WEAPONS OF MERE DESTRUCTION

ECOWAS AND UN POLICY COUNTERING THE PROLIFERATION OF SMALL ARMS DURING AND IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE FIRST AND SECOND LIBERIAN CIVIL WARS.

MA Thesis History of International Relations written by

Lothar van Riel

Under the supervision of Ms. Prof. Dr. M. van Leeuwen and Mr. Prof. Dr. W. Klinkert

5th of August, 2015

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Contents Introduction ...... 3 Historiography and historical context ...... 5 Historiography ...... 5 The historical context of the Liberian conflict ...... 9 The ...... 12 Acquire arms, acquire power ...... 12 International context ...... 15 ECOWAS intervenes ...... 17 ECOWAS mandate regarding SA/LW ...... 18 ECOMOG lands ...... 19 Doe’s murder ...... 19 Preventing the spread of small arms ...... 21 The First Liberian Civil War: Second Phase ...... 25 Enter ULIMO ...... 25 ECOMOG’s new strategy ...... 28 Cotonou Agreement: Observers ...... 29 Agreement...... 34 Abuja II DDRR programme ...... 38 Taylor and peace ...... 41 Types of weapons used and their origins ...... 41 An ethnic war? ...... 42 The Second Liberian Civil War ...... 43 Peace under Taylor ...... 43 : A garrison state headed towards war ...... 44 Rise of LURD ...... 48 ECOWAS and UN intervention...... 52 DDRR program ...... 53 Types and origins of weapons ...... 58 International policy on small arms ...... 62 ECOWAS Moratorium ...... 62 UN embargo ...... 63 The New ECOWAS Convention ...... 65 Continued ethnic grievances ...... 67 Conclusion ...... 69 References ...... 70 3

Introduction On Christmas Eve 1989, a force of 150 militias led by Charles Taylor marched into Liberia in a bid to take control of the country. Within months, the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), as the amateur soldiers called themselves, seized control of the entire Liberian hinterland. Within years, Taylor managed to cultivate a pseudo-government, creating ministries, a private bank and even his own currency.1 The secret to the NPFL’s rapid advance was the deadliest weapon of the past thirty years: an adolescent male equipped with an Avtomat Kalashnikova – the AK-47. Of course, the AK-47 was not the only weapon that featured in the war. The small arms and light weapons (SA/LW) used during the war ranged from Belgian FN-FAL assault rifles, to American M-16’s to Chinese and Serbian made variants of the Kalashnikov. Unfortunately, these weapons were not limited to the Extended Civil War in Liberia either. Young men, women, and children brandished these arms not only in various conflicts in Africa, but also in Bosnia, Haiti, Cambodia and Colombia.2 According to a UN statement in 1997:

“The excessive and destabilizing accumulation and transfer of small arms and light weapons is closely related to the increased incidence of internal conflicts and high levels of crime and violence. It is, therefore, an issue of legitimate concern for the international community. Groups and individuals operating outside the reach of state and government forces make extensive use of such weapons in internal conflicts. Insurgent forces, irregular troops, criminal gangs, and terrorist groups are using all types of small arms and light weapons.”3

There are several critical reasons why assault rifles and other light weapons are the arms of choice in these intrastate conflicts. First and foremost, they are relatively cheap and easily accessible. Following the end of the , millions of these weapons have been declared surplus by the nations that owned them. Consequently, they often fell into the hands of corrupt brokers, who were more than ready to sell them to organizations like Taylor’s NPFL. Secondly, these weapons are durable and remarkably easy to use. Especially the assault rifles based on the Russian Kalashnikov architecture, and to lesser extent the American M-16’s left over from the Vietnam War, require very little and simple maintenance. Finally, small arms and light weapons are easy to carry, transport and conceal and are capable of inflicting enormous damage. One of the conflicts that brought the destabilizing role of small arms to the attention of the international community was the First Civil War in Liberia. Their destructive capability was illustrated by the extraordinary amount of human suffering caused in the conflict: the war claimed the lives of over 200,000 people and displaced over a million. As these kinds of conflicts proliferate, the flood of small arms has become a relentless torrent.

The death toll from small arms dwarfs that of all other weapons systems and in most years greatly exceeds the toll of the atomic bombs that devastated Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In terms of the carnage they cause, small arms, indeed, could well be described as “weapons of mass destruction”. Yet there is still no global non-proliferation regime to limit their spread, as there is for chemical, biological and nuclear weapons. Small arms proliferation is not merely a security issue; it is also an issue of human rights and of development.4

1 Stephen Ellis, The mask of anarchy: The destruction of Liberia and the Religious dimension of an African civil war (London 1999) 171. 2 Michael Klare, “The Kalashnikov Age,” The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists Vol. 55, No. 1 (January/February 1999). 3 United Nations (UN), “General and complete disarmament: Small Arms,” A/52/298 (27th of August 1997) 9-10. 4 UN, We the Peoples: The role of the United Nations in the 21st century (United Nations 2000) 52. 4

The outbreak of violent civil conflict in Liberia marked the beginning of a change to the political and security configuration of the region, and attracted millions of illicit small arms.5 The easy accessibility of timber and provided non-state actors with the opportunity to barter these natural resources for weapons, fuelling the small arms scourge in the Basin.6 Extended Liberian Civil War posed a considerable security threat to the region; porous borders and large amounts refugees and displaced people put significant stress on the stability of the neighbouring countries. This spurred the regional Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to intervene in the First and subsequently In the Second Liberian Civil War, with support from the United Nations. Before the start of the 21st century the arms control and proliferation debate concentrated almost exclusively on the availability of major weapon systems and weapons of mass destruction. Research on arms production and transfers neglected the field of small arms as well.7 Only at the start of the year 1995 do we first see references to the problems small arms cause in official United Nations (UN) documents.8 In the eyes of an historian, it is safe to say that this field of research could be considered as being relatively young. The research pertaining to the First Liberian Civil War has focused on spiritualistic and ethnic violence, and to a lesser extent on the subsequent ECOWAS intervention. Research on the Second Liberian Civil War has focused on the role of small arms and on disarmament in particular, but has so far neglected to place it in a historic context. The interventions by ECOWAS and the UN were officially concluded at a post-disarmament ceremony held on the 3rd of November 2004, after almost 15 years of war. Representatives of the warring factions signed a formal declaration disbanding their respective armed forces, which officially ceased to exist as military groups and signified their complete disarmament.9 The United Nations Mission in Liberia presented the disarmament programme as a success.10 But how did the ECOWAS and UN interventions and the related policy attempt to curb the proliferation of small arms and light weapons during and immediately after the First and Second Liberian civil wars? This question signifies the principal theme of this research. In order to sufficiently answer this question, the way in which the SA/LW are used by the various actors, the tactics surrounding their usage, and the modes of acquiring the weapons need to be identified and analysed. Furthermore, the role these weapons have played in the conflict need to be set within a greater historical framework. This will allow for an explorative conclusion pertaining to the exact role of the weapons as a root cause or a catalyst. The research is subsequently divided into three sections, all of which will present a preliminary conclusion. The first section offers a chronological account of the First Liberian Civil War with a special focus on the role small arms and light weapons played in the conflict. It is preceded by a short summary of the historiography surrounding the conflict and its historical context. The second section deals with the events that leading up to the eruption of the Second Liberian Civil War and the conflict itself. The two chronological sections both end with a short analysis of the disarmament programs and the possible origins of the weapons. The final chapter consists of a thematic analysis of the international policy on the proliferation of small arms and light weapons during the two conflicts.

5 Alhaji Ms Bah, “Micro-disarmament in ,” African Security Review Vol. 13, No. 3 (2004) 33. 6 The Mano River Basin is comprised of , , Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire. 7 Peter Lock, “Armed conflicts and small arms proliferation: Refocusing the research agenda,” Policy Sciences 30 (1997) 117. 8 UN, Supplement to an agenda for peace: Position paper of the Secretary-General on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations, A/50/60-S/1995/1, (United Nations 3rd of January 1995). 9 United Nations Mission in Liberia, “Liberia’s warring factions disbanded as disarmament of ex-combatants ends,” UNMIL/PIO/PR/142 (3rd of November 2004). 10 Idem. 5

Historiography and historical context

Historiography One of the conflicts that helped propel the problem of small arms to the global stage is the extended civil war in Liberia. It actually consisted of two separate intrastate conflicts, the First Liberian Civil War starting in 1989 and ending in 1996 and the Second Liberian Civil War, which would begin a mere three years after the end of the first civil war and only ended in October 2003. These two conflicts would become two of Africa’s bloodiest wars, claiming the lives of nearly half a million people and destabilizing the entire region. The use of child soldiers, the war atrocities and the ritualistic mutilation of people in the wars between 1989 and 2003 defined Liberia as the epitome of a collapsed state and the epicentre of the West African wars. 11 Because the Liberian extended civil war is one of the more well-known post-Cold War conflicts, it has garnered a considerable amount of academic attention from various fields of study. Disregarding any possible differences between these various fields, there are several views on the wars discernible in the historiography. The first reaction to the Liberian conflict was to dub it as one of the ‘new wars’.12 The primary explanation for the violence was the so-called ‘greed and grievance’ thesis, drawing attention to both the economic motives and the global character of the conflict.13 The global connections between local conflicts and international (often illegal) market based-actors is often cited by proponents of the ‘new war literature’ as the most important characteristic of the violence around the turn of the millennium. This ‘new war’ interpretation is spearheaded by Mary Kaldor, in her book ‘New and old wars: Organized violence in a global era’, with the Liberian extended civil war as a primary example.14 A more socially grounded explanation that is still in line with the ‘new war literature’ has been put forward by Ibrahim Abdullah, who focuses his attention on socially marginalised youth.15 Other notable examples of explanations offered include authors such as Thandika Mkandawire, William Reno, Robert D. Kaplan and Martin van Creveld.16 On the other side of the ‘new war literature’ is a more historic approach to the wars by authors such as Morten Bøås, and Sinisa Malesevic.17 They argue that there is nothing ‘new’ about the wars, and often use the Liberian civil war as an example. This conflict is deeply entrenched in history and, according to Morten Bøås, the only way to fully understand the Liberian war is to come to terms with this history and the ramifications it holds.18 In my research, I will attempt to view the Liberian conflicts in this exact way, with an historic perspective.

11 Christof Kurz, “Review of ‘Liberia’s civil war: , ECOMOG, and regional security in West Africa’,” Journal of intervention and statebuilding Vol. 3 No. 3 (November 2009) 366. 12 Mary Kaldor, New and old wars: Organized violence in a global era (Oxford polity press 2001). 13 Morten Bøås, “The Liberian civil war: new war/old war?”, Global Society Vol. 11 No. 1 (October 2010) 74. 14 Kaldor, New and old wars (Oxford 2001) 20. 15 Ibrahim Abdullah, Between democracy and terror: The ( 2004) 280. 16 Thandika Mkandawire, “The terrible toll of post-colonial “rebel movements” in Africa: Toward an explanation of the violence against the peasantry” Journal of modern African studies Vol. 40 no. 2 (2002) 181- 215. William Reno, “Reinvention of an African patrimonoal state: Charles Taylor’s Liberia”, Third World Quarterly Vol. 16 No. 1 (1995) 109-120. Robert D. Kaplan, “The coming anarchy”, Atlantic Monthly Vol. 277 (1994) 44-76. Martin van Creveld, The transformation of war (New York Free Press 1991). 17 Bøås, “The Liberian civil war,” Global Society Vol. 11 No. 1 (2010) 74. Amos Sawyer, “Violent conflicts and governance challenges in West Africa: The case of the Mano River Basin Area,”Journal of modern African studies Vol. 42 No. 3 (2004) 437-463. Sinisa Malesevic, “The sociology of New Wars. Assessing the causes and objectives of contemporary violent conflicts,” International political sociology No. 2 (2008) 97-112. 18 Bøås, “The Liberian civil war,” Global Society Vol. 11 No. 1 (2010) 74. 6

This distinction within the secondary literature is important for a research into the policy surrounding small arms in the West African conflicts. The historic view in particular has garnered more support the last few years, and is especially useful in the research of small arms policy over a longer period of time. The role and recognition of small arms in academic literature has changed over the years, just like the interpretation of the causes of violence. Whereas proponents of the ‘new war literature’ often disregarded the role of small arms or did not acknowledge it as an important destabilizing factor, the historic perspective has started to shift more of the blame onto SA/LW. When it comes to small arms, three different, consecutive currents can be discerned in most of the academic work on the Mano River Basin wars. The first current paid no significant attention to the role of small arms in these conflicts. A good example is the early work of Stephen Ellis, who has made significant steps in advancing our understanding of the spiritual dimension of the violence in the Liberia civil wars.19 His work, however, definitely belongs to the ‘new war literature’ and as such has offered limited insight into the role of small arms; SA/LW are mentioned, but their role is not analysed any further. 20 The second academic current is characterized by noticing the destabilizing influence of small arms and light weapons, but regarding it as something entirely new; an affirmation of the author’s interpretation that these wars presented an entirely different set of attributes than from before.21 The most noticeable example is Mary Kaldor, also one of the main protagonists of the ‘new war literature’, and Mats Berdal.22 These include the abundance of small arms and light weapons as destabilizing factors, but argue that the ‘greed and grievances’ thesis takes precedence as a possible explanation.23 The final wave of academic publishing surrounding the small arms proliferation in the Mano River Basin wars is more historic in nature. It roughly coincides with the historic reaction to the ‘new war literature’ in both timing and general message. Most of the recent work into the larger West African regional war zone now adheres to this perspective on the wars in for instance Liberia and Sierra Leone.24 The authors in this field of study acknowledge the potential destabilizing threat that SA/LW pose, but put it in a more historic context. They recognize that the use of the weapons is not particularly new and are often able to point to the origins of the weapons as well; earlier conflicts in

19 Stephen Ellis, “Liberia 1989-1994: A Study of ethnic and spiritual violence, “African Affairs Vol. 94 No. 375 (April 1995) 165-197. Ellis, The mask of anarchy (London 1999). 20 Other notable examples include Yekutiel Gershoni, “War without end and end to war: The prolonged wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone,” African studies review Vol. 30 No. 3 (1997) 55-76; and Arie M. Kacowicz, “’Negative’ international peace and domestic conflicts, West Africa, 1957-96,” Journal of modern African studies Vol 35 No. 3 (1997) 367-385. Finally, Quentin Outram does mention SA/LW in his article on the first Liberian Civil War, but also fails to analyse the ramifications further. Quentin Outram, “’It’s terminal either way’: An analysis of armed conflict in Liberia 1989-1996, “ Review of African Political Economy Vol. 24 No. 73 (1997) 355-371. 21 William D. Hartung, “The new business of war: Small arms and the proliferation of conflict,” Ethics & international affairs Vol. 15 (2001) 79-96. 22 Mary Kaldor, “Cosmopolitanism and organized violence,” Paper prepared for conference on ‘Conceiving cosmopolitanism’ (Warwick, 27-29th of April 2000). Mary Kaldor, “Old wars, cold wars, new wars and the ,” International politics Vol. 42 (2005) 491-489. Mary Kaldor, New and old wars – organized violence in a global era (Cambridge polity press 2006). Mats Berdal and David M. Malone (eds.), Greed and grievance: Economic agendas in civil wars (Boulder 2000). Mats Berdal, “How ‘new’ are the ‘new wars’? Global economic change and the study of civil war,” Global governance Vol. 9, No. 3 (2003) 477-502. 23 Kaldor, New and old wars (Cambridge 2006) 14-16. 24 James Hentz (ed.), Routledge handbook of African security (Routledge 2013). Mary Kaldor, “In defence of new wars,” Stability: International journal of security and development Vol. 2, No. 1 (2013) 4-11. 7 different African regions.25 One of the earliest authors to have placed the wars in an historic context was Morten Bøås. 26 This final current is also characterized by the role the ECOWAS and UN intervention played in the conflict, specifically with regards to small arms and light weapons.27 The UN and the military part of ECOWAS, the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) made policy specifically to counter the proliferation of small arms during the conflicts.28 The wars in the Mano River Basin refocused the international research agenda to SA/LW, and eventually place them in a historic context.29 However, the effectiveness of the policy by supranational organizations like ECOMOG and the UN has not yet been placed in a comprehensive, historic context. It has only recently entered the academic fray and has mainly been analysed by the social studies; there is still a lot of ground to be covered.

25 Lock, “Armed conflicts and small arms proliferation,” Policy Sciences (1997) 117-132. Bah, “Micro- disarmament in West Africa,” African Security Review (2004) 33-46. David Todd Kinsella, “The illicit arms trade: A social network analysis,” Political Science Faculty Publications and Presentations Paper 12 (2008) 3-4. 26 Bøås, “’Hunting ghosts of a difficult past’,” Third World Quarterly Vol. 35 No. 4 (2014) 652-668. 27 Idem, 85. 28 Adekeye Adebajo and Ismail Rashid (eds.), West Africa’s security challenges: Building peace in a troubled region (Lynne Rienner Publishers 2004). 29 Lock, “Armed conflicts and small arms proliferation,” Policy Sciences Vol 30 (1997) 119. Denise Garcia (ed.), Small arms and security: New emerging international norms (Routledge 2006) 16-19. 8

Figure 2.1: Liberia

Source: Nicolas Florquin and Eric Berman, Armed and Aimless: Armed groups, guns, and human security in the ECOWAS region (Small Arms Survey, 2005).

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The historical context of the Liberian conflict In order to provide causal explanations, historians and social scientists alike have been quick to emphasize the antecedent factors to conflicts in general. This approach has attracted newfound attention as an alternative to the ‘new war literature’, championed by scholars like Mary Kaldor.30 When it comes to the first period of the Republic of Liberia, founded by emancipated African- American slaves in 1847, there is a general consensus regarding the state of politics at the time. Ever since its founding, the country had been governed by an exclusivist oligarchy imbued with a sense of “the civilizing mission.”31 According to David Wippman:

“The Americo-Liberians […] recreated the social hierarchy they had experienced in the antebellum South [of the United States], but with themselves as the socially dominant, landowning class. They considered the indigenous population primitive and uncivilized, and treated it as little more than an abundant source of forced labor.”32

The oppression was so ruthless and spiteful, that some scholars, such as Monday Akpan and Yuketiel Gershoni, have called it “black imperialism” or “black colonialism”.33 The Americo-Liberians dominated the country’s political, social, and economic life, even though they only constituted about 5 percent of the entire population.34 From the founding of the Liberian state to the death of William Tubman, who reigned from 1944 to 1971, there was relatively little social upheaval. After the Second World War, Tubman introduced several social programs to alleviate the poverty and illiteracy of the masses. These programs were designed to integrate the native population into Liberia’s political economy. Consequently, by the start of the 1960s, this gave rise to a corps of educated natives who began to climb the social ladder. As is the case for many African colonies, the struggle for socio-economic space by the elites took on a national character as each group returned to its social base for support.35 The kinship and ethnic group served as a natural constituency for the native Liberian elites in this scenario. When William Tolbert, the last of the Americo-Liberian Presidents, inherited the reign from Tubman, he was saddled with a rapidly deteriorating national and global economy and mounting socio-economic tension. This tension was a consequence of Tubman’s educational reform, which had resulted in the emergence of an articulate native middle class.36 Tolbert’s reign was marked by popular discontent. The “Rice Riots” which took place in in April 1979 serve as a prime example. Under increased financial pressure following yet another oil crisis caused by the Iran-Iraq war, the Tolbert government announced its plans to dispense with the state subsidy of rice, the staple food of Liberia’s urban poor. The resulting increase of food prices set off a series of mass riots in Monrovia throughout the spring of 1979.37 The government responded by swiftly cracking down on the rioters and their perceived leaders in the

30 Mary Kaldor, New and old wars: Organized violence in a global era (Oxford polity press 2001). 31 See, among others, G.S. Boley, Liberia: The rise and fall of the First Republic (London: Macmillan Press, 1983); Yuketiel Gershoni, Black colonialism: The Americo-Liberian scramble for the hinterland (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1985); and D.E. Dunn and S.B. Tarr, Liberia: A national policy in transition (Metuchwen, N.J.: Scarecrow Press, 1988). 32 David Wippman, “Enforcing the Peace: ECOWAS and the Liberian Civil War”, in Lori Fisler Damrosch (ed.), Enforcing restraint: Collective intervention in internal conflicts (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1993) 160. 33 Monday Akpan, “Black imperialism: Americo-Liberian rule over the African peoples of Liberia, 1841-1964”, Canadian Journal of African Studies Vol. 7, No. 2 (1973) 217-236; Gershoni, Black colonialism (1985). 34 Wippman, “Enforcing the peace” in Fisler Damrosch (ed.), Enforcing restraint (1993) 160. 35 Gershoni, Black colonialism (1985) 30-31. 36 Boley, Liberia (1983) 80-86. 37 Idem. 10 native elite. This repressive environment is what set the stage for the native members of the presidential guard, led by Master-Sergeant , to stage a coup d’état on the 12th of April 1980. By most accounts, Doe’s reign was marked by extreme and bizarre acts of violence and brutality. Next to the gruesome murder of Tolbert, thirteen of the country’s most prominent opposition were murdered during a series of televised executions.38 Doe himself belonged to the Krahn tribe, which, like the Americo Liberian community, constituted about four percent of Liberia’s population. After fortifying his power, Doe proceeded to supplant the Americo-Liberian imperialism with his own native-Liberian version, or “Krahn-imperialism”.39 The resulting oppression of Liberia’s populace led to a failed coup attempt in November 1985 by Brigadier-General Thomas Quiwonpka, Doe’s second-in-command. In the aftermath of the coup, Doe ordered the public execution of Quiwonpka and “took immediate reprisals against Quiwonkpa’s ethnic group, the Gio, and against a closely related group, the Mano. Hundreds were executed after being subjected to “blood-curdling brutality”.40 A period of unguarded pursuit of real and imaginary enemies followed, leaving Doe’s army exhausted, demoralized and badly depleted.41 In this state, the army was unable to contain or repel an insurrection launched from the northern Nimba towns of Khanple and Butuo by a couple of “ill-trained recruits, many of them in their early teens,” belonging to Charles Taylor’s National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL).42 By May 1990, what began as a hit-and-run attack against government forces by Taylor’s guerrillas had metamorphosed into a well-coordinated, traditional military assault on Doe’s . Due to an internal power struggle within the NPFL, Prince Yormie Johnson broke off from the movement to form the Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL). This would lead to a three-way politico-military stalemate between Doe, Taylor and Johnson.43 The root cause of the Liberian civil war was the exclusionary, predatory, exploitative neo- colonial Liberian state, which generated a number of multidimensional crises of underdevelopment. These crises were economic, political, and social in their nature, and also related to individual security. Socially, the settler state created by the Americo-Liberians, excluded the sixteen indigenous ethnic groups, until 1951, when full citizenship was granted. Similarly, the various national symbols such as the flag, the seal and the motto, only reflected the historical and cultural experiences of the Americo-Liberians. The Doe regime only exacerbated these ethnic differences, by portraying the personal rivalry between Quiwonkpa and Doe as an ethnic feud. Following the failed coup attempt in 1985, the Doe regime targeted the members of the Gio and Mano ethnic groups, hundreds of whom were subsequently killed.44 The economic crisis was illustrated by the decline in real income, inequities in income and wealth, as well as structural unemployment, especially amongst youngsters. When Doe’s military

