual, but for individuals to draw on this internal transformation to collectively bring about societal transformation (Batliwala 1993, Kabeer
1994, Bookman& Morgen 1988, Sen 1997, Rowlands 1997, Klouzal 2003:259, Lairap-
Fonderson 2002). These different bodies of scholarship differ regarding the foci of such transformation, ranging from challenging unequal gendered power relations and gendered inequalities to anti-colonial resistances (Cain& Yuval-Davis 1990, Fanon 1952, Kitzinger
Alexander 2009, Leckie 2009:14, Whitworth 2004, Cornwall et al 2007:3, Desai 2005:96, Gentry& Sjoberg 2015:8, Duncanson 2016:14f, O’Reilly 2013:64, Hudson 2010b:51, George et al 2019).
121 1991). Moreover, empowerment in critical, feminist, and post-colonial literatures is widely understood as a ‘process, not an end-point’ (Cornwall& Rivas 2015:405) of the ongoing challenge to inequalities and colonialism (Bystydzienski 1992:3, Mosedal 2005:244,
Batliwala 2007, Gjelsvik 2010:19, Maschietto 2016:23). Such understandings overlap with my critical feminist peacebuilding perspective in various ways, as the following paragraphs discuss.
Firstly, empowerment is aimed at challenging unequal power relations, including gender. In this sense, the goals of empowerment in critical, feminist, and post-colonial scholarship overlap with those of my critical feminist peacebuilding perspective, where an emancipatory peace is the aim. The key difference is the latter’s focus on peace in challenging unequal gendered power relations. Secondly, these critical, feminist, and post- colonial roots of empowerment recognize and build on the agency of individuals, restricted as it might be by structures and unequal power relations. Empowerment then presupposes an agential subject. Moreover, empowerment is aimed at expanding the individual’s scope for agency over time to contribute to a collective social transformation (Dyrdryk 2013:250,
Ibrahim& Alkire 2007:8). The critical, feminist, and post-colonial roots of empowerment therefore closely relate to my critical feminist peacebuilding perspective: empowerment recognizes and challenges unequal power relations, including gender, and seeks to build on and expand the agency of individuals in this process. Empowerment in critical, feminist, and post-colonial scholarship therefore starkly differ from ‘trends’ in liberal peacebuilding: in the former, the emphasis is on challenging, not reproducing unequal power relations, which extends far beyond ‘empowering’ women through economic resources or economic growth.
Another benefit of utilizing the concept of empowerment is that inherent to the term is a focus on temporality. This builds on Rowlands’ (1997:129) conceptualization,
122 who argues that empowerment “is most usefully defined as a process (or processes) rather than an end product; it is dynamic and changing, and varies widely according to circumstance.” This allows me to trace the different forms of empowerment (power over, power to, power within, and power with) through mobilization, roles in conflict, and reintegration. Paying attention to the temporality of female ex-combatants’ experiences through the concept of empowerment thus enables analyzing implications of reintegration and especially UN-led DDR for female ex-combatants’ empowerment. Such an approach also acknowledges that empowerment may not be equal among female ex-combatants and that one female ex-combatant may not experience these different forms of empowerment to an equal extent. A further advantage of approaching female ex-combatants’ experiences through the concept of empowerment is that it is relative, i.e. it is an analysis of an increase or decrease in different forms of power experienced by a particular female ex-combatant over time. Implicit in Rowlands’ conceptualization is also an understanding of empowerment as shaped by spatiality, as ‘circumstances’ or different spaces can shape variations in empowerment. From my critical feminist peacebuilding perspective, empowerment is thus a useful concept for analyzing female ex-combatants’ experiences over time in relation to UN-led DDR, as ‘empowerment’ is closely tied to spatiality and temporality.
Furthermore, empowerment from my critical feminist peacebuilding perspective draws explicitly on the stories and experiences of female ex-combatants conveyed to me in interviews. As Chapter 2 discussed, the understanding of empowerment and its four different forms of power utilized here is shaped through my interviews with female ex- combatants. Analyzing empowerment provides a useful frame to capture and convey female ex-combatants’ multiple and conflicting experiences of combatanthood, reintegration, and UN-led DDR. Moreover, this ‘window’ of empowerment also allows for
123 an analysis of how these multiple and conflicting experiences are recognized and built upon in UN-led DDR, as well as how UN-led DDR and hybridities within UN-led DDR shape female ex-combatants’ empowerment. Moreover, I utilize an understanding of empowerment as an expanded scope for agency. As discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, female ex-combatants are (often) stripped of their agency in DDR. Analyzing female ex- combatants’ empowerment can highlight female ex-combatants’ gendered agency and how this changes over time. Recognizing such a complex picture of female ex-combatants’ experiences by focusing on their empowerment opens up various possibilities. For instance, recognizing empowerment can mean building on this in UN-led DDR in ways that female ex-combatants find beneficial. In this sense, empowerment can be transformed to benefit female ex-combatants post-conflict. Furthermore, recognizing female ex-combatants’ empowerment which contributes to challenging gender as a social relation of inequality and supporting this through reintegration and peacebuilding has potential to contribute to building an emancipatory peace. Analyzing female ex-combatants’ empowerment is thus valuable from my critical feminist peacebuilding perspective, as it allows for transforming
DDR and challenging gender as social relation of inequality.
There are thus various reasons why empowerment is useful analyzing female ex- combatants’ experiences in relation to UN-led DDR. Empowerment reflects a concern with agency and how agency changes over time. Highlighting this empowerment can draw attention to the agency female ex-combatants already exercise (enabled by their role as combatant), including agency and empowerment to challenge gendered inequalities.
Furthermore, empowerment is closely linked to temporality and spatiality, making it a useful concept for tracing female ex-combatants’ experiences through combatanthood, reintegration, and UN-led DDR. Incidentally, an engagement with empowerment as a
124 concept from my critical feminist peacebuilding perspective also recovers the critical, feminist roots of the concept.
Power Over
As noted, I am adapting Jo Rowland’s (1997) conceptualization of four forms of power in the concept of empowerment. Rowlands (1997:13) overviews different interpretations of the power aspect of empowerment, drawing on feminist literatures on power. She discusses four types of power: power over, power to, power within, and power with. ‘Power over’ refers to ‘controlling power’, while ‘power to’ refers to “generative or productive power
[…] which creates new possibilities and actions without domination.” ‘Power within’, refers, according to Rowlands, to ‘self-acceptance and self-respect.’ The last, ‘power with’ refers to being able to solve problems as a collective. 32
The first form of empowerment I consider is ‘power over’. Power over is, as noted, a controlling form of power. Such an understanding of power is for example prominent in realist understandings of power, where it is considered “the power to force or influence someone to do something that they otherwise would not” (True 2005:225, Jaquette 1984).
From a feminist perspective, Rowlands (1997:11) argues that power over “is wielded predominantly by men over other men, and by men over women.” As such, Rowlands continues, “When power is defined as ‘power over’, then if women gain power it will be at men’s expense.” This, I argue, is an oversimplified approach to power over. To make this argument and provide a more complex understanding of power over, I return to my critical feminist peacebuilding understanding of power (Chapter 2) as exercised, relational, productive, gendered, and shaped by temporality and spatiality. Following this understanding, ‘power over’ is not something Agent A possesses over Subject B, but rather is exercised by Agent/Subject A in their unequal relation to Agent/Subject B. Such a
32 Collective is used in the broadest sense of the word
125 relational exercise of power is not merely repressive (e.g. stopping Agent/Subject B from doing something), but can also be productive (e.g. getting B to do something). This power over is however not absolute. Critical feminist peacebuilding scholarship, drawing on post- colonial literature, has for example long pointed out that the imposition of liberal peacebuilding practices has been met with varying forms of resistances by a diversity of actors (cf. El-Bushra 2000:80, Björkdahl& Kappler 2017:17ff, Björkdahl& Höglund 2013,
Björkdahl& Selimovic 2015, McEvoy-Levy 2015). Female ex-combatants may for example resist power over by running away from armed groups, as was often the case for abducted girl ex-combatants. As a result of escaping, these female ex-combatants frequently avoided DDR or were excluded, thereby losing out on potential benefits
(MacKenzie 2012:87f, Ní Aoláin et al 2011:137). Resistance may therefore enable certain options, as well as disable others. Of course, there may be many more subtle forms of resistance against power over.
Moreover, a consideration of temporality and spatiality highlights that
Agent/Subject A does not always exercise power over Agent/Subject B, but that this is shaped by ‘spacetime’ in which this power is exercised. To illustrate this, I draw on Mats
Utas’ (2005b) detailed case study of Liberian female ex-combatant Bintu. The story of
Bintu emphasizes that women’s experiences of conflict are varied, ranging from victimization through rape to shrewdly navigating relations to keep herself and others safe.
To the many male combatants who came from rural areas, having multiple girlfriends was not only for their pleasure, but functioned as status symbol, mimicking their own
‘traditional’ ideals of polygamous households (ibid.:415). Male combatants would sometimes kill these ‘girlfriends’ who failed to obey them or ran away, thus suggesting that male combatants frequently exercised power over ‘girlfriends’ like Bintu. ‘Girlfriends’ frequently also used this position to keep their families safe and obtain resources.
126 Moreover, girlfriends would demand that their combatant go to the frontlines to fight and bring back loot for them, and having to risk their lives. If he would fail to do so, the
‘girlfriends’ could leave the man for another higher-ranking combatant. This suggests that female ex-combatants such as Bintu were also able to exercise power over male combatants and that the exercise of power over is shaped by gender. The ability to influence ‘boyfriends’ to obtain loot was also dependent on whether a particular female combatant/girlfriend was a current favorite, a status she could easily lose. Fellow
‘girlfriends’ also played a role in this, as they sometimes spread rumors that could result in the favorite girlfriends losing her status, or even being killed. Bintu’s story therefore illustrates that depending on the space and time, female ex-combatants are both agent and subject of power over, and that this is shaped by gender as social relation of inequality.
For female ex-combatants’ reintegration, ‘power over’ has several implications.
Female ex-combatants may exercise, be subject to, and resist ‘power over’. Particularly child ex-combatants may be prevented or discouraged from leaving armed groups, although many may also choose to stay, as was the case in Nepal (UNSC S/2008/5). In
Sierra Leone, commanders retaining girl ex-combatants as wives and/or laborers was reportedly widespread (MacKenzie 2012:77f, Shekhawat et al 2015:60). Specht (2006:13f) elaborates that in Liberia, many female ex-combatants did not want to leave commanders and resisted DDR, which attempted to separate combatants from commanders.
Additionally, , empowerment-as-power-over can be understood as power over resources. Such understandings are especially prominent among development and liberal peacebuilding approaches to empowerment, where women’s empowerment has been reduced to granting economic resources (e.g. microfinance) to women, based on the assumption that this contributes to (or even constitutes) overall empowerment, and, more importantly, contributes to economic growth (cf. Batliwala et al 2007:21, Kabeer 1994:443,
127 2008:91f, Rowlands 1998:13, Shepherd 2011:509). This is problematic from my critical feminist peacebuilding perspective, as increased power over resources does not necessarily challenge inequalities that obstruct access to such resources along gender, caste, class, age lines (Kabeer 1999, 2005ab, 2008, 2010, Kabeer et al 2011). Furthermore, as critical feminists have long emphasized, economic growth reproduces gendered inequalities, often to the detriment of women/girls, and linked to other forms of inequality (cf. Bedford and
Rai 2010, Boserup 1970, Elias 2011, Griffin 2016, Kabeer 1994, Peterson 2005, Steans
1999). As such, empowerment cannot be taken to simply mean power over resources.
Power over resources has implications for female ex-combatants’ reintegration.
Power over physical resources in the context of conflict can mean acquisition of looted goods in conflict. While female ex-combatants may not necessarily become combatants for the sole purpose of looting (Henshaw 2013:175f), female combatants do participate in and benefit from looting, and contribute to conflict economies (MacKenzie 2012, Utas 2003,
2005a:147). The problem here is that power over such resources comes at the expense of others (predominantly civilians), who may have acquired these resources through legitimate or illegitimate means. The concern for building an emancipatory peace is that female ex-combatants who have gained power over such resources may be reluctant to give them up. In the context of Liberia, ‘former’ combatants from LURD (Liberians
United for Democracy) still maintained control over rubber plantations in Tubmanburg and
Sinoe counties until at least 2004 and 2006 respectively (IRIN in Reliefweb 2004, IRIN
2006, INT42). While such news reports usually portray young male combatants as responsible, it is plausible that female combatants, especially female commanders, were involved in retaining control over such resources acquired through conflict. Putting aside the colonial overtones in calling combatant-controlled plantations ‘lawless’, the IRIN articles draw attention to the people and employees living on the plantation, and
128 ‘harassment… such as beating people or extorting money’ from people who live on or near plantations. Empowerment-as-power-over resources can thus have negative implications for peacebuilding, and can prevent reintegration of ex-combatants into civilian life through sustaining elements of armed conflict.
As noted, it is important to consider the temporality of empowerment.
Empowerment-as-power-over resources, civilians, and other combatants is particularly affected by temporality. The examples provided here are all contingent on being a high- ranking female combatant, and loss of this status likely means a loss of this empowerment.
DDR, and reintegration particularly, are designed to remove weapons (which can be used to exercise power over) and to disband armed groups (structures which enable the exercise of power over). Reintegration is further designed to turn combatants into peaceable civilians, thereby aiming to stop violence as a way to exercise power over. Reintegration is thus explicitly designed to undermine empowerment-as-power-over.
Empowerment-as-power-over is therefore considered to be female ex-combatants’ relational exercise of power over civilians, resources, and other combatants. This exercise of power over is not absolute, but is shaped by ‘spacetime’ and may be resisted by the subject of power over. Moreover, the relational exercise of power over is shaped by gender as social relation of inequality, often to the detriment of women/girls, but sometimes also providing opportunities. Empowerment-as-power-over may benefit female ex-combatants individually, but ultimately undermines their reintegration and the reintegration of other ex-combatants. It further has potentially negative implications for building an emancipatory peace.
Power To
The next form of empowerment I consider is empowerment-as-power-to. As noted above,
Rowlands considers power to as “generative or productive power […] which creates new
129 possibilities and actions without domination.” Implicit in this understanding of empowerment is a productive form of power which seeks to challenge gendered inequalities, making empowerment-as-power-to beneficial from my critical feminist peacebuilding perspective to contribute to an emancipatory peace. At its most basic,
‘power to’ can for example be considered the development of new skills which create such new possibilities. Such skills can for example contribute to female ex-combatants’ economic reintegration. Utas (2005a:147) explains that combatants learned to do business, and “many continued to use the trade skills they had learnt during war in the post-war setting.” This illustrates that skills developed during conflict can be beneficial to female ex-combatants’ economic reintegration.
As with ‘power over’, female ex-combatants’ new skills can also undermine peacebuilding. This is especially the case where ex-combatants acquire combat skills and as the ‘spoilers literature’ tends to argue, can lead to continued conflict and violence
(Duncanson 2016:12, Jennings 2007:205, Stedman 2008, UNDP 2008, UNMIL 2007,
World Bank 2002a). Themnér (2011) however challenged the assumption that violent combatants remain violent combatants, arguing that several factors, including grievances and command-chains can play a pivotal role in sustaining conflict. As argued in Chapter 1, political reintegration can create different ways to address grievances, thus removing incentives for conflict. Thus, skills as empowerment-as-power-to can contribute to and undermine female ex-combatants’ reintegration and the building of an emancipatory peacebuilding.
A different interpretation of ‘power to’ is control over one’s life. Liz Kelly (1992, cited in Rowlands 1997:12) links power to and power over, writing that power to “is achieved by increasing one’s ability to resist and challenge ‘power over’.” Rather than who or what previously exercised ‘power over,’ resisting such power over increases the amount
130 of control female ex-combatants can exercise over their own lives, thereby expanding the scope for their exercise of agency. To return to the challenges empowerment-as-power- over can pose (see above), such resistance and increased control over one’s life might entail escaping armed groups. Such resistance may also mean that female ex-combatants cannot benefit from DDR, as they often exclude themselves, either because they consider it dangerous, no longer consider themselves a combatant, or are excluded because they are no longer affiliated with armed groups at the time of DDR (MacKenzie 2010:158f).
However, resistance can also mean participating in DDR. This was for example the case in
Nepal, where 848 female Verified Minors and Late Recruits (VMLRs) participated in the
UNIRP despite the Maoist leaders’ rejection and discouragement of the program (Bleie et al 2012:39). This highlights that what constitutes resistance to increased control over one’s life is dependent on the space and context in which it is exercised. Control over one’s life may thus be exercised and gained through resistance, which in turn is shaped by spatiality.
Control of one’s life is tied to choice. Naila Kabeer’s work on choice as empowerment is instructive here. Choice, Kabeer (2010:17) writes, “is clearly only meaningful if it is possible to have chosen otherwise.” As discussed in Chapter 2, choice can constitute an exercise of agency, but this is always shaped by the structures and unequal relations in which this choice and agency is exercised. For choice to constitute empowerment, it needs to expand female ex-combatants’ scope for the exercise of agency.
For female ex-combatants’ reintegration this has several implications. Regarding economic reintegration, this means that female ex-combatants have the choice of several qualitative economic reintegration support options in UN-led DDR programs, although these choices are always shaped by structures and unequal power relations reproducing gendered inequalities. It also means being able to choose economic reintegration support options that are not usually available to women and girls in a particular context, and feeling enabled to
131 exercise their choice. For social reintegration, this means being able to choose partners, and deciding how to integrate into families and communities. Following Kabeer, this also means that female ex-combatants can choose otherwise, including not reintegrating into families and communities at all, but to resettle elsewhere. For political reintegration this can mean choosing to reintegrate politically, joining a political party or distancing oneself from political parties, such as the parties/armies female ex-combatants fought for. As discussed in Chapter 1, such choices are frequently inaccessible to women/girls based on their gender. For choice to constitute empowerment, choice therefore needs to reflect an expanded scope for agency, as well as challenging rather than reproducing gendered inequalities.
Empowerment-as-power-to is also shaped by temporality. Particularly control over one’s life and choice depend on structures and spaces, which change over time and shape and limit female ex-combatants’ choice and control over their lives. However, skills may be less marked by temporality. Although female ex-combatants may not exercise certain skills upon reintegration, skills may be hard to forget once acquired. As such, empowerment-as-power-to is temporally flexible regarding choice and control over one’s life, which are limited by structures. Empowerment-as-power-to may be less slippery in relation to skills.
Empowerment-as-power-to is therefore productive, consisting of the development of new skills and increased control and choice in one’s life. Empowerment-as-power-to can thus be understood as a form of power in relation to the self, although this is always situated in structures (including structures which reproduce gendered inequalities) which may shape and limit this form of power. Control and choice may support female ex- combatants’ reintegration and can contribute to peacebuilding. Skills may support and undermine this, as combat skills lead to continued violence and conflict.
132 Power Within
Increased choice however does not simply occur. Kabeer (2003:171) emphasizes that while choices may exist, oppressions (e.g. gendered inequalities) are often so internalized that people may not see such alternative options or feel unable to pursue such alternative options as choices and agency are exercised within unequal social relations (Chapter 2). As outlined here, critical feminist peacebuilding scholarship argues that a recognition of these alternative options and the pursuit thereof requires an internal transformation, or empowerment-as-power-within.
Rowlands (1997:13) defined power within as “the spiritual strength and uniqueness that resides in each one of use and makes us truly human. Its basis is self-acceptance and self-respect.” Others have approached such internal transformation as ‘self-esteem’ (Moser
1993:27) or a ‘sense of self-worth’ (Beetham& Demetriades 2007:207, Kabeer 2005).
Empowerment-as-power-within can be understood as self-realization. This overlaps with
Patricia Hill Collins’ (1991:224) understanding of empowerment. She writes that “African-
American women have overtly rejected theories of power based on domination [i.e. empowerment-as-power-over] in order to embrace an alternative vision of power based on a humanist vision of self-actualization, self-definition, and self-determination.” In this sense, empowerment-as-power-within particularly focuses on the internal transformation aspect of empowerment (see above).
However, self-realization often takes place in contexts and structures limiting such self-realization. Collins (1991:111) stresses this, writing: “If a Black woman is forced to remain ‘motionless on the outside,’ she can always develop the ‘inside’ of a changed consciousness as a sphere of freedom. Becoming empowered through self-knowledge, even within conditions that severely limit one's ability to act, is essential.” As detailed in
Chapter 2, people are always situated in structures which reproduce unequal gendered
133 power relations and thereby shape their agency. Collins here follows empowerment’s focus on individual transformation to enable a collective societal transformation. Such changed consciousness (‘awareness’ as I call it in Chapter 4; this is the buzzword used in the Nepali peacebuilding context) thus forms the basis for self-realization. Such increased awareness is related to awareness of unequal power structures as prerequisite for social change.
Critical Pedagogy scholar Paulo Freire (2000 [1970]) argued the same. He termed this conscientização (‘conscientization’) of the oppressed, understood as an internal transformation with the ‘oppressed’ and awareness of their oppression or state of
‘unfreedom’ (ibid.:47ff). According to Freire, this conscientização functions on an individual level (here ‘power within’) and collective level (‘power with’, below) and is indispensable to the emancipation of the ‘oppressed’ from power over. Awareness or conscientization (empowerment-as-power-within) is thus productive, enabling empowerment-as-power-with and emancipation from power over.
There are however issues with Freire’s approach to awareness from my critical feminist peacebuilding perspective. A critical feminist view of oppression for example highlights several layers and hierarchies of oppression, whereas Freire employs a clear dichotomy of oppressor-oppressed. For example, female ex-combatant Savitra (INT10) became a high-ranking Maoist commander. She joined the conflict early, becoming involved through student politics. Her access to education was facilitated (or at least not hindered) by being upper-caste, as was her rise to high-ranking positions in the PLA.33 In spite of this high-ranking positions, Savitra felt that she has had to overcome additional challenge because of her gender, as “Nepali society is patriarchal, so naturally men used to think themselves as senior and more capable and women as weak,” even in the PLA with its rhetoric of gender equality. Savitra’s story highlights that a clear dichotomy of
33 Despite its rhetoric to abolish the caste system, high-level positions in the PLA were disproportionately filled with upper-caste commanders (Yami 2006:15, Bogati 2014).
134 oppressor-oppressed is oversimplified and requires closer attention to multiple unequal gendered power relations, which differ according to context.
A second issue is that Freire places the full burden of challenging (gendered) inequalities on the ‘oppressed’. Specifically, Freire (2000:56) contends that only the
‘oppressed’ can change unequal relations through conscientização, whilst the ‘oppressor’ cannot. Although the ‘oppressed’ frequently reproduce unequal power relations and gendered inequalities (Chapter 2), Freire’s approach lacks a consideration of structures which reproduce such gendered inequalities, and that ‘oppressors’ also reproduce or challenge gendered inequalities. To return to Savitra’s example, the upper-caste Savitra fought and continues to work to end discrimination based on gender and caste, highlighting that ‘oppressors’ can and do contribute to challenging inequalities based on caste.
Moreover, whilst an important step, increased awareness as a form of empowerment-as- power-within alone does not challenge gendered inequalities and structures reproducing these.
As awareness as empowerment-as-power-within underlies self-realization, improves choice and control over one’s life, and is important to empowerment-as-power- with to collectively challenge inequalities, this has implications for female ex-combatants’ reintegration. Increased awareness of inequalities that may obstruct or prevent self- realization, limit qualitative choice and control over one’s life, and prevent challenging
(structural) inequalities thus is the first step in addressing these. Such awareness may push female ex-combatants to pursue employment in non-traditionally female roles which frequently pay more, challenge acceptable social roles and behavior, or become politically active where such involvement was restricted. In this sense, awareness as empowerment- as-power-within can be seen as positive developments for female ex-combatants’
135 reintegration as it can create greater space for female ex-combatants’ self-realization, choice and control over one’s life, and contribute to challenging inequalities.
However, increased awareness can also cause problems for female ex-combatants’ reintegration, as “People who do not conform to widely held gender stereotypes might be castigated as odd, or deviant, or might even be represented as posing a threat or danger to mainstream society” (Steans 2013:7). Among female ex-combatants, this has often resulted in relocation to urban environments, where such ‘gender stereotypes’ are less strict, economically, socially, and politically (De Watteville 2002). It also resulted in self- segregation of female ex-combatants who returned to villages, as was the case in Eritrea
(Bop 2002, Hale 1999) and Northern Uganda (Ochen 2013). Conversely, this can also mean losing established support networks (e.g. family, community, and friends). As argued, support networks such as family and community are part of social reintegration, and beneficial to the economic reintegration of ex-combatants and a potential source of psychological support. Cutting off such networks can therefore undermine female ex- combatants’ reintegration.
Moreover, awareness of inequalities, particularly of rights not being met, can also cause frustrations among female ex-combatants. On the one hand, awareness and frustrations can result in political activism and political (re)integration. On the other hand, such frustrations can cause disillusionment and further grievances, potentially resulting in renewed conflict or silences among female ex-combatants. This can be usefully understood along a spectrum of voice and silence. Cornwall and Brock (2005) for instance make a connection between empowerment and voice; however, they do not elaborate on the nature of this link. Parpart (2010a:4) criticizes the “uncritical identification of silence with disempowerment, and voice with agency/empowerment, so common in the gender and development literature […] as well as much of the wider feminist literature.” She suggests
136 that silence can also be empowering, citing for example the Mothers of the Plaza the Mayo or the silent protests of Liberian women organized by the Women in Peacebuilding
Network to encourage resumption of peace talks.
To produce a more complex understanding of silence-as-empowerment, I return to my discussion in Chapter 2, where I contended that silence can be both ‘expression or oppression’, depending on the motivations behind this silence. Selimovic (2018:1ff) provides a typology for making sense of the motivations behind silences, ranging from coping or protection mechanism (enabling silences) to silence as shaming or denial
(disabling silences). Hansen’s (2000) work on silence in relation to security is further illustrative here. Drawing on the case study of Zina34 and honor killings of women in
Pakistan, Hansen argues that female rape victims in Pakistan are structurally silenced or risk bodily harm or death. Hansen (2000:306) further concludes that “silence is a powerful political strategy that internalized and individualizes threats thereby making resistance and political mobilization difficult.” Following Selimovic’ typology, female rape victims’ silence can be understood as enabling (e.g. protection from honor killings) and disabling
(e.g. denial of rape, making prosecution and other protection mechanisms improbably).
Parpart and Parashar (2018:7) have further complicated this dichotomy of silence- voice/resistance by drawing attention to embodied resistance, i.e. resistance that is not voiced, but performed. This provides more nuance than the unequivocal association of voice with empowerment and silence with lack of empowerment. Silences as empowerment-as-power-within can be differentiated according to motivations, which may be revealed through embodied resistance.
34 According to Hansen (2000:291f), the 1979 Zina Ordinance “bans sexual intercourse outside of properly sanctioned marriage and allows for stoning to death in the case of transgression by married women and one hundred lashes in public in the case of unmarried ones.” Zina applies regardless of consent, including to victims of rape and where “families succeed in declaring the marriage [of a couple] void” (ibid.)
137 Voice as empowerment-as-power-within can be understood as articulation of awareness of inequalities. The concern for female ex-combatants’ reintegration is when this voice is ignored. As Maclay and Özerdem (2010:35) argue, “In many cases, children and young people are not voiceless in war; war is their voice […]. A peaceful mechanism is needed for listening to that voice.” I argued in Chapter 1 that political reintegration can transform such voices/grievances into peaceful ways for building an emancipatory peace.
The concern is when such political reintegration fails to take place, and female ex- combatants do not feel listened to and continue to participate in conflict. Continued participation is antithetical to reintegration into civilian life. As such, voice as empowerment-as-power-within can contribute to or undermine female ex-combatants’ reintegration.
As with empowerment-as-power-over and empowerment-as-power-to, it is important to consider the temporality of empowerment-as-power-within. As empowerment-as-power-within is about internal transformation (and therefore less contingent on outside forces), it is likely that many forms of empowerment-as-power- within maintain post-conflict. However, empowerment-as-power-within is still molded by structures reproducing gendered inequalities. This is particularly visible in silence and voice. As argued, voice and embodied resistances are contingent on having the qualitative choice to speak/resist and this is shaped by unequal gender relations and structures. Voice and embodied resistances are therefore also limited by such structures. Voice may be further limited by structures when these inhibit this voice being listened to. Particularly where such structures are reinforced post-conflict, voice and embodied resistance may therefore be largely limited to conflict as a ‘temporary disturbing event’ (Puechguirbal
2010b:170) of such structures reproducing gendered inequalities. Considering temporality
138 can therefore highlight how female ex-combatants exercise voice/resistance within structures and how this changes over time.
Empowerment-as-power-within can thus be understood as an internal transformation. Therefore, empowerment-as-power-within is an expanded scope for agency and exercise of power in relation to the self which may be largely temporally unaffected by reintegration, apart from voice and embodied resistance. Power within includes self-actualization and self-realization, as well as awareness and voice, internal forms of expansion of power in response to structures. As with power over and power to, empowerment-as-power-within may both contribute to an emancipatory peace and undermine this. Particularly ‘awareness’ of inequalities without changing such inequalities may cause frustrations and renewed conflict or silencing of female ex-combatants.
Empowerment-as-power-within can therefore contribute to or present a challenge to building an emancipatory peace.
Power With
The last and, as I contend here, the most important form of empowerment from my critical feminist peacebuilding perspective is ‘power with’ as it has the largest potential for challenging gendered inequalities on a societal level and contribute to an emancipatory peace. The Oxfam (1994:233) understanding of ‘power with’ Rowlands builds on conceptualizes empowerment-as-power-with as “a sense of the whole being greater than the sum of the individuals, especially when a group tackles problems together.” At a first step, the individual then becomes part of a group or collective. Freire (2000 [1970]) has specifically approached this through the notion of the ‘community’. Yuval-Davis
(1994:181) has been critical of this, arguing that “the notion of ‘the community’ assumes an organic wholeness,” ignoring differences within (cf. Yuval-Davis 1991, Anthias and
Yuval-Davis 1992, Young 1990). Notably, a community is frequently associated with
139 shared identity, potentially homogenizing people within and excluding others (Yuval-
Davis 1994, 2006, 2011). Armed groups are not necessarily based on a shared identity, but more through a common purpose, as many female ex-combatants saw it in Liberia and
Nepal (Chapter 5). I therefore follow the language of the critical, feminist, and post- colonial roots of empowerment of a collective with a shared purpose, e.g. collective action to challenge unequal power relations through individual transformation (cf. Young 1993,
Rowlands 1997:15). Based on this, I re-approach empowerment-as-power-with not through the concept of community but rather through the shared purpose of a collective.
Specifically, I look at three ‘purposes’ which emerged through interview with female ex- combatants as their motivations for joining armed groups: collective security, challenging of inequalities within a group, and collective challenging on inequalities at a societal level.
Collective security is the first form of empowerment-as-power-with I consider.
More specifically, I consider this the security female ex-combatants derive (whether perceived or real) from being part of a collective with a shared purpose, for instance a particular armed group. For female ex-combatants’ reintegration, this collective security can have several implications. For example, social reintegration into communities can provide a source of psychological support, which benefits all aspects of reintegration
(Chapter 1). As argued, networks established during conflict can provide a source of economic and social reintegration and security, as well as psychological support. In this sense, security derived from a collective can transform to support female ex-combatants’ reintegration. Conversely, this joining of armed groups and collective security as empowerment-as-power-with can also adversely affect female ex-combatants’ reintegration. Female ex-combatants are for example stigmatized, particularly where they are “members of an armed group that is defeated or continues to be perceived as illegitimate,” leading to potential ostracization (Farr 2002:23). This suggests that collective
140 security as form of empowerment-as-power-with may have different implications for female ex-combatants’ reintegration, depending on the spaces into which they reintegrate and how their groups is viewed in these spaces at that moment in time. Stigma also carries over to the following two forms of empowerment-as-power-with.
These next two forms of empowerment-as-power-with are the challenging of inequalities (e.g. along gender, caste, class, and age lines) at a group and societal level.
From my critical feminist peacebuilding perspective, especially the latter form of empowerment-as-power-with is to be aspired for, as it potentially contributes to building an emancipatory peace. As Kabeer (2003:175) notes, “Individual empowerment is an important starting point for processes of social transformation, but unless it leads to some form of structural change it will do little to undermine the systemic reproduction of inequality.” Applying the ‘personal is political’ to empowerment, Kabeer (1994:245f) further argues that empowerment-as-power-within can also stem from empowerment-as- power-with through uncovering “the socially constructed and socially shared basis of apparently individual problems.” Empowerment-as-power-with can therefore contribute to an emancipatory peace and can reinforce empowerment-as-power-within. Some feminists, frequently from the ‘liberal camp’ have argued that women’s presence in the military is necessary to obtain gender equality in society (Addis 1994:3ff, Kennedy-Pipe 2017:23ff,
Snyder 1990, 1999, 2003, Stiehm 1982, 1989, 1996) and that this would challenge the masculine nature of militaries (Kronsell 2006, 2012, 2016, Mathers 2013:125, Sasson-
Levy 2008). However, critical feminists have raised concerns regarding the extent to which participation in armed groups contributes to gender equality (Yuval-Davis 1997:104,
Whitworth 2008:110, Enloe 1983, 2007). The extent to which female ex-combatants experience empowerment-as-power-with in the form of challenging gendered inequalities therefore remains debated in feminist literatures.
141 The difference between the two forms of empowerment-as-power-with as challenging inequalities (group and societal level) is the scope of change. Although some discrimination remained, the PLA made great progress in terms of gender, caste, and class equality among its members. 35 Collectives, however, also remain part of structures, especially after conflict ends, as many female ex-combatants had to learn the hard way upon reintegration (Chapter 5). Conflict however can have a disruptive effect on structures, for example by breaking down the rule of law, loosening social norms or developing new laws and social norms within armed groups. However, conflict does not take place in a vacuum, and armed group still depend on trade, interaction with communities, families, and civilians, and thus cannot fully depart from societal (re)production of inequalities. The collective challenging of gendered inequalities at a group level and societal level are thus intrinsically linked.
The two related forms of empowerment-as-power-with however have potentially drastically different implications for female ex-combatants’ reintegration. If inequalities experienced by female ex-combatants have been successfully challenged at a group and societal level, there should be no tensions between the two. Tensions for female ex- combatants’ reintegration however arise where changes occurred at group level, but not at societal level. To return to the discussion in Chapter 1 on ‘oppressive subordinate roles of women’, it is likely that challenging inequalities at a group level but not at a societal level causes tensions for female ex-combatants’ reintegration. Female ex-combatants may for instance not have equal opportunities for their economic reintegration. Army integration is such an example where female ex-combatants are often legally and/or structurally excluded based on gender, although Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 discuss this in detail in
35 Heidi Riley (2019) for example illustrates how male Maoist combatants proudly took on ‘women’s work’ such as cooking, and lower caste men were addressed with the most respectful form of ‘you’ (Tapain), largely unthinkable in Nepali society more broadly at that time.
142 relation to Nepal and Liberia. Lastly, the tensions created by social reintegration may be the most problematic for female ex-combatants. Not only may their choice be limited to
‘oppressive subordinate roles’ in the family and community, or not reintegrating into these at all, but they may be more marginalized than before becoming combatants. Bogati
(2014:14) writes regarding Nepal that, “women combatants face double stigma: first, for having been associated with armed opposition groups, and second, for having transgressed socio-cultural norms of female behavior” (cf. Ní Aoláin 2011:142f, UN-INSTRAW
2010:11). While male ex-combatants also transgress such socio-cultural norms, female ex- combatants often experience more radical change, especially where armed groups are influenced by egalitarian ideologies, including challenging inequalities along gender lines
(Barth 2002:7, Campbell 1990:117). Empowerment-as-power-with can thus be understood as a form of security derived from becoming part of a collective, or as challenging inequalities at a group and societal level. These three forms of empowerment-as-power- with can support or undermine female ex-combatants’ reintegration which is furthermore shaped by gender, spatiality, and temporality.
Empowerment-as-power-with may be more affected by temporality than empowerment-as-power-to and empowerment-as-power-within, because empowerment-as- power-with is entirely contingent on being part of (armed) groups. Similarly to empowerment-as-power-over, empowerment-as-power-with can therefore be undermined by DDR, particularly reintegration, as it is designed to disband armed groups and break combatant ties. Empowerment-as-power-with is also shaped by changing structures, spaces, and contexts. For example, female ex-combatants may join armed groups in search of security derived from these groups; however, this may be a response to conflict-related insecurities, which may not necessarily persist post-conflict. Again, this suggests that empowerment-as-power-with is shaped through structures and spaces which change over
143 time. Empowerment-as-power-with has the largest potential to contribute to an emancipatory peace, particularly where a collective seeks to challenge gendered inequalities at the group and societal level.
Conclusions
This chapter reconceptualized empowerment as four different forms of power in relation to female ex-combatants and their reintegration. These four forms of empowerment include
‘power over,’ ‘power to,’ ‘power within,’ and ‘power with.’ Empowerment in these different forms of power is a process or an expansion of female ex-combatants’ scope for agency within structures and can vary among and within female ex-combatants.
Empowerment-as-power-over can be beneficial to female ex-combatants individually through power over combatants, civilians, and resources, but can undermine building a positive peace. Empowerment-as-power-to includes gaining skills, as well as increased choice and control over one’s life, which can benefit female ex-combatants’ economic, social, and political reintegration. Empowerment-as-power-within includes self-esteem, self-realization made possible through awareness (or conscientization), and voice/silence.
Particularly awareness and voice enable female ex-combatants to challenge inequalities, including in their reintegration. Lastly, empowerment-as-power-with is understood as a form of security derived from being part of a collective, and challenging inequalities at a group and societal level. This chapter argued that this can create tensions for female ex- combatants’ reintegration but can also contribute to their reintegration and building an emancipatory peace.
Manisha’s story exemplified the four different forms of empowerment. Manisha experienced ‘power over’ because she became a brigade commissioner where she was responsible for instructing and training other (female) combatants. In this sense, she held power over other combatants to tell them what (not) to do. Manisha also experienced
144 empowerment-as-power-to. Based on her story, Manisha gained power to do certain things, including combat and (political) leadership skills. The role of combatant further gave her increased control over her life to ‘secure everything she wanted’. This also suggests that she gained power within, for example in the form of self-realization. Mostly, Manisha’s story provides examples of empowerment-as-power-with. For example, Manisha experienced ‘total freedom’ in the PLA, suggesting a breakdown of ‘oppressive thinking’
Manisha credits the Maoist movement, her participation included, with bringing about increased gender equality in Nepal, including those new rights protected by the constitution. She acknowledges that progress remains to be made but stressed her and the
PLA’s achievements in challenging (gendered) inequalities.
Stories such as Manisha’s are significant from my critical feminist peacebuilding perspective for various reasons. Manisha’s story and experiences for example highlight that female ex-combatants already have agency to challenge gendered inequalities and that the role of combatant served to expand the scope for this agency. From my critical feminist peacebuilding perspective, paying attention to female ex-combatants’ agency and the expanded scope for agency (empowerment) allows for identifying how female ex- combatants already challenge gendered inequalities. Furthermore, building on female ex- combatants’ empowerment can produce an emancipatory peace by challenging gendered inequalities. It also enables us to identify structures (such as reinforced by DDR) and how these undermine female ex-combatants’ empowerment and challenging of gendered inequalities. Additionally, this reconceptualization of empowerment highlights the complexities of power in empowerment, to highlight the nuances of female ex-combatants’ experiences, as well as differences between, among, and within female ex-combatants in
Liberia and Nepal. Another implication is that some forms of empowerment may be more susceptible to undermining through UN-led DDR. Empowerment is therefore a useful
145 concept for analyzing female ex-combatants’ experiences of combatanthood, reintegration, and UN-led DDR from my critical feminist peacebuilding perspective with its emphasis on agency to challenge unequal (gendered) power relations.
146 Chapter 4: Empowerment of Female Combatants in Liberia and Nepal
Following from my reconceptualization of empowerment in Chapter 3, this chapter analyzes to what extent female combatants in Liberia and Nepal experienced empowerment during their role as combatant. This chapter therefore focuses specifically on the time that female combatants participated in conflict. To do so, I draw primarily on my interviews with female ex-combatants in Liberia and Nepal. I argue that female combatants in Liberia and Nepal experienced empowerment, although there were differences between, among, and within female combatants in Liberia and Nepal. On average, this research generated more examples of empowerment in Nepal, particularly empowerment-as-power-with. I contend that this can be explained by the Maoist nature of the conflict, which sought to explicitly challenge (gendered) inequalities. With regards to female combatants in Liberia, this chapter argues that female combatants’ empowerment was primarily visible as power over and power to. In Nepal, many female combatants experienced power with, power within, and power to (to some extent), and some female combatants experienced power over. These differences in empowerment have implications for the extent that female combatants can draw on their empowerment for reintegration.
Another implication of this argument is that female combatants in Nepal are on average better situated to challenge gendered inequalities, as I argued in Chapter 3 that empowerment-as-power-with is most useful in this regard.
This chapter contends that female combatants exercised agency in their role as combatant in multiple ways and that the role of combatant expanded the scope for this agency for many female combatants in Liberia and Nepal. To make this argument, this chapter draws on the four forms of power discussed in Chapter 3, highlighting the complexities of empowerment. These four forms of power are discussed in the following order: power over, power to, power within, power with. Before this, this chapter overviews
147 the negative experiences of conflict to provide a nuanced understanding of female combatants’ experiences of conflict.
Negative Experiences of Conflict
Before exploring different forms of empowerment, I acknowledge that female ex- combatants also had negative experiences of conflicts. Failing to acknowledge this would risk over-emphasizing empowerment, and risks omitting important discussions of how the various negative experiences discussed here may influence empowerment both as combatants and through reintegration. Highlighting the negative experiences and female ex-combatants’ empowerment further challenges the victim-perpetrator dichotomy
(Chapter 1) to stress that female ex-combatants’ experiences may be uneven and contradictory; that is, some female ex-combatants may experience more empowerment than others, or, only in some ways, or female ex-combatants may experience profound empowerment as well as victimization during their time as combatants.
Violence against women and girls was prolific in the Liberian Civil Wars. In a famous example, Liberian ‘warlord’ Colonel Black Diamond joined LURD (Liberians
United for Democracy) after being raped by NPFL (National Patriotic Front of Liberia) forces, rising quickly through the ranks to avenge her rape (Taylor 2012). Some female ex- combatant interviewees also confirmed being raped, or being taken as sex slaves (INT22,
INT31, INT33, INT40). According to the UNDPKO (2010a:31), “A 2008 [United Nations
Mission in Liberia] study in Liberia among 1,216 women indicated that 74% of them had been raped during the conflict (and a further 13% since).” Douma et al (2012:6) have however raised questions around the accuracy of such statistics, arguing that sexual violence is frequently underreported. Utas (2005a) and Baaz and Stern (2013:99) argue that in Liberia and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) respectively, donor funds for victims of sexual violence has created an economy where women claimed to be victims of
148 sexual violence to access funds, as this was often the only way to obtain any support. That is not to say that sexual violence was not prolific in Liberia, but rather that these numbers may not be as high as suggested or that actual victims of sexual violence never step forward, while women who are not victims do. Female ex-combatants also perpetrated sexual violence, which can also constitute a source of trauma (Baaz& Stern 2009, 2013,
2014). Victimization in relation to rape is thus more complex than much liberal peacebuilding practice and literature suggests. Female ex-combatants can be victimized and traumatized by being raped and raping themselves, but this is not always the case.
In Nepal, sexual violence was also perpetuated, primarily by the state (Gauta
2006:18). In police detention, female Maoists faced more psychological and sexual torture than their male counterparts (Rai 2017:204). Hisila Yami (2006:223ff) went as far as to say that government police and armed forces used rape as a weapon of war to intimidate female ex-combatants. Bishnu Sapkota (2004:29) highlighted that female Maoists also faced sexual harassment from male colleagues. Such experiences were not articulated during my interviews, although this does not mean that female ex-combatant in Nepal did not experience sexual harassment. Nepali female ex-combatants (both those who are still with the party or have distanced themselves from it), were quick to point out mechanisms the party had in place to prevent sexual violence, as well as extra-marital consensual sexual activity (INT3, INT4, INT6). That is not to say that sexual violence against female Maoists at the hands of fellow combatants did not take place in Nepal, but it does suggest that prevalence was less than in Liberia.
As in any conflict, female combatants experienced torture and injuries. In Nepal, female Maoists were tortured at the hands of the state (INT65), and the police specifically
(INT70). In Liberia, Theresa (INT25) explained that she was forcibly recruited by the
National Patriotic Front of Liberia and was forced to spy disguised as a market woman.
149 Once, she was captured and beaten, they cut her hair and tied her up naked, but managed to escape because she was stronger than the male combatant responsible for watching her.
Beyond direct physical violence, female ex-combatants in both contexts sustained health problems, for example from giving birth inadequate places (Rai 2017:213), or from bullet wounds, as Shanti (INT65) sustained to her leg, still causing pain today. Furthermore, an element of psychological trauma is present. Many female ex-combatant interviewees talked about traumatic experiences, such as Vonyee (INT31), whose parents were murdered in front of her, and Ratna (INT69), whose father was tortured by the Nepali police when she was just twelve, his injured body thrown into a river, but he managed to survive and fled to India for safety for the duration of the conflict.
Another source of psychological trauma is forced recruitment. As discussed elsewhere (UNDPKO 2010b:22, Sherif 2008:28, UNSCR S/2006/1007:161), forced recruitment was common in Liberia. Some interviewees (INT24, INT43) confirmed joining armed groups this way. The frequency of forced recruitment in Liberia however is lower than the narrative surrounding female ex-combatants suggests. Pugel (2007:7) for instance argues that women and girls were abducted at lesser rates than male counterparts (12% and
21% of surveyed ex-combatants respectively). Nonetheless, it remains the case that ‘a very fuzzy line is often all that separates voluntary from coerced participation,’ especially among child ex-combatants (Goodwin-Gill& Cohn 1994, Peters 2004:7). Forced recruitment also took place in Nepal (Saferworld 2010, Shawna 2015:40f, Khadka
2012:42ff); however, none of my Nepali female ex-combatant interviewees joined this way.
This research proceeds on this understanding that most female ex-combatant interviewees had agency in joining; however they often joined armed groups in restricted or limited circumstances.
150 The female ex-combatants I interviewed had negative experiences during the conflicts, including injuries, torture, sexual violence, and forced recruitment. These negative experiences and victimization of female ex-combatants appear to have been considerably higher in Liberia than in Nepal. Identifying these negative experiences both brings nuance to the discussion of female combatants’ experiences and enables a discussion of empowerment (or the limits of) in relation to these negative experiences. The next section begins to analyze female combatants’ empowerment.
Power Over
Relying on my conceptualization of power over in the previous chapter, this section argues that empowerment-as-power-over was a product of picking up guns and having increased power over the civilian population and resources. Empowerment-as-power-over can be exercised through (the threat) of violence, but this is not always the case. This section highlights that this can be a relative process, i.e. while some female ex-combatants have greater power over civilians and resources, they are also placed in a new hierarchy where commanders have power over them. This section also argues that not all female ex- combatants experienced empowerment-as-power-over and that there are considerable differences among those who did. This already highlights the diversity of female combatants’ experiences during their role as combatant.
Power over civilians became quickly apparent in my interviews. One Liberian female duty commander, Lysie (INT33), explained to me that her duties included overseeing the capturing of Mandingo children and slitting their throats. She was responsible for deciding where they attacked and which children would die. Fighting for
Prince Johnson (Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia), she ‘killed a lot of people’, predominantly civilians. Furthermore, the United Nations Development Fund for
Women (UNIFEM) argued that female ex-combatants in Liberia were complicit in sexual
151 violence against other women. UNIFEM (2004:10) write that female ex-combatants
‘purposefully captured female prisoners’ to avoid rape and sexual violence themselves (cf.
Human Rights Watch 2004). While such experiences were not mentioned during my interviews, Dara Kay Cohen (2013, 2017. cf. Sjoberg& Gentry 2007, Bop 2002) also argues that female ex-combatants in neighboring Sierra Leone participated in sexual violence. In Nepal, Maoists were known to target civilians for interrogations and torture
(Amnesty International 2002), but my interviews in Nepal did not bring out such extreme examples of power over civilians. Thus, picking up a gun could offer empowerment-as- power-over civilian bodies and lives, primarily in Liberia. However, not all ex-combatants held a gun in Liberia, as they were often shared within groups (Themnér 2011, INT56) and children and sex slaves were less likely to have access to guns. Empowerment-as-power- over was therefore restricted.
Another form of empowerment-as-power-over is the control of resources using a gun. Based on their own interviews, Satya Shrestha-Schipper (2008:108) argues that young women and girls joined the Maoists because ‘they would be given a gun and would be able to eat anywhere free of charge,’ and that this promise indeed materialized. Certainly, power over resources is a particular form of empowerment that also took place in Liberia.
While not mentioned in my interviews, Irma Specht (2006:11) recorded that for some girl combatants “the motive for entering fighting forces was purely economic, deriving sometimes from severe poverty but also the wish for material luxury items such as make- up and red shoes,” which many female ex-combatants, especially those from the
‘hinterlands’ such as Nimba county, previously had no or limited access to because of their gender and poor background. In fact, many female ex-combatants would also force their boyfriends and husbands to go to the frontlines for the sole purpose of obtaining loot for their girlfriends/wives (Utas 2003:193). Contrary to the assumption that female ex-
152 combatants are often only found in support roles as male combatants do the real fighting
(Chapter 1), this demonstrates that female combatants certainly do exercise power over male combatants who in turn also (primarily) fulfill support roles. Therefore, participation in conflict meant that many female combatants experienced empowerment-as-power-over physical resources, which many previously not had access to, either directly or through their influence over boyfriends/husbands.
Another form of empowerment-as-power-over is by becoming a higher-ranking officer in armed forces. I interviewed two former brigade commissioners, one brigade vice- commander, and two female ex-combatants who led small groups in Nepal. In Liberia, I interviewed one battalion commander and one duty commander. In both contexts, female ex-combatants thus attained positions of influence. Some Maoist commanders are now members of the Constituent Assembly in Nepal. In Liberia, Black Diamond (mentioned above), became a colonel of LURD’s notorious Women’s Auxiliary Corps. They held considerable control over combatants under their command, including training and discipline. As commander Lysie explains, she ‘executed people under her command who didn’t follow her rules’ (INT33), thus demonstrating considerable power over other combatants. This power over also extended to ‘wives’36 of high-ranking officers. Female ex-combatant Wonhehmi (INT44) explained that a general fell in love with her, she joined him, and she became in charge of distributing food37 to others, thus demonstrating ‘power over’ other combatants in terms of resource distribution. Guns and being part of armed groups can therefore (temporarily) alter unequal power relations, enabling female combatants to exercise power over others and resources, which had previously been restricted due to their gender and situated in structures.
36 ‘Wives’ in the context of the Liberian conflicts could mean wife, girlfriend or sex slave 37 And likely other loot. See Utas (2005) for a discussion of hierarchies among ‘commander wives’
153 Conversely, being placed in a new hierarchy meant that some female ex- combatants were at the mercy of their commanders and were often considered less valuable. Two female ex-combatants, Sita (INT6), and Ruth (INT55) explained how their duty was to protect their commander and general respectively at all costs. Especially in
Nepal, this included protecting them with their own lives, as the child ex-combatants were considered dispensable according to Sita (INT6). Such hierarchies are not just a source of insecurity, but sometimes also a source of protection (Specht 2006). In Liberia, Ciata
(INT54) was captured by LURD at 17, but the general who captured her said: “You are very small and you [are] 17, you can’t be my wife, but I will make you to be with me like my daughter.” In the Liberian context, this meant the general would protect her. In one instance, the general protected her in combat and taught her how to fire a gun. Thus, female ex-combatants may have experienced empowerment-as-power-over in Liberia and
Nepal; however, this form of empowerment should be understood as relative, in that it benefitted some female ex-combatants more than others.
How did this unequal empowerment-as-power-over come about? As already noted, weapons were instrumental to empowerment-as-power-over, thus already accounting for some inequalities in Liberia. The high-ranking Liberian female commanders I interviewed,
Lysie and Zaye, had both joined in their late twenties and fought since the Taylor War.
