"The Conflict between Mul}ammad and the Jewish Tribes of Med1na"

WA.'ITERS "The Conflict between Muhammad. and the Jewish Tribes of Medina" (submitted for the M.A.)

John F. Watters Institute of Islamic Studies

This thesis represents the result of a close study of the early Arabie sources concerning the long and violent conflict between Muhammad and the three Jewish tribes of •

Medina: the B. Qaynuq~< 1 B. al-Na~ir and B. Quray~ah. It is discovered that in his actions against these tribes the

Prophet was not acting from a simple anti-Jewish bias but in order to protect himself and his community from these potentially very dangerous centers of opposition. Thus the elimination of the Jewish tribes from the oasis is the result of Muhammad's. efforts to break up centers of opposition and thereby rnake secure his own community. In his long struggle with the Jewish tribes ~ammad skillfully isolated the three tribes--from each other as weIl as from their Arab allies-- and eliminated their dangerous presence one by one, beginning with the weakest of the three tribes. The justifications

set forth by Mul}anunad for actions against the Je1tlS are almost without exception political in nature (although the Jewish

opposition ~~s primarily religious in nature), and redress

was usually called for under the traditional tribal law.

On the rare occasions when the tribal la", would not support his actions, Muhammad. used revelation as justification • ---THE CONFLICT BETWEEN MUHAMMAD.

~ THE JEWISH TRIBES OF MEDINA

by

John F. Watters

Thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and

Research, McGill University, July 29, 1970, in partial

fulfillment of the M.A. degree in Islamic Studies •

.1 @) John F. \lattera 1971 - ii -

Acknowledgements

This thesis could not have materialized had it not

been for the help, advice and encouragement of many people

during the months of research and writing. l wish to

thank the staff of the Library of the Institute of Islamic

Studies, McGill University, for their cooperation and

"". assistance in the sometimes frustrating and difficult

taskof locating research materials. This research proj-

ect would have been an impossible undertaking without a

good background in the Arabic language, and for giving

me this l wish to thank my Arabic instructors, Dr. SaLman

al-Ani and Dr. Donald P. Little of the Institute of Islamic

Studies, and the staff of the Center for Arabic Studies,

American University at Cairo. Finally, l wish to express

my appreciation and indebtedness to Dr. Charles J. Adams,

Director of the Institute of Islamic Studies, for his

constant encouragement and advice not only on this thesis

but during my years of study at McGill University.

t - iii -

Transliteration

Transliteration from the Arabic is in this thesis

rendered according to the standard transliteration scheme

of the Institute of Islamic Studies. A few exceptions

have been made, and these exceptions are those of Arabic

names of place which have become commonly accepted and

standardized in an English forme Thus l have used Mecca

instead of Makkah, and Medina instead of al-Madinah.

t - iv -

Table of Contents

Acknowledgements. ii

Transliteration. iii

Chapter One: Introduction 1

Chapter Two: The Courting of the Jews-- 19 from the Hijrah to the Battle of Badr

Chapter Three: The Aftereffect of Badr: 43 c The Expulsion of the B. Qaynuqa •

Chapter Four: The Affair of the B. al-Na9ir. 54

Chapter Five: The Oasis is Made Secure: The 74 Massacre of the B. Quray~ah.

Footnotes. 96

Bibliography. 108

" .~ , Chapter ~: Introduction

One of the most important problems faced by Muhammad • and the Muslim community in the years immediately following the hiirah was the conflict with the Jewish tribes of Medina: the B. Qaynuqa', the B. al-Na9ïr and the B. Quray~ah. The dramatic consequences of this conflict are well lcnown, but relatively little attention has been given to the details and the dynamics of the conf lict.

This study is intended to supplement our knowledge of

this conflict through a close exa~ation of the relations between Muhammad. and the Jewish tribes of Medina. Through reconstruction of the historical sequence of events as re-

corded in the earliest sources and analysis of these events

in terms of the interplay of the various forces which pro-

duced them the nature and significance of the conflict with

the Jews is made clear. A study of this conflict contributes

to our knowledge of early Islam by providing a key ta the

understanding of the nature of the resistance to ~slam of-

fered by the Jews of ~dina and the behavior of MUhammad. and the Z,luslim community in reacting ta this opposition.