38 John Inegbedion, “ECOMOG in comparative perspective”, in Timothy M. Shaw and Julius Emeka Okolo (eds.) The political economy of foreign policy in ECOWAS (London: Macmillan, 1994) 224-226. 39 Amos Sawyer, Effective immediately: Dictatorship in Liberia, 1980-1986 – A personal perspective. Bremen: Liberia Working Group Papers No. 5. (1987) 23-25. 40 Wippman, “Enforcing the peace” in Fisler Damrosch (ed.), Enforcing restraint (1993) 162. 41 Clement Adibe, “Managing arms in peace processes: Liberia,” Disarmament and conflict resolution project (New York: United Nations, 1996) 10. 42 Wippman, “Enforcing the peace” in Fisler Damrosch (ed.), Enforcing restraint (1993) 163. 43 Adibe, “Managing arms”, Disarmament and Conflict Resolution (1996) 11. 44 Patrick Seyon, The results of the 1985 ,” Liberian Studies Journal Vol. 12, No. 2 (1988) 220- 238; Human Rights Watch, Liberia: Flight from terror (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1990) 1. 11 coup occurred, 60 percent of the labour force earned wages below the official poverty line.45 During Doe’s regime the real income for civil servants declined as well with 16.7 percent in 1981 and 25 percent in 1985.46 The decline in income led to people’s inability to buy essential commodities such as rice. Meanwhile, the income and wealth inequity increased; in 1980 Liberia’s upper class consisted of approximately 4 percent of the entire population, but it accounted for about 65 percent of the national income.47 Similarly, it controlled about 60 percent of the wealth.48 In 1985, the subaltern classes made up around 75 percent of the population while they only accounted for approximately 20 percent of the national income, while the ruling class secured around 68 percent. In 1989, the upper class grew to 6 percent and owned just over 70 percent of the national wealth.49 In 1988, the unemployment rate levelled out around 36 percent.50 Politically, the major problems of the Liberian state were the recurring human rights violations, from the Tubman to the Doe regime. The Doe regime in particular was authoritarian and oppressed the opposing political parties and civil society organizations.51 The political systems carried consequences for physical well-being of many Liberians. During the Tolbert regime, political detainees were subjected to various forms of physical torture and regular beatings.52 Doe´s reign was also marked by the hunting and killing of real and perceived opponents of the regime, in particular by the Special Anti-Terrorist Unit (SATU).53 Finally, the Liberian state has never made any form of social development a priority.54 Although it was paid lip service on several occasions, a coherent policy was never formed. This has thrown Liberia into a social development crisis for the larger part of six decades.55 According to the United Nations Development Program, “Liberia’s human development index has, for some time, been at the bottom of the list of countries with the lowest human development indices.”56 The country’s literacy rate was relatively high and even increased from 65 percent in 1980 to 77 percent in 1985. Approximately 65 percent of the population had no structural access to health care, most of who lived in the rural areas of Liberia.57

45 The official poverty line at the time was defined as being $125 a month for an urban family of four people. Togba Nah Tipoteh, “Crisis in the Liberian economy, 1980-1985,” Liberian Studies Journal Vol. 11, No. 2 (1986) 126. 46 Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs, Liberia, Liberia’s Economic Recovery Plan (Monrovia: Government Printing Office, 1985) 3. 47 Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs, Liberia, Economic Survey of Liberia (Monrovia: Government Printing Office, 1986) 75. 48 Movement for Justice in Liberia, The situation in our country (Monrovia: MOJA, 1980) 2. 49 George Klay Kieh, Jr., Liberia’s First Civil War: The crises of underdevelopment (New York: Peter Lang Publishing, 2008) 27. 50 United Nations Human Development Program, Human Development Program (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990) 156. 51 Freedom House, Freedom in the World Country Ratings, 1972-2006 (New York: Freedom House, 2007). 52 Idem. 53 Human Rights Watch, Africa Watch, Liberia: Flight from terror (New York, Human Rights Watch 1990) 6. 54 Kieh, Jr., Liberia’s First Civil War (2008) 107 55 Idem. 56 United Nations Development Program, Liberia’s national human development report (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006) 38. 57 Idem, 1; Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs, Liberia, Economic Survey of Liberia (Monrovia: Government Printing Office, 1986) 28 12

The First Liberian Civil War

Acquire arms, acquire power At the start of the conflict, when Taylor’s troops attacked the border town of Butuo, Taylor’s forces were not only “ill-trained and in their early teens”, but also badly supplied.58 The attack seemed to have been designed to procure firearms for the rebels. Eyewitness reports state that the rebels initially fought with a large variety of weapons, including agricultural tools, weapons and machetes.59 Acquiring weapons was of the utmost importance for Taylor in the early days of insurgency, but apparently not all that easy. The initial attempts to acquire arms from sympathetic soldiers were unsuccessful. In January 1990, three men were arrested in Monrovia because they tried to acquire arms for the rebels. They allegedly confessed their involvement in the insurgency and confessed to receiving training in .60 The training was provided by the World Revolutionary Centre (WRC) just outside the city of Benghazi. Dubbed the “Harvard and Yale of a whole generation of African revolutionaries” by Stephen Ellis and Douglas Farah, the recruits from various countries were provided with training in weapons and intelligence techniques. A few of the most prominent alumni included Idriss Déby, current president of Chad; , founder of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone; Ibrahim Bah, one of the leaders of the RUF, Blaise Campaoré, president of from 1987 to 2014; and finally Charles Taylor, founder and leader of the NPFL.61 At first the rebels were not organized under a central command of any kind. Charles Taylor quickly took up a position of leadership and subsequently sought to unify the scattered forces under a central command and single banner; the national Patriotic Front of Liberia. Taylor was instrumental in acquiring training in Libya as well as the logistics and provision of arms.62 Where the bulk of these arms came from remains unclear. Considering basic training seems to have been provided by Libya and Burkina Faso’s president Blaise Campaori, a Libyan Protégé, it seems likely that they provided arms and military supplies too.63 Taylor is said to have visited Libya several times between 1986 and 1989, and is reported to have met with a number Gambians rebels who had taken part in a coup attempt in in 1981.64 Due to a clear lack of sources, the exact origins of the weapons during this time will have to remain in the realm of speculation. While Côte d’Ivoire and Guinea were said to support Taylor with military equipment, light weapons and ammunition too, Guinea is not likely to have supplied arms.65 Several of the rebels crossed over into Guinea, only to be expelled later. Guinea’s President Conte was allegedly concerned that the overthrow of the Doe regime could perhaps encourage attempts by possible rebels in his own country. President Conte thus developed a zero tolerance policy toward Liberian rebels. 66 The conflict erupted before the international research agenda was focused on small arms

58 Wippman, “Enforcing the peace” in Fisler Damrosch (ed.), Enforcing restraint (1993) 164. 59 Jean-Baptiste Placca, “Liberia, Journey into the rebel stronghold,” Jeune Afrique (12th of March 1990). 60 Africa Watch, Liberia: Flight from terror; testimony of abuses in (New York 1990) 5-6. 61 Ellis, The mask of anarchy (1999) 69. 62 Jonathan C. Randall, “Army rampage said to spark resistance,” Washington Post (19th of March 1990). 63 Jenny Kuper, Military training and children in armed conflict: Law, policy and practice (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 2005) 33; Jeremy Levitt, The evolution of deadly conflict in Liberia (Durham: Carolina Academic Press, 2005) 22-23. 64 Arnold Hughes, “The attempted Gambian coup d’etat of 29 July 1981”, in Arnold Hughes (ed.), : Studies of society and politics. African Studies Series No. 3 (Birmingham, 1991) 80, 90-106. 65 Berki, Gbanaboma, “’Enfant terrible’ explains,” West Africa (4th-10th of May 1992) 753-755. 66 Human Rights Watch (HRW), Africa Watch, Liberia: Flight from terror (New York, Human Rights Watch 1990) 6. 13 and light weapons, translating into an unfortunate lack of sources surrounding the role of these weapons in the early stages of the war.

Figure 3.1: NPFL advance across Liberia

Source: James Hart Lidow, Violent Order: Rebel organization and Liberia’s civil war (Stanford University, 2011).

During the early part of 1990, however, the NPFL advanced rapidly. The “ill-trained recruits” were replaced by a core group of guerrillas, Libyan trained and supplemented by mercenaries from Burkina Faso. These mercenaries were supplied by President Blaise Compaoré and by internationalist revolutionaries from Gambia and Sierra Leone.67 It is likely that these mercenaries also brought small arms with them. According to a report written by a US human rights’ monitoring group, the Lawyers Committee on Human Rights, the hatred of the Krahn was so extensive, that the prospect of massive reprisals was very likely to become reality.68 The NPFL made ready use of this hatred by distributing arms to the Gio and Mano villagers of Nimba County. The NPFL knew these weapons would be used indiscriminately to attack Krahn and anyone suspected of cooperating with the Doe government. Armed bands claiming allegiance to the NPFL launched pogroms against people suspected of being Krahn or Mandingo, whom the armed bands regarded as supporters of the Doe government.69

67 Lawyers’ Committee on Human Rights, Liberia: A promise betrayed (New York, 1986) 23. 68 Idem, 22-24. 69 Ellis, The mask of anarchy (1999) 31. 14

Doe responded by distributing weapons to Krahn and Mandingo civilians in the capital of Monrovia and Grand Gedeh County, the Krahn heartland. At this point, the bulk of Doe’s weapons and ammunition were being supplied by Nigeria, despite denials by the then President .70 President Babangida was a close friend of Samuel Doe. They were business partners and at one point Babangida even went as far as paying a Liberian government debt with Nigerian public funds, claiming a gesture of pan-African solidarity.71 Another source of weapons might have been the government of Gambia. According to Charles Taylor, Doe was also in business with Sir Dawda Jawara, president of Gambia.72 Regardless of their origin, these weapons enabled Doe to hold several key areas of Monrovia for a prolonged period of time, transforming the capital to the site of a protracted battle. In July 1990, Prince Yormie Johnson broke away from the NPFL to form the Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL). Johnson himself was a former soldier in Doe’s army who had fled in the early 1980s and subsequently received military training in Libya.73 Johnson had been the NPFL training officer and took with him the core of experienced fighters, most notably the Libyan trained Special Commandos.74 This meant Taylor’s force now consisted mainly of civilians who joined the NPFL on its progress towards Monrovia and were armed in the process. By the end of July, six months after the invasion began, Taylor’s NPFL controlled more than 80 percent of Liberia, including Liberia’s second largest port, Buchanon, and all of Liberia’s iron ore and timber resources.75 Monrovia itself was now effectively divided into three zones, each belonging to a different group. The NPFL held the zone with access to key resources and port facilities, offering a significant advantage over the INPFL, which held the zone where daily life was least affected. The use of ethnic differences by Taylor, Doe and later on Johnson for their own political or personal motives was characteristic of the first phase of the Liberian conflict. Doe had used the hatred of the Americo-Liberians by the various ethnic groups within Liberia to topple the Tolbert regime, and had subsequently supplanted the Americo-Liberians with his own ethnic group, the Krahn. This in turn led to a general sense of resentment of the Krahn and the closely related Mandingo. Taylor similarly used this resentment to stir up ethnic violence against the Krahn and Mandingo, mainly by arming the Gio and Mano ethnic groups. When Prince Yormie Johnson broke off from Taylor’s NPFL, the newly created INPFL catered mainly to Gio interests, while the NPFL remained a mixture of Gio, Mano, and various other ethnic groups. 76 In a sense, the first phase of the Liberian conflict can be seen more as a continuation of the conflict orchestrated by Doe to topple the Tolbert regime. Tribal and racial animosity was instrumental in the eruption of violence. Consequently, Taylor’s NPFL entered Liberia to redress grievances by Gio and Mano groups against the Krahn and Mandingo political elites. This situation was exacerbated by the presence of SA/LW, and indeed access to these weapons proved vital, but it was not caused by the availability of small arms, as is argued by proponents of the “new war theory”.

70 Clement Adibe, “Coercive diplomacy and the Third World: Africa after the Cold War,” Paper presented to the workshop on coercive diplomacy , King’s College London (7th-9th of June 1995) 14; Press release from the Campaign for Democracy, Lagos, Nigeria (20th of May 1992); Frank Aigbogun, “Strikers predict disaster, seek aid to Nigeria.” Associated Press (26th of August 1994). 71 Margaret Vogt and E. Ekoko, Nigeria in international peace-keeping 1960-1992 (Malthouse Press, 1993) 199; Mobolade Omonijo, Doe: The Liberian tragedy (Sahel Publishing and Printing 1990) 53. 72 ‘Face to face with Charles Taylor’, interview by Baffour Ankomah, Ghanian Chronicle (12-18th of October 1992) 6-7. 73 Ellis, The mask of anarchy (1999) 33. 74 Eric Schmitt, “Man in the news; A foe to be feared: Prince Yormie Johnson,” New York Times (11th of September 1990). 75 See figure 3.1. 76 Schmitt, “Man in the news” New York Times (1990). 15

International context There was a general expectation that the USA would intervene in what had long amounted to an unofficial US colony. Indeed, there were numerous calls for international intervention to stabilize the situation.77 In June 1990, US warships anchored off the coast of Liberia with 2,000 marines on board, but contended themselves with just evacuating US citizens. There were no attempts to restore order, despite the widespread agreement that most Liberians would have accepted a US intervention.78 The US might have staged an intervention if it were not for a crucial event elsewhere in the world. In August 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait, demanding all of America’s attention and ruling out any possibility of US intervention in Liberia. As S. Neil MacFarlane and Thomas Weiss have observed: “[...] the fact that some 1.5 million persons were displaced, the same number that had led to the humanitarian intervention in Kurdistan, was seemingly not enough to trigger a response from outside the [West African] region.”79 Moreover, the situation in the Gulf region was more appealing to the dominant geostrategic paradigm than the civil war in Liberia, at least for the United States. Other countries in West Africa were becoming increasingly alarmed by the situation in Liberia. President Babangida of Nigeria wanted to support his friend Samuel Doe and saw himself as the regional hegemon. Moreover, he wanted to establish Nigeria as the principal regional peace- keeper in the Post-Cold War era; as opposed to its francophone rival, Côte d’Ivoire. Since Taylor’s NPFL had the backing of the francophone bloc, consisting of Côte d’Ivoire, Burkina Faso, and (allegedly) Guinea, Nigeria felt itself politically challenged.80 Taylor also kept relations with rebels from , Sierra Leone, and Gambia with whom he likely met during his time visiting Libya.81 Factoring in the Libyan involvement, a country that had a history of political and military adventurism in West Africa, this led other English-speaking countries to believe that Taylor’s victory in Liberia could cause insurrections or coups elsewhere. The obvious power vacuum left by a disinterested United States, created a tremendous opportunity for a regional initiative. The regional organization most fit to handle the situation was the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). The organization was established on the 28th of May 1975 as a consequence of the Treaty of Lagos, signed by fifteen different West African states.82 The primary objective of this Union was improving intra-regional trade and securing favourable terms of trade from their western trading partners. However, underlying these economic goals was a strong desire for some form of security integration.83 There was (perceived) context of regional insecurity, what Emmanuel Aning refers to as “the preponderance of violent military takeovers in the sub-region with probable spill-over characteristics.”84 It was in this context that the members of ECOWAS signed the Protocol of Non-Aggression (hereafter: the Protocol) on the 22nd of April 1978.

77 Ellis, The mask of anarchy (1999) 41-43. 78 George Klay Kieh Jr., “United States Foreign Policy and the Second Liberian Civil War,´ African journal of international affairs Vol. 12 No. 1-2 (2010) 121-144. 79 S. Neil MacFarlane and Thomas G. Weiss, “Regional organizations and regional security,” Security Studies Vol. 2, No. 1 (1992) 18. 80 Idem. 81 Arnold Hughes, “The attempted Gambian coup d’etat”, in Hughes (ed.), The Gambia (1991) 80. 82 These states included: Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, , Sierra Leone, and Togo. The former Portuguese colony of Cape Verdé, joined in 1977 and became the sixteenth member. See Figure 3.2. 83 Olatunde Ojo, “Nigeria and the formation of ECOWAS,” International Organization Vol. 34, No. 4 (1980) 577 (571-604). 84 Emmanuel Kwezi Aning, “Managing regional security in West Africa: ECOWAS, ECOMOG and Liberia,” Copenhagen centre for development research: Working paper Vol. 92, No. 2 (February 1994) 5. 16

Figure 3.2: ECOWAS Member States, 1989

The Protocol ensured signatories refrained from “committing, encouraging or condoning the acts of subversion, hostility or aggression against the territorial integrity or political independence of other Member States.”85 Because the protocol did not provide any institutional mechanism for responding to such aggression, it was widely criticized as a mere idealistic injunction, and did little to allay the fear of regime insecurity. At the 1981 ECOWAS Summit in Freetown, the Protocol was expanded upon by ratifying the Protocol Relating to Mutual Assistance on Defence (hereafter: the Defence Protocol). The Defence Protocol entered into force in September 1986 and emphasized that “any armed threat or aggression directed against any Member State shall constitute a threat of aggression against the entire Community.”86 Furthermore, the treaty envisioned an elaborate response mechanism, including the creation of the Allied Forced of the Community (AAFC), a Defence Council of the Community, and a Defence Commission.87 The Defence Protocol makes no distinction between internal and external sources of threat to the signatories, signified by the use of the word “any” in article two.88 This is further emphasized in article 3, which obliges the Community to “give mutual aid and assistance for defence against any armed threat or aggression.”89 What the Defence Protocol fails to define, however, is what types of conflict within a Member State constitutes a threat; this is left open to interpretation. The remaining provisions only define the institutional framework that is to be created in the event of a threat.

85 Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Protocol on Non-Aggression 1978), article 2. 86 ECOWAS, Protocol Relating to Mutual Assistance on Defence (1981), article 2. 87 Idem, articles 5-18. 88 Idem, article 2. 89 Idem, article 3. Emphasis added. 17

It was in this context that Doe appealed to ECOWAS to introduce a “peacekeeping Force into Liberia to forestall increasing terror and tension […].”90 On the 30th of May 1990, during a meeting in Banjul, The Gambia, ECOWAS called for an end to hostilities and established a Standing Mediation Committee (SMC) with a mandate to with the Liberian crisis. The SMC consisted of The Gambia, Ghana, Nigeria and Togo, but in reality it was led by the Nigerian president Babangida.91 The SMC was subsequently able to produce a comprehensive peace plan that focused on a number of key objectives, including a call for an immediate cease-fire, the establishment and deployment of an ECOWAS Cease-Fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), and the establishment of an interim government.92 The plan had the support of the USA, the UN, as well as Doe, but was rejected by Taylor and the francophone bloc in ECOWAS, Côte d’Ivoire and Burkina Faso.93 The greater francophone block in ECOWAS, consisting of Mali, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, and Togo, could be characterized as non-interventionist. It consistently opposed any form of intervention in what their leaders described as a strictly domestic matter.94 While ECOWAS had previously been characterized by a divide imposed by colonial and linguistic differences; the main factor now appeared to be political. The francophone block rallied behind public support to the doctrine of non-intervention in domestic affairs of sovereign member states of ECOWAS.

ECOWAS intervenes The Banjul Summit Resolution calling on the warring parties to agree to a cease-fire and stop the destruction of their motherland was seen as consistent with the tradition of African multilateral diplomacy.95 The creation of the SMC to deal with the conflict by the authority of ECOWAS was seen as little more than an appeal to the rebels and the Liberian government. The plan did not feature any guidelines towards or reference to disarmament, nor did it specify whether the Member States had to stop weapon shipments to the warring factions. That meant that for a few months, there was an awkward situation wherein the Member States stated their intent to broker a peace-fire, while they might have still supplied the different factions with arms.96 Unfortunately, the suppliers did not keep detailed records of the shipments, making this a purely speculative assumption. However, during the inaugural meeting of the SMC, which was held in Banjul from the 6th to the 7th of August, it was clear that the politics of ECOWAS would constitute a shift from the traditional passivity to actual multilateral intervention and disarmament. The SMC described Taylor’s NPFL as the main party to the armed conflict together with the government.97 As such, they tried to mediate a peaceful end to the conflict with these two parties, not with Johnson’s INPFL. Taylor opposed most of the conditions for ECOWAS mediation, in particular the Nigerian element, which he did not consider to be sufficiently neutral.98 Despite Taylor’s opposition, however, ECOWAS was determined to bring the conflict to a peaceful end. The

90 Marc Weller, “Letter addressed by President Samuel K. Doe to the Chairman and Members of the Ministerial Meeting of the ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee. 14 July 1990,” supra note 20, p. 60. 91 The committee also invited Liberia’s two direct neighbours, Sierra Leone and Guinea, to participate in its deliberations. See: Rasheed Draman and David Carment, “Managing chaos in the West African sub-region: Assessing the role of ECOMOG in Liberia,” Journal of Military and Strategic Studies Vol. 6, No. 2 (Fall 2003) 4-6. 92 ECOWAS, “ECOWAS Peace Plan, Banjul Communique, (7th of August 1990). 93 Clement Adibe,”The Liberian conflict and the ECOWAS-UN partnership,” Third World Quarterly Vol. 18, No. 3 (1997) 471-488 478-479. 94 Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: Sub-Saharan Africa (9th of August 1990). 95 Adibe, “Managing arms”, Disarmament and Conflict Resolution (1996) 20. 96 Nkem Agetua, Operation Liberty: The story of Major General Joshua Nimyel Dogonyaro (Lagos: Hona Communications Limited, 1992) 6. 97 Idem. 98 ECOWAS, “Final report of the ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee Ministerial Meeting,” ECW/SMC/FM/90/3/Rev. 1 (Banjul, 30th of May 1990). 18

President of Guinea and summit member of the SMC, General Lansana Conté, was quoted on record responding to Taylor’s indisposition: “We do not need the permission of any party involved in the conflict to implement the decisions reached in Banjul. So, with or without the agreement of any of the parties, ECOWAS troops will be in Liberia.”99 This signifies the clear intent of ECOWAS towards a military intervention. The decisions Conté refers to, were made without any of the parties involved during the meeting of the SMC in Banjul on the 6th and 7th of August. The summits resolution, known as Decision A/DEC.1/8/90, contained five key elements.100 The first, that relates to an “immediate cease-fire”, is arguably the most important. It stipulates seven different requirements that “the parties to the conflict shall” adhere to.101 Most importantly, they shall “cease all activities of a military or para-military nature [...]”.102 Next to that, they shall also refrain from any activity that prejudice the establishment of an interim government, release all prisoners of war, and fully cooperate with ECOMOG, among others things.103 Furthermore, they shall also “surrender all arms and ammunition to the custody of the [ECOMOG]” as well as “refrain from importing or acquiring or assisting or encouraging the importation and acquisition of weapons or war materials”.104

ECOWAS mandate regarding SA/LW The fact that out of nine provisions, two specifically featured arms and ammunition, tells us that the role small arms played was at least recognized. But how did ECOWAS envision the process of surrendering arms? How did they plan to enforce the ban on arms import? The second article of the resolution stipulates that in order to “arrive at a peaceful and lasting settlement of the dispute”, a Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) will be created.105 This intervention force shall be “composed of military contingents” drawn from the Member States of the SMC as well as from Guinea and Sierra Leone.106 The second article further defines the mandate and the mission of ECOMOG, but does not make any further reference to small arms of the disarmament process. It does stipulate the duration of the force that “shall commence forthwith” (7th of August 1990) and “shall remain in Liberia, if necessary, until the successful holding of general elections and the installation of an elected government.”107 Again, the primary goal of ECOMOG’s mission was, at this point in time, to install an interim government and ensure democratic elections in a peaceful environment. It does not say anything specific about disarming and dismantling rebel groups like the NPFL and the INPFL. It was clear, however, that Doe and Taylor would not head this interim government, which also became the reason for them to reject ECOMOG’s mission. 108 It is also not clear whether the resolution’s provision that forbade rebel factions from “importing, acquiring, assisting, or encouraging the importation of weapons” was actually an objective.109 The subjects of the resolution are “all parties to the conflict”. However, it is unclear if this includes the ECOWAS Member States, or whether it just refers to the different factions active in the Liberia civil war; Samuel Doe’s National Democratic Party of Liberia (NDPL), Taylor’s NPFL and

99 Quoted in Africa Research Bulletin (15th of September 1990) 9802. 100 ECOWAS, “Decision A/DEC.1/8/90 on the cease-fire and establishment of an ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Group for Liberia,” Decision A/DEC.1/8/90 (Banjul, 6th – 7th of August 1990). 101 Idem, article 1.1, 1.2. 102 Idem, article 1.2 103 Idem, article 1.2. 104 Idem, article 1.2.b, 1.2.c. 105 Idem, article 2. 106 Idem, article 2.1. 107 Idem, article 2.4. 108 Adibe, “Managing arms,” Disarmament and Conflict Resolution (1996) 26-27. 109 ECOWAS, “Decision A/DEC.1/8/90,” Decision A/DEC.1/8/90 (1990) article 1.2.c. 19

Johnson’s INPFL. This is a significant distinction to be made, considering the fact that Côte d’Ivoire, Burkina Faso, and Nigeria had been known to supply the various parties with military bases, logistics, supplies, light weapons, and ammunitions.110 There is no material or archival source left that show whether these shipments continued or not. The only thing that can be objectively concluded is that no specific embargo has been placed on supplying these weapons, only that it was illegal for the parties involved in the conflict to receive them.