Both were from Nimba (National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) heartland) and had fought for different factions at different times (Independent National Patriotic Front of
Liberia and the NPFL; Armed Forced of Liberia and the NPFL respectively), as is not uncommon in the Liberian context. Moreover, both joined voluntarily (INT33, INT34).
The majority of Liberian female ex-combatant interviewees I met were considerably younger, fought for a shorter period of time, fought in the Second Liberian Civil War
(1999-2003), and many of them joined as a way to keep themselves and their families alive
154 (see below). Ruth (INT55) for example, joined the war in Monrovia in 2003 to find her brother who had been captured by LURD and only fought for five months. Based on my interviews in Liberia, it is hard to ascertain what specifically accounts for the differences in empowerment-as-power-over among female ex-combatants; however, it appears that age and length of time spent fighting were important factors.
On the other hand, in Nepal, the three highly-ranked female ex-combatants,
Manisha (INT2), Lila (INT4), and Savitra (INT10) who also obtained important political positions after the conflict. All joined the Maoists through active involvement in student politics. Two of them are Magar (indigenous), and one is Brahmin-Chhetri (upper caste).
Their involvement in the conflict was lengthy: fighting for 6, 10, and 4 years respectively.
On average, they had been slightly older than other female ex-combatants I interviewed.38
Among the other two group leaders I interviewed, one was janajati (indigenous), and the other lower caste. They joined at 17 and 14 and fought for 3 and 8 years respectively. The other female ex-combatants I interviewed in Nepal were around this age when they joined, also janajati or lower caste, but had fought for shorter periods of time. Overall, this suggests that age, length of combatant-hood, and especially political involvement as a student, played a role in empowerment-as-power-over within the PLA. Caste does not seem to influence the extent of power over, but it is possible that Dalits had fewer opportunities than Brahmin-Chhetris. Further research is needed in this regard.
Empowerment-as-power-over civilians, resources, and other combatants is tied to being part of an armed group, and to possession of a gun. This power over is a form of empowerment that is enabled through conflict, as it requires armed groups and weapons.
This also means that this form of empowerment is likely to be temporary, as the ending of
38 I focused on finding female ex-combatants who were eligible for DDR. As these were minors and late recruits in Nepal, the age difference does not necessarily explain differences in empowerment-as-power-over
155 armed conflict means disbanding armed groups and removing weapons from circulation, as was the case in Liberia and Nepal. However, in Liberia this process was incomplete, as many child combatants, including captured girl combatants, often remained with commanders after disarmament, as DDR officials informed me (INT51, INT58, INT61. Cf.
Shekhawat and Pathak 2015:60, Paes 2005:256, Specht 2006). Little is known about these girl combatants today and my interviews did not provide any such examples. Mats Utas’
(2005a) analysis of ex-combatants living together with commanders highlights that these hierarchical relationships are not always a bad thing, as ex-combatants in Utas’ case study worked together under the leadership of commanders in mining, plantations, and brick- making enterprises. As argued above, hierarchies could also be a source of protection. In this sense, empowerment-as-power-over may have lasted beyond the conflict in Liberia, but this may have offered protection as opposed to a further source of insecurity. This however requires further research as this did not come out of my interviews with female ex-combatants.
To summarize, this section has argued that empowerment-as-power-over is visible in power over civilians, power over physical resources, and power over other combatants.
This section has argued that there were considerable differences among female ex- combatants in this regard, between and among female ex-combatants in Nepal and Liberia.
Much of this empowerment-as-power-over is tied to being part of armed groups, possessing a gun, and to hierarchies within armed groups. To recall the Introduction, DDR is explicitly aimed at disbanding armed groups and remove weapons. Therefore, DDR explicitly aims to undo these as sources of empowerment-as-power-over. Once these are removed, so then is this empowerment-as-power-over. There is thus a potential temporality to empowerment-as-power-over insofar that it is dependent on the use of the gun, which is
156 actively discouraged in post-conflict peacebuilding. The next section, power to, considers a form of empowerment that has the possibility to persist post-conflict.
Power To
The previous chapter argued that power to constitutes another form of empowerment. This form of power is considered an enabling form of power. Based on this, this section discusses three forms of power to: skills, control over one’s life, and choice. This section argues that female ex-combatants acquired a variety of combat-specific and non-combat skills, enabling them to do things they were not previously able to do. Next, this section argues that the conflicts produced insecurity, pushing some female ex-combatants to join armed groups, thus offering more control/power over their lives that was lost through the conflicts. Lastly, this section argues that the conflicts expanded the qualitative choices available to female ex-combatants in Nepal, including careers and marriage, although these remain shaped by structures reproducing gendered inequalities. This section concludes that while some female ex-combatants in both contexts acquired new skills and joined armed forces to regain control over their lives by addressing conflict-related insecurities, the expansion of choice only came out of interviews in Nepal.
Perhaps one of the more visible forms of empowerment-as-power-to is the development of new skills. This has already been noted by Susan McKay and Dyan
Mazurana (2004:17), who argue that female ex-combatants in Uganda, Sierra Leone, and
Mozambique learned new skills. They however do not elaborate what kind of skills this entails. I divide empowerment-as-power-to through acquiring new skills into three groups: combat-specific skills, non-combat skills, and ‘missed’ skills as a result of having been a combatant.
Among the combat-specific skills, learning how to use a gun was confirmed by most of my female ex-combatant interviewees in Nepal and Liberia. All received some
157 form of military training, and especially younger female ex-combatants were utilized as spies in villages, markets, and towns. Becoming a combatant was physically demanding in both contexts. In Nepal, however, cantonment following the Comprehensive Peace
Agreement (CPA) allowed for the professionalization of the PLA, where Maoist combatants were expected to participate in physical and military exercises (Saferworld
2010:8). Female Maoists were expected ‘to fight like men’ (Dahal 2015:191). Saferworld
(2010:8) write that “many female combatants felt that the physical differences between men and women meant it was difficult for themselves to participate in all military activities.” My interviews do not substantiate this. Among those who stayed in cantonment in Nepal, none mentioned feeling or being treated differently to male combatants. On the contrary, the UNIRP (2013b) found that “The roles and responsibilities of male and female ex-combatants in the cantonments were found to be quite similar,” the main different being that male Verified Minors and Late Recruits (VMLRs) were more often responsible for patrolling the cantonment and for domestic/maintenance chores, the latter being an active attempt by the Maoists to challenge a ‘traditional’ gendered division of labor. In this sense, the role of combatant in Nepal taught female combatants new skills, but also challenged unequal power relations by redressing gendered divisions of labor and gender-specific skills.
A further combat-specific skill female ex-combatants acquired was leadership within the PLA. As also recorded by Stijn Smet (2009:153) in Sierra Leone, some female ex-combatants in Liberia learned how to lead and discipline large groups of combatants.
Nilsson (2005:72) further stresses that “as it is for men, taking part in war can be empowering for women. This may in fact be especially true for women. Living in societies with clear gender roles- where women are systematically discriminated- war may be one way to gain a career and equality.” Specht (2006) has also discussed the opportunities for a
158 career within armed groups for female combatants in Liberia and highlights that becoming a combatant offered girls an opportunity for a career and associated skills that were realistically unachievable outside of armed groups. However, Gentry and Sjoberg (2015:9) argue that “when women are allowed into men’s traditional roles, often more is required of them than is required of the men that usually fulfil those roles,” or, like Gingers Rogers, who did everything Fred Astaire did, only ‘backwards and in high heels’ (Thaves 1982).
The need to prove themselves can be seen in female ex-combatants’ reported viciousness in the Liberian conflict. Olonisakin (1995:38) interviewed a Monrovian girl who stated,
“people were more afraid of them than the men, because the female combatants’ temper was very quick.”39 As discussed earlier, access to leadership among female ex-combatants was restricted and unequal. My interviews for example suggest that those female ex- combatants who had joined through student politics and were slightly older, on average fared better. Therefore, leadership skills as empowerment-as-power-to are restricted and shaped by unequal power relations.
In Nepal, some female ex-combatants were trained in non-combat roles such as political roles. Uma (INT5) was responsible for ‘union expansion and management’ in the
PLA. Savitra (INT10) was, among other responsibilities, responsible for ‘collaborat[ing] with citizens about the problems of each household, including economic, political, and social problems, and to address those problems,’ effectively taking on the role of governance. Another female ex-combatant, Ratna (INT69), was responsible for spreading
Maoist propaganda. Hisila Yami (2006:44) also emphasized that illiterate female combatants were taught how to read and write, although this is not applicable to my female ex-combatant interviewees, as all of them had had some schooling. Again, these political roles and therefore the skills, were largely restricted to those who had joined the Maoists
39 It may of course be that women’s violence is seen as more abhorrent, because it is constructed as ‘unnatural’ and ‘unwomanly’ (cf. Gentry& Sjoberg 2015, Zalewski 2010:33)
159 through student politics (Savitra, INT10) or through the political wings of the Maoists as part-timers (Uma, INT5).
In Liberia, the non-combatant skills female ex-combatants acquired were less political. They are nonetheless useful skills during and after conflict, but will have different implications for female ex-combatants’ reintegration (Chapter 5). Theresa
(INT25), who was captured as a 13-year-old, learned how to cook during her time with armed forces. Gracie (INT39) learned how to administer first aid. Fanta (INT52) learned how to be a midwife during the war. Mary (INT26) had already been a midwife before the war and continued to practice this whilst with armed forces. Thus, some female ex- combatants in Liberia also acquired new skills or continued to apply these. The conflicts in
Liberia thus enabled female ex-combatants through developing new skills, constituting a form of empowerment-as-power-to.
However, female ex-combatants in Liberia and Nepal noted that their time in armed forces meant missing out on education. Several interviewees mentioned this: Theresa
(INT25) and Faith (INT40) in Liberia, who joined armed forces at 13 and 16 respectively.
In Nepal, Kalpana (INT70) and Kamala (INT64) joined the People’s Liberation Army
(PLA) at 13 and 17 respectively. All were recruited as children.40 This suggests that although some female ex-combatants learned new skills, the conflicts also prevented some from learning other essential skills. Missing out on education affected female ex- combatants recruited as children, by restricting them in their employment options upon reintegration (Chapter 5). This particular example stresses that age can impact developing new skills as a form of empowerment-as-power-to.
Moreover, these newly acquired skills (whether combat-specific or non-combat skills), are not necessarily acquired for life. Kalpana (INT70), from Nepal, stressed, “We
40 According to the official designation of child soldiers in the Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989)
160 were taught about war and weapons and I’ve forgotten everything. I would have remembered it if it was practiced on a regular basis.” This has implications for skills as empowerment-as-power-to. To continue to draw on skills, these skills need to be practiced and improved, or else they risk being forgotten. There is thus a temporality to skills as empowerment-as-power-to and this form of empowerment is not necessarily acquired for life. It can be improved over time, or it can slip away with the forgetting of skills. This is particularly relevant to DDR, as enabling female ex-combatants to maintain skills is thus necessary to maintain this empowerment-as-power-to.
While some female combatants thus experienced empowerment-as-power-to by developing new skills, this empowerment may be temporary. Furthermore, some young female ex-combatants in Liberia and Nepal missed out on other essential skills (e.g. education) as a result of having been a combatant. This particularly came out of my interviews with female ex-combatants who were (forced) recruited as children. This suggests that female combatants’ empowerment through their role as combatant may be shaped by age. Therefore, female ex-combatants did not benefit equally from becoming a combatant in terms of developing skills.
Control and Choice as Empowerment-As-Power-To
Increased control over their lives is another form of empowerment-as-power-to for female ex-combatants. Many female combatants join armed groups out of conflict-related insecurities (Themnér 2011:15). For some female ex-combatants in Liberia, joining armed groups offered protection from sexual violence, particularly rape (INT25, INT31, INT37.
Cf. Specht 2006:10f). In some cases, such as Black Diamond’s (Taylor 2012), picking up guns offered an opportunity to avenge rape and prevent further rapes. Other forms of insecurity that encouraged female ex-combatants to join armed groups are food insecurity
(INT38), and as a way to survive conflict (INT24, INT26, INT54). In the Nepali context,
161 Shanti (INT65) states, “I was tortured by the state, saying that Maoists come to our place and we feed them. So I was arrested and left in the middle of the road after being tortured.
I was just 14. […] So, I thought I would be safe if I join the Maoists.” Insecurity is thus a driving force for female ex-combatants in joining armed groups to regain control over their lives.
Whether this is a form of empowerment is however debated. Veronika Fuest
(2008:202) states she does not want to “mistakenly label coping mechanisms or new strategies of survival demonstrated by women in times of crisis as empowerment.” While I appreciate her hesitance to label joining armed forces out of insecurity a form of empowerment, based on my conceptualization of empowerment in Chapter 3, I do consider this a form of empowerment. Specifically, joining armed forces to seek protection from insecurities is a form of increased control over their lives. Granted, this form of empowerment-as-power-to is shaped by structures and unequal power relations limiting female combatants’ agency. However, reading this form of empowerment-as-power-to entirely in its context, female ex-combatants lost control over their lives at some point throughout the conflicts, and joined armed groups to regain this control. Joining armed groups for protection from rape, insecurity, death, or torture does not mean that these insecurities could not materialize after joining armed groups. Of course, feminists have long emphasized a continuum of violence (Cockburn 2004, Pankhurst 2007, Reardon
1993), arguing that these insecurities are not absent before and after conflict. However, for my female ex-combatant interviewees, the insecurities they identify as their motivation for joining were derived directly from the conflicts, and joining armed forces offered an opportunity to regain the control they had lost. Conversely, (re)gaining control over one’s life by joining armed groups is not an option in the absence of armed groups after conflict has ended. This form of empowerment-as-power-to is thus a highly temporary form of
162 empowerment for female ex-combatants enabled through conflict, but is also characterized by contexts which severely limit female combatants’ agency.
As with empowerment-as-power over and skills, there is a temporality to control over one’s life. Female combatants could only regain the control over their lives they had lost because of the conflict by joining armed groups precisely because they had lost this control due to conflict. Without conflict and armed groups, the particular conflict-related insecurities female combatants experienced would not exist (although other insecurities of course may exist), meaning that female combatants would never lose control over their lives because of conflict. Therefore, control over one’s life as empowerment-as-power-to as experienced by female combatants is only possible during conflict and with the existence of armed groups. Gaining control over one’s life outside of conflicts may however be possible, just in different ways.
Choice, as discussed in the previous chapter, is closely related to empowerment-as- power-to. To briefly recall, choice and female combatants’ scope for exercising agency is always shaped by structures and unequal gendered power relations. The following paragraphs contend the increase in choices and scope for agency female ex-combatants experience are gendered, i.e. these choices were restricted or absent prior to becoming a combatant because of their gender. Notably, empowerment-as-power-to through increased choice and scope for agency is tied to the reasons why female ex-combatants joined armed forces, i.e. their motivations. This means that joining not necessarily increased qualitative choices, but that in some cases, this remained an unfulfilled promise.
One example of empowerment-as-power-to through increased choice and scope for the exercise of agency I want to focus on is economic opportunities. Economic roles were and still are highly gendered in Nepal and Liberia, with higher-paid, higher-valued roles often being restricted to men (see Introduction). Becoming a combatant offered increased
163 choice and opportunity to access more important, more lucrative roles. In the context of youth in Liberia, Krijn Peters (2012:879) argues that armed forces were “in some cases more based on meritocratic than on patrimonial principles, offering opportunities to those who normally would have remained vulnerable to exploitation and marginalization,” This article completely focuses on male youth, with women only mentioned as ‘brides’ and
‘wives’, thus missing an important insight into how female youth were treated pre-conflict, and what choices opened up to them by becoming combatants. McKay and Mazurana
(2004:17) address this male bias with their case study of girl combatants in Sierra Leone,
Uganda, and Mozambique, writing, “armed conflict and girls’ and women’s participation in fighting forces sometimes provided opportunities for these girls and women- such as achieving positions of power not previously possible.” Unfortunately, they do not elaborate what these kinds of positions of power are. Subindra Bogati (2014:9) is clearer on this regarding the Nepali context, arguing that “to aspiring young women, [the People’s War] offered challenging opportunities to work alongside men- on equal terms- and to prove their worth.” Bogati (ibid., 24) also offers a case study of Sabina, whose entire family was in the Nepali or Indian army, but this career choice was denied to her because she was a woman. The People’s War changed this, and, as it pressured the (Royal) Nepal Army 41 to also recruit women. This career choice is now available to women throughout Nepal. In this sense, the People’s War expanded the career choices women could make which had previously been restricted because of their gender, and therefore provided empowerment- as-power-to. Chapter 5 details to what extent such career choices remain limited by unequal gendered power relations.
41 Up until the peace agreement in 2006, the government’s army was called the Royal Nepal Army. Following the peace agreement, the monarchy was abolished and the army was renamed as the Nepal Army.
164 The conflicts did not just provide women and girls with the choice to become combatants, it also provided female combatants with the opportunity to become a high- ranking leader in ranks of armed groups. This is evidenced by my interviews. As discussed,
I interviewed several high-ranked female ex-combatants in Nepal, including two brigade commissioners (INT2, INT4), one brigade vice chair (INT10), and two leaders of smaller groups (INT64, INT65) in Nepal. In Liberia, I interviewed one duty commander (INT33) and one battalion commander (INT34). As argued, access to leadership positions was restricted. Tone Bleie et al (2012:37) also argue this regarding the Maoists, writing,
“Women are underrepresented among mid- and top-ranking Maoist combatants,” suggesting that female combatants still did not have the same career opportunities and choices as their male counterparts. Indigenous and ethnic groups were also underrepresented among Maoist leaders (Aryal 2010:11, Lama-Tamang et al 2003:35).
Research on indigenous and ethnic minority female leaders in the PLA remain strikingly absent. Among the female Maoist leaders I interviewed, two were Magar (janajati), and one was Brahmin-Chhetri (upper-caste). While this is in line with the overall ethnic/caste distribution in the PLA recorded by Hisila Yami (2006:59)42, I was unable to find female
Dalit or Madhesi ex-combatants who had obtained high ranks. Further research is thus necessary to determine how different intersecting oppressions affected career progression within the PLA, and thus empowerment-as-power-to through the expansion scope for choice and scope in careers.
Focusing specifically on leadership of female ex-combatants in the PLA, there were several restrictions based on gender that limited this empowerment-as-power-to. One example of this is motherhood. Female combatants such as Amrita Thapa lobbied the PLA early on in the conflict to ensure that motherhood did not negatively impact career
42 Roughly half the PLA are Tibeto-Burman, Brahmin/Chhetri/Newar make up 38.3 %, Dalit 7.3% but Madhesi only 0.35%
165 progression (Kathmandu Post 2014). A policy was introduced to distribute the time of childcare responsibilities: one-third for female Maoists and two-thirds for male Maoists, but implementation was not enforced (Rai 2017:213). In practice, female combatants ‘were expected to bear the major burden of parenting’ (Bhatterai 2016:137-41). Furthermore, feminist scholars have long argued that women often have to prove themselves much more than men, and this is no different for female combatants (D’Amico and Beckman 1995:8,
Sjoberg 2007:93). While the female ex-combatants Punam Yadav (2016:165) interviewed said that ‘they did not feel any discrimination during the People’s War based on their gender,’ Hisila Yami argued that “Women thus have to work hard twice, even thrice, to establish their authority over [the] PLA. Fortunately they are able to do so.” Female combatants therefore had increased choice in careers as combatants in Nepal, they also had to prove themselves more than male counterparts, highlighting persisting unequal gendered inequalities in terms of access to leadership roles.
The majority of my Nepali female ex-combatant interviewees stated that they had not been treated differently than male combatants in the PLA; however, there were examples of discrimination. For instance, Sita (INT6) stressed a lack of sanitary pads for menstruating female combatants. Although many resources are in short supply during conflict, female reproductive needs were also not met during cantonment when supplies were more readily available (Saferworld 2010:36, Olonisakin et al 2011:69). The lack of sanitary pads for women resulted in widespread reproductive health problems (INT12,
INT75). This suggests a male bias in what basic needs were catered to in the PLA during conflict and cantonment. Gendered inequalities were not fully challenged, as also argued by Savitra (INT10, cf. Chapter 3), Manisha (INT2), and Hisila Yami (2006:50). Female ex-combatants thus experienced an expansion of agency and choice in careers that had
166 been unavailable to them because of their gender, but this form of empowerment-as- power-to remained restricted due to persisting unequal gendered power relations.
Besides careers, female ex-combatants also experienced empowerment-as-power-to through increased choice regarding marriage. The Maoists pushed for intercaste, janabadi
(revolutionary) love marriages, widow remarriages, and normalized divorce where a partner was not fulfilling their duties in marriage and to the revolution (Rai 2017:207ff,
Bhattarai 2016:131, Dahal 2015:190, Gulbrandsen et al 2008). As divorce and especially remarriage were largely culturally taboo in Nepal, this opened up space for female combatants and other women to enjoy greater control over whom they marry and if they want to stay married. However, as Hisila Yami confirmed in an interview with Rita
Manchanda (2004:237ff. cf. Dahal 2015:190), young female combatants faced pressure to marry in the PLA, “as unmarried women draw lots of suspicion from men as well as women,” resulting “in marriages against their wishes or before they are really ready to get married.” Shrestha-Schipper (2008) further argues that the Maoists banned marital practices that had previously offered benefits to women, including the practice of jari in
Jumla, “a de facto divorce involving no court hearing and commonly practiced in the region without any stigmatization towards women.” The Maoists have denounced jari as a
‘degraded wife-selling tradition,’ banning the practice in areas under their influence. The extent to which female combatants in Nepal thus experienced empowerment-as-power-to through increased choice and agency in getting and staying married is therefore debatable.
This section considered three forms of empowerment-as-power-to that female ex- combatants experienced as a result of becoming a combatant. Many female ex-combatants in Liberia and Nepal learned combat-specific skills, and some acquired non-combat skills such as cooking, midwifery, and first aid in Liberia, and political skills in Nepal. The latter however was restricted to those who became involved through student politics and
167 obtained high-ranking positions in the PLA. This has implications for our understanding of female ex-combatants’ empowerment. Firstly, this highlights that some forms of empowerment may depend on the nature of the conflict, i.e. female combatants in Nepal were enabled to acquire political skills as empowerment-as-power-to because of the PLA’s heavy emphasis on propaganda/political outreach. Female ex-combatants in both contexts decided to join armed groups to address conflict-related insecurities (e.g. rape, torture, death, food insecurity) and regain control over their lives. This form of empowerment-as- power-to was only possible through the loss of this control in the first place and is not possible post-conflict in the absence of armed groups. Regaining control by becoming a combatant is thus a temporary form of empowerment, as this section argued. Additionally, this section argued that female ex-combatants in Nepal experienced some empowerment- as-power-to through the expanded scope for agency and choice, particularly related to careers and marriage, although this remains shaped by unequal gendered power relations.
To conclude this section, some female ex-combatants in Liberia and Nepal experienced empowerment-as-power-to, but this was more frequent in Nepal, although not all female ex-combatants in Nepal experienced this equally.
Power Within
Based on my conceptualization of empowerment in Chapter 3, power within constitutes another form of empowerment and is fundamental to challenging gendered inequalities.
This section considers various forms of empowerment-as-power-within, namely self- reliance, self-esteem, self-confidence, as well as awareness and the ability to speak out against inequalities. This section argues that empowerment-as-power-within was experienced to a much greater extent by female ex-combatants in Nepal than in Liberia, which is largely related to the ideological nature of the Nepali conflict.
168 The first form of empowerment-as-power-within I discuss is self-reliance and survival. Stijn Smet (2009:153), referring to girl combatants in Sierra Leone, argued that
“they were exposed to situations in which being strong, fending for themselves and creating a sense of independence were the only ways to survive.” Thus, Smet suggests that self-reliance and power-within are prerequisites for survival. My female ex-combatant interviewees however noted that increased self-reliance and learning to survive gave them strength, which they consider a positive thing today. For example, Uma (INT5) recalled
“Before joining the party, there was not much courage within me as I was female and I cannot do everything, but after joining and surviving on my own, I became self-reliant and [feeling] I am not less than men. A kind of passion, courage and awareness was developed, and the feeling of surviving alone, and capacity to lead and to do something for society was developed.”
This empowerment-as-power-within was also found in Liberia. As Gracie explains, “I am better than people [who did not fight]. I [am] still living, the war gave me strength. If I [do] not get strength, I will die” (INT39). Thus, the conflicts enabled and required some female ex-combatants to develop a sense of self-reliance to survive, but that surviving has produced a strength that can be considered as empowerment-as-power-within according to my conceptualization in Chapter 3.
Becoming a combatant further offered women and girls the opportunity of self- realization. A few female ex-combatants in Nepal wanted to join the Nepal Army already as children. Kalpana (INT70) recalled,
“I had a wish to join [the army] when I was young, but everyone used to tease me about that as I wasn’t tall. Maybe [I was interested in this] because of family as my father was an army man and other cousins were also army. I used to say I will join the army if I get taller or be an artist as I also enjoy singing. But I ended up being nothing.”
169 For Savitra (INT10), becoming a combatant for the PLA offered an opportunity for self- realization: “While waiting for the results of the SLC,43 I used to think about joining the
Nepal Army, but my parents scolded me for this, saying daughters cannot be recruited in the army. But I ended up becoming an army recruit of the [Maoist] party.” Furthermore,
Rai (2017:200) recounts the story of female ex-combatant Rekha Kranti, to whom “armed women in combat dress are extremely beautiful.” Joining the PLA allowed Kanti to pursue this (unconventional) beauty ideal as a form of self-realization. In another example,
Kamala (INT64) explained, “I joined the Maoists thinking to establish power while I was young. Now it has become a waste since I could not join the army because of my children.
Nobody insisted on me to join [the PLA], my heart said to do so.” For Kamala, joining the
PLA was an opportunity to gain ‘power’ and constitutes a form of self-realization. Critical feminist peacebuilding scholars have however been wary of women’s access to military positions, arguing that it neither leads to challenging of gendered inequalities, nor does women’s militarization contribute to a positive peace around the world (Carreiras 2006,
Cockburn 2007, D’Amico& Weinstein 1999, Duncanson& Woodward 2016, Enloe 2007,
Peterson& Runyan 2010, Sjoberg& Gentry 2007). While self-realization as empowerment- as-power-within in the form of becoming a combatant benefitted these female combatants individually, this inevitably fueled the conflict, as there is no war without combatants.
From my critical feminist peacebuilding perspective, there are also examples of self-realization as form of empowerment-as-power-within that can potentially contribute to building an emancipatory peace. Lila’s (INT4) reasons for wanting to join the army as a child are instructive here:
“During my childhood I used to feel like why should only brothers prepare for the army and women are considered weak or why can’t I compete with men and so on. Our brothers were trained since childhood because of our [Magar] culture to join
43 School Leaving Certificate
170 the [Royal Nepal] army. I was always against these things that females are weak and why can’t a daughter look after her parents.”
This childhood wish to join the army emanates from a desire to demonstrate that women and girls are not weak and to challenge gendered inequalities, specifically patrilocal marriage practices. 44 Joining the PLA offered a path to challenge patrilocal marriage practices and to self-realization, but this is not the only way to challenge such practices.
Becoming a combatant as a form of self-realization (empowerment-as-power-within) may or may not have negative implications for building an emancipatory peace, depending on the motivations behind self-realizations and whether this can be achieved in ways that do not undermine an emancipatory peace.
The next aspect of empowerment-as-power-within is self-esteem. Drawing from
Uma’s quote above (‘I am not less than men’, INT5), we can see an increase in self-esteem, and a particularly gendered one at that. As women and girls have generally been considered less valuable than men and boys (especially in Nepal, but also in Liberia, see
Introduction), becoming a combatant thus encouraged some female ex-combatants to realize that they are not essentially less valuable than men (cf. Bogati 2014:9, Shawna
2015:46). This overlaps with the internal transformation envisioned by critical, feminist, and post-colonial scholarship on empowerment as prerequisite for challenging unequal gendered power relations. Notably, none of the Liberian female ex-combatants interviewees mentioned such increase in self-esteem as a result of breaking down unequal gendered power relations. However, becoming a combatant also allowed some female ex- combatants to regain self-esteem after rape. Black Diamond stated,
“Before the war, rape was almost unknown in our country. When the rapes started, I and the other girls who fought were determined not to be victims. We wanted to
44 The specific patrilocal practice referred to by Lila is that women/girls move in with their families-in-law upon marriage, whereas their male siblings stay with their parents, usually providing for them in old age. The female sibling is frequently excluded from caring for her parents.
171 fight back to show our attackers they couldn't get away with such things and that they, not we, should feel shame for the rapes” (in Taylor 2012).
For Black Diamond, the self-esteem lost through rape could be regained by fighting back.
In this sense, empowerment-as-power-within is not something that was necessarily never there, but that this power-within could be taken away (through rape) and regained by becoming a combatant.
Closely related to this is increased self-confidence as form of empowerment-as- power-within. An increase in self-confidence was observed by several female ex- combatants. Examples of this include Savitra (INT10), who ‘gained the confidence of carrying leadership responsibilities,’ Lysie (INT33), who has ‘confidence in her skills and leads a good lifestyle now’, Wonkehmi (INT44), who was never captured when spying, because she was ‘too good’ at it, and Mina (INT71) developed a confidence to speak to other people as a result of becoming a combatant. Before the conflict, she would not speak, particularly not with men, ‘not even her own father and brother’. She overcame this anxiety, and now she goes out in public, speaks to strangers, rings in to radio programs, and even sings publicly. This, she argued, was all enabled through her time as a combatant.
Therefore, increased self-confidence as a form of empowerment-as-power-within was enabled by becoming a combatant for some female ex-combatants in Liberia and Nepal.
Another form of empowerment-as-power-within is increased ‘awareness’ in Nepal.
‘Awareness’ as a term was ubiquitous among peacebuilding and development actors, researchers, and activists during my fieldwork in Nepal in development and peacebuilding contexts. ‘Awareness’ can refer to various things, but particularly refers to awareness of rights, and problems of inequality along gender, caste, ethnic, and class lines. 45 This increase of ‘awareness’ among female ex-combatants in Nepal has been widely noted; cantonment after the CPA in particular functioned as a ‘political university’ (Bleie et al
45 Awareness overlaps closely with Freie’s conscientização, Chapter 3
172 2012:18. Saferworld 2010:7). This also came out of my interviews: Savitra (INT10) said that the conflict ‘brought a huge change in [her] awareness’, and Jaya (INT3), a janajati female ex-combatant, stated that her awareness was better than those who did not fight, particularly because she came from a poorer background. In a specific example, Lila (INT4) argued, “I am in a better position than those who did not fight, because I understood the country, visited several districts, and have seen the lives of people.” As an important member of the Nepal Communist Party, this awareness was relevant, perhaps even instrumental, to her current position. However, Sapana (INT68) summarized, “Women who fought are above [those who did not fight] regarding awareness on political and social issues, but are very weak economically.” This increase in awareness thus often came at the expense of education and learning a trade, which many now regret (see above). This suggests that ‘awareness’ as empowerment-as-power-within is not considered as relevant as economic reintegration, a discussion to which Chapter 5 returns.
Closely related to ‘awareness’ is the ability to speak out to assert rights and challenge inequalities. Lesley Abdela (2011:70) argues that in Nepal “marginalized groups developed a greater awareness of their rights, as well as the ability to stand up and demand equality.” This ability to speak up came out of several interviews in Nepal. Manisha
(INT2), stressed, “Due to political awareness, I learned to speak up if something wrong is happening.” Lila (INT4) remarked that she learned to be assertive and to have her voice heard. This new assertiveness has also been confirmed by DDR officials in Nepal (INT1,
INT73) and by Hisila Yami (in Gulbrandsen et al 2008). Female ex-combatants were quick to point out the effects of their ability to speak out within the PLA. For example, they came to an agreement with the party that female combatants should not marry before the age of
20-22 to allow time to ‘develop [their] own personality and capabilities’ (INT4). In this sense, assertiveness enhanced the potential for self-realization (empowerment-as-power-
173 within) and for developing skills (empowerment-as-power-to). Notably, only one VMLR,
Laxmi (INT7), mentioned an increased ability to speak out; all other female ex-combatants who noted this were and still are heavily involved in the political side of the party. This suggests that rather than being a combatant, political involvement is more relevant to producing assertiveness as empowerment-as-power-within. As already discussed, these political roles were restricted to high-ranking female combatants who had become involved through student politics. Again, it can therefore be concluded that empowerment- as-power-within was experienced at varying intensities to different extents, depending on how female ex-combatants were situated in the PLA.
Increased awareness and assertiveness as empowerment-as-power-within in Nepal stands in stark contrast to Liberia. None of the Liberian female ex-combatants mentioned these forms of empowerment. On the contrary, Ciata (INT54) states, “I am feeling bad because at that time I was very small,” and at 17, she was forced into joining LURD.
Another female ex-combatant, Theresa (INT25), went as far as to say: “I regret every single day of my life. […] I never felt good, because I knew I was doing the wrong thing. I went [with INFPL], because I had no other choice.” She was also forced recruited at 13 and went spying against her will. That is not to say that all Liberian female ex-combatants consider their time as combatants negatively. Fanta (INT52) picked up guns at 14 to protect the area she was living in with others, by her account quite successfully. While the war was ongoing, she said, “We used to enjoy,46 we used to eat, we used to play with money, we used to sleep [in] good place[s],” as a result of protecting their home. There are a few things at play here that may influence how Liberian female ex-combatants feel about their time as combatant. As these anecdotes demonstrate, some female ex-combatants were not negatively affected during the conflicts, and even derived a good life from the conflict.
46 Liberian-English expression to describe living a good life
174 Forced recruitment, and the kind of roles female ex-combatants consequently had to fulfill, appears to have had a negative impact on self-perception and their time as a combatant.
Overall, my interviews provided fewer examples of empowerment-as-power-within in Liberia than in Nepal. This has implications for the ‘transformative potential’ of female combatants’ empowerment to challenge gendered inequalities, as Chapter 3 contended that empowerment-as-power-within facilitates empowerment-as-power-with. While this section has argued that some female ex-combatants in Liberia derived empowerment-as-power- within in the form of increased self-reliance and developing inner strength drawn from surviving conflict, this section has also argued that opportunities for empowerment-as- power-within were far more numerous in Nepal. Here, this section has highlighted that female ex-combatants gained increased ‘awareness’ and some were able to draw on this to speak out, assert their rights, and challenge gendered inequalities. While Nepali female ex- combatants from different levels mentioned increased self-esteem, self-confidence, and awareness from joining the PLA, the ability to speak out remains largely restricted to higher-ranked female ex-combatants who were also politically involved in the party. The increase in awareness in Nepal among female ex-combatants as a form of empowerment- as-power-within is not surprising, given that the PLA were concerned with the ideological educations of combatants and non-combatants. This suggests that the nature of the conflict further shapes female combatants’ empowerment. To conclude this section, there are large discrepancies in empowerment-as-power-within between female ex-combatants in Liberia and Nepal, moreover, there are also discrepancies among female ex-combatants in Nepal.
Power With
Drawing on the conceptualization of empowerment-as-power-with in the previous chapter, this section argues that female ex-combatants experienced empowerment-as-power-with to some extent, particularly so in Nepal. From a critical feminist peacebuilding perspective,
175 power with is the most significant form of empowerment, as argued in Chapter 3, as this has the greatest potential to challenge gendered inequalities and structures reproducing these. This section considers various forms of empowerment-as-power-with, including seeking power with to overcome conflict-related insecurities, and the extent to which unequal gendered power relations were challenged in the Maoist ranks and in wider society.
To recall, women and girls joined armed groups to regain control over their lives after this was lost through insecurity from rape, torture, death, and a lack of food, marking a form of empowerment-as-power-to. The joining of armed groups because of conflict- related insecurities is, I argue, also a form of empowerment-as-power-with. To reiterate the harrowing story of how Shanti (INT65) became a Maoist combatant: “I was tortured by the state, saying that Maoists come to our place and we feed them. So I was arrested and left in the middle of the road after being tortured. I was just 14. […] So, I thought I would be safe if I join the Maoists.” There is a clear assumption that joining the Maoists would protect her from direct violence at the hands of the state. Joining armed groups such as the PLA then offered an opportunity to collectively escape and address direct violence (perpetrated by the state), thus constituting a form of empowerment-as-power-with. As for empowerment-as-power-to, this form of empowerment is only possible in the presence of state violence. If there were no state violence, there would be no reason to join armed groups to address this state violence. This again stresses the temporality of empowerment.
Joining armed forces to seek empowerment-as-power-with by addressing insecurity from direct violence is however only a promise of empowerment that is not necessarily fulfilled. To put it differently, just because Shanti joined the PLA to seek protection from further torture and possible death, did not mean that this could not still materialize after her joining. Paradoxically, some might say, becoming a combatant is marked by profound insecurity from direct violence. It is, for example, legal to kill enemy combatants in
176 conflict under the 1949 Geneva Conventions (ICRC 1949), whereas civilians are supposed to be protected. However, the majority of conflict deaths are civilians, sometimes estimated as high as 80-90% (Tickner 1992:56, Lorentzen& Turpin 1998, Meintjes et al
2002, Snyder 2009, UNSCR 1325). This indicates that it may be safer to become a combatant in terms of protection from direct violence resulting in death. Joining armed groups therefore offered some female ex-combatants empowerment-as-power-with through collective protection from conflict-related, as well as greater control over their lives.
Beyond addressing direct violence through joining armed groups, female ex- combatants also sought to address unequal gendered power relations, constituting another form of empowerment-as-power-with (according to my conceptualization). The Maoists promised to address a range of issues pertaining to gender, ethnic/caste, class and regional inequalities (Shekhawat 2015, Dahal 2015, Rai 2017, Saferworld 2010, Khadka 2012,
Aryal 2007, Aylra 2007, Bogati 2014, UN-INSTRAW 2009, Toda 2010). Female ex- combatants in Nepal joined out of different forms of gendered inequalities and discrimination reproduced by structures. Laxmi (INT7) specifically joined to address caste discrimination: “I belong to the Dalit caste and discrimination exists in Nepal, so I heard that it will end after we join [the PLA]. If discrimination based on caste will end then I thought I should join.” Lila (INT4) stressed, “There was class, caste, region-based inequality and oppression so to end this I participated in student politics. […] We found the feudal system [in Nepal] to be the main reason for unequal distribution of rights and the
[Maoist] party has the same view and brought up the idea of picking up arms because the king has the arms.” Other female ex-combatants joined the PLA to address gendered inequalities. Manisha (INT2), for example, picked up arms for the PLA because “As an individual I had an aim of rescuing oppressed females and I continuously contributed to the war for ten years.” Discussing such oppressions, Sapana (INT68) recalled,
177 “I was attracted [to the Maoists] by their revolutionary programs and their political ideology, [like addressing] the situation where women are not allowed to go to school. [The conflict] also provided freedom and taught us that we should not live in sadness, everyone needs to be treated equally and no domestic violence should exist.”
In Sapana’s particular case, she went against her parents’ wishes to attend school. This highlights that several Nepali female ex-combatants were motivated by the Maoists’ narrative of challenging inequalities, thus providing an opportunity for empowerment-as- power-with. However, different female ex-combatants sought to challenge different
(though not mutually exclusive) inequalities by joining the PLA, thus indicating that the empowerment-as-power-with to address inequalities can have different meanings to different female ex-combatants.
The Maoist narrative of addressing gendered inequalities has however been contested. Lawoti and Kumar Pahari (2009:34) for example argue that, “By linking villagers’ dissatisfaction with their daily lives to larger problems in the political system, the
[Maoist Party]47 was able to exploit grievances for the purpose of rebel recruitment” [My emphasis]. This implies that villagers-come-combatants had no agency in joining the PLA, but rather the Maoists ‘seduced’ them into joining. The argument that PLA recruitment took place out of self-interest is also offered by Bleie et al (2012:23), who contend that,
“the Maoists were aware that women and children were in fact more trustworthy and loyal to the cause and would not defect as easily as men. This recognition builds on and uses personality traits formed by deep-rooted gender and caste hierarchies,” failing however to substantiate this claim. In another example, in Northern Ireland, Miranda Alison (2004:454) has critiqued the ‘strategic or ideological need for women’s involvement’ as the primary reason for female combatants to join armed groups, arguing that they have agency and personal and political motivations for joining. My female ex-combatant interviewees in the
47 Now succeeded by the Nepal Communist Party
178 paragraph above further corroborate this agency in joining, as these female ex-combatants wanted to challenge gendered inequalities in Nepal by joining the PLA. Therefore, joining the PLA to challenge gendered inequalities constitutes a form of empowerment-as-power- with.
The extent of empowerment-as-power-with to address gendered inequalities can be judged from the implementation of gender equality within the Maoist ranks. Although my female ex-combatant interviewees for the most part stressed that they were treated equally to male combatants (INT64, INT67, INT68, INT71), this chapter has thus far recorded several examples of persistent gendered inequalities for female ex-combatants. To reiterate, female ex-combatants were restricted from leadership roles (Yami 2006, Aryal 2010:44f) and struggled with unequal distribution of childcare responsibilities (Bleie et al 2012:37,
Kathmandu Post 2014). Additionally, female ex-combatants were excluded from peace negotiations (Shekhawat and Pathak 2015:62, Dhamala 2003), and, as was the case in
Nicaragua in the Sandinista movement (Molyneux 1985), women’s emancipation was considered secondary to class liberation, even by Prachanda, co-chairman of the Nepal
Communist Party (Yadav 2016:100, Thapa 2016:96). The combat dress of female combatants (‘functional as opposed to feudal frills’, Tamang 2017:231) was the same to male combatants’; however, as Sewa Bhattarai (2016:134) convincingly argues, “The unisex look was, thus, a marker of equality, though in reality it too was built on default male standards.” Overall, this indicates that gendered inequalities were not fully addressed in the PLA, bringing into doubt the extent to which joining armed forces brought about empowerment-as-power-with by addressing gendered inequalities.
The breaking down of unequal gendered power relations in Nepali society more generally can provide further inside regarding the extent of the empowerment-as-power- with experienced by female ex-combatants. After all, the Maoists aimed to break these
179 down in its ranks and wider society. One DDR official (INT9) stressed that ‘society hasn’t changed’, while Michael Hutt (2004:163) notes that unequal gendered power relations persisted in villages. This has however been widely challenged. Women have the right to divorce and remarry, and Nepal has seen an increase in widow remarriages (Thapa
2016:101). Women now also have the right to join the Nepal Army (Aryal 2010:49), a direct result of the conflict. The People’s War pushed for an end to domestic violence, child marriage, forced marriage, and polygamy (Karki 2016:150). While these practices have not ceased to exist in Nepal, the People’s War arguably opened space to challenge these practices. Perhaps here is where the greatest of changes lie in post-conflict Nepal, in that it has encouraged marginalized people, including women, to rethink and challenge gendered inequalities (Abdela 2011, Aryal 2010, Hutt 2004, Yadav 2016). In terms of empowerment-as-power-with, this suggests that female combatants indeed had opportunities to challenge inequalities on a wider societal level by joining the PLA in
Nepal. This has implications for understanding female combatants’ empowerment. For example, this suggests that empowerment can be far-reaching and be beneficial to challenging gendered inequalities on a societal level and can therefore contribute to an emancipatory peace. The next chapter considers the extent to which improvements in unequal gendered power relations were made in the places where female ex-combatants reintegrated, and to what extent this empowerment-as-power-with has been supported or undermined through reintegration.
Conclusions
This chapter has considered in what ways female ex-combatants in Liberia and Nepal experienced empowerment through the role of combatant. For this purpose, I relied on my conceptualization of empowerment from Chapter 3, and focused on four forms of empowerment: power over, power to, power within, and power with. This chapter argued
180 that some female ex-combatants in Liberia and Nepal experienced empowerment, although examples of this were more numerous in Nepal. Female ex-combatants in both contexts gained power over civilians, resources, and other combatants, although some experienced this much more so than others, particularly power over other combatants. In Nepal and
Liberia, female ex-combatants experienced power to, through acquisition of new skills and increased control over their lives. Empowerment-as-power-within was much more visible in Nepal, where female ex-combatants had gained self-confidence, awareness, and an ability to speak out. Female ex-combatants in Nepal also provided more examples of power with.
As this chapter has contended, these differences in empowerment between female ex-combatants in Liberia and Nepal are closely related to the heavily ideologically-driven nature of the conflict in Nepal, which emphasized challenging inequalities along ethnic/caste, class, gender, and regional lines and actively challenged unequal gendered power relations for female combatants. For example, the Maoists had a policy of treating male and female combatants equally, as discussed regarding ‘power to’ (although this was not fully implemented). As a result, female ex-combatants in Nepal gained increased self- confidence, awareness, and assertiveness. The ideological nature of the conflict in Nepal also enhanced power with, as it actively sought to change society, thus providing a community for the many female ex-combatants who had experienced inequalities along gender, caste/ethnic, class, and regional lines. Female ex-combatants in both contexts became leaders in armed groups, giving them new skills (‘power to’) and power over other combatants. Thus, different forms of empowerment are interlinked.
This chapter has further stressed the temporality of some forms of empowerment.
Conflict offers (some) female combatants a unique opportunity of leadership
(empowerment-as-power-over) and skills (empowerment-as-power-to), which they would
181 be unlikely to acquire without conflict. Skills however need to be practiced, or risk being forgotten, meaning this form of empowerment is slippery. Furthermore, conflict also offered the opportunity to challenge gendered inequalities within the PLA and in society more broadly (empowerment-as-power-with), likely to a larger extent than without conflict and armed groups. Empowerment-as-power-over is tied to the use of the gun and being part of armed groups, meaning that this form of empowerment as experienced by female combatants is only possible during conflict. Likewise, gaining control over one’s life
(empowerment-as-power-to), which was lost as a result of conflict-related insecurities can only be gained because this control was lost due to conflict. This highlights the temporality of empowerment, although there are differences among its various forms. The following chapter elaborates on the temporality of empowerment, specifically considering the extent to which female ex-combatants’ empowerment has been maintained post-conflict.
182 Chapter 5: Reintegration and Empowerment of Female Ex-Combatants in Liberia and Nepal
Building on my analysis of female ex-combatants’ empowerment (Chapter 4) this chapter analyzes to what extent this empowerment is maintained through their post-conflict reintegration. This chapter builds on the frameworks for analyzing the reintegration and empowerment (Chapter 3), drawing on my critical feminist peacebuilding approach to this analysis outlined in Chapter 2. This chapter further builds on my analysis of female combatants’ empowerment in Liberia and Nepal (Chapter 4) to analyze the extent to which this empowerment has been maintained through reintegration. I also explore how empowerment and reintegration have affected each other. For this purpose, I draw on data from female ex-combatant and DDR official interviews in both contexts. I argue that much of the empowerment gained through becoming a combatant was lost through reintegration and that empowerment can be both beneficial and detrimental to female ex-combatants’ reintegration.
To make this argument, this chapter first introduces economic, social, and political reintegration support provided to female ex-combatants in UN-led DDR, specifically the
UNIRP and LDDRR. Here, I demonstrate that support provided was insufficient to support the reintegration of the vast majority of female ex-combatants. I then turn to the four different forms of empowerment introduced and analyzed in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, including power over, power to, power within, and power with. This frameworks allows for analyzing the temporality of different forms of power in empowerment experienced by female ex-combatants.
183 Reintegration of Female Ex-Combatants
6 and 14 of my female ex-combatant interviewees in Nepal and Liberia respectively participated in the UNIRP and LDDRR. There were various reasons why female ex- combatants did not participate in UN-led DDR in Nepal and Liberia. In Nepal, only those female ex-combatants classified as Verified Minors and Late Recruits (VMLRs) were eligible to participate in the UNIRP. I found no interviewees who chose not to participate despite being eligible, but as noted in the Introduction, female VMLRs were less likely to participate compared to male ex-combatants. Further research is needed to determine why these female ex-combatants did not access the UNIRP, to what extent they have reintegrated, and how this affected their empowerment. The UNIRP has conducted no such analysis to this date.
In Liberia, female ex-combatants were frequently excluded by the LDDRR, as
Chapter 1 argued. Female ex-combatants in Liberia also chose to exclude themselves from
DDR. Vonyee (INT31) went home because she felt unwelcome at the ‘DD’ site, where
DDR officials ‘were not paying attention to us child soldiers’. As discussed, DDR programs had a ‘one man, one gun’ approach to disarmament, and female and child combatants were regarded only as ‘supporters’ and/or victims, and not in need of DDR support. Female ex-combatants thus excluded themselves, as this mentality prevailed (see
Chapter 6 for a detailed discussion of such narratives). Even female ex-combatants who participated in DD did not always participate in the reintegration phase, for example because the gap between ‘DD’ and ‘R’ was too big (INT33) or because it was not safe. In other cases, it was because of seemingly more mundane reasons; for instance, Gracie’s husband took her back home after dropping off her gun (INT39).48 Those who participated
48 There may well be gendered reasons why Gracie’s husband took her back home (e.g. control of his wife, protection of his wife, accessing DDR would be inappropriate for a woman), although my
184 generally considered ‘DD’ beneficial, because it was safe compared to the situation outside cantonments (INT40). This is in line with literature on female ex-combatants’ exclusion from reintegration (Chapter 1, MacKenzie 2009, 2010, 2012, McKay& Mazurana 2004,
Nilsson 2005, Mazurana& McKay 2003).
The LDDRR offered three support options for the economic reintegration of ex- combatants: education, vocational skills, and agriculture (UNDP 2006a:15). Reintegration in Liberia was envisioned as “needs driven and takes into account skills and aspirations for productive civilian life” (UNDP 2004) and thus theoretically builds on skills female ex- combatants had acquired during or before conflicts. Notably, training or education were the only support provided to ex-combatants (NCDDRR 2007:8). Since the LDDRR, the
IDDRS (2006, module 4.30) has emphasized that training does not equal economic reintegration, and more support is needed. Furthermore, it was not the commitment of the
LDDRR to fully train ex-combatants (Munive et al 2012:373). As a result, the ‘success’ of economic reintegration of ex-combatants in Liberia has been highly debated. Pugel (2007:2) argues that ex-combatants who participated in DDR were better off financially than ex- combatants who did not, while Ian Levely (2014:140) found an insignificant effect on income and only a small impact on employment, utilizing Pugel’s dataset. McMullin
(2013:397) found ex-combatants and non-combatants were ‘just as likely to resort to criminal enterprise’.49 This highlights the debatable success of economic reintegration for ex-combatants, but does not tell us the implications of economic reintegration support for female ex-combatants’ empowerment in Liberia.
The UNIRP had a more comprehensive approach to economic reintegration; it offered education, vocational skills training (VST), microenterprise training, and health-
interview was unable to verify this. In any case, it seems that Gracie agreed with the decision not to participate in DDR but to go home with her husband. 49 Criminal activity is often used as indicator of (un)successful economic reintegration (INT13)
185 related training. This lasted up to two years for the latter three options, and up to four years for education. Access to education was negotiated with the Ministry of Education (INT12), and provided support to government schools and stipends for ex-combatants (UNIRP
2012c). Over 40 different microenterprise trainings were offered by the UNDP and implementing partners and provided one to three months of business or skill training, business start-up training, support and financing. More than 35 VST options were offered, either on-the-job training or in training institutions. VST built upon curricula by the Nepali
Council for Technical Education and Vocational Training (CTEVT) and skills were tested by the National Skill Testing Board, which provides certificates recognized in and out of the country (UNIRP 2012i). Health-related training was overseen by the United Nations
Population Fund (UNFPA) and included 15-18 months of institutional and on-the-job- training as auxiliary nurse assistant, nurse midwife, community assistant, lab assistant, and medical assistant. It was only available to those who already completed the School Leaving
Certificate (SLC)50 (UNIRP 2012e). Thus, unlike the LDDRR, the UNIRP was tied to existing national training and education frameworks. The UNIRP was therefore potentially better set up to support the reintegration of (female) ex-combatants, as these ties to national frameworks may reflect more localized approaches to reintegration rather than a foreign imposition. Chapter 6 elaborates on the extent to which this was the case and the implications thereof for female ex-combatants’ empowerment.