In order ta achieve this understanding particular attention - 2 -

will be paid to the reasons--especially the justifications

put fo~mrd by the Muslims--for the actions against the

three Jewish tribes and to the effect of each of these actions on the Medinan oasis and the position of MUhammad. • A close exarnination of the sources suggests that Muhammad. acted against the Jewish tribes not in order to vent hatred

of the Jews but in or der to make the oasis of Medina safe

and secure for the Muslim community. Further, although aIl

three Jewish tribes were removed from the oasis in one way

or another, physical removal of the Jews "ms not in itself

the Prophet's primary goal. Muhammad. 1 S aim "ms rather to incorporate the entire population of the oasis into his com-

munity; the deportation of two of the Jewish tribes and the

massacre of the third resulted from his inability to accom-

plish this task. Throughout the course of the conflict "lith the Jewish tribes Muhammad. was "rilling to grant complete for- giveness to any Jews who were \.,illing to convert to Is lam,

for it was not the Jm.,ish people as individuals to \'lhom the

Prophet objected so much as the significant opposition which

was provided by the organized Jewish comnnmity.. The insti-

tutionalized religious opposition of the Jewish community

kept the Jews outside the Prophet's community and social

:~ , - 3 -

.... order, and because of the dangerous external threat from

Mecca this lack of unitY within the oasis of Medina made

Mu~ammad's position considerably less secure. This Jewish

opposition from within Mu~ammad's own oasis must be viewed

together with the Meccan opposition in order to appreciate

fully the systematic way in \'lhich the Prophet dealt , ... ith

those , ...ho opposed him and the way in which he was able to

exploit events to the fu11est for maximum gain for himse1f

and his community. The timing of ~ammad's moves against

the Jewish tribes provides an interesting indication of the

systematic nature of his approach to opposition, for it will

be seen that these actions are neat1y in counterpoint to

his encounters with the Meccans.

THE SECONDARY SOURCES:

The conf1ict with the Medinan Je~IS has been dea1t with

by \'lestern scho1ars in 1iterally hundreds of books and articles.

It is desirab1e to discuss severa1 of the more prominent and

significant of these warks, and this may be convenient1y ac-

comp1ished by examining the works in a rough1y chrono1ogica1

order.

The most relevant and detai1ed work prior to the year 1900 - 4 -

\'las Sprenger 1 s lengthy biography of Mul}annnad. 1 Despite the

length of this work, however, the treatment given the con-

flict with the Jews is brief, and the discussion is restricted

almost entirely to the final outcome of the conflict rather

than to the sequence of events which caused this outcome.

Sprenger makes much of the similarities between Judaism and Islam, stressing Muhammad's. preoccupation with the older faith and almost suggesting that the Prophet was in fact sorne sort

of proto-Jew (thus foreshadowing the conclusions reached by

Hanna Zakarias almost one hundred years later). Lack of

substantiating data and supporting analysis require that

this view be rejected.

Works by several other distinguished scholars appeared

during the period 1900-1920. Muir's biography of the Prophet

treats the conflict with the Jewish tribes in sorne detail

but with little or no analysis and no reference to the sources.2

This criticism also applies to contemporary works by l1argoliouth, 3 Hurgronje and Wensinck. wensinck in particular displays

insight into the subject, but again without substantiating

his views through references to the Arabie sources.

The many works of Larmnens are useful in gaining an un-

der standing of the milieu of seventh century Arabia, but - 5 -

he does not deal directly with the subject here under study.

Further, his references to the conflict with the Je\"IS are

colored by his firm conviction that Mu~ammad was a staunch

ant l.-senu., 't e.- 4

It was during this period also that Caetani's great

compilation and translation of Arabie historical sources

appeared. 5 This work undoubtedly sheds much light on the

Prophet's controversy with the Jews, and it is unfortunate

that this author's linguistic shortcomings made impossible

its use in the present study.