ECOMOG lands Barely one week after the Banjul summit of the 6th and 7th of August established ECOMOG, a military contingent was assembled in Freetown, Sierra Leone, to deploy in Monrovia. The contingent consisted of some 3,000 soldiers, the bulk of which supplied by Nigeria.111 Under the command of Ghana’s General Arnold Quainoo, ECOMOG troops landed on the beach of Monrovia on the 24th of August, assigned to the operation now called “Operation Liberty”.112 The operation commenced without a prior cease-fire agreement and without the consent of all the warring parties. Without the consent of Taylor’s NPFL there was no peace to keep and thus, when ECOMOG’s flotilla landed on Liberian shores, they were met with an instant attack by the NPFL.

“On landing, nothing had changed at the diplomatic level to raise bright hopes for ECOMOG in the task ahead. And so, the force had to inch ahead against all the persistent odds. The fierce fighting we sensed on the high sea between the NPFL rebels of Charles Taylor and the INPFL forces of did not subside. Even as sea men struggled to anchor the ships and off-load their contents, heavy gunfire cracked interspersed with booms from mortar, lasting for an hour.”113

The initial response to this baptism by fire was defensive. ECOMOG was to consolidate its hold by establishing a defensive perimeter surrounding its initial headquarters located within the Free-port area of Monrovia.114 During these weeks, ECOMOG was confronted by three contending factions. Whereas Taylor’s NPFL went on the offensive, the INPFL and Doe’s Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) eagerly offered their cooperation. According to Herbert Howe, the INPFL and the AFL cooperated with ECOMOG because each was too weak to challenge ECOMOG directly, but they could both benefit from its protection and any damage inflicted upon the NPFL.115

Doe’s murder The INPFL readily took advantage of the situation. During a lull in the fighting on the 9th of September 1990, President Doe, who had been holed up in the Executive Mansion for weeks, ventured to Monrovia’s port for an unscheduled meeting with General Quianoo. While he was at the ECOMOG base, Doe was captured by Prince Johnson’s INPFL and transported to their headquarters.116 Video footage chronicles the events that followed: a visibly drunk Prince Johnson orders his men to torture Doe, who lays sobbing and bleeding in a corner of the room. The soldiers cut off Doe’s ears before

110 See note 61, 62, 68, and 69. 111 Adibe, “Managing arms,”Disarmament and conflict resolution (1996) 32. 112 Nkem Agetua, Operation Liberty (1992) 25. 113 Segun Aderiye, “ECOMOG Landing,” in: M.A. Vogt (ed.), The Liberian Crisis and ECOMOG (Lagos: Gabumoh Publishing Co., 1992) 106. (95-122). 114 Nkem Agetua, Operation Liberty (1992) 25-27. 115 Herbert Howe, “Lessons of Liberia: ECOMOG and Regional Peacekeeping,” International Security Vol.21, No. 3 (Winter 1997) (145-176) 165. 116 Ellis, The mask of anarchy (1999) 19-24; John-Peter Pham, Liberia, Portrait of a failed state (New York: Reed Press, 2004) 84. 20 finally shooting him to death. The triumphant INPFL men then loaded Doe’s body into a wheelbarrow and paraded his corpse through the streets.117 Doe’s murder changed the general perception of ECOMOG as a traditional peacekeeping mission to a complex peace-building operation; there was no “peace to keep”.118 Subsequently, ECOMOG’s original mandate and strategy were completely transformed. The Ghanaian General Quainoo was replaced as force commander by the Nigerian General Dogonyaro, who was said to report directly to the Nigerian presidency.119 In the face of stiff opposition from Taylor’s forces and in the context of a complete paralysis of social order, the mandate was transformed to adopt a strategy of ‘limited offensive’.120 This resulted in a series of deadly encounters between ECOMOG and the various warring factions, further strengthening the perception of ECOMOG to that of another faction in the conflict. This perception of ECOMOG and the nature of the mission and its mandate are essential to the way it handled the question of small arms. Even though ECOMOG was referred to as a ‘peacekeeping force’, the NPFL’s resistance, the lack of active cooperation by the government forces and the inability of ECOMOG to stop the murder of Samuel Doe by INPFL forces, are a clear indication of an absence of consent. The consent of the warring parties, however, is a key ingredient of conventional peacekeeping.121 As one senior UN official put it, “Pushing Taylor out of Monrovia by force is hardly peacekeeping.”122 It is in this context that Nigeria´s president, Ibrahim Babangida, instructed ECOMOG´s Force Commander, General Dogonyaro, to “stabilise the chaotic situation, end the bloodletting and create an enabling atmosphere for a peaceful resolution of the crisis.”123 Dogonyaro received additional reinforcements of troops and materiel from ECOWAS, in particular Nigeria and Ghana, and proceeded to reorganize the force’s structure. Subsequently, he launched the ‘limited offensive’ in an attempt to impose any form of social order in Monrovia and encourage the warring factions to yield to political negotiations led by ECOWAS. This limited offensive also featured orders “to try and prevent arms and ammunition continuing to come into the rebel forces, who were still not subscribing to a cease-fire.”124 This is the first real evidence of any attempt being made to enforce parts of the first article specified in ECOWAS’ original resolution (known as Decision A/DEC.1/8/90).125 At the very least, ECOMOG was ordered to actively try and prevent small arms from falling into enemy hands. There is no evidence of an order actually coming down the command chain to actively start disarming the rebels, as the first article of the resolution stipulates.126 This makes sense; it would be difficult to disarm a faction that actively and violently opposes ECOMOG, without any form of consent. Furthermore, it is doubtful whether General Dogonyaro believed and supported the disarmament program. He attributed the assassination of President Doe to the former Force

117 Bootlegged versions of the video were widely available on the streets of Monrovia until 2005. The video is now widely available on the World Wide Web. 118 , “10-year reign in the shadow of brutality” (14th of September 1990) 1; The Independent, “Civil war in Liberia threatens to divide West African Neighbors” (20th of July 1990) 2. 119 Adibe, “Managing arms”, Disarmament and Conflict Resolution (1996) 33. 120 Aderiye, “ECOMOG Landing,” in: Vogt (ed.), The Liberian Crisis and ECOMOG (Lagos, 1992) 110. (95-122). 121 Voetnoot theorie peacekeeping 122 Colin Scott, Larry Minear, and Thomas G. Weiss, Humanitarian actions and security in Liberia, 1989-194, Occasional Paper No. 20, Thomas J. Watson Institute for International Studies, Brown University (1995) 9. 123 General Ibrahim Babangida, “Foreword,” in: Nkem Agetua, Operation Liberty (1992) xiii. 124 M.A. Vogt, “The problems and challenges of Peace-Making: From peace-keeping to peace enforcement,” in The Liberian Crisis and ECOMOG 155 125 ECOWAS, “Decision A/DEC.1/8/90 on the cease-fire and establishment of an ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Group for Liberia,” Decision A/DEC.1/8/90 (Banjul, 6th – 7th of August 1990). 126 Idem, article 1.2.b, 1.2.c; also see Agetua, Operation Liberty (1992) 28-31. 21

Commander Quainoo’s “softness”. He was critical of Quainoo’s faith in the warring parties and actively questioned the wisdom of the disarmament initiative.127 Dogonyaro’s main focus shifted from diplomatic talks and disarmament to actually defeating the warring parties in combat. Hence, ECOMOG continuously fought battles during Dogonyaro’s time as Force Commander. Any prospects of a negotiated solution to the conflict as well as the disarmament process thus suffered.

Preventing the spread of small arms Still the question remains how ECOMOG planned to enforce the part of the first article that required the parties to the conflict to “refrain from importing or acquiring or assisting or encouraging the importation and acquisition of weapons or war materials”.128 It would seem that this is impossible to achieve without consent. Not only that, but the order given to ECOMOG’s new Field Commander Dogonyaro, “to try and prevent arms and ammunition continuing to come into the rebel forces […]”, would be next to impossible to achieve within the boundaries of the nation state of Liberia.129 ECOMOG’s mandate only extended to Liberia, but the import and export of small arms cannot be trapped within a national container. This is further emphasized by the fact that weapons were supplied by ECOWAS Member States like Burkina Faso and Côte d’Ivoire, nations that did not supply any troops to the peace-keeping mission either.130 There is no evidence that reveals any meaningful attempts by the ECOWAS to stop these nations from supplying the NPFL with weapons; although that does not mean that it could not have been discussed. The difficulty in enforcing the parties to refrain from importing small arms and light weapons is highlighted during the year of 1991. During this period the ECOWAS attempted to put end to the war through several cease-fires and peace initiatives. Indeed, several cease-fire agreements were struck and subsequently broken. It seems, however, that most of the warring parties used these cease-fires to replenish their arsenal. This holds true especially in the case of the AFL and the NPFL. 131 While the AFL, ECOMOG, and INPFL were largely confined to Monrovia, the NPFL controlled most of the hinterlands. This also meant that it controlled the key resources and port facilities, acquiring significant funds through partnerships with foreign iron and timber corporations.132 These funds are likely to have been spent on the procurement of small arms and light weapons. Thus, any actions the ECOWAS took towards active disarmament in Liberia would have been offset by the relative ease with which the NPFL could import weapons from for instance the neighbouring countries. There was no comprehensive policy formulated towards prohibiting the neighbouring ECOWAS Member States from exporting war materials.

127 Agetua, Operation Liberty (1992) 35. 128 Idem, article 1.2.b, 1.2.c. 129 M.A. Vogt, “The problems and challenges of Peace-Making: From peace-keeping to peace enforcement,” in The Liberian Crisis and ECOMOG 155 130 See note 61, 62, 68, and 69. 131 Adibe, “Managing arms”, Disarmament and Conflict Resolution (1996) 37. 132 UN, “Report of the Panel of Experts on Liberia submitted in accordance with Resolution 1343 (2001),” S/2001/1015 (26th of October 2001) 78-80. 22

Table 3.1: Yamoussoukro IV timetable

Date Description of Activities

D-Day: 15th Issue Orders of Nov. 1991

- Confirmatory reconnaissance completed of all encampment areas and forward patrol bases. - Border guards in place including buffer zones along Sierra Leone/Liberia border. - Roadblocks and checkpoints removed in collaboration with administrative authorities. - Reception centres for encampment opened. - ECOMOG patrols commence. D-Day +7 - NPFL encampment and documentation. - Receiving, crating and storage of weapons at designated points completed. - Resettlement programme commences. - Robertsfield International Airport reactivated. - Consolidation of Border Areas in collaboration with the administrative authorities. - Appropriate light Air Detachments deployed in Liberia (including helicopters). - Routine patrols recommence - Permanent presence and supervision of all airports and seaports. - International flights into Robertsfield commence. - No movement of heavy weapons belonging to ECOMOG where not necessary. D-Day + 60 Assignment completed by 14 January 1992. The operation itself will be conducted at small unit and subunit levels but there is an overriding need to keep border security forces as long as necessary. Command and control will be exercised at Force Headquarters.

Source: ECOWAS, Final Communique of the Fourth Meeting of the Committee of Five on the Liberian Crisis held in Yamoussoukro, 29-30 October 1991 (1991), annex.

Active disarmament did emerge as a primary ECOMOG objective in the following year, however. At the Yamoussoukro peace meeting in October 1991, which later came to be known as Yamoussoukro IV, the ECOWAS Member States formulated a detailed disarmament programme that was to be fully implemented within a timeframe of two months.133 Generally speaking, the program, which was signed by Charles Taylor and Amos Sawyer, was aimed at dismantling Liberia’s irregular militias. It included diversifying the ECOMOG ground troops with soldiers from Mali, Ghana and Gambia.134 In addition, the agreement stipulated that a number of weapon depots would be erected, designed to store all typed of weapons and ammunition belonging to the militias. These depots

133 See table 3.1. 134 The force now included 150 troops from Gambia, 1,500 from Ghana, 600 from Guinea, 6 from Mali, and 700 from Sierra Leone. Nigeria still provided the bulk of the force, with 9,000 soldiers. Inegbedion, “ECOMOG in comparative perspective”, in Shaw and Okolo (eds.), The political economy of foreign policy in ECOWAS (1994) 231. 23 would be guarded and maintained by the ECOMOG force. Furthermore, it provided for the demobilisation and resettlement of all militias and civilians into normal life.135 What is surprising about the programme is that the entire process of disarmament was scheduled to be completed within seven days after D-Day, the implementation of the program.136 In this period, the borders would be monitored by ECOMOG forces, to stop any illicit trafficking of weapons. Reception centres for the weapons would be erected, and the arms would be stockpiled at designated points and put under guard. In these seven days, the resettlement programme would also commence. The resettlement programme was planned to be completed within the next two months, together with the repairs to the air- and seaports, and the resumption of all economic activities. In hindsight, returning Liberia to a full state of socio-economic normalcy within two months seems nearly impossible. In reality, it did turn out to be impossible and the programme flopped even before it had entirely begun.137 The aspect of disarmament seemed to be especially troubling for the ECOMOG forces, due to the unwillingness of the militias and the warring parties to relinquish their weapons.138 The Yamoussoukro disarmament initiative has been thoroughly criticized by scholars such as John Mackinlay and Abiodun Alaso. They argued that “the instinctive urge to have warring factions disarmed as soon as possible” was “counter-productive to the overall efforts to establish conditions for a lasting peace process.”139 According to them:

“No population that has ‘survived in’ a war zone for several years can be expected to be absolutely disarmed. There will be too many residual weapon caches to monitor, and consequently impossible to guarantee that factions could not swiftly rearm when the need arises. Nor can disarmament be conducted in isolation. First there must be convincing reasons to disarm. […] This is only likely to happen when individual security can be assured by a higher authority or regime in which the individual does not have to fend for himself. In a collapsed state, it is when a super-gang or military force which is superior to the sum of all the parties in the immediate area, possible nation-wide, can establish itself. […] The question that the designers and negotiators of a peace process have to decide is whether a despotic regime is easier to bring into a peace process than the array of sub-factions and local gangs spawned by a partially successful disarmament process that has robbed the district of its super-gang which previously guaranteed security.”140

Mackinlay and Alao were mainly addressing the frustrations that were present in Liberia, resulting from the partial implementation of the disarmament program. The local gangs that fought off threats to their community were, in the first phase of the program, disarmed, whereas the larger factions like the NPFL and the INPFL, were not. This rendered the local communities vulnerable to raids by the other factions. ECOMOG was hardly capable of projecting power and had trouble protecting the communities outside the city borders of Monrovia. The larger factions either simply refused to disarm, or could quickly rearm during one of the intermittent cease-fires. This subsequently angered the local populace and further increased their unwillingness to disarm.

135 ECOWAS, Final Communique of the Fourth Meeting of the Committee of Five on the Liberian Crisis held in Yamoussoukro, 29-30 October 1991 (1991), annex. 136 Idem. 137 Adibe, “Managing arms”, Disarmament and Conflict Resolution (1996) 42. 138 Agetua, Operation Liberty (1992) 45. 139 John Mackinlay and Abiodun Alao, Liberia 1994: ECOMOG and UNOMIL response to a complex emergency (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 1995) 32. 140 Idem, 32-33. 24

The notion that disarmament cannot be conducted in isolation did not gain any traction with the organizers of the peace talks. Again, during the Yamoussoukro peace meeting, no attempts were made to enforce any moratorium on exports of war materials to Liberia from the ECOWAS member states. Nor was there any specific action towards preventing the illicit trafficking of weapons across the borders from Sierra Leone, Guinea or Côte d’Ivoire.141 The border guards specified in the Yamoussoukro disarmament programme still only covered the Liberian part of the “Sierra Leone/Liberian border”.142 At no point does it address any obligations of the ECOWAS Member States to perform any cross-border operations. In the preceding Yamoussoukro agreements – there were four in total – no such efforts were made either. Yamoussoukro II was signed on 29th of July; it was a joint product of ECOWAS and Jimmy Carter’s International Negotiation Network (INN). It was mainly meant to reaffirm Yamoussoukro I and introduced yet another cease-fire in Liberia.143 There was to be a follow up meeting on the 17th of September 1991, where it was decided that the ECOMOG force was to be reinforced. Senegal also announced its intention to contribute troops to ECOMOG, and the concern for the border regions with Sierra Leone and Guinea was reiterated.144 The final Yamoussoukro meeting was held on the 30th of October 1991 and, next to the disarmament programme mentioned earlier, it also expanded the ECOMOG mission to “cover the whole of Liberia”.145 Besides the expanded territory ECOMOG now had to cover, Senegal agreed to send a contingent as well. This was important for several reasons. First, it broadened ECOMOG with a wider support base. Second, Senegal yielded the first true francophone contingent, which was an important counterbalance to Nigeria. Third, the Senegalese contingent was well trained and highly regarded professionally.146 However, the Senegalese were distrustful of Nigeria’s leadership and sensed that the mission was peace-enforcing rather than peacekeeping. In April 1992, an advance contingent of forty Senegalese troops left Monrovia for Grand Cape Mount and Bomi counties to establish one of the buffer zones referred to in Yamoussoukro IV.147 At the same time, a small force of Ghanaians went to Grand Bassa county on a similar mission. 148 When six Senegalese soldiers were killed in an encounter with NPFL soldiers in a market in , Senegal reassessed the nature of the peacekeeping mission and its role therein, and withdrew the contingent back to Monrovia. Within a year of entering Liberia, Senegal departed the country entirely.149 Projecting power beyond Monrovia proves to be a continuous problem for ECOMOG. In early 1992 ECOMOG increased its capacity and imposed a full naval blockade of all large seaports, the most notable being the one at Buchanan. By blocking the NPFL sea access, they hoped to stop the faction from the illicit trafficking of iron and timber.150 The naval blockade was accompanied by an enlargement of the unit stationed at Freetown. Following the Yamoussoukro IV

141 Florquin and Berman, Armed and Aimless (2005). 142 ECOWAS, Final Communique of the First Meeting of the Committee of Five on the Liberian Crisis held in Yamoussoukro, 30 June 1991 (1991), annex. 143 ECOWAS, Final Communique of the Second Meeting of the Committee of Five on the Liberian Crisis held in Yamoussoukro, 29 July 1991 (1991), annex. 144 ECOWAS, Final Communique of the ECOWAS Committee of Five on the Liberian Crisis held in Yamoussoukro, 16-17 September 1991 (1991), annex. 145 ECOWAS, Final Communique of the Fourth Meeting of the Committee of Five on the Liberian Crisis held in Yamoussoukro, 29-30 October 1991 (1991), annex. 146 Karl P. Magyar, “ECOMOG’s operations: Lessons for peacekeeping,” in: Karl P. Magyar and Earl Conteh- Morgan (eds.), Peacekeeping in Africa: ECOMOG in Liberia (New York: St. Martin’s Press, Inc., 1998) 68. 147 Agetua, Operation Liberty (1992) 51. 148 Magyar, “ECOMOG’s operations,” in: Magyar and Conteh-Morgan (eds.), Peacekeeping in Africa (1998) 68. 149 Idem. 150 See note 132. 25 agreement, ECOMOG took up several positions in the NPFL controlled rural areas farther inland. This proved to be a contentious act; clashes ensued especially along the Po River Bridge, where ECOMOG suffered heavy casualties.151 Subsequently, in early September, over 500 ECOMOG troops stationed in the rural NPFL controlled Bomu county, were taken prisoner by the NPFL. The International Negotiation Network (INN) led by former US President Jimmy Carter had to negotiate their release.152 The failure of ECOMOG to pacify the region and launch a coherent disarmament campaign was in part due to the continued distrust between the various factions and ethnic groups. In line with the argument made by Mackinlay and Alao, disarmament is unlikely to succeed if individual security is not guaranteed. The continued tribal strife and racial enmity present since the creation of the Liberian state only served to further endanger the individual security in the country. A single tribe or ethnic group is unlikely to disarm without guarantee that the opposing group had fully disarmed as well.

The First Liberian Civil War: Second Phase

Enter ULIMO Liberia’s civil war soon entered a new phase because of two developments, following each other in rapid succession. The first was the appearance of a new rebel group in the Liberian theatre of war: the United Liberian movement for Democracy (ULIMO). It made rapid progression, capturing strategic towns along the Sierra Leone-Liberian border. ULIMO’s history began in the Liberian refugee camps in Sierra Leone. After the civil war broke out, hundreds of former AFL soldiers fled to these camps across the border. In March 1991, these camps came under increased threat and were even attacked by the Revolutionary United Front (RUF). The RUF was supported by the NPFL and conducted a series of attacks that targeted civilians in Sierra Leone as well as Liberians in the refugee camps.153 ULIMO had its roots in the Liberian United Defence Force (LUDF), a self-defence militia formed in the refugee camps in Sierra Leone. It was led by Albert Karpeh, Liberia’s ambassador to Sierra Leone.154 The LUDF initially received weapons from the Sierra Leonean government in exchange for their support; their common enemy was the RUF.155 However, the LUDF lacked the manpower to push back the RUF and when it tried to enter Liberia, it was quickly routed by the NPFL. In order to increase the group’s strength, Karpeh reached out to another group of Liberian exiles, the Movement for the Redemption of Liberian Muslims (MRM), Albaji Kromah, a retired AFL General. The group initially consisted of deserted AFL soldiers belonging to the Mandingo ethnic group, but later also included people from various ethnic groups.156 The two groups adopted the name ULIMO and quickly managed to win a series of key battles in the north-western part of Liberia. Dissatisfied with his position, Kromah orchestrated the assassination of Karpeh early on the groups history, disconnecting ULIMO from the Sierra Leonean government. Nevertheless, the group was better organized and better equipped than INPFL or AFL. During the early skirmishes, several strategic locations were captured, such as the towns of

151 Agetua, Operation Liberty (1992) 47. 152 Magyar, “ECOMOG’s operations,” in: Magyar and Conteh-Morgan (eds.), Peacekeeping in Africa (1998) 69- 70. 153 James Hart Lidow, Violent Order: Rebel organization and Liberia’s civil war (Stanford University, 2011) 155- 156. 154 Idem, 156. 155 Eric Witte, “5:00 Prosecution witness Abu Keita takes the stand,” Summary from Charles Taylor at the Special Court for Sierra Leone (International Justice Monitor, 22nd of January of 2008). Accessed on 8th of June 2015. http://www.ijmonitor.org/2008/01/500-prosecution-witness-abu-keita-takes-the-stand/. 156 Idem. 26

Tubmanburg and Klay, and in august 1992 ULIMO captured the Po river Bridge, just 25 kilometres from Monrovia.157 When the supply of ammunition stopped, ULIMO was forced to find a new ally to supply them. They found one in ECOMOG, which was again faced with the dilemma of siding with one of the antagonists who could be of great value, but whose strategic alliance violated orthodox peacekeeping practices. Disregarding any moral objections, ECOMOG proposed a partnership in exchange for the supply of ammunition.158 ECOMOG’s Field Commander General Bakut even commended ULIMO for its cooperation.159 It is difficult to track where exactly ULIMO got their weapons. Several members of the organization have claimed that their arms were captured from NPFL and AFL forces. Nevertheless, a contemporary report from the U.S. State Department stated that ECOMOG supplied, or at least facilitated, some arms transfers to AFL and ULIMO forces.160 The Pentagon is also said to have confirmed ECOMOG’s supply of weapons to ULIMO.161

Figure 4.1: ULIMO’s advance against the NPFL

Source: James Hart Lidow, Violent Order: Rebel organization and Liberia’s civil war (Stanford University, 2011).