There are differences in female ex-combatants’ economic reintegration. Some female ex-combatants (INT2, INT4, INT5, INT10) in Nepal now have influential political positions in the Constituent Assembly or in the Nepal Communist Party, the successor party to the PLA. They fared better economically than other female ex-combatants in
Nepal, although there are differences among them. Uma (INT5) for instance is still
50 Standard Nepali school examination, equivalent to Grade 10
186 struggling economically, as she comes from a poor background and is a single parent after her husband was killed during the conflict. Most of the female VMLRs are employed, although none are employed as a direct result of the economic reintegration support provided by the UNIRP. Two female VMLRs (INT70, INT71) run shops, while Laxmi
(INT7) works irregularly as a karate teacher, and Jaya (INT3) and Sita (INT6) are cleaners.
The latter three are struggling to make ends meet. Among the adult female ex-combatants not politically employed, Kamala (INT64) runs a small shop, while others are mostly housewives or involved in debt labor and potentially even bonded labor, which is widespread in rural Nepal (ILO Nepal 2013). In Liberia, economic reintegration is poor, with less than a third of female ex-combatant interviewees having any income. Two female ex-combatants who accessed the child DDR have been able to receive employment based on their training: Teewon (INT36) for example has used her university degree in General and Computer Management to work on short contracts and has passed tests for becoming a police officer. Among female ex-combatants who accessed adult DDR, only Theresa
(INT25) is employed in house care (e.g. cleaning, cooking), a role she appreciates and enjoys. The rate of employment among female ex-combatants who did not access DDR is marginally higher than those who did. Among my interviewees, Gracie (INT39) does security work, Lysia (INT33) owns two houses from which she conducts business or gathers rent, and Suah (INT32) and Zaye (INT34) are petty traders.51 While a source of income, living of the informal economy is by nature insecure and leaves women ‘trapped in a cycle of poverty’ (Basini 2013:548f). Female ex-combatants have thus largely reintegrated poorly, especially in Liberia, and economic reintegration support has been of little use to the vast majority of female ex-combatants who participated in UN-led DDR.
51 ‘Selling small-small things’ as it is called in Liberia
187 There were various reasons for female ex-combatants’ poor economic reintegration among those who participated in UN-led DDR. Teachers in the LDDRR were not supported to handle the influx of ex-combatants, resulted in many dropping out (INT30).
Neither was education itself sufficient to obtain employment (INT3, INT7). Both programs faced corruption (INT36, INT70, Munive et al 2012:372), meaning female ex-combatants struggled with continued access to support. The quality in the LDDRR was low (NCDDRR
2007:5), owning to institutions not being up to standard (INT46), and training in Liberia and Nepal was too short to sufficiently support female ex-combatants’ economic reintegration (INT3, INT22, INT57). The LDDRR did not provide toolkits to those who completed training even though this was promised (INT25, INT28, INT38, INT35), because the funds for this were redirected to the education component (UNDP 2007:19f).
Neither did the LDDRR provide business support, meaning female ex-combatants felt unable to apply their (limited) skills (INT25, INT35). There were thus many issues in the
LDDRR and UNIRP that undermined female ex-combatants’ economic empowerment.
There were large discrepancies in female ex-combatants’ social reintegration. In
Nepal, all female ex-combatants who were elected Constituent Assembly members or working for the Nepal Communist Party felt accepted by their families(-in-law) and (new) communities, and that their current positions and involvement in the conflict contributed to this. Other adult female ex-combatants in Nepal also felt accepted by families and communities, particularly where they performed female gender roles, such as agricultural
(debt) labor, and housewife. Female VMLRs felt accepted by their families, but unwelcome by communities, resulting in their resettlement elsewhere. In Liberia, all female ex-combatants who accessed the adult DDR and 83% of female ex-combatants who accessed child DDR reported feeling accepted by their family and community, but chose to resettle in Monrovia for different reasons. Among female ex-combatants who did not
188 participate in the LDDRR, only 27% reported feeling accepted by family and community, suggesting that LDDRR participation may have had a positive influence on social reintegration into families and communities. Therefore, female ex-combatants’ social reintegration has had mixed results.
Social reintegration support in the LDDRR and the UNIRP was mainly aimed at child combatants and largely absent for adult ex-combatants. In Liberia, the LDDRR and implementing partners supported the social reintegration of demobilized child ex- combatants by providing family tracing and reunification (FTR), family mediation or dispute resolution (FDR), working together with local leaders, including religious leaders, and by establish Child Welfare Committees (CWCs) in communities that still exist today.
The CWCs are represented by male and female adults, youth, and children (INT60).
Additionally, traditional ceremonies (such as Sande and Poro)52 were utilized to support the social reintegration of (child) ex-combatants and reflected different approaches throughout the country, depending on locality (INT49). In practice, however, “Economic reintegration was the focus of the program as social reintegration was largely left aside.”
(UNDP 2006a:17). In the UNIRP, much social reintegration support was delivered through the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and established implementing partners for child protection. While family tracing and reunification were largely left up to ex- combatants, the UNIRP provided counseling to families. Additionally, the UNIRP ensured access to government schools for ex-combatants and provided community-based peacebuilding activities, such as football, singing, picnics, funded youth clubs, as well as
‘youth as agents of change’ training (INT15, INT16). This support was the shortest of all
UNIRP support (INT12), raising questions to what extent this could have supported female
52 Sande and Poro are secret Liberian societies for women/girls and men/boys respectively, where girls and boys are initiated into adulthood
189 ex-combatants’ social reintegration, as this usually requires the most amount of time
(Chapter 1).
In practice, FTR in Liberia or family counseling in Nepal was largely not implemented, and this would have been helpful to female ex-combatants (INT25). Female ex-combatants do not always return to families. Many female ex-combatants did not want to return home and chose to resettle elsewhere. Especially in Nepal, where married women habitually resettle with their family-in-law, and would as such not return home to their own families. These female ex-combatants also received little UNIRP support for their family reintegration, particularly where they settled far away from their parents (Transition
International 2013:17). Among female ex-combatants, social reintegration into families seemed to happen more organically than in Liberia. Kamala (INT64) stated regarding her and her husband that, “Our family did accept us completely after almost a year. We started living in a new place, so it took some time.” This suggests that some female ex-combatants in Nepal and Liberia struggled with family reintegration and may choose to resettle elsewhere. As noted in Chapter 1, resettlement outside of families can mean missing out on psychological and other support, with potential implications for their empowerment discussed later in this chapter.
Community reintegration is more problematic. As with family reintegration, female ex-combatants in Nepal also exclude themselves from communities, often because they are stigmatized (Shrestha-Schipper 2008:120). In Liberia, many female ex-combatants excluded themselves from families, although this was not based on stigmatization, which
Jennings (2008b:336) argues is overstated in academic literature on DDR. Jennings further argues, “Pugel reports that 94 percent of ex-combatants (both DDR participants and non- participants) self-reported having no problems gaining acceptance from neighbors.”
Female ex-combatants sometimes resettle close together, as was the case in Northern
190 Uganda and Lebanon, which can provide a source for ‘emotional, physical, and socioeconomic support’ (Ochen 2013:212, Karamé 2009:495). This was the case for many of my female ex-combatant interviewees in Liberia who resettled in Peace Island. This suggests that resettlement into new communities may benefit female ex-combatants’ wellbeing, reintegration, and empowerment. This is contrary to the assumptions in Chapter
1 that resettlement outside of ‘home’ communities is detrimental to female ex-combatants’ reintegration.
In Liberia, the LDDRR introduced no political reintegration support, while through the UNIRP some female ex-combatants joined youth clubs, including political ones. Jaya
(INT3) for example joined such a Youth Club with some ex-combatants friends. She explains that “It was helpful for personal development, as we used to participate in different programs. We learned to take the present generation forward in different aspects and the role of youth in making the state.” However, “activities and indicators on […] assisting women to become agents of change were missing.” (Transition International
2013:8). In spite of this, some female ex-combatants in Nepal have reintegrated politically, although most female ex-combatants in Nepal (and Liberia) were pushed out of this.
In Nepal, the conflict generated considerable change in political participation of women and girls. As Shobha Gautam et al (2001:215) highlight, “Women, especially poor, peasant, illiterate and janajati (tribal) women have achieved a political visibility never before imaginable in Nepal’s politics.” Furthermore, Pankhurst (2008:36) argued that political (re)integration of women is more likely where their contributions to conflict have been recognized, as was the case in Nepal. Indeed, women including female ex-combatants, have achieved political (re)integration at the highest level, the Constituent Assembly. Such a position was hitherto not imaginable to the majority of women and girls in Nepal, as female ex-combatant and Minister Jaya Puri Gharti explained (in Ward 2015). As Chapter
191 4 discussed, the vast majority of female ex-combatants in Nepal developed awareness
(empowerment-as-power-within), but few developed political skills and leadership skills
(empowerment-as-power-to). These were restricted to female ex-combatants who were involved in student politics and political side of the party, and possibly dependent on the time spent fighting and the age of female ex-combatants. At the same time, female ex- combatants were disadvantaged compared to male ex-combatants, as fewer female ex- combatants became commanders, and motherhood further limited retaining high-ranking positions (Yami 2006:5, INT21). This has had the result that ‘male ex-combatants are more politically engaged’ following the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (INT75).
Another example of political reintegration beyond high politics include participation in ex-combatant organizations. In Liberia, there is a veteran’s bureau in
Monrovia, while in Nepal there are organizations such as the Discharged PLA network and the women ex-PLA Academy. The Discharged PLA network is chiefly designed to lobby the Government of Nepal, for their rights (Transition International 2013:6), and to demand justice and reparations for their recruitment as child combatants in violation of international law, reflecting their sense of awareness (empowerment-as-power-within).
Another ex-PLA network, the PLA Women’s Academy, reportedly has over 10,000 members (Adhikari 2014), and is aimed at recognizing the contributions of female ex- combatants to the conflict and to address their current (economic) needs (Bogati 2014:10).
Female ex-combatants in Liberia and Nepal are thus politically active in various ex- combatant organizations.
The LDDRR and UNIRP provided physical and psychological health support, with limited benefits to female ex-combatants. While cantonment is an opportunity to conduct physical and mental health screening (Marwah et al 2010:13), physical health concerns
(e.g. bullet wounds, INT22, INT56) remain in Liberia. In Nepal, female ex-combatants
192 used their retirement fund to treat injuries or relocate near health facilities, limiting their social reintegration (Bogati 2014:8). In Liberia, psychological support remained ‘an intention rather than a plan’ (Abramowitz 2014:161), and there was ‘nothing clinical about the process’ (INT51) in a context where only two qualified psychiatrists remained in
Liberia (UNDP 2007). A standardized psychosocial counseling curriculum was absent in the LDDRR, meaning that “NGOs were at liberty to teach their own topics and the consequence was a wide variation of topics covered as well as the quality of delivery”
(ibid.:17ff). Counseling was also restricted to child ex-combatants (INT61). Consequently, psychological problems among female ex-combatants remain pervasive in Liberia (INT25,
INT56, INT58, Johnson et al 2008, Denov 2007:21, UN Women 2015:179). Psychological support as part of UN-led DDR was better in Nepal, and helped with retention of female
VMLRs (Transition International 2013). In total, 1,400 psychosocial assessments were conducted by implementing partners, such as Transcultural Psychosocial Organization
Nepal (TPO Nepal, INT18), and provided referrals for severe mental health problems
(INT20). Despite this, Kalpana (INT70) for example recalled ‘crying all the time for a few years’ and that her psychological problems were ‘obvious’. The UNIRP (2013d) identified that particularly male and married ex-combatants suffered from anxiety, depression, and
PTSD. Thus, physical and psychological mental health problems were poorly addressed in the LDDRR and UNIRP, although there were improvements in the UNIRP.
This section argued that female ex-combatants in Liberia and Nepal have on average reintegrated poorly. The UNIRP and LDDRR concentrated their efforts on the economic reintegration aspect of DDR, yet few female ex-combatants have benefitted directly from this support. Few have gained sustainable employment, and a stable income, and those who did achieved this through other means. Female ex-combatants in Nepal were accepted by families but struggling with community acceptance, while some female
193 ex-combatants in Liberia felt rejected by families and the majority chose to resettle in different communities, such as Peace Island. Neither the LDDR nor the UNIRP provided comprehensive political reintegration support, although some female ex-combatants have reintegrated politically in various ways. Lastly, physical and mental health problems remain pervasive among female ex-combatants and counselling had limited coverage, thereby undermining the overall reintegration process of female ex-combatants. The remainder of this chapter analyzes the implications of reintegration for female ex- combatants’ empowerment in Liberia and Nepal and vice versa.
Power Over
This section argues that female ex-combatants lost power over civilians and resources through reintegration. Some female ex-combatants retained power over other combatants, for whom they have become responsible. In this regard, power over has transformed to benefit some female ex-combatants’ reintegration. Empowerment-as-power-over as the first form of empowerment considered here in relation to reintegration. This form of empowerment includes power over civilians, power over resources, and power over other combatants.
As Chapter 4 argued, female combatants in Liberia and Nepal gained empowerment-as-power-over civilians exercised through use of the gun. Removing weapons after conflict (albeit often an incomplete process, Themnér 2011) means that female ex-combatants are no longer able to exercise such power over civilians. This means that this empowerment-as-power-over civilians is lost by removing weapons in UN-led
DDR and related peacebuilding programs. However, this loss of empowerment-as-power- over civilians is a positive development from my critical feminist peacebuilding perspective, as a decrease in weapons and direct violence is one aspect of developing an emancipatory peace.
194 Female ex-combatants also lost empowerment-as-power-over resources through the use of a gun. For the majority of female ex-combatants who gained power over resources as combatants, reintegrating into civilian life meant losing this access, nor had they found alternatives (see economic reintegration above). They have become ‘equally poor’ to the rest of the population (McMullin 2004:630). In some cases, (female) ex-combatants are worse off than the general population. In Peace Island, the unemployment rate is estimated at 95% by a community leader (INT56). This had already improved since a bridge was built to the community two years earlier. This is considerably higher than the Liberian unemployment rate of 18.8% of men and 34.2% of women in 2016 (ILO 2016).
Nonetheless, some female ex-combatants transformed their empowerment-as-power-over resources to benefit their economic (re)integration. Utas (2003:213) writes that these female ex-combatants
“were most often fighting commandos, in some cases high ranking officers. With looted wealth, they managed to build up business enterprises and with contacts in the [National Patriotic Front of Liberia], they often had a plethora of ‘big men’ to back them. Naturally women who fought for other warring factions than NPFL did not have the same political advantages.”
Lysie (INT33) was a ‘big man’ during the conflict and now owns two houses in Peace
Island, likely facilitated or funded by wealth obtained during conflict, from where she conducts business or gathers rent. For some high-ranking female ex-combatants, empowerment-as-power-over resources thus benefitted their economic reintegration. As
Chapter 4 discussed, few female ex-combatants became commanders compared to male ex-combatants, and longer periods of fighting facilitated such promotions. Additionally, some factions such as the NPFL offered female ex-combatants more leadership opportunities than others. Therefore, relying on conflict resources for economic reintegration was largely restricted to female ex-commanders in Liberia.
195 As discussed in Chapter 4, some female combatants in Liberia and Nepal became high-ranking combatants. With reintegration into civilian life, female commanders also lose the status and empowerment-as-power-over other combatants (Specht 2006:13).
However, in some cases, female commanders maintained ties with their (female) combatants despite attempts of UN-led DDR to break command chains. As Specht (ibid.) argues, “the conflict left a strong sense of responsibility towards their girls on the part of commanders, which also still persists. Female commanders, despite having difficulty sustaining themselves in many cases, generally still feel obliged to protect and provide for their girls.” Therefore, for some female commanders, ‘with great power [over] comes great responsibility’ for their former combatants. For these female commanders, empowerment- as-power-over transformed into a responsibility potentially economically and socially beneficial to other female combatants.
Thus, empowerment-as-power-over has been undermined through reintegration.
The removal of weapons has meant that female ex-combatants could no longer rely on the use of the gun to exercise power over civilians and resources. From a critical feminist peacebuilding perspective, this points to progress towards a decrease in direct violence as one aspect of an emancipatory peace. Some high-ranking female ex-combatants in Liberia have successfully utilized their power over resources to benefit their economic reintegration. Lastly, some female ex-combatants retained empowerment-as-power over other combatants, where this relationship transformed into a responsibility for respective commanders to support their former combatants.
Power To
Empowerment-as-power-to is another form of empowerment female ex-combatants in
Liberia and Nepal gained as combatants. Specifically, empowerment-as-power-to includes military, political, and medical skills, and increased choice and control over one’s life. This
196 subsection argues that while many female ex-combatants developed new skills, few female ex-combatants have been able to draw on these skills to support their reintegration. The higher-ranking female ex-combatants in Nepal who became members of the Constituent
Assembly or Nepal Communist Party have drawn on their leadership and political skills for their political (and by extension economic) reintegration. Lastly, this section argues that economic reintegration can further reinforce choice and control over one’s life as a form of empowerment-as-power-to; however, as few female ex-combatants are reintegrated economically (see above), this was not the case for the majority of female ex-combatants.
On the contrary, the respective UN-led DDR programs actively limited female ex- combatants’ choices in reintegration.
Female ex-combatants in Liberia and Nepal experienced empowerment-as-power- to by developing military, political, and medical skills such as midwifery and first aid.
None of the female ex-combatants I interviewed in Liberia and Nepal are currently using their military skills. Many female ex-combatants would have liked to join the army or peacekeeping forces, especially female VMLRs in Nepal (INT3, INT6, INT7, INT70,
INT71), but were ‘disqualified’ from Nepal Army integration by UNMIN (United Nations
Mission in Nepal) verification as they were under the age of 18 at the date of the peace agreement in November 2006. These female VMLRs spent three years in cantonment alongside adult ex-combatants and had become adults themselves in the meantime. They gained skills as combatants whilst missing out on education or acquire skills for their economic reintegration. Exclusion from Nepal Army integration based on designation as child combatants by UNMIN thus removed one of few economic reintegration opportunities for female VMLRs in Nepal. Older female ex-combatants in Nepal were often structurally excluded from army integration. As Bogati (2014:10) writes “Within family units, it was common for husbands to join the Army and the wives to stay at home,
197 looking after children.” Only one female ex-combatant, Sita (INT6), did not want to join, as her father was brutally tortured by the Royal Nepal Army during the conflict. Other female ex-combatants would have liked to join, some even from an early age, but their skills were considered to be necessary in the political side of the party (INT10) or were elected to the Interim Constituent Assembly (INT5). Others, such as Kamala (INT64) and
Shanti (INT68), had small children and were therefore unable to join. However, as discussed in Chapters 1 and 4, militaries are problematic from a critical feminist peacebuilding perspective, as it neither guarantees women’s equality to men, nor does it contribute to an emancipatory peace.
More so than economic reintegration, becoming a combatant offered unparalleled opportunities. Specht (2006:13) writes, “As civilians, higher-ranking girls face a society which– unlike the military– neither recognizes their past achievements nor offers them other ways to prove themselves equal to men. It seems almost impossible to retain as civilians the independence and status which they acquired as fighters.” Not only might this impact self-reliance, self-esteem, and self-confidence (empowerment-as-power-within), as many gained these forms of empowerment as commanders, but it also removes them from leadership. Manisha (INT2) drew on her political and leadership skills for her position in the Constituent Assembly. She further has “respect from the people of the community as well as I became a leader.” Some female ex-combatants therefore managed to draw on leadership skills and political skills to support their political and by extension social and economic reintegration. These skills as empowerment-as-power-to thus transformed to benefit these women as ex-combatants. However, only higher-ranking female ex- combatants in Nepal became elected members of the Constituent Assembly or Nepal
Communist Party officials (INT2, INT4, INT10). As Chapter 4 argued, becoming a high- ranking female combatant was largely restricted to older female ex-combatants who had
198 fought for longer and had become involved through student politics. Only these female ex- combatants gained the leadership and political skills necessary for becoming a member of the Constituent Assembly. Therefore, the transformative potential of skills as empowerment-as-power-to was limited to few female ex-combatants.
As Chapter 4 discussed, female ex-combatants in Liberia and Nepal also developed other skills, such as midwifery or first aid. However, none of the female ex-combatants who developed these skills are using these during post-conflict. Fanta (INT52), learned how to be a midwife during the conflict, and would have liked to professionalize this skill.
The LDDRR offered no such training. In Nepal, where female ex-combatants had learnt medical skills, the UNIRP offered health-related training, but this required the School
Leaving Certificate (SLC, INT19, INT74), which many VMLRs had not obtained as they became child combatants before being able to complete this. Additionally, Dalits, Janajati, and Madhesi are far less likely to obtain higher education, and among these, women and girls again less likely than their male counterparts. 53 While female ex-combatants in
Liberia and Nepal thus gained a diversity of skills to draw on post-conflict, UN-led DDR in Liberia and Nepal did not build on these skills. Chapter 6 engages extensively with the narratives and hybridities in UN-led DDR that resulted in a lack of building on these skills.
Where female ex-combatants developed new skills through DDR, these likely faded away, as skills need to be practiced (Chapter 4).
Some female ex-combatants have used their skills (empowerment-as-power-to) developed during conflict for their economic reintegration. In Ganta, Liberia, Utas (2005a) found ex-combatants relying on their business skills developed as combatants. Thus, these business skills (empowerment-as-power-to) derived from looted goods (empowerment-as-
53 See Bhatta et al (2008) for a discussion on representation in higher education. According to the authors, no ethnic/caste-segregated data exists for the SLC.
199 power-over resources) assisted (some) female ex-combatants with their economic reintegration.
Notably, economic (re)integration can reinforce greater choice and control over one’s life. Kalpana (INT70) considers her business extremely empowering, because before
“I had to ask my husband if I needed even as much as NRS50 or I wanted to buy something, or even if the child demands something, I don’t have to ask my husband. Before, I had to ask, but these days I have money and I can give [that money] if my child asks. So, I have that capacity. I feel happy. Even if I want to go somewhere, I don’t have to ask for travel expenses. I can take out from my pocket as much as I need. I am able to show my skill. People know me.”
While she did not set up a business through the UNIRP support (she opted for education), this highlights the profound impact microenterprises can have on the lives of female ex- combatants. Kalpana now is no longer dependent on her husband to provide her with pocket money, providing her with greater choice and control over her life, and increased freedom of movement. While Kalpana’s story points to an unequal gendered (financial) responsibility for childcare, this nonetheless stresses that economic reintegration through skills can contribute to empowerment-as-power-to in the form of greater choice and control over one’s life post-conflict. In this sense, economic reintegration can help in challenging unequal gendered power relations. As the vast majority of female ex-combatants have experienced limited economic reintegration, they are unlikely to experience such increased control and choice. The widespread failure of the LDDRR and UNIRP to sufficiently support female ex-combatants’ economic reintegration thus undermined their choice and control (empowerment-as-power-to).
Choice itself was limited in the LDDRR and UNIRP. While both DDR programs had a range of economic reintegration support options to choose from, these were limited and gendered. As Özerdem et al (2015:192) contend,
“the majority of the [LDDRR] programming aimed at boys focuses on gendered male roles such as construction and agriculture while training for girls focuses, for
200 example, on cosmetology and baking. This does not necessarily mean boys and girls want this type of training – rather, if they want to access training, it is often the only option available to them.”
Even these options were often restricted. Faith (INT40) wanted to take tailoring training, but the only VST open to her was hair plaiting, which she already knew. Not only are the options in UN-led DDR limited, they also do not build on skills female ex-combatants may already have (Williamson 2006). It is further problematic from a critical feminist peacebuilding perspective, as teaching skills based on gender reinforces rather than challenges gendered inequalities, particularly because skills available to female ex- combatants are lower-paid than those of male ex-combatants (Chapter 1). UN-led DDR thus limits female ex-combatants choices of economic reintegration support, limiting their empowerment-as-power-to, and reinforces structures reproducing gendered inequalities.
While female ex-combatants in Liberia and Nepal gained empowerment-as-power- to in both contexts in the form of military, political, and medical skills, as well as increased choice and control over one’s life, few have successfully drawn on these skills to benefit their reintegration. Female ex-combatants in Nepal who had gained political skills employed these skills for their political reintegration into the Constituent Assembly or political parties such as the Nepal Communist Party, and ensuring themselves an income through this political reintegration. Empowerment-as-power-to has further emphasized the temporality of empowerment; that is, female ex-combatants may have gained skills as combatants, but not utilizing these skills regularly means these skills are forgotten. Lastly, female ex-combatants largely lost empowerment-as-power-to in the form of choice and control over one’s life. Specifically, the LDDRR and UNIRP limited the kind of skills (and quality thereof) female ex-combatants could access, either overtly by restricting access along gender lines, or structurally by disadvantaging female ex-combatants’ access based on education, to which female ex-combatant had had less access than male ex-combatants.
201 Power Within
The third form of empowerment female ex-combatants gained is empowerment-as-power- within. Empowerment-as-power-within entails self-esteem, self-confidence, self-reliance, awareness, and voice. Many female ex-combatants have maintained this empowerment-as- power-within and some have utilized on this empowerment-as-power-within to benefit their social, economic, and political reintegration. However, empowerment-as-power- within also caused frictions and undermined social reintegration. Lastly, awareness and voice in the absence of political reintegration also has potentially negative implications for peacebuilding.
Reintegration affected the self-esteem of female ex-combatants, particularly, female VMLRs who were labeled ayogya, which translates as ‘disqualified’. The term ayogya was supposed to be a technical term to imply ineligibility for army integration based on classification as child ex-combatants at the date of the Comprehensive Peace
Agreement in November 2006. However, in Nepal ayogya has a severely negative connotation and was “universally understood as meaning [that VMLRs] were ‘unfit’ or
‘incapable’ as a person.” (Robins et al 2016:9). One female VMLR, Mina (INT71), explained that ‘when we are called unqualified my heart feels bad’ and she ‘regretted the decision to join’ the PLA. Kamala (INT64) further explained that ‘sometimes we hate ourselves as ex-PLA.’ Kamala relates this to the lack of opportunities that have come out of becoming a female combatant. Kamala wanted to join the army, a promise made by the
Maoists in recruiting people, but Kamala could not integrate into the Nepal Army “because of my child and I am injured from the conflict, which kept my mental state weak.” Her lack of self-esteem as ex-PLA is thus related to her (treatable) conflict-related injury and her inability to integrate into the Nepal Army or viable economic reintegration alternatives.
202 The lack of economic reintegration has thus undermined her empowerment-as-power- within.
Furthermore, stigma also affected female ex-combatants’ self-esteem as empowerment-as-power-within. Kalpana (INT70) explained that she sustained psychological problems ‘when we mixed up in different groups’54 and ‘spent all the time crying for a few years.’ During the conflict, female combatants were particularly stigmatized as being overtly sexual for breaking gender norms, such as staying with unrelated men. According to Seira Tamang (2017:230), this was strongly related to the media portrayal by high-caste male journalists, where ‘their male gaze was amply visible’ and sexualized the bodies of female Maoists. This is in line with research on female ex- combatants are widely stigmatized for being overtly sexual or having been raped, including in Liberia and Nepal (MacKenzie 2012:11, UN Women 2015:81, Saferworld 2010:33,
Sørensen 1998:37f, Ochen 2013:213, Douma et al 2012, UN-INSTRAW 2010). Shanti
(INT65) elaborates that the length of time spent with the PLA contributed to stigma, saying that “It was obvious that people from the community somehow looked at us negatively since we were away for so long. If we had received counseling then we must have felt better and adjusted well.” This suggests that counseling as part of reintegration provided in
UN-led DDR can potentially mitigate the impacts of stigma. However, as counseling in
Liberia and Nepal was largely restricted to the ex-combatants themselves this approach has done little to address stigma faced by female ex-combatants whilst reintegrating into communities and families. This highlights a need to shift away from the combatant-centric approach of counseling in UN-led DDR to a more community-centric approach to female ex-combatants’ reintegration to maintain their self-esteem and not lose this form of empowerment-as-power-within as a result of reintegration.
54 I.e. unmarried and unrelated men and women living together in army camps in the jungle
203 Self-confidence as empowerment-as-power-within has further supported some female ex-combatants’ reintegration. As noted in Chapter 4, Mina (INT71) became much more self-confident by becoming a combatant, who was initially too shy to even speak to male family members, but can now confidently speak with strangers, ring into live radio, or sing at public events and concerts. Especially the latter skill of singing, enabled through increased self-confidence, has supported her social reintegration after moving districts to a new community. Her self-confidence as a form of empowerment-as-power-within that
Mina developed as a result of becoming a combatant enabled her to sing in public, which in turn supported her social (re)integration into a new community. Potentially, increased self-confidence as a result of becoming a combatant also assisted her economic reintegration; it is unlikely that Mina would have been able to run a shop if she were too shy to speak to people.
Self-confidence as a form of empowerment-as-power-within can also be restored or reinforced through successful economic reintegration. Basini (2013a:550), quoting a female ex-combatant, writes, “Because I never had anyone to send me to school, learning soapmaking made me feel fine.” More so than skills, self-confidence is derived from economic reintegration. Mina (INT71) runs a shop in her new community and states, “I feel that I am doing right whatever I have been doing and satisfied with it. I don’t have to be dependent on others, I am doing everything.” Particularly the independence that comes from running shops reinforces female ex-combatants’ self-confidence during reintegration.
Kalpana (INT70) clarifies,
“I have gotten respect from [my new community] at this point of time. I learned skills and became self-sustained. Nothing is more important than skill, not even studies. So, everyone acknowledges that a girl from a small village learned skills and is earning for herself even after going through that difficult life, it has been a big thing [for me] to spend my everyday life like this. Other friends of mine are still in the village and busy cutting hay. So, people say I am progressing, whatever it is [I do].”
204 Therefore, Mina and Kalpana derive further self-confidence from their economic reintegration. Self-confidence can also be reinforced or derived from social reintegration.
Ratna’s (INT69) explains that coming home after her time as combatant, “There were brothers and uncles who encouraged and asked me not to be weak. That helped me to develop self-confidence.” Here, the support from family has helped reinforce self- confidence as empowerment-as-power-within.
However, as argued, female ex-combatants in Liberia and Nepal struggle with economic and social (re)integration. As such, few female ex-combatants can derive self- confidence directly from economic and social reintegration. Ratna, Kalpana, and Mina’s
(INT69, INT70, INT71) stories discussed here were all examples of female ex-combatants who had reintegrated socially and economically despite the failures of the UNIRP, not because of it. On the contrary, Jaya (INT3) for example accessed education as economic reintegration support option, but this was unsuccessful because of her time gap in education spent as a combatant. Jaya explains,
“My job does not grant me greater respect because I work in someone else’s house and hotels, wash clothes and dishes because I do not have academic qualifications and computer skills. Just to make sure that my child will have a better life than mine, I am performing these kinds of tasks. I tell people that I work but cannot say gladly that I work here.”
Jaya appears to have low self-confidence in her skills because of her employment and a cleaner. Poor economic reintegration can thus (re)produce a lack of self-confidence.
As Chapter 4 argues, fewer female ex-combatants in Liberia reported having gained self-confidence (empowerment-as-power-within). Many Liberian female ex- combatants regret their participation in conflict. For instance, Faith (INT40) is ‘feeling bad’ because she was raped during the conflict, and feels worse off than non-combatant women because I did not plan to be a rebel’. She demonstrates low self-confidence because she was raped and became a combatant against her will. As few female ex-combatants in
205 Liberia have reintegrated economically, they are largely unable to (re)gain self-confidence as a form of empowerment-as-power-within. Nor are they able to build on self-confidence for their (economic) reintegration in the absence of this self-confidence. Thus, some female ex-combatants in Nepal could build on self-confidence in their reintegration, and reintegration has reinforced self-confidence. In Liberia, this has not been the case, as few female ex-combatants gained self-confidence as combatants nor did they reintegrate economically.
Another form of empowerment-as-power-within is self-realization. Bhattarai
(2016:134) recalls the story of Lalita Thapa from Pokhara, who is “constantly reproached by her mother-in-law for presenting herself so plainly. The former Maoist soldier does not wear even the simplest makeup,” because she “doesn’t not want to wear anything that says she belongs to a man,” such as marriage bangles and ribbons. Although Lalita’s mother-in- law tries to argue that such ornaments are also for unmarried women and therefore do not signify being a man’s possession, Lalita is clearly resisting pressure from her mother-in- law to comply with local gendered beauty norms (makeup and bangles). In this, she is making choices about whether to conform to gendered beauty norms (empowerment-as- power-to) and to what extent, although plausibly influenced by the Maoists’ beauty ideals for women based on default male standards (Chapter 4). Ultimately, this resistance can be seen as a form of empowerment-as-power-within as a self-realization, as empowerment-as- power-within can be influenced by changing ideals (for instance around feminine beauty and dress) within collectives (empowerment-as-power-with), and is in this instance related to the exercise of choice within structures and reproducing unequal gendered power relations (empowerment-as-power-to).
However, not all female ex-combatants have been able to exercise choice in pursuit of self-realization. As anecdotally relayed to me by a UNIRP official (INT16), one female
206 ex-combatant with whom this UNIRP officially reportedly worked closely with became a deputy platoon commander. She wanted to join the NA, but could not because of her children. She went back to being a housewife, having ‘not fulfilled her dreams’. Due to this resumption of local gender norms as housewife, she was however ‘at least accepted by her community.’ This suggests that resuming ‘traditional’ (i.e. unequal) gendered roles and power relations, whatever they may be in a certain context, can support female ex- combatants’ social reintegration into communities and families, which may be at odds with female ex-combatants’ self-realization. In a different example provided by Robins et al
(2016:46f), a female ex-combatant states that, “I have become like a village woman. I must be like other women if I live in this place.” Arguably, social reintegration is achieved by a performance of ‘traditional’ and unequal female gender roles, not necessarily acceptance of a return to these unequal gendered power relations. To recall Steans (2013:7), transgressing gender roles might lead to ostracization or danger, and female ex-combatants may
(re)adopt ‘traditional’ gender roles for such reasons. Therefore, social reintegration through reinforcing unequal gendered power relations at the expense of self-realization
(empowerment-as-power-within) may not be what women seek, but rather, the pursuit of self-realization may be considered too dangerous or difficult. Some female ex-combatants have thus felt able to pursue self-realization (empowerment-as-power-within) in various forms, whereas others have not. Especially where this self-realization entails transgressing unequal gendered power relations and norms, it may be dangerous and undermine female ex-combatants’ social reintegration. Conversely, social reintegration may come at the expense of female ex-combatants’ self-realization where social reintegration involves a return to unequal gendered power relations many in Nepal had joined the PLA to escape from (Chapter 4).
207 As Chapter 4 discussed, many female ex-combatants, particularly in Nepal, gained
‘awareness’ of inequalities. In Nepal, this was actively pushed by the Maoists, and ‘special privilege was given to females for understanding political issues’ during conflict and cantonment (INT4). This new awareness was reiterated by several Nepali female ex- combatant interviewees. Jaya (INT3) stated, “In one aspect I feel like my condition is better in awareness because I have come from a poorer background than those who did not fight.” The conflict thus provided female ex-combatants with increased awareness, in
Jaya’s case a class awareness, and has persisted.
Unlike other forms of empowerment, awareness as empowerment-as-power-within has largely persisted. Savitra (INT10) elaborates that such increased awareness means that female ex-combatants “are positive and are able to have eye contact in society and discuss issues. But financially they have problems with living and economic maintenance.” Thus, awareness is directly related to voice - speaking out, and being able to challenge inequalities - however, female ex-combatants are also struggling financially. Another female ex-combatant, Sapana (INT68) explained that “Women who fought are above [non- combatant women] regarding awareness on political issues, but are very weak economically. They are not able to do what they want and go where they wish to reach.
But they have become able to give answers to several questions [around inequality and its causes].” In this sense, awareness of inequality has benefitted female ex-combatants only to a limited extent in their reintegration. Whilst female ex-combatants may have gained awareness, this is itself does not mean that they are able to challenge inequalities.
Moreover, this awareness often came at the expense of education or skills needed to become economically self-sufficient. Jaya (INT3) elaborates, “I also feel that I could have a better educational background if I had not joined the war, and settle in a better way.” Lila
(INT4) argues that, “I could have become an academic if I had not joined the war. I may
208 also not have been politically aware.” Therefore, this internal transformation and awareness of inequalities often came to the detriment of economic reintegration post- conflict.
Awareness of inequalities coupled with an inability to fully challenge these has further undermined social reintegration. As the Nepali think tank Martin Chautari suggests,
“the move to the Terai and relocations to new sites [were] informed by the fact of leaving home communities at a small age and inter-caste marriages. Some were reluctant to return to their old communities given that they were unable to fulfill the promises of change that they had made earlier” (Martin Chautari 2013:6). This is particularly the case for female ex-combatants who married intercaste during their time with the Maoists. Female ex- combatants in Nepal were disproportionally affected by intercaste marriages, as 51% of the female VMLRs were married outside of their caste, compared to 17% of the male ex- combatants. Furthermore, this UNIRP report stated that “over half of the women who married outside [their caste] (52%) were not living with their husband’s family. This could indicate their family’s reservation towards intercaste marriage,” (UNIRP 2012b:11) as was also confirmed by my interviews with NGOs (INT8) and UNIRP officials (INT10, INT12).
This has various consequences, such as divorce and separations (Rai 2017:210), and even murder of female ex-combatants, particularly wives or daughters-in-law from lower castes
(Saferworld 2010:xx), or relocation to the Terai (Dahal 2015:192). This has undermined social reintegration, as female ex-combatants do not reintegrate into families (whether their own or their family-in-law), and communities and miss out on their potential psychological support (Chapter 1). Awareness of inequalities without fully challenging these inequalities has thus undermined female ex-combatants’ social and economic reintegration in Nepal, because they were unable to acquire skills necessary for their economic reintegration and felt unable to return home as they failed to fully challenge inequalities.
209 As argued in Chapter 4, female combatants also gained a voice as empowerment- as-power-within. Some female ex-combatants in Nepal continue to feel that they have a voice. Lila (INT4) discussed,
“I don't see any reason to immediately pick up arms. At that time [of the People’s War’] it was necessary, but now some changes have occurred in governance. People love their country and community and at this point of time I think my country and community are okay and our voices are being heard.”
While inequalities may not yet have been fully challenged in Nepal, Lila’s story suggests that the conflict has provided female ex-combatants with a voice to challenge inequalities, and that this voice is being heard. As member of the Constituent Assembly, Lila has reintegrated politically at the highest levels of politics, which was an opportunity limited to a few female ex-combatants (see above). In this regard, female ex-combatants such as Lila have gained a voice as empowerment-as-power-within during conflict and is able to exercise this for her political (and by extension economic) reintegration.
Many female VMLRs and adult female ex-combatants in Nepal felt their voices are not heard, or at least not acted upon. Many female ex-combatants, particularly female
VMLRs, feel abandoned by their party (Adhikari 2016a:24), or they feel angry and disappointed towards the party (INT70, INT71). Most female VMLRs and Voluntary
Retiree interviewees are ready to hold arms. Laxmi (INT7) stresses, “If our demands are not fulfilled and the government continues to ignore us, then we can’t say we will not pick up arms again, because we were trained to use them.” She is part of a network, the
Discharged PLA network, who have lobbied the government, and the Maoist party and have staged sit-ins at the Maoist Party’s head office, where 169 members of the
Discharged PLA network were arrested (Kharel 2016). That is not to say that combatant networks are necessarily malign. As noted, the Discharged PLA network lobbied the government and Nepal Communist Party on the rights and needs of VMLRs. Female
210 VMLRs are thus demanding justice for violations of their human rights, which constitutes a use of voice. Voice here resulted in a limited form of political reintegration into ex- combatant groups, which are treated as a nuisance (INT6) for demanding justice. Moreover, there is some danger that this can lead to renewed conflict, drawing on the skills these female ex-combatants had developed during their time with the Maoists (empowerment-as- power-to). Voice in the absence of sufficient political reintegration can thus undermine building an emancipatory peace.
For other female ex-combatants, this voice has been replaced by silence, at least in some contexts. Sita (INT6) said, “I don’t want to feel proud about being ex-PLA. We don’t even want to say that we have lived that life even to the people who are living next to us.
Our pain is our own place.” In Sita’s case, the stigma that comes from being ‘disqualified’
(see above) has resulted in her migrating to Kathmandu, where she chose not to disclose her (and her husband’s) past as ex-combatant to their new neighbors and keeps her pain to herself. This form of silence thus enables social reintegration, yet precludes relying on these new communities for psychological support.
In Liberia, the LDDRR actively contributed to the silencing of female ex- combatants through counseling, as I elaborate here. Counseling in Liberia was geared towards female ex-combatants’ social reintegration. This was generally well-received by my female ex-combatant interviewees. Only Princess (INT43) felt that she was ‘not being listened to’ and had no chance to discuss her needs. Some of the messages female ex- combatants considered useful were ‘love your neighbors,’ ‘do not have temper’ (INT44),
‘be kind, acting normal’ (INT25), and ‘apologize to friends’ (INT37). Other messages, which were considered useful by female ex-combatants for their social reintegration, are more problematic from a critical feminist peacebuilding perspective. Female ex- combatants ex-coms were counseled to ‘forget about the war’ (INT38) so communities
211 ‘will accept us back’ (INT36). They were further counseled to ‘not say you fought during the war’ to communities (INT37) and that “If someone do bad to you, you must forget it, you must not keep it in your heart’ (INT44). The LDDRR’s counseling program encouraged a ‘strategic silence’ (Parpart 2010ab, Duriesmith 2018:66ff) of female ex- combatants. While such messages reportedly helped female ex-combatants reintegrate into communities (and can therefore be understood as enabling), the concern here is that such messages are profoundly silencing. The voice (empowerment-as-power-within) some female ex-combatants had gained is largely lost. This precludes female ex-combatants from being able to rely on communities and families as a form of psychological support
(Chapter 3). Some female ex-combatants in Nepal continue to use their voice to assert their rights, while others, particularly in Liberia, were discouraged by the LDDRR to do so.
Consequently, voice has been replaced by silence regarding their participation in conflict.
Most female ex-combatants have been able to maintain their empowerment-as- power-within gained as combatants. This empowerment has further benefitted some female ex-combatants’ political, social, and economic reintegration. For others, this empowerment caused friction with families, communities, and political parties and undermined their social, political, and by extension economic reintegration. Particularly, self-realization, awareness, and voice have undermined the political reintegration of some female ex- combatants. This can further have negative implications for building an emancipatory peace. For some female ex-combatants, social reintegration has come at the expense of self-realization as a form of empowerment-as-power-within, and has simultaneously reinforced unequal gendered power relations. Among female ex-combatants in Nepal, awareness has largely been maintained and some female ex-combatants utilize this and the voices they gained to assert their rights. In Liberia, female ex-combatants are
212 comparatively silent about their needs and conflict experiences, and this silence was encouraged by the LDDRR.
Power With
The last form of empowerment female combatants in Liberia and Nepal gained was empowerment-as-power-with. As Chapter 4 argued, this form of empowerment was predominantly gained by female combatants in Nepal, which was a result of their ideological nature of the conflict (Maoist), with an emphasis on societal change. This subsection contends that some female ex-combatants have been able to draw on this empowerment-as-power-with to benefit their economic and social reintegration by resettling together, which has however prevented them from resettling into non-combatants communities. For some female ex-combatants, this empowerment-as-power-with has also transformed and benefitted their political reintegration. Nonetheless, empowerment-as- power-with also undermined some female ex-combatants’ reintegration, to which the
UNIRP contributed.
One reason women and girls become combatants is conflict-related insecurities, such as (the threat of) rape, being killed, or lack of food (Chapter 4). Becoming a combatant offered a promise of security to some, which may not always have been fulfilled.
For some female ex-combatants, empowerment-as-power-with as a form of security derived from being part of a collective (such as armed groups) has transformed post- conflict. Themnér (2011:4) contends that “ex-combatant networks can provide opportunities for information sharing, security and even employment.” Themnér (2011:165) and Utas (2005a) demonstrate how ex-combatants frequently relied on their combatant- networks to develop joint enterprises in Liberia to the benefit of their economic
(re)integration. Such enterprises include brick-making, gold and diamond mining, plantation work and logging. In Colombia for example, former female ex-combatants from
213 FARC have joined together to start enterprises, such as pig farming or the brewing of a
FARC beer called La Roja (Atehortúa 2019, Atuesta 2019). Sometimes, these collaborative economic reintegration enterprises developed under the leadership of a former commander
(see empowerment-as-power-over above). This was also the case in Lebanon, where
“majority of the ex-combatants came to rely on their family and network established within the militia for their social and economic reintegration [and] there has been little rupture between life as combatants and life as civilians” (Karamé 2009:495). This is also the case in Peace Island, Monrovia, where ex-combatants from all the different factions are now living together, reportedly without tensions (INT56). At least initially, Peace Island (also known as the ‘540’) provided a space where ex-combatants could resettle in Monrovia. It provides a source of collective security, where ex-combatants are not stigmatized among other ex-combatants. This empowerment-as-power-with thus transformed to benefit female ex-combatants’ social reintegration, although female ex-combatants did also not reintegrate socially into families and communities of origin, and can thus not benefit from this social reintegration as psychological support.
Empowerment as-power-within has for some female ex-combatants also transformed to benefit their political reintegration. As noted, some female ex-combatants in Nepal became members of the Maoist successor party, currently the Nepal Communist
Party (INT2, INT4, INT5, INT10). As further contended, this was restricted to female ex- combatants who achieved higher ranks during the conflict, which in turn was tied to prolonged involvement in the conflict or becoming involved through student politics. For these female ex-combatants, empowerment-as-power-with through becoming a member of the PLA has facilitated their political (re)integration. To recall Manisha’s (INT2) story in
Chapter 3, she was initially not allowed to attend school and supposed to marry at a young age. She would unlikely have been able to obtain such an influential position as member of
214 the Constituent Assembly without the People’s War as the pre-conflict access to democratic participation was restricted based on gender, caste, ethnicity, region, and religion (Yadav 2016:41). For female ex-combatants such as Manisha, empowerment-as- power-with has thus transformed and supported the political (re)integration of these female ex-combatants.
Beyond the Maoist political party, empowerment-as-power-with can also have positive effects on female ex-combatants’ social reintegration. Manisha (INT2) stressed, “I was fully accepted by the family because 8-9 family members, including my husband, were involved in the [Maoist] party as full-timers. The police also killed my father-in-law when the People’s War started. Therefore, it was not difficult for me to return back home.”
In this sense, fighting the People’s War was seen as justified (‘police killed my father-in- law’) and the extended family has participated in the conflict and Maoist party. Politically,
Manisha and her family-in-law were thus all Maoist, facilitating her social reintegration into her marital family.
Empowerment-as-power-with has also benefitted some female ex-combatants’ social reintegration into communities. Uma (INT5) argued that, “My family accepted me fully and the community as well. At present almost all the members of the community are
Maoist.” She continued, “I have got greater respect from the family as well as the community” as a result of her involvement in the PLA and becoming an elected
Constituent Assembly member. This suggests that it is easier for female ex-combatants to reintegrate into Maoist areas (cf. UNIRP 2013b:2). Particularly for female ex-combatants this can be beneficial, given the Maoists’ commitment to gender equality (at least rhetorically, Chapter 4). There might for instance be less stigma for having transgressed acceptable female behavior as is usually the case for female ex-combatants (Shekhawat
2015:55, Gentry& Sjoberg 2015:12, UN-INSTRAW 2010:4). Uma’s story above for
215 example suggests that her participation in the conflict was well-received by her family, not least because the police killed her father-in-law. For these female ex-combatants, being a
Maoist (empowerment-as-power-with) supported their social reintegration into communities.
However, not all female ex-combatants could transform this empowerment-as- power-with to benefit their social reintegration. For example, Kalpana (INT70) stated that
“parents will always allow their daughter when she returns home after a long time. My parents did not listen to the community when they say anything. My parents were happy to see me again. The community started asking why I came back, whether I am staying or not and all that. Instead of answering to the community, I told my parents that I wanted to stay somewhere else than the village. So, father settled me down [in a nearby city], I used to visit home at the end of each month for 2-3 days and father also came to visit regularly”
This highlights that female ex-combatants like Kalpana struggled with social reintegration and chose to resettle in or close to urban areas. This was true for the vast majority of my female ex-combatants interviewees, although this also reflects my urban fieldwork bias.
Kalpana elaborated that when she left her community to join the PLA, ‘almost all of them were Maoists’. Thus, despite the community’s political tendency towards the Maoists, she struggled with social reintegration into the community. The link between the (Maoist) political environment and female ex-combatants’ social reintegration therefore does not hold. As the two female ex-combatants quoted above, Manisha and Uma, have obtained high-level political positions in the PLA and Constituent Assembly, while Kalpana has not, it is possible that this difference in rank and political reintegration further influences social reintegration.
Moreover, the use of the term ayogya (‘disqualified’) had severe implications for female ex-combatants. The implications of this term are illustrated by Sita (INT6):
“Although [my] family accepted me, the community was not happy, because[…] I was deemed disqualified. [The community] raised questions like how and why I
216 was disqualified […]. So, it took a few months to be fully accepted by the community and the family.”
Another female VMLR from Nepal, Jaya (INT3), was not re-accepted by her community as a result of the label ‘disqualified’, and only visits her family for a few days at a time.
The term ayogya applied to all VMLRs, and has, as discussed, severely negative connotations, such as being considered unfit as a person. In this regard, the empowerment- as-power-with gained through becoming a member of an armed group (here the PLA) has changed into a negative for a specific subgroup of Maoists, the VMLRs who were labeled ayogya. The association to the Maoists through the term ayogya has for these female
VMLRs undermined their social reintegration into communities and families, as they feel unable to return home due to the stigma associated with being characterized as ayogya.
Therefore, empowerment-as-power-with through association with armed groups has transformed for some female ex-combatants in Nepal to benefit their political
(re)integration, as well as social reintegration into families and communities, as for other female ex-combatants, particularly female VMLRs, empowerment-as-power-with has been detrimental to their social reintegration into communities.
The female VMLRs I interviewed have also distanced themselves from the Nepal
Communist Party. Sita (INT6) says that VMLRs no longer trust the party. Kalpana (INT70) elaborates, “I won’t be taking the membership of any party and I don’t have faith in parties.
Even our own party we worked hard for betrayed us and others are also the same. Now, we are not able to trust anyone.” This is in stark contrast to the older female ex-combatants now in the Constituent Assembly, who feel positively about the party. Other than the latter group, female VMLRs in Nepal felt abandoned by the party, particularly the female
VMLRs who joined the Discharged PLA network. The Discharged PLA network is aimed at lobbying the government and Maoist party to have their contribution to the conflict recognized, their rights and current needs resulting from the conflict met, and to receive an
217 official apology for the use of the term ayogya to describe these ex-combatants. While these female ex-combatants may not have reintegrated politically in the same way that female ex-combatants in the Constituent Assembly have (re)integrated politically, the
Discharged PLA network can certainly be seen as a form of political integration. In other words, the Discharged PLA network can be understood as a form of transformed empowerment-as-power-with through joining armed groups. As argued above, this form of political reintegration has the potential of renewed conflict, and can thus undermine building an emancipatory peace.
Another form of empowerment-as-power-with is challenging inequalities, including unequal gendered power relations in the PLA. As already mentioned in Chapter 4, empowerment-as-power-with in the form of challenging gendered inequalities in the PLA was existent but limited. This can also be seen post-conflict. One NGO official (INT21) emphasized that female ex-combatants had not gained full equality within the PLA, stating that “Even as PLA many women were given subordinate roles, were used as human shields, and were not really part of decision-making.” This has, as discussed in Chapter 4, limited their other forms of empowerment, including leadership (power over) and associated skills
(power to). Due to the high female involvement in the PLA, the Royal Nepal Army began recruiting women into its ranks, although primarily in technical roles (INT9). By the end of the conflict, the Royal Nepal Army only had 3% women in its ranks. The high female participation in the PLA thus offered an excellent opportunity for the Nepal Army (NA) to increase the amount of women in their ranks (Bleie et al 2012:42), particularly for UN peacekeeping missions, where Nepal is a major contributor (Saferworld 2010:23).
Although in itself problematic from a critical feminist peacebuilding perspective (see above), female ex-combatants were excluded by the NA for disabilities, recent surgeries, giving birth, and breastfeeding (Jha 2012, Bogati 2014:10, Robins et al 2016:36f, INT9).
218 Numerous female ex-combatants would have liked to join the NA, but in addition to the structural and gendered restrictions imposed by the NA, many of these female ex- combatants took on the role of primary parent as husbands joined the NA or took other work abroad (Bogati 2014:10). This suggests that unequal gendered power relations and division of labor has not been fully challenged among PLA combatants.