In 1930 Buhl's biography of the Prophet appeared.6

This t,olOrk is the product of good critical analysis~ the author

maintains a relatively objective stance in his treatment of Muhammad's. life and his discussion of the conflict with the Je\·lish tribes is weIl balanced. This is not a lengthy

work, however, and since the Jewish controversy occupied

but a fe\"I years of the Prophet 1 s life it is of necessity

treated only briefly by Buhl.

Tor Andrae's biography of ~ammad appeared at approx-

imately the sarne time as that of Buhl, but it is very dif-

ferent in method and in its userulness in the study of his­

torical events. 7 Andraels biography is a study in religious - 6 -

psychology, an attempt to examine the inner dynamics of a religious leader, and because of this the factual side of the Prophet's life does not receive a great deal of emphasis.

The conflict \'lÎth the Jews is dismissed in only ten pages, with no references to the Arabic sources. Thus \-lhile Andrae may have successfully accomplished aIl his goals in this

\'lork, it is not of much help in the present study.

The lengthy "'lork of Zakarias presents dramatically un­ conventional conclusions regarding the Prophet's relations 8 with Judaism. This author states that !-1ul}ammad .,VclS the disciple of a Jewish teacher, and that he was used by this

Je.,., with the aim of spreading the religion of Judaism. This position may be seen as the result of scholarly opinion ex­

pressed earlier by Torrey and perhaps originating in the work of Geiger.9 These conclusions are not justified by

the sources, hm'lever, and since they are not supported ad­

equately by the author they must be rejected.

!-lany extreme 1y va1uab1e "'Jorks have appeared since 1950,

reflecting a ne.,.; and more critica1 trend in scho1arship.

\'lorks such as those by Blachère and Paret do not contribute

directly to an understanding of the conflict bet\<;een l'hlJ:lar:tmad

and the Je'.·/S, but they do shed MUch 1ight on the sources - 7 -

available for this study. 10 Ne\-, biographies of the Prophet by Gaudefroy-Demombynes, Watt, Gabrieli and Rodinson over­ come many of the shortcomings of earlier \',orks. ll \'latt and

Rodinson in particular follo\-, a more sociological approach than was used by earlier scholars and manage to give the reader a more total and \'lell-rounded picture of the life of MuJ:anunad. Watt 1 s discussion of l-iul}ammad 1 s conf lict \·,ith the Je\-lish tribes is \'lithout doubt the best that is available in the secondary literature. It is difficult to fault his conclusions, anà one may only regret that he did not present a more complete account of the contents of the sources from which he drew these conclusions.

It is extremely difficult to rnake general rernarks about

such a varied array of secondary literature. It rnay be noted,

hO\'lever, that very few scholars have examined the conflict

with the Je'\'lS as other than just one event in the life of

l~hammad,. i.e. as part of a biography of the Prophet. In such a biography this subject must be discussed only briefly,

and accordingly most authors have done little more than pre-

sent a skeletal outline of the conflict, followed by cornments

on the fates of the Je\tlish tr ibes. l'latt 1 s method of organ-

ization enabled him to present a much more dctailed analysis - 8 -

of the conflict, but even he ":laS forced to condense drasti- cally the accounts of the Arabie sources. NO\'1here in the secondary literature is there a full and critical account of the contents of these early sources. This study ''lill present such an account, integrating "lith it an analysis of the conflict.

THE PRIMARY SOURCES:

The source materials which are available for a study of the conflict between Muhammad. and the Jewish tribes of Medina leave much to be desired and form a major part of the difficulty of the undertaking. Fortunately the diffi-

culties presented hy the sources do not extend to the selec-

tion of the main works to he used in the research. There

is little choice in this area. Examination of the Arabie

historical sources reveals that the conflict which is the

subject of this project is usually dismissed in only a few

paragraphs. Moreover, the se extremely ahridged accounts

can he seen to be drawn (often word for word) from one or

hoth of the two earliest and rnost extensive sources on the

subject--the works of Ibn Is~aq and al-~qidï.12 These two - 9 -

works proved to be the major sources for this research proj- ect both because their accounts of the conf1ict are by far the most extensive and because almost a11 other avai1ab1e sources simp1y draw on them.