157 Lidow, Violent Order (2011) 156. 158 Ellis, The mask of anarchy (New York, 1999) 81. 159 Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: Sub-Saharan Africa (7th of July 1992). 160 Department of State, Country reports on human rights practices for 1992 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993). 161 HRW, Liberia: Waging war to keep the peace. The ECOMOG intervention and human rights Vol. 5, no. 6 (June 1993) 5. 27

Soon after the formation of ULIMO, the war would intensify as the NPFL began a major offensive against ECOMOG and INPFL positions surrounding Monrovia on the 15th of October 1992.162 The operation was dubbed ‘Operation Octopus’, and it would last for approximately 120 days. ECOMOG and the remaining AFL forces struggled to repel the continuous attacks for the first month, which became to be known as ‘the ’.163 It is not clear whether the attack was intended as a final, full-scale assault to capture Monrovia, or whether the NPFL wanted to try and pressure ECOMOG out of Liberia once again.

ECOMOG stood its ground, however, and the operation proved to be costly for the NPFL. ECOMOG responded with armoured cars and mortar attacks, combined with indiscriminate shelling and use of napalm, even within the suburbs of Monrovia, causing many civilian casualties.164 At the same time, Nigerian Alpha jets bombed NPFL positions in the outskirts of Monrovia, sometimes using cluster bombs.165 On the ground, according to a contemporary report by the American State Department “renegade elements of the AFL […] sometimes in cooperation with ULIMO, formed vigilante squads which reportedly engaged in ethnic score-settling by summarily executing several members of the Nimban community suspected of NPFL of INPFL affiliations.”166 Before Operation Octopus started, NPFL negotiators had already made contact with Prince Johnson in secret, in a bid to secure his collaboration in the assault of Monrovia. After Taylor and Johnson had agreed terms, the NPFL’s fighters infiltrated the Monrovia suburbs and the assault began. At the last moment before the assault, however, Johnson renounced his deal with Taylor, fearing treachery.167 Amid the assault on Monrovia, the INPFL split in two factions, one of which, led by Samuel Varney, re-joined the NPFL. During and after the Siege of Monrovia, Johnson lost all political and military support and surrendered to the ECOMOG forces. Eventually, Prince Yormie Johnson was forced to flee the country for exile in Nigeria.168 While the INPFL left the theatre of war, ULIMO had opened up a new front in the war. Together with ULIMO, ECOMOG stepped up its pressure on the NPFL. Next to the controversial bombings, the peacekeepers implemented a blockade of NPFL controlled areas.169 The blockade was intended to prevent trade and put economic pressure on Taylor’s regime, but also prevented humanitarian aid from entering what Taylor referred to as ‘Greater Liberia’. Nigerian planes even attacked vehicles of Médecins sans Frontières, the only major aid organization which insisted on working in Great Liberia, despite the ECOMOG embargo.170 Taylor went to great lengths to cultivate all the attributes of a sovereign government in the Greater Liberia region. He created ministries and his own currency. He encouraged a private bank to open its doors in , the de facto capital of Greater Liberia, and foreign diplomats regularly visited Taylor’s headquarters, including German and French representatives.171 Before the embargo, Taylor did business with foreign firms, exporting timber, iron ore and diamonds through the sea ports

162 See figure 4.1. 163 “U.N. Agency says 3,000 feared dead in Monrovia,” Reuters (3rd of November 1992). 164 Ellis, The mask of anarchy (New York, 1999) 99. 165 Idem. 166 Department of State, Country reports on human rights practices for 1992 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993). 167 Ellis, The mask of anarchy (New York, 1999) 99. 168 Idem. 169 Colin Scott, “Humanitarion action and security in Liberia, 19809-1994,” Occasional paper No. 20 (Providence: Institute for International Studies, 1995) 11. 170 Lindsay Barrett, “The relief game in Liberia,” in Lindsay Barrett (ed.), Report on Liberia (Monrovia, 1993) 32- 36. 171 Ellis, The mask of anarchy (1999) 171. 28 under his control, the biggest one being Buchanan. All the foreign firms had to do was pay taxes, usually to Taylor personally.172 The embargo mainly consisted of the blocking of the harbours under Taylor’s control and the frequent bombing of overland trading routes, crossing the borders at Guinea and Côte d’Ivoire. When ECOMOG moved in to capture Taylor’s most important seaport at Buchanan, after already taking control of the Freeport Harbour, the NPFL came under significant economic pressure. The blockade led, among other things, to the capture of the NPFL supply ship MV Sea Rose by the Nigerian navy ship NNS Ayam. No weapons were reported to be found on the ship, and it remains unclear whether the NPFL used the shipping routes to import small arms or light weapons.173 Now fighting on several fronts, Charles Taylor became interested in a negotiated settlement for peace for the first time since the start of his insurgency. After the initial ‘Siege of Monrovia’, ECOMOG’s new Field Commander, General Olurin, announced a new strategy; one of ‘offensive defence’.174 The strategy consisted of resigning ECOMOG to a military stalemate, now that it controlled a significant share of the strategic cities and counties in Liberia, but would defend itself aggressively when attacked. While Taylor’s strategy before had seemed to revolve around taking advantage of the elements of time, calculating that ECOMOG would not go the distance, the tables had now turned.

ECOMOG’s new strategy The new strategy depended on other, political and non-violent means of conflict resolution, in particular the involvement of the United Nations. The UN’s enthusiasm for a peacekeeping force was so far distinctly limited. While it already played a role in humanitarian aid, it refrained from any type of involvement in the peace process. The UN was plagued by the limitations it displayed during the conflicts in Bosnia and Somalia, and found itself at the start of a financial crisis.175 There was little desire among Security Council members to authorize a large-scale UN peacekeeping force for Liberia.176 Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali saw Liberia as “a good example of systematic cooperation” between the UN and ECOWAS, in which the UN should only play a “supporting” role.177 The Security Council could not avoid its involvement in the Liberian conflict, however. The atrocities and gross human rights violations during Operation Octopus – including the murder of five American nuns on the 31st of October 1992 – received global attention.178 The heavy-handed, indiscriminate bombings and use of napalm by the ECOMOG forces also raised international concerns. As the US Secretary of State Herman Cohen stated: “Unfortunately [ECOWAS] is no longer a neutral party […] I think the next step […] will be U.N. intervention to provide a neutral party to try and bring about a

172 William Reno, “Foreign firms and the financing of Charles Taylor’s NPFL,” Liberian Studies Journal, Vol. 18, No. 2 (1993) 175-187. 173 Gani Yoroms, “Scope of ECOMOG operations in peace operations in West Africa: Perspectives on Nigerian Naval and Air operations from 1990-2003,” Paper submitted to the Nigerian Institute for International Affairs Journal (2005) 16. 174 Magyar, “ECOMOG’s operations,” in: Magyar and Conteh-Morgan (eds.), Peacekeeping in Africa (1998) 69- 70. 175 Herbert Howe, “Lessons of Liberia: ECOMOG and regional peacekeeping, “International Security, Vol. 31. No.3 (July of 1996) 150. 176 Katherina Coleman, “Liberia,” in: Jane Boulden (ed.), Responding to Conflict in Africa: The United Nations and regional organizations (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013) 209. 177 United Nations Security Council (UNSC), “Report of the Secretary-General on the Question of Liberia,” S/25402 (12th of March 1993) 40. 178 Robert McFadden, “Five U.S. nuns are shot to death while trapped by Liberian War,” New York Times (1st of November 1992). 29 political solution.”179 The statement was quickly repudiated by the US State Department, but it shows the mounting pressure for greater UN involvement.180 Responding to the mounting international pressure, the Security Council unanimously decided to impose an arms embargo on Liberia, of which the ECOMOG was exempted.181 This meant that the NPFL could legally import any arms or ammunition over the cross-border trading routes with Guinea and Côte d’Ivoire, its main ally. Without a steady source to resupply the NPFL’s stock of arms and ammunition, the other factions hoped the insurgency would eventually wither and a political settlement could be realistically initiated. There is no evidence that there was a structural supply of weapons going to the NPFL through Guinea. Côte d’Ivoire, however, had been known to supply the NPFL with weapons. Although the UN arms embargo put an end to most trafficking of weapons, there were still incidents where the Ivorian military was caught supplying the NPFL with small arms and ammunition. The most notable incident took place in Danane, just over the border with Liberia, where two Nigerian bombed a convoy of trucks carrying illicit supplies to the NPFL. Reportedly, the Ivorian military fired back at the Nigerian warplanes.182 Nigerian coastal crafts also sank two smaller cargo ships sailing from Côte d’Ivoire to Liberia.183 Following the arms embargo, the UN also sent a Special Representative of the Secretary- General (SRSG) to Liberia, Trevor Gordon-Somers. The SRSG was to hold intensive consultations with the warring parties, and in May 1993 he recommended “a U.N. observer presence to monitor and balance ECOMOG’s planned supervision of disarmament and encampment.”184 His diplomatic efforts culminated in the UN-sponsored peace talks in Geneva during the 10th-17th of July 1993 and helped pave the way for renewed peace talks.

Cotonou Agreement: United Nations Observers On the 25th of July in Cotonou, Benin, a peace conference was organized involving the three main Liberian factions. At this peace talks, the Cotonou Agreement was signed by the NPFL, the AFL and ULIMO, who agreed to end hostilities and maintain the positions they currently occupied. Subsequently, a provision was made for the establishment of a transitional government containing representatives of ULIMO and the NPFL, as well as several others, to be nominated by the current temporary president, Amos Sawyer. A timetable for elections and a return to a constitutional government was made and the three factions were to give up their arms to ECOMOG. 185 The involvement of the United Nations at this stage of the peace process was merely to provide transparency to the process of disarmament, without any significant commitments by the organization to the socio-economic measures needed to cushion the impact of disarmament on Liberians.186 The Cotonou Agreement did call for precisely the kind of observer mission Gordon-Somers had advocated. The request was politically hard for the UN to deny. This is illustrated in Boutros- Ghali’s report to the Security Council, on the 2nd of August 1993, in which he affirmed that the UN had already played a “major role [in humanitarian assistance]” and suggested that the UN could assume a “larger role”. Furthermore, he stated that an observer mission was “crucial”, even though it

179 “U.S. official takes firm stance on U.N. intervention in Liberia,” Houston Chronicle (11th of November 1992). 180 “Liberia: U.S. insists it backs peacekeeping force,” Inter Press Service (12th of November 1992). 181 UNSC, “Resolution 788,” S/RES/788 (November 1992). 182 Mark Huband, “Targeting Taylor,” Africa Report (July/August 1993) 31. 183 Magyar, “ECOMOG’s operations,” in: Magyar and Conteh-Morgan (eds.), Peacekeeping in Africa (1998) 69- 70. 184 Peter da Costa, “Liberia: United Nations, United States urged into the breach,” Inter Press Service (14th of May 1993). 185 UNSC, “Cotonou Agreement, 9th of August 1993,” S/26272 (9th of August 1993). 186 Adibe, “Managing arms”, Disarmament and Conflict Resolution (1996) 43. 30 should remain “supportive in nature”.187 The subsequent Concept of Operations proposed a modest mission consisting of 303 military observers.188 The Security Council accepted the Concept on the 22nd of September 1993, and would be dubbed the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL).189 The new plans for disarmament were an important part of the new accord. As the agreement states:

“Disarmament being the ultimate objective of the cease-fire, the Parties hereto agree and express their intent and willingness to disarm to and under the supervision of ECOMOG, monitored and verified by the United Nations Observer Mission [UNOMIL].”190

The signatories agreed not to “import any weapons and war-like materials by any means into Liberia” and not to “use the period of this cease-fire to engage in any military build-up whether in manpower of armaments.”191 Furthermore, it required the parties to hand in “all weapons and warlike materials” which would be stored in armouries “designated by ECOMOG, monitored and verified by United Nations Observers.”192 In order to enforce this ECOMOG now had “the authority to disarm any combatant or non-combatant in possession of weapons and warlike materials.”193 Again, “the United Nations observers [would] monitor all such activities.”194 The agreement also called for the immediate encampment of all combatants in centres designated for that purpose by ECOMOG. Although the Cotonou Agreement did not bring about any form of peace for Liberia, collapsing as it did within the next few months, it was a significant development in the war. In the first place, it provided for the dissolution of Dr. Amos Sawyers Interim Government of National Unity (IGNU) and the installation of the Liberian National Transitional Government (LNTG), in which both the NPFL and ULIMO were represented. This gave the NPFL a stake in the official government of Liberia for the first time.195 This would prove useful, as it gradually drew the NPFL into the realm of politics instead of war. Secondly, it spawned new armed factions. While the signatories to the accord were publically committed to peace, they were privately still intent on war.196 This drove them to support the creation of surrogate groups, who were not bound to the peace process. One group stood out in its brutality and violence, the Liberian Peace Council (LPC). While the ECOMOG forces held Monrovia and much of western Liberia, and the ULIMO forces held the north-western part of Liberia, yet another armed group emerged to fight the NPFL. , former minister of state for presidential affairs and minister of post and telecommunications during the Doe regime, relaunched the . It was originally formed in 1991 with fighters recruited from the AFL, veterans of Doe’s old Special Anti-Terrorist Unit.197 The group used the Krahn and Sapo ethnicities as the main basis for recruitment, which resulted in ethnic violence aimed at other ethnic groups. As the LPC began to spread out towards the south-eastern from its base in Buchanan, it tortured and robbed civilians, thus depopulating the region around the port city and depriving the NPFL of its local support base. They forced civilians

187 UNSC, “United Nations Secretary-General, Further report on Liberia,” S/26200 (2nd of August 1993) 16-18. 188 United Nations Security Council, “United Nations Secretary-General, Report on Liberia,” S/26422 (9th of September 1993) 18. 189 UNSC, “Resolution 866,” S/RES/866 (22nd of September 1993). 190 UNSC, “Cotonou Agreement, 9th of August 1993,” S/26272 (9th of August 1993) Section E, Article 6. 191 Idem, Section C, Article 4. 192 Idem, Section E, Article 6. 193 Idem. 194 Idem. 195 Ellis, The mask of anarchy (1999) 101. 196 Idem, 101-102. 197 “Liberia miltia says fight will go on,”Reuters (14th of April 1994). 31 towards strategic points held by ECOMOG, until there were almost no civilians left. In just short of a year, the LPC managed to capture most of the remaining ports in the south eastern parts of Liberia and gained access to trades in timber, diamonds, gold and rubber, which had previously belonged to the NPFL.198 During this time, the United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy (ULIMO) also experienced a power struggle, resulting in a split in two hostile factions. Disagreements over appointments in the transitional government divided the group along ethnic lines. Throughout ULIMO territory, Krahn and Mandingo soldiers deserted their commanders in favour of ethnically homogenous units.199 The Mandingo forces that were loyal to Alhaji Kromah became known as ULIMO-K. The members of the Krahn ethnic group renamed themselves ULIMO-J, after their leader , ULIMO’s former chairman of military affairs.

Figure 4.2: Territorial control in Liberia, 1995

Source: James Hart Lidow, Violent Order: Rebel organization and Liberia’s civil war (Stanford University, 2011).

198 HRW, Africa Watch, “Human rights abuses by the Liberian Peace Council and the need for international Oversight,”Liberian Studies Journal, Vol. 10, No. 1 (1995) 162-171; Justice and Peace Commission, “Report of trip to Buchanan,” National Catholic Secretariat, Monrovia (6th of February 1995). Also see Figure 4.2. 199 Lidow, Violent Order(2011) 158. 32

The plans for disarmament made at Cotonou closely resemble those made during the failed Yamoussoukro agreements. Again the urge to disarm the warring factions as soon as possible proved to be counter-productive to the overall peace effort, considering the individual security could still not be assured by a higher authority.200 While the implementation of the broader government went rather smoothly, aside from the infighting in ULIMO, the encampment of fighters and the disarmament did not go as planned.

“Due to the lack of Liberia-wide security and the failure of ECOMOG’s infantry companies to reach all their agreed locations, disarmament and demobilisation sites were not opened in all of the areas originally proposed. On arrival at an established site, fighters received clothing, rations, digging tools and transport to a community of their choice. After an initial flow of personnel and weapons from each faction (except the LPC), disarmament came to a standstill by June 1994, except for a small trickle of variously motivated fighters heading for Monrovia.”201

Consequently, the number of weapons and ammunition recovered from the involved factions was significantly less than expected, as table 3.2 illustrates. A notable exception is the AFL, which however had become, for all practical purposes, the extension of ECOMOG.202 Many of the weapons handed in were reported to be in a bad state, most of them old and non-functioning.203 It seems likely that the best weapons were kept within the armed factions, possibly given to loyal fighters, as is common within armed militias.204

Table 4.1. ECOMOG disarmament

Personnel Weapons Ammunition Faction Estimated Disarmed Estimated Handed Estimated Handed for by 22nd of for Hand- over by for Hand- over by Disarming June 1994 over 22nd of June over 22nd of June 1994 1994 AFL 8,037 755 1,921 1,078 85,413 151,062 NPFL 35,000 741 3,500 562 - 1,284 ULIMO 10,500 769 3,520 378 - 78,096

Source: John Mackinlay and Abiodun Alao, Liberia 1994: ECOMOG and UNOMIL response to a complex emergency (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 1995) 35.

The new factions, ULIMO-J, ULIMO-K, and the LPC are not specified as separate entities in the table detailing the disarmament progress.205 Whereas ULIMO is not split out into the separate entities, probably due to administrative reasons, the LPC did not join the disarmament process altogether. The LPC was not a signatory of the Cotonou agreement, translating into a significant advantage over Charles Taylor’s NPFL. Especially the LFC and ULIMO –J enjoyed the sympathy of some of the leading officers of the ECOMOG mission, in particular those from the dominant Nigerian

200 Mackinlay and Alao, Liberia 1994(1995) 32. 201 Idem, 35. 202 Adibe, “Managing arms”, Disarmament and Conflict Resolution (1996) 44. 203 Florquin and Berman, Armed and Aimless (2005) 97-98. 204 Lidow, Violent Order(2011) 34. 205 See table 4.1 33 continent.206 The stronger these factions became, and the more weapons and ammunition they managed to stockpile, the more independent they threatened to become.207 These developments alarmed the United Nations observer mission as well as the United States government, who saw Nigerian duplicity in fuelling the civil war, while also leading the peace mission. In order to prevent any further tarnishing of ECOMOG’s reputation as a neutral force, the US government persuaded ECOWAS to accept the services of an American private security company. The Pacific Architect and Engineers, which had close links to the pentagon, would take control of most aspects of ECOMOG’s logistics.208 American managers now took charge of the trucks donated to ECOMOG by the Dutch government, and most other forms of transport.209 This not only increased the military effectiveness of the peacekeeping force, but also provided the US government with some influence over ECOMOG’s activities on the ground. These developments allowed the US government the means to keep any Nigerian duplicity in check. A second development in ECOWAS’ power structure paved the way for a new peace- agreement, the Abuja Accord. In August 1994, Ghana’s became the new chairmen of ECOWAS. Rawlings quickly developed a friendship with Charles Taylor, with whom he held multiple private talks in Ghana and at several other secret locations throughout the region.210 The full details of these meetings are still unclear, but Rawlings did manage to ease tensions between the NPFL and Nigeria. In August 1995, a new peace agreement was reached. The two key players, Charles Taylor and Nigeria’s president Abacha, together with the other parties involved, managed to come to the thirteenth and final peace accord of the First Liberian Civil War. The Abuja Agreement, as it became known, built upon the Cotonou Agreement in establishing a similar transitional government and reaffirming the timetable for disarmament.211 Unlike the earlier agreements, however, the Abuja accord actually managed to bring about a decrease in fighting among the warring factions. 212

206 Ellis, The mask of anarchy (1999) 102. 207 Idem, 103. 208 Terrence Lyons, Voting for peace: Postconflict elections in Liberia (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1999) 41. 209 Ester Bootsma, “Krijgsheren handelen nog steeds met buurlanden,” Trouw (03/10/1996). 210 Stephen Riley and Max Sesay, “Liberia: After Abuja,” Review of African political economy Vol. 23, No. 69 (September 1996) 431. 429-437. 211 UNSC, “Abuja agreement to supplement the Cotonou and Aksombo Agreements as subsequently clarified by the Accra Agreement,” S/1995/742 (28th of August 1995). 212 Lidow, Violent Order(2011) 160-161. 34

Table 4.2: Abuja schedule of implementation of the agreement from cease-fire to election – August 1995-August 1996

Period Step Weeks Aug. Sept. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. May June Jul. Aug. 95 95 95 95 95 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l) (m) (n) (o) 1 2 22------4 Factions inform combatants of cease-fire 2 3 5-26 Factions disengage from checkpoints/present combat positions to areas under own arrangements 3 3 5-26 Verification by ECOMOG/UNOMIL/LNTG/Warring factions 4 2 15- Recce mission/built-up of logistics 30 ECOMOG/UNOMIL/LTNG 5 10 2------14 Deployment of ECOMOG/UNOMIL to safe havens throughout countries 6 4 8------8 Completion/preparation for new assembly/encampment sites 7 4 9--- --31 Combatants in assembly/encampment sites 8 8 1--- --30 Disarmament/demobilization 9 9 1------2 Resettlement/repatriation 10 Preparation for elections 1------12 11 Election ------20 day

Source: United Nations Security Council, “Abuja agreement to supplement the Cotonou and Aksombo Agreements as subsequently clarified by the Accra Agreement,” S/1995/742 (28th of August 1995).