The last form of empowerment-as-power-with is the power to collectively challenge gendered inequalities in society beyond the group level. The People’s War has challenged gendered inequalities in various ways. Especially female ex-combatants now in the Constituent Assembly discussed the improvements in gendered inequalities they had contributed to as part of the Maoists, as the story of Manisha (Chapter 3) highlights. Some female ex-combatants, such as Uma (INT5) argue that there is a need for a fully proportional system that also includes Dalits and janajati peoples. As noted in Chapter 1, critical feminist peacebuilding is skeptical of representation as a solution to gendered inequalities, as it implies biological determinism. Based on this, it is unlikely that increased representation of Dalits and janajati peoples in politics would bring about their equality and fundamentally challenge unequal gendered power relations and structures reproducing these.
Challenging inequalities needs to go further than representation of women, Dalits, and janajati people in national services. As Manisha (INT2) further argues, equality not only needs to happen at a constitutional level, but also needs to be implements as “even within the big parties there is a lot of talk about equality but not at the policy-making level.”
Furthermore, Manisha continues, “Oppressive thoughts are still in existence, but we have to remove them in the future.” This is evidenced by Jaya’s (INT3) facing of stigma:
“People from outside [the PLA] say that we are no good as both men and women were staying together.” Nepali female ex-combatants are frequently stigmatized for having been
219 a combatant and ‘having transgressed socio-cultural norms of female behavior’ (Bogati
2014:10). Thus, challenging gendered inequalities and norms (empowerment-as-power- with) has not been fully attained in Nepali society beyond the Maoists, and this insufficient challenging of unequal gendered power relations means that female ex-combatants like
Jaya now face stigma for having transgressed gender norms. However, the changes that have occurred are not to be dismissed. For instance, the Maoists cracked down on forced and child marriage, Chaupadi pratha, increased freedom for widows, and women can now increasingly access jobs to which they previously had no or limited access (Yadav 2016,
Manchanda 2010, Karki 2016). The new constitution also has some of the most progressive LGBT constitutional rights in Asia (International Alert 2014:15, GoN 2015), although implementation of policies addressing inequalities is thus slow, but some progress has been made by the Maoists.
Empowerment-as-power-with has thus maintained for some female ex-combatants and has been undermined for others. Furthermore, some female ex-combatants have been able to draw on their empowerment-as-power-with to benefit their economic, social, and political reintegration. Many of my female ex-combatant interviewees in Liberia had joined other ex-combatants and resettled in Peace Island, Monrovia for their security, and has provided a source of social reintegration. Being a Maoist combatant has also helped female ex-combatants’ social reintegration in Nepal, particularly where families and communities were also Maoist. This is not the case for all female ex-combatants in Nepal; some have struggled with their social reintegration because they were labeled ayogya, demoting a specific Maoist subgroup. Empowerment-as-power-with in the form of the collective pursuit of equality at a group level has largely been undermined through reintegration. Although incomplete in the first place (Chapter 4), many ex-combatant marriages reflect continued unequal gendered power relations and divisions of labor, where
220 female ex-combatants become the primary parent and male ex-combatants the primary income-earner. This has prevented these female ex-combatants from pursuing their own
(economic) goals. Lastly, the conflict has begun to challenge gendered inequalities in
Nepali society more broadly, although this process is far from complete. As unequal gendered power relations still prevail, some female ex-combatants have struggled to reintegrate socially due to stigma for having been a female ex-combatants and having spent time with unrelated male combatants. Thus, empowerment-as-power-with has somewhat maintained and has both supported and undermined female ex-combatants’ reintegration.
Conclusions
The purpose of this chapter was to analyze to what extent the empowerment experienced by female combatants in Liberia and Nepal through their role as combatant (Chapter 4) has been maintained post-conflict. This chapter has argued that much of the empowerment gained by female combatants has been lost through their reintegration, although some female ex-combatants have drawn on their empowerment to benefit their economic, social, and political reintegration and maintain this empowerment. These female ex-combatants also reintegrated relatively better than other female ex-combatants. Particularly female ex- combatants in the Constituent Assembly and in the Nepal Communist Party benefitted from empowerment in this way, suggesting that becoming involved in through student politics, being older and fighting for a longer period of time ultimately facilitated their reintegration.
Empowerment-as-power-over resources and civilians through the use of the gun was largely lost, although this is a positive development from a critical feminist peacebuilding perspective as a decrease of such violence can contribute to building an emancipatory peace. For some female ex-combatants, conflict hierarchies (i.e. commander- combatant) have transformed into relationships of protection, benefitting the economic and
221 social reintegration of both parties. In Liberia, empowerment-as-power-with has transformed for some female ex-combatants in Peace Island to benefit their social reintegration and provides a source of security. As with empowerment-as-power-over, some female ex-combatants in Liberia and Nepal have maintained empowerment-as- power-to, while for others this was undermined through reintegration. Particularly political skills benefitted some female ex-combatants’ political and social reintegration, while other female ex-combatants have had limited choice in their reintegration and the skills they acquired as combatants have been forgotten. In Liberia, female ex-combatants who accessed DDR were marginally less likely to have reintegrated economically, than those who did not, suggesting that economic reintegration support was unhelpful at best and detrimental at worst. Many female ex-combatants in Nepal and Liberia maintained empowerment-as-power-within, although fewer female ex-combatants in Liberia had gained this as combatants. Empowerment-as-power-within has created tensions for some female ex-combatants in Nepal in their reintegration, while for others, social reintegration has come at the expense of this empowerment, particularly self-realization and voice.
Empowerment-as-power-with has further benefitted some female ex-combatants in Nepal in their political, economic, and social reintegration, while for other female ex-combatants, empowerment-as-power-with had undermined their reintegration. Particularly for female
VMLRs this empowerment-as-power-with transformed to undermine their social reintegration into communities, leading female VMLRs interviewees to resettle in urban areas.
This chapter has highlighted the temporality of empowerment, demonstrating that for the vast majority of female ex-combatants, the empowerment gained as combatant has been lost through reintegration, including reintegration support by UN-led DDR in Liberia and Nepal. The next chapter considers the role of UN-led DDR in supporting and
222 undermining this empowerment and investigates why some female ex-combatants who did not access UN-led DDR sometimes fared considerably better in terms of empowerment and reintegration compared to those female ex-combatants who accessed UN-led DDR.
223 Chapter 6: Gendered Narratives in UN-led DDR
During my fieldwork in Liberia and Nepal one moment particularly surprised me. I interviewed a DDR official (INT60) in Monrovia, who had worked with girl ex- combatants in the Interim Care Centers (ICCs), the first point of contact for ex-combatants with the Liberian DDR program (LDDRR). The LDDRR official told me horrific stories of girl ex-combatants she supported, including loss of parents, forced recruitment, PTSD, drug addictions, and cannibalism. Yet what struck me was when the LDDRR official began to discuss counseling, she proudly told me they taught girl ex-combatants how to shave, “because women need to shave their armpits.” While going over my interview data, this particular statement stayed with me. In light of this trauma the LDDRR official described, why are limited resources spent on this? Especially as the statement suggests girl ex-combatants did not necessarily request this, but rather it is taught ‘because women need to shave their armpits’. Do girl ex-combatants want to shave? Why was it considered important to teach girls how to shave, especially in a context where resources are limited, girl ex-combatants are unlikely to have an income to buy shaving products, if they are available at all? Why was counseling concerned with girls shaving armpits, when there are seemingly more pressing needs to address, such as trauma? Why was shaving introduced in counseling, as no LDDRR documentation mentioned this? These were all questions that puzzled me.
This anecdote therefore prompts a range of questions regarding UN-led DDR, on which I draw to analyze in what ways UN-led DDR has undermined female ex-combatants’ empowerment. This chapter employs two of the critical feminist peacebuilding strategies detailed in Chapter 2 to make sense of anecdotes such as these. Specifically, this chapter investigates gendered narratives in UN-led DDR, as well as how different actors coalesce to produce hybridities in UN-led DDR. This chapter contends that UN-led DDR largely
224 undermines female ex-combatants’ empowerment by reproducing gendered inequalities through gendered narratives and multiple hybridities produced by local-international interactions in UN-led DDR. To this end, this chapter argues that the gendered narratives in UN-led DDR reproduce female ex-combatants as either victims or threats, as wives, mothers, and daughters, and an emerging narrative of women as peacebuilders. All of these narratives limit female ex-combatants’ options for reintegration, reproduce gendered inequalities and thereby undermine female ex-combatants’ empowerment. More so than this, these narratives reinforce a ‘double burden’ of reproductive and productive labor, potentially even a triple burden of added peacebuilding/political labor. To make these arguments, this chapter considers gendered narratives in UN-led DDR regarding female ex-combatants in the following order: victims, threats, mothers, wives, daughters, and as potential peacebuilders.
Throughout these narratives, and specifically in the last section of this chapter, this chapter argues that different local and international actors produce, reproduce, and challenge these narratives, thereby introducing hybridities in UN-led DDR design and implementation, which further undermine female ex-combatants’ empowerment. While hybridities may be understood in multiple ways, the understanding taken here draws on my conceptualization of hybridities in Chapter 2 and specifically refers to the changes introduced to the respective UN-led DDR programs through the production and reproduction of gendered narratives by different actors in UN-led DDR. In other words, the resulting UN-led DDR programs are neither the literal translation of DDR policies into practice nor the sole intervention of different actors in UN-led DDR, but rather an amalgamation of the two. The particular actors I consider throughout this chapter include female ex-combatants, local and international DDR officials, and officials working for national DDR bodies. This chapter concludes that these gendered narratives (of female ex-
225 combatants as victims, threats, mothers, wives, daughters, and potential peacebuilders) have been produced and reproduced by local LDDRR and UNIRP officials, as well as officials working for national DDR bodies, with the effect of undermining female ex- combatants’ empowerment.
Victims Narrative
To recall, Chapter 1 argued that according to feminist literature on DDR, a predominant reason for disappearance of empowerment is because female ex-combatants were reconstructed through DDR narratives (MacKenzie 2009, 2012, Jennings 2009,
Puechguirbal 2010b). This section first highlights that female ex-combatants in Liberia are narrated as victims of conflict without any agency in their participation. This narrative is introduced primarily by LDDRR officials, whereas officials working for the national DDR body in Liberia (the NCDDRR55) have a nuanced understanding of female ex-combatants’ agency in conflict, but that these DDR officials have been unable to challenge the prevailing narrative of female-ex-combatants-as-victims in the LDDRR. This section contends that the victim narrative denies female ex-combatants’ agency in their conflict- participation and obscures any empowerment they experienced, particularly skills female ex-combatants developed (empowerment-as-power-to). This victims narrative, reproduced by LDDRR officials, therefore undermined female ex-combatants’ empowerment.
The gendered characterization of female ex-combatants as victims (of sexual violence) was apparent in my research. This was especially true in Liberia, where most
LDDRR officials referred to female ex-combatants as ‘bush wives’, or ‘sex slaves’, and victims of sexual exploitation and abuse (INT46, INT47, INT61). On the other hand, boy ex-combatants ‘a lot of them participated’ (INT46, INT48) and are frequently characterized as agential threats (McMullin 2013ab, Jennings 2008c:5, Stedman 2008:153,
55 National Commission on Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation, and Reintegration
226 Themnér 2011:1ff, Zahar 2008:168). This implies that female ex-combatants by contrast did not actually participate in conflict. This, as Chapter 4 argued, is not the case, as all female ex-combatant interviewees participated in various combat and support roles. When discussing how female ex-combatants joined armed groups, another LDDRR official
(INT60) constructed female ex-combatants primarily as victims, but begins to recognize some agency of female ex-combatants in this, albeit in restricted circumstances. She listed various routes of female ex-combatants into armed groups, including through friends and boyfriends, ‘conscripted’ as ammo bearer or wife/sex slave 56, ‘some joined after parents were killed and became wives’, while other female ex-combatants joined because of the lack of food, protection, and as a means of avoiding being killed. While this still does not recognize female ex-combatants’ political stakes in conflict, this is closer to my findings on empowerment-as-power-over and empowerment-as-power-with (Chapter 4) than the female-ex-combatants-as-victims-of-conflict narrative. The victim narrative in Liberia reproduced by local LDDRR officials therefore reflects earlier feminist research on female ex-combatants and DDR (Chapter 1).
Paradoxically, some LDDRR officials characterized female ex-combatants as victims of conflict, and only as victims, whilst offering contrary examples at different points in the interview. A LDDRR official (INT49) suggested all girl ex-combatants were
‘abused as sex slaves during the conflict’ in Liberia, while earlier in the interview, this
DDR official recalled a female ex-combatant who shot her friend because her ‘friend was also sleeping with the same boyfriend.’ In Nepal, a UNIRP official also offered such a paradoxical narrative, stating that ‘many combatants did not join because of their own choice’ and continued, ‘many [combatants] wanted to join because they wanted to see what it is like to hold a gun’ (INT75). Moreover, in Liberia another LDDRR official (INT51)
56 This was used interchangeably. This is problematic, as it conflates non-consensual and consensual relations and UN-led DDR does not intervene accordingly
227 acknowledged that ‘each of the children [going through DDR] had unique experiences’ and later in the interview she stressed that counseling was ‘to allow girls to know that they were victims, not aggressors’. As Chapter 1 contended, this binary is an oversimplification of female combatants’ experiences in armed groups, and nor is this binary useful, as it shaped the (lack of) UNIRP support. Without overemphasizing female ex-combatants’ agency during conflict, the victimhood narrative largely denies this agency (Chapters 1 and 2). DDR officials thus follow official narratives of female-ex-combatants-as-victims, with no agency in their participation in conflict, even when offering examples to the contrary.
As Chapter 4 discussed, female ex-combatants’ experiences of conflict are more complex than the victim-aggressor binary suggested. Nor do female ex-combatants themselves buy into this victimhood narrative. To illustrate this, after one interview with a female ex-combatant in Liberia, she was curious why I was conducting interviews with female ex-combatants. I explained how UN documentation often categorized female ex- combatants as victims of conflict and I, assuming this was more complex, wanted to find out female ex-combatants’ views on their role as combatants. She responded, offended by this UN characterization as ‘victim’, asserting, “No, we were there! We were doing everything the men did and we were doing it better.” Unlike the victim narrative, female ex-combatants largely consider their participation in armed groups as an exercise of their agency and choice, albeit in restricted circumstances.
There may be various reasons why the victimhood narrative persisted among
LDDRR officials in Liberia. To recall Chapter 2, in the case of Liberia, international actors and particularly donors had a strong influence over the predominant narratives, as Moran
(2010:267) and Utas (2005a) highlight. UNIFEM (2004:10) noted that “many women and girl [ex-combatants] can arguably be described primarily as victims” [my emphasis]. This
228 is a concern in liberal peacebuilding more broadly, where women are primarily characterized as victims of conflict, regardless of their actual experiences or differences in the respective conflicts (Chapter 2, Shepherd 2008b, 2016b, 2017). Such oversimplified narratives are facilitated by a lack of local knowledge among international actors, including international UNMIL and LDDRR staff. Autesserre (2014:13) argues, “The expatriates’ deficient understanding of local contexts prompts them to employ ready-to-use templates of conflict resolution, even when these universal models are ill-suited to local conditions.” This was the case in the LDDRR, where the program was an effective copy- paste from the problematic UN-led DDR program in Sierra Leone (cf. MacKenzie 2012), to the point where in some of the Liberian documents, ‘you saw Sierra Leone written in it’
(INT50). For the LDDRR, this meant “many of the concerns associated with the gender aspects of the Sierra Leonean program were left in place” (Basini 2013a:543. Cf. O’Neill&
Ward 2005:50). As Chapter 1 discussed, MacKenzie (2012) argues that female ex- combatants were largely excluded from UN-led DDR because they were assumed to be
‘victims’ and not active participants in conflict. The economic and social reintegration support female ex-combatants who participated received was geared towards reinforcing gendered roles of women and girls as unpaid mothers, whose economic reintegration support consisted of training in low-skilled, low-paid professions intended to support their husbands’ income. As discussed, many of these problems materialized for female ex- combatants in Liberia, thus reproducing similar problems for female ex-combatants in
Sierra Leone for female ex-combatants in Liberia. Therefore, international LDDRR and peacebuilding actors more broadly likely introduced the female-ex-combatants-as-victims narrative, facilitated by a lack of local, contextual knowledge, which has subsequently been reproduced by LDDRR officials.
229 Unlike these DDR officials working for the LDDRR (either directly or as implementing partners), officials from the Liberian National Commission on Disarmament,
Demobilization, Rehabilitation and Reintegration (NCDDRR) narrate female ex- combatants not as victims only, but as agents in conflict. One NCDDRR official (INT57) stated that ‘women were very decisive,’ ‘executed orders better and more thoroughly in combat,’ and were as a result ‘more serious than male ex-combatants, more focused’. 57
Arguably, such understandings of female ex-combatants’ participation in conflict failed to challenge the predominant female-ex-combatants-as-victims narrative among LDDRR officials because these NCDDRR officials had very limited influence over the DDR program more broadly. One NCDDRR official (INT42) for instance suggested that working on the LDDRR was like ‘the drum is hanging on you and someone is beating it’.
This suggests that NCDDRR officials felt they had little control over the LDDRR. The
NCDDRR was undeniably marginalized in the LDDRR, where they had ‘little semblance of ownership’, especially in the first years of the program (INT57). The overwhelming influence of international actors on the LDDRR can be understood as a neo-colonial imposition of outside values and norms (Kfir 2012:72, Maddison& Shepherd 2014,
Richmond& Mitchell 2012, Jabri 2016). Critical feminist peacebuilding scholars have pointed out that such neo-colonial interventions frequently reproduce unequal gendered power relations to the detriment of women and girls (cf. MacKenzie 2012:66, Ansatha
2016, Hudson 2010a, 2016, Basu 2010:309, Duncanson 2016:14ff). The outside imposition of the female-ex-combatants-as-victims narrative and the inability of NCDDRR officials to challenge this narrative have reproduced unequal gendered power relations, which the following paragraphs illustrate in detail.
57 This construction of female ex-combatants as decisive and serious is potentially in contrast to an understanding of male ex-combatants as threats and lazy (cf. McMullin 2013a) and is also gendered; however, the point here is to illustrate that this NCDDRR official recognizes female ex- combatants’ agency in their participation in conflict.
230 The victims narrative has various implications for female ex-combatants and their empowerment. For instance, such gendered victimhood narratives deny female ex- combatants’ agency in joining and fighting, and results in a lack of recognition for skills female ex-combatants gained or had prior to the conflict (Chapter 1). The IDDRS (2006, module 4.30) for instance writes that ex-combatants have ‘limited skills’, are a threat to communities ‘because of their lack of skills,’ and particularly ‘women are likely to have few marketable skills’. This highlights the gendered nature of the victims narrative, as particularly female ex-combatants are not recognized as having marketable skills
(empowerment-as-power-to). As Chapter 4 argued, female ex-combatants acquired military, political, and medical skills. These skills were not built upon, although some female ex-combatants wanted to continue their conflict-roles such as midwifery (INT52).
Particularly in contexts where much health infrastructure was destroyed and few healthcare professionals remain, supporting female ex-combatants who acquired medical skills to professionalize these could benefit female ex-combatants’ economic reintegration and health of communities. It can further contribute to female ex-combatants’ social reintegration. In Nepal, female ex-combatants who took health-training reportedly reintegrated well socially because they were ‘taking care of sick people,’ an endeavor usually appreciated by respective communities (INT20). Female ex-combatants thus have skills beneficial to their economic and social reintegration; however, these skills are rarely recognized or built upon. As discussed, if skills are not practiced they risk being forgotten.
The victimhood narrative, reproduced by UN-led DDR, denies women’s agency and active involvement in conflicts, including skills they acquired as combatants. Consequently, this victimhood narrative undermines female ex-combatants’ empowerment-as-power-to and their economic and social reintegration.
231 In Nepal, the Maoists actively resisted the female-ex-combatants-as-victims narrative. The Maoists for example argued that the PLA, including all child ex-combatants, were a legitimate army and not a defeated armed group, at which they felt the DDR was targeted (Transition International 2013:2, International Crisis Group 2011:17). The
Maoists therefore rejected the DDR program from the beginning. The working relationship between the Maoists and the UNIRP reportedly became easier throughout the UNIRP, especially after adult ex-combatants were released from cantonment in 2012. Before this point, the Maoists had actively discouraged VMLRs from participating, even wanting the
UNIRP to fail (INT1). Anecdotally, I came across several examples of particularly male ex-combatants who, as a result of the Maoist party’s promises of military employment, showed up to training, signed attendance sheets with the trainer so both received payment, but did not actually participate in training. While the quality and quantity of training was low (Chapter 5), the influence of the Maoist party over (some) ex-combatants meant they did not develop new skills or build on already developed skills (empowerment-as-power-to) through economic reintegration support. The Maoists therefore challenged the female-ex- combatants-as-victims narrative, but this appears to not have benefitted female ex- combatants’ empowerment. The following section on the threats narrative further scrutinizes this.
In the LDDRR, female ex-combatants are therefore primarily narrated as victims of conflict in contrast to male ex-combatants as aggressors. This gendered narrative is reproduced by LDDRR officials, who reiterate this narrative in spite of their own examples to contrary. As a consequence of this gendered narrative of female-ex-combatants-as- victims, the LDDRR has failed to recognize and build on female ex-combatants’ empowerment, particularly newly-developed skills (empowerment-as-power-to), which have subsequently been undermined and have begun to slip away. Notably, NCDDRR
232 officials had more nuanced understandings of female ex-combatants’ agency in their participation in conflict, but these NCDDRR officials failed to challenge the victim narrative owning to their own marginalization in the LDDRR.
Threats Narrative
The second narrative considered here is that of female ex-combatants as threats. This section highlights that female ex-combatants in Nepal are increasingly narrated as threats like male ex-combatants, but that this remains gendered and continues to set female ex- combatants apart from both male ex-combatants and non-combatant women. This section further illustrates that particularly international UNIRP officials and officials working for the national DDR body (the MoPR58) narrate female VMLRs as threats and wanted to limit the amount and kind of support available to them. Local UNIRP officials also narrate female ex-combatants as threats, but in spite of this (or maybe because of this), pushed the
UNIRP to better support the needs and empowerment of female ex-combatants.
Nonetheless, the threat narrative has ultimately undermined female ex-combatants’ empowerment, as this narrative encouraged a lack of quality and quantity in reintegration support.
The victim-narrative had already changed in Nepal since the LDDRR. UNIRP officials in Nepal acknowledged some empowerment of female ex-combatants, stating that politically, male and female ex-combatants ‘were the same’ (INT72), that ‘the level of awareness among female ex-combatants was high’ and that ‘women [Verified Minors and
Late Recruits, VMLRs] were more liberated than their non-combatant counterparts’
(INT1). This suggests an understanding of female ex-combatants’ awareness
(empowerment-as-power-within) and increased equality (empowerment-as-power-with).
58 Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction
233 This recognition however did not translate into support for female ex-combatants to maintain such empowerment. I attribute this to female-ex-combatants-as-threat narrative.
On several occasions UNIRP officials stated that VMLRS were ‘just like a local bomb’
(INT14), or like a ‘human bomb, if not diffused in time, they will go off in your own yard’
(INT19). This clearly shifts away from the female-ex-combatants-as-victims narrative in
Liberia towards a female-ex-combatants-as-threats narrative in Nepal, although this does not mean the UNIRP better supported female ex-combatants’ empowerment through reintegration. McMullin’s (2013a:385) work on narratives of male ex-combatants in
Liberia is instructive here. McMullin argues that threat narratives draw boundaries between
‘dangerous, apolitical’ and ‘savage’ ex-combatants, ‘communities as victims,’ and
‘international actors as saviors’. As McMullin rightly stresses, this process of ‘othering’
(Spivak 1985) of ex-combatants justifies international actors’ (here DDR officials) raison d’être while stripping ex-combatants of their political agency. While there are differences between female ex-combatants in Liberia and Nepal in terms of motivations for participating in armed groups, female ex-combatants frequently have vested interests in the political (and by extension socioeconomic) stakes of conflict (Chapter 4). To deny this is to deny their political agency.
Furthermore, female ex-combatants in Nepal were considered ‘indoctrinated’ much more so than their male counterparts (INT9). This implies that female ex-combatants did not participate in conflict because their grievances aligned with the Maoists’ beliefs, but rather that the Maoists pushed their cause onto them. Paradoxically, female VMLRs are constructed as threats by DDR officials whilst being stripped of their political agency and constructed as Maoist pawns. In this sense, female VMLRs are an ‘other other’: dangerous unlike other women, but simultaneously lacking agency compared to male ex-combatants.
This suggests that the threat narrative remains gendered. This overlaps with critical
234 feminist peacebuilding scholarship on women’s political violence more broadly which is often explained away through terminology such ‘victims’, ‘camp followers’, or ‘mothers, monsters, and whores’ (Gentry& Sjoberg 2015, Sjoberg& Gentry 2007, Henshaw 2016ab,
MacKenzie 2012:46, Enloe 1999:37). The threat narrative therefore remains gendered in that it constructed female ex-combatants as dangerous, yet without agency in perpetrating danger.
More so than local UNIRP officials, international UNIRP officials saw male and female VMLRs as threats who were not to be trusted. This is evidenced by the unwillingness of international UNIRP managers to provide money to the VMLRs (such as lodging support or the maternity allowances later introduced). This can be seen in the lack of provision of lunch money for female VMLRs accessing training, but providing an excess of stationary, to the point where Kalpana’s (INT70) son is now using the stationary, including notebooks. Such decisions can be understood through the threat narrative, which constructs female ex-combatants as dangerous and irresponsible, hence the need for material instead of monetary support which would allow female ex-combatants to allocate spending as needed.
Notably, it was local UNIRP officials who succeeded in convincing international
UNIRP officials of the need for comprehensive reintegration packages and tailored monetary support, frequently upon recommendations of female ex-combatants. In this regard, local UNIRP officials and female ex-combatants coalesced with the UNIRP to produce hybridities in the DDR program. This was reportedly facilitated because the
UNIRP ‘was not fixed’ and therefore open to changes (INT74). Nonetheless, one UNIRP official (INT12) felt it difficult to influence international head office staff to better support
VMLRs. The working relationship became so difficult that for a time he was “considered one of the whistleblowers.” For this UNIRP official, influencing the UNIRP was
235 potentially detrimental to their career, highlighting that such hybridities in the UNIRP to benefit female ex-combatants’ empowerment were not easily introduced.
There are various consequences to this threat narrative for female ex-combatants’ empowerment. One is that political reintegration support is not part of UN-led DDR in
Nepal and Liberia. Seeing conflict not in terms of grievances but in terms of greedy criminals requires policing, not addressing ‘root causes’ of conflict (Richards 2005:10).
This applies particularly to female ex-combatants as threats (and less so to male ex- combatants); if they are constructed as ‘indoctrinated’ with no political stakes in conflict, there is no need to address these grievances through political reintegration because they are not seen to exist. As political reintegration offers an opportunity to transform empowerment-as-power-with in the form of collectively challenging gendered inequalities into a non-violent endeavor that can contribute to a positive peace, the absence of political reintegration support potentially undermined (or at least does not support) female ex- combatants’ empowerment-as-power-with. Furthermore, awareness (empowerment-as- power-within) without adequate political reintegration potentially causes further tensions and affects peacebuilding (Chapter 5).
Another consequence of the female-ex-combatants-as-threat narrative is that it shapes economic and social reintegration support. McMullin (2013a:413f) further argues that the ex-combatants-as-threat narrative legitimizes short-term interventions that “justify reintegration assistance only as long as ex-combatants constitute a security threat.” As
Chapter 5 argued, reintegration support in UN-led DDR did little to support female ex- combatants” reintegration and one issue is the lack of quality and quantity of support.
Female ex-combatants may learn new skills (empowerment-as-power-to) in UN-led DDR but do not learn these skills well enough to become financially independent. This may for instance limit female ex-combatants’ self-realization (empowerment-as-power-within),
236 where using a skill professionally is part of this. Moreover, earning income can provide female ex-combatants with choice and control over their lives (empowerment-as-power-to), for instance by giving them greater independence (Chapter 5).
In the UNIRP, much of this lack of quantity and quality of economic and social reintegration support was a consequence of the influence of the Ministry of Peace and
Reconstruction (MoPR) over the UNIRP. UNIRP officials noted that the MoPR ‘agreed, but never contributed’ in decision-making meetings (INT12). This was the result of short- lived, minority governments with a quick turnover of MoPR representatives, including representatives from political parties who did not support any ‘benefits’ provided to
VMLRs as part of the UNIRP, as they felt this would reward criminal behavior (INT14).
Where the MoPR did contribute, this had severe implications for female ex-combatants’ empowerment. The MoPR for example set a ceiling expenditure of 60,000NRS per VMLR, regardless of where ex-combatants resettled, the training taken, and start-up costs of their enterprise (INT19). One UNIRP official acknowledged VMLRs ‘didn’t want to stay in remote areas,’ but the UNIRP ‘support was not enough to set up a business in urban areas’
(INT77). Sita (INT6), who resettled in Kathmandu and took digital photography training, explains “[The UNIRP] gave me a small camera worth 8-10,000NRS and then an old desktop computer, but I was not able to continue [my business] with these limited instruments, because my economic status is weak. Therefore, Photoshop training was meaningless for me.” Female ex-combatants’ ‘choice’ to resettle outside of expected localities, influenced by social, economic, and political reintegration factors, is thus not always recognized in UN-led DDR, nor is reintegration support adapted accordingly. The
MoPR therefore introduced a ceiling expenditure that neither took into consideration female ex-combatants’ resettlement not the regional context of their economic reintegration. As economic reintegration can be instrumental in supporting female ex-
237 combatants’ control and choice over their lives (empowerment-as-power-to), as well as self-confidence (empowerment-as-power-within, Chapter 5), the failure to support their economic reintegration through the ceiling expenditure undermined, or at least did not support, female ex-combatants’ empowerment.
A third consequence is that characterizing female-ex-combatants-as-threats continues to set them apart from communities into which they reintegrate. Female ex- combatants may self-segregate or be ostracized from communities, undermining their social reintegration, or they may resettle together as an alternative form of social reintegration. In these instances, (female) commanders may retain power over their combatants, which can transform into a beneficial relationship for these combatants. It may also leave ex-combatants open to (continued) abuse (INT51, MacKenzie 2012:77f, Nilsson
2005, McKay& Mazurana 2004). Such hierarchies can furthermore enable renewed conflict (Themnér 2011). The LDDRR attempted to reduce female ex-combatants’ stigmatization and resulting ostracization by prescribing appropriate behavior in counseling, including silence as reintegration strategy (Chapter 5). The LDDRR actively encouraged this silence through counseling, thereby undermining female ex-combatants’ empowerment-as-power-within.
As noted, female ex-combatants are constructed as ‘other other’: dangerous unlike non-combatant women, yet different from male ex-combatants. For example, one UNIRP official stressed that ‘male and female naturally have different characteristics’ (INT72).
This can further be illustrated through ‘gender support’ in Nepal. ‘Gender support’ was only introduced one year into the UNIRP, which lasted just over two years (INT12). The introduction of gender support was in response to female ex-combatants’ not accessing or staying in the program. Gender support was first provided to female ex-combatants and only later to male ex-combatants (UNIRP 2011:4). This served to attract and retain an
238 increased amount of female ex-combatants in the UNIRP, particularly in education and microenterprise. The overall dropout rate was ultimately lower for female ex-combatants
(1%) than for male ex-combatants (6%, UNIRP 2013b:3). Gender support, primarily delivered by the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), entailed additional nutrition funds to pregnant and lactating mothers, nutrition funds to young children, child care facilities and care takers at training centers, funds for chaperones, breastfeeding breaks during training, parental leave, and reproductive health support and medical referrals
(INT1, INT13, INT17, INT19). While this increased participation and completion of female ex-combatants’ economic reintegration support in the UNIRP, this is still based on assumptions that mothers are responsible for children. This is evidenced by the late introduction of gender support (e.g. paternity leave) to male ex-combatants, who were initially seen as ‘jealous of the extra funding’ (INT13). The problem here is that gender in
‘gender support’ is used synonymously to women, without addressing other gendered concerns male and female ex-combatants face, and which may inhibit their continued and full participation in the UNIRP. In the UNIRP for example there was no mechanism in place to support fathers to take more responsibility for childcare, or even consider single fathers, for example whose wives died during conflict.
International and local DDR officials increasingly narrate female ex-combatants in
Nepal as threats. However, this has not supported their empowerment. As argued, the threat narrative justifies short-term intervention, resulting in limited benefits for female ex- combatants’ reintegration. The female-ex-combatants-as-threats narrative remains gendered, whereby female ex-combatants are understood as ‘other other’; not like non- combatant women, but also not like male ex-combatants. In this, the threat narrative continues to deny female ex-combatants’ agency. Consequently, reintegration support has failed to recognize and build on female ex-combatants’ awareness (empowerment-as-
239 power-within), skills (empowerment-as-power-to), and commitment to challenge gendered inequalities (empowerment-as-power-with), thereby undermining female ex-combatants’ empowerment.
Mothers Narrative
In both Liberia and Nepal, DDR officials frequently narrated female ex-combatants as mothers. This section highlights that this narrative of female-ex-combatants-as-mothers is primarily reproduced by LDDRR officials. By contrast, in Nepal both UNIRP officials and
UNIRP documentation have reproduced the mothers narrative. The mothers narrative consequently had different implications for female ex-combatants’ empowerment. In
Liberia, the mothers narrative resulted in a lack of support to female ex-combatants, undermining their reintegration. In Nepal, the mothers narrative translated into increased
(but still limited and gendered) support to female ex-combatants, benefitting their reintegration and empowerment in the form of control and choice over their lives, skills
(empowerment-as-power-to), and potential self-realization (empowerment-as-power-with).
In Liberia for example, it was noted that among girl ex-combatants, ‘most women became single mothers’ (INT48), that it was common for girl ex-combatants to arrive at the DDR with children as access to reproductive services had been limited during the conflict, and that girl ex-combatants subsequently would have to go home with babies
(INT49). By contrast, in the LDDRR documentation I reviewed, I struggled to find any reference to female ex-combatants (and male ex-combatants) as mothers or parents. In
Liberia, the female ex-combatants-as-mothers narrative is therefore found only among
LDDRR officials.
In Nepal, both UNIRP officials and UNIRP documentation narrated female ex- combatants as mothers. Notably, it was local UNIRP officials who first drew the attention of international UNIRP officials to the fact that many female VMLRs were mothers. One
240 UNIRP official (INT73) involved with the UNIRP from the early design stages stated, “If
[female VMLRs] had children, we had to think about the children, how will they be taken care off and all those things. But in general, it was not easy for me, to deal with senior management of the UNDP.” This suggests that local UNIRP officials even introduced the mothers narrative in Nepal by first emphasizing that many female VMLRs had become mothers between the peace agreement in 2006 and the start of the UNIRP in 2010. As a result of this mother narrative introduced by local UNIRP officials, gender support was introduced a year into the two-year UNIRP program. Notably, this UNIRP official already stressed that female ex-combatants were mothers before the UNIRP even began, highlighting that it took over a year for international managers to respond to this and introduce relevant support in the UNIRP.
The resulting support was called gender support. The UNIRP on paper ultimately had a broad concept of what ‘gender issues’ female ex-combatants faced and needed support for, including stigma, a lack of gender equality compared to the equality they had experienced in the PLA, and sexual and gender-based violence (UNIRP 2013). This
UNIRP gender support (ibid.) admitted the deficiencies of the UNIRP in recognizing that male ex-combatants also have ‘gender issues’, few of which were addressed in the
UNIRP.59 In contrast to this broad conception of gender, UNIRP officials narrated gender- support as a short-hand for reproductive health services to female ex-combatants. When asked what gender support entailed, local UNIRP officials discussed support such as extra resources to pregnant and lactating mothers, maternity leave, and referrals and coverage for medical support (INT74). Rarely did UNIRP officials suggest that male ex-combatants also received gender support. In Nepal, UNIRP officials and documentation therefore both
59 Male ex-combatants for instance also faced stigma, particularly among those who married intercaste. Male ex-combatants also needed paternity leave, which was only introduced in the last few months of the UNIRP.
241 narrate female ex-combatants as mothers; however, only UNIRP officials collapse gender with mothers. The following paragraphs elaborate on the implications of this mothers narrative for female ex-combatants’ empowerment.
The UNIRP provided 1,575 cases of gender support to female ex-combatants, and
437 to male ex-combatants (Transition International 2013:20) 60 . This high volume, particularly for the 846 female ex-combatants who participated in the UNIRP, suggests a comprehensive coverage. Arguably, earlier introduction of this support could have increased female ex-combatants’ access and retention in the UNIRP, because gender support was considered very useful by female ex-combatants who received this. Kalpana
(INT70) for example received considerable support during and after her pregnancy, including financial and physical resources and emotional support from UNIRP officials, which enabled her to resume training following maternity leave. Nonetheless, there are questions about how comprehensive the implementation of this gender support was in the
UNIRP. Jaya (INT3) and her husband were employed, but she “was unaware about family planning so, unknowingly, I got pregnant and we both had to quit our jobs […]. I had a very hard time after delivery due to financial struggles.” She now works as a cleaner, granting her little respect from her family or community. This suggests that economic reintegration, whether the direct result of UN-led DDR or achieved by female ex- combatants themselves, is ultimately of little benefit to female ex-combatants if they are not supported to take control over their lives as mothers (empowerment-as-power-to). The lack of reproductive health training in the UNIRP is surprising given the United Nations
Population Fund’s (UNFPA) involvement in the UNIRP, as the UNFPA has long provided reproductive health training to non-combatant women and girls throughout Nepal. This can
60 Much of this gender support to male ex-combatants was support to their non-VMLR wives who were pregnant or had recently given birth (Transitional International 2013).
242 be understood as another indication of female VMLRs as ‘other other’, as they are not considered the same as male ex-combatants, nor are they like women who did not fight.
While gender support in Nepal is limited, this is nonetheless an improvement from the lack of support provided in Liberia to female ex-combatants who were also mothers. In the LDDRR, the only support provided for girl ex-combatant mothers was food, clothing, and soap for babies (INT62). In Liberia, Ciata (INT54) did not attend Vocational Skills
Training (VST) because she had nobody to support her and to take care of her child whilst participating in training. Another female ex-combatant, Fanta (INT52) became pregnant during training and received no support with her pregnancy and consequently dropped out.
There were few attempts to address this. An exception is the development of five early child development centers attached to public schools and built by Save the Children. Save the Children supported the development of a curriculum and the centers were later transferred to the Ministry of Education (INT46). While this provides a good example of support to ex-combatants who were parents (female ex-combatants in particular) and a sustainable contribution to community-based development, five such centers have limited impact in a DDR program with over 101,000 participants, many of whom were parents.
The lack of motherhood support in Liberia can be understood in two ways. Firstly, it is assumed in the LDDRR that female ex-combatants are responsible for children.
Fathers were for example not supported to be involved in parenting (INT51), although
‘some fathers came voluntarily’ (INT48). The second assumption, Megan MacKenzie
(2012:131) contends, is that “it is assumed that mothering skills will invoke themselves naturally even in the case of those women and girls with neither experience of nor familiarity with motherhood.” The LDDRR only recognized much later that female ex- combatants are ‘not taking care of their child’ (INT51). This is still having harmful effects on their children, as particularly girl ex-combatants ‘were not able to learn life skills in the
243 family because of the war’ (INT58). The mother narrative can therefore be seen as having harmful implications for female ex-combatants’ children.
While the LDDRR did not actively exclude female ex-combatants who were mothers, the lack of support to female ex-combatant mothers meant they felt unable to fully benefit from economic reintegration support. This undermined female ex-combatants’ empowerment in different ways. First, this reproduces gendered inequalities, where female ex-combatants are expected to perform the unpaid role of mother/primary parent, thereby making them dependent on husbands. As discussed in Chapter 1, the nuclear household is also far from the reality for women, particularly post-conflict. Additionally, it undermines female ex-combatants’ choice and control over their lives (empowerment-as-power-to) and self-realization (empowerment-as-power-within), by limiting what roles they can fulfill.
These inequalities are further reinforced by the education component of the
LDDRR. Female ex-combatants who were pregnant or already mothers were not allowed to access the education component of the LDDRR, because “people do not want [their] kids to associate with girl mothers” (INT61). Other female ex-combatants who became pregnant during education were also pushed out (INT61) or left by their own choice in the absence of any support with their pregnancy (INT46). Mothers and mothers-to-be could only go to night school; this was to discourage others from becoming pregnant (INT59).
Female ex-combatants over the age of 18 were also not allowed to access education.
Notably, male ex-combatants who were fathers, fathers-to-be, or over the age of 18 were not excluded (INT60). From my critical feminist peacebuilding perspective, this is problematic for several reasons. Not only did female ex-combatants want to return to school and regretted missing out on education during conflict, girls in Liberia across the board have less access to education than boys (Chapters 4, 5). Secondly, a lack of education gives female ex-combatants few economic reintegration options beyond low-
244 skilled, low-paid professions or informal economies (Basini 2013b). The lack of access to education for mothers, mothers-to-be, and adult female ex-combatants (but not fathers or adult male ex-combatants) therefore reproduced gendered inequalities in terms of access to education and knowledge, as well as economic reintegration. The same concerns were already in place in Sierra Leone (Mazurana et al 2004:22), stressing again the problematics of copying the LDDRR program from the DDR program in Sierra Leone.
My interviews suggest that this exclusion of female ex-combatants from education was official DDR policy (INT59), although I have been unable to verify this in LDDRR documentation. It is possible this policy was informally introduced by local DDR officials.
As Autesserre (2014:25) contends, “On-the-ground peacebuilders are much more than implementers. Instructions from the top must always be interpreted and translated into action, which provides field-based interveners with substantial leeway in conducting their operations.” Local DDR officials therefore may have influenced the DDR implementation in terms of the education component, and have adapted the program to local norms. This overlaps with critical feminist peacebuilding scholarship, which has emphasized that local adaptations of liberal peacebuilding programs frequently reproduce gendered inequalities
(Chapter 2, McLeod 2015, George& Kent 2017, Björkdahl 2012, Partis-Jennings 2017,
Simangan 2018). This particular hybridity of the exclusion of female ex-combatants from the education component potentially introduced by LDDRR officials and shaped by local perceptions of gender have thus reproduced gendered inequalities.
The female-ex-combatants-as-mothers narrative has therefore undermined female ex-combatants’ empowerment in Liberia, whereas the same narrative in Nepal both supported or undermined female ex-combatants’ empowerment. In Liberia, the female-ex- combatants-as-mothers narrative meant that female ex-combatants are given little choice in their economic reintegration support provided in UN-led DDR, and this economic
245 reintegration support largely means female ex-combatants reintegrate poorly economically.
As Chapter 5 discussed, economic reintegration can support female ex-combatants’ empowerment, particularly reinforcing the control they have over their lives
(empowerment-as-power-to) and (further) boosting their self-confidence (empowerment- as-power-within). A failure of the LDDRR to sufficiently support female ex-combatants’ economic reintegration suggests the LDDRR has undermined these forms of empowerment, or at least not supported them. Furthermore, as the LDDRR provided severely restricted options for economic reintegration support, this left female ex-combatants with little choice, nor were they given support to professionalize skills female ex-combatants developed during conflict, meaning that many lost these skills in the absence of utilizing them regularly (empowerment-as-power-to). The gendered narrative of female-ex- combatants-as-mothers therefore resulted in the provision of maternity support to female ex-combatants in Nepal (but not to male ex-combatants), and in no support and even exclusion from economic reintegration support in Liberia.
Wives Narrative
Another closely related narrative is what I consider female ex-combatants as ‘wives’. This section highlights that female ex-combatants in Liberia and Nepal are narrated as wives.
The implications of this however differ. In Liberia, the wives narrative serves to reproduce female ex-combatants’ economic reintegration as ‘supplementary’ to husbands’.
Consequently, female ex-combatants’ empowerment is undermined by limiting their choices in reintegration and control over their lives (empowerment-as-power-to), and failed to build on empowerment-as-power-with in the form of challenging gendered inequalities. In Nepal, the female-ex-combatants-as-wives narrative meant that the UNIRP failed to provide any support to female ex-combatants seeking divorce. This was especially sought by female ex-combatants who married intercaste (and were therefore struggling
246 with social reintegration) and whose marriages had been coerced by the Maoists. This failure to provide support placed local gender norms of female ex-combatants as wives
(and not divorcées) above their wellbeing, limiting their choice and control over their lives
(empowerment-as-power-to).
The female-ex-combatants-as-wives narrative was most evident in the LDDRR, where female ex-combatants were referred to as ‘bush wives’ or ‘girlfriends’ of male ex- combatants (Chapter 2). The term ‘bush wife’ is problematic, because in the LDDRR, the term was used to denote consensual and non-consensual relationships. This was also the case in Sierra Leone, where “The implicit assumption […] is that female soldiers are married, that they wish to stay married and that their primary objective is to support their husband, who is presumed to be the principle wage earner” (MacKenzie 2009:213). This is in line with the view in DDR of female ex-combatants’ incomes as ‘supplementary’ to their husbands (Chapter 1).
This narrative of female ex-combatants as wives and their economic reintegration as ‘supplementary’ to husbands’ is further evidenced by the discrimination female ex- combatants faced in selecting VST in Liberia. Although the LDDRR framework opened
VST to male and female ex-combatants, in practice, local counselors working on behalf of the LDDRR actively pushed female ex-combatants into trainings they deemed appropriate for female ex-combatants (cf. Özerdem& Podder 2015:192). Teewon (INT36) recalled,
“At that time [of the DDR], there was discrimination, because [the counselors] say that female [do] not have strength like men, so the training that the men can take, they cannot allow me to take, the female to take. So the big difference was there.” Most of my female ex-combatant interviewees in Liberia were trained in hair plaiting, soap making, tailoring, or baking, either in cantonment for those registered as child combatants, or in vocational schools for adult female ex-combatants. Female ex-combatants also opted for these roles
247 themselves. Teewon was one of few female ex-combatants to highlight such discrimination.
Most female ex-combatants in Liberia and Nepal chose training in (low-paid) roles considered appropriate for women/girls. In Nepal, only single female VMLRs would sometimes pursue ‘non-traditional’ roles (INT20), while mothers nearly always chose from
‘traditional’ roles because they could ‘run these businesses from home’ (INT19). Female ex-combatants therefore both ‘chose’ low-paid ‘female’ roles and are pushed into these.
Another concern regarding the female-ex-combatants-as-wives narrative whose income is ‘supplementary’ to their husbands’ is that it fails to consider where female ex- combatants choose to resettle. The place of reintegration matters for economic, social, and political reintegration and female ex-combatants’ empowerment. The importance of economic contexts for female ex-combatants’ reintegration has been discussed by Basini
(2013a:548f), who argues that “flooding the market with one skill or teaching trades which have high startup costs are common outcomes in reintegration programs.” The amount of skills offered in economic reintegration support for female ex-combatants in Liberia were fewer than those offered to male ex-combatants, meaning LDDRR flooded the market with numerous female ex-combatants trained in limited, low-paid skills. (INT49, UN Women
2015:178f). This creates high supply and low demand, driving down prices, further reducing female ex-combatants’ capacity to benefit from economic reintegration support.
Skills offered to female ex-combatants as economic reintegration support were not based on market-needs assessments (Basini 2013a:548f), but on what implementing partners offered (INT50, INT59), as was the case in Nepal (INT73). Such market-needs assessments should be localized and dependent on where female ex-combatants choose to reintegrate. In both contexts, there was for example little interest in agricultural training
(Jennings 2008, Saferworld 2010:xvi), as many female ex-combatants resettled in urban areas for social and economic reasons.
248 Moreover, economic reintegration support is unlikely to benefit female ex- combatants as long as unequal gendered divisions of labor remain unchallenged.
Wonkehmi (INT44) completed agricultural training and secured employment in Nimba for four years with an agricultural NGO, where she became a supervisor training other women.
She is no longer doing this ‘because I [do] not have a man who is actually willing to help,’ with either the agricultural or reproductive labor. She utilizes her knowledge and skills to raise chickens for self-subsistence. Her husband is an ex-commander she met during conflict and they have children together. His unwillingness to help means Wonkehmi is not able to implement her training to benefit her economic reintegration. As the LDDRR reinforced the idea of female ex-combatants’ labor as ‘supplementary’ to their husbands’
(see above), it is unsurprising that male ex-combatants were not encouraged to support their wives’ productive labor. While it would be unreasonable to expect a DDR program to alter unequal gendered power relations and divisions of labor, the LDDRR failed to utilize this post-conflict moment to challenge such unequal gendered power relations. At least the
UNIRP provided some gender-based violence training to male and female VMLRs (INT3).
The failure of the LDDRR to challenge such gendered inequalities and even reinforce it by reproducing female ex-combatants’ labor as ‘supplementary’ undermined female ex- combatants’ economic reintegration. This, as noted, can prove invaluable to female ex- combatants’ choice and control over their lives (empowerment-as-power-to) and self- realization and self-confidence (empowerment-as-power-within), thereby undermining these forms of empowerment.
DDR officials acknowledged this gendered division of roles in DDR. A DDR official (INT59) states, “In Liberia, there were few things restricted to men, one was carpentry, and the other was masonry. But right now, the DDR changed everything. You see female carpenters, you even see female mechanics [doing] car repairs. So that worked
249 well, that changed the whole thing.” This suggests opening of ‘traditionally’ male gender roles in the LDDRR contributed to challenging gendered inequalities. However, female ex- combatants entering traditionally male roles were the exception. While the LDDRR program sought to make non-traditional roles attractive to girl combatants by offering more apprenticeships for example in mechanics training (INT58), there was no additional support, such as working with trainers to ensure female ex-combatants are treated equally
(INT59). One DDR official noted that such support was far from a priority in the LDDRR and that Liberia “is only now emphasizing equality between the male and the female”
(INT42). As stated by Cynthia Enloe (2004:215), ‘later’ is a patriarchal time-zone for female ex-combatants in Liberia. By failing to challenge unequal gendered power relations in terms of economic reintegration and roles, the LDDRR has provided female ex- combatants with little opportunity to reintegrate into better-paid roles. This suggests that the LDDRR initially did little to challenge gendered inequalities, failing to build on empowerment-as-power-with experienced by female ex-combatants, which was already limited in Liberia (Chapter 5).
The female-ex-combatants-as-wives narrative has different implications in Nepal.
To recall, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) expanded female ex-combatants’ choices in marriage, but also coerced marriages, particularly intercaste marriage. Among these marriages, the UNIRP found injustices, such as harassment, verbal and physical violence, and discrimination, sometimes ‘worse than in ‘normal’ society’ (INT74). Despite this,
DDR officials admitted, the UNIRP ‘decided not to intervene’ (INT72), because ‘divorce is a very sensitive issue’ in Nepal (INT18). While it is legally possible for wives to obtain a divorce in Nepal (GoN 2015) the cultural taboo meant the UNIRP did not support female
VMLRs to leave such marriages where desired. Nonetheless, there ‘were lots of separations’ among ex-combatants (INT18). Such separations or divorces have to be seen
250 within marriage practices in Nepal more broadly. In Nepal, wives move in with their new husband’s family, sometimes across the country, and take their husband’s family as their own family, thereby reducing female ex-combatants’ reliance on their own families for logistical, emotional, and financial support. In Liberia, divorce or separations become more accessible to women ‘as they become more economically self-sufficient’ (Basini 2013b:6.
Cf. Ellis 2007:144). As female ex-combatants in Nepal struggle with economic reintegration (Chapter 5), the UNIRP’s failure to intervene in such marriages where desired placed cultural norms (i.e. divorce as sensitive issue) above addressing vulnerabilities some female ex-combatants face. Saferworld’s (2010:xx) research on ex- combatants in Nepal highlights this vulnerability, stressing that wives or daughters-in-law of lower castes in intercaste marriages among ex-combatants have been abused and even murdered.