The ear1ier of these two main sources is the Sirah of

Mu~ammad b. Is~aq (d. 151/768). Ibn Is~~q was a contemporary of sorne of the greatest ear1y traditionists, such as a1-Zuhrî and' cÂsim b. cUmar b. Qatadah, and he drew extensive1y from their accounts in compi1ing his biography of the Prophet.

A major prob1em is posed by the fact that the generations of historians which created a biography of Muhammad. worked at this task after the passing of an entire century. Because of this many European orienta1ists, notab1y Lammens, Becker

and Caetani, have essentia11y rejected the Sirah as a usefu1 and trustworthy historica1 source. They argue that Ibn Ishaq. and his kind neither had access to accurate information nor

had a rea1 desire to provide an accurate description of the

past. According to these critics the biographers rather

wished to furnish a picture of the past as they fe1t it should

have been.

This criticism of the SIrah carries sorne weight, for

in view of the considerable gap of time between the author - 10 -

and the events being described it is obvious that something must have been lost. Ibn Is~aq was forced to base his work on many different types of sources: the Qur'ân and tafsïr material, anecdotes of contemporaries of the Prophet, poetry, legendary material, maghazI material and formaI traditions containing elements of aIl these various ty~es of material. 13

Working under such circumstances a biographer would not find it difficult to select data in order to color his account according to his sectarian or other interest. The mere pos- sibility of such shaping does not warrant dismissal of the whole work, however, and such slanted reporting must be sought out in each account of the events described. The charge that

Ibn Is~âq had a ShI~ï bias has long been a matter of con- tcntion, but without venturing an opinion on this issue it may be noted that such a sectarian bias would not likely be introduced into the accounts of ~~bammad's conflicts with the Jewish tribes of Medina. A more relevant charge is that in the Sirah Ibn Ishaq. displays a bias in favor of the Ansar.. Such a bias could very definitely affect the reporting of

events within the Medinan oasis, and the researcher must

examine the Sïrah carefully for evidence of overt or covert

slanting of the accounts. - Il -

Setting as ide the likelihood of sectarian bias solves only a part of the problem of the credibility of the Sïrah, unfortunately, for there are even more basic questions concerning the integrity of the texte Several recensions were made of Ibn Ishaq's. work, but aIl except one of these have been lost, together with Ibn Ishaq's. own version •

Today we can examine the work of Ibn Is~aq only through the recension by eAbd al-Malik b. Hisham (d.c. 218/833). Thus the accuracy of the extant version of Ibn Ishaq's. biography of Muhammad,. already affected by being based on largely traditional material, is further affected by

the skill (or lack of skill) displayed by Ibn Hisham in

his role as an editor. Much attention has been given to

the way in which Ibn Hish~m carried out this editorial

role, and in several instances later historians have been found to contain quotations from Ibn Ishaq. which have been omitted in Ibn Hisham's recension of the Sïrah. In such

cases the role played by Ibn Hisnam must be considered

very closely. There is no evidence to suggest any such

editorial manipulation of the text in the passages relating

to the Jews of Medina, so although certainty is an impos- - 12 -

sibi1ity we may be re1atively confident that in this re- search we are dea1ing with the authentic, original account of Ibn Ishaq. •

Another genre is represented by the Kitab ~-Maghazï of a1-Waqidï (d. 822/3), which can be seen to fa1l more square1y in the stream of deve10prnent of Arabie historica1 writing. Ma9h~zï materia1 (i.e. that materia1 dealing with the rni1itary expeditions of Mu~amrnad) served as a major source

for both authors, but while Ibn Is~aq made use of it 'to pro- duce a new 1iterary form, al-Wâqidï further deve10ped the

maghazï form.