Abuja Agreement The disarmament programme was scheduled to begin in January 1996 and should be completed by the end of June 1996. It would commence during the preparation for elections and would be well underway by election day, the 30th of May. The programme was embedded within a larger encampment and rehabilitation programme for the fighters. At the time of the Abuja Agreement, there were an estimated 50,000 to 60,000 combatants active in Liberia, 25 percent of whom were thought to be children.213 The entire disarmament process was to be completed within five months, with the resettlement and repatriation completed within four months. This timeframe is reminiscent of the earlier programs introduced during for instance the Yamoussoukro Accords. For many Liberians, their safety was still not entirely safeguarded by a force they considered to be neutral. Thus, there will still no convincing reason for the local militias or the fighters to disarm.214 In accordance with the peace agreements, however, ECOWAS would continue to occupy the lead role in the peace process, and ECOMOG would retain the primary responsibility for implementing the military provisions of the agreements. The force would fall under UNOMIL’s mandate, thus acting as a neutral force and enforce the cease-fire, prevent recurring violations of the cease-fire, and monitor compliance with the other military provision of the peace agreements. This

213 UN, “The United Nations and the situation in Liberia,” Reference paper (February 1997) 18. 214 Mackinlay and Alao, Liberia 1994 (1995) 32. Also see table 4.2. 35 included the impartial application of disarming and demobilizing the combatants, and assist in maintaining the assembly sites.215 There were concerns that ECOMOG was not at all up to the task, however, financially, logistically and also in terms of manpower. President Rawlings, the Ghanaian leader who brokered the peace accord, pleaded to ECOWAS as well as the UN for an enhancement of ECOMOG. He warned that the implementation of the peace accord, in particular the disarmament program, was threatened unless the ECOMOG troop level was raised from its current 7,269 to 12,000. 216 Furthermore, Rawlings estimated that about $110 million was required to ensure effective nationwide deployment.217 In response to Rawlings plea, aid donors at a UN-sponsored conference in New York pledged approximately $145 million for Liberia. The overall cost of disarmament and resettlement was set at $150 million. Out of the total amount, the United States pledged $75 million, Great Britain $7 million, France $3 million, and the European Commission $15 million.218 Consequently, the UN Security Council also approved the expansion of UNOMIL from 70 to 160 personnel.219 Despite this pledge of support, the donors were very slow in actually providing financial and logistical support. The lack of funding for peacekeeping operations hampered the commencement of disarmament; by February 1995, only $18.4 million of the $150 million pledged, had been actually donated to the UN Trust Fund for Liberia. Only ten percent of the funds went to the ECOMOG contingents.220 Furthermore, two months prior to the signing of the Abuja accord, in June 1995, the US government cut off funding to the ECOMOG peacekeepers due to a lack of accountability.221 The lack of donor support also prevented the supply of the additional troops promised to ECOWAS; severely damaging ECOMOG’s ability to project power in the Liberian hinterland.222 The lack of structural presence of a neutral force led to a breakdown of the disarmament programs specified in the first Abuja Accord. Charles Taylor in particular rejected the notion that he would have to disarm before the ECOMOG and UNOMIL peacekeepers were deployed throughout the country. According to Taylor: “[…] there would be no disarmament before the ECOMOG units from ECOWAS and the United Nations are fully deployed and all observers are on the ground.”223 Furthermore, Taylor challenged the provisions of the Abuja Agreements, insisting that the disarmament programme should commence after the national elections, instead of before. According to critics, Taylor feared an elections campaign without adequate personal, armed protection.224 Roosevelt Johnson, the leader of ULIMO-J, also opposed the disarmament provisions of the accord, and refused to disarm his troops to ECOMOG. In a speech on the 1st of January in 1996, he

215 UN, “The United Nations and the situation in Liberia,” Reference paper (February 1997) 19. 216 “Liberia makes a fresh start after six years of civil war,” Christian Science Monitor (5th of September 1995). 217 “Liberia: ECOWAS pledge on troop presence,” Keesing’s Record of World Events (October 1995) 40759. 218 “Liberia: UN ups support,” Africa Research Bulletin (1st – 30th of November 1995) 12059. 219 Julius Mutwol, Peace agreements and civil wars in Africa: Insurgent motivations, state responses, and third party peacemaking in Liberia, Rwanda, and Sierra Leone (Cambria Press, 2009) 144. 220 United Nations Security Council, “Ninth progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia,” S/1995/158 (February 1995). 221 Adekeye Adebajo, Liberia’s Civil War: Nigeria, ECOMOG, and regional security in West Africa (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002) 173. 222 United Nations Security Council, “Twenty-third progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia,” S/1997/478” (1997). 223 “Charles Taylor’s views,” West Africa (20th- 26th of November 1995) 1804. 224 “Liberia: Keeping what peace?” Africa Confidential (16th of February 1996) 1. 36 declared: “We are not going to give our arms to ECOMOG peacekeepers […] you’ve become a faction already. Why do we give you our arms now?”225 The failure of the disarmament programme and ECOMOG’s clear lack of ability in enforcing the cease-fire became epitomized during the so-called April Violence in Monrovia. The violence broke out as a result of a failed attempt by ULIMO-K to arrest Roosevelt Johnson, ULIMO-J’s leader. Several leaders from the same ethnic group as Johnson, the Krahn, saw this as an attempt to exclude them from power.226 Thus, what initially seemed to be a police action, degenerated into a bloody fight lasting seven weeks, killing over 3,000 people.227 ECOMOG proved unable to stop what a US Embassy official described as “very, heavy, very systematic looting.”228 Whereas critics laid the blame on the various rebel factions and their warlords, the United Nations and the United States were also criticized because of their reluctance to actively support and speed up disarmament efforts. The Secretary-General of ECOWAS, Edouard Benjamin, cited the “lack of support” and “unkept promises” from the international community as the main factor in the failure of the first Abuja Accord.229 In a final attempt to stem the violence, President of Nigeria summoned all faction to Abuja to reaffirm and augment the first Abuja Peace Agreement. On the 17th of August 1996, all factions convened in Abuja to sign what became known as the Abuja II Peace Agreement. The revised agreement now featured strong threats to the different warlords in order to ensure strict compliance to the provisions of the agreement:

“Sanctions including travel restrictions, freezing of business assets, restricting violators from engaging in business activities in ECOWAS, Member States, putting restrictions on the use of the air space and territorial waters of Member States, exclusion from elections and expulsion of the families of warlords who do not comply with the terms of new Abuja Accord and invoking of 1996 OAU Summit Resolution which calls for the establishment of war crimes tribunal to try human rights offenses against Liberians, and non-recognition of any government which comes to power by force of arms in Liberia.”230

Abuja II provided the mediators with a timeline that would remain in force for a period of nine months, until the 15th of July, when an elected government would assume power in Monrovia. The timeline was quite similar to the one presented in the first Abuja Accord, despite the failure of the first agreement.231

225 “Liberia: ULIMO-J refuses to disarm,” Africa Research Bulletin (1st – 31st of January 1996) 12128. 226 Mutwol, Peace agreements and civil wars in Africa (2009) 147. 227 UNSC, “Seventeenth progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia,” S/1996/362 (May 1996). 228 BBC, Summary of World Broadcasts (11th of April 1996), quoted in Steve Riley and Max Sesay, “Sierra Leone: The Coming Anarchy?” Review of African Political Economy Vol. 21, No. 69 (1995) 121-126. 229 “Liberia: ECOWAS army chiefs meet,” Africa Research Bulletin (April 1996) 12200. 230 ECOWAS, Official journal of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Vol. 22 (1997). 231 See table 4.3. 37

Table 4.3. Revised schedule of implementation of the Abuja agreement from cease-fire to election August 1996 – May 1997

Date Event 20th-31st of August, 1996 Cease-fire, disengagement of factions from combat positions 1st of September – 30th of November 1996 Delivery of logistical supplies by donor communities to ECOMOG 20th of August 1996 – 31st of January 1997 Verification of cease-fire and disengagement by ECOMOG, UNOMIL, and LTNG 3rd -10th of October, 1996 Situation assessment meeting in Liberia by chairman’s special envoy with ECOMOG, UNOMIL, reps. Of donor community, and LNTG 12th of October, 1996 – 31st of January 1997 Recce mission by ECOMOG and UNOMIL of arms collection centres 4th – 8th of November 1996 Committee of Nine ministerial meeting in Monrovia 7th of November 1996 – 31st of January 1997 Deployment of ECOMOG to agreed safe havens by Committee of Nine 22nd of November 1996 – 31st of January 1997 Disarmament, Demobilization, and Repatriation (DDR) 6th – 13th of January 1997 Verification visit to Liberia by chairman’s special envoy with ECOMOG, UNOMIL, reps. Of donor community, and LNTG 20th of January – 15th of April 1997 Preparations for elections 10th – 15th of March 1997 Committee of Nine meeting, Monrovia 17th – 24th of April 1997 Assessment visit to Liberia by chairman’s special envoy with ECOMOG, UNOMIL, reps. Of donor community, and LNTG 30th of May 1997 Election Day 15th of June 1997 Handover of power to an elected administration

Source: ECOWAS, Official journal of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Vol. 22 (1997).

38

Abuja II DDRR programme The encampment and disarmament programme of Abuja II, commonly referred to as DDRR (Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation and Re-integration) was slow to take off. As in earlier attempts at a DDRR, the disarmament phase was again surprisingly short; it was programmed to be completed after 72 days. The slow start was mainly because of the same reasons Abuja I had failed; a shortage of funds and an inadequate number of ECOMOG forces in demobilization sites. There are a number of possible explanations for the reluctance of the involved peacekeeping parties to commit to a comprehensive, long term DDRR. One is the so-called “compassion fatigue”, or “ECOMOG fatigue” among key regional states – including Nigeria, where the Liberian effort was increasingly unpopular and where democratization pressures forced the ECOWAS states to bring an end to the intervention. This resulted in the Abuja I and Abuja II Accords, which now comes across as hastily organized elections as an “honourable exit strategy”.

Table 4.4: Revised estimates of faction strength, January 1997

Estimated Strength of Factions Fighters Disarmed Faction Original Revised No. % of Est. Strength NPFL 25,000 12,500 11,553 92.42 ULIMO-K 12,460 6,800 5,622 82.68 AFL 8,734 7,000 571 8.1 ULIMO-J 7,776 3,600 1,114 29.32 LPC 4,650 2,500 1,223 48.92 LDF 750 400 249 62.25 Total 59,370 33,000 20,332 61.6

Source: UN Office in Monrovia, cited in: Abiodun Alao, John Mackinlay, and Funmi Olonisakin, Peacekeepers, Politicians, and Warlords: The Liberian Peace Process (New York: United Nations University Press, 1999) 99.

Six days after the disarmament began only 1,815 combatants had been disarmed and reportedly demobilized.232 Because of the slow start of the disarmament program, the 31st of January deadline was extended by one week.233 Despite these early setbacks, disarmament picked up in the following weeks. The number of combatants disarmed grew to 2,500 of the estimated 33,000.234 Despite these rather optimistic statistics, the demobilization efforts failed to break command chains and the control that faction leaders exercised over their rank and file.235 With limited resources and planning, demobilization was restricted to a process in which combatants simply registered and handed over their gun.236 This lack of encampment undermined the gains that were made from the disarmament of the fighters. Originally, the Abuja Accord provided for a comprehensive encampment program, in which:

232 UN-HACO in Liberia, “Demobilizaton Bulletin, Day 7,” (28th of November 1996). 233 Abiodun Alao, John Mackinlay, and Funmi Olonisakin, Peacekeepers, Politicians, and Warlords: The Liberian Peace Process (New York: United Nations University Press, 1999) 99.

234 See table 4.4. 235 Klaas van Walraven, The Netherlands and Liberia: Dutch Policies and interventions with respect to the Liberian Civil War (Netherlands Institute of International Relations ‘Clingendael’, November 1999) 45. 236 Klaas van Walraven, “Containing conflict in the Economic Community of West African States,” p66; Lyons, peace and elections in Liberia 181 39

“The combatants were to be disarmed, registered, interviewed and receive some counselling and a medical examination. Thereafter, those with no immediate means of livelihood were to be absorbed into “bridging activities” – work and training projects to help ensure they were productively engaged – in order to bridge the gap between disarmament and longer-term reintegration programmes. The ex-combatants were to be provided with food assistance for the duration of the bridging activities and such tools and equipment as deemed appropriate.”237

While the UN did report that 20,332 had been disarmed and demobilized, it is not sure whether they actually were demobilized.238 While there had were 15 disarmament/demobilization sites established throughout the country, there were ultimately no special camps for these “bridging activities” set up.239 The fact that the fighters disarmed could not be encamped to help transition them from the warlordist culture of violence, destruction, and death to a more civil life, militated against any demobilization efforts. It is difficult to determine and verify whether the disarmed combatants actually and actively sought to get re-integrated into the larger society. Since the end of the war, there has been a repository of evidence uncovered that points to the fact that large swaths of the disarmed ex-fighters, in particular those from the NPFL, simply turned in their weapons to convey the false impression that the Taylor-led militia faction was cooperating with the disarmament exercise.240 It reality, it seems that most of the NPFL combatants handed over their weapons and returned to the militia’s feigned state of dormancy, pending the elections.241 Taylor was confident that the disarmament exercise would not have a negative impact on the factions command and control structure, thus he ordered his troops to turn in their weapons and return to their “combat ready” position while the elections took place.242 Moreover, as Victor Tanny has observed, “the fighters that queued in the demobilization centres were not the factions’ more reliable troops.”243 The “elite fighters” and most loyal, well-trained troops of the different factions, particularly the NPFL, never disarmed or demobilized. Subsequently, this would have made it very easy for Taylor to restructure the NPFL back into a capable fighting force, in the event that he would not prevail in the elections. It seems likely that the other warlords, namely Alhaji Kromah and Roosevelt Johnson, would also try to retain their hardened fighters as a form of insurance. This makes the DDRR more of a symbolic exercise that did not significantly diminish the capability of the various factions, particularly the NPFL, to throw Liberia back into a state of war. The UN presented the disarmament programme as being relatively successful.244 The key to their apparent success of the disarmament and demobilization was the feigned cooperation of the warring factions. The unwillingness to cooperate of the NPFL in particular, prevented and collapsed previous disarmament accords. During the Abuja I disarmament program, this was illustrated by the various factions threatening to execute, and in some cases reportedly executing, those war-weary fighters who wanted to disarm without permission.245 The difference was that, after the April

237 United Nations, “The United Nations and the situation in Liberia,” Reference paper (February 1997) 26. 238 See table 4.4. 239 UN, “The United Nations and the situation in Liberia,” Reference paper (February 1997) 26. 240 George Klay Kieh, Jr., “The roots of the Second Liberian Civil War,” International Journal on World Peace Vol. 16, No. 1 (March 2009) 10-11. 241 Victor Tanny, “Liberia: Railroading peace, ”Review of African Political Economy Vol. 25, No. 75 (1998) 137. 242 Kieh, Jr., “The roots of the Second Liberian Civil War,” International Journal on World Peace (2009) 10-11. 243 Tanny, “Liberia: Railroading peace, ”Review of African Political Economy (1998) 144. 244 UNSC, “Twenty-Third progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia,” S/1997/478 (19th of June 1997). 245 Riley and Sesay, “Liberia: After Abuja,” Review of African political economy (1996) 432. 40

Violence, the NPLF’s Charles Taylor and ULIMO-K’s Alhaji Kromah had cemented their dominance in Monrovian politics, although a degree of mistrust remained. Subsequently, they ordered their soldiers to cooperate with the disarmament program; ULIMO-J and the LPC reluctantly followed suit.246 By the end of the disarmament period, at the 13th of June, a cumulative total of arms and ammunition recovered and verified by the military observers was 10,036 weapons and more than 1.24 million assorted pieces of ammunition.247 At the same time, 3,750 weapons had been reported surrendered to ECOMOG outside the official disarmament sites and ECOMOG cordon-and-search operations have led to the discovery of approximately 3,000 weapons and 10,000 pieces of ammunition.248 The reports do not go into detail about the types of weapons found, nor their origins. Without any identification of the weapons, it would be next to impossible to pinpoint their suppliers, thus significantly limiting the ability of any supranational institution to formulate structural policy countering the proliferation of these weapons. Furthermore, there is again evidence that only the oldest and nearly defunct weapons were handed in, while the weapons which were in a better state, were kept of hidden by the various warring factions.249 In many instances, the weapons surrendered by the combatants were completely unserviceable. On the 26th of January 1997, the UN reported a total of 12,510 fighters had been disarmed and a total of 4,428 serviceable and 1,103 unserviceable weapons had been recovered, as well as 500,000 pieces of ammunition.250 To lend more credibility to the exercise, the UN had announced beforehand that compensation would only be provided in exchange for a serviceable weapon or 100 rounds of ammunition.251 Despite this announcement, 20 percent of the weapons surrendered were defunct, which led towards suspicion among critics that the apparent compliance to the DDRR was a feint by the various factions, lulling the international community into a sense of false-security during the elections. This is further supported by the regular announcements by ECOMOG that it recovered new, hidden weapons caches.252 Especially noteworthy were the caches of hidden weapons that ECOMOG uncovered in the residence of Alhaji Kromah, the leader of ULIMO-K.253 The weapons were discovered during the campaign period for the election in July 1997. Nevertheless, ECOMOG nor UNOMIL took any decisive action towards deterrence; there were no reprisals for failing to comply to the disarmament program. No ban for the upcoming election was imposed on Kromah and his All Liberian Coalition Party, nor was Kromah arrested or detained. ECOWAS showed no resolve whatsoever in dealing with the violations of the Abuja II Accords, all it did was confiscate the weapons, allowing Kromah and his party to contest the election. This episode reaffirmed the warlords’ belief that the ECOMOG and UNOMIL forces were not wholly committed to the DDRR program. Moreover, it provided the leaders with the opportunity to reposition the weapon caches they had hidden, preventing the ECOMOG forces from finding them.

246 Lidow, Violent Order (2011) 161. 247 UNSC, “Twenty-Third progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia,” S/1997/478 (19th of June 1997) 4-5. 248 Idem, 5. 249 Florquin and Berman, Armed and Aimless (Small Arms Survey, 2005) 39. 250 UN, “The United Nations and the situation in Liberia,” Reference paper (February 1997) 30. 251 Idem. 252 Van Walraven, The Netherlands and Liberia (Netherlands Institute of International Relations ‘Clingendael’, November 1999) 45. 253 “Taylor heads for victory,” Africa Research Bulletin Vol. 34, No. 7, (1st – 31st of July 1997) 12751. 41

Taylor and peace The implementation of the various political aspects of the agreement progressed smoothly. On the 7th of April 1997, the Supreme Court and Liberia’s Independent Election Commission (IECOM) were established in the capital of Monrovia. Despite its smooth instalment, there were some planning and funding problems for IECOM, forcing the ECOWAS heads of state to postpone the elections from the 30th of May to the 19th of July. There were only minor incidents during the registration of voters. Despite the numerous allegations of fraud, there was no evidence of any large-scale irregularities during the registration process; most prospective voters were rejected for being under age. Approximately 750,000 people registered during the ten-day period ECOMOG forces provided security at registration sites.254 Polling day passed by without any serious incidents, and Charles Taylor scored a resounding victory. There was a registered turn-out of 85 percent, and Taylor gained the Liberian Presidency with over 75 percent of the votes. Nearly all polling stations had multi-party observers as well as ECOMOG security personnel.255 The elections were judged by IECOM and UN observers as having been free and fair. 256 After seven years of war, Charles Taylor had finally achieved his goal, becoming the . At the same time, ECOWAS could not prevent the NPFL form coming to power, which was exactly what it had set out to do.

Types of weapons used and their origins It is difficult to determine the exact weapons used by the various warring parties and militias at the time, as well as their origins. Considering no records appear to have been kept of any of the types of weapons collected, locating the sources of the weapons through the manufacturers would be far from definitive, damning evidence. It is possible, however, to present circumstantial evidence based off a number of assumptions, just to paint a vague picture of the situation on the ground and the weapons used. In 1992, a more comprehensive disarmament programme was launched by ECOMOG. Statistics of the active disarmament programme were published in 1994, although featured few specific details regarding the manufacturers or the origins of the weapons.257 There are other ways to identify the weapons, namely through film material made at the time of the war and through eyewitness accounts. There are two reliable sources of film material readily available at the moment. The first is a film made by Mark Stucke and Carlos Mavroleon, The Peace Keeper’s War. The film revolves around the ECOMOG intervention and deals with the military aspect of it. The images range from small to larger skirmishes and show us fighters from the AFL, NPFL, the INPFL and ECOMOG.258 The second is a shorter documentary about Liberia’s efforts of recovery after the first civil war. It includes unique footage of some of the fighters and militias active from 1989 to 1996.259 The footage presented in these films, allows for visual identification of several of the weapons used. While some militias are filmed brandishing light weapons, such as fully automatic machine guns and rocket propelled launchers (RPG), most of these seem to be a bad state.260 There is, however, an abundance of smaller assault rifles, submachine guns, and some handguns. The predominant weapon featured in both films is the assault rifle, however. Variants of the AK-47

254 T. Lyons, “Peace and Elections in Liberia,” in K. Kumar (ed.), Postconflict Elections, democratization, and international assistance (Boulder and London, 1998) 231. 255 Idem, 231-233. 256 John-Peter Pham, Liberia: Portrait of a failed state (New York: Reed Press, 2004) 133. 257 See table 3.6. 258 Mark Stucke, Carlos Mavroleon (dirs.), The Peace Keeper’s War (Journeyman Pictures, 1992). 259 Emily Marlow (dir.), Between War and Peace – Liberia (TVE, 2004). 260 Stucke, Mavroleon (dirs.), The Peace Keeper’s War (1992). 42

Kalashnikov assault rifle seem to be the most common amongst the different militias, with the modernized AK-74 assault rifle a close second. Although both rifles are originally a Russian design, they were already produced in so many countries at the time, and in so many variants, that a thorough study of model numbers, serial numbers and factory markings would be required in order to determine their precise origin.261 There are, however, other rifles that are easily identified. One example is the American M-16, which is used by several members of the AFL. These are likely to have originated from American weapon sales to Samuel Doe’s government. It is also possible that some of these assault rifles have migrated from other conflicts, most notably Angola.262 Furthermore, there are German Heckler & Koch G-3 and the Belgian FN-FAL, as well as numerous variants of SLR rifles. Where these weapons could have originated from is unclear, although it is conceivable that the FN-FAL rifles originated from Congo.263 Unfortunately, the various attempts by ECOMOG at disarmament did not produce reliable data concerning the make and model of the collected weapons. This is compounded by the fact that the weapons collected were often unserviceable and of subpar quality – the best weapons were kept as a safeguard against the other factions. Coupled with the fact that after the end of the First Civil War, a plethora of arms were illicitly trafficked into Liberia, it is now next to impossible to assess the amount or origins of the weapons used during the First Liberian Civil War.

An ethnic war? There was an increased ethnicization and multiplication of the various militias active during the first Liberian Civil War. ULIMO served as the most obvious example, being split into two factions along pronounced ethnic lines; one Krahn-led and the other Mandingo-led. The AFL was also increasingly divided intro Krahn and non-Krahn, as well as its surrogate, the LPC.264 When the Prince Yormie Johnson broke off from the NPFL, it catered mainly to Gio interests, while the NPFL remained a mixture of Gio, Mano and various other ethnic groups. However, even within the NPFL there was distrust between the ethnic groups. Taylor was reported to be increasingly reluctant to trust anyone outside of his inner circle of Americo-Liberians, reminiscent of the Tolbert regime.265 The ethnicization of the various armed factions appeared to exacerbate their mutual distrust. This led to a general reluctance to cooperate with any disarmament programme and moved the militias to hide their most serviceable weapons in caches around the country. The conflicting goals of their leaders to obtain a seat in the national government and thus take a share of the ‘national cake’ for themselves and their tribe or ethnic group, meant that they sought to build in as many safeguards as possible during the various peace talks. This consistent division of the warring parties along ethnic lines serves to reinforce the assumption that the Liberian conflict was a continuation of historical grievances between tribes and ethnic groups, instead of a proponent of the “new war” theory. The availability and use of weapons certainly exacerbated the conflict, but the ethnic divisions within the Liberian society, as well as the multidimensional crises of underdevelopment should be considered the root causes of the First Liberian Civil War.

261 Nicolas Florquin and Eric Berman, Armed and Aimless: Armed groups, guns, and human security in the ECOWAS region (Small Arms Survey, 2005) 33-34. 262 James Brooke, “C.I.A. said to send weapons via Zaire to Angola rebels,” The New York Times (1st of February 1987); Mark Mazzetti, “C.I.A. study of covert aid fuelled scepticism about helping Syrian rebels,” The New York Times (1th of October 2014). 263 Robert Cashner, The FN FAL Battle Rifle (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2013) 41. 264 Ellis, The mask of anarchy (1999) 195. 265 Idem. 43

The Second Liberian Civil War

Peace under Taylor Following his election, President Charles Taylor immediately started to reinforce his position of power. He not only rewarded his most loyal commanders with positions in his new government, but also extended offers to his formal rivals of the two branches of ULIMO. He offered Alhaji Kromah a position of chairman of a Reconciliation committee; Kromah declined and soon left Liberia. Roosevelt Johnson was appointed Minister of Rural Development, a position he accepted. Several combatants of the various factions were also incorporated into the government’s security apparatus.266 Taylor’s concessions to his rivals proved to be distractions, however, as the most valuable positions within the government were held by his allies. Soon after, Taylor began ousting any potential rivals. He purged many Mandingo civil servants from the government, most of whom left the country for Guinea.267 In the first months of 1998, he forced approximately 2,500 Krahn soldiers in the AFL to retire early, thereby robbing Johnson’s ULIMO-J of any potential fighting capabilities.268 The move also put the AFL under severe pressure, and allowed the Anti-Terror Unit (ATU), Taylor’s personal security force, to become the dominant military organization of Liberia. Soon after ATU’s ascent to military power, its first operation began. The first mission consisted of invading Roosevelt Johnson’s headquarters, with the intention of disarming and arresting him. ULIMO-J fought off the initial attack and on the 18th of September 1998 Monrovia was once again faced with widespread violence. Johnson’s forces were severely weakened by the purging of the AFL, however, and his fighters proved no match for Taylor’s well-trained, loyal Anti-Terror Unit. During the final months of 1998, Johnson fled to exile in Nigeria. His forces, together with large swaths of the Krahn population, fled to Guinea and Côte d’Ivoire, in fear of possible reprisals by Taylor’s government. After barely a year of peace, refugee camps in Liberia’s neighbouring countries again began to swell with new arrivals. Clearly, the disarmament had not been as successful as the UN had presented it. Although the initial numbers provided spoke of less than 50 percent disarmed, the statistics the UN later published argued that over 61 percent of the combatants had been disarmed. These numbers were not based on the original 60,000 fighters, but on revised numbers stating that there were 33,000 fighters active.269 It seems likely that the original estimates of the number of active combatants were too high, however, critics have argued that the basis for the revised estimates lack transparency and are difficult to be verified.270 Be that as it may, it is evident that the DDRR phase of the Abuja II Accords significantly favoured the largest faction; Taylor’s NPFL. While the Abuja II Peace Accord had called for an open and transparent restructuring of the security forces under the supervision of ECOMOG, Taylor rejected the provision entirely.271 It enabled Taylor to keep a significant reserve of troops, while he worked to incorporate the remainder of his “disarmed and demobilized” fighters into the country’s security forces. These former NPFL fighters were recruited to the security and police forces,

266 Lidow, Violent Order (2011) 162. 267 Idem. 268 John-Peter Pham, Liberia, Portrait of a failed state (New York: Reed Press, 2004) 177. 269 See table 4.4. 270 Mats Berdal, “Disarmament and demobilization after civil war,” Adelphi Paper No. 303 (London: ITSS and Oxford Univeristy Press, 1997) 43; Mamadou Diouma Bah, “Peace-building through informal channels: A comparative analysis of Liberia and Mozambique,” Master Thesis (Tromso: University of Tromso, 2006) 7. 271 ECOWAS, Official journal of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Vol. 22 (1997); Human Rights Watch, Emerging from the destruction (New York: Human Rights Watch, 17th of November 1997). 44 oftentimes without any additional training.272 The example of the Armed Forces of Liberia is especially telling; while the government originally estimated that the army needed around 5,000 active troops, the Liberian Minister of Defence stated that the number had grown to 14,000.273 Moreover, the Taylor granted his former NPFL fighters not enrolled into the security services the right to create private security firms, which could be hired by private sector companies. These private security firms became known for their general lawlessness and remained fiercely loyal to Charles Taylor.274 The implied threat, and Taylor’s history of unreliability regarding peace agreements, enticed other warlords to try and keep their most experienced fighters and command and control structures intact during Taylor’s reign. Because of the lack of a reconciliation programme in the Abuja II accords, there was no attempt to address the underlying animosity between the different factions. No effort was made to reconcile the NPFL, ULIMO-K, the LPC, or ULIMO-J, and thus no mutual confidence was likely to grow between the warring militias. The insecurity the various factions experienced under Taylor’s regime made it easy for the anti-Taylor warlords and their former fighters to eventually regroup under the banner of Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy, or LURD.