The female-ex-combatants-as-wives narrative undermined female ex-combatants’ empowerment in various ways. The UNIRP knowingly failed to provide support or referrals to ex-combatants seeking to leave abusive marriages, placing cultural taboos of divorce over the security of some female ex-combatants. Furthermore, the female-ex- combatants-as-wives narrative in the LDDRR limited female ex-combatants to low-skilled, low-paid jobs primarily designed as ‘supplementary’ income to husbands’, if these female ex-combatants work at all. This has limited their economic reintegration, and undermined their choice and control over their lives (empowerment-as-power-to) by limiting their career choices and self-realization (empowerment-as-power-within) and income prospects.
Daughters Narrative
A fifth narrative of female ex-combatants by DDR officials is what I broadly consider the narrative of ‘daughters’. This section first highlights that female ex-combatants in Liberia and Nepal are narrated by DDR officials as daughters for whom the best place to
251 reintegrate is in their family. Moreover, this section highlights that DDR officials frequently narrative themselves in parent-like roles to these female ex-combatants. This section argues that because of these related narratives of female ex-combatants as daughters and DDR officials as parent-like, DDR officials presume to know what is best in terms of reintegration. In doing so, the DDR undermines female ex-combatants’ empowerment by limiting their choices and control over their lives (empowerment-as- power-to), their self-realization (empowerment-as-power-within), and reproduces rather than challenges gendered inequalities (empowerment-as-power-with). Additionally, by pushing female ex-combatants back to families (where this is possible), female ex- combatants are hindered from reintegrating into new communities, such as ex-combatant communities (empowerment-as-power-with) which further undermines their reintegration and empowerment
In both Liberia and Nepal female ex-combatants are frequently narrated by DDR officials as daughters. In Liberia, DDR officials reiterated that ‘the best place for the child is in the family setting’ (INT61), highlighting that particularly girl ex-combatants are to be reintegrated into their roles as daughters. In Nepal, female ex-combatants were also narrated as daughters, where DDR officials wanted female VMLRs to attend counseling with their parents to help them make the ‘right decisions’ for their reintegration and ‘to break the influence of friends’ on female ex-combatants (INT19). This suggests an understanding of female ex-combatants as daughters, who need their parents to help them make decisions.
Aside from the actual parents, DDR officials frequently narrate themselves in parent-like roles to female ex-combatants as daughters. In Liberia, one LDDRR official
(INT60) who worked closely with female ex-combatants in cantonment, stated that she
“used her role as a mother-figure to help these girl [ex-combatants].” The parent-like role
252 to female-ex-combatants-as-daughters was especially visible in Nepal, where UNIRP officials noted that ‘the UNIRP was the only project to take care of VMLRs’ (INT77) and that VMLRs could ‘only trust the UN, because it is a neutral agency’ (INT14). This narrative echoes the construction of ‘international actors as saviors’ (McMullin 2013a:385, above), benevolent interveners on behalf of helpless ‘others’, which “dovetails neatly with depictions of Africa both as a place born of hell and misery and as a continent that, like a child, can be saved” (McMullin 2013b). McMullin however misses a gender analysis. To recall, female ex-combatants in Liberia in particular are narrated as victims of conflict while male ex-combatants are constructed as threats. This victims narrative arguably plays into the daughters narrative, as female ex-combatants are constructed as victims of conflict in need of protection by DDR officials. This parent-like role of DDR officials and the DDR program vis-à-vis female ex-combatants as daughters has various implications for female ex-combatants and their empowerment, as the following paragraphs illustrate.
Chiefly, the narration of the DDR officials as themselves as parent-like to female ex-combatants as ‘daughters’ meant that DDR officials frequently assumed to know what is best in terms of female ex-combatants’ reintegration, with little regard for female ex- combatants’ views on the matter. For example in Liberia, one LDDRR official (INT48) proudly relayed an anecdote of a female ex-combatant whose leg was amputated following a conflict wound. This female ex-combatant wanted to take cosmetology training, but because she would have to stand and the DDR assumed this would be too hard for her, she was pushed to access tailoring training instead. Her choices (empowerment-as-power-to) in economic reintegration support were thus limited even further due to her injury. Moreover, it potentially limited her self-realization (empowerment-as-power-within) by limiting what economic reintegration she could pursue. In this case, the DDR official influenced what this female ex-combatant could access in the DDR, thereby undermined her empowerment.
253 Another consequence of the female-ex-combatants-as-daughters narrative and DDR officials as parent-like in LDDRR is pushing them to return to families and communities through Family Tracing and Reunification (FTR). To reiterate, this was premised on the assumption that ‘the best place for the child is in the family setting’ (INT61). This was resisted, especially by boy ex-combatants but also by girl ex-combatants (INT61) who gave wrong addresses to avoid going home (INT47). There were various reasons for this resistance. Not only were female ex-combatants such as Deylue (INT24) afraid of retributions from family or community, going home can cause (re)traumatization. After all, the home setting is where many female ex-combatants fled from to escape abuse, committed atrocities, or were themselves victimized (Chapter 4). Another reason for female ex-combatants’ avoiding going home and reuniting with commanders instead is because ‘some [child ex-combatants] saw commanders as parent figures’ or as ‘the only family they knew’ (INT58). This DDR official noted that girl ex-combatants in particular wanted to go to commanders as they were rejected by their families. As argued in Chapter
5, such hierarchies (empowerment-as-power-over) could transform to benefit the reintegration of female ex-combatants to form a new, supportive community
(empowerment-as-power-with). Forcing female ex-combatants to go back to families rather than allowing them to stay with commanders therefore potentially undermined female ex-combatants’ empowerment-as-power-with.
Moreover, many of my female ex-combatant interviewees resettled away from their families in Monrovia not to be with commanders, but because they did not want to go home. Fanta (INT52) adamantly did not want to go home; the main reason for this was the lack of economic opportunities at home to provide for herself and her children. Female ex- combatants thus resisted FTR, a practice emerging from the ‘daughter’ narrative, for
254 various reasons, including seeing commanders as their family, not wanting to return home, and lack of economic opportunities in home communities.
Such cases highlight two concerns. Firstly, there is a need to rethink the girl-ex- combatants-as-daughters narrative, particularly in the context of the nuclear family as this is often not the reality of families, especially in post-conflict contexts (cf. MacKenzie
2009:201, Stevens 1999:22). In Liberia, Maclay et al (2010:347) stress, “Family is also one of the greatest casualties of war,” with 31.4% of girls and 29.9% of boys in Liberia having neither parent in the household. Elta (INT41) could not find her family as
‘everybody was displaced’ after the conflict. Returning to home communities and families was thus not always possible. Only later in the LDDRR were girl ex-combatants increasingly placed in alternative care group homes (INT47, INT58), but this was not available to adult female ex-combatants (INT45). Again, such ex-combatant communities could provide female ex-combatants with a form of collective security (empowerment-as- power-with) and benefit their reintegration. Pushing female ex-combatants to go back to families therefore undermined this empowerment.
In attempting to push female ex-combatants back to their families in predominantly rural areas, DDR officials failed to recognize that female ex-combatants frequently resettled elsewhere, usually in more urban areas. The LDDRR for example pushed female ex-combatants to access agricultural training, but many chose leaving the DDR over agricultural training, as they could not or did not want to return to rural areas (Munive et al
2012:371, O’Neill& Ward 2005:57, UNIFEM 2004), as was also the case in Nepal
(Saferworld 2010:xvi). In 2004, of the 11,271 Liberian female ex-combatants accessing training, only 744 (6.6%) had selected agricultural training, even though most came from rural areas where agriculture is a predominant source of income (Aboagye et al 2004:9).
This highlights that female ex-combatants had limited choice in their economic
255 reintegration, especially in Liberia, where options were often restricted. As Chapter 1 stressed, not participating meant losing out on potential benefits of DDR altogether. This risks reproducing gendered inequalities for female ex-combatants, as female ex-combatants frequently missed learning other relevant skills to support their economic reintegration due to their participation in conflict (Chapter 4).
Moreover, in narrating girl ex-combatants as daughters, local LDDRR officials reproduced local gendered norms around what daughters should or should not do, and what their relationships with families and male partners should look like. For instance, one
NCDDRR61 official (INT42) explained he received child protection and sexual and gender- based violence training, but that “international partners, tried to change our traditional culture […]. We, at the time, we were going to it, but we were not putting our mind to it.
We always say, we hear it, because we needed the money, but we are not going to particularize it.” Elaborating on what ‘traditional culture’ entails and how international partners were changing it, the NCDDRR official stated, “The child protection training, it was mainly focusing on the rights of the child, and there were so many that even we were seeing it like the parent had no right, in the rights of the child.” Local DDR officials therefore resisted child protection in the LDDRR. Resistance of DDR officials to implementing child protection can be seen as reinforcing their construction of girl ex- combatants as daughters, i.e. where parents have ‘rights’ over their child, undermining girl ex-combatants’ choice and control over their lives (empowerment-as-power-to) by reinforcing structures reproducing gendered inequalities. The issue here is as Enloe et al
(2016:348) put it, that ‘culture is wielded in ways to silence people,’ with the effect of reinforcing ‘patriarchal relationships’. The same is true regarding child protection; the
NCDDRR official acknowledged that ‘later, we saw why child protection was needed,’ but
61 National Commission on Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation and Reintegration
256 by then, many child ex-combatants, especially girl ex-combatants had already been excluded and neglected by DDR. As Chapter 1 argued, (self-)exclusion means missing out on potential benefits of DDR and often results in silence. In this regard, DDR officials’ refusal to implement child protection resulted in loss of voice (empowerment-as-power- within); for these female ex-combatants silence is reintegration.
UNIRP officials had a more nuanced understanding where female ex-combatants chose to resettle. Although it was noted that the best place to reintegrate would remain with families and families-in-law (INT19), UNIRP officials acknowledged that female ex- combatants resettled elsewhere due to stigma, access to medical services, or education
(INT16, INT20). Notably, with regards to education, it was female VMLRs who succeeded in alerting local UNIRP officials of their resettlement outside of families and to shape the
UNIRP to deliver support that closer matches their respective needs. Based on female ex- combatants’ requests, the UNIRP introduced additional stipends for female ex-combatants to study away from home (Transition International 2013:10), which for example benefitted
Jaya (INT3). The UNIRP later arranged residences for female ex-combatants who studied together, upon suggestions made by female ex-combatants such as Laxmi (INT7). This support was provided predominantly to female ex-combatants (and to a few male ex- combatants), who “may not be staying with their family members owing to various reasons, such as a lack of family acceptance and living single due to various reasons.” At the end of
2012, 110 female and five male VMLRs had received such additional support (UNIRP
2012a:10). Nor did the UNIRP exclude mothers or female ex-combatants who were married or pregnant, as was the case in the LDDRR. In Nepal, 44% of male and female
VMLRs in education were married (UNIRP 2012a:10), and some female ex-combatants were pregnant or already mothers. This suggests that in the UNIRP, female ex-combatants were not excluded (either directly or structurally) from education, and even managed to
257 receive additional funding and support for accessing education. Moreover, this suggests that female ex-combatants succeeded in influencing the UNIRP, benefitting their reintegration.
The education component was the exception in providing lodging support.
Participants in a UNIRP forum argued that such support was also necessary for vocational skills training (VST), especially as this training was provided in urban environments, frequently far away from female ex-combatants’ localities (UNIRP 2011:25). For example, much VST for formally known Karnali district and other parts of western Nepal took place in Nepalgunj (INT74). One of the main cities in Karnali, Jumla, is, at best, nine and a half hours by private transport from Nepalgunj. 62 This may explain why only six female
VMLRs accessed VST, all training as Indian Cooks. It is plausible these female VMLRs had to relocate to pursue this training, potentially limiting their social reintegration by removing them from families and communities. Thus, female VMLRs were not successful in pushing for additional stipends in VST for those no longer living at home, thereby limiting their choices (empowerment-as-power-to).
Another consequence of the daughters narrative and DDR officials as parent-like who know best is the intervention of LDDRR officials in girl ex-combatants’ relationships.
In Liberia, many female ex-combatants had relationships and ‘bush marriages’, ranging from consensual to non-consensual (Specht 2006:11). Unlike the UNIRP, the LDDRR intervened particularly in relationships of girl ex-combatants. Child protection agencies
(implementing partners in the LDDRR) went to great lengths to split up girl ex-combatants from their ‘bush husbands’, because they were ‘too young for relationships’ (INT47).
Another LDDRR official (INT61) argues that ‘taking girls away from their bush husbands’ was necessary, ‘because who would accept them?’ This suggests that splitting girl ex-
62 Access by public transport takes considerably longer
258 combatants up from ‘bush husbands’ was not for girl ex-combatants per se, but to ensure their social reintegration by reinforcing socially acceptable behavior, i.e. girls as premarital, single, and not sexually active. While DDR should certainly support female ex-combatants
(of all ages, not just girls) to leave (abusive) relationships where they so choose, not all relationships are abusive and female ex-combatants may not want to leave ‘bush husbands’.
Not only does this limit choices and control over one’s life (empowerment-as-power-to), as argued above, female ex-combatants’ economic reintegration support in Liberia was largely geared towards low-skilled, low-income jobs, and primarily designed as supplementary income to their husbands’. Splitting up female ex-combatants’ relationships may thus reinforce female ex-combatants’ vulnerabilities and gendered inequalities.
The female-ex-combatants-as-daughters narrative in Liberia is also visible in the
(lack of) provision of reproductive and sexual health training. The LDDRR and some implementing partners introduced reproductive and sexual health training to girl ex- combatants (not to adult female ex-combatants) as part of counseling (INT45, INT51,
INT58). Boy ex-combatants received no such training (INT49). While adult female ex- combatants should also be able to access this, it is a concerning that male ex-combatants are not offered such training. This is gendered, placing the full responsibility of preventing
(early) pregnancies and STIs on female ex-combatants while absolving male ex- combatants of this responsibility. Not only does this undermine effectiveness of reproductive and sexual health training, particularly where men and boys are decision- makers and/or sexual violence is high, but women and girls are disproportionally affected by pregnancies, associated complications, and STIs, impacting their health, and thereby economic and social reintegration (UN AIDS 2017). Learning about reproductive and sexual health can arguably increase choice and control female ex-combatants have in their lives, for example by recognizing problems early, or preventing them altogether. My
259 interviews were unable to establish what this training entailed and how useful this was for female ex-combatants.63 Among my female ex-combatant interviewees in Liberia, Sona
(INT53) became pregnant, seemingly unplanned, and therefore dropped out of economic reintegration support, suggesting reproductive health training was not comprehensive.
The decision to not provide adult female ex-combatants with reproductive health training can be explained in two ways. First, adult female ex-combatants spent less time in cantonment, giving the LDDRR less time to provide reproductive health training. Second, it can be seen as a result of the ‘mothers’ and ‘daughters’ narratives, where adult female ex-combatants are seen as natural mothers and bearing children their primary responsibility.
Conversely, girl ex-combatants are ‘daughters’: premarital and not mothers. These gendered narratives pertaining to female ex-combatants thus shape the kind of support provided. In this example, UN-led DDR reproduced gendered inequalities through the
‘daughters’ and ‘mothers’ narratives, which determined who is and who isn’t given access to reproductive health training.
This section has highlighted that female ex-combatants in Liberia and Nepal are narrated by DDR officials as daughters, and DDR officials narrate themselves as parent- like saviors of these female ex-combatants. This daughters narrative has undermined female ex-combatants’ empowerment in several ways, as this section argued. Firstly, by pushing female ex-combatants back to families rather than letting them reintegrate into ex- combatant communities where they so choose undermines their empowerment-as-power- with, which could further benefit their economic reintegration and provide a psychological support network. Secondly, by presuming to know what is best for female ex-combatants,
DDR officials undermine female ex-combatants’ empowerment by restricting their choice and control over their lives (empowerment-as-power-to) and their self-realization
63 Abstinence-only reproductive and sexual health training for example are ‘ineffective at best and harmful at worst’, for women and girls (Legal Momentum 2008)
260 (empowerment-as-power-within). Lastly, DDR officials have undermined female ex- combatants’ empowerment-as-power-with by reproducing gendered inequalities in terms of who is responsible for preventing parenthood and STIs, as well as by pushing them into low-paid economic roles. The daughters narrative has therefore undermined female ex- combatants’ empowerment.
Peacebuilders and Agents of Change Narrative?
As discussed in Chapter 2, women and girls are increasingly narrated as potential peacebuilders in liberal peacebuilding, although this remains limited in terms of how frequently women/girls’ political and peacebuilding agency is recognized, as well as whose political/peacebuilding agency is recognized. This is true in the LDDRR and UNIRP, where female ex-combatants are primarily narrated as victims and threats respectively, with little agency in their participation in conflict or their subsequent reintegration. While some UNIRP officials recognized female ex-combatants’ political stakes in the conflict
(see above), others were quick to point out that upon reintegration, male ex-combatants were considerably more likely to take on political roles and leadership positions (INT75,
INT72). This reflects a bigger concern in liberal peacebuilding that women are structurally excluded from post-conflict political participation and nation/statebuilding, thereby reproducing a male-biased state and unequal gendered power relations (cf. Yuval-Davis
1991, 1997, 2006, 2011, Wilson 2005, Shepherd 2017:37, Ní Aoláin 2016:152). The widespread absence of political reintegration support therefore draws into question the ability of DDR to contribute to an emancipatory peace by not challenging this reproduction of unequal gendered power relations.
Nonetheless, there was some consideration for ‘women as agents of change’ in the
UNIRP. For example, some implementing partners introduced support for female ex- combatants to become ‘agents of change’ and ‘youth as peacebuilders’ (INT1, INT15,
261 INT16, INT3). As noted in Chapter 2, this slowly changing narrative of women as peacebuilders and agents of change risks reproducing a triple burden of productive, reproductive, and peacebuilding/political labor. While female ex-combatants’ political reintegration is beneficial for building an emancipatory peace (Chapter 1), the success of this is likely limited without balancing this ‘triple burden’. The following paragraphs elaborate on this ‘triple burden’ potentially reproduced by political reintegration.
Female ex-combatants in Nepal elected to the CA, thus at the highest political level, are struggling to balance their political roles with other aspects of their lives. This is true case for Uma (INT5), who became a single mother after her husband died during conflict.
She explains,
“We [female ex-combatants] have become financially weak compared to those who did not fight, because we joined [the PLA] at a time we were supposed to study and earn, and now we are surrounded by household chores. I feel that when you are financially weak, then it would be difficult for females to be stable in politics, because being a politician, you cannot do business or other services because you have to give time to people and travel frequently and have to use your own funds as well.”
Uma’s story highlights several issues. Firstly, in spite of having a highly-respected, well- paid position as a member of the CA, she is still struggling to make ends meet. Political reintegration at this level then remains a privilege not accessible to most female ex- combatants based on income alone, as Chapter 5 argued most female ex-combatants are struggling with economic reintegration.
The second issue Uma points to is that household chores prevent her from studying and earning. Women more widely in Liberia and Nepal take on most household duties, including cooking, cleaning, collecting water and fuel. On average, women in Nepal spend
5 hours every day on collecting water and fuel and completing household chores, compared to 75 minutes for men (Action Aid 2013). To encourage female ex-combatants’ political reintegration is likely meaningless as long as female ex-combatants face time-
262 poverty. Shepherd (2011:511) for example stresses that women have limited time to be politically active and to contribute to peacebuilding as long as they have “to spend upwards of six hours per day sourcing and gathering water and wood.” To introduce political reintegration support to transform female ex-combatants’ empowerment-as-power-with to build an emancipatory peace by challenging gendered inequalities in peaceable way thus needs balancing with female ex-combatants’ productive and reproductive labor to be meaningful (Ramnarain 2015). Additionally, Ramnarain contends, such participation is meaningless if it is not designed with women present and for women. Introducing political reintegration support in UN-led DDR offers opportunities to support female ex-combatants’ empowerment, challenge gendered inequalities, and building an emancipatory peace, but also poses gendered pitfalls, including a triple burden. Female ex-combatants’ political reintegration will thus require continued ‘feminist curiosity’ (Enloe 2004:3) to avoid such pitfalls.
Hybridities Through Narratives
The beginning of this chapter recounted an interview with a LDDRR official (INT60) who worked with girl ex-combatants in interim care centers and taught girls how to shave
“because women need to shave their armpits.” This was not official LDDRR policy, but was introduced by LDDRR officials in the implementation of the LDDRR, fueled by particular gendered narratives and constructions of how female ex-combatants should and should not behave. Drawing on my conceptualization of hybridities in Chapter 2, this section seeks to draw out how different actors produce, reproduce, and challenge predominant gendered narratives in UN-led DDR, and thereby introduce hybridities in the respective UN-led DDR programs. Specifically, this section is interested in the changes in the design and implementation of UN-led DDR that are introduced through the production and reproduction of gendered narratives about female ex-combatants by different actors in
263 UN-led DDR, termed hybridities in the context of this thesis. This section argues that such hybridities in UN-led DDR further undermine female ex-combatants’ empowerment and the building of an emancipatory peace, reproduce gendered inequalities, and that different actors introduce hybridities to varying extents and with different implications for female ex-combatants’ empowerment. To make these arguments, this section illustrates how the gendered narratives discussed above have been produced, reproduced, and challenged by different actors (i.e. female ex-combatants, the MoPR and the Maoists, UNIRP officials,
LDDRR officials, and NCDDRR officials) and how these have introduced hybridities in the design and implementation of UN-led DDR.
As discussed, female ex-combatants in Liberia and Nepal had little opportunity to shape the predominant narratives in the respective DDR programs, and therefore to influence these. Female ex-combatants in Liberia and Nepal were narrated as mothers, wives, and daughters. In Liberia, female ex-combatants were also overwhelmingly narrated as victims of conflict by LDDRR officials whilst in Nepal, female ex-combatants were increasingly narrated as threats, especially by the MoPR. All of these narratives oversimplify the lived experiences of female ex-combatants and have, as argued, undermined their empowerment. By and large, female ex-combatants were unable to challenge these predominant gendered narratives and to introduce hybridities in how UN- led DDR was implemented. In Liberia, female ex-combatants frequently rejected the victims narrative and instead narrated their experiences of combatanthood both as victimization but also as empowerment (Chapter 4). In the LDDRR, female ex-combatants’ resistance to these narratives remained restricted to not participating in the LDDRR, which also meant missing out on its potential benefits for supporting their reintegration and empowerment. In Nepal, female ex-combatants were marginally more successful in introducing hybridities in the UNIRP by challenging gendered narratives. For instance, in
264 convincing local UNIRP officials of the need for lodging support as part of the education component, female ex-combatants resisted the daughters narrative and the corresponding assumption that female ex-combatants best resettle in their home communities. As lodging support was beneficial to female ex-combatants’ continued access to education (Chapter 5), this hybridity in the UNIRP introduced by female ex-combatants has benefitted their reintegration. Overall, female ex-combatants had limited opportunity to challenge gendered narratives and to introduce hybridities in the LDDRR and UNIRP respectively to better support female ex-combatants’ empowerment and reintegration.
In Nepal, different actors have produced and reproduced different narratives and, in doing so, have introduced hybridities in the UNIRP. As noted, the MoPR (re)produced the threats narrative. Consequently, the MoPR was unwilling to contribute to the reintegration of female ex-combatants and wanted to restrict the amount and kind of support available through the UNIRP, undermining female ex-combatants’ empowerment. The Maoists also introduced hybridities in the UNIRP by resisting the victims narrative. Specifically, the
Maoists rejected the UNIRP as they considered DDR a program for defeated armed groups with forced recruits, whereas the Maoists considered the PLA a legitimate army. As a result, the Maoists removed economic reintegration support options such as agriculture
(Saferwordl 2010:xvi) and discouraged VMLRs from participating in the UNIRP. The female VMLRs I interviewed participated in the UNIRP in spite of the Maoists’ rejection thereof. However, as many female VMLRs were still ‘missing’ from the UNIRP (Chapter
5), it is plausible that this rejection by the Maoists influenced other female VMLRs to not access the UNIRP and to miss out on potential support for their empowerment and reintegration. The (re)production of the threats narrative by the MoPR and the rejection of the victims narrative, and consequently the UNIRP, by the Maoists therefore restricted female ex-combatants’ participation in the UNIRP. As discussed, a lack of both access to
265 and quality in UN-led DDR has undermined female ex-combatants’ reintegration and empowerment. These hybridities in the UNIRP can therefore be said to have undermined female ex-combatants’ empowerment.
Local UNIRP officials also produced and reproduced these gendered narratives and thereby introduced hybridities in the UNIRP. As discussed, local UNIRP officials frequently narrated female VMLRs as vices. Indeed, many female VMLRs had married during cantonment, including intercaste marriages pushed by the Maoists. Local UNIRP officials acknowledged that such marriages were frequently problematic and even put female VMLRs’ lives at risk (Saferworld 2010:xx). Despite this recognition, local UNIRP officials failed to introduce measures to support these female VMLRs based on their own cultural biases of ‘divorce as a taboo’, despite it being legal in Nepal. In this sense, the reproduction of the wives narrative by UNIRP officials and the corresponding assumption that female VMLRs ought to remain married even as it put their lives at risk resulted in a lack of hybridity whereby UNIRP officials did not shape the UNIRP to better support female ex-combatants. Local UNIRP officials also narrated female VMLRs as daughters who would best reintegrate into families. Although local UNIRP officials reproduced this daughters narrative, they also understood that resettlement into families and home communities was not always feasible or desirable (Transition International 2013:10). Local
UNIRP officials therefore pushed for the UNIRP to support female VMLRs in additional ways, such as lodging support for education. In this example, local UNIRP officials reproduced the daughters narrative, yet were willing to deviate from this to better support the reintegration and empowerment of female VMLRs. A third narrative reproduced by local UNIRP officials is that of female VMLRs as mothers Notably, it was precisely because UNIRP officials narrated female VMLRs as mothers and understood that these
VMLRs needed additional support to benefit from reintegration support that gender
266 support was introduced (INT73, see above). Whilst there remain feminist concerns regarding the gendered responsibilities for reproductive labor (Chapter 5), the mothers narrative and the consequent introduction of gender support on behest of local UNIRP officials support female VMLRs’ reintegration and empowerment. In this sense, the reproduction of the mothers narrative by local UNIRP officials served to introduce hybridities in the UNIRP to provide support in a way that took seriously the particular needs of female VMLRs mothers. The reproduction of gendered narratives by local
UNIRP officials of female VMLRs as wives, daughters, and mothers therefore introduced different hybridities in the UNIRP, with mixed implications for female VMLRs’ reintegration and empowerment.
As discussed in this chapter, LDDRR officials produced and reproduced several gendered narratives, all of which undermined female ex-combatants’ empowerment. By
‘copy-pasting’ the female-ex-combatants-as-victims narrative from Sierra Leone, female ex-combatants were considered passive victims of conflict without any agency. This translated into a consideration of female ex-combatants’ reintegration as ‘secondary’ to that of ‘violent male ex-combatants’ (cf. Chapter 1) and yet failed to shape the LDDRR to meet the needs of these supposed victims. In Liberia, the mothers and wives narratives were (to the best of my knowledge) introduced by LDDRR officials. Bringing in their own gendered cultural biases that (girl) mothers shouldn’t attend school with other girls and that a wife’s economic reintegration should be ‘supplementary’ to their husband’s, LDDRR officials introduced hybridities in the implementation of the LDDRR by excluding girl mothers and relegating female ex-combatants’ economic reintegration to ‘supplementary roles. Additionally, this chapter has stressed that LDDRR officials narrate girl ex- combatants and themselves as parent-like, with the consequence that LDDRR officials presumed to know what is best for these girl ex-combatants. Due to this daughters
267 narrative, LDDRR officials introduced hybridities in the LDDRR by attempting to split up all relationships of girl ex-combatants and by pushing girl ex-combatants to return to home communities, regardless of their own wishes. In producing and reproducing these gendered narratives, LDDRR officials have introduced hybridities in the LDDRR, such as the exclusion of girl mothers from education and pushing girl ex-combatants back to families.
As noted, this undermined female ex-combatants’ empowerment. The production and reproduction of these gendered narratives by LDDRR officials and the resulting hybridities in the LDDRR have therefore undermined female ex-combatants’ empowerment.
Furthermore, this chapter has highlighted that NCDDRR officials had a more nuanced understanding of female ex-combatants as victims but also as agents; however,
NCDDRR officials were unable to challenge the predominant victims narrative and to better support the reintegration and empowerment of female ex-combatants. NCDDRR officials however introduced hybridities in the LDDRR implementation by refusing to implement child protection training. NCDDRR officials reproduced the girl-ex- combatants-as-daughters narrative; however, in doing so, NCDDRR officials applied a particular construction of ‘traditional culture’ whereby daughters (and children more broadly) are controlled by their parents. As NCDDRR officials felt that the ‘rights of the child’ training interfered with ‘traditional cultural rights of the parent’ (see above),
NCDDRR officials opted not to implement child protection, to the detriment of girl ex- combatants’ safety and empowerment. Whilst the NCDDRR overall had limited influence over the LDDRR, the reproduction by NCDDRR officials of the daughters narrative resulted in the reproduction of their own cultural ideas of daughter-parent relations, thereby introducing hybridities in the LDDRR by failing to provide child protection.
Highlighting how different actors have produced and reproduced these gendered narratives regarding female ex-combatants in Liberia and Nepal, this section has sought to
268 stress the importance of analyzing how these actors introduced hybridities in three different ways. Firstly, considering in what ways different actors shape the design and implementation of UN-led DDR by producing and reproducing gendered narratives has highlighted that these hybridities in UN-led DDR can support or undermine female ex- combatants’ reintegration and empowerment, as well as reproduce gendered inequalities. It is therefore imperative that critical feminist peacebuilding scholarship remain suspicious of hybridities and their potential reproduction of gendered inequalities. Secondly, this section has stressed that different actors introduce hybridities in UN-led DDR to varying extents.
LDDRR officials were for example much more influential in shaping gendered narratives in the design and implementation of the LDDRR than female ex-combatants in Liberia.
Echoing Chapter 2, a critical feminist peacebuilding analysis of hybridities should therefore be clear on whose hybridities we are looking at and what the gendered implications are, for instance for female ex-combatants. Thirdly, this section has reaffirmed critical feminist peacebuilding scholarship on hybridities which has stressed that whilst hybridities introduced by local actors may make liberal peacebuilding processes and practices more ‘localized’, such hybridities frequently reinforce rather than challenge local hierarchies. As the hybridities discussed in this section highlight a reproduction of unequal gendered economic and social roles, it can be suggested that the numerous hybridities introduced through the (re)production of gendered narratives by various actors have undermined female ex-combatants’ empowerment, as well as the building of an emancipatory peace. Therefore, analyzing hybridities has enabled an insight into how gendered narratives in UN-led DDR are produced and reproduced, as well as the gendered implications thereof for female ex-combatants’ empowerment and an emancipatory peace.
269 Conclusions
Bringing together previous chapters, this chapter specifically sought to answer the main question of this thesis: In what ways have UN-led DDR programs, particularly the reintegration aspect, undermined (or supported) female ex-combatants’ empowerment in
Liberia and Nepal? This chapter considered the role of UN-led DDR, arguing that UN-led
DDR in Liberia (the LDDRR) and Nepal (the UNIRP) undermined female ex-combatants’ empowerment. As part of this argument, this chapter applied two of the critical feminist peacebuilding analytical strategies discussed in Chapter 2, including gendered narratives and multiple hybridities in UN-led DDR.
This chapter contended there were different narratives by DDR officials regarding female ex-combatants in Liberia and Nepal, which largely undermined their empowerment.
Female ex-combatants resist and participate in these narratives and their reproduction. This chapter focused on six narratives: victims, threats, mothers, wives, daughters, and peacebuilders. Unlike emerging narratives of women as peacebuilders (Chapter 2), female ex-combatants are not recognized as potential peacebuilding/political actors, resulting in the lack of political reintegration support. The mothers, wives, and daughters narratives were present among DDR officials in both Liberia and Nepal. The victim narrative was mainly present in Liberia, whereas in Nepal, female ex-combatants are increasingly recognized as threats. This suggests a change in narratives regarding female ex-combatants.
However, the implications for female ex-combatants’ empowerment remain much the same. These narratives limit female ex-combatants to few roles, and fail to build on and even undermine their empowerment. The different narratives for example reconstruct female ex-combatants as wives, whose productive labor is ‘supplementary’ to that of male ex-combatants, or as mothers, who are primarily responsible for reproductive labor such as childcare. Therefore, these gendered narratives in UN-led DDR have reproduced gendered
270 inequalities for female ex-combatants, thereby undermining female ex-combatants’ empowerment.
This chapter has further argued that female ex-combatants, local and international
DDR officials, and officials working for national DDR bodies have produced, reproduced, and challenged these gendered narratives, with the effect of producing hybridities in the respective UN-led DDR programs. Female ex-combatants have had limited opportunities to shape UN-led DDR. As an exception, female ex-combatants have been able to influence the UNIRP to provide lodging support for education, which benefitted their continued access to the UNIRP. LDDRR officials produced gendered narratives and consequently introduced hybridities in the LDDRR; however, this did not benefit female ex-combatants’ empowerment. By reproducing the victims and wives narratives, LDDRR officials limited female ex-combatants’ choice and control over their lives (empowerment-as-power-to), and their self-realization (empowerment-as-power-within). In Nepal, local UNIRP officials’ hybridities somewhat benefitted female ex-combatants’ empowerment; for instance, by introducing the mothers narrative, which led to the provision of gender support. MoPR officials made little attempt to influence the UNIRP or the gendered narratives, with the exception of narrating VMLRs as threats and consequently seeking limiting the amount of support provided as part of the UNIRP, undermining female ex-combatants’ empowerment.
The MoPR introduced a ceiling expenditure per VMLR, limiting the quality and quantity of reintegration support, further limited female ex-combatants’ skills, as well as choice and control over their lives (empowerment-as-power-to). Lastly, NCDDRR officials were marginalized in the LDDRR, making it difficult for them to challenge the predominant narrative of female ex-combatants as victims. Nonetheless, these NCDDRR officials, alongside other LDDRR officials, adapted the daughters narrative to local norms, ignoring child protection training and reproducing gendered vulnerabilities in the process. These
271 gendered narratives, produced and reproduced by different actors, and the resulting hybridities in UN-led DDR have therefore undermined female ex-combatants’ empowerment. The Conclusion elaborates on the implications of these arguments for both academic literature and UN-led DDR policy and programming.
272 Conclusion
This thesis started out by discussing the following ‘research puzzle’: female combatants experience empowerment during conflict, but this empowerment is often lost once conflict has ceased. I argued that it is therefore important to analyze reintegration as the process which seeks to transform combatants into civilians. I chose to focus especially on the reintegration phase of DDR, as this is the main phase to conduct this ‘social engineering’ of ex-combatants and has the biggest implications for female ex-combatants’ empowerment. Nonetheless, I acknowledged that reintegration cannot be fully untangled from the disarmament and demobilization (DD) phases of DDR, as these DD phases determine who participates and how this participation is designed and implemented in UN- led DDR. To conduct this research, I chose the case studies of Liberia and Nepal: Liberia, because it was the first DDR program to have a mandate on the inclusion of female ex- combatants, and Nepal because it has the highest participation of female ex-combatants to date. The specific research question this thesis addressed is: In what ways have UN-led
DDR programs, particularly the reintegration aspect, supported or undermined female ex- combatants’ empowerment in Liberia and Nepal?
The main argument of this thesis is that female ex-combatants in Liberia and Nepal often experienced empowerment through their role as combatant (albeit to varying extends), but that this empowerment is largely undermined through reintegration, to which
UN-led DDR contributes. To arrive at this overall conclusion, I made three interrelated arguments. Firstly, female combatants often experienced empowerment during conflict, although there were differences among, within, and between female combatants in Liberia and Nepal. The nature of the conflict shapes in what ways and to what extent female ex- combatants may experience empowerment. For instance, my research generated more examples of female combatants’ empowerment in Nepal; a consequence of the Maoist
273 nature of the conflict, which sought to address gendered inequalities. Secondly, I argued that most of this empowerment was lost upon reintegration, but again, there were differences among, between, and within female ex-combatants in Liberia and Nepal.
Particularly, reintegration supported the empowerment of a few high-ranking female ex- combatants in Nepal, while for most other female ex-combatants, reintegration served to undermine their empowerment. Lastly, I contended that UN-led DDR undermined female ex-combatants’ empowerment in Liberia and Nepal through gendered narratives and multiple hybridities in UN-led DDR which have reproduced gendered inequalities, thereby undermining female ex-combatants’ empowerment. The following sections reflect on three central themes of my thesis: reintegration and DDR, empowerment, and an emancipatory peace. In doing so, this chapter elaborates on the contributions this thesis makes to academic scholarship.
Reintegration and DDR
A key theme this thesis has focused on is that of reintegration and UN-led DDR. In doing so, this thesis contributes to feminist literature on reintegration and DDR (Basini 2013ab,
2016, Jennings 2007, 2008ab, 2009, MacKenzie 2008, 2012, Farr 2000, 2003, 2007,
Kingma 1997, 2002) by arguing that gendered narratives and multiple hybridities in UN- led DDR have undermined female ex-combatants’ empowerment. As argued, UN-led DDR undermined female ex-combatants’ empowerment through gendered narratives (as victims, threats, wives, mothers, and daughters) in UN-led DDR, stripping female ex-combatants of their agency and reproducing gendered inequalities. These gendered narratives have been produced, reproduced, and adapted by local and international DDR officials and officials working for national DDR bodies. The resulting hybridities in UN-led DDR have further undermined female ex-combatants’ empowerment. In making these arguments, this thesis has drawn on critical feminist peacebuilding scholarship on liberal peacebuilding,
274 narratives, and hybridities (Shepherd 2007, 2008b, 2010b, 2011, 2016b, 2017,
Puechguirbal 2010a, Puechguirbal& Enloe 2004, McEvoy 2010, Björkdahl 2012, McLeod
2015, Partis-Jennings 2017, Kappler 2013, Björkdahl 2012, Björkdahl& Selimovic 2015,
2016, Wallis et al 2018). This thesis has therefore contributed to feminist literature on female ex-combatants and reintegration by drawing and expanding on critical feminist peacebuilding insights on liberal peacebuilding to analyze how UN-led DDR has undermined female ex-combatants’ empowerment.
Empowerment
Empowerment is a second central theme of this thesis. This thesis has contributed to feminist literature on empowerment in three ways. Firstly, this thesis has elaborated on literature and female ex-combatants and their empowerment is Liberia (Basini 2013b, 2016,
Fuest 2008, Jennings 2007, 2008bc, 2009, Specht 2006, Utas 2005b), as well as Nepal
(Manchanda 2001, 2004, 2005, 2010ab, Bleie et al 2012, Subedi 2014, Shawna 2015) by analyzing female ex-combatants’ experiences of empowerment in relation to reintegration and UN-led DDR. Secondly, analyzing female ex-combatants’ experiences of combatanthood, reintegration, and UN-led DDR through the ‘window’ of empowerment has highlighted the temporality of these different forms of power, demonstrating that some forms of empowerment (e.g. empowerment-as-power-over, empowerment-as-power-to) may be more slippery than others (e.g. empowerment-as-power-within). For female ex- combatants to maintain such forms of empowerment, targeted support is needed, for example through UN-led DDR. Thirdly, this thesis has highlighted that some forms of empowerment can directly contribute to female ex-combatants’ reintegration, such as skills
(empowerment-as-power-to). Empowerment-as-power-with in the form of challenging unequal gendered power relations can furthermore contribute to the building of an emancipatory peace, making it imperative for UN-led DDR to support this form of
275 empowerment. This thesis has therefore contributed to feminist literature on female ex- combatants and their empowerment in three ways: 1. Empirically, through interviews and fieldwork; 2. By highlighting the temporality of different forms of empowerment; and 3.
By illustrating that some forms of empowerment can contribute to building an emancipatory peace.
Towards an Emancipatory Peace
A third theme I want to reflect on here to conclude this thesis is that of an emancipatory peace. As Chapter 2 discussed, my critical feminist peacebuilding perspective envisions an emancipatory peace, which entails the absence of structural violence, and challenges unequal gendered power relations. As discussed in Chapter 5, the majority of female ex- combatants in Liberia and Nepal accessing the respective DDR programs have reintegrated poorly in economic, social, and political terms. Chapter 6 elaborated on this, contending that multiple gendered narratives and hybridities in UN-led DDR have reproduced gendered inequalities and contributed to this poor reintegration of female ex-combatants.
This has implications for the building of an emancipatory peace. Firstly, there remains a danger that conflict will return as many female ex-combatants are willing to pick up arms again as long as their diversity of needs are not met. Others remain ready to fight should conflict return. That is not to say that ex-combatants are necessarily inclined to continued violence; rather, as Themnér (2011:1ff) reminds us, ex-combatants have the skills and potential networks needed to escalate violence. As argued throughout this thesis, female ex-combatants have grievances that motivated them to fight in the first place; providing political reintegration support might reduce the likelihood of renewed conflict as ex- combatants are enabled to address their grievances through peaceful means. The ‘peace’ that exists in Liberia and Nepal very much remains a ‘gendered peace’ (Pankhurst 2007,
Brock-Utne 1990:147), to which UN-led DDR contributed.
276 Until UN-led DDR begins to take seriously female ex-combatants’ empowerment and challenges rather than reproduced gendered inequalities, an emancipatory peace will remain elusive. This is paradoxical, because the UN is (at least rhetorically) committed to both peace and gender equality (IDRRS 2006). Failing to take seriously female ex- combatants’ empowerment and building on this in UN-led DDR is at odds with the UN’s own goals of peace and gender equality. This happens for two main reasons. Firstly, female ex-combatants frequently have political motivations and/or grievances that push them to join armed groups in search of empowerment. Particularly, female ex-combatants in Liberia and Nepal joined armed groups in search of collective security or to challenge gendered inequalities (empowerment-as-power-with). Failing to consider and address these political motivations and grievances potentially means that even a negative peace remains elusive, as female ex-combatants remain inclined to pick up arms again (Chapter 5).
Secondly, female ex-combatants may have developed awareness of gendered inequalities and a voice to address these inequalities, either individually (empowerment-as-power- within) or collectively (empowerment-as-power-with). Transforming such empowerment through UN-led DDR can provide an opportunity for female ex-combatants to contribute to an emancipatory peace. For UN-led DDR to contribute to the building of an emancipatory peace, it therefore needs to take seriously and build on female ex-combatants’ empowerment. The following paragraphs provide policy recommendations for UN-led
DDR to contribute to the building of emancipatory peace.
Policy Recommendations
To realize the ‘transformatory potential’ of DDR and to contribute to an emancipatory peace, this thesis makes various policy recommendations. Firstly, this research affirms earlier literature on female ex-combatants and DDR that female ex- combatants should be given equal opportunities to participate in UN-led DDR (MacKenzie
277 2010, 2012, Farr 2000, 2002, 2003, 2007, Mazurana& McKay 2003, McKay& Mazurana
2004). Female ex-combatants in Liberia and Nepal remained excluded from UN-led DDR based on their gender, either directly or structurally (Puechguirbal 2010b, Mazurana&
Carlson 2004, Basini 2013ab, 2016, Specht 2006). While there are considerable improvements between the LDDRR and the UNIRP, as Chapter 5 discussed, many female ex-combatants in Nepal were still ‘missing’ from the UNIRP.
Beyond participation, UN-led DDR should also ensure that at a minimum, gendered inequalities are not reproduced, but rather seek to challenge such inequalities.
This thesis contended that all reintegration aspects (economic, social, and political) have reproduced such gendered inequalities. UN-led DDR in Liberia and Nepal have reproduced female ex-combatants primarily as wives, daughters, and mothers, often placing the full responsibilities of reproductive labor on female ex-combatants whilst absolving male ex- combatants and male partners of these responsibilities. Not only do such approaches fail to acknowledge and envision different labor division configurations, this gendered division of labor also impacts female ex-combatants’ productive labor. Time and time again, my interviews provided examples where female ex-combatants were unable to pursue employment because of their reproductive labor commitments. Where they were able to pursue this, the only options for economic reintegration support realistically available to them were also based on a gendered division of labor which constructs male partners as primary breadwinner while female ex-combatants’ income is constructed as supplementary in the form of low-income jobs. DDR officials actively introduced such gendered division of labor in economic reintegration support in the LDDRR. In the UNIRP, such gendered divisions of labor were structurally reproduced by failing to capitalize on the post-conflict moment to challenge unequal gendered power relations. Without taking into consideration this potential ‘double burden’ of productive and reproductive labor, economic reintegration
278 support may be of little benefit to either female ex-combatants or economic recovery in the post-conflict environment.
A second policy implication is the need to move beyond oversimplified narratives of female ex-combatants as either victims of conflict, threats, or even potential peacebuilders. Such dichotomies neither capture realities on the ground, nor do they contribute to female ex-combatants’ reintegration and the building of an emancipatory peace. There is a need for UN-led DDR to avoid relying on unfounded assumptions and shift to recognition of and building on individual contexts. Chiefly, this involves identifying any agency female ex-combatants may have already exercised or gained during conflict (i.e. empowerment), ranging from power over, power, to, power within, and power with. While some forms of empowerment (i.e. power over) may require concerted efforts to transform female ex-combatants into peaceable citizens, other forms of empowerment
(e.g. power to, power within) may largely contribute to reintegration of female ex- combatants. Additionally, empowerment-as-power-with provides opportunities to challenge gendered inequalities at a societal level. There is therefore potential to transform and build on these forms of empowerment. Moreover, transforming empowerment and the reintegration of female ex-combatants needs to consider the individual context of female ex-combatants, their empowerment, and their reintegration. As this thesis argued, female ex-combatants may experience empowerment to different extents and in different ways, and the contexts of their reintegration (e.g. education, location of reintegration, marital status, parenthood status) influence empowerment and reintegration. It is therefore imperative that DDR transforms any empowerment of female ex-combatants to benefit the female ex-combatants, their reintegration, and peacebuilding, whilst taking into account the diversity of female ex-combatants’ individual contexts for reintegration.
279 A third policy implication is that of political reintegration. As this thesis contended, political reintegration is crucial in transforming potentially violent female ex-combatants into peaceable citizens, contributing to an emancipatory peace. This is because political reintegration has the potential to address female ex-combatants’ grievances and motivations for conflict participation to a much greater extent than either economic and social reintegration support (cf. Chapter 1). In fact, economic and social reintegration aimed at female ex-combatants may cause further grievances, for example by not provided toolkits and sustainable employment or by reinforcing gendered inequalities (Chapter 5).
However, for political reintegration support to benefit female ex-combatants, it is essential that political reintegration and peacebuilding labor does not add to the ‘double burden’ of productive and reproductive labor by challenging rather than reinforcing gendered responsibilities and norms.
Further Research
Notably, DDR is not the only peacebuilding process to engage with female ex- combatants, and other closely-related processes likely have implications for female ex- combatants’ empowerment, reintegration, and the building of an emancipatory peace. To further our understanding of female ex-combatants’ empowerment and to contribute to an emancipatory peace, further research into peacebuilding practices and gender from a critical feminist peacebuilding perspective is needed.
One such an opportunity for further research is male ex-combatants and DDR. To recall, Jennings (2009:475) argued that DDR programs are coded ‘default male’, i.e. geared towards male ex-combatants as the ‘real fighters’ of conflict. However, this may not mean that male ex-combatants automatically benefit or even benefit comparatively more than female ex-combatants. As discussed in Chapter 6, female ex-combatants were reproduced as victims primarily responsible for reproductive labor, while male ex-
280 combatants were reproduced as perpetrators and as primary breadwinner. In this perspective of male ex-combatants, they were not seen as (potential) parents, therefore excluding them from gender support in Nepal or family planning training in Liberia. This indicated that UN-led DDR reproduces gendered inequalities, norms, and responsibilities for male and female ex-combatants, which may be detrimental to both. Nor do these narratives provide space for male ex-combatants who have been victimized during conflict, which too often goes unacknowledged and unaddressed (cf. Kirby 2019, Sivakumaran
2005, 2007, Johnson et al 2008, Dolan 2014, Schulz 2016, 2018). The ‘transformative potential’ of DDR remains unfulfilled as long as the gendered implications of DDR for male ex-combatants are not also addressed, both in their own right, and in their potential implications for female ex-combatants.
Another opportunity for further research is the overlap between DDR and other peacebuilding practices, and their implications for female ex-combatants and an emancipatory peace. While DDR is the main peacebuilding practice to concern itself with ex-combatants, other peacebuilding and security practices may have further significant implications for female ex-combatants and their empowerment. Peace negotiations as one such practice are instrumental in this, as they frequently set parameters for DDR (Berdal&
Ucko 2009, 2013, Muggah& Baaré 2009, Subedi 2013ab, 2014:674). However, female ex- combatants, and women and women’s organizations more broadly remain excluded from peace negotiations, including in Liberia (Schnabel& Farr 2012:90) and Nepal (Abdela
2011:71, Upreti 2012:102). The exclusion of female ex-combatants from peace negotiations in Nepal was explained by a male Maoist ex-combatant: “Women are by nature peaceful. It is very natural for them not to get involved in formal peace making since they cannot negotiate peace. […] Negotiation is a tough process.” (Shekhawat et al
2015:62). Gendered assumptions and narratives therefore already appear to play a role at
281 peace negotiations, likely influencing the extent to which female ex-combatants would be able to assert themselves and their interests. Female ex-combatants’ participation in peace negotiations alone therefore is unlikely to determine to what extent DDR is set up to support female ex-combatants’ reintegration and empowerment; however, given the importance of peace negotiations in shaping DDR, addressing this gap in research would further enable critical feminist peacebuilding scholarship in transforming DDR and to building an emancipatory peace.
A further peacebuilding practice is Security Sector Reform (SSR). There is increased recognition for the need to consider DDR and SSR in tandem (cf. IDDRS 2014,
Schnabel& Farr 2012:201, Porter 2018:330). SSR in particular has been critiqued for its lack of attention to gender, although there is increased attention to women in relation to
SSR, at least at the policy level (Farr 2007, Hudson 2010b:106, Kunz 2014, Mobekk
2010:288, Schnabel &Farr 2012:85). The inclusion of female ex-combatants in SSR has been extremely limited. Exceptions include the SSR process in Timor-Leste, where female ex-combatants were increasingly permitted to joining security institutions (UNDPKO
2010a:25) and the inclusion of female ex-combatants in the security sector in Nepal, as discussed in this thesis. However, as Chapter 5 discussed, less than 100 female ex- combatants were eventually integrated into the new Nepal Army, disproportionally less than male ex-combatants. Particularly female ex-combatants who were pregnant, breastfeeding, or had recently given birth were directly excluded from army integration
(Bleie et al 2012:18, Bogati 2014:10, Dhungana 2007:70ff, Martin 2010:117ff), while other female ex-combatants were structurally excluded because they resumed the role of primary parent as combatant-husbands joined the Nepal Army (Chapter 5) or because female ex-combatants feared (sexual) violence (Saferworld 2010:13) and retributions
(INT9) if they were to join the Nepal Army. While the SSR process in Nepal may be
282 lauded from a critical feminist peacebuilding perspective for being a ‘homegrown’ process
(Upreti 2012:102), this has seemingly not supported the empowerment of female ex- combatants. SSR therefore is closely related to DDR, making it a practice necessary to analyze through feminist lenses.
DDR further overlaps with transitional justice processes, such as Truth and
Reconciliation Commissions (TRCs). All too frequently considered in isolation, Patel
(2009:255ff) argues that ex-combatants may avoid participation in DDR if they fear prosecution, but that TRCs can also offer an opportunity to take responsibility for their actions and apologize, thereby facilitating their social reintegration. Nonetheless, female ex-combatants are often excluded from TRCs, as was the case in South Africa (Modise in
Farr 2000:28). Furthermore, transitional justice processes are often criticized for reproducing rather than challenging gendered inequalities (cf. Baker& Obradovic-Wocknik
2016, Björkdahl et al 2015:167f, Maddison& Shepherd 2014, O’Reilly 2016). In Nepal, ex-combatants participated in the TRC, although there is no specific mandate on ex- combatants or even the use of child ex-combatants in the Nepali TRC (INT11). An NGO official (INT8) I interviewed raised serious concerns regarding the inclusivity and particularly the victim-friendliness of the TRC process, arguing that victims’ groups are excluded from the TRC process, the TRC is only using one survey, and there were no safe spaces for conducting surveys. Lastly, the TRC is still ongoing, more than 12 years after the Comprehensive Peace Agreement was signed. Transitional justice processes may therefore support or undermine female ex-combatants’ reintegration and can have implications for building an emancipatory peace. To build an emancipatory peace, it is therefore important to scrutinize transitional justice processes in relation to DDR through feminist lenses.