The ear1ier maghazï materia1, referred to as the "Days

of the Arabs" (Ayyam ~-CArab), \'las made up of both prose

and poetry. The prose sections of this rnateria1 were sirnp1y

aecounts of military engagements: these accounts were pre-

sented in a straightforward and impartial manner, with no

ref1ection on the rightness or wrongness of the actions

described. In contrast to this those sections of the ac-

eounts whieh were in verse forrn tended to be extrernely

partisan in nature, glorifying the poet's own group at the

expense of its enemies. A1-~qaqidï' s work can be seen as - 13-

further deve10pment from this ear1ier type of historical account. A1-Waqidï does not include the highly prejudiced poetica1 sections but limits himself to impersonal prose accounts. He presents his history by giving accounts

(usually several variant accounts) of past events with no editorial comment beyond an occasional indication of preference for one account over another. This lack of obvious bias does not rule out the possibility of a par­ tisan tendency, and indeed al-Wâqidï is called a Shï~ï in Ibn al-Nadïm's al-Fihrist. Ibn al-Nadïm's charge: - is not granted genera1 acceptance, however, and in any case a Shï

The Kitab sl-Maghazï is a more systematic work than the Sïrah. for al-Waqidï follows a fixed plan in his presentation of events. He begins his account of a mil­ itary expedition with the date of the beginning of the expedition, then gives an account of the action. The main narrative is most often made up of severa1 individual ac­ counts. This is fo1lowed by accounts giving variant versions of events, and the treatment of an expedition - 14-

is concluded with tables of information, lists of relevant

Qur'anic passages and of men killed or wounded in action.

The dates given by al-waqidI undoubtedly represent the re­ sult of research by the author. The dates form a consist­ ent chronology throughout the work, and the conspicuous placing of the date at the beginning of each account indi­ cates the importance the author attached to them. In contrast, the Sïrah simply includes the dates given in the various accounts which were gathered by Ibn Is~aq, and the result is conflict in chronologies within the work. For example, three different dates are given in the SIrah for the deportation of the B. Qaynuqa'. Because it is more complete and consistent than that of the Sïrah. the chronology provided by al-Wâqidï has been used as the chronological framework for this study.

Ibn Isltàq' s Sîrah and al-waqid'i" s Kitab al-Maghaz't serve very well as checks on each other, for they are com­ posed from independent lines of authorities.14Although he had access to Ibn Is~aq's work, al-Waqidï never cites him as a source; instead he makes use of different lines of authorities. As a result instances of agreement between the two authors almost certainly represent, if not the - 15 -

11 true historica1 facts, at 1east the lI officia1 , genera11y

accepted versions of past events.

The Qur1an presents special prob1ems as a source.15

Certain sections ofthis book of reve1ation are common1y

said to refer to Mu~ammad's conf1ict with the Jewish tribes

of Medina, but unfortunate1y these passages 1ack references

to specifie tribes, specifie incidents or, in most cases,

even to the Jews. In view of this it is impossible to

match these relevant passages to the occasions on which

they were revea1ed. It is usefu1, however, to examine

the manner in which the ear1y Mus1im writers of history

made use of the Qur1anto support their historica1 accounts.

Both Ibn Is~aq and a1-Waqidi cite Qur'anic passages which

they allege were revealed in connection with the specifie

historical events about which they report. In some cases

the cited verses fit the historical situation very closely

and in other cases it is difficult to find any connection

at all. It may be supposed that these citations tell us

more about the traditional version of Islamic history and

the interests of the authors under examination than about

the precise occasions of the revelations. In any event,

these references are often of great interest, and exami- - 16 -

nation of them is the most satisfactory alternative to the thorough hermeneutical analysis made impossible by

lack of data.

Several other relatively early Arabic sources were

exarnined, but as mentioned above it was found that their

accounts are culled from Ibn Is~aq and al-Waqidï. An

exarnple is provided by the work of Ibn Sacd (d~ 845), who was the secretary of al-waqidï and because of this had

access to all the latter's writings and notes.16 In his

Kitâb al-Tabagat. ~-Kab!r Ibn Sa~d covers Muhammad's. con- flicts with the Jewish tribes in very brief narratives

which in fact arnount to little more than skeletal out-

lines of al-Wâqidi's work. The Ta'rLkh ai-~~ ~ al-Mulük

of al-~abarï (d. 923), with its much larger scope, also

dismisses these events in a very few pages, and the ac­

counts are drawn from Ibn Is~aq and al-Waqidï.17 Because

of this situation the greatest attention has been given

to these two which form the sources for the later accountsi

the rare occasions when other works provide variant in-

formation are duly noted.