Liberia: A garrison state headed towards war The inability of the Taylor regime to address the root causes of the First Liberian Civil War provides another set of factors that help explain the occurrence of the Second Civil War. The failure to democratically re-establish the neo-colonial Liberian state is a major cause of this. The socio- economic, political, ethnic, and security crises that caused the First Liberian Civil War, were exacerbated instead of addressed during Taylor’s reign. This became especially apparent in Taylor’s use of ethnic scape-goating for justifying any bad performances by the regime. Taylor specifically blamed the Mandingo and Krahn ethnic groups, who were originally aligned with Doe’s government. The disposal of his rivals illustrates the ethnic groups used as scape goats, for instance the arrest and imprisonment of Hassan Bility, an ethnic Mandingo journalist.275 Another example is the failed attempt to arrest Roosevelt Johnson, who ultimately fled the country. In response to Johnson’s flight to Nigeria, the government intensified its persecution of the Krahn. In October 1998, thirteen ethnic Krahn were arrested, charged with treason and sentenced to ten years in prison during a mock trial.276 The political repression was not limited to members of these two ethnic groups, however. The media, political parties, and civil society organizations quickly became the target of repression. From 1997 to 1999, 26 persons were arrested and incarcerated without a trial, most of them journalist or members of civil society organizations.277 Political opponents were often killed, rather than imprisoned. One of the more famous cases is the murder of Samuel Dokie and his wife, son, and sister by government troops.278 In total, 357 political opponents are confirmed to have been executed between the years of 1997 to 1999.

272 Kieh, Jr., “The roots of the Second Liberian Civil War,” International Journal on World Peace (2009) 13. 273 HRW, “Liberia,” World Report 1999 (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999) 50. 274 Idem, 50-52. 275 The government accused him of leading a Mandingo-orchestrated propaganda campaign aiming to overthrow the regime. Bility was incarcerated and tortured by the police’s Special Operations Division. U.S. State Department, Liberia: Human rights reports, 1997-1999 (Washington D.C.: U.S. State Department, 2000). 276 Kieh, Jr., “The roots of the Second Liberian Civil War,” International Journal on World Peace (2009) 21. 277 U.S. State Department, Liberia: Human rights reports, 1997-1999 (Washington D.C.: U.S. State Department, 2000). 278 HRW, “Liberia,” World Report 1999 (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999) 51. 45

The independent press also came under periodic attack by the Taylor regime. In 1997, several staff members of The Inquirer, a Monrovia based newspaper, were arrested and detained.279 On the 21st of December, one of Liberia’s more famous television producers for the Ducor Broadcasting Association, was abducted and held hostage for several days by security forces.280 The Independent Star Radio Station was raided and closed indefinitely, and all Liberian press agencies were banned from publishing anything but positive information about the regime on the internet.281

Table 5.1: Liberia’s socio-economic development, 2000-2002

Indicator 2000 Life expectancy 47.7 years 2000 Child Mortality (under 5 years) per 1,000 pop. 196 2000 Maternal mortality rate per 100,000 pop. 578 2000 Population with access to education (%) 40 2000 Population with access to safe drinking water (%) 26 2000 Population with access to acceptable sanitation (%) 45 2001 Poverty rate (living on less than $1 a day (%)) 76.02 2001 Extreme poverty rate (living on less than $0.50 a day (%)) 52 2002 Adult literacy rate (%) 37.7

Source: United Nations Development Program, Liberia: National human development report (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006) 1.

As table 5.1 indicates, the socio-economic performance was dismal and had worsened when compared to Doe’s regime. The literacy rate had gone down from 77 percent in 1985 to 37.7 percent in 2002.282 Access to safe drinking water and acceptable sanitation were at an all-time low and had not improved during the relatively peaceful years after the First Liberian Civil War. In terms of economic well-being, more than 76 percent of the Liberians lived in poverty, while 52 percent lived in extreme poverty. That meant the majority of Liberians lacked access to basic human needs, including food. These statistics led The Economist to declare Liberia as the “worst place to live in the world.”283 The dire economic situation in the country also seriously prohibited a successful and comprehensive disarmament, demobilization, rehabilitation and re-integration (DDRR) campaign. Because of the unwillingness to disarm and demobilize together with the intact command and control structures, the rehabilitation and re-integration proved to be impossible to achieve without structural socio-economic reforms and foreign investment. There was a lack of job opportunities and little to no training available for the disarmed and demobilized ex-combatants, leaving them without any prospects. This, in turn, created a large reserve of desperate people living in poverty, willing to enlist in future militias. The former fighters often roamed the rural hinterlands of Liberia, plundering

279 Idem. 280 Idem. 281 African Faith and Justice Network, Human Rights Watch’s letter to President Charles Taylor (Washington D.C.: AFJN, 1998) 2. 282 Idem. 283 “The world’s worst place to live in 2003: Liberia,” The Economist (17th of December 2002). 46 and pillaging villages of cattle, rice, and other foodstuff. Taylor’s regime did little to counter these roving bands, sometimes provisionally enlisting their loyalty in the event of a renewed war.284 During the few years of relative peace, Liberia under Charles Taylor could best be characterized as a garrison state. Next to the Anti-Terrorist Unit (ATU), several other para-military units were formed. The Executive Mansion Special Unit (EMSU) was created to offset the ATU; Taylor did not want to put all of his trust in a single unit.285 The EMSU’s main role was to guard his heavily fortified house, nicknamed “White City”, whereas the ATU was intended to be more of a fighting force. For this purpose, the unit was put under the command of Taylor’s son, Chucky Taylor. Within the police force, a new Special Operations Department (SOD) was created, and finally a myriad of security checkpoints were established all over the country. The checkpoints were manned by various militias, organised in the same way as the NPFL’s militias. These militias were composed mostly of adolescent men and boys as young as ten years.286 There was a network of competing militias, led by longstanding supporters, most of whom were child soldiers that fought with Taylor during his time as a rebel leader.287 The majority of the militias were informally organized; small bands of boys headed by the eldest. They featured names like ‘Jungle Fire’ or ‘Tie-Dye Boys’, or lacked names entirely.288 Very few of them had actually received training, and even fewer wore any sort of official uniform. While the EMSU mainly wore the tiger striped camouflage uniforms previously worn by the AFL, and the ATU were assigned brown uniforms, the militias stationed at the roadblocks and checkpoints wore civilian clothes. These clothes were heavily influenced by American rap and gang culture, although some militia members took to wearing bright yellow t-shirts.289 Furthermore, many government soldiers carried ‘juju’, traditional magic charms as well as bizarre outfits, ranging from wigs to wedding dresses to actual cross-dressing.290 The purpose of these outfits was twofold; on the one hand they served as a means to strike fear into the enemy’s heart. On the other, the fighters harboured the belief that by dressing up as someone else, they created a second identity, rendering them invulnerable in combat. The spiritual beliefs the fighters held, are also illustrated by the various juju charms they carried, as well as the presence of the various witchdoctors within the rebel ranks.291 During his time in office, Taylor kept close relations with the RUF and its leader, Fodya Sankoh, with whom he received training in Libya. Although Taylor always denied having provided any support to the RUF, the UN “found unequivocal and overwhelming evidence that Liberia had been actively supporting the RUF at all levels, in providing training, weapons and related materiel, logistical support, a staging ground for attacks and a safe haven for retreat and recuperation.”292 Furthermore, the UN report found convincing evidence that there was a steady arms flow to the Sierra Leonean rebels:

“Police and military intercepts, civilian accounts, the written reports of RUF commanders to Foday Sankoh and oral testimony provided to the Panel by ex-combatants provide lengthy and detailed descriptions of a constant flow of weapons and supplies entering Sierra Leone

284 Kieh, Jr., “The roots of the Second Liberian Civil War,” International Journal on World Peace (2009) 21. 285 Nicole Itano, “Liberating Liberia: Charles Taylor and the rebels who unseated him,” Institute for Security Studies Paper 82 (November 2003) 3-5. 286 Mats Utas, Sweet battlefields: Youth and the Liberian Civil War (Stockholm: Lindblom & Co, 2003) 11-12. 287 Idem. 15. 288 Itano, “Liberating Liberia,” Institute for Security Studies Paper 82 (2003) 4. 289 Idem, 4; Utas, Sweet battlefields (2003) 26. 290 Idem, 27. 291 Idem, 27-28. 292 UNSC, “Report of the Panel of Experts appointed pursuant to Security Council resolution 1306 (2000), paragraph 19, in relation to Sierra Leone,” S/2000/1195 (December 2000). 47

from Liberia. Weaponry and supplies include mortars, rifles, RPGs, satellite phones, computers, vehicles, batteries, food and drugs. Most of the supplies are sent by road or helicopter to Foya-Kama, a few miles from the Sierra Leone border near Kailahun, and then they are trucked across the border into RUF territory for onward distribution.”293

It is important to note that the arms embargo that had been adopted unanimously in November 1992 by the UN Security Council was still in place. The embargo officially ended in May 2001, when it was supplanted by UN Security Council resolution 1343. The new resolution reaffirmed the arms embargo placed on Liberia for twelve months and introduced additional sanctions on the country.294 The embargo and sanctions were extended for another twelve months in May 2002 and in May 2003 by resolution 1408 and 1478, respectively.295 Government officials, military commanders, and not in the least Charles Taylor himself blamed the arms embargo for their inability to provide individual security to the Liberian people, and presented it as the reason behind the military reorganization. They believed that, as the legitimately elected government of Liberia, they should be allowed to purchase arms freely. As Sam Jackson, then minister of State for Financial and Economic Affairs said: “What kind of mind set would keep an arms embargo on an elected government that is trying to protect three million people? It’s because they don’t like Taylor.”296 In reality, however, the reason behind the arms embargo was Taylor’s continuing support for the RUF in Sierra Leone, as well as the occasional weapon shipment to rebels in Guinea and Côte d’Ivoire.297 The embargo notwithstanding, the Taylor regime still managed to import war materials into the country and continued to be able to supply foreign rebel factions with weapons. The ethnic purging of the AFL by Taylor, the political oppression and the lack of discipline showcased by the various militia groups resulting in a gross disregard for the human rights of the local populace, convinced the former warlords that Taylor’s regime lacked mass support. Their supporters and the disaffected members of Taylor’s warlordist militia calculated that the time became increasingly ripe to remove Taylor from power. This started in April 1999, when small groups of former ULIMO-J soldiers, who has fled to refugee camps in Guinea, started undertaking uncoordinated hit and run attacks into Liberia. A number of exiled politicians unsuccessfully attempted uniting these hodgepodge forces into a coherent military group. Without outside support, the militias were confronted with a shortage of arms and ammunition, and mainly staged minor attacks on military compounds; reminiscent of the NPFL’s early campaign to acquire weapons.298 While Sierra Leone and Guinea had seemed like natural allies, neither country appeared willing to support the fledging rebel organization. Early on, the rebels suspected Sierra Leone might be willing because of the continuing attack by the Taylor backed RUF; the Sierra Leonean government refused to provide the militias with a base and war materials, even going as far as arresting some aspiring group leaders.299 Côte d’Ivoire and Guinea also proved reluctant to provide any form of support, out of fear of Liberian reprisals.

293 UN, “The United Nations and the situation in Liberia,” Reference paper (February 1997) 26. 294 UNSC, “Resolution 1343 (2001),” S/RES/1343 (7th of March 2001). 295 UNSC, “Resolution 1408 (2002),” S/RES/1408 (6th of May 2002); UNSC, “Resolution 1478 (2003),” S/RES/1478 (6th of May 2003). 296 Itano, “Liberating Liberia,” Institute for Security Studies Paper 82 (2003) 4. 297 UNSC, “Resolution 1343 (2001),” S/RES/1343 (7th of March 2001). 298 Lidow, Violent Order (2011) 162-163. 299 Idem, 163. 48

Rise of LURD The dissidents experienced a lucky break in early 2000, after a small group of Guinean rebels briefly occupied Guékédou, a Guinean town close to the border with Liberia. These rebels turned out to be backed and supplied with arms by the Taylor regime.300 The Guinean President Lansana Conté proved more susceptible to supporting the Liberian dissident and the Guinean military started to provide the groups with weapons and ammunition.301 In return for the support of Conté, the dissidents were forced to accept as their chairman. Conneh – a used car salesmen in the past without any political of military experience, was married to the spiritual advisor of the Guinean president.302 Under Conneh’s leadership, the dissidents reorganized themselves into the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD). LURD quickly went on the offensive and captured Voinjama, the largest city and capital of . Taylor’s forces responded by staging a couple of hit-and- run’s into Guinea and pillaging several towns. Outraged by Taylor’s attack, President Lansana Conté chose to dramatically increase his military support to LURD.303

300 Utas, Sweet battlefields (2003) 34. 301 Idem, 163. 302 Morten Bøås, “Making plans for Liberia – a trusteeship approach to good governance?” Third World Quarterly Vol. 30, No. 7 (2009) 14. 303 International Crisis Group, “Liberia: The key to ending regional instability,” Africa Report Vol. 43 (24th of April 2002). 49

Figure 5.1: LURD’s advance across Liberia

Source: James Hart Lidow, Violent Order: Rebel organization and Liberia’s civil war (Stanford University, 2011).

Conté’s support for the rebels came at a time when Guinea itself benefitted from increased military support from the United States. Several transfers of arms and ammunition were recorded form the United States government to Guinea. The transfers consisted of undisclosed amounts of pistols and revolvers, American-made M-16A1 and Kalashnikov AK-47 assault rifles, as well as a variety of non-lethal military supplies.304 While it would be inaccurate to accuse the American government of directly supplying the rebels with weapons, it did significantly lower the costs for Guinea to support LURD. Conté’s goal was to keep Taylor’s forces occupied with minor skirmishes in Lofa County, thus preventing any incursions into Guinean territory. For approximately eighteen months, the tactic proved to be effective. While LURD battled with Liberian government forces in Lofa County, no attacks were recorded within the Guinean borders. In this time, LURD and the AFL both saw a mix of victories and defeats. First LURD would capture a part of Lofa, only to pull back from it a few months later after the government retaliation. This continued until early 2002, when LURD launched a large- scale campaign to gain a permanent foothold in Lofa County. The organization swept across northern Liberia and managed to capture a handful of important towns, such as Tubmanburg and Klay. Even

304 Idem; Donald J. McConnell, “Combating the spread of small arms: the U.S. approach,” U.S. Foreign policy Agenda Vol. 6, No. 2 (June 2001); Norwegian Initiative on Small Arms Transfers (NISAT), Trade Database 1992. 50 though Taylor’s forces managed to stage a swift reprisal, retaking some territory, LURD’s campaign proved successful, firmly entrenching the dissidents in the county.305 LURD had now proven itself to be a significant threat to the Taylor regime. Although they made no move on Monrovia yet, they were now structurally active within the Liberian interior. Taylor responded by dramatically expanding the ATU, and formed an additional militia by recalling former NPFL commanders into active service.306 The threat to Taylor’s regime increased when a new rebel faction formed, the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL). Similar to ULIMO, LURD would split according to ethnic lines into two factions. Members of the Krahn ethnic group, mostly former ULIMO-J fighters, became unsatisfied when the group came under the leadership of Sekou Conneh, an Islamic Mandingo. They united under the banner of Yaya Nimely, a certified psychologist with a United States citizenship.307 Nimely had tried to rouse support for a new dissident organization during most of his time in LURD, and finally succeeded in September 2002, when civil war erupted in Sierra Leone. Because of the large-scale campaign waged by the Taylor backed RUF in Côte d’Ivoire, thousands of Liberian refugees were trapped on the frontline. Originally under the guise of Liberians Mobilized in Action (LIMA), they fought alongside the Ivorian military, recapturing strategic towns such as Blolélin and Toulepleu.308 In exchange for their military support, the government of Côte d’Ivoire supplied them with weapons, enough to stage an incursion into Liberia. After a few motnhs of fierce fighting, the group had stockpiled enough weapons to start a campaign in Liberia and subsequently settled in the south-eastern timber producing areas of Liberia.309 MODEL’s advance proved to be expedient; the important harbour city of Buchanan was quickly captured in July 2003, as the group came ever closer to Monrovia.310 The capture of Buchanan coincided with the start of a series of brutal military campaigns by LURD, which became known as ‘World War I’, ‘World War II’, and ‘World War III’.311 During these campaigns, LURD moved closer to Monrovia and penetrated the outskirts of the metropolitan areas by early August. Taylor’s forces suffered a series of defeats at the hands of the LURD and MODEL soldiers, and retreated towards the capital.

305 See Figure 5.1. 306 International Crisis Group, “Liberia: The key to ending regional instability,” Africa Report Vol. 43 (24th of April 2002); Lidow, Violent Order (2011) 163. 307 Lidow, Violent Order (2011) 164. 308 Idem. 309 BBC, “Profile: Liberia’s rebels,” BBC (10th of June 2003). 310 See figure 5.2. 311 James Brabazon, “Liberia: Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD),” Armed Non-State Actors Project Briefing Paper No. 1 (February 2003). 51

Figure 5.2: MODEL’s advance across Liberia

Source: James Hart Lidow, Violent Order: Rebel organization and Liberia’s civil war (Stanford University, 2011).

52

ECOWAS and UN intervention The situation was of grave concern to ECOWAS, and its Member States increasingly sought to mediate through diplomatic efforts. Several meetings were organized in 202 to address the escalating conflict. The first meeting was held on the 17th of May in Yamoussoukro, where the decision was made to seek peaceful means to end the conflict. This was quickly followed by the creation of the International Contact Group on Liberia (ICGL) on the 17th of September 2002 in New York, which was co-chaired by ECOWAS and the European Union.312 ECOWAS was tasked to negotiate a renewed peace process in Liberia, resulting in the start of peace talks in Accra, Ghana on the 4th of June 2003. A comprehensive cease-fire agreement was negotiated on the 17th of June 2003, which called for the formation of a transitional government within 30 days. It stipulated that Taylor was not to be included in the transitional government, a demand made by LURD and MODEL.313 The agreement called for a West African-led “stabilization force” of over 2,000 troops, to be deployed within 60 days of the agreement. Taylor would hand over his power to his Vice-President, Moses Blah.314 Furthermore, the UN Security Council authorized the creation of a multinational force in Liberia on the 1st of August 2003. For this purpose, the UNSC adopted Resolution 1497, authorizing ECOWAS to:

“Establish a Multinational Force in Liberia to support the implementation of the 17 June 2003, ceasefire agreement, including establishing conditions for initial stages of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration activities, to help establish and maintain security in the period after the departure of the current President and the installation of a successor authority, taking into account the agreements to be reached by the Liberian parties and to secure the environment for the delivery of humanitarian assistance, and to prepare for the introduction of a longer-term UN stabilization force to relieve the Multinational Force.”315

The ECOWAS Vanguard Force deployed on the 4th of August 2003 and consisted of 3,566 troops, and was dubbed the ECOWAS Mission in Liberia (ECOMIL). After five years, ECOMOG troops again patrolled the streets of Monrovia. Unlike ECOMOG, however, ECOMIL enjoyed diplomatic, political and logistical support of the international community. The UNSC Resolution 1497 provided the legitimacy ECOMIL needed under international law, and it received military and logistical support from the US Joint Task Force.316 Under increasing international pressure from Liberia’s neighbours, the UN, and ECOWAS, and under military pressure from LURD and MODEL, Taylor was forced to admit defeat. On the 11th of August 2003, Taylor officially resigned as President of Liberia and accepted exile in Nigeria. ECOWAS’ relatively timely response and the rapid organization of peace talks resulted in the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) on the 18th of August 2003 in Accra. It declared an

312 ECOWAS, “ECOMIL After Action Review (AAR) Final Report,” African Centre for Strategic Studies (August 2004). 313 UNSC, “Agreement on ceasefire and cessation of hostilities between the Government of the Republic of Liberia and Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy and the Movement for Democracy in Liberia,” S/2003/657 (17th of June 2003). 314 Idem. 315 UNSC, “Resolution 1497,” S/RES/1497 (1st of August 2003). 316 The US force was part of the Fleet Anti-Terror Support Team (FAST) returning from Iraq, and landed between 150 and 200 marines in Monrovia. 53 immediate end to the war and stipulated the creation of a National Transitional Government of Liberia (NTGL).317 True to their word, the UN followed up on their commitment to take over from ECOMIL, and adopted Resolution 1509 on the 19th of September 2003. The Resolution authorized the creation of UNMIL, to be deployed on the 1st of October for an initial period of twelve months. The mission would consist of “15,000 UN military personnel, including up to 250 military observers and 160 staff officers, and up to 1,115 civilian police officers, including formed units, to assist in the maintenance of law and order throughout Liberia, and the appropriate civilian component.”318 This involved “rehatting” the ECOMIL troops to United Nations peacekeepers. The UNMIL mandate had broad and specific features. They ranged from supporting the implementation of the ceasefire agreement to, more specifically, several implementation goals. The disarmament, demobilization, rehabilitation and reintegration (DDRR) of ex-combatants were central to attaining these implementation goals.319

DDRR program One of UNMIL primary tasks, critical to prevent a recurrence of events following the First Civil War, was the disarmament of former combatants belonging to all armed factions. In order to accomplish this task, the National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation and Reintegration (NCDDRR) was created. Although the commission consisted of representatives of the various armed groups, the planning and implementation was the sole responsibility of UNMIL’s Joint Implementation Unit (JIU).320 In turn, the JIU subcontracted many of the technical and educational aspects to local service providers working out of Monrovia, usually international NGO’s like UNICEF.321UNMIL initially estimated that approximately 38,000 fighters would register for demobilization benefits, although it remains unclear how this number was reached. The International Crisis Group, for instance, estimated that 48,000 and 58,000 fighters would register.322 The DDRR process would originally take up three weeks, at a single designated cantonment site. Because none of the armed factions kept an inventory of the available weaponry, eligibility for DDRR benefits was based on the willingness of a combatant to hand in a firearm.323 After the initial disarmament at D1, as the cantonment site was called, the former fighters would be transported to the D2 site. Here, they would register, receive medical care, and additional human rights and career training. During this time, they were not allowed to leave the site and mingle with the local populace. At the end of the period, the ex-combatants received enough food to last a month and a fee of $150. Free transport to a location of their choice was also to be provided. Foreign fighters could opt to either be transferred to their home country, or apply for refugee status in Liberia. The rehabilitation and reintegration would take place once the former fighters had arrived at their new location; further career training and anther stipend of $150 were included in this phase of the program.