283 Concluding Remarks
This Conclusion has reflected on three central themes to this thesis: reintegration and DDR, empowerment, and an emancipatory peace. In doing do, this Conclusion has sought to highlight my contributions to academic literature on female ex-combatants and their empowerment, reintegration, and UN-led DDR. Specifically, this Conclusion has stressed that the extent to which and in what ways female ex-combatants experience empowerment is shaped by their respective contexts, including the aims of particular armed groups and the nature of conflict. Through the case studies and their insights on female ex-combatants’ empowerment in relation to reintegration and UN-led DDR, this thesis has contributed to feminist literature on female ex-combatants and their empowerment, as well as feminist literature on DDR. It is my hope that by contributing to the ongoing conversation on female ex-combatants, DDR, and peacebuilding, my research and the experiences and narratives of female ex-combatants reflected in this thesis will contribute to DDR and peacebuilding’s ‘transformatory potential’ by reimagining DDR through feminist lenses.
284 Bibliography
Abdela, Lesley, 2011, “Nepal and the Implementation of UNSCR 1325,” in Olonisakin, ‘Funmi; Karen Barnes; Eka Ikpe (eds), Women, Peace and Security: Translating Policy Into Practice, London: Routledge. Abels, Gabriele; Maria Behrens, 2009, “Interviewing Experts In Political Science: A Reflection On Gender And Policy Effects Based On Secondary Analysis,” In Bogner, Alexander; Beate Littig; Wolfgang Menz (eds.), Interviewing Experts. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Aboagye, Festus; Alhaji Bah, 2004, “Liberia at a Crossroads: A Preliminary Look at the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) and the Protection of Civilians,” ISS Paper 95. Abramowitz, Sharon Alane, 2014, Searching for Normal in the Wake of the Liberian War, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. Abramowitz, Sharon; Mary Moran, 2012, “International Human Rights, Gender-Based Violence, and Local Discourses of Abuse in Post-conflict Liberia: A Problem of 'Culture'?” African Studies Review, 55:2, 119-146. Acker, Joan; Kate Barry; Joke Esseveld, 1983, “Objectivity and Truth: Problems in Doing Feminist Research,” Women’s Studies International Forum, 6:4, 423-435. ActionAid, 2013, Making Care Visible: Women’s Unpaid Care Work in Nepal, Nigeria, Uganda, and Kenya, Johannesburg: ActionAid. Addis, Elizabetta, 1994, “Women And The Economic Consequences Of Being A Soldier,” in Elizabetta Addis, Valeria E. Russo and Lorenza Sebesta (eds), Women Soldiers: Images and Realities, London: Macmillan/St Martin's Press, 3-27. Adhikari, Deepak, 2014, “Commander Asmita’s Many Battles,” The Kathmandu Post, 27 November 2014, http://kathmandupost.ekantipur.com/printedition/news/2014-12- 26/commander-asmitas-many-battles.html, [accessed 30/03/2016]. Adhikari, Deepak, 2016a, “A Deft Defense,” in Murthy, Laxmi; Mitu Varma (eds), Garrisoned Minds: Women and Armed Conflict in South Asia, New Delhi: Speaking Tiger, 110-127 Adhikari, Deepak, 2016b, From Maoist Commander to Social Worker, the Remarkable Journey of Comrade Asmita, The Wire, 30/07/2016, https://thewire.in/10086/comrade-asmita/, [accessed 07/09/2016]. Ahmed, Dunya Ahmed Abdulla, Gillian Lewand Hundt; Clare Blackburn, 2011, “Issues of Gender, Reflexivity and Positionality in the Field of Disability: Researching Visual Impairment in an Arab Society,” Qualitative Social Work, 10:4, 467–484. Alden Chris; Minika Thakur; Matthew Arnold, 2011, Militias and the Challenges of Post- Conflict Peace: Silencing the Guns, London: Zed Books. Alexander, Ronni, 2009, “Costly Development? Gendered Insecurity in a Militarized Pacific,” in Leckie, Jacqueline (ed), Development in an Insecure and Gendered World: The Relevance of the Millennium Goals, Surrey: Ashgate, 113-138. Alexander, Ronni, 2019, “Gender, Structural Violence, and Peace,” in Gentry, Caron; Laura Shepherd; Laura Sjoberg (eds), The Routledge Handbook of Gender and Security, London: Routledge, 27-36.
285 Alison, Miranda, 2004, “Women as Agents of Political Violence: Gendering Security,” Security Dialogue, 35:4, 447-463. Alison, Miranda, 2009, Women and Political Violence: Female Combatants in Ethno- National Conflict, London: Routledge. Allen, Amy, 2008, The Politics of Our Selves: Power, Autonomy, and Gender in Contemporary Critical Theory, New York: Columbia University Press. Allport, Gordon, 1954, The Nature of Prejudice, Cambridge: Addison-Wesley. Amnesty International, 1997, Nepal: Human Rights Violations in the Context of the Maoist People’s War, AI Index: ASA 31/001/1997, London: Amnesty International. Amnesty International, 2002, Nepal: A Deeping Human Rights Crisis, AI Index: ASA 31/072/2002, London: Amnesty International. Amnesty International, 2008, Liberia: A Flawed Post-War Process Discriminates Against Women and Girls, London: Amnesty International. Anderson, Mary, 1999, Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace – or War, Boulder: Lynne Rienner. Anderson, Mary, 2005, “Humanitarian NGOs in Conflict Intervention,” in Crocker, Chester A.; Fen Osler Hampson; Pamela Aall (eds.), Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict, Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 637-648. Ansahta Garnett, Tanya, 2016, “Ellen is Our Man: Perceptions of Gender in Postconflict Liberian Politics,” International Feminist Journal of Politics, 18:1, 99-118. Anthias, Floya; Nira Yuval-Davis, 1992, Racialized Boundaries: Race, Nation, Gender, Color and Class and the Anti-Racist Struggle, London: Routledge. Arendell, Terry, 1997, “Reflections On The Researcher-Researched Relationship: A Woman Interviewing Men” Qualitative Sociology, 20, 341-368. Aryal, Archana, 2010, “Bullets to Ballots: Participation of Maoist Women in the Parliament and the Government of Nepal after the People’s Movement 2006,” Saarbrücken: LAMBERT Academic Publishing. Ashcroft, Bill; Gareth Griffiths; Helen Tiffin, 2000, Post-Colonial Studies: The Key Concepts, Oxon: Routledge. Atehortúa, Adrián, 2019, “La Roja, La Cerveza de Los Excombatientes de Las Farc,” Hacemos Memoria, 26 January 2019, http://hacemosmemoria.org/2019/01/26/la- roja-cerveza-excombatientes-farc/, [accessed 21/03/2019]. Atuesta, Maria, 2019, Colombia’s Peace Experiment: ‘Collective Reincorporation’: Many Ex-Combatants are Sticking Together to Build Communities Rather than Demobilize on their Own, 11 February 2019, https://www.usip.org/blog/2019/02/colombias-peace-experiment-collective- reincorporation, [accessed 16/04/2019]. Auchter, Jessica, 2012, “Gendering Terror,” International Feminist Journal of Politics, 14:1, 121-139. Autesserre, Séverine, 2010, The Trouble With the Congo: Local Violence and the Failure of International Peacebuilding, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Autesserre, Séverine, 2014, Peaceland: Conflict Resolution and the Everyday Politics of International Intervention, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014.
286 Aylra, Mallika, 2007, A Tale of Two MPs, Nepali Times, 30 March 2007, http://nepalitimes.com/news.php?id=13389#.WobsEWacZsM, [accessed 16/02/2018]. Baaré, Anton, 2004, An Analysis of Transitional Economic Reintegration, Stockholm: Swedish Initiative for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (SIDDR). Baaz, Maria Eriksson; Maria Stern, 2009, “Why Do Soldiers Rape? Masculinity, Violence, and Sexuality in the Armed Forces in the Congo (DRC),” International Studies Quarterly, 53:2, 495-518. Baaz, Maria Eriksson; Maria Stern, 2013, Sexual Violence as a Weapon of War? Perceptions, Prescriptions, Problems in the Congo and Beyond, London: Zed Books. Baaz, Maria Eriksson; Maria Stern, 2014, “Understanding Sexual Violence in Conflict and Post-Conflict Settings,” in Evans, Mary; Clare Hemmings; Marsha Henry; Hazel Johnstone; Sumi Madhok; Ania Plomien; Sadie Wearing (eds.), The Sage Handbook of Feminist Theory, Los Angeles: Sage, 585-605. Baaz, Maria Eriksson; Maria Stern, 2016, “Researching Wartime Rape in the Democratic Republic of Congo: A Methodology of Unease,” in Wibben, Annick (ed), Researching War: Feminist Methods, Ethics and Politics, Oxon: Routledge, 163- 184. Baker, Catherine; Jelena Obradovic-Wochnik, 2016, “Mapping the Nexus of Transitional Justice and Peacebuilding,” Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, 10:3, 281- 301. Bakker, Isabella; Stephen Gill, 2003, “Ontology, Method, and Hypotheses,” in Bakker, Isabella; Stephen Gill (eds.), Power, Production, and Social Reproduction, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 17-41. Barkawi, Tarak; Mark Laffy, 2001, “The International Relations Of Democracy, Liberalism And War,” in Barkawi, Tarak; Mark Laffy, (eds), Democracy, Liberalism and War: Rethinking the Democratic Peace Debate, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1-25. Barnes, Karen, 2006, Reform or More of the Same? Gender Mainstreaming and the Changing Nature of UN Peace Operations’, Toronto: York Centre for International and Security Studies, Working Paper 41. Barth, Elise Fredrikke, 2002, Peace as Disappointment: The Reintegration of Female Soldiers in Post-Conflict Societies: A Comparative Study from Africa, Oslo: PRIO. Basini, Helen, 2013a, “Gender Mainstreaming Unraveled: The Case of DDRR in Liberia,” International Interactions, 39:4, 535-557. Basini, Helen, 2013b, An Imperfect Reality: Gender Mainstreaming and Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation and Reintegration (DDRR) in Liberia, Limerick: University of Limerick, PhD Thesis. Basini, Helen, 2016, “Doing No Harm: Methodological and Ethical Challenges of Working With Women Associated with Fighting Forces/Ex-Combatants in Liberia,” in Wibben, Annick (ed), Researching War: Feminist Methods, Ethics and Politics, Oxon: Routledge, 163-184.
287 Basu, Amrita, 2010, “Globalization of the Local/Localization of the Global: Mapping Transnational Women’s Movements,” in McCann, Carole; Seung-kyung Kim (eds), Feminist Theory Reader: Local and Global Perspectives, New York: Routledge, 69-79. Basu, Soumita; João Nunes, 2013, “Security as Emancipation,” in Shepherd, Laura (ed), Critical Approaches to Security: An Introduction to Theories and Methods, London: Routledge. Batliwala Srilatha, 1993, Empowerment of Women in South Asia: Concepts and Practices. : Mumbai: Asian-South Pacific Bureau of Adult Education. Batliwala, Srilatha, 2007, “Taking the Power Out of Empowerment: An Experiential Account,” Development in Practice, 17:4/5, 557-565. Batliwala, Srilatha; Deepa Shanraj, 2007, “Gender Myths that Instrumentalize Women: A View From the Indian Front Line,” in Cornwall, Andrea; Elizabeth Harrison; Ann Whitehead (eds), Feminisms in Development: Contradictions, Contestations and Challenges, London: Zed Books, 21-34. Bedford, Kate; Shirin Rai, 2010, “Feminists Theorize International Political Economy,” Signs, 36:1, 1-18. Beetham, Gwendolyn; Justina Demetriades, 2007, “Feminist Research Methodologies and Development: Overview and Practical Application,” Gender and Development, 15:2, 199-216. Beginkhani, Nazand; Wendelmoet Hamelink; Nerina Weiss, 2018, “Theorizing Women and War in Kurdistan: A Feminist and Critical Perspective,” Kurdish Studies, 1, 5- 30. Bellamy, Alex; Paul Williams, 2007, Peace Operations and Global Order, London: Routledge. Berdal, Mats, 1996, Disarmament and Demobilization after Civil Wars: Arms, Soldiers and the Termination of Armed Conflicts, Adelphi Paper 303, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Berdal, Mats; David Malone (eds), 2000, Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars, Boulder: Lynne Rienner. Berdal, Mats; David Ucko, 2009, Reintegrating Armed Groups after Conflict: Politics, Violence and Transition, London: Routledge. Berdal, Mats; David Ucko, 2013, “Introduction to the DDR Forum: Rethinking the Reintegration of Former Combatants,” International Peacekeeping, 20:3, 316-320. Bergeron, Suzanne, “Formal, Informal, and Care Economies,” in Disch, Lisa; Mary Hawkesworth (eds), 2016, The Oxford Dictionary of Feminist Theory, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Bernal, Victoria, 2000, “Equality to Die For?: Women Guerrilla Fighters and Eritrea’s Cultural Revolution,” Political and Legal Anthropology Review, 23:2, 61-76. Best, Amy, 2003, “Doing Race in the Context of Feminist Interviewing: Constructing Whiteness Through Talk,” Qualitative Inquiry, 9:6, 895-914. Beswick, Danielle, Paul Jackson, 2015, Conflict, Security and Development, Oxon: Routledge.
288 Betts, Alexander, 2005, “Should Approaches To Post Conflict Justice And Reconciliation Be Determined Globally, Nationally Locally?” The European Journal of Development Research, 17:4, 735-752. Bhabha, Homi, 1985, “Signs Taken for Wonders: Questions of Ambivalence and Authority under a Tree outside Delhi, May 1817,” Critical Inquiry, 12:1, 144–165. Bhabha, Homi, 1994, The Location of Culture, London: Routledge. Bhatta, Pramod; Lila Adhikari; Manu Thada; Ramesh Rai, 2008, “Structures of Denial: Student Representation in Nepal’s Higher Education,” Studies in Nepali History and Society, 13:2, 235-263. Bhattachan, Krishna, 2001, “Socio-cultural Aspect of Gender Equity/Equality and Democracy in Nepal,” in Manandhar, Laxmi; Krishna Bhattachan (eds.), Gender and Democracy in Nepal, Kathmandu: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 153-167. Bhattarai, Sewa, 2016, “The Battle Within,” in Murthy, Laxmi; Mitu Varma (eds), Garrisoned Minds: Women and Armed Conflict in South Asia, New Delhi: Speaking Tiger, 128-142. Björkdahl, Annika, 2012, “A Gender-Just Peace? Exploring the Post-Dayton Peace Process in Bosnia,” Peace and Change, 37:2, 286-317. Björkdahl, Annika; Johanna Mannegren Selimovic, 2015, “Gendering Agency and Transitional Justice,” Security Dialogue, 46:2, 165-182. Björkdahl, Annika; Johanna Mannegren Selimovic, 2016, “Gender: The Missing Piece in the Peace Puzzle,” in Richmond, Oliver; Sandra Pogodda; Jasmin Ramivić (eds), The Palgrave Handbook of Disciplinary and Regional Approaches to Peace, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 181-192. Björkdahl, Annika; Kristine Höglund, 2013, “Precarious Peacebuilding: Friction in Global- Local Encounters,” Peacebuilding, 1:3, 289-299. Björkdahl, Annika; Stefanie Kappler, 2017, Peacebuilding and Spatial Transformation: Peace, Space, and Place, London: Routledge. Blakely, Ruth, 2013, “Elite Interviews,” in Shepherd, Laura J (ed), Critical Approaches to Security: An Introduction to Theories and Methods, London: Routledge, 158-168. Bleie, Tony; Ramesh Shrestha, 2012, DDR in Nepal: Stakeholder Politics and the Implications for Reintegration as a Process of Disengagement, https://uit.no/Content/307292/Nepal_Report_Final.pdf, [accessed 20/10/2015]. Blommaert, J; Dong Jie, 2010, Ethnographic Fieldwork: A Beginner’s Guide, Bristol: Multilingual Matters. Bogati, Subindra, 2014, “Assessing Inclusivity in the Post-War Army Integration Process in Nepal,” Inclusive Political Settlements Paper, 11, 1-15. Bookman, Ann; Sandra Morgen (eds.), 1988, Women and the Politics of Empowerment, Philadelphia: Temple University Press. Booth, Ken, 1991, “Security and Emancipation,” Review of International Studies, 17:4, 313-326. Bop, Codou, 2002, “Women in Conflicts, Their Gains and Their Losses,” in Meintjes, Sheila; Anu Pillay; Meredeth Turshen (eds.), The Aftermath: Women in Post- Conflict Transformation, London: Zed Books, 19-34. Boserup, Ester, 1970, Women’s Role in Economic Development, London: Allen and Unwin.
289 Bouatta, Cherifa, 1994, “Feminine Militancy: Moudjahidates During and After the Algerian War,” in Moghadam, V (ed.), Gender and National Identity: Women and Politics in Muslim Societies, London: Zed Books. Boucher, Anna, 2017, “Power in Elite Interviewing: Lessons from Feminist Studies for Political Science,” Women’s Studies International Forum, 62, 99-106. Boulding, Elise, 1977, Women in the Twentieth Century World, New York: Sage Publications. Bourke, Brian, 2014, “Positionality: Reflecting on the Research Process,” The Qualitative Report, 19:33, 1-9. Boutron, Camille; Diane Gómez, 2017, From Rifles to Aprons? The Challenges of Reincorporating Colombia’s Female ex-combatants into Civilian and Political Life, 08/03/2017, https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/latamcaribbean/2017/03/08/from-rifles-to- aprons-the-challenges-of-reincorporating-colombias-female-ex-combatants-into- civilian-and-political-life/, [accessed 18/03/2019]. Bowd, Richard, 2008, “From Combatant to Civilian: The Social Reintegration of Ex- Combatants in Rwanda and the Implications for Social Capital and Reconciliation,” PhD Thesis, York: University of York. Bowd, Richard; Alpaslan Özerdem, 2013, “How to Assess Social Reintegration of Ex- Combatants,” Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, 7:4, 453-475. Brock-Utne, Birgit, 1985, Educating for Peace, New York: Pergamon Press. Brock-Utne, Birgit, 1989, Feminist Perspectives on Peace and Peace Education, New York: Pergamon Press. Brock-Utne, Birgit, 1990, “Feminist Perspectives on Peace,” in Smoker, Paul; Ruth Davies; Barbara Munske (eds), A Reader in Peace Studies, Oxford: Pergamon Press, 144- 150. Brock-Utne, Birgit, 2000, “An Analysis of Peace and Development Studies As Well As Peace Education from A Feminist Perspective,” in Tryggestad, Torunn L.; Kari Karamé; Torunn L. Tryggestad; Kari Karamé (eds), Gender Perspectives on Peace and Conflict Studies, Oslo: NUPI & PRIO. Broom, Alex; Kelly Hand; Philip Tovey, 2009, “The Role of Gender, Environment and Individual Biography in Shaping Qualitative Interview Data,” International Journal of Social Research Methodology, 12:1, 51-65. Brown, Grace; Deborah Western; Janice Pascal, 2013, “Using the F-Word; Feminist Epistemologies and Postgraduate Research,” Journal of Women and Social Work, 28:4, 440-450. Brown, Sarah, 1989, “Feminism, International Theory and International Relations of Gender Inequality,” Millennium, 17:3, 461-475. Brunson, Jan, 2016, Planning Families in Nepal: Global and Local Projects of Reproduction, New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press. Burguieres, Mary, 1990, “Feminist Approaches to Peace: Another Step for Peace Studies,” Millennium, 19:1, 1-18. Bystydzienski, Jill (ed.), 1992, Women Transforming Politics: Worldwide Strategies for Empowerment, Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
290 Cain, Harriet; Nira Yuval-Davis, 1990, “The Equal Opportunities Community and Anti- Racist Struggle,” Critical Social Policy, 10:29, 5-26. Call, Charles, 2010, “Liberia’s War Recurrence: Grievance over Greed,” Civil Wars, 12:4, 347-369. Campbell, D’Ann, 1990, “The Regimented Women of World War II,” in Elsthain, Jean Bethke; Sheila Tobias (eds.), Women, Militarism, and War, Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield. Campbell, Rebecca; Sharon Wasco, 2000, “Feminist Approaches to Social Science: Epistemological and Methodological Tenets,” American Journal of Community Psychology, 28, 778-791. Caprioli, Mary Mark Boyer, 2001, “Gender, Violence, and International Crisis,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 45:4, 503–518. Carpenter, Charli, 2005, “Women, Children and Other Vulnerable Groups,” International Studies Quarterly, 49, 297-299. Carpenter, Charli, 2006, Innocent Women and Children, Gender, Norms and the Protection of Civilians, Burlington, VT: Ashgate. Carreiras, Helena, 2006, Gender and The Military: Women In The Armed Forces Of Western Democracies. Abingdon: Routledge. Chacko, Elizabeth, 2004, “Positionality and Praxis: Fieldwork Experiences in Rural India,” Singapore Journal of Tropical Geography, 25:1, 51-63. Chandler, David, 1998, “Democratization in Bosnia: The Limits of Civil Society Building Strategies,” Democratization, 5:4, 1998, 78-102. Chandler, David, 2006, Empire in Denial: The Politics of Statebuilding, London: Pluto Press Chandler, David, 2008, “Post-Conflict Statebuilding: Governance Without Government,” in Pugh, Michael; Neil Cooper; Mandy Turner (eds), Whose Peace? Critical Perspectives on the Political Economy of Peacebuilding, Palgrave Macmillan, London, 337-355 Chandler, David, 2013, “Peacebuilding and the Politicis of Non-Linearity: Rethinking ‘Hidden’ Agency and ‘Resistance’,” Peacebuilding, 1:1, 17-32. Chandler, David, 2017, Peacebuilding: The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1997-2017, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Charlesworth, Hilary, 2005, “Not Waving But Drowning: Gender Mainstreaming and Human Rights in the United Nations,” Harvard Human Rights Journal, 18, 1-18. Chinkin, Christine, 2004, “Gender, International Legal Framework and Peace-Building,” in Karamé, Kari (ed), Gender and Peace Building in Africa, Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 2004. CIA, 2011, Nepal, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world- factbook/geos/np.html, [accessed 18/09/2018]. CIA, 2018, Liberia, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world- factbook/geos/li.html, [accessed 18/09/2018]. Clair, Robin Patric, 1998, Organizing Silence. A World of Possibilities, Albany: State University of New York Press.
291 Cockburn, Cynthia, 2004, “The Continuum of Violence: A Gender Perspective on War and Peace,” in Giles, Wenona; Jennifer Hyndman, Sites of Violence: Gender and Conflict Zones, Berkeley: University of California Press. Cockburn, Cynthia, 2007, From Where We Stand: War, Women’s Activism and Feminist Analysis, London: Zed Books. Cockburn, Cynthia, 2010b, “Militarism and War,” in Shepherd, Laura (ed.), Gender Matters in Global Politics: A Feminist Introduction to International Relations, London: Routledge, 105-115. Cockburn, Cynthia; Dubravka Zarkov, 2002, The Postwar Moment: Militaries, Masculinities And International Peacekeeping, London: Lawrence & Wishart. Cohen, Dana Kay; Ragnhild Nordås, “Do States Delegate Shameful Violence to Militias? Patterns of Sexual Violence in Recent Armed Conflicts,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 59:5, 877-898. Cohen, Dara Kay, 2013, “Female Combatants and the Perpetration of Violence: Wartime Rape in the Sierra Leone Civil War,” World Politics, 65:3, 383-415. Cohen, Dara Kay, 2017, “The Ties that Bind: How Armed Groups Use Violence to Socialize Fighters,” Journal of Peace Research 54:5, 701-714. Cohn, Carol, 1987, “Sex and Death in the Rational World of Defense Intellectuals,” Signs, 12:4, 687-718. Cohn, Carol, 2006, “Motives and Methods: Using Multi-sited Ethnography to Study US National Security Discourses,” in Ackerly, Brooke; Maria Stern; Jacqui True (eds), Feminist Methodologies for International Relations, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Colletta, Nat; Markus Kostner; Ingo Wiederhofer, 1996, The Transition from War to Peace in Sub-Saharan Africa, Washington: World Bank. Colletta, Nat; Markus Kostner; Ingo Wiederhofer, 2004, “Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration. Lessons and Liabilities in Reconstruction”, in Rotberg, Robert (ed), When States Fail. Causes and Consequences, Princeton: Princeton University Press. Collier, Paul; Anke Hoeffler, 1998, “On Economic Causes of Civil War,” Oxford Economic Papers 50:4, 563-573. Collier, Paul; Anke Hoeffler, 2000, Greed and Grievance in Civil War, Washington DC: World Bank Policy Research Paper 2355. Collier, Paul; Anke Hoeffler, 2004, “Greed and Grievance in Civil War,” Oxford Economic Papers, 56:4, 563-595. Collins, Patricia Hill, 1991, Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness, and the Politics of Empowerment, New York: Routledge. Collins, Patricia Hill, 2000, Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness, and the Politics of Empowerment, New York: Routledge. Collins, Patricia Hill; Silma Bilge, 2016, Intersectionality, Cambridge: Polity. Combahee River Collective, 1978, The Combahee River Statement. Confortini, Catia Cecilia, 2006, “Galtung, Violence, and Gender: The Case for a Peace Studies/Feminism Alliance,” Peace and Change, 31:3, 333-367.
292 Confortini, Catia Cecilia, 2010, “Feminist Contributions and Challenges to Peace Studies,” Oxford Research Encyclopedia, International Studies, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1-33. Connell, Patricia, 1997, “Understanding Victimization And Agency: Considerations Of Race, Class And Gender,”PoLAR: Political and Legal Anthropology Review, 20:2, 115-143. Connell, Raewyn; Rebecca Pears, 2015, Gender in World Perspective, Cambridge: Polity. Cook Burgess, Lauren, 1994, An Uncommon Soldier, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Cooper, Davina, 1994, “Productive, Relational and Everywhere? Conceptualizing Power and Resistance Within Foucauldian Feminism,” Sociology, 28:2, 435-454. Cornwall, Andrea, 2016, “Women’s Empowerment: What Works,” Journal of International Development, 28, 342-359. Cornwall, Andrea; Althea-Maria Rivas, 2015, “From ‘Gender Equality’ and ‘Women’s Empowerment’ To Global Justice: Reclaiming a Transformative Agenda for Gender and Development,” Third World Quarterly, 36:2, 396-415. Cornwall, Andrea; Elizabeth Harrison; Ann Whitehead (eds), 2007, Feminisms in Development: Contradictions, Contestations and Challenges, London: Zed Books. Cornwall, Andrea; Karen Brock, 2005, “What Do Buzzwords Do For Development Policy? A Critical Look at ‘Participation, ‘Empowerment’ and ‘Poverty Reduction’,” Third World Quarterly, 26:7, 1043-1060. Corrin, Chris, 1999, Feminist Perspectives on Politics, Essex: Pearson Education Limited. Corrin, Chris, 2004, “Traffic in Women in War and Peace: Mapping Experiences in Southeast Europe,” Journal of Contemporary European Studies, 12:2, 177-192. Cotterill, Pemela, 1992, “Interviewing Women: Issues of Friendship, Vulnerability and Power,” Women Studies International Forum 15:5, 593-606. Coulter, Chris, 2008, “Female Fighters in the Sierra Leone War: Challenging the Assumptions?” Feminist Review 88: 54–73. Cramer, Christopher, 2008, “From Waging War to Peace Work: Labor and Labor Markets,” in Pugh, Michael; Neil Cooper; Mandy Turner (eds), Whose Peace? Critical Perspectives on the Political Economy of Peacebuilding, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 121-138. Crenshaw, Kimberlé, 1989, “Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics,” University of Chicago Legal Forum, 1, 139-167. Crenshaw, Kimberlé, 1992, “Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Political, and Violence against Women of Colon,” Stanford Law Review, 43:6, 1241-1249. Crewe, Emma, 2010, “Protecting Children in Different Contexts: Exploring the Value of Rights and Research,” Journal of Children’s Services, 5:1, 43-55. D’Amico, Francine; Laurie Weinstein, 1999, Gender Camouflage: Women and the US Military, New York: NYU Press. D’Amico, Francine; P Beckman, (eds), 1995, Women in World Politics: An Introduction, Westport: Bergin& Garvey.
293 D’Costa, Bina, 2006, “Marginalized Identity: New Frontiers of Research for IR?” in Ackerly, Brooke; Maria Stern; Jacqui True (eds), Feminist Methodologies for International Relations, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006, 129-152. Dahal, Swechchha, 2015, “Challenging the Boundaries: The Narratives of the Female ex- Combatants in Nepal,” in Shekhawat, Seema (ed), Female Combatants in Conflict and Peace: Challenging Gender in Violence and Post-Conflict Reintegration, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 185-199. Daigle, Megan, 2019, “Exploring Gendered Security Dynamics Through Fieldwork,” in Gentry, Caron; Laura Shepherd; Laura Sjoberg (eds), The Routledge Handbook of Gender and Security, London: Routledge, 116-126. Darby, John; Roger Mac Ginty (eds.), 2008, Contemporary Peacemaking: Conflict, Peace Processes and Post-War Reconstruction, New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Date-Bah, Eugenia, 2003, “Women and Other Gender Concerns in Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Job Promotion Efforts,” in ILO, Jobs After War: A Critical Challenge in the Peace and Reconstruction Puzzle, Geneva: ILO, 111-152. Davies, Sara; Jacqui True; Maria Tanyag, 2016, “How Women’s Silence Secures the Peace: Analyzing Sexual and Gender-Based Violence in a Low-Intensity Conflict,” Gender and Development, 24:3, 459-473. De Greiff, Pablo, 2006, The Handbook of Reparations, Oxford: Oxford University Press. De Vries, Hugo; Nikkie Wiegink, 2011, “Breaking Up and Going Home? Contesting Two Assumptions in the Demobilization and Reintegration of Former Combatants,” International Peacekeeping, 18:1, 38-51. De Watteville, Nathalie, 2002, “Addressing Gender Issues in Demobilization and Reintegration Programs,” Africa Region Working Paper Series 33. DeMarrais, Kathleen; Stephen Lapan (eds), 2004, Foundations for Research: Methods of Inquiry in Education and the Social Sciences, Mahwah: Lawrence Erlbau, Associates. Democratic Progress Institute, 2012, DDR and the Complexity of Contemporary Conflict, Working Paper, London: Democratic Progress Institute. Denov, Myriam, 2007, Girls in Fighting Forces: Moving Beyond Victimhood, Montreal: CIDA. Denov, Myriam, 2008, “Girl Soldiers and Human Rights: Lessons from Angola, Mozambique, Sierra Leone and Northern Uganda,” The International Journal of Human Rights, 12:5, 813-836. Desai, Vandana, 2005, “NGOs, Gender Mainstreaming, and Urban Poor Communities in Mumbai,” Gender and Development, 13:2, 90-98. Development Initiatives, 2016, Aid Spending on Conflict Prevention and Resolution, Peace and Security, 26th April 2016, http://devinit.org/post/aid-spending-on-conflict- prevention-and-resolution-peace-and-security/, [accessed 15/08/2019]. Dhamala, Kalpana, 2003, Women in the Revolution, 13 May 2003, Nepali Times, http://nepalitimes.com/news.php?id=3048#.WnoLjejFLIU [03/09/2016]. Dhungana, Shiva Kuma, 2007, “Security Sector Reform and Peacebuilding in Nepal: A Critical Reflection,” Journal of Peacebuilding and Development, 3:2, 70-78.
294 Disch, Lisa; Mary Hawkesworth (eds), 2016, The Oxford Dictionary of Feminist Theory, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Disney, Abigail, 2008, Pray the Devil Back to Hell, Balcony Releasing. Dolan, Chris, 2014, Into the Mainstream: Addressing Sexual Violence Against Men and Boys in Conflict, Briefing paper for the Overseas Development Institute: London, 14 May. Doniger, Wendy; Brian Smith, 1991, The Laws of Manu, London: Penguin Books. Doucet, Andrea; Natasha Mauthner, 2002, “Knowing Responsibly: Ethics, Feminist Epistemologies and Methodologies,” in Melanie Mauthner, Maxine Birch, Julie Jessop and Tina Miller (eds.), Ethics in Qualitative Research, London: Sage, 123- 145. Doucet, Andrea; Natasha Mauthner, 2006, “Feminist Methodologies and Epistemology,” in Bryant, Clifton; Dennis Peck (eds), 21st Century Sociology: A Reference Handbook, Thousand Oaks: Sage, 26-32. Douma, Nynke; Dorothea Hilhorst, 2012, “Fond de Commerce? Sexual Violence Assistance in the Democratic Republic of Congo,” Wageningen: Wageningen Disaster Studies. Drydyk, Jay, 2013, “Empowerment, Agency, and Power,” Journal of Global Ethics, 9:3, 249-262. Duffield, Mark, 2000, “Globalization, Transborder Trade, and War Economies,” in Berdal, Mats; David Malone (eds), Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 69-90. Duffield, Mark, 2005, Global Governance and the New Wars: The Merging of Development and Security, London: Zed Books. Duffield, Mark, 2007. Development, Security and Unending War: Governing the World of Peoples, Cambridge: Polity. Duffield, Mark, 2014, Global Governance and the New Wars: The Merging of Development and Security, London: Zed Books. Duncancson, Claire; Rachel Woodward, 2016, “Regendering the Military: Theorizing Women’s Military Participation,” Security Dialogue, 47:1, 3-21. Duncanson, Claire, 2016, Gender and Peacebuilding, Cambridge: Polity. Duriesmith, David, 2018, “Negative Space and the Feminist Act of Citation: Strategic Silence and the Limits of Gendering an Unloving Discipline,” in Parpart, Jane; Swati Parashar (eds), Rethinking Silence: Voice and Agency in Contested Gendered Terrains Beyond the Binary, Milton: Routledge, 66-77. Eastmond, Marita, 2010, “Introduction: Reconciliation, reconstruction, and everyday life in war-torn societies,” Journal of Global History of Anthropology 57, 3–16. Edwards, Rosalind, 1996, “White Woman Researcher – Black Women Subjects,” in Wilkinson, Sue; Celia. Kitzinger (eds), Representing the Other, London: Sage. Egharevba, Itohan, 2001, “Researching An-‘Other’ Minority Ethnic Community: Reflections Of A Black Female Researcher On The Intersections Of Race, Gender And Other Power Positions On The Research Process,” International Journal of Social Research Methodology, 4:3, 225-241.
295 Ehrenreich, Barbara, 1997, Blood Rites: Origins and History of the Passions of War, New York: Henry Holt. Eisler, Riane; David Loye, 1986, “Peace and Feminist Theory: New Directions,” Bulletin of Peace Proposals, 17:1, 95-99. El-Bushra, Judy, 2000, ‘Transforming Conflict: Some Thoughts on a Gendered Understanding of Conflict Processes’, in Jacobs, Susie; Ruth Jacobson; Jennifer Marchbank (eds), States of Conflict, Gender, Violence and Resistance, London: Zed Books. Elias, Juanita, 2011, “Critical Feminist Scholarship and IPE,” in Shields, Stuart; Ian Bruff; Huw Macartney (eds), Critical International Political Economy: Dialogue, Debate and Dissensus, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 899-115. Ellerby, Kara, 2019, “Peace Processes and Women’s Inclusion,” in Gentry, Caron; Laura Shepherd; Laura Sjoberg (eds), The Routledge Handbook of Gender and Security, London: Routledge, 323-333. Ellis, Stephen, 2007, The Mask of Anarchy: The Destruction of Liberia and the Religious Dimension of an African Civil War, New York: New York. Elshtain, Jean Bethke, 1987, Women and War, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Elsthain, Jean Bethke, 1994, “Thinking about Women and International Violence,” in Beckman, Peter; Francine D’Amico, Women, Gender, and World Politics: Perspectives, Policies, and Prospects, London: Bergin and Garvey, 109-118. England, Kim, 1994, “Getting Personal: Reflexivity, Positionality, and Feminist Research,” The Professional Geographer, 46:1, 80-89. Enloe, Cynthia, 1983, Does Khaki Become You? Boston: South End Press. Enloe, Cynthia, 1989, Bananas, Beaches and Bases: Making Feminist Sense of International Relations, Berkeley: University of California Press. Enloe, Cynthia, 1993, The Morning After: Sexual Politics and the End of the Cold War, Berkeley: University of California Press. Enloe, Cynthia, 1996, “Margins, Silences and Bottom Rungs: How to Overcome the Underestimation of Power in the Study of International Relations,” in Smith, Steve; Ken Booth; Marysia Zalewski (eds), International Theory: Positivism and Beyond, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 186-202. Enloe, Cynthia, 1999, Maneuvers, Berkeley: University of California Press. Enloe, Cynthia, 2000, Bananas, Beaches and Bases: Making Feminist Sense of International Relations, Berkeley: University of California Press. Enloe, Cynthia, 2004, The Curious Feminist: Searching for Women in a New Age of Empire, Berkeley: University of California Press. Enloe, Cynthia, 2007, Globalization and Militarism: Feminists Make the Link, Lanham: Rowman& Littlefield. Enloe, Cynthia, 2013, Interview with Cynthia Enloe on E-International Relations, 13/03/2013, www.e-ir.info /2013/03/13/interview-cynthia-enloe/, [accessed 21/12/2017]. Enloe, Cynthia; Anita Lacey; Thomas Gregory, 2016, “Twenty-Five Years of Bananas, Beaches and Bases: A Conversation with Cynthia Enloe,” Journal of Sociology, 52:3, 537-550.
296 Eriksen, Stein Sundstøl, 2009, “The Liberal Peace is Neither: Peacebuilding, Statebuilding and the Reproduction of Conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo,” International Peacekeeping, 16:5, 652-666. Escola de Cultura de Pau, 2009, Analysis of the World’s Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) Programs in 2008, Barcelona: Escola de Cultura de Pau. Fallon, Kathleen, 2010, Democracy and the Rise of Women’s Movements in Sub-Saharan Africa, Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press. Fanon, Frantz, 1952, Black Skin, White Masks, London: Pluto Press. Farr, Vanessa, 2000, “How Do We Know We Are at Peace? Reflections on the Aftermath Conference,” Agenda, 16:43, 23-31. Farr, Vanessa, 2002, Gendering Demilitarization as a Peacebuilding Tool, Bonn: Bonn International Center for Conversion. Farr, Vanessa, 2003, “The Importance of a Gender Perspective to Successful Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Processes,” Disarmament Forum: Women, Men, Peace and Security, 4, 25-35. Farr, Vanessa, 2007, “Notes Towards a Gendered Understanding of Mixed-Population Movements and Security Sector Reform after Conflict,” Signs 32:3, 591-596. Fetherston, A Betts, 2000, “From Conflict Resolution to Transformative Peacebuilding: Reflections from Croatia,” Working Paper 4, Bradford: Centre for Conflict Resolution. Finch, Janet, 1984, “It’s Great To Have Someone To Talk To’: The Ethics And Politics Of Interviewing Women,” in Bell, Colin; Helen Roberts (Eds) Social Researching: Politics, Problems, Practice, London: Routledge, 70-87. Fine, Michelle, 1992, Disruptive Voices: The Possibilities Of Feminist Research. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Flick, Ume, 2014, An Introduction to Qualitative Research, London: Sage. Forcey, Linda, 1987, Mothers of Sons: Toward an Understanding of Responsibility, New York: Praeger. Forcey, Linda, 1995a, “Integrating Women’s Studies With Peace Studies: Challenges For Feminist Theory,” Indian Journal of Gender Studies, 2:2, 211-226. Forcey, Linda, 1995b, “Women’s Studies, Peace Studies, and the Difference Debate,” Women’s Studies Quarterly, 23:3, 1995, 9-14. Forcey, Linda, 2001, “Feminist Perspectives on Mothering and Peace,” Journal of the Association for Research on Mothering, 3:2, 155-174. Foucault, Michel, 1978, The History of Sexuality. Volume 1: An Introduction, London: Penguin Books. Foucault, Michel, 1980, Power/Knowledge, New York: Pantheon. Foucault, Michel, 1983, The Subject and Power, in Dreyfus, Hubert; Paul Rabinow (eds), Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 208-226. Franke, Katherine, 2006, “Gendered Subject of Transitional Justice,” Columbia Journal of Gender and Law, 15:3, 813-828. Franzosi, Roberto, 1998, “Narrative Analysis—Or Why (And How) Sociologists Should Be Interested In Narrative,” Annual Review of Sociology, 24, 517-554.
297 Freire, Paulo, 2000 [1970], Pedagogy of the Oppressed, New York: Continuum. Friedman, Marilyn, 2003, Autonomy, Gender, Politics, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Friedman, Rebekka, 2018, “Remnants of A Checkered Past: Female LTTE and Social Reintegration in Post-War Sri Lanka,” International Studies Quarterly, 62, 632-642. Fuest, Veronika, 2008, “’This is the Time to Get in Front’: Changing Roles and Opportunities for Women in Liberia,” African Affairs, 107/427, 201-224. Gal, Susan, 1991, “Between Speech and Silence,” in de Leonardo, Micaela (ed), Gender at the Crossroads of Knowledge: Feminist Anthropology in the Postmodern Era, Berkeley: University of California Press. Gallie, W.B., 1956, “Essentially Contested Concepts”, Proceedings of Aristotelian Society 56, 167-198. Galtung, Johan, 1964, “An Editorial,” Journal of Peace Research, 1:1, 1-4. Galtung, Johan, 1967a, “Scientific Colonialism,” Transition, 30, 10-15. Galtung, Johan, 1967b, “Two Approaches to Disarmament: The Legalist and the Structuralist,” Journal of Peace Research, 4:2, 161-195. Galtung, Johan, 1967c, Theories of Peace: A Synthetic Approach to Peace Thinking, Oslo: International Peace Research Institute. Galtung, Johan, 1969, “Violence, Peace, and Peace Research,” Journal of Peace Research, 6:3, 167-191. Galtung, Johan, 1990, “Cultural Violence,” Journal of Peace Research, 27:3, 291-305. Galtung, Johan, 2017, “Foreword,” in Björkdahl, Annika; Stefanie Kappler, Peacebuilding and Spatial Transformation: Peace, Space, and Place, London: Routledge. Garcia González, Andrea, 2016, “Feminist Approaches to Peacebuilding and Reconciliation,” Paper presented at Feminist Review Early Careers Workshop, SOAS, 10 May 2016. Gardner, Judith; Judy El-Bushra (eds), 2004, Somalia- The Untold Story: The War Through the Eyes of Somali Women, Amherst: CIIR. Gauta, Shobha, 2006, Sexual Violence in the People’s War: The Impact of Armed Conflict on Women and Girls in Nepal, IHRICON. Gautam, Shobha; Amrita Banskota; Rita Manchanda, 2001, “Where There Are No Men: Women in the Maoist Insurgency in Nepal,” in Manchanda, Rita (ed), Women, War and Peace in South Asia: Beyond Victimhood to Agency, New Delhi: Sage, 214-251. Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), 2011, Gender and Security Sector Reform: Examples from the Ground, Geneva: DCAF. Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), 2005, Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR): Conceptual Approaches, Specific Settings, Practical Experiences, Geneva: DCAF. Gentry, Caron E; Laura Sjoberg, 2015, Beyond Mothers, Monsters, Whores: Thinking About Women’s Violence in Global Politics¸ London: Zed Books. Gentry, Caron; Laura Shepherd; Laura Sjoberg (eds), 2019, The Routledge Handbook of Gender and Security, London: Routledge. George, Alexander; Andrew Bennett, 2005, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences, Boston: MIT Press.
298 George, Nicole, 2016, “Light, Heath and Shadows: Women’s Reflections on Peacebuilding in Post-Conflict Bougainville,” Peacebuilding, 4:2, 166-179. George, Nicole, 2017, “Policing ‘Conjugal Order’: Gender, Hybridity, and Vernacular Security in Fiji,” International Feminist Journal of Politics, 19:1, 55-70. George, Nicole, 2018, “Hybridity and Regulatory Authority in Fiji: Vernacular Perspectives on Gender and Security,” in Wallis, Joanne; Lia Kent; Miranda Forsyth; Sinclair Dinnen; Srinjoy Bose, (eds), Hybridity on the Ground in Peacebuilding and Development: Critical Conversations, Acton: Australian National University Press. George, Nicole; Katrina Lee-Koo; Laura Shepherd, 2019, “Gender and the UN’s Women, Peace, and Security Agenda,” in Gentry, Caron; Laura Shepherd; Laura Sjoberg (eds), The Routledge Handbook of Gender and Security, London: Routledge, 311- 322. George, Nicole; Lia Kent, 2017, “Sexual Violence and Hybrid Peacebuilding: How Does Silence ‘Speak’?” Third World Thematics, 2:4, 518-537. Giddens, Anthony, 1984, The Constitution of Society, London: Polity. Gilbert, Melissa, 1994, “The Politics of Location: Doing Feminist Research ‘At Home’,” Professional Geographer, 46, 90-96. Gilligan, Carol, 1982, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women’s Development, Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Ginifer, Jeremy, 2003, “Prioritizing Reintegration,” in Malan, Mark (ed), Sierra Leone: Building the Road to Recovery, Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies. Gizelis, Theodora-Ismene, 2009, “Gender Empowerment and United Nations Peacebuilding,” Journal of Peace Research, 46:4, 505-523. Gjelsvik, Ingvild Magnæs, 2010, Women, War and Empowerment: A Case Study of Female Ex-Combatants in Colombia, Master’s Thesis, Oslo: University of Tromsø. Glucksmann, Miriam, 2002, “The Work of Knowledge and the Knowledge of Women’s Work,” in Maynard, Mary; June Purvis (eds), Researching Women’s Lives from a Feminist Perspective, New York: Taylor and Francis, 149-165. Goldstein, Joshua, 2001, War and Gender: How Gender Shapes the War System and Vice Versa, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Gomes Porto, J, Imogen Parsons, Chris Alden, 2007, From Soldiers to Citizens: The Social, Economic and Political Reintegration of UNITA Ex-Combatants, Aldershot: Ashgate. Goodwin-Gill, Guy; Ilene Cohn, 1994, Child Soldiers- The Role of Children in Armed Conflict, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Gortz, Andre, 1982, Farewell to the Working Class, London: Pluto Press. Government of Liberia (GoL); United Nations Development Programme, 2007, Reintegration Assistance to Liberia DDRR Programme Residual Caseload Beneficiaries, Monrovia: GoL. Government of Nepal (GoN) and the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), 2006, Comprehensive Peace Accord, 22 November 2006. Government of Nepal (GoN), 2006, 12 Point Understanding Reached Between the Seven Political Parties and Nepal Communist Party (Maoists)
299 Government of Nepal (GoN), 2007, The Interim Constitution of Nepal, Kathmandu: Government of Nepal. Government of Nepal (GoN), 2015a, Constitution of Nepal. Government of Nepal (GoN), 2015b, Labor Migration for Employment. A Status Report for Nepal: 2013/2014, Kathmandu: Ministry of Labor and Employment Graef, Julian, 2015, Practicing Post-Liberal Peacebuilding: Legal Empowerment and Emergent Hybridity in Liberia, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Grahn-Farley, Maria, 2009, “Neutral Law and Eurocentric Lawmaking: A Postcolonial Analysis of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child,” Brooklyn Journal of International Law, 34:1, 1-33. Greenberg, Marcia; Elaine Zuckerman, 2009, “The Gender Dimensions of Post-Conflict Reconstruction: The Challenges in Development Aid,” in Addison, Tony; Tilman Brück (eds), Making Peace Work: The Challenges of Social and Economic Reconstruction, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 101-135. Griffin, Penny, 2016, “Feminist Political Economy,” in Steans, Jill; Daniela Tepe-Belfrage (eds), Handbook on Gender in World Politics, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar Publishing, 245-353. Guannu, Joseph Saye, 2010a, Liberian Civics, Monrovia: Star Books. Guannu, Joseph Saye, 2010b, Liberian History Since 1980, Monrovia: Star Books. Guannu, Joseph Saye, 2010c, Liberian History up to 1847, Monrovia: Star Books. Guardian, 2018, UK Universities Making Slow Progress On Equality, Data Shows, 07/09/2018, https://www.theguardian.com/education/2018/sep/07/uk-university- professors-black-minority-ethnic, [accessed 13/06/2019]. Gulbrandsen Jorun; Johan Peter Andresen, 2008, Interview with Comrade Parvati of the CPN(M), 21/03/2008, http://kersplebedeb.com/posts/interview-with-comrade- parvati-of-the-cpnm/, [accessed 07/09/2016]. Haeri, Medina; Nadine Puechguirbal, 2010, “From Helplessness to Agency: Examining the Plurality of Women’s Experiences in Armed Conflict,” International Review of the Red Cross, 92:877, 103-122. Halberstam, J Jack, 2012, Gaga Feminism: Sex, Gender, and the End of Normal, Boston: Beacon Press. Hale, Sondra, 1999, “Post-War Eritrean Women: The Soldier, the Party, and the National Union of Eritrean Women,” paper prepared for The Aftermath Conference on Women in Post-War Situations, Johannesburg, 20-22 July 1999. Hall, Rachel, 2004, “Inside Out: Some Notes On Carrying Out Feminist Research In Crosscultural Interviews With South Asian Women Immigration Applicants,” International Journal of Social Research Methodology, 7:2, 127-141. Hameiri, Shahar; Lee Jones, 2018, “Against Hybridity in the Study of Peacebuilding and Statebuilding,” in Wallis, Joanne; Lia Kent; Miranda Forsyth; Sinclair Dinnen; Srinjoy Base (eds.), Hybridity on the Ground in Peacebuilding and Development: Critical Conversations, Acton: Australia National University Press, 99-114. Handrahan, Lori, 2004, “Conflict, Gender, Ethnicity and Post- Conflict Reconstruction,” Security Dialogue, 35:4, 429-445.
300 Hanish, Carol, 2006, The Personal is Political, http://www.carolhanisch.org/CHwritings/PIP.html, [accessed 20/01/2019]. Hansen, Lene, 2000, “The Little Mermaid’s Silent Security Dilemma and the Absence of Gender in the Copenhagen School,” Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 29:2, 285-306. Hansen, Lene, 2012, “Reconstructing Desecuritization: The Normative-Political in the Copenhagen School and Directions for How to Apply It,” Review of International Studies, 38:3, 525-546. Haraway, Donna, 1990, “A Manifesto For Cyborgs: Science, Technology, And Socialist Feminism In The 1980s,” Feminism/Postmodernism, 190-233. Harcourt, Wendy (ed), 2016, The Palgrave Handbook of Gender and Development, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Hartsock, Nancy, 1983, Money, Sex, And Power: Toward a Feminist Historical Materialism, New York: Longman. Harvey, Lee, 1990, Critical Social Research, London: Unwin Hyman. Heideman, Laura, 2013, “The Vulnerable Protecting the Vulnerable: NGOs and Human Security in the Aftermath of War,” in Tripp, Aili Mari; Myra Marx Ferree; Christina Ewig (eds.), Gender, Violence, and Human Security: Critical Feminist Perspectives, New York: NYU Press, 214-237. Henshaw, Alexis, 2013, Why Women Rebel: Understanding Female Participation in Intrastate Conflict, Tucson: The University of Arizona PhD Dissertation. Henshaw, Alexis, 2016a, “Where Women Rebel,” International Feminist Journal of Politics, 18:1, 39-60. Henshaw, Alexis, 2016b, “Why Women Rebel: Greed Grievance, and Women in Armed Rebel Groups,” Journal of Global Security Studies, 1:3, 204-219. Henshaw, Alexis, 2016c, Revisiting Rebellion: Why Women Participate in Armed Conflict, August 2, 2016, http://politicalviolenceataglance.org/2016/08/02/revisiting- rebellion-why-women-participate-in-armed-conflict/, [accessed 06/02/2018]. Herbert, Siân, 2014, Conflict Analysis of Liberia, Birmingham: GSDRC. Hills, Christopher; Megan MacKenzie, 2017, “Women in Non-State Armed Groups after War: The (Non)Evaluation of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration,” in Woodward, Rachel; Claire Duncanson, The Palgrave International Handbook of Gender and the Military, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 455-471. Hillstrom, Kevin; Laurie Collier Hillstrom, 2000, American Civil War Biographies, Vol 1: A-K, Farmington Hills: The Gale Group. Holmes, Georgina, 2019, “Situating Agency, Embodied Practices and Norm Implementation in Peacekeeping Training,” International Peacekeeping, 26:1, 55- 84. Holmes, Georgina; Katherine Wright; Sourmita Basu; Matthew Hurley; Maria Martin de Almagro; Roberta Guerrina; Christine Cheng, 2018, “Feminsit Experiences of ‘Studying Up’: Encounters with International Institutions,” Millennium, 1-27. hooks, bell, 1984, Feminist Theory: From Margin to Center, New York: South End Press. hooks, bell, 2000, Feminism is for Everybody: Passionate Politics, London: Pluto Press.