317 UNSC, “Peace agreement between the Government of Liberia, the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy, the Movement for Democracy in Liberia and the political parties,” S/2003/850 (18th of August 2003). 318 UNSC, “Resolution 1509,” S/RES/1509 (19th of September 2003). 319 Idem. 320 United Nations Development Program, External mid-term evaluation report of the disarmament, demobilization, rehabilitation and reintegration program in Liberia (2nd of October 2006). 321 Wolf-Christian Paes, “The challenges of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration in Liberia,” International Peacekeeping Vol.12, No. 2 (2005) 253. 322 International Crisis Group, “Rebuilding Liberia: Prospects and Perils,” Africa Briefing No. 75 (Freetown/Brussels, 2004) 1. 323 Draft Interim Secretariat, Liberian disarmament, demobilization, rehabilitation, and reintegration programme: Strategy and implementation framework (Monrovia, 31st of October 2003) 27. 54

The first phase of the DDRR was launched on the 7th of December 2003 on the outskirts of Monrovia. The UNMIL targeted the paramilitaries and the former government soldiers that still lingered around Monrovia. Instead of the planned three weeks, the programme would only last a couple of days; UNMIL was struck by an overwhelming response, higher than anticipated. Due to organizational restrictions and lack of resources, UNMIL was forced to pause the program. This in turn led to riots at D1 and looting in Monrovia, leaving several people dead.324 A general period of rioting ensued and after a few chaotic days the programme was suspended until the 21st of January. Nevertheless, a total amount of 8,769 weapons and 2.7 million rounds of ammunition were collected during these couple of days.325 More than 13,000 fighters had reportedly disarmed, although JIU estimated that at least 3,000 of these fighters had succeeded to ‘disarm twice’, which was possible due to the lack of monitoring and control.326 Following the December fiasco, UNMIL decided to re-design the process. A precise estimate of the possible number of fighters interested in registering could still not be made, because the various armed factions had failed to disclose comprehensive lists of combatants to UNMIL.327 Despite the absence of this critical piece of information, a nationwide information campaign was launched on the 21st of January 2004.328 This campaign advertised the fact that the qualification criteria for the DDRR were expanded to include people who could not produce a weapon, but who could instead present 150 rounds of ammunition. 329 The requirements were expanded to accommodate the camp followers, children or women associated with the fighting forces (CAFF and WAFF, respectively). These represented the wives, girlfriends, children, cooks and general support staff of the armed factions, The second phase started on the 15th of April 2004 at four different cantonment sites at Monrovia, Tubmanburg, Gbarnga, and Buchanan. These sites were selected specifically because of their geographic distribution; they were located within the territory of the various armed factions. Due to a lack of resources ex-fighters now were to be encamped for a period of only five days, instead of the intended three weeks.330 Furthermore, the number of reintegration programme slots was still limited to their original number, even though the number of participants was far higher than initially estimated. This forced ex-combatants to wait for the available slots of months, often in subpar living conditions in the greater Monrovia region. During the second phase of the DDRR, a total number of 51,466 former fighters were disarmed and a total of 9,417 weapons and 2.9 million rounds of ammunition were collected by the UNMIL forces. The third and final phase of the DDRR began in early July 2004 and featured the opening of a number of new camp sites in , Ganta, and Voinjama. These remote sites had not been services during the earlier two phases of the programme and there were significant logistic difficulties, forcing UNMIL to extend the deadline by three weeks. 331 At the conclusion of the programme, 102,193 people had been processed and 27,000 weapons and over 6.15 million rounds of ammunition had been collected.332 After collecting the weapons and ammunition, explosive teams

324 International Crisis Group, “Rebuilding Liberia: Prospects and Perils,” Africa Briefing No. 75 (Freetown/Brussels, 2004) 5. 325 Florquin and Berman, Armed and Aimless (2005) 110. 326 Idem, 111. 327 United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), “Nationwide DDRR information campaign launched,” UNMIL/PIO/PR/35 (21st of January 2004). 328 Idem. 329 Paes, “The challenges of disarmament,“ International Peacekeeping Vol.12, No. 2 (2005) 255. 330 United Nations Development Program, External mid-term evaluation (2nd of October 2006). 331 Morten Bøås and Ingunn Bjørkhaug, “DDRed in Liberia: Youth remarginalisation or reintegration?” MICROCON Research Working paper 28 (June 2010) 5. 332 United Nations Development Program, External mid-term evaluation (2nd of October 2006). 55 destroyed ammunition at disposal sites throughout the country. The weapons were stored until they could be transported to Monrovia. Upon arriving in Monrovia, the weapons were recounted and catalogued by type and serial number by UNMIL personnel. Subsequently, and American company, ORDSafe, destroyed and disposed of the weapons.333

Table 5.2: Number of ex-combatants by faction

Faction Phase I Phase II Phase III Total AFL 4,164 6,830 1,252 12,246 LURD 48 19,717 13,720 33,485 MODEL 11 2,855 10,283 12,149 GoL334 11 5,107 10,471 15,589 Others335 8,889 16,957 1,878 27,724

Total 13,123 51,466 37,604 102,193

Source: National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation, and Reintegration (NCDDRR), NCDDRR Consolidated Report (Monrovia, 24th of November 2004).

Out of the total number of disarmed fighters, 67 percent were adult males, 22 percent females, 9 percent male children and 2 percent were female children.336 UNMIL took great care to separate the underage and adult combatants as well as the males and females. The organization did this to prevent any possible abuse of the more vulnerable groups within the encampment sites. The system was very susceptible to abuse, however, because women and children were often accepted into the DDRR programme through a special clause; it did not require them to surrender arms or ammunition, not even the 150 rounds of ammunition. Allegedly, this led to a commercialization of the DDRR program. Rebel commanders recruited adolescents form neighbouring countries to enter the programme, splitting the cash reward between the commander and the family of the “combatant”.337 Apparently, weapons and especially ammunition have also been obtained by civilians, to allow them to register as former fighter. Camp workers have reported that rebel commanders distributed weapons and especially ammunition to civilians and again split the cash reward.338 UNMIL officers also reported that spent cartridges were often filled with sand and

333 Florquin and Berman, Armed and Aimless (2005) 114. 334 These fighters belonged to the former government of Liberia. While the CPA called for the Armed Forces of Liberia to be “confined to their barracks, their arms placed in armouries and their ammunition in storage bunkers.” However, this requirement was never reinforced and AFL members were allowed to go through the DDRR process together with the fighters form the various other factions. United Nations Security Council, “Peace agreement between the Government of Liberia, the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy, the Movement for Democracy in Liberia and the political parties,” S/2003/850 (18th of August 2003). 335 This category is thought to include the different militias as well as a number of ex-GoL fighters. See table 5.2. 336 National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation, and Reintegration (NCDDRR), NCDDRR Consolidated Report (Monrovia, 24th of November 2004). Also see table 5.2. 337 Paes, “The challenges of disarmament,“ International Peacekeeping Vol.12, No. 2 (2005) 256. 338 Idem, 256-257. 56 surrendered as live ammunition.339 This is further supported by the large number of ex-fighters registered as “other”.340 The political leadership of UNMIL has consistently denied any possible abuse of the system.341 It is, however, very probable that the organizations own policy is responsible for the high numbers of fake combatants registered. The high cash reward of $300 dollars provides a powerful motivation for civilians to try and game the system. The comparative luxury of the encampment sites, which even offered satellite television, paired with the lack of social stigma for being an ex- combatant, made the limitations of the programme a small price to pay. The abuse of the system can also be attributed to the flawed screening process put forward by the UNMIL. In the first phase of the DDRR, the disarmament process and subsequent screening process was supposed to be carried out by military observers (MILOBS).342 The screening process included a series of questions, designed to ascertain that the person who registered was indeed an ex-combatant, CAFF, or WAFF. After the overwhelming initial response, UNMIL lacked the resources and MILOBS, leaving to local NGO staff, which lacked training and authority to effectively carry out the screening process. Furthermore, the times that the MILOBS did manage to participate in the process, language barriers and cultural misunderstandings often undermined the effort. Compared to the disarmament programme following the Abuja II peace agreement, the DDRR programme was, when it comes to the numbers of people who participated, significantly more popular. This is due to the fact that a monetary compensation was offered, as well as the relative luxury of the encampment sites. Furthermore, the rebel factions did not experience the same amount of distrust that characterized the end of the first Liberian civil war. Finally, the relative success of the ECOMIL and subsequently the UNMIL peacekeeping forces in guaranteeing the individual security, added to the willingness of combatants and militias to register. Similar to the earlier programme however, the rehabilitation and reintegration phase of the project came up short. This manifested itself in a lack of slots for the RR part of the DDRR programme, leaving some 57,000 ex-combatants without RR coverage.343

339 United Nations Development Program, External mid-term evaluation report of the disarmament, demobilization, rehabilitation and reintegration program in Liberia (2nd of October 2006). 340 See table 5.3. 341 Integrated Regional Information Network (IRIN), “Liberia: Where are the weapons? Is disarmament really working?” Integrated Information News Network (2828th of July 2004). 342 Draft Interim Secretariat, Liberian disarmament, demobilization, rehabilitation, and reintegration programme: Strategy and implementation framework (Monrovia, 31st of October 2003) 24. 343 Paes, “The challenges of disarmament,“ International Peacekeeping Vol.12, No. 2 (2005) 260. 57

Table 5.3: Weapons collected by UNMIL as of the 24th of November 2004

Total weapons collected

Rifle/sub-machine guns 20,458 7.62 mm machine guns 690 Pistols (all calibre) 641 RPG launchers 1,829 Mortars 178 Misc. 4,008 TOTAL 27,804 Total ammunition collected

Small arms/light weapons 7,129,198 RPG rockets 8,703 60/81 mm mortars 12,287 82 mm mortars 15 Hand grenades 10,410 Surface-to-air missiles 12 Misc. 1,103 TOTAL ammunition (excl. SA/LW) 32,530

Source: National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation, and Reintegration (NCDDRR), NCDDRR Consolidated Report (Monrovia, 24th of November 2004).

The large number of ex-combatants that registered in the DDRR programme would not be considered a cause for concern, were it not for the lack of corresponding weapons collected. There were only 27,804 weapons collected for a total number of 102,193 ex-fighters. The relatively small number of weapons might have been even smaller, due to various administrative errors. For instance, after the DDRR started, the UN officials soon noticed a disparity between the amount of weapons reported to be collected and the physical count taking place prior to their destruction.344 The MILOBS and the NGO staff replacing them, who were in charge of the initial intake of the weapons, registered them by filling out the disarmament forms by hand. The identification for a 120 mm mortar was the number ‘1’, while that of an AK-74 was a ‘7’. Because the forms were filled out by hand, these numbers were easily misread, resulting in an incredibly high number of 120 mm mortars being surrendered.345 The reporting errors were compounded by the fact that a significant portion of the NGO staff was unqualified to accurately identify the weapons collected. Significant problems arose with mortar weapon, which consist of three basic parts: a base, a tripod and a firing tube. These components would be handed in separately and each part would be registered as a complete weapon.346 Coupled with the fact that many semi-automatic rifles were mistakenly identified as AK-74s and that the

344 UN Development Program, External mid-term evaluation report of the disarmament, demobilization, rehabilitation and reintegration program in Liberia (2nd of October 2006). 345 National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation, and Reintegration (NCDDRR), NCDDRR Consolidated Report (Monrovia, 24th of November 2004). 346 Idem. 58 identification numbers could easily be misread, this led to an unusually high number of registered of AK-74s. Furthermore, out of the 4,008 weapons identified as ‘miscellaneous’, at least 75 percent were actually shotguns. Most of these were of extremely poor quality and it is questionable whether the armed factions actually used these weapons. Some UNMIL officials therefore questioned whether these weapons should have been accepted.347 Without trained and qualified MILOBS to observe the state of the weapons upon collecting, however, filtering the unserviceable weapons was next to impossible. Many larger weapons used amongst others during the 2003 siege of Monrovia were never handed in, despite promises made by faction leaders.348 Considering the complex dynamics between the various armed factions and the unexpected numbers of ex-combatants registering for the DDRR, there were no major mishaps during the DD phase of the programme, the December 2003 incident aside. This is no small feat. Despite these technical shortcomings, there were greater problems underlying the process. One senior UNMIL official is commented that during the start-up phase, the entire programme had to be drawn up from scratch; it was not clear what policies should have guided it. He further stated that the process should have been based on a template formed in consultation with the involved parties and neighbouring countries.349 What did make the DDRR more successful than the one following the Abuja II Accords was the presence of an international peacekeeping force, ECOMIL and UNMIL respectively. A DDRR programme should not launch before there are sufficient peacekeepers to maintain a secure environment and guarantee individual security.

Types and origins of weapons As was the case in the analysis of the weapons present in Liberia during and after the Abuja II Peace Accords, there is no clear indication of the number and types of SA/LW present in the country prior to and after the DDRR. It remains difficult to determine how many arms were stockpiled by the various warring factions as well as the composition of those stockpiles. Similar to the previous peace processes and disarmament programs, caches of weapons were likely to be hidden by the different parties to the conflict. For example, in October 2003 UNMIL discovered large weapons caches hidden in the residence of ex-President Moses Blah. Two more caches were found in the bush near Voinjama and near the western border with Sierra Leone.350 The local media also regularly reported the discovery of weapon caches.351 Unfortunately, similar to the DDRR campaign following the Abuja II Accords, There was no precise inventory kept of the types of weapons collected. The distinctions that were made often appeared to be made by unqualified staff lacking the training required to positively identify the make and model of the surrendered weapons. Combined with the administrative errors surrounding the mortar processing, this led to an unusually high number of AK-47s reported to be handed in.352 During the physical inventory made before the destruction of the weapons, the arms were recounted. A grand total of 18.859 AK-47 assault rifles were surrendered, of which 389 were unserviceable and 925 were registered as ‘N/A’ or ‘not available’.353 It is unclear what this designation is supposed to mean and it is not expanded upon further in the report. Furthermore, 385

347 Florquin and Berman, Armed and Aimless (2005) 123. 348 NCDDR, “Warring groups pledge to submit heavy weapons,” NCDDR (15th of July 2004). 349 Florquin and Berman, Armed and Aimless (2005) 139. 350 Florquin and Berman, Armed and Aimless (2005) 124. 351 The Analyst, “Heacy weapons conceiled in Kumgba Town,”The Analyst (17th of November 2004). 352 National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation, and Reintegration (NCDDRR), NCDDRR/JIU DDRR Consolidated Report (Monrovia, 19th of September 2004) 29. 353 Idem, 34. 59

Heckler & Koch G3 assault rifles were found, of which 47 were unserviceable and 19 N/A; 566 machine guns of 7.62 mm calibre were found, of which 30 were unserviceable and 59 ‘N/A’.354 The obvious problem with weapons classified as AK-47 is that it usually just refers to the rifle’s architecture. There is a large variety of weapons, by various manufacturers, based on the Kalashnikov principle. There are few notable examples that were in the hands of LURD and MODEL fighters, as well as government forces. These include the Serbian Zavasta M70 AB2 and the M72 AB2, the Russian AKM and AK-47 assault rifles and several varieties of Chinese-made AK-47s. Other assault rifles used, all of the 7.62 calibre, include the Belgian Fabrique Nationale (de Herstal) FAL, American- made M-16s, Russian PKM light machine guns, RPK and RPD machine guns, various SKS guns and finally Chinese M-60 type 7.62 mm type light machine guns.355 The origins of these weapons are easier to establish than was the case in the analysis of the weapons used in the First Liberian Civil War. This is largely due to the interest in SA/LW in the international community, interest sparked in part by the First Civil War. While scholars like Stephen Ellis significantly advanced our understanding of the violence and ritualistic dimensions of the war, as well as offer a well research account of the war itself, there is no focus on the use of small arms or the origins of these weapons. As such, most of the research was geared towards the way these weapons were used; instead of how the various factions acquired them. Despite its shortcomings, the disarmament process after the Second Liberian Civil War was a more structured, comprehensive process, featuring a better registration system as well as inventory keeping than the First Civil War. After the various ceasefires and peace agreements, disarmament was to be handled by the ECOMOG forces. The organization was too inexperienced and proved to be incapable of launching a successful disarmament campaign. The UN and the international community were reluctant to offer support or advice, resulting in an inconclusive DDRR programme. Despite the unqualified staff collecting and registering the SA/LW, there is a significant amount of reliable data which allows for tracing the origins of some of the weapons used. Taylor’s government found several ways to circumvent the UN embargo, as well as the ECOWAS moratorium on small arms. The Taylor government was heavily involved in supporting rebel factions in its neighbouring countries, most notably in Côte d’Ivoire and Sierra Leone, requiring a constant flow of small arms and light weapons. Most arms illicit trafficking took place via logging ships and airplanes. Weapon imports by ship were facilitated by the Taylor-controlled Oriental Timber Company (OTC).356 For instance, there were a number of dubious business deals between the OTC and a Chinese national firm, China National Aero-Technology Import and Export Corporation (CATIC).357 While the exact contents of these business deals never became public, there was a marked increase in Chinese-made weapons in Liberia, in particular Chinese made AK-47 assault rifles and M-60 Type 7.62 mm light machine guns.358 Furthermore, it is thought that a large portion of the 7.62 mm ammunition is of Chinese origin.359 These deals were brokered by arms traders in Hong Kong and mainland China, most notably by Joseph Wong, and involved the People’s Republic of

354 Idem. 355 UNSC, “Report of the Panel of Experts concerning Liberia,” S/2003/498 (24th of April 2003); Global Witness, The Usual suspects: Liberia’s weapons and mercenaries in Côte d’Ivoire and Sierra Leone (London: Global Witness, 2003); 355 Brabazon, “Liberia,” Armed Non-State Actors Project Briefing Paper No. 1 (February 2003); International Crisis Group, “Tackling Liberia: The eye of the regional storm,” Africa Report No. 62 (Freetown/Brussels, 30th of April 2003); International Crisis Group, “Liberia: Security Challenges,” Africa Report No. 71 (Freetown/Brussels, 3rd of November 2003). 356 Global Witness, The Usual suspects (2003) 21. 357 Idem, 23. 358 Idem, 22. 359 Florquin and Berman, Armed and Aimless (2005) 127. 60

China’s (PRC) largest arms producers, Norinco and Poly Technology.360 The Dutch businessman Gus Kouwenhoven, managing director of OTC and owner of the Hotel Monrovia in Monrovia, is also said to have been of critical importance in brokering these deals.361 The Liberian government admitted to acquiring significant amount of weapons from the Ex- Yugoslavian country Serbia. Between June and August 2002, six weapons shipments have taken place from Belgrade to Robertsfield International Airport.362 The UNSC Panel of Experts on Liberia initiated an investigation regarding these shipments and uncovered the broker and supplier. The broker turned out to be Orhan Dragas, President of the board of the MDO Systems Company, who brought the Taylor regime into contact with Slobodan Tezic, director of the Belgrade-based Temex company.363 Temex had taken to acquiring large numbers of SA/LW, mainly old military equipment from the former Yugoslavian army stockpiles. The Taylor regime consequently ordered a significant number of SA/LW from Temex. This included, but was not limited to 5,000 Zavasta M70 AB2 7.62 mm assault rifles with 10 million rounds of ammunition as well as 100 PKM M84 7.62 mm machine guns with 5 million rounds of ammunition.364 The cargo documents had stomps from the Nigerian receiver, a Lagos-based company by the name of Aruna Import, the Lagos International Airport, as well as the Nigerian Ministry of Defence. The End User Certification was later proven to be false.365 The material arrived at Robertsfield International airport in six different shipments. Regionally, several other countries have been implicated in illicitly supplying the Taylor regime with arms. Most notably, Burkina Faso and Libya have acted as transhipment points for arms destined for Liberia.366 Several reports have implicated Burkina Faso’s president Blasé Campaore and a Senegalese mercenary Ibrahim Bah.367 However, the exact number and types of weapons trafficked along these connections have never been accurately determined.368 Most of these weapon shipments were facilitated by private traffickers like Victor Bout. The vast network that operated consisted of almost 60 aircraft operated by various shell companies, supposedly facilitated the forging of End User Certificates as well.369 The rebel factions fighting the Taylor regime had their own sources of weapons. LURD was provided with arms, ammunition, as well as logistical and medical support by Guinea.370 According to

360 UNSC, “Revised list of persons subject to travel restrictions pursuant to resolution 1343 (2001),” SC/8033 (23rd of March 2004); Global Witness, The Usual suspects (2003) 21; Amnesty International, “China: Sustaining conflict and human rights abuses - the flow of arms accelerates,” Amnesty International (June 2005) 12-14. 361 The Independent, “EC countries, including Britain, have been helping indirectly to finance the bloodshed in Liberia’s three-year-old civil war, by importing Liberian timber,” The Independent (22nd of November 2003). 362 UNSC, “Report of the Panel of Experts concerning Liberia,” S/2002/1115 (24th of October 2002); Human Rights Watch, “Weapons sanctions, military supplies, and human suffering: Illegal arms flows to Liberia and the June-July 2003 shelling of Monrovia,” Human Rights Watch Briefing Paper (New York: Human Rights Watch, 3rd of November 2003) 18-25. 363 UNSC, “Report of the Panel of Experts concerning Liberia,” S/2002/1115 (24th of October 2002). 364 UNSC, “Report of the Panel of Experts concerning Liberia,” S/2003/498 (24th of April 2003). 365 UNSC, “Report of the Panel of Experts concerning Liberia,” S/2002/1115 (24th of October 2002). 366 Global Witness, The Usual suspects (2003) 23. 367 Douglas Farah, “An “axis” connected to Gadaffi,” The Washington Post (2nd of November 2001); Douglas Farah, “African diamonds finance Al-Qaeda,” The Washington Post (29th of December 2002). 368 HRW, “Liberian refugees in Guinea: Refoulement, militarization of camps, and other protection concerns,” Human Rights Watch (25th of November 2002). 369 John C. K. Daly, “The deadly convenience of Viktor Bout,” ISN Security Watch (24th of June 2008); HRW, “No questions asked: The Eastern European arms pipeline to Liberia,” Human Rights Watch (21th of November 2001). 370 UNSC, “Report of the Panel of Experts concerning Liberia,” S/2003/498 (24th of April 2003); International Crisis Group, “Liberia: The key to ending regional instability,” Africa Report No. 43 (Freetown/Brussels, 3rd of November 2002) 11; Human Rights Watch, “Liberian refugees in Guinea: Refoulement, militarization of camps, and other protection concerns,” Human Rights Watch (25th of November 2002). 61 a report by Human Rights Watch, a private Guinean mining and trading company was used as a broker for the procurement of military weapons and supplies. The mining company went by the name of Societé Katex Mine Guinea, or Katex Mine.371 According to the UN Panel on Liberia, Katex Mine´s head office was consistently guarded by Special Forces usually assigned to the Presidency of Guinea.372 Even though the Guinean government denied any involvement with LURD, the UN Panel on Liberia found that the Katex mine played a direct role in supplying LURD with weapons.373 The largest number of shipment to Guinea, made by the airline owned by Victor Bout via Teheran, directly preceded the major LURD offensive of March 2003.374 Still, the exact contents of the shipments and the types of weapons have never been obtained. LURD has allegedly also used United Arab Emirates made ammunition, which is reported to have leaked from Guinean stockpiles.375 Unfortunately, this has never been conclusively proven. Likewise, MODEL is said to have received its arms, military equipment and supplies from Côte d’Ivoire.376 Even though a plethora of weapon shipments into Liberia have been discovered over time, it remains difficult to make an accurate assessment of the weapons stockpiles present in the country during the Second Civil War. This complicates determining to what extent the DDRR programme has been successful. It is possible to make a crude calculation using the limited amount of data provided by UNMIL with regards to the make and model of the weapons collected. The trafficking of the Zavasta M70 AB2 assault rifles from Serbia has been well documented and these weapons are sure to have been used by the regime. At the end of the disarmament period, exactly 3,175 of these weapons were recovered, or 64 percent of the original weapons.377 Although this calculation can be considered especially crude, it could be used to provide an estimate rate of disarmament. It remains difficult to estimate how many weapons were present in Liberia during and directly after the civil war. The DDRR programme has been criticized for being designed and implemented without any consideration given to Liberia’s neighbours. The long and porous borders between the Mano River Basin States meant that small arms and light weapons especially, cannot be trapped in a national container. When a DDRR programme was launched and UNMIL started paying for weapons and ammunition, a regional market was instantly created. There are at least two individuals reported to have been selling ammunition for transport to Liberia.378 Alternatively, there are also reports of arms and ammunition being smuggled from Liberia into Sierra Leone. 379 Without accurate inventories made public by the UN, it will remain impossible to determine exactly how many weapons were used, and where they originated from.