301 Hudson, Heidi, 2009, “Peacebuilding Through a Gender Lens and the Challenges of Implementation in Rwanda and Côte d’Ivoire,” Security Studies, 18:2, 287-318. Hudson, Heidi, 2010a, “Peace Building through a Gender Lens and the Challenges of Implementation in Rwanda and Côte d’Ivoire,” in Sjoberg, Laura, (ed.), Gender and International Security: Feminist Perspectives, London: Routledge, 256-279. Hudson, Natalie Florea, 2010b, Gender, Human Security and the United Nations: Security Language as a Political Framework for Women, London: Routledge. Hudson, Natalie Florea; Laura Huber, 2019, “Gender in International Security Organizations,” in Gentry, Caron; Laura Shepherd; Laura Sjoberg (eds), The Routledge Handbook of Gender and Security, London: Routledge, 373-384. Human Rights Watch, 2004, How To Fight How to Kill, https://www.hrw.org/reports/2004/liberia0204/3.htm#_Toc61673954, [accessed 17/02/2018]. Hutt, Michael (ed), 2004, Himalayan ‘People’s War’: Nepal’s Maoist Rebellion, London: Hurst and Company. Ibáñez, Ana Cristina, 2001, “El Salvador: War and Untold Stories – Women Guerillas,” in Moser, Caroline; Fiona Clark (eds), Victims, Perpetrators or Actors? Gender, Armed Conflict and Political Violence, London: Zed books, 117-130. Ibrahim, Solava; Sabina Alkire, 2007, “Agency and Empowerment: A Proposal for Internationally Comparable Indicators,” OPHI Working Paper Series. ICRC, 1949, Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (Fourth Geneva Convention), 75/UNTS/287. ILO Nepal, 2013, Forced Labour of Adults and Children in the Agriculture Sector of Nepal, ILO Kathmandu: Country Office. ILO, 2010, Socio-Economic Reintegration of Ex-Combatants, Geneva: International Labor Office. ILO, 2016, The ILO in Liberia, Abuja: ILO Country Office. Impunity Watch, 2015, Memorialization as Related to Transitional Justice Processes in Nepal: An Exploration, Utrecht: Impunity Watch. International Alert, 2014, Rethinking Gender in Peacebuilding, London: International Alert. International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ), 2009, Transitional Justice and DDR: The Case of Liberia, https://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-DDR-Liberia- CaseStudy-2009-English.pdf, [accessed 28/10/2015]. International Crisis Group, 2011, Nepal: From Two Armies to One, Brussels: International Crisis Group. Interparliamentary Union (IPU), 2019, Women in National Parliaments: Situation as of 1st of February 2019, http://archive.ipu.org/wmn-e/world.htm, [accessed 24/05/2019]. IRIN, 2006, Rubber Plantations ‘Lawless’, Says UN, 11 May 2006, http://www.irinnews.org/news/2006/05/11/rubber-plantations- %E2%80%9Clawless%E2%80%9D-says-un, [accessed 17/07/2018]. Izugbara, C. Otutubikey, 2004, “Gendered Micro-Lending Schemes And Sustainable Women’s Empowerment In Nigeria,” Community Development Journal, 39:1, 72– 84.
302 Jaquette, Jane, 1984, “Power as Ideology: A Feminist Analysis,” in Stiehm, Judith (ed.), Women’s Views of the Political World of Men, Ardsley: Transnational Publishers, 7-30. Jennings, Kathleen, 2007, “The Struggle to Satisfy: DDR Through the Eyes of Ex- Combatants in Liberia,” International Peacekeeping, 14:2, 204-218. Jennings, Kathleen, 2008a, “Securitizing the Economy of Reintegration in Liberia,” in Pugh, Michael; Neil Cooper; Mandy Turner (eds), Whose Peace? Critical Perspectives on the Political Economy of Peacebuilding, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 157-172. Jennings, Kathleen, 2008b, “Unclear Ends, Unclear Means: Reintegration in Postwar Societies – The Case of Liberia,” Global Governance 14:3, 327-345. Jennings, Kathleen, 2008c, Seeing DDR from Below: Challenges and Dilemmas Raised by the Experiences of Ex-Combatants in Liberia, Oslo: FAFO. Jennings, Kathleen, 2009, “The Political Economy of DDR in Liberia: A Gendered Critique,” Conflict, Security and Development, 9:4, 475-494. Jeong, Ho-Won (ed), 2002, Approaches to Peacebuilding, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Jeong, Ho-Won, 2005, Peacebuilding in Postconflict Societies: Strategy and Process, Boulder: Lynne Rienner. Jha, Prashant, 2012, “One Country Two Armies’ Situation Ends in Nepal,” The Hindu, 2 November 2012, http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/%E2%80%98One- country-two-armies%E2%80%99-situation-ends-in-Nepal/article12542632.ece, [accessed 15/06/2017]. John, Moolakkattu Stephen, 2006, “Feminism and Peace Studies: Taking Stock of a Quarter Century of Efforts,” Indian Journal of Gender Studies, 13:2, 137-162. Johnson, Kirsten; Jana Asher; Stephanie Rosborough; Amisha Raja; Rajesh Panjabi; Charles Beadling; Lynn Lawry, 2008, “Association of Combatant Status and Sexual Violence with Health and Mental Health Outcomes in Post-conflict Liberia,” JAMA 300:6, 676-690. K.C. Luna; Gemma Van Der Haar, 2018, “Living Maoist Gender Ideology: Experiences of Women Ex-Combatants in Nepal,” International Feminist Journal of Politics, Forthcoming, 1-20. Kabeer, Naila, 1994, Reversed Realities: Gender Hierarchies in Development Thought, London: Verso. Kabeer, Naila, 1999, “Resources, Agency, Achievements: Reflections on the Measurement of Women’s Empowerment,” Development and Change, 30, 435-464. Kabeer, Naila, 2003, Gender Mainstreaming in Poverty Eradication and the Millennium Development Goals: A Handbook for Policy-Makers and Other Stakeholders, Ottawa: International Development Research Centre. Kabeer, Naila, 2005a, “Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment: A Critical Analysis of the Third Millennium Development Goal,” Gender and Development, 13:1, 13- 24.
303 Kabeer, Naila, 2005b, “Is Microfinance a ‘Magic Bullet’ for Women’s Empowerment? Analysis of Finds from South Asia,” Economic and Political Weekly, 40:44/45, 4709-4718. Kabeer, Naila, 2007, “Marriage, Motherhood and Masculinity in the Global Economy: Reconfigurations of Personal and Economic Life,” Center for Global, International and Regional Studies Working Paper 290. Kabeer, Naila, 2008, Paid Work, Women's Empowerment and Gender Justice: Critical Pathways of Social Change, Pathways of Empowerment Working Papers, 3, Brighton: Institute of Development Studies. Kabeer, Naila, 2009, “Women's Control over Economic Resources and Access to Financial Resources, Including Microfinance: 2009 World Survey on the Role of Women in Development,” United Nations Division for the Advancement of Women. http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/public/WorldSurvey2009.pdf. [accessed 17/05/2018]. Kabeer, Naila, 2010, “Voice, Agency and the Sounds of Silence: A Comment on Jane L Parpart’s Paper’ Gender, Development, and Globalization Program, Working Paper 297. Kabeer, Naila; Simeen Mahmud; Sakiba Tasneem, 2011, “Does Paid Work Provide a Pathway to Women’s Empowerment? Empirical Findings from Bangladesh,” IDS Working Paper 375. Kant, Immanuel, 1795, [1983], “To Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch,” in Humphrey, T (ed), Immanuel Kant: Perpetual peace and Other Essays on Politics, History, and Morals, Indianapolis: Hackett, 107-143. Kaplan, Robert, 1994, “The Coming Anarchy,” Globalization and the Challenges of A New Century: 34-60. Kappler, Stefanie, 2013, “Peacebuilding and Lines of Friction Between Imagined Communities in Bosnia-Herzegovina and South Africa,” Peacebuilding, 1:3, 349- 364. Kappler, Stefanie; Nicolas Lemay-Hébert, 2019, “From Power-Blind Binaries to the Intersectionality of Peace: Connecting Feminist and Critical Peace and Conflict Studies,” Peacebuilding, [online], 1-18. Kappler, Stefanie; Oliver Richmond, 2011, “Peacebuilding and Culture In Bosnia And Herzegovina: Resistance Or Emancipation?” Security Dialogue, 42:3, 261-278. Karam, Azza, 2000, “Women in War and Peace-Building: The Roads Traversed, The Challenges Ahead,” International Feminist Journal of Politics, 3:1, 2-25. Karamé, Kari, 2009, “Reintegration and the Relevance of Social Relations: The Case of Lebanon,” Conflict, Security and Development, 9:4, 495-514. Karamé, Kari; Torunn Tryggestad (eds), 2000, Gender Perspectives on Peace and Conflict Studies, Oslo: NUPI & PRIO. Kardam, Nüket, 1994, “Women and Development, in Beckman, Peter; Francine D’Amico, Women, Gender, and World Politics: Perspectives, Policies, and Prospects, London: Bergin and Garvey, 141-154. Karim, Lamia, 2011, Microfinance and Its Discontents: Women in Debt in Bangladesh, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
304 Karki, Darshan, 2016, “An Incomplete Revolution,” in Murthy, Laxmi; Mitu Varma (eds), Garrisoned Minds: Women and Armed Conflict in South Asia, New Delhi: Speaking Tiger, 143-160. Kathmandu Post, 2014, The Price of Sacrifice, December 6. Keen, David, 2000, “Incentives and Disincentives for Violence,” in Berdal, Mats; David Malone (eds), Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 19-42. Kelly, Liz, 2000, “Wars Against Women: Sexual Violence, Sexual Politics and the Militarized State,” in Jacobs, Susie; Ruth Jacobson; Jennifer Marchbank (eds), States of Conflict: Gender, Violence and Resistance, London: Zed Books, 45-65. Kennedy-Pipe, Caroline, 2017, “Liberal Feminists, Militaries, and War,” in Woodward, Rachel; Claire Duncanson, The Palgrave International Handbook of Gender and the Military, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 23-39. Kesby, Mike, 2005, “Retheorizing Empowerment-Through-Participation as a Performance in Space: Beyond Tyranny to Transformation,” Signs 30:4, 2037-2065. Kfir, Isaac, 2012, “Security, Gender and Post-Conflict Reconstruction: The Need for a ‘Woman Question’ When Engaging in Reconstruction,” Texas Journal of Women and the Law, 22:1, 71-112. Khadka, Sharada, 2012, Female Combatants and Ex-Combatants in Maoist Revolution and Their Struggle for Reintegration in Post-War, Nepal, Master’s Thesis. Kharel, Deepak, 2016, “Discharged Ex-Maoist Fighters Arrested,” MyRepublica, 8 November 2016, http://www.myrepublica.com/news/8737/, [accessed 07/05/2018]. Kilroy, Walt, 2009, Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration: The Co-Evolution of Concepts, Practices, and Understanding, New York: The City University of New York. Kilroy, Walt, 2015, Reintegration of Ex-Combatants After Conflict: Participatory Approaches in Sierra Leone and Liberia, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. King, Elisabeth, 2009, “From Data Problems to Data Points: Challenges and Opportunities of Research in Post-genocide Rwanda,” African Studies Review, 52:3, 127-148. Kingma, Kees, 1997, Post-War Demobilization and the Reintegration of Ex-Combatants into Civilian Life, paper presented at the USAID conference Promoting Democracy, Human Rights, and Reintegration in Post-conflict Societies, 30–31 October 1997, Washington, DC. Kingma, Kees, 2000, “Assessing Demobilization: Conceptual Issues,” in Kingma, Kees (ed), Demobilization in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Development and Security Impacts, London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 23-44. Kingma, Kees, 2002, “Demobilization, reintegration and peacebuilding in Africa” in Newman, Edward; Albrecht Schnabel (eds), Recovering from Civil Conflict: Reconciliation, Peace and Development, London: Frank Cass, 181-201. Kinney, Edith, 2013, “Securitizing Sex, Bodies, and Borders: The Resonance of Human Security Frames in Thailand’s ‘War against Human Trafficking,” in Tripp, Aili Mari; Myra Marx Ferree; Christina Ewig (eds.), Gender, Violence, and Human Security: Critical Feminist Perspectives, New York: NYU Press, 79-108.
305 Kirby, Paul, 2019, “Wartime Sexual Violence,” in Gentry, Caron; Laura Shepherd; Laura Sjoberg (eds), The Routledge Handbook of Gender and Security, London: Routledge, 216-226. Kitzinger, Celia, 1991, “Feminism, Psychology, and the Paradox of Power,” Feminist and Psychology, 1:1, 111-130. Klouzal, Linda, 2003, “The Subjective Side Of Development: Sources Of Well-Being, Resources For Struggle” in Bhavanani, Kum-Kum; John Foran, Priya Kurian (eds.), Feminist Futures, London: Zed Books. Knight, Mark; Alpaslan Özerdem, 2004, “Guns, Camps and Cash: Disarmament, Demobilization and Reinsertion of Former Combatants in Transitions from War to Peace,” Journal of Peace Research, 41:4, 499-516. Knox, Colin, 2010, “Peace Building in Northern Ireland: A Role for Civil Society,” Social Policy and Society, 19:1, 13-28. Kobayashi, Audrey, 1994, “Coloring The Field: Gender, ‘Race’, And The Politics Of Fieldwork,” Professional Geographer 46, 73-80. Kothari, Uma (ed.), 2005, A Radical History of Development Studies: Individuals, Institutions and Ideologies, London: Zed Books. Krause, Jana; Werner Krause; Piia Bränsfors, 2018, “Women’s Participation in Peace Negotiations and the Durability of Peace,” International Interactions, 44:6, 985- 1016. Kronsell, Annica, 2006, “Methods for Studying Silences: Gender Analysis in Institutions of Hegemonic Masculinity” In Ackerly, Brooke; Maria Stern; Jacqui True (eds.), Feminist Methodologies for International Relations, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 108–128. Kronsell, Annica, 2012, Gender, Sex and the Postnational Defence: Militarism and Peacekeeping, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Kronsell, Annica, 2016, “Sexed Bodies and Military Institutions: Gender Path Dependency in EU’s Common Security and Defense Policy.” Men and Masculinities, 19:3, 1–26. Kunz, Rahel, 2014, “Gender and Security Reform: Gendering Differently?” International Peacekeeping, 21:5, 604-622. Lairap-Fonderson, Josephine, 2002, “The Disciplinary Power of Micro Credit: Examples from Kenya and Cameroon,” in Parpart, Jane; Shirin Rai; Kathleen Staudt, Rethinking Empowerment: Gender and Development in a Global/Local World, London: Routledge. Lama-Tamang, Mukta; Sumitra Gurung; Dharma Swarnakar; Sita Rana Magar, 2003, Social Change in Conflict Affected Areas: Assessment Report, Kathmandu: DFID Nepal. Lather, Patti, 1991, Getting Smart: Feminist Research and Pedagogy with/in the Postmodern, New York: Routledge. Lawoti, Mahendra; A Kumar Pahari, 2009, The Maoist Insurgency in Nepal: Revolution in the Twentyfirst Century, London: Routledge. Leckie, Jacqueline (ed), 2009, Development in an Insecure and Gendered World: The Relevance of the Millennium Goals, Surrey: Ashgate.
306 Lederach, John Paul, 1997, Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies, Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press. Lederach, John Paul, 2003, The Little Book of Conflict Transformation, Intercourse, PA: Good Books. Legal Momentum, 2008, Sex, Lies and Stereotypes: How Abstinence-Only Programs Harm Women and Girls, New York: Legal Momentum. Lemay-Hébert, Nicolas, 2013, “Critical Debates on Liberal Peacebuilding,” Civil Wars, 15:2, 242-252. Leonardsson, Hanna; Gustav Rudd, 2015, “The ‘Local Turn’ In Peacebuilding: A Literature Review of Effective and Emancipatory Local Peacebuilding,” Third World Quarterly, 36:5, 825-839. Levely, Ian, 2014, “Measuring Intermediate Outcomes of Liberia’s Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation and Reintegration Program,” Defence and Peace Economics, 25:2, 139-162. Lipschutz, Ronnie, 1998, “Beyond the Neoliberal Peace: From Conflict Resolution to Social Reconciliation,” Social Justice, 25:4, 5-19. Lohani-Chase, Rama, 2008, Women and Gender in the Maoist People’s War in Nepal: Militarism and Dislocation, PhD Dissertation, Rutgers: The State University of New Brunswick. Lorentzen, Lois Ann; Jennifer Turpin, 1998, (eds), The Women and War Reader, New York: New York University Press. Lovenduski, Joni, 2011, “Foreword,” in Krook, Mona; Fiona Mackay (eds.), Gender, Politics, and Institutions: Toward a Feminist Institutionalism, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Lund, Michael, 1996, Preventing Violent Conflicts A Strategy for Preventative Diplomacy, Washington: USIP. Mac Ginty, Roger, 2008, “Indigenous peacemaking versus the liberal peace,” Cooperation and Conflict, 43:2, 139–163. Mac Ginty, Roger, 2010, “Hybrid Peace: The Interaction Between Top-Down and Bottom- Up Peace,” Security Dialogue, 41:4, 391-412. Mac Ginty, Roger, 2011, International Peacebuilding and Local Resistance: Hybrid Forms of Peace, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Mac Ginty, Roger, 2012, “Routine Peace: Technocracy and Peacebuilding,” Cooperation and Conflict, 47:3, 287-308. Mac Ginty, Roger, 2013a, (ed), Routledge Handbook of Peacebuilding, London: Routledge. Mac Ginty, Roger, 2013b, “Introduction: The Transcripts of Peace: Public, Hidden or Non- Obvious?” Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, 7:4, 423-430. Mac Ginty, Roger, 2015, “Where is the Local? Critical Localism and Peacebuilding,” Third World Quarterly, 36:5, 840-856. Mac Ginty, Roger; Gurchathen Sanghera, 2012, “Hybridity in Peacebuilding and Development: An Introduction,” Journal of Peacebuilding and Development, 7:2, 3-8. Mac Ginty, Roger; Oliver Richmond, 2013, “The Local Turn in Peace Building: A Critical Agenda for Peace,” Third World Quarterly, 34:5, 763-783.
307 MacKenzie, Megan, 2009, “Empowerment Boom or Bust? Assessing Women’s Post- Conflict Empowerment Initiatives,” Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 22:2, 199-215. MacKenzie, Megan, 2010, “Securitization and Desecuritization: Female Soldiers and the Reconstruction of Women in Post-Conflict Sierra Leone,” in Sjoberg, Laura, (ed.), Gender and International Security: Feminist Perspectives, London: Routledge, 151-167. MacKenzie, Megan, 2012, Female Soldiers in Sierra Leone: Sex, Security, and Post- Conflict Development, New York: NYU Press. Maclay, Christopher; Alpaslan Özerdem, 2010, “‘Use’ Them or ‘Lose’ Them: Engaging Liberia’s Disconnected Youth through Socio-Political Integration,” International Peacekeeping, 17:3, 343-360. Maddison, Sarah; Laura Shepherd, 2014, “Peacebuilding and the Postcolonial Politics of Transitional Justice,” Peacebuilding 2:3, 253-269. Maedi, Anne; Elisabeth Schauer; Michael Odenwald; Thomas Elbert, “Psychological Rehabilitation of Ex-Combatants in Non-Western, Post-Conflict Settings,” in Martz, E (ed), Trauma and Rehabilitation After War and Conflict, New York: Springer, 177-213 Mageza-Barthel, Rirhandu, 2016, “Tracing Women’s Rights After Genocide: The Case of Rwanda,” in Wibben, Annick (ed), Researching War: Feminist Methods, Ethics and Politics, Oxon: Routledge, 143-162. Manchanda, Rita, 2001, (ed), Women, War and Peace in South Asia: Beyond Victimhood to Agency, New Delhi: Sage. Manchanda, Rita, 2004, “Maoist Insurgency in Nepal: Radicalizing Gendered Narratives,” Cultural Dynamics, 16:2, 237-258. Manchanda, Rita, 2005, “Women’s Agency in Peace Building: Gender Relations in Post- Conflict Reconstruction,” Economic and Political Weekly, 40:44, 4737-4745. Manchanda, Rita, 2010a, “Nepali Women Seize the New Political Dawn: Resisting Marginalization after Ten Years of War,” Humanitarian Dialogue. Manchanda, Rita, 2010b, “Women’s Question in Nepal’s Democratic Post Conflict Transition: Towards A Policy Research Agenda,” Peace Prints: South Asian Journal of Peacebuilding, 3:1. Manderson, Lenore; Sari Andajani, 2007, “The Social Dynamics of the Interview: Age, Class, and Gender,” Qualitative Health Research, 16:10, 1317-1334. Mani, Lata, 1998, Contentious Traditions: The Debate on Sati in Colonial India, Berkeley: University of California Press. Mansaray, Binta, 2000, “Women Against Weapons: A Leading Role for Women in Disarmament,” In Ayissi, Anatole; Robin Poulton, (eds.), Bound to Cooperate: Conflict, Peace and People in Sierra Leone, Geneva: UN Institute for Disarmament Research, 139-162. Martin Chautari, 2013, “Political Risk and Ex-Combatants,” Policy Brief, 9. Martin, Ian, 2010, “Opportunities Lost on the Path to Army Integration in Nepal,” European Bulletin of Himalayan Research, 37, 117-125.
308 Marwah, Priya; Pamela DeLargy; Lara Tabac, 2010, “Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration: Opportunities in Post-Conflict Settings,” Forced Migration Review, Supplement: HIV/AIDS, Security and Conflict, 12-13. Maschietto, Roberta Holanda, 2016, Beyond Peacebuilding: The Challenges of Empowerment Promotion in Mozambique, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Mathers, Jennifer, 2013, “Women and State Military Forces.” In Cohn, Carol (ed.), Women and Wars, Cambridge: Polity, 124–145. Maynard, Mary; June Purvis (eds), 2002, Researching Women’s Lives from a Feminist Perspective, New York: Taylor and Francis. Mayoux, Linda, 2000, “Poverty Elimination and the Empowerment of Women,” London: DFID. Mazurana, Dyan, 2004, Women In Armed Opposition Groups Speak On War, Protection and Obligations Under International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law, Workshop Report, Geneva Call and the Program for the Study of International Organizations (PSIO), Geneva, August 26-29, 2004. Mazurana, Dyan; Angela Raven-Roberts; Jane Parpart (eds.), 2005, Gender, Conflict, and Peacekeeping, Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers. Mazurana, Dyan; Kristopher Carlson, 2004, From Combat to Community: Women and Girls of Sierra Leone, Cambridge: Women Waging Peace. Mazurana, Dyan; Linda Eckerborn Cole, 2013, “Women, Girls and Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR), in Cohn, Carol (ed), Women and Wars, Cambridge: Polity Press, 194-214. Mazurana, Dyan; Susan McKay, 1999, Women and Peacebuilding, Montreal: International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development. Mazurana, Dyan; Susan McKay, 2003, Girls in Fighting Forces in Northern Uganda, Sierra Leone and Mozambique: Policy and Programme Recommendations, Quebec: CIDA. McEvoy, Sandra, 2010, “Loyalist Women Paramilitaries in Northern Ireland: Beginning a Feminist Conversation about Conflict Resolution,” in Sjoberg, Laura, (ed.), Gender and International Security: Feminist Perspectives, London: Routledge, 129-150. McEvoy-Levy, Siobhan, 2013, “Youth,” in Mac Ginty, Roger (ed), Routledge Handbook of Peacebuilding, London: Routledge, 296-308. McKay, Susan; Dyan Mazurana, 2004, Where Are the Girls? Girls in Fighting Forces in Northern Uganda, Sierra Leone and Mozambique: Their Lives During and After War, Montreal: Rights and Democracy. Mclafferty, Sara, 1995: “Counting For Women,” Professional Geographer, 47, 436-442. McLeod, Laura, 2015, “A Feminist Approach to Hybridity: Understanding Local and International Interactions in Producing Post-Conflict Gender Security,” Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, 9:1, 48-69. McLeod, Laura, 2019, “Gender and Post-Conflict Reconstruction,” in Gentry, Caron; Laura Shepherd; Laura Sjoberg (eds), The Routledge Handbook of Gender and Security, London: Routledge, 346-358. McLeod, Laura; Maria O’Reilly, 2019, “Critical Peace and Conflict Studies: Feminist Interventions,” International Journal of Feminist Politics, Forthcoming.
309 McMullin, Jaremey, 2004, “Reintegration of Combatants: Were the Right Lessons Learned in Mozambique,” International Peacekeeping 11:4, 625-643. McMullin, Jaremey, 2013a, “Integration or Separation? The Stigmatization of Ex- Combatants After War,” Review of International Studies, 39, 385-414. McMullin, Jaremey, 2013b, Ex-Combatants and the Post-Conflict State: Challenges of Reintegration, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. McNay, Lois, 2003, “Having It Both Ways: The Incompatibility Of Narrative Identity And Communicative Ethics In Feminist Thought,” Theory, Culture and Society, 20:6, 1- 20. McWilliams, Monica; Avila Kilmurray, 2015, “From the Global to the Local: Grounding UNSCR 1325 on Women, Peace and Security in Post Conflict Policy Making,” Women’s Studies International Forum, 51, 128-135. Meger, Sara, 2016, “The Fetishization of Sexual Violence in International Security,” International Studies Quarterly, 60, 149-159. Meintjes, Sheila, 2002, “War and Post-War Shifts in Gender Relations,” in Meintjes, Sheila; Anu Pillay; Meredeth Turshen (eds.), The Aftermath: Women in Post- Conflict Transformation, London: Zed Books, 63-77. Meintjes, Sheila; Anu Pillay; Meredeth Turshen (eds.), 2002, The Aftermath: Women in Post-Conflict Transformation, London: Zed Books. Mellor, Jody; Nicola Ingram; Jessia Abrahams; Phoebe Beedell, 2014, “Class Matters in the Interview Setting? Positionality, Situatedness and Class,” British Educational Research Journal, 40:1, 135-149. Millar, Gearoid, 2015, “We Have No Voice for That: Land Rights, Power, and Gender in Rural Sierra Leone,” Journal of Human Rights, 14:4, 445-462. Millar, Gearoid, 2016, “Local Experiences of Liberal Peace: Marketization and Emergent Conflict Dynamics in Sierra Leone,” Journal of Peace Research, 53:4, 569-581. Millar, Gearoid; Jaïr van der Lijn; Willemijn Verkoren, 2013, “Peacebuilding Plans and Local Reconfigurations: Frictions between Imported Processes and Indigenous Practices,” International Peacekeeping, 20:2, 137-143. Miller, Tina; Linda Bell, 2002, “Consenting to What? Issues of Access, Gate-Keeping and ‘Informed’ Consent,” in Mauthner, Melanie; Maxine Birch; Julie Jessop; Tina Miller (eds), Ethics in Qualitative Research, London: SAGE, 53-69. Mobekk, Eirin, 2010, “Gender, Women and Security Sector Reform,” International Peacekeeping, 17:2, 278-291. Mohanty, Chandra Talpade, 1984, “Under Western Eyes: Feminist Scholarship and Colonial Discourses,” Boundary 2, 12:3, 333-358. Mohanty, Chandra Talpade, 2003, Feminism Without Borders: Decolonizing Theory, Practicing Solidarity, Durham: Duke University Press. Molloy, Patricia, 1995, “Subversive Strategies or Subverting Strategy? Toward a Feminist Pedagogy for Peace,” Alternatives, 20, 225-242. Molnar, Augusta, 1982, “Women and Politics: Case of the Kham Magar of Western Nepal,” American Ethnologist, 9:3, 485-502. Molyneux, Maxine, 1981, “Socialist Societies Old and New: Progress Towards Women’s Emancipation?” Feminist Review, 8, 1-34.
310 Molyneux, Maxine, 1985, “Mobilization without Emancipation? Women’s Interests, the State, and Revolution in Nicaragua,” Feminist Studies, 11:2, 227-254. Molyneux, Maxine, 1995, “Gendered Transitions in Eastern Europe,” Feminist Studies, 21:3, 637-345. Moon, Katherine, 1997, Sex Among Allies: Military Prostitution in US-Korea Relations, New York: Columbia University Press. Moran, Mary, 1989, “Collective Action and the "Representation" of African Women: A Liberian Case Study,” Feminist Studies, 15, 443-460. Moran, Mary, 2010, “Gender, Militarism, and Peacebuilding: Projects of the Post-Conflict Moment,” Annual Review of Anthropology, 39, 261-274. Moran, Mary, 2011, Liberia: The Violence of Democracy, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. Mosedale, Sarah, 2005, “Assessing Women’s Empowerment: Towards a Conceptual Framework,” Journal of International Development, 17:2, 243-257. Moser, Caroline, 1989, “Gender Planning in the Third World: Meeting Practical and Strategic Gender Needs,” World Development, 17:11, 1799-1825. Moser, Caroline, 1993, Gender Planning and Development: Theory, Practice and Training, London: Routledge. Muggah, Robert (ed), 2009, Security and Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Dealing with Fighters in the Aftermath of War¸ London: Routledge. Muggah, Robert; Anton Baaré, 2009, “Negotiating Reintegration in Uganda: Dealing with Combatants during Peace Processes,” in Muggah, Robert (ed), Security and Post- Conflict Reconstruction: Dealing with Fighters in the Aftermath of War¸ London: Routledge, 226-247. Muggah, Robert; Mats Berdal; Stina Torjesen, 2009, “Conclusions: Enter an Evidence- Based Security Promotion,” in Muggah, Robert (ed), Security and Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Dealing with Fighters in the Aftermath of War¸ London: Routledge, 268-284. Mukhopdhyay, Maitrayee, 2007, “Mainstreaming Gender or ‘Streaming’ Gender Away: Feminists Marooned in the Development Business,” in Cornwall, Andrea; Elizabeth Harrison; Ann Whitehead (eds), Feminisms in Development: Contradictions, Contestations and Challenges, London: Zed Books, 135-149. Munive, Jairo; Stine Finne Jakobsen, 2012, “Revisiting DDR in Liberia: Exploring the Power, Agency and Interests of Local and International Actors in the ‘Making’ and ‘Unmaking’ of Combatants,” Conflict, Security and Development, 12:4, 359-385. Murshed, S Mansoob; Scott Gates, 2005, “Spatial-Horizontal Inequality and the Maoist Insurgency in Nepal,” Review of Development Economics, 9:1, 121-134. Mutua, Makau, 2001, “Savages, Victims and Saviors: The Metaphor of Human Rights,” Harvard International Law Journal, 42:1, 201. Nadarajah, Suthaharan; David Rampton, 2015, “The Limits of Hybridity and the Crisis of Liberal Peace,” Review of International Studies, 41, 49-72. Nader, Laura, 1972, “Up the Anthropologist: Perspectives Gained from Studying Up,” in Hymes, Dell (ed), Reinventing Anthropology, New York: Pantheon.
311 Nagelhus Schia, Niels; John Karlsrud, 2013, “‘Where the Rubber Meets the Road’: Friction Sites and Local-Level Peacebuilding in Haiti, Liberia, and South Sudan,” International Peacekeeping, 20:2, 233-243. Narayan, Uma, 1997, Dislocating Cultures: Identities, Traditions, and Third World Feminism, New York: Routledge. National Investment Commission Liberia (NIC), 2019, http://investliberia.gov.lr/new/page_info.php?&7d5f44532cbfc489b8db9e12e44eb8 20=NDIw, [accessed 18/03/2019]. NCDDRR, 2007, Liberian Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Programme, Final Phase, Monrovia: NCDDRR. NepalNews, 2012, 17,800 People Died During Conflict Period Says Ministry of Peace, 18 June 2012, http://www.nepalnews.com/index.php/politics-archive/19558-17800- people-died-during-conflict-period-saysministry-of-peace, [accessed 16/07/2016]. Newman, Edward, 2013, “The International Architecture of Peacebuilding,” in Mac Ginty, Roger (ed), Routledge Handbook of Peacebuilding, London: Routledge, 311-324. Newman, Edward; Roland Paris; Oliver Richmond (eds), 2009, New Perspectives on Liberal Peacebuilding, Tokyo: United Nations University Press. Ní Aoláin, Fionnuala, 2009, “Women, Security, And the Patriarchy Of Internationalized Transitional Justice,” Human Rights Quarterly 31:4, 1055–1085. Ní Aoláin, Fionnuala, 2013, “What Does Postconflict Security Mean for Women?” in Tripp, Aili Mari; Myra Marx Ferree; Christina Ewig (eds.), Gender, Violence, and Human Security: Critical Feminist Perspectives, New York: NYU Press, 33-49. Ní Aoláin, Fionnuala, 2016, “The Relationship of Political Settlement Analysis to Peacebuilding from a Feminist Perspective,” Peacebuilding, 4:2, 151-165. Ní Aoláin, Fionnuala; Dina Francesca Haynes; Naomi Cahn, 2011, On the Frontlines, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Nilsson, Anders, 2005, Reintegrating Ex-Combatants in Post-Conflict Societies, Stockholm: SIDA. Nordstrom, Carolyn, 1997, A Different Kind of War Story, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. NPFL, ULIMO, COALITION, Liberia Peace Council, 1995, Abuja Agreement, https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/file/resources/collections/peace_agreements /liberia_08191995.pdf, [accessed 19/09/2016]. Nussbaum, Martha, 2000, Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. O’Neill, April; Leora Ward, 2005, “Mainstreaming or Maneuvering? Gender and Peacekeeping in West Africa,” KAIPTC Monograph, 1. O’Reilly, Maria, 2013, “Gender and Peacebuilding,” in Mac Ginty, Roger (ed), Routledge Handbook of Peacebuilding, London: Routledge, 57-68. O’Reilly, Maria, 2016, “Peace and Justice through a Feminist Lens: Gender Justice and the Women’s Court for the Former Yugoslavia,” Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, 10:3, 419-445. O’Reilly, Maria, 2018, Gendered Agency in War and Peace: Gender Justice and Women’s Activism in Post-Conflict Bosnia-Herzegovina, London: Palgrave Macmillan.
312 O’Reilly, Maria; Andrea Ó Súillebháin; Thania Paffenholz, 2015 Reimagining Peacemaking: Women’s Role In Peace Processes, New York: International Peace Institute. Oakley, Ann, 1981, “Interviewing Women: A Contradiction In Terms,” in Roberts, Helen (ed), Doing Feminist Research, London: Routledge, 30-61. Oakley, Ann, 2005, The Ann Oakley Reader: Gender, Women And Social Science, Bristol: Policy. Ochen, Eric Awich, 2013, “Gender Issues in Reintegration: A Feminist and Rights-Based Analysis of the Experiences of Formerly Abducted Child-Mothers in Northern Uganda,” in Omeje, Kenneth; Tricia Redeker Hepner, Conflict and Peacebuilding in the African Great Lakes Region, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 197- 216. Öjendal, Joakim; Sivhuoch Ou, 2013, “From Fiction to Hybridity in Cambodia: 20 Years of Unfinished Peacebuilding,” Peacebuilding, 1:3, 365-380. Okely, Judith, 1992, “Anthropology and Autobiography: Participatory Experience and Embodied Knowledge,” in Okely, Judith; Helen Callaway (eds.), Anthropology and Autobiography, London: Routledge, 1-28. Olonisakin, ‘Funmi, 1995, “Liberia,” in Bexley, Jo; Kitty Warnock; Olivia Bennet (eds). Arms To Fight- Arms To Protect: Women Speak About Conflict, London: Panos. Olonisakin, ‘Funmi; Karen Barnes; Eka Ikpe (eds), 2011, Women, Peace and Security: Translating Policy Into Practice, London: Routledge. Opie, Anne, 1992, “Qualitative Research, Appropriation of the ‘Other’ and Empowerment,” Feminist Review, 40, 52-69. Ortbals, Candice; Meg Rincker, 2009, “Fieldwork, Identities, And Intersectionality: Negotiating Gender, Race, Class, Religion, Nationality, And Age In The Research Field Abroad: Editors' Introduction,” Political Science and Politics, 42:2, 287-290. Oxfam, 1994, The Oxfam Gender Training Manual, Oxford: Oxfam. Özerdem, Alpaslan, 2012, “A Re-Conceptualization of Ex-Combatant Reintegration: ‘Social Reintegration’ Approach,” Conflict, Security and Development, 12:1, 51-73. Özerdem, Alpaslan, 2013, “Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration,” in Mac Ginty, Roger (ed), Routledge Handbook of Peacebuilding, London: Routledge, 225-236. Özerdem, Alpaslan; Sukanya Podder, 2011, “Disarming Youth Combatants: Mitigating Youth Radicalization and Violent Extremism,” Journal of Strategic Security, 4:4, 63-80. Özerdem, Alpaslan; Sukanya Podder, 2015, Youth in Conflict and Peacebuilding: Mobilization, Reintegration and Reconciliation, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Paczynska, Agnieska, 2010, Liberia ICAF Report, https://2009- 2017.state.gov/documents/organization/187971.pdf, [accessed 24/07/2018]. Paes, Wolf-Christian, 2005, “The Challenges of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration in Liberia,” International Peacekeeping, 12:2, 253-261. Pankhurst, Donna, 2000, “Women, Gender and Peacebuilding,” Working Paper 5, Bradford: Centre for Conflict Resolution.
313 Pankhurst, Donna, 2003, “The ‘Sex War’ and Other Wars: Towards a Feminist Approach to Peace Building,” Development in Practice, 13:2, 154-177. Pankhurst, Donna, 2007, Gendered Peace: Women’s Struggles for Post-War Justice and Reconciliation, Oxford: Taylor & Francis. Pankhurst, Donna, 2008, “The Gendered Impact of Peace,” in Pugh, Michael; Neil Cooper; Mandy Turner (eds), Whose Peace? Critical Perspectives on the Political Economy of Peacebuilding, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 30-46. Pankhurst, Donna, 2010, “Sexual Violence in War,” in Shepherd, Laura (ed.), Gender Matters in Global Politics: A Feminist Introduction to International Relations, London: Routledge, 148-160. Pankhurst, Donna; Jenny Pearce, 1998, “Engendering the Analysis of Conflict: A Southern Perspective,” in Afshar, Haleh (ed), Women and Empowerment: Illustrations from the Third World, Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 155-163. Parashar, Swati, 2009, “Feminist International Relations and Women Militants: Case Studies from Sri Lanka and Kashmir,” Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 22:2, 235-256. Paris, Roland, 1997, “Peacebuilding and the Limits of Liberal Internationalism,” International Security, 22:2, 54-89. Paris, Roland, 2002, “International Peacebuilding and the ‘Mission Civilisatrice’,” Review of International Studies, 28:4, 637-656. Paris, Roland, 2004, At War’s End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Paris, Roland, 2010, “Saving Liberal Peacebuilding,” Review of International Studies, 36, 337-365. Parpart, Jane, 2010a, “Choosing Silence: Rethinking Voice, Agency, and Women’s Empowerment,” Gender, Development, and Globalization Program, Working Paper 297. Parpart, Jane, 2010b, “Response to Naila Kabeer’s Comments on ‘Choosing Silence: Rethinking Voice, Agency and Women’s Empowerment,” Gender, Development, and Globalization Program, Working Paper 297. Parpart, Jane, 2014a, “Exploring the Transformative Potential of Gender Mainstreaming in International Development Institutions,” Journal of International Development, 26, 382-395. Parpart, Jane, 2014b, “Gender, Violence and Human Security: Critical Feminist Perspectives,” Gender and Development, 22:3, 589-592. Parpart, Jane; Shirin Rai; Kathleen Staudt, 2002, Rethinking Empowerment: Gender and Development in a Global/Local World, London: Routledge. Parpart, Jane; Swati Parashar, 2018, Rethinking Silence: Voice and Agency in Contested Gendered Terrains Beyond the Binary, Milton: Routledge. Partis-Jennings, Hannah, 2017, “The (In)Security of Gender in Afghanistan’s Peacebuilding Project: Hybridity and Affect,” International Feminist Journal of Politics, 19:4, 411-425.
314 Patel, Ana Cutter, 2009, “Transitional Justice and DDR,” in Muggah, Robert (ed), Security and Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Dealing with Fighters in the Aftermath of War¸ London: Routledge, 248-267. Pathak, Bishnu; Devendra Uprety, 2010, “Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration and Security Sector Reform in Nepal: A Preliminary Sociological Observation,” Situation Update, 90, 1-25. Pauwels, Nathalie, 2000, (ed), War Force to Work Force: Global Perspectives on Demobilization and Reintegration, Baden-Baden: NOMOS Verlag. Peake, Gordon, 2009, “What the Timorese Veterans Say: Unpacking Security Promotion in Timor-Leste,” in Muggah, Robert (ed), Security and Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Dealing with Fighters in the Aftermath of War¸ London: Routledge, 165-189. Pearson, Ruth, 2007, “Reassessing Paid Work and Women’s Empowerment: Lessons from the Global Economy,” in Cornwall, Andrea; Elizabeth Harrison; Ann Whitehead (eds), Feminisms in Development: Contradictions, Contestations and Challenges, London: Zed Books, 201-213. Peters, Krijn, 2004, Re-Examining Voluntarism: Youth Combatants in Sierra Leone, Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies. Peters, Krijn, 2012, “Youth, Wars and Violence in West Africa,” History Compass, 10:12, 879-888. Peterson, Jenny, 2012, “A Conceptual Unpacking of Hybridity: Accounting for Notions of Power, Politics and Progress in Analyses of Aid-Driven Interfaces,” Journal of Peacebuilding and Development, 7:2, 9-22. Peterson, V Spike, 2005, “How (The Meanings Of) Gender Matters in Political Economy,” New Political Economy, 10:4, 499-521. Peterson, V Spike; Anne Runyan, 2010, Global Gender Issues: In the New Millennium, Boulder: Westview. Phillips, Ruth, 2015, “How ‘Empowerment’ May Miss Its Mark: Gender Equality Policies and How They are Understood in Women’s NGOs,” Voluntas, 26, 1122-1142. Podder, Sukanya, 2012, “From Recruitment to Reintegration: Communities and Ex- Combatants in Post-Conflict Liberia,” International Peacekeeping, 19:2, 186-202. Poland, Blacke; Ann Pederson, 1998, “Reading Between the Lines: Interpreting Silences in Qualitative Research,” Qualitative Inquiry, 4:2, 293-312. Popplewell, Rowan, 2018, “Civil Society, Hybridity and Peacebuilding in Burundi: Questioning Authenticity,” Third World Quarterly, 39, 1-18. Porter, Antonia, 2018, “Women, Gender, and Peacebuilding,” in Karbo, Tony; Kudrat Virk (eds), The Palgrave Handbook of Peacebuilding in Africa, Cham: Palgrave, 317- 337. Porter, Antonia, 2018, “Women, Gender, and Peacebuilding,” in Karbo, Tony; Kudrat Virk (eds), The Palgrave Handbook of Peacebuilding in Africa, Cham: Palgrave, 317- 337. Porter, Elisabeth, 2007, Peacebuilding: Women in International Perspective, London: Routledge. Porter, Elisabeth, 2016a, “Feminists Building Peace and Reconciliation: Beyond Post- Conflict,” Peacebuilding, 4:2, 210-255.
315 Porter, Elisabeth, 2016b, “Gendered Narratives: Stories and Silences in Transitional Justice,” Human Rights Review, 17, 35-50. Porter, Elizabeth, 2013, “Rethinking Women’s Empowerment,” Journal of Peacebuilding and Development, 8:1, 1-14. Pouligny, Béatrice, 2004a, Les Anciens Combattants D’Aujourd’Hui: Désarmement, Démobilisation et Réinsertion, Paris: CERI. Pouligny, Béatrice, 2004b, The Politics and Anti-Politics of Contemporary ‘Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration’ Programs, Paris: CERI Sciences Po. Prieto, Juan Diego, 2012, “Together after war While the War Goes On: Victims, Ex- Combatants and Communities in Three Colombian Cities,” The International Journal of Transitional Justice, 6, 525-546. Prügl, Elisabeth, 2004, “International Institutions and Feminist Politics,” Brown Journal of World Affairs, 10:2, 69-84. Puechguirbal, Nadine, 2003, “Women and War in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,” Signs, 28:4, 1271-1281. Puechguirbal, Nadine, 2010a, “Discourses on Gender, Patriarchy and Resolution 1325: A Textual Analysis of UN Documents,” International Peacekeeping, 17:2, 172-187. Puechguirbal, Nadine, 2010b, “Peacekeeping, Peacebuilding and Post-Conflict Reconstruction,” in Shepherd, Laura (ed.), Gender Matters in Global Politics: A Feminist Introduction to International Relations, London: Routledge, 161-175. Puechguirbal, Nadine; Cynthia Enloe, 2004, “Failing to Secure the Peace: Practical Gendered Lessons from Haiti and Iraq,” Tufts University, Consortium Lecture. Pugel, James, 2007, What the Fighters Say: A Survey of Ex-Combatants in Liberia, February-March 2006, New York: UNDP. Pugel, James, 2009, “Measuring Reintegration in Liberia: Assessing the Gap Between Outputs and Outcomes,” in Muggah, Robert (ed), Security and Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Dealing with Fighters in the Aftermath of War¸ London: Routledge, 70-102. Pugh, Michael, 2005, “The Political Economy of Peacebuilding: A Critical Theory Perspective,” International Journal of Peace Studies, 10:2, 23-42. Pugh, Michael; Neil Cooper; Mandy Turner (eds), 2008, Whose Peace? Critical Perspectives on the Political Economy of Peacebuilding, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. RA Online, 2019, Maps of Nepal, https://www.raonline.ch/pages/np/npmaps01b.html, [accessed 18/03/2019]. Rabasa, Angela; John Gordon IV; Peter Chalk; Christopher Chivvis; Audra Grant; K Scott McMahon; Laurel Miller; Marco Overhaus; Stephanie Pezard, 2011, From Insurgency to Stability. Volume I: Key Capabilities and Practices, Santa Monica: RAND Corporation. Rabe, Marlize, 2003, “Research Reports: Revisiting ‘Insiders’ And ‘Outsiders’ As Social Researchers,” African Sociological Review, 7:2, 149-161. Rai, Kailash, 2017, “Heroic Tales: Memoirs by Maoist Women,” in Hutt, Michael; Pratyoush Onta (eds), Political Change and Public Culture in Post-1990 Nepal, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 197-222.
316 Rajasingham-Senanayake, Darini, 2001, “Ambivalent Empowerment: The Tragedy Of Tamil Women In Conflict,” in Manchanda, Rita (ed) Women, War And Peace In South Asia: Beyond Victimhood To Agency, New Delhi: Sage, 102–130. Ramazanoğlu, Caroline; Janet Holland, 2002, Feminist Methodology: Challenges and Choices, London: Sage. Ramnarain, Smita, 2015, “Interrogating Women’s Peace Work: Community-Based Peacebuilding, Gender, and Savings’ Co-Operatives in Post-Conflict Nepal,” Community Development Journal, 50:4, 677-692. Reardon, Betty, 1985, Sexism and the War System, New York: Teachers College Press. Reardon, Betty, 1990, “Feminist Concepts of Peace and Security,” in Smoker, Paul; Ruth Davies; Barbara Munske (eds), A Reader in Peace Studies, Oxford: Pergamon Press, 136-143. Reardon, Betty, 1993, Women and Peace: Feminist Visions of Global Security, Albany: SUNY Press. Reardon, Betty, 1998, “Gender and Global Security: A Feminist Challenge to the United Nations and Peace Research,” Journal of International Cooperation Studies, 6:1, 29-56. Reay, Diane, 1996, “Insider Perspectives Or Stealing The Words Out Of Women’s Mouths: Interpretation In The Research Process,” Feminist Review, 53, 57-73. Rees, Teresa, 1998, Mainstreaming Equality in the European Union, Education, Training and Labour Market Policies, London: Routledge. Rehn, Elisabeth; Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, 2002, Women, War and Peace: The Independent Experts’ Assessment on the Impact of Armed Conflict on Women and Women’s Role in Peace-Building, New York: UNDP. Reily, Heidi, 2019, “Male Collective Identity in the People’s Liberation Army,” International Feminist Journal of Politics, [online]. Reinharz, Shulamit, 1992, Feminist Methods in Social Research, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Reliefweb, 2004, Liberia: Rebels Dig in at Rubber Plantation, 10 August 2004, https://reliefweb.int/report/liberia/liberia-rebels-dig-rubber-plantation, [accessed 17/07/2018]. Rhodes, Penny, 1994, “Race-Of-Interviewer Effects: A Brief Comment,” Sociology, 28:2, 547–558. Richards, David, 1996, “Elite Interviewing: Approaches and Pitfalls,” Doing Politics, 16:3, 199-204. Richards, Paul, 1995, “Rebellion in Liberia and Sierra Leone: A Crisis of Youth?” in Oliver Furley, Conflict in Africa, London: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 134-170. Richards, Paul, 2005a, (ed.), No Peace, No War: An Anthropology of Contemporary Armed Conflicts, Athens, OH: Ohio University Press. Richards, Paul, 2005b, “New War: An Ethnographic Approach,” in Richards, Paul (ed.), No Peace, No War: An Anthropology of Contemporary Armed Conflicts, Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 1-21. Richmond, Oliver, 2002, Maintaining Order, Making Peace, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
317 Richmond, Oliver, 2008a, “The UN and Liberal Peacebuilding: Consensus and Challenges,” in Darby, John; Roger Mac Ginty (eds.), Contemporary Peacemaking: Conflict, Peace Processes and Post-War Reconstruction, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 257-270. Richmond, Oliver, 2008b, Peace in International Relations, Oxon: Routledge. Richmond, Oliver, 2009a, “A Post-Liberal Peace: Eirenism and the Everyday,” Review of International Studies, 35, 557-580. Richmond, Oliver, 2009b, “Becoming Liberal, Unbecoming Liberalism: Liberal-Local Hybridity via the Everyday as a Response to the Paradoxes of Liberal Peacebuilding,” Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, 3:3, 324-344. Richmond, Oliver, 2010a, (ed), Palgrave Advances in Peacebuilding: Critical Developments and Approaches, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Richmond, Oliver, 2010b, “Resistance and the Post-Liberal Peace,” Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 38:3, 665-692. Richmond, Oliver, 2011a, “Critical Agency, Resistance and a Post-Colonial Civil Society,” Cooperation and Conflict, 46, 419-440. Richmond, Oliver, 2011b, “De-Romanticizing the local, De-Mystifying the International: Hybridity in Timor Leste and the Solomon Islands,” The Pacific Review, 24:1, 115- 136. Richmond, Oliver, 2011c, A Post-Liberal Peace, London: Routledge. Richmond, Oliver, 2016, “Peace in International Relations Theory,” in Richmond, Oliver; Sandra Pogodda; Jasmin Ramivić (eds), The Palgrave Handbook of Disciplinary and Regional Approaches to Peace, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 57-680 Richmond, Oliver, 2018a, “Rescuing Peacebuilding? Anthropology and Peace Formation,” Global Society, 32:2, 221-239. Richmond, Oliver, 2018b, “The Impact of Inequality on Peacebuilding and State-Building in Africa,” in Karbo, Tony; Kudrat Virk (eds), The Palgrave Handbook of Peacebuilding in Africa, Cham: Palgrave, 299-316. Richmond, Oliver; Audra Mitchell (eds), 2012, Hybrid Forms of Peace: From Everyday Agency to Post-Liberalism, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Richmond, Oliver; Audra Mitchell, 2011, “Peacebuilding and Critical Forms of Agency: From Resistance to Subsistence,” Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, 36:4, 326- 344. Richmond, Oliver; Roger Mac Ginty, 2015, “Where Now for the Critique of the Liberal Peace?” Cooperation and Conflict, 50:2, 171-189. Richmond, Oliver; Stefanie Kappler; Annika Björkdahl, 2015, “The ‘Field’ in the Age of Intervention: Power, Legitimacy, and Authority Versus the ‘Local’,” Millennium 44:1, 23-44. Riley, Heidi, 2019, “Male Collective Identity in the People’s Liberation Army of Nepal,” International Feminist Journal of Politics, [online]. Roberts, Helen, 1981, Doing Feminist Research. London: Routledge. Robins, Simon; Ram Kumar Bhandari; Ex-PLA Research Group, 2016, “Poverty, Stigma and Alienation: A Participatory Action Research Project with ex-PLA Fighters in Nepal,” York: Centre for Applied Human Rights.
318 Rose, Gillian, 1997, “Situating Knowledges: Positionality, Reflexivities and Other Tactics,” Progress in Human Geography, 21:3, 305-320. Rowlands, Jo, 1997, Questioning Empowerment, Oxford: Oxfam. Rowlands, Jo, 1998, “A Word of the Times, but What Does It Mean? Empowerment in the Discourse and Practice of Development,” in Afshar, Haleh (ed), Women and Empowerment: Illustrations from the Third World, Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 11-34. Ryan, Caitlin; Helen Basini, 2017, “UNSC Resolution 1325 National Action Plans In Liberia And Sierra Leone: An Analysis Of Gendered Power Relations In Hybrid Peacebuilding,” Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, 11:2, 186–206. Ryan, Caitlyn; Helen Basini, 2017, “UNSC Resolution 1325 National Action Plans in Liberia and Sierra Leone: An Analysis of Gendered Power Relations in Hybrid Peacebuilding,” Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, 11:2, 186-206. Ryan, Stephen, 2009, “Conflict Transformation: Reasons to be Modest,” in Sandole, Dennis; Sean Byrne; Ingrid Sandole-Staroste; Jessica Senehi (eds), Handbook of Conflict Analysis and Resolution, Oxon: Routledge, 303-314. Ryan, Stephen, 2013, “The Evolution of Peacebuilding,” in Mac Ginty, Roger (ed), Routledge Handbook of Peacebuilding, London: Routledge, 25-35. Sabaratnam Meera, 2013, "Avatars of Eurocentrism in the critique of the liberal peace," Security Dialogue, 44:1, 259–278. Saferworld, 2010, Common Ground? Gendered Assessment of Needs and Concerns of Maoist Army Combatants for Rehabilitation and Integration, http://www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/view-resource/502-common-ground, [accessed 29/04/2016]. Said, Edward, 1978, Orientalism, New York: Pantheon. Santa-Barbara, Joanna, 2007, “Reconciliation,” in Webel, Charles; Johan Galtung (eds), Handbook of Peace of Conflict Studies, London: Routledge, 173-186. Santander, Louis Monroy, 2016, “Reconciliation: A Critical Approach to Peacebuilding in Bosnia-Herzegovina,” Peace, Conflict and Development, 22, 77-116. Sapkota, Bishnu, 2004, The Cost of War in Nepal: A Research Study, Kathmandu: National Peace Campaign. Sasson-Levy, Oma, 2008, “Individual Bodies, Collective State Interests: The Case of Israeli Combat Soldiers.” Men and Masculinities 10:3, 296–321. Scheyvens, Regina; Barbara Nowak; Henry Scheyvens, 2003, “Ethical Issues,” in Scheyvens, Regina; Donovan Storey (eds). Development Fieldwork: A Practical Guide, London: Sage Publication, 139-166. Schnabel, Albrecht; Vanessa Farr (eds), 2012, Back to the Roots: Security Sector Reform and Development, Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces. Schulhofer-Wohl, Jonah; Nicholas Sambanis, 2010, Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Programs: An Assessment, Uppsala: Fyris Tryck. Schulz, Philipp, 2016, “Transitional Justice for Male Victims of Conflict-Related Sexual and Gender-Based Violence,” International Journal of Rule of Law, https://www.ceeol.com/search/viewpdf?id=740697, [accessed 18/01/2019].
319 Schulz, Philipp, 2018, “The ‘Ethical Loneliness’ of Male Sexual Violence Survivors in Northern Uganda: gendered Reflections on Silencing,” International Feminist Journal of Politics, 20:4, 583, 601. Scott, Joan, 1992, “Experience,” in Butler, Judith; Joan Scott (eds), Feminists Theorize the Political, New York: Routledge, 22-40. Selby, Jan, 2008, “The Political Economy of Peace Processes,” in Pugh, Michael; Neil Cooper; Mandy Turner (eds), Whose Peace? Critical Perspectives on the Political Economy of Peacebuilding, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 11-29. Selimovic, Johanna Mannergren, 2010, Remembering and Forgetting After War, Ph.D. diss., Gothenburg: University of Gothenburg. Selimovic, Johanna Mannergren, 2018, “Gendered Silences in Post-Conflict Societies: A Typology,” Peacebuilding, [online], 1-15. Sen, Gita, 1997, “Empowerment As An Approach To Poverty,” Working Paper Series 97, New York: UNDP. Sending, Ole Jacob, 2009, “Why Peacebuilders Fail to Secure Ownership and be Sensitive to Context,” Security in Practice, 1. Shah, Saeeda, 2004, “The Researcher/Interviewer In Intercultural Context: A Social Intruder!” British Educational Research Journal, 30:4, 549-575. Shaw, Rosalind, 2007, “Memory Frictions: Localizing the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in Sierra Leone,” International Journal of Transitional Justice, 1:1, 183-207. Shawna, Carroll, 2015, “Catch Them Young: Participation and Roles of Girl Child Soldiers in Armed Conflict,” in Shekhawat, Seema (ed), Female Combatants in Conflict and Peace: Challenging Gender in Violence and Post-Conflict Reintegration, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 36-52. Shekhawat, Seema (ed), 2015, Female Combatants in Conflict and Peace: Challenging Gender in Violence and Post-Conflict Reintegration, New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Shekhawat, Seema; Bishnu Pathak, 2015, “Female Combatants, Peace Process and the Exclusion,” in Shekhawat, Seema (ed), Female Combatants in Conflict and Peace: Challenging Gender in Violence and Post-Conflict Reintegration, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 53-68. Shepherd, Laura, 2007, “‘Victims, Perpetrators and Actors’ Revisited: Exploring the Potential for a Feminist Reconceptualization of (International) Security and (Gender) Violence,” British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 9:2, 239-256. Shepherd, Laura, 2008b, Gender, Violence and Security: Discourse as Practice, London: Zed Books. Shepherd, Laura, 2010a, (ed.), Gender Matters in Global Politics: A Feminist Introduction to International Relations, London: Routledge. Shepherd, Laura, 2010b, “Women, Armed Conflict and Language – Gender, Violence and Discourse,” International Review of the Red Cross, 92:877, 143-159. Shepherd, Laura, 2011, “Sex, Security and Superhero(in)es: From 1325 to 1820 and Beyond,” International Feminist Journal of Politics, 13:4, 504-521.
320 Shepherd, Laura, 2013a, (ed),Critical Approaches to Security: An Introduction to Theories and Methods, London: Routledge. Shepherd, Laura, 2013b, “The State of Feminist Security Studies: Continuing the Conversation,” International Studies Perspectives, 14, 436-439. Shepherd, Laura, 2015, “Constructing Civil Society: Gender, Power and Legitimacy in United Nations Peacebuilding Discourse,” European Journal of International Relations, 21:4, 887-910. Shepherd, Laura, 2016a, “Feminist Security Studies,” in Steans, Jill; Daniela Tepe- Belfrage (eds), Handbook on Gender in World Politics, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar Publishing, 263-270. Shepherd, Laura, 2016b, “Victims of Violence of Agents of Change? Representations of Women in UN Peacebuilding Discourse,” Peacebuilding, 4:2, 121-135. Shepherd, Laura, 2017, Gender, UN Peacebuilding, and the Politics of Space: Locating Legitimacy, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Sherif, Abu, 2008, “Reintegration of Female War-Affected and Ex-Combatants in Liberia,” Conflict Trends, 3, 26-33. Shikola, Teckla, 1998, “We Left Our Shoes Behind,” In Turshen, Meredeth; Clotilde. Twagiramariya, (eds.), What Women Do in Wartime: Gender and Conflict in Africa, New York: Zed Books, 150-162. Showden, Carisa, 2011, Choices Women Make: Agency in Domestic Violence, Assisted Reproduction, and Sex Work, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Shrestha-Schipper, Satya, 2008, “Women’s Participation in the People’s War in Jumla,” European Bulletin of Himalayan Research, 33, 105-122. SIDA, 2009, Women’s Economic Empowerment in Conflict and Post-Conflict Countries, Stockholm: Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency. Sideris, Tina, 2002, “Problems of Identity, Solidarity and Reconciliation,” in Meintjes, Sheila; Anu Pillay; Meredeth Turshen (eds.), The Aftermath: Women in Post- Conflict Transformation, London: Zed Books 46-62. Simangan, Dahlia, 2018, “When Hybridity Breeds Contempt: Negative Hybrid Peace in Cambodia,” Third World Quarterly, Forthcoming, 1-18. Sivakumaran, Sandesh, 2005, “Male/Male Rape And The “Taint” Of Homosexuality,” Human Rights Quarterly, 27:4, 1274–1306. Sivakumaran, Sandesh, 2007, “Sexual Violence Against Men In Armed Conflict,” European Journal of International Law, 18:2, 253–276. Sjoberg, Laura, 2007, “Agency, Militarized Femininity and Enemy Others: Observations From The War in Iraq,” International Feminist Journal of Politics, 9:1, 82-101. Sjoberg, Laura, 2009a, “Gender, Just War, and Non-State Actors,” in Heinze, Eric; Brent Steele (eds), Ethics, Authority, and War: Non-State Actors and the Just War Tradition, New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Sjoberg, Laura, 2009b, “Introduction to Security Studies: Feminist Contributions,” Security Studies, 18:2, 183-213. Sjoberg, Laura, 2010, “Women Fighters and the ‘Beautiful Soul’ Narrative,” International Review of the Red Cross, 92:877, 53-68.
321 Sjoberg, Laura, Caron Gentry, 2007, Mothers, Monsters and Whores: Women’s Violence in Global Politics, London: Zed Books. Sjoberg, Laura; Jessica Peet, 2011, “A(Nother) Dark Side Of The Protection Racket,” International Feminist Journal of Politics, 13:2, 163–182. Smet, Stijn, 2009, “A Window of Opportunity – Improving Gender Relations in Post- Conflict Societies: the Sierra Leonean Experience,” Journal of Gender Studies, 18:2, 147-163. Smith, Dorothy, 1977, “Some Implications of a Sociology for Women,” in Glazer, Nona; Helen Waehrer (eds), Women in a Man-Made World: A Socioeconomic Handbook, Chicago: Rand McNally. Smith, Fiona, 1996, “Problematising Language: Limitations And Possibilities In `Foreign Language' Research,” Area 28, 160-166. Smith, Katherine, 2006, “Problematizing Power Relations in Elite Interviews,” Geoforum, 37, 643-653. Smith, Sarah, 2019, Gender Peace: UN Peacebuilding in Timor Leste, London: Routledge. Snodgrass, Lyn, 2010, “A Gendered Perspective of Post-Conflict Reconstruction: African Women in Peacebuilding,” Africa Insight, 40:2, 109-120. Snyder, Anna, 2009, “Gender Relations and Conflict Transformation Among Refugee Women,” in Sandole, Dennis; Sean Byrne; Ingrid Sandole-Staroste; Jessica Senehi (eds), Handbook of Conflict Analysis and Resolution, Oxon: Routledge, 45-58. Snyder, KL, 1990, “Equal Right to Fight: An Analysis of The Constitutionality of Laws and Policies That Exclude Women from Combat in The United States Military,” West Virginia Law Review 93, 421–454. Snyder, R Claire, 1999, Citizen-Soldiers and Manly Warriors: Military Service and Gender in the Civic Republican Tradition, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield. Snyder, R Claire, 2003, “The Citizen-Soldier Tradition And Gender Integration Of The US Military,” Armed Forces & Society, 29:2, 185–204. Sørensen, Birgitte, 1998, “Women and Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Issues and Sources,” WSP Occasional Paper, 3. Specht, Irma, 2006, Red Shoes: Experiences of Girl-Combatants in Liberia, Geneva: ILO. Spivak, Gayatri Chakrabarty, 1985, “The Rani of Sirmur: An Essay in Reading the Archives,” History and Theory, 24:3, 247-272. Spivak, Gayatri Chakrabarty, 1988, “Can the Subaltern Speak?” in Nelson, Cary; Lawrence Grossberg (eds), Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture, 271-313. Stacey, Judith, 1988, “Can There Be a Feminist Ethnography?” Women’s Studies International Forum 11, 21-27. Stachowitsch Saskia, 2013, “Professional Soldier, Weak Victim, Patriotic Heroine,” International Feminist Journal of Politics, 15:2, 157–176. Stankovic Tatjana; Torjesen Stina; Bleie Tone, 2010, Fresh Insights on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration: A Survey for Practitioners in Nepal, Tromsø: Center for Peace Studies. Steans, Jill, 1999, “The Private is Global: Feminist Politics and Global Political Economy,” New Political Economy, 4:1, 113-128. Steans, Jill, 2013, Gender and International Relations, Cambridge: Polity.
322 Steans, Jill; Daniela Tepe-Belfrage (eds), 2016, Handbook on Gender in World Politics, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar Publishing. Stedman, Stephen John, 2008, “Peace Processes and the Challenged of Violence,” in Darby, John; Roger Mac Ginty (eds.), Contemporary Peacemaking: Conflict, Peace Processes and Post-War Reconstruction, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 147-158. Steinberg, Gerald, 2013, “The Limits of Peacebuilding Theory,” in Mac Ginty, Roger (ed), Routledge Handbook of Peacebuilding, London: Routledge, 36-54. Stern, Maria, 2005, Naming Security, Constructing Identity: ‘Mayan –Women’ In Guatemala on the Eve of ‘Peace’, Manchester: Manchester University Press. Stern, Maria, 2006, “Racism, Sexism, Classism, and Much More: Reading Security- Identity in Marginalized Sites” in Brooke Ackerly, Maria Stern, Jacqui True (eds), Feminist Methodologies for International Relations, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 174-198. Stevens, Jacqueline, 1999, Reproducing the State, Princeton: Princeton University Press. Stiehm Judith Hicks, 1982, “The Protected, The Protector, The Defender,” Women’s Studies International Forum, 5:3, 367–376. Stiehm Judith Hicks, 1989, Arms and the Enlisted Woman, Philadelphia: Temple University Press. Stiehm Judith Hicks, 1996, It’s Our Military, Too! Women and the US Military, Philadelphia: Temple University Press. Sturges, Judith; Kathleen Hanrahan, 2004, “Comparing Telephone and Face-To-Face Qualitative Interviewing: A Research Note,” Qualitative Research, 4:1, 107-118. Subedi, DB, 2013a, “Does Cash Induce Corruption in DDR programmes? Unpacking the Experience from Nepal,” Peace and Conflict Review, 8:1, 30-42. Subedi, DB, 2013b, “From Civilian to Combatant: Armed Recruitment and Participation in the Maoist Conflict in Nepal,” Contemporary South Asia, 21:4, 429-443. Subedi, DB, 2014, “Dealing with Ex-Combatants in a Negotiated Peace Process: Impacts of Transitional Politics on the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Programme in Nepal,” Journal of Asian and African Studies, 49:6, 672-689. Subrahmanian, Ramya, 2007, “Making Sense of Gender in Shifting Institutional Contexts: Some Reflections of Gender Mainstreaming,” in Cornwall, Andrea; Elizabeth Harrison; Ann Whitehead (eds), Feminisms in Development: Contradictions, Contestations and Challenges, London: Zed Books, 112-121. Suhrke, Astri; Mats Berdal (eds), 2012, The Peace in Between: Post-War Violence and Peacebuilding, London: Routledge. Sundar, Aparna; Nandini Sundar (eds), 2014, Civil Wars in South Asia: State, Sovereignty, Development, London: Sage. Sweetman, Caroline, 2005, Gender, Peacebuilding and Reconstruction, Oxford: Oxfam. Sylvester, Christine, 1994, Feminist Theory and International Relations in the Postmodern Era, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Sylvester, Christine, 2010, “War, Sense, and Security,” in Sjoberg, Laura, (ed.), Gender and International Security: Feminist Perspectives, London: Routledge, 24-37.
323 Sylvester, Christine, 2013, War as Experience: Contributions from International Relations and Feminist Analysis, London: Routledge. Tamagnini, Andrea; Teresa Krafft, 2010, “Strategic Approaches to Reintegration: Lessons Learned from Liberia,” Global Governance, 16:1, 13-20. Tamang, Seira, 2009, “The Politics of Conflict and Difference or the Difference of Conflict in Politics: The Women’s Movement in Nepal,” Feminist Review, 91, 61-80. Tamang, Seira, 2017, “Motherhood Containers: Cantonments and the Media Framing of Female Ex-Combatants in Nepal’s Transition,” in Hutt, Michael; Pratyoush Onta (eds), Political Change and Public Culture in Post-1990 Nepal, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 223-252. Taylor, Diane, 2012, Black Diamond: A Female Victim of Charles Taylor’s Crimes Speaks Out, The Guardian, 28th May 2012, https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2012/may/28/female-victim-charles- taylor-speaks, [accessed 29/03/2017]. Thapa, Deepak, 2016, “Introduction: The Maoist Conflict and Women,” in Murthy, Laxmi; Mitu Varma (eds), Garrisoned Minds: Women and Armed Conflict in South Asia, New Delhi: Speaking Tiger, 109. Thaves, Bob, 1982, Sure He Was Great, But Don't Forget That Ginger Rogers Did Everything He Did ... Backwards And In High Heels! Frank and Ernst. Themnér, Anders, 2011, Violence in Post-Conflict Societies: Remarginalization, Remobilizers and Relationships, London: Routledge. Themnér, Anders, 2015, The Ties that Bind: Ex-Military Command Structures as a Foundation for Peace or Source for Insecurity? December 11, 2015, https://matsutas.wordpress.com/2015/12/11/the-ties-that-bind-ex-military- command-structures-as-a-foundation-for-peace-or-source-for-insecurity-by-anders- themner/, [accessed 09/05/2017]. Tickner, J Ann, 1992, Gender in International Relations: Feminist Perspectives on Achieving Global Security, New York: Columbia University Press. Tickner, J Ann, 1995, “Introducing Feminist Perspectives into Peace and World Security Courses,” Women’s Studies Quarterly, 23:4, 48-57. Tickner, J Ann, 2004, “Feminist Responses to International Security Studies,” Peace Review, 16:1, 43-48. Tickner, J Ann, 2014, A Feminist Voyage Through International Relations, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Tickner, J Ann; Jacqui True, 2018, “A Century of International Relations Feminism: From World War I Women’s Peace Pragmatism to the Women, Peace and Security Agenda,” International Studies Quarterly, 62, 221-233. Toda, Junko, 2010, “Girls on the Front Lines: Perspectives from Nepal,” OPSCEN Take. Torres, Paula; Yaneth Giha; Sergio Jaramillo, Transitional Justice and DDR: The Case of Colombia, New York: International Center for Transitional Justice. Transition International, 2013, Independent Evaluation of the UN Interagency Rehabilitation Programme (UNIRP), http://mptf.undp.org/document/download/10951, [accessed 15/10/2016].
324 Tripp, Aili Mari, 2015, Woman and Power in Post-Conflict Africa, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Tripp, Aili Mari; Isabel Casimiro; Joy Kwesiga; Alice Mungwa, 2009, African Women’s Movements: Transforming Political Landscapes, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. True, Jacqui, 2005, “Feminism” in Burchill, Scott; Andrew Linklater; Richard Devetak; Jack Donnelly; Matthew Paterson; Christian Reus-Smit; Jacqui True (eds), Theories of International Relations, 3rd Edition, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 213-234. True, Jacqui, 2017, “Rebuilding with or Without Women? Gendered Violence in Postconflict Peace and Reconstruction,” in True, Jacqui, The Political Economy of Violence against Women, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1-27. True, Jacqui; Michael Mintrom, 2001, “Transnational Networks and Policy-Diffusion: The Case of Gender Mainstreaming,” International Studies Quarterly, 45:1, 27-57. Tryggestad, Torunn, 2010, “The UN Peacebuilding Commission and Gender: A Case of Norm Reinforcement,” International Peacekeeping, 17:2, 159-171. Tsing, Anna Lowenhaupt, 2005, Friction: An Ethnography of Global Connection, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Turpin, Jennifer, 1998, “Many Faces: Women Confronting War,” in Lorentzen, Lois Ann; Jennifer Turpin (eds), The Women and War Reader, New York: New York University Press, 3-18. Turshen, Meredeth, 2001, “Engendering Relations of State to Society in the Aftermath,” in Meintjes, Sheila; Anu Pillay; Meredeth Turshen (eds.), The Aftermath: Women in Post-Conflict Transformation, London: Zed Books, 78-96. Turshen, Meredeth; Clotilde Twagiramariya, 1998, What Women do in Wartime: Gender and Conflict in Africa, London: Zed Books. UN AIDS, 2017, Ending Aids: Progress Towards the 90-90-90 Targets, Geneva: UN AIDS. UN General Assembly, 1989, Convention on the Rights of the Child. UN Peacebuilding Support Office (UN PBSO), 2012, “DDR and Peacebuilding: Thematic Review of DDR Contributions to Peacebuilding and the Role of the Peacebuilding Fund,” New York: United Nations. UN Women, 2015, Preventing Conflict, Transforming Justice, Securing the Peace: A Global Study on the Implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325, http://wps.unwomen.org/~/media/files/un%20women/wps/highlights/unw- global-study-1325-2015.pdf, [accessed 01/02/2016]. UN Women, 2018, About UN Women, http://www.unwomen.org/en/about-us/about-un- women, [20/09/2018]. UN Women, 2018b, Women’s Participation in Peace Negotiations: Connections Between Presence and Influence, http://www.unwomen.org/- /media/headquarters/attachments/sections/library/publications/2012/10/wpssourceb ook-03a-womenpeacenegotiations-en.pdf?la=en&vs=1159, [accessed 24/11/2018]. UN Women, 2019, Gender Mainstreaming, http://www.unwomen.org/en/how-we- work/un-system-coordination/gender-mainstreaming, [accessed 18/03/2018].
325 UNDP, 2003b, UNDP Liberia Post-Conflict Strategy 2004/2005, Monrovia: UNDP. UNDP, 2004, Liberia Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation, and Reintegration Programme, Monrovia: UNDP. UNDP, 2005, Practice Note: Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of Ex- Combatants, New York: UNDP. UNDP, 2006a, DDRRP Liberia Lessons Learnt and Summary, , https://erc.undp.org/evaluation/evaluations/detail/2703, [accessed 29/04/2016]. UNDP, 2006b, Gender Equality: Evaluation of Gender Mainstreaming in UNDP, New York: UNDP. UNDP, 2007, Final Report to the European Commission for the 3rd EC Contribution to Liberia DDRR Trust Fund, Monrovia: UNDP. UNDP, 2008, Crisis Prevent and Recovery Support to Nepal, May 2008-Apr 2009, Kathmandu: UNDP. UNDP, 2010, UNDP’s Partnership with the Global Fund in Liberia: Supporting Implementation, Developing Capacity, UNDP: New York. UNDP, 2012, Blame It on the War? The Gender Dimensions of Violence in Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration, New York: UNDP. UNDP, 2015, Annual Report Nepal, New York: UNDP. UNDP, 2016, Goal 5: Gender Equality, http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/sustainable-development-goals/goal-5- gender-equality.html, [accessed 20/09/2018]. UNDPKO, 1999, Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants in a Peacekeeping Environment: Principles and Guidelines, New York: UNDPKO. UNDPKO, 2005, Gender Mainstreaming in Peacekeeping Operations: Progress Report, New York: UNDPKO. UNDPKO, 2010a, Second Generation Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) Practices in Peace Operations: A Contribution to the New Horizon Discussion on Challenges and Opportunities for UN Peacekeeping, New York: UNDPKO. UNDPKO, 2010b, Ten-Year Impact Study on Implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) on Women, Peace and Security in Peacekeeping, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/10year_impact_study_1325.pdf, [accessed 09/02/2016]. UNICEF, 2012, The Situation of Children and Women in Liberia 2012: From Conflict to Peace, Monrovia: UNICEF. UNIFEM, 2004, Getting it Right, Doing it Right: Gender and Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration, New York: UNIFEM. UN-INSTRAW, 2009, Reintegrating Gender: A Gendered Analysis of the Nepali Rehabilitation Process, Santa Domingo: UN-INSTRAW. UN-INSTRAW, 2010, Reintegrating Female Ex-Combatants: Good Practices and Lessons Learned in Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of Women and Girls, New York: UN-INSTRAW. UNIRP, 2011, Gender Report Jan-Jun 2011, Kathmandu: UNIRP.
326 UNIRP, 2012a, Annual Programme Narrative Progress Report 1 January 2011-31 December 2011, Kathmandu: UNIRP. UNIRP, 2012b, Annual Progress Report, Kathmandu: UNIRP. UNIRP, 2012c, Information Sheet: Education Support to VMLRs, Kathmandu: UNIRP. UNIRP, 2012d, Information Sheet: Gender Support for Sustainable Rehabilitation, Kathmandu: UNIRP. UNIRP, 2012e, Information Sheet: Health Related Training and Education, Kathmandu: UNIRP. UNIRP, 2012f, Information Sheet: Micro-Enterprise Development, Kathmandu: UNIRP. UNIRP, 2012g, Information Sheet: Peacebuilding for Social Harmony, Kathmandu: UNIRP. UNIRP, 2012h, Information Sheet: Socioeconomic Support for Sustainable Employment, Kathmandu: UNIRP. UNIRP, 2012i, Information Sheet: Vocational Skills Training, Kathmandu: UNIRP. UNIRP, 2013a, UNIRP Notes ‘Towards One UN’ in Nepal: An Integrated Approach to Reintegration of Ex-Combatants, Kathmandu: UNIRP. UNIRP, 2013b, UNIRP Notes on Gender Issues, Kathmandu: UNIRP. UNIRP, 2013c, UNIRP Notes on Mainstreaming Conflict Sensitivity in the Rehabilitation Programme, Kathmandu: UNIRP. UNIRP, 2013d, UNIRP Notes on Psychosocial Issues, Kathmandu: UNIRP. UNIRP, 2014, Annual Programme Narrative Progress Report 1 January 2013-31 December 2013, Kathmandu: UNIRP. UNIRP, 2018, Gender and DDR: Lessons Learned/Good Practices in Nepal, Kathmandu: UNIRP, 4 March 2018. United Nations DDR Resource Centre, 2006, IDDRS Framework. United Nations Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Resource Centre, 2014, Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards Framework, http://www.unddr.org/iddrs-framework.aspx, [accessed 25/11/2015]. United Nations et al, 2011, Nepal Peace and Development Strategy 2010-2015: A Contribution to Development Planning from Nepal’s International Development Partners, http://un.org.np/sites/default/files/English%20Version.pdf, [accessed 19/08/2016]. United Nations General Assembly, 1992, An Agenda for Peace, A/47/277. United Nations Secretary General Study, 2002, Women, Peace and Security, New York: UNSG. United Nations; Government of Nepal, 2012, United Nations Development Assistance Framework for Nepal 2013-2017. UNMIL, 2007, DDRR Assessment Report 2007, Monrovia: UNMIL. UNMIL, 2008, UNDP, NCDDRR, MPEA, Minutes of the Third Project Steering Committee Meeting, Monrovia: UNMIL. UNMIN, 2008, United Nations Monitoring in Support of the Peace Process Factsheet 4, Kathmandu: UNMIN. UNSC, 2000, Resolution 1325, S/RES/1325.
327 UNSC, 2003, First Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Liberia, S/2003/1175. UNSC, 2003, Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on Liberia, S/2003/875. UNSC, 2004, Fifth Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Liberia, S/2004/972. UNSC, 2005, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1579 (2004) Regarding Liberia, S/2005/376. UNSC, 2005, Resolution 1645, S/RES/1645. UNSC, 2006, Report of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict in Nepal, S/2006/1007. UNSC, 2007, Report of the Secretary-General on the Request of Nepal for United Nations Assistance in Support of Its Peace Process, S/2007/235. UNSC, 2008, Report of the Secretary-General on the Request of Nepal for United Nations Assistance in Support of Its Peace Process, S/2008/5. UNSC, 2008, Sixteenth Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Liberia, S/2008/183. UNSC, 2009, Report of the Secretary-General on the Request of Nepal for United Nations Assistance in Support of Its Peace Process, S/2009/1. UNSC, 2010, Report of the Secretary-General on the Request of Nepal for United Nations Assistance in Support of Its Peace Process, S/2010/183. Upreti, Bishnu Raj, 2012, “Nepal from War to Peace,” Peace Review: A Journal of Social Justice, 24:1, 102-107. Utas, Mats, 2003, Sweet Battlefield: Youth and the Liberian Civil War, Uppsala: Uppsala University. Utas, Mats, 2005a, “Building a Future? The Reintegration and Remarginalization of Youth in Liberia,” in Richards, Paul (ed.), No Peace, No War: An Anthropology of Contemporary Armed Conflicts, Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 137-154. Utas, Mats, 2005b, “West-African Warscapes: Victimcy, Girlfriending, Soldiering: Tactic Agency in a Young Woman’s Social Navigation of the Liberian War Zone,” Anthropological Quarterly, 78:2, 403-430. Väyrynen, Tarja, 2010, “Gender and Peacebuilding,” in Richmond, Oliver(ed), Palgrave Advances in Peacebuilding: Critical Developments and Approaches, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 137-153. Villellas Ariño, María, 2008, “Nepal: A Gender View of the Armed Conflict and the Peace Process,” Escola de Cultura de Pau: Peacebuilding Papers, 4, 1-16. Walby, Sylvia, 2005, “Gender Mainstreaming: Productive Tensions in Theory and Practice,” Social Politics, 12:3, 321-343. Wallis, Joanne; Lia Kent; Miranda Forsyth; Sinclair Dinnen; Srinjoy Base (eds.), 2018, Hybridity on the Ground in Peacebuilding and Development: Critical Conversations, Acton: Australia National University Press. Wamai, Emma Njoki, 2011, “UNSCR 1325 Implementation In Liberia,” in Olonisakin, Funmi, Karen Barnes, K; Eka Ikpe (eds), Women, Peace And Security: Translating Policy Into Practice, London: Routledge, 52-65.
328 Ward, Patrick, 2015, There is a Culture of Mismanaging Funds Meant for Earthquake Victims, Rediff News, 24/12/2015, http://www.rediff.com/news/interview/there-is- a-culture-of-mismanaging-funds-meant-for-earthquake-victims/20151224.htm, [accessed 03/09/2016]. Waring, Marilyn, 1988, Counting for Nothing, Wellington: Bridget Williams Books. Waugh, Charles G.; Martin H. Greenberg, 1999, The Women’s War in the South: Recollections and Reflections of the American Civil War, Nashville: Cumberland House. Webel, Charles, 2007, “Introduction: Toward a Philosophy and Metapsychology of Peace,” in Webel, Charles; Johan Galtung (eds), Handbook of Peace of Conflict Studies, London: Routledge, 3-13. Weber, Annette, 2006, “Feminist Peace and Conflict Theory,” Encyclopaedia on Peace and Conflict Theory, https://www.scribd.com/document/68185720/Feminist-Peace- and-Conflict-Theory, [accessed 23/01/2019]. Weedon, Chris, 1997, Feminist Practice and Poststructural Theory, Cambridge: Blackwell. Welland, Julia, 2019, “Gender and War,” in Gentry, Caron; Laura Shepherd; Laura Sjoberg (eds), The Routledge Handbook of Gender and Security, London: Routledge, 129-139. Westendorf, Jasmine-Kim, 2018, “Challenges of Local Ownership: Understanding the Outcomes of the International Community’s ‘Light Footprint’ Approach to the Nepal Peace Process,” Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, 12:2, 228-252. Wheeler, Nicholas, 2001, “The Political and Moral Limits of Western Military Intervention to Protect Civilians in Danger,” Contemporary Security Policy, 22:3, 1-27. Whelpton, John, 2005, A History of Nepal, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Whitworth, Sandra, 2004, Men, Militarism and UN Peacekeeping: A Gendered Analysis, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers. Whitworth, Sandra, 2008, “Militarized Masculinity And Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder,” In Parpart, Jane; Marysia Zalewski, Rethinking The Man Question: Sex, Gender And Violence In International Relations, New York: Zed Books, 109-126. Wibben, Annick (ed), 2016, Researching War: Feminist Methods, Ethics and Politics, Oxon: Routledge. Wibben, Annick, 2011, Feminist Security Studies: A Narrative Approach¸ Oxon: Routledge. Williams, Christine; Joel Heikes, 1993, “The Importance of Researcher’s Gender in the In- Depth Interview,” Gender and Society, 7:2, 280-291. Williamson, John, 2006, “The Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of Child Soldiers: Social and Psychological Transformation in Sierra Leone,” Intervention 4:3, 185-205. Wilson, Kalpana, 2008, “Reclaiming Agency, Reasserting Resistance,” IDS Bulletin, 38:6, 83–91. Wilson, Zoë, 2005, “State Making, Peace Making and the Inscription of Gendered Politics into Peace: Lessons from Angola,” in Mazurana, Diane; Angela Raven-Roberts; Jane Parpart (eds), Gender, Conflict and Peacekeeping, Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 242-264.
329 Wolf, Diane (ed.), 1996, Feminist Dilemmas In Fieldwork. Boulder: Westview. Woodward, Beverly, 1976, “Peace Studies and the Feminist Challenge,” Peace and Change, 3:4, 3-12. World Bank, 2002a, “Sierra Leone: Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration,” Africa Region, 81, http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/955321468102883526/pdf/298850ENG LISH0Infob81.pdf, [accessed 17/07/2018]. World Bank, 2002b, Conflict, Peacebuilding and Development Cooperation: The World Bank Agenda, Washington: World Bank. World Bank, 2005, “Community Cohesion in Liberia: A Post-War Rapid Social Assessment,” Social Development Papers, 21. World Bank, 2012, Gender Equality and Development, Washington DC: World Bank. World Health Organization (WHO), 2005, WHO Multi-country Study on Women’s Health and Domestic Violence Against Women, Geneva: World Health Organization. Yadav, Punam, 2016, Social Transformation in Post-Conflict Nepal: A Gender Perspective, London: Routledge. Yami, Hisila, 2006, People’s War and Women’s Liberation in Nepal, Raipur: Purvaiya Prakashan. Young, Iris Marion, 1990, Justice and the Politics of Difference, Princeton: Princeton University Press. Young, Iris Marion, 1998, “Polity and Group Difference: A Critique of the Ideal of Universal Citizenship,” Phillips, Anne (ed.), Feminism and Politics, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 401–429. Young, Kate, 1987, “Further Thoughts on Women’s Needs,” in Planning for Women at the National, Regional and Local Levels, Paris: UNESCO. Young, Kate, 1988, “Reflections on Meeting Women’s Needs,” in Young, Kate (ed), Women and Economic Development: Local, Regional and National Planning strategies, Oxford: Berg Publishers, 1-30. Young, Kate, 1993, Planning Development with Women: Making a World of Difference, Basingstoke: Macmillan. Yuval-Davis, Nira, 1991, “The Citizenship Debate: Women, the State and Ethnic Processes,” Feminist Review, 39:1, 58-68. Yuval-Davis, Nira, 1994, “Women, Ethnicity and Empowerment,” Feminism and Psychology, 4:1, 179-197. Yuval-Davis, Nira, 1997, Gender and Nation, London: Sage Publications. Yuval-Davis, Nira, 2006, “Belonging and the Politics of Belonging,” Patterns of Prejudice, 40:3, 197-214. Yuval-Davis, Nira, 2011, “Power, Intersectionality, and the Politics of Belonging,” FREIRA Working Paper Series, 75. Zahar, Marie-Joëlle, 2008, “Reframing the Spoiler Debate in Peace Processes,” in Darby, John; Roger Mac Ginty (eds.), Contemporary Peacemaking: Conflict, Peace Processes and Post-War Reconstruction, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 159-177.
330 Zalewski, Marysia, 2006, “Intervening in Northern Ireland: Critically Re-Thinking Representations of the Conflict,” Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, 9:4, 2006, 479-497. Zalewski, Marysia, 2010, “Feminist International Relations: Making Sense…,” in Shepherd, Laura (ed.), Gender Matters in Global Politics: A Feminist Introduction to International Relations, London: Routledge, 28-43. Zalewski, Marysia, Paula Drummond, Elisabeth Prügl and Maria Stern (eds), 2018, Sexual Violence Against Men in Global Politics, Abingdon: Routledge. Zalewski, Marysia; Anne Sisson Runyan, 2019, “Feminist Violence and the In/Securing of Women and Feminism,” in Gentry, Caron; Laura Shepherd; Laura Sjoberg (eds), The Routledge Handbook of Gender and Security, London: Routledge, 106-115. Zuckerman Harriet, 1972, “Interviewing an Ultra-Elite,” The Public Opinion Quarterly, 36, 159–175.
331 Appendices
Appendix A: 40-Point Demands
40 Point Demand 4 February, 1996 Right Honourable Prime Minister Prime Minister's Office, Singha Darbar, Kathmandu
Sub: Memorandum Sir,
It has been six years since the autocratic monarchical partyless Panchayat system was ended by the 1990 People's Movement and a constitutional monarchical multiparty parliamentary system established. During this period state control has been exercised by a tripartite interim government, a single-party government of the Nepali Congress, a minority government of UML and a present Nepali Congress-RPP-Sadbhavana coalition. That, instead of making progress, The situation of the country and the people is going downhill is evident from the fact that Nepal has slid to being the second poorest country in the world; people living below the absolute poverty line has gone up to 71 per cent; the number of unemployed has reached more than 10 per cent while the number of people who are semi-employed or in disguised employment has crossed 60 per cent; the country is on the verge of bankruptcy due to rising foreign loans and deficit trade; economic and cultural encroachment within the country by foreign, and especially Indian, expansionists is increasing by the day; the gap between the rich and the poor and between towns and villages is growing wider. On (lie other hand, parliamentary parties that have formed the government by various means have shown that they are more interested in remaining in power with the blessings of foreign imperialist and expansionist masters than in the welfare of the country and the people. This is clear from their blindly adopting so-called privatisation and liberalisation to fulfil the interests of all imperialists and from the recent 'national consensus' reached in handing over the rights over Nepal's water resources to Indian expansionists. Since 6 April, 1992, the United People's Front has been involved in various struggles to fulfil relevant demands related to nationalism, democracy and livelihood, either by itself or with others. But rather than fulfil those demands, the governments formed at different times have violently suppressed the agitators and taken the lives of hundreds; the most recent example of this is the armed police operation in Rolpa a few months back. In this context, we would like to once again present to the current coalition government demands related to nationalism, democracy and livelihood, which have been raised in the past and many of which have become relevant in the present context.
Our demands
Concerning nationality 1. All discriminatory treaties, including the 1950 Nepal-India Treaty, should be abrogated. 2. The so-called Integrated Mahakali Treaty concluded on 29 January, 1996 should be repealed immediately, as it is designed to conceal the disastrous Tanakpur Treaty and allows Indian imperialist monopoly over Nepal's water resources.
332 3. The open border between Nepal and India should be regulated, controlled and systematised. All vehicles with Indian licence plates should be banned from Nepal. 4. The Gurkha/Gorkha Recruitment Centres should be closed. Nepali citizens should be provided dignified employment in the country. 5. Nepali workers should be given priority in different sectors. A 'work permit' system should be strictly implemented if foreign workers are required in the country. 6. The domination of foreign capital in Nepali industries, business and finance should be stopped. 7. An appropriate customs policy should be devised and implemented so that economic development helps the nation become self-reliant. 8. The invasion of imperialist and colonial culture should be banned. Vulgar Hindi films, videos and magazines should be immediately outlawed. 9. The invasion of colonial and imperial elements in the name of NGOs and INGOs should be stopped.
Concerning people's democracy 10. A new constitution should be drafted by representatives elected for the establishment of a people's democratic system. 11. All special privileges of the king and the royal family should be abolished. 12. The army, the police and the bureaucracy should be completely under people's control. 13. All repressive acts, including the Security Act, should be repealed. 14. Everyone arrested extra-judicially for political reasons or revenge in Rukum, Rolpa, Jajarkot, Gorkha, Kabhrc, Sindhupalchowk. Sindhuli, Dhanusa, Ramechhap, and so on, should be immediately released. All false cases should be immediately withdrawn. 15. The operation of armed police, repression and state-sponsored terror should be immediately stopped. 16. The whereabouts of citizens who disappeared in police custody at different times, namely Dilip Chaudhary, Bhuwan Thapa Magar, Prabhakar Subedi and others, should be investigated and those responsible brought to justice. The families of victims should be duly compensated. 17. All those killed during the People's Movement should be declared martyrs. The families of the martyrs and those injured and deformed should be duly compensated, and the murderers brought to justice. 18. Nepal should be declared a secular nation. 19. Patriarchal exploitation and discrimination against women should be stopped. Daughters should be allowed access to paternal property. 20. All racial exploitation and suppression should be stopped. Where ethnic communities are in the majority, they should be allowed to form their own autonomous governments. 21. Discrimination against downtrodden and backward people should be stopped. The system of untouchability should be eliminated. 22. All languages and dialects should be given equal opportunities to prosper. The right to education in the mother tongue up to higher levels should be guaranteed. 23. The right to expression and freedom of press and publication should be guaranteed. The government mass media should be completely autonomous. 24. Academic and professional freedom of scholars, writers, artists and cultural workers should be guaranteed. 25. Regional discrimination between the hills and the tarai should be eliminated. Backward areas should be given regional autonomy. Rural and urban areas should be treated at par. 26. Local bodies should be empowered and appropriately equipped.
333
Concerning livelihood 27. Land should be belong to 'tenants'. Land under the control of the feudal system should be confiscated and distributed to the landless and the homeless. 28. The property of middlemen and comprador capitalists should be confiscated and nationalised. Capital lying unproductive should be invested to promote industrialisation. 29. Employment should be guaranteed for all. Until such time as employment can be arranged, an unemployment allowance should be provided. 30. A minimum wage for workers in industries, agriculture and so on should be fixed and strictly implemented. 31. The homeless should be rehabilitated. No one should be ' relocated until alternative infrastructure is guaranteed. 32. Poor farmers should be exempt from loan repayments. Loans taken by small farmers from the Agricultural Development Bank should be written off. Appropriate provisions should be made to provide loans for small farmers. 33. Fertiliser and seeds should be easily available and at a cheap rate. Farmers should be provided with appropriate prices and markets for their produce. 34. People in flood and drought-affected areas should be provided with appropriate relief materials. 35. Free and scientific health services and education should be available to all. The commercialisation of education should be stopped. 36. Inflation should be checked. Wages should be increased proportionate to inflation. Essential goods should be cheaply and easily available to everyone. 37. Drinking water, roads and electricity should be provided to all villagers. 38. Domestic and cottage industries should be protected and promoted. 39. Corruption, smuggling, black marketing, bribery, and the practices of middlemen and so on should be eliminated. 40. Orphans, the disabled, the elderly and children should be duly honoured and protected.
We would like to request the present coalition government to immediately initiate steps to fulfil these demands which are inextricably linked with the Nepali nation and the life of the people. If there are no positive indications towards this from the government by 17 February, 1996, we would like to inform you that we will be forced to adopt the path of armed struggle against the existing state power.
Thank you.
Dr Baburam Bhattarai Chairman Central Committee, United People's Front, Nepal
[reprinted in Thapa 2003].
334 Appendix B: List of Interviews
Female Ex-Combatant Interviewees Nepal Manisha, Interview 2, Kathmandu, 9/8/2016. Jaya, Interview 3, Kathmandu, 9/9/2016. Lila, Interview 4, Kathmandu, 9/9/2016. Uma, Interview 5, Kathmandu, 9/10/2016. Sita, Interview 6, Kathmandu, 9/10/2016. Laxmi, Interview 7, Kathmandu, 9/12/2016. Savitra, Interview 10, Kathmandu, 9/20/2016. Kamala, Interview 64, Surkhet, 4/26/2017. Shanti, Interview 65, Surkhet, 4/26/2017. Archana, Interview 66, Surkhet, 4/26/2017. Parvati, Interview 67, Surkhet, 4/26/2017. Sapana, Interview 68, Surkhet, 4/26/2017. Ratna, Interview 69, Surkhet, 4/27/2017. Kalpana, Interview 70, Koholpur, 4/29/2017. Mina, Interview 71, Koholpur, 4/29/2017.
Female Ex-Combatant Interviewees Liberia Kou, Interview 22, Waterside, 1/9/2017. Glayee, Interview 23, Waterside, 1/9/2017. Deylue, Interview 24, Waterside, 1/9/2017. Theresa, Interview 25, Waterside, 1/9/2017. Mary, Interview 26, Peace Island, 1/11/2017. Konah, Interview 27, Peace Island, 1/11/2017. Miata, Interview 28, Peace Island, 1/11/2017. Arway, Interview 29, Peace Island, 1/11/2017. Vonyee, Interview 31, Peace Island, 1/12/2017. Suah, Interview 32, Peace Island, 1/12/2017. Lysie, Interview 33, Peace Island, 1/12/2017. Zaye, Interview 34, Peace Island, 1/12/2017. Binta, Interview 35, Congo Town, 1/12/2017. Teewon, Interview 36, Peace Island, 1/13/2017. Natasha, Interview 37, Peace Island, 1/13/2017. Jerelyn, Interview 38, Peace Island, 1/13/2017. Gracie, Interview 39, Peace Island, 1/13/2017. Faith, Interview 40, Peace Island, 1/14/2017. Elta, Interview 41, Peace Island, 1/14/2017. Princess, Interview 43, Peace Island, 1/14/2017. Wonkehmi, Interview 44, Congo Town, 1/17/2017. Fanta, Interview 52, Peace Island, 1/25/2017. Sona, Interview 53, Peace Island, 1/25/2017. Ciata, Interview 54, Peace Island, 1/26/2017. Ruth, Interview 55, Peace Island, 1/26/2017.
DDR Official Interviewees Nepal Senior UNIRP Official, Interview 1, Skype, 8/16/2016. UNIRP Official, Interview 12, Kathmandu, 9/21/2016. UNIRP Official, Interview 13, Kathmandu, 9/24/2016.
335 UNIRP Official, Interview 14, Kathmandu, 9/26/2016. Implementing Partner, Interview 15, Kathmandu, 9/28/2016. Implementing Partner, Interview 16, Kathmandu, 9/28/2016. UNIRP Official, Interview 17, Kathmandu, 9/29/2016. UNIRP Official, Interview 18, Kathmandu, 9/30/2016. UNIRP Official, Interview 19, Kathmandu, 10/1/2016. UNIRP Official, Interview 20, Kathmandu, 10/2/2016. MoPR Official, Interview 72, Kathmandu, 5/1/2017. UNIRP Official, Interview 73, Kathmandu, 2/2/2017. UNIRP Official, Interview 74, Kathmandu, 5/3/2017. UNIRP Official, Interview 75, Phone, 5/4/2017. UNIRP Official, Interview 77, Kathmandu, 5/9/2017.
DDR Official Interviewees Liberia NCDDRR Official, Interview 42, Peace Island, 1/14/2017. Implementing Partner, Interview 46, Monrovia, 1/19/2017. Implementing Partner, Interview 47, Monrovia, 1/19/2017. Implementing Partner, Interview 48, Monrovia, 1/19/2017. LDDRR Official, Interview 49, Monrovia, 1/20/2017. Implementing Partner, Interview 50, Monrovia, 1/20/2017. Implementing Partner, Interview 51, Monrovia, 1/24/2017. NCDDRR Official, Interview 57, Monrovia, 1/27/2017. LDDRR Official, Interview 58, Monrovia, 1/30/2017. LDDRR Official, Interview 59, Monrovia, 1/31/2017. LDDRR Official, Interview 60, Monrovia, 2/2/2017. LDDRR Official, Interview 61, Monrovia, 2/7/2017. LDDRR Official, Interview 62, Monrovia, 2/13/2017. NCDDRR Official, Interview 63, Monrovia, 2/17/2017.
Additional Perspectives NGO Official, Interview 8, Kathmandu, 9/14/2016. Security Sector Reform Official, Interview 9, Kathmandu, 9/18/2016. Truth and Reconciliation Commission Official, Interview 11, Kathmandu, 9/20/2016. NGO Official, Interview 21, Kathmandu, 10/3/2016. School Principal Monrovia, Interview 30, Logan Town, 1/11/2017. NGO Official, Interview 45, Monrovia, 1/19/2017. Community Leader/Male Ex-Commander, Interview 56, Monrovia, 1/26/2017. NGO Official, Interview 76, Kathmandu, 5/4/2017.
336 Appendix C: Consent Form
University of Manchester School of Social Sciences
Empowerment, Marginalization & Post-Conflict Security Practices: Female Ex- Combatants in Nepal and Liberia
CONSENT FORM
If you are happy to participate please read the consent form and initial it:
1. I confirm that I have read the attached information sheet on the above project and have had the opportunity to consider the information and ask questions and had these answered satisfactorily.
2. I confirm that I have read the attached information sheet on the above project and have had the opportunity to consider the information and ask questions and had these answered satisfactorily.
3. I understand that my participation in the study is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time without giving a reason and without detriment to any treatment/service
4. I agree that the interviews will be audio-recorded 5. I agree to the use of quotations that are anonymous
Name of participant Date Signature
Name of person taking consent Date Signature
337 Appendix D: Participant Information Sheet
University of Manchester School of Social Sciences
Participant Information Sheet
Who will conduct the research?
Michanne Steenbergen, PhD Researcher at the University of Manchester, UK
What is the aim of the research?
The aim of this research is to identify how female ex-combatants and females associated with the armed forces and groups (FAAFGs) have been addressed by Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) as well as Rehabilitation programs, including empowerment initiatives, and what outcomes such programs have produced for female ex- combatants and FAAFGs.
Why have I been chosen?
You have been chosen because you work for an organization which has delivered DDR and Rehabilitation programs in Nepal or Liberia.
What would I be asked to do if I took part?
You will be interviewed by Michanne at a time and place that is mutually convenient. Interviews will be no longer than one hour. The interview questions will focus on how DDR and Rehabilitation programs address female ex-combatants and FAAFGs, how outputs and outcomes are measured, and lessons learnt from these programs.
What happens to the data collected?
Where you agree to this, interviews will be audio-recorded and transcribed by Michanne. Once transcribed, the recording will be deleted and transcripts are anonymized to ensure that you are not identifiable. The format of citations will be agreed upon at the start of the interview.
How is confidentiality maintained?
Once transcribed all interview recordings will be deleted and all transcripts will be fully anonymous. Interview data will be stored securely and password protected.
What happens if I do not want to take part or if I change my mind?
You have to provide full consent to participate in this interview. I will provide my full contact details if you wish to withdraw consent for the entire interview or specific answers at any stage of the interview process (before, during, after) without giving a reason and without detriment to yourself.
338 Will I be paid for participating in the research?
No, but Michanne will pay for any non-alcoholic beverage consumed during the interview.
What is the duration of the research?
Interviews will last up to one hour.
Where will the research be conducted?
At a mutually agreed place, such as your office or a public space (e.g. café).
Will the outcomes of the research be published?
The outcomes of this research are primarily intended for the interviewer’s PhD Thesis but it is feasible that generalized and anonymized results will be used for publication (e.g. presentations, articles).
What benefit might this research be to me or other subjects of the research?
The outcomes of this research will be presented in an accessible and generalized manner for relevant policy-makers. The research findings will indicate how DDR and Rehabilitation programs can be more inclusive and effective with respect to female ex- combatants and FAAFGs both in the context of ongoing rehabilitation and development initiatives in Nepal and Liberia, as well as in future DDR programs.
Contact for further information
For further information regarding the interview please contact: Michanne Steenbergen University of Manchester, School of Social Sciences: Politics, Arthur Lewis Building, Oxford Road, Manchester, M13 9PL, United Kingdom. [email protected]
What if something goes wrong?
Please contact Michanne Steenbergen ([email protected]) regarding any questions and concerns before or after the interview. Please let Michanne know at any point during the interview if you have any problems, concerns, or questions. If you would like to interrupt the interview, please let Michanne know and the interview can be rescheduled or cancelled altogether.
339