371 HRW, “Weapons sanctions, military supplies, and human suffering: Illegal arms flows to Liberia and the June-July 2003 shelling of Monrovia,” Human Rights Watch Briefing Paper (New York: Human Rights Watch, 3rd of November 2003) 18-25. 372 UNSC, “Report of the Panel of Experts concerning Liberia,” S/2002/1115 (24th of October 2002). 373 Global Witness, The Usual suspects (2003) 25; Amnesty International, “China: Sustaining conflict and human rights abuses - the flow of arms accelerates,” Amnesty International (June 2005) 12-14. 374 Douglas Farah, “An “axis” connected to Gadaffi,” The Washington Post (2nd of November 2001); Douglas Farah, “African diamonds finance Al-Qaeda,” The Washington Post (29th of December 2002); Global Witness, The Usual suspects (2003) 30-32. 375 United Nations Security Council, “Report of the Panel of Experts concerning Liberia,” S/2002/1115 (24th of October 2002). 376 Florquin and Berman, Armed and Aimless (2005) 113. 377 UNSC, “Report of the Panel of Experts concerning Liberia,” S/2002/1115 (24th of October 2002); Brabazon, “Liberia,” Armed Non-State Actors Project Briefing Paper No. 1 (February 2003) 9; Florquin and Berman, Armed and Aimless (2005) 124. 378 Florquin and Berman, Armed and Aimless (2005). 379 United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), “UNAMSIL launches Operation Blue Vigilance,” UNAMSIL/PIOR036/2003 (21st of October 2003). 62

International policy on small arms

ECOWAS Moratorium Of all African States, the ones located in West Africa seem to be at the forefront of international legislation preventing the proliferation of small arms and light weapons. Just under half of the nations are signatories of the United Nations Protocol against the spread of firearms.380 Furthermore, many West African states have engaged in regional and continental proliferation initiatives. The most notable example is the Bamako Declaration, the result of a ministerial conference in the final months of 2000. The Declaration promoted national action towards the coordination of agencies involved in small arms issues. These included the destruction of surplus stocks, confiscated weapons, as well as the creation of bilateral arrangements for small arms control along borders.381 The key initiative, however, is the decision by the ECOWAS Member States to adopt the Moratorium on the Importation and Manufacture of Small Arms and Light Weapons in West Africa. The serious small arms challenge, and the availability of these weapons to non-state actors such as rebel groups and criminal gangs, spurred the West African nations to adopt this moratorium. The problems were exacerbated by the violent civil wars and conflicts within Sierra Leone, Mali, and especially the one in Liberia. These conflicts necessitated a regional solution, considering these arms could not be trapped in national containers. In tacit recognition of these challenges, President Alpha Konare of Mali proposed a regional freeze on the import, export, and manufacturing of SA/LW in West Africa.382 The Moratorium was signed in Abuja, Nigeria on the 31st of October 1998 for a period of three years, and entered into force on the 1st of November 1998.383 Since then, it has been consistently renewed for periods of three years. The moratorium contained three main parts: next to the Moratorium Declaration, it featured the Plan of Action for the Implementation of the Programme for Coordination and Assistance on Security and Development (PCASED). The PCASED was approved in March 1999 and could be considered a UNDP support programme.384 Finally, a Code of Conduct was established and subsequently adopted on the 10th of December 1999, stipulating the development of national commission, regional arms registers, and commitments to arms collection and destruction amongst others.385 Most importantly, the signatories agreed to refrain from importing, manufacturing firearms and their ammunition.386 In the first six years of the moratorium, the realization of the Code of Conduct proved problematic for the different Member States. The national commission suffered from a lack of funds as well as political support and there was little commitment to the arms registers.387

380 The signatories which are also a Member State of ECOWAS include Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, and Sierra Leone. United Nations, “The Protocal against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime,” A/55/383/Add.2 (3rd of July 2005). 381 Adedeji Ebo, “West Africa: An assessment of small arms control initiatives,” Security and peacebuilding Programme: West Africa Series No. 1 (London, October 2003). 382 Alex Vines, “Combating light weapons proliferaton in West Africa,” International Affairs Vol. 81, No. 2 (2005) 341-360 342. 383 ECOWAS, “Concept paper for ECOWAS/UNDP conference on small arms and light weapons,” ECOWAS/UNDP (Abuja, 30th – 31st of August 2004). 384 ECOWAS, “ECOWAS small arms control programme (ECOSAP): Programmeto tackel the illicit proliferation of small arms and light weapons in ECOWAS States,” ECOWAS/UNDP RAF/05/007 (August 2007). 385 Idem. 386 Idem. 387 Vines, “Combating light weapons proliferation,” International Affairs (2005) 343. 63

Article 9 of the Code of Conduct stated that any Member State could apply for an exemption to the moratorium under certain circumstances. If there were legitimate national security needs or if the country required small arms to successfully participate in an international peace operation, they could still be allowed to import arms.388 To acquire this exemption, the Member State had to file a proposal to the ECOWAS secretariat, to be circulated among the signatories. Without objections, the secretariat would grant an ‘exemption certificate’.

Table 6.1:. Exemptions granted by ECOWAS under the moratorium 2001-2003

Country 2001 2002 Benin - 5 Côte d’Ivoire - 19 Gambia - 1 Ghana 1 3 Niger - 1 Nigeria 4 3 Mali 1 - Senegal 2 1 Sierra Leone 5 2

Source: Foundation for Security Development in Africa, Focus on small arms in West Africa No. 4 (May 2003); Foundation for Security Development in Africa, Focus on small arms in West Africa No. 5 (October 2003).

Numerous exemption certificates have been granted suggesting some measure of compliance the Code of Conduct.389 The various weapon transfers to the Liberian government, LURD, and MODEL facilitated by Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea, Guinea and Liberia itself were not authorized by the ECOWAS secretariat; exemption was never requested.390 This illustrates the noncommittal nature of the original moratorium, there were no repercussions or legal consequences for the Member States that failed to comply with the Code of Conduct. Furthermore, there was no control system or authority in place that could keep Member States in check; the ECOWAS secretariat could only honour exemptions. The eruption of the Second Liberian Civil War as well as the plethora of violations of the Code of Conduct serves to illustrate the inability of the moratorium to prevent violence.

UN embargo In November 1992, three years after the First Liberian Civil War started in earnest, the UN adopted Resolution 788, imposing an arms embargo on Liberia.391 However, the UN was reluctant to actively enforce the embargo; it took two years even for a sanctions committee to be established. The course of the war was not influenced in any way. The NPFL and INPFL had no trouble acquiring weapons and were readily provided with small arms by neighbouring countries. While ECOMOG was exempted, it in turn provided various factions and militias with weapons, most notably ULIMO and the LPC.

388 ECOWAS, “ECOWAS small arms control programme (ECOSAP): Programme to tackle the illicit proliferation of small arms and light weapons in ECOWAS States,” ECOWAS/UNDP RAF/05/007 (August 2007). 389 See table 6.1. 390 Idem. 391 UNSC, “Resolution 788,” S/RES/788 (November 1992). 64

Whether this was allowed under the arms embargo remains unclear, it has never been formally investigated. The sanctions remained in place even after Taylor was elected president, even though the subject was now a democratically elected government and the war had officially ended. Despite the embargo, Taylor still managed to import large amounts of weaponry.392 The UN quoted Taylor’s support of rebel groups in the neighbouring countries as the main reason for maintaining the embargo. Despite the UN’s apparent commitment to stopping the flow of arms into West Africa, and eventually the establishment of a sanctions committee, sanctions were never placed on the Taylor regime before the outbreak of the Second Civil War. In the 25 progress reports of the Secretary General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia, there is no mention of any structural action required to prevent the illicit trafficking of arms.393 There is no evidence of any action taken in cooperation with ECOWAS to enforce the UN embargo or the ECOWAS moratorium on small arms. Despite the fact that the final report issued by UNMIL quoted the “easy availability of small arms” as one of the factors that escalated the civil war, no comprehensive action was taken by the international community to counter the spread of these weapons.394 The outbreak of the Second Civil War can be partly attributed to the failure of ECOWAS and the UN to limit the proliferation of small arms in the region. The Liberian government as well as the rebel factions could readily acquire arms to perpetuate the conflict. Coupled with the limited DDRR programme and the lack of sanctions on failing to conform to the programme, the conditions were ripe for a violent follow-up to the First Civil War. This time around, ECOWAS was expedient in staging a response to the violence. ECOWAS was quick to stage diplomatic talks and subsequently deploy a peacekeeping force under the guise of ECOMIL, which enjoyed financial, logistic, and military support by the UN and the United States. The UNSC replaced the ECOMIL with its own mission, UNMIL. The commitment the UN displayed to the peace process and the subsequent DDRR programme was instrumental to the resignation of Taylor and the conclusion of the Second Civil War. Moreover, the UN mission was the most expensive peacekeeping mission to date.395 Following a successful arms embargo on the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council and subsequently the Taylor-backed RUF in Sierra Leone, the UN decided to mimic approach and approved additional sanctions on Liberia. The sanctions imposed on the RUF and later on the Kabbah government of Sierra Leone not only included an arms embargo, but also an oil embargo and a travel ban on the members of the rebel factions and their associates.396 In response to attacks by the RUF on UN peacekeepers, the Security Council passed resolution 1306 in July 2000.397 The resolution established a panel of experts who were to report on violations of the sanctions and particularly focus on the links between arms trafficking and the global trade.398 Following the report of the Panel of Experts on Sierra Leone, the UNSC thus decided to impose new sanctions on Liberia, coming into force in May 2001.399 Resolution 1343 reauthorized the

392 See note 354 – 359. 393 See UNSC progress reports four to twenty-four. 394 UNSC, “Final report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia,” S/1997/712 (12th of September 1997). 395 Integrated Regional Information Network (IRIN), “Liberia: Where are the weapons? Is disarmament really working?” Integrated Information News Network (2828th of July 2004). 396 UNSC, “Resolution 1306 (2000),” S/RES/1306 (5th of July 2000). 397 UNSC, “Report of the Panel of Experts appointed pursuant to Security Council resolution 1306 (2000), para. 19, in relation to Sierra Leone,” S/2000/1195 (20th of December 2000). 398 Idem. 399UNSC, “Resolution 1343 (2001),” S/RES/1343 (7th of March 2001); UNSC, “Report of the Panel of Experts appointed to Security Council Resolution 1208 (2002), para. 16, concerning Liberia ,” S/202/1115 (25th of 65 arms embargo and imposed a travel ban on several key officials in the Taylor government, as well as known business associates. One of these associates banned from travelling is the Dutch businessman Gus Kouwenhoven.400 Furthermore, there was an embargo placed on all exports of diamonds, which were often trafficked from Sierra Leone to Liberia for sale. More importantly, in July 2003 an embargo on the export of timber was placed on the Liberian government. The trade in timber made up one of the most important trafficking routes for the Taylor government, and significantly diminished its ability to illicitly import small arms.401 In order to monitor compliance with the sanctions, a panel of experts on Liberia was created. Despite the establishment of a panel of experts, there were still no repercussions for the Taylor regime upon violating of the embargoes. Subsequently, the Liberian government gave up trying to observe them.402 Timber was still exported from Liberia and even imported to Member States of the European Community.403 The travel ban was widely violated and various dubious flights, allegedly carrying ammunition, still arrived in Monrovia.404 Despite almost a dozen reports by the panel on the violations, there was never any action taken towards the violators of the embargoes; there were no warrants or arrests issued for the various brokers, middle men and suppliers.405 The Panel also found its investigations increasingly difficult to pursue; the authorities became obstructive and hostile and people were less inclined to talk.406 Almost all the neighbouring states, including members of the Security Council were involved in violating the embargoes. Paradoxically, by restricting the flow of weapons, the embargoes also provided the opportunity for various transnational criminal organizations to prosper. To summarize, the embargoes and their enforcement had become a mess.407

The New ECOWAS Convention The ECOWAS Moratorium on the Importation and Manufacture of Small Arms and Light Weapons in West Africa was not sufficient to stop the proliferation of small arms in West Africa. Despite the initiative, The Second Liberian Civil War still erupted in Liberia and was fuelled by small arms originating from ECOWAS Member States. The weaknesses of the moratorium were apparent, however they also provided the Member States with the momentum required to design a stronger, binding ECOWAS convention. One of the main problems with the moratorium was the voluntary nature and the lack of repercussion if the signatories did not comply.

October 2002); UNSC, “Report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1395 (2002), para 4, in relation to Liberia,” S/2002/470 (19th of April 2002); UNSC, “Report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1458 (2003), para 4, concerning Liberia,” S/2003/498 (24th of April 2003); UNSC cil, “Report of the Panel of Experts appointed pursuant to para. 25 of Security Council Resolution 1478 (2003) concerning Liberia,” S/203/937 (28th of October 2003). 400 UNSC, “Revised list of persons subject to travel restrictions pursuant to resolution 1343 (2001),” SC/8033 (23rd of March 2004). 401 UNSC, “Resolution 1478 (2003),” S/RES/1478 (6th of May 2003); Global Witness, The Usual suspects (2003) 21. 402 Vines, “Combating light weapons proliferation,” International Affairs (2005) 350. 403 The Independent, “EC countries, including Britain, have been helping indirectly to finance the bloodshed in Liberia’s three-year-old civil war, by importing Liberian timber,” The Independent (22nd of November 2003). 404 Global Witness, The Usual suspects (2003) 18-25. 405 HRW, “Weapons sanctions, military supplies, and human suffering: Illegal arms flows to Liberia and the June-July 2003 shelling of Monrovia,” Human Rights Watch Briefing Paper (New York: Human Rights Watch, 3rd of November 2003). 406 Vines, “Combating light weapons proliferation,” International Affairs (2005) 350. 407 Brabazon, “Liberia,” Armed Non-State Actors Project Briefing Paper No. 1 (February 2003); Small Arms Survey, Small Arms Survey 2004: Rights at risk (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004) 192-198. 66

In October 2004 ECOWAS heads of state extended the moratorium by two years, but declared their intent to strengthen the agreement by transforming it into a legally binding convention.408 A working draft was circulated to Member States, the European Union, donors, and civil society organizations for feedback. The draft was titled the ‘Protocol Regarding the Fight against the Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons, Their Munitions and Other Related Material’.409 Eventually the Protocol was signed in June 2006 in Abuja by the ECOWAS Member States and was strongly supported by the European Union and The Netherlands in particular.410 The ECOWAS Protocol includes the basic principles of the Arms Trade Treaty proposed to UN Member States.411 It expands on the UN Treaty by requiring the signatories to establish a National Commission for Small Arms (NACSA). These National Commissions are a legal obligation and are to spearhead activities that lead to the reduction in the production and importation of SA/LW.412 Next to these National Commission, a Small Arms Units was created in the ECOWAS Commission, as well as a programme dedicated to implementing the ECOWAS Small Arms Control programme (ECOSAP), in conjunction with the UN Development Programme.413 ECOSAP supports Member States in implementing the various requirements of the Protocol by supplying national surveys on the distribution of SA/LW, supporting stockpile management issues and providing training. It also frequently organizes capacity-building workshops for the Member States’ military and police on stockpile management, recordkeeping and accident prevention. Finally, it tries to harmonize the SA/LW policy as much as possible across West Africa. 414 The Protocol expanded upon the existing Moratorium as much as possible. This means that the Code of Conduct, stipulating the development of regional arms registers and commitments to arms collection and destruction were reaffirmed. The signatories again agreed to refrain from importing, and manufacturing firearms and their ammunition, with similar exemption rules in place.415

408 Vines, “Combating light weapons proliferation,” International Affairs (2005) 347. 409 Idem. 410 United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), “The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook 2006,” United Nations Disarmament Yearbook Vol. 31 (2006) 166. 411 United Nations, “Arms Trade Treaty,” A/61/PV.67 (2nd of July 2012). 412 ECOWAS, ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, Their Ammunition and Other Related Materials (June 2006) article 22a. 413 Idem, article 19-24. 414 UN, “Programme of Action, Implementation Support System,”PoA-ISS ECOWAS. Accessed on 20th of June 2014. http//www.poa-iss.org/regionalorganizations/7.apsx. 415 Idem. 67

The initiative has proven to provide a template for other African regions to follow. Several regional initiatives have followed ECOWAS’ example and established similar protocols, like the Nairobi Protocol and the Kinshasa Convention.416 None of the initiatives have come as far as ECOWAS in implementing the various stipulations.417 Since 2012, eleven out of the fifteen countries have ratified the treaty, including Liberia.418

Continued ethnic grievances The eruption of the Second Liberian Civil War bears some similarities with the start of the first conflict. The tribal allegiances and ethnic rivalries inherited from the Tolbert regime marked Doe’s reign over Liberia. Likewise, Taylor’s Liberia transformed into a reiteration of the regime he had sought to overthrow from the beginning, albeit in a more militaristic style. During Taylor’s reign, new ethnic grievances were created and old ones perpetuated. Taylors increasing reliance on his close group of confidants – Americo-Liberians or members of the Gio ethnic group – resulted in a systematic abuse of rivalling ethnic groups. The purge of Mandingo civil servants upon Taylor’s ascension to office as well as the early retirement forced upon over 2,500 Krahn soldiers in the AFL are characteristic for the way grievances were reinforced. Taylor’s regime responded to the poor economic and social performances of his government with the ethnic scapegoating of Krahn and Mandingo Liberians, causing many of them to flee the country. After these refugees united under the banner of LURD, the ethnicization of the conflict again became clear. When the Guinean president demanded the Mandingo Sekou Conneh to become LURD’s leader in return for Guinea’s support, the Krahn members of the group became increasingly dissatisfied. This dissatisfaction eventually led to the creation of MODEL, a Krahn oriented armed faction supported by Sierra Leone. Throughout the Second Liberian Civil War, the ethnic strife dominated the fighting and resulted in many atrocities committed against one group or the other. The availability and use of SA/LW was instrumental in the perpetuation of this violence; it was however not the cause. The inability of the Taylor regime to address the crises that lay at the basis of the collapse of the Doe regime and the tribal and ethnic grievances, coupled with an insufficient and overall lacking disarmament and rehabilitation programme led to a renewal of conflict in Liberia. In the post-disarmament ceremony held on the 3rd of November 2004, representatives of the Liberian Government Forces, LURD, and MODEL signed a formal declaration in, disbanding their organizations. The warring factions had now officially ceased to be military groups, and claimed to be entirely disarmed.419 The UN declared the DDRR programme to be successful, partly because of the large number of combatants disarmed and demobilized. While the ceremony was a reassuring step towards lasting peace in Liberia, the declaration did not seem to affect the Liberian hinterlands. While it remained relatively calm in the final months of 2004, the armed factions are far from disbanded. Despite the fact that UNMIL maintained a peacekeeping force of 15,000 troops in Liberia,

416 Regional Centre on Small Arms in the Great Lakes Region, the Horn of Africa and Bordering States (RECSA),” Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa,” RECSA (Nairobi, 21st of April 2004); United Nations, “Central African Convention for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons, Their Ammunition and All Parts and Components That Can Be Used for Their Manufacture, Repair and Assembly (Kinshasa Convention),” United Nations Treaty Collection (Kinshasa, 30th of April 2010). 417 Lina Grip, “SIPRI yearbook 2013: Armaments, disarmament and international security,” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (2013) 401-404. 418 Idem. 419 United Nations Mission in Liberia, “Liberia’s warring factions disbanded as disarmament of ex-combatants ends,” UNMIL/PIO/PR/142 (3rd of November 2004). 68 it could not prevent the LURD and MODEL from retaining their hold on large portions of the country. LURD, still very much intact and armed, controls the north-western region of Liberia; its territory extended as far south as Tubmanberg. Illustrative of the groups control over the region is the fact that it even presented typed ‘laissez-passer’ documents for individuals travelling through their territory, well after the post-disarmament ceremony.420 MODEL too remained well organized and de facto ruled over the south-eastern part of Liberia. It issued visas and even had an official stamp for passports.421 Even in this newly formed state, ethnic groups seemed to be unwilling to fully disarm and remained in control over large swaths of the population. In 2003, a few months prior to the post-disarmament ceremony, Taylor resigned his office and went into exile in Nigeria. He remained there for almost three years, until the newly elected President submitted an official request to Nigeria to extradite Taylor. On the 16th of June 2006, the UNSC unanimously agreed to send Taylor to The Hague so he could stand trial at the International Criminal Court. On the 26th of April 2012, Taylor was convicted of all eleven charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity and sentenced to 50 years in prison.

420 Florquin and Berman, Armed and Aimless (Small Arms Survey, 2005) 133. 421 Idem, 134. 69

Conclusion This research has set out to analyse the ECOWAS and UN interventions and the related policy attempting to curb the proliferation of small arms during and immediately after the First and Second Civil Wars in Liberia. The intervention by ECOWAS in the First Liberian Civil War quickly lost the appearance of neutrality and lacked support from the UN. This translated in a clear lack of comprehensive policy on small arms and their proliferation, as well as a thoroughly lacking disarmament of the warring factions. The First Civil War did spawn an ambitious regional moratorium on small arms and a UN embargo. Unfortunately, both were unenforced and were incessantly violated by ECOWAS and UN Member States. The Member States continued to import SA/LW and provided the various parties to the conflict with war materials. The inability of Taylor’s regime to deal with the underlying causes of the First Civil War is one of the key causes of the eruption of a renewed civil war in Liberia. While the conflict was certainly greatly facilitated by the ready availability of small arms and light weapons, it was not necessarily caused by it. The tribal and ethnic grievances that marked Liberian society ever since its inception plagued relations between the different ethnic groups within the country. The gross violations of human rights and the violence that characterized the war were exacerbated by the widespread availability and use of SA/LW. The perpetuation of old grievances and the creation of new ones by the Taylor regime further led to a polarized and disrupted society, and hampered a successful disarmament and rehabilitation programme. Nevertheless, the Second Liberian Civil War featured a relatively responsive intervention by ECOWAS and subsequently the UN. The successful peacekeeping mission was followed by a more comprehensive disarmament agreement, especially when compared to the First Civil War. Still, the disarmament was voluntary. Relatively little arms were collected, especially when compared to the large numbers of ex-combatants who applied for the rehabilitation programme. While the disarmament was formally completed, the situation in Liberia remained potentially volatile for years to come; armed factions still controlled large swaths of the countryside, despite the presence of a UN peacekeeping force. Liberia’s history has shown that unless the underlying causes of a conflict are addressed and the trafficking of small arms in the region is countered, conditions remain ripe for continued instability. Regional as well as global initiatives to counter the proliferation of small arms, such as the renewed ECOWAS moratorium, will prove critical in ensuring lasting peace.

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- Stucke, Mark and Mavroleon, Carlos (dirs.), The Peace Keeper’s War (Journeyman Pictures, 1992). - Marlow, Emily, (dir.), Between War and Peace – Liberia (TVE, 2004).

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