In judging the credibility of the historical accounts

it is useful to break down the recorded data into classi-

fications with differing degrees of credibility. When this - 17 -

is done with the material concerning the conflicts between'

the Prophet and the Medinan Jews it is found that sorne

categories contain much varying and even contradictory

material while others are quite consistent. Contradiction

within a given class of data suggests distortion and pos­

sibly tampering with the facts, and indeed such variance

and contradiction is to be found in precisely those areas

where prejudiced reporting might further the cause of the

Muslims: accounts of the religious practices of the Jews

and stories which purport to give the reasons for Mu~ammad's

military actions against the Jews. Such a11egation of

causes and motives is perhaps the simplest and most obvious

method of shaping an historical account, and the researcher

must remain constant1y aware of the distinction between

externa1 acts and the alleged causes and motives of such

acts.

Not all relevant data is inconsistent and self-contra­

dictory, however. A considerable portion of the data is

quite consistent, with no suggestion of shaping; this in­

cludes that data relating to tribal and clan alliances,

occupations, geographical information, pre-hijrah events,

religious practices of the Muslims, detailed accounts of l - 18 -

campaigns (i.e. of the actual battle information) and the fates of the Jewish tribes. It may be noted that many of these classifications represent types of maghaz! material.

These are commonly presented in the form of simple lists, thus representing the work of historical research rather· than the account of one traditionist. This material in effect forms a sizable body of almost undisputed fact, and is thus of great help in reconstructing events. In­ formation concerning the fates of the Jewish tribes of

Medina gain credibility from the fact that these accounts seem to make no effort to les sen the apparent harshness of Mu~amrnad's actions. The effect of aIl this more secure and trustworthy material is to provide a firm ground upon which to work and from which the less credible material may be examined and judged. The existence of aIl; these different types of historical information enables the researcher to approach the facts from many different points of view and from these build a clearer picture of historical forces and events. - 19 -

..• Chapter ~: The Courting of the Jews--

At the time of the hiirah the most significant groups

in the population of the oasis of Medina were the Arab

groups of the Aws and the Khazraj and the three Jewish

tribes, the B. Qaynuqa~, the B. al-Na~ïr and the B. Quray~ah.

All these tribal groups interacted in the economic and

political life of_the oasis and seem to have been bound

by a complex network of treaties and alliances. Mu~ammad's

efforts to cope with the Jewish elements of this Medinan

society form the subject for this study.

It must be assumed that well before the hijrah Mu~ammad

obtained a certain degree of awareness of the social struc-

ture of Medina, for such an important decision as that to

move the Muslim community there could hardly have been

made without giving consideration to the prospects of being

accepted by the peoples of the oasis. The Jews of Medina

were simply too important an element to be disregarded,

and in view of this it is very likely that MUQammad brought

with him to Medina certain pre-conceived notions about

the Jewish community as well as contingent plans for dealing t - 20 -

with them. The sources offer no record of any direct negotiations between Muhammad. and the Jews prior to the hiirah, but with the invitation to move to Medina with his community of Muslims the Prophet must have begun to take an interest in the situation there. If he had been unaware of the significance of the Jews at Medina earlier, he clearly was made aware on the occasion of his meeting with some men of the Khazraj at al-cAqabah, shortly be­ fore the hii~.l At this time he learned that the Khazraj were neighbors and allies of the Jews. 2 It appears that

Mu~ammad made use of this occasion to tell the men of

Khazraj about Islam while at the same time gaining from

them knowledge of Medina. Thus it is extremely likely

that, at least from the time when he began seriously to

consider the prospect of a migration from Mecca to Medina,

the Prophet began to give consideration to the stance he

should take towards the Jewish tribes.

MUQammad came to feel that the oasis of Medina, largely

because of its internai dissension, wouid prove to be a

more hospitable environment for the Muslim community than

had been the strong, relatively unified city of Mecca.

By serving as arbitrator in the Medinan disputes the Prophet - 21 -

t hoped to bring about a situation in which he wou1d be

given a wide degree of acceptance in contrast to the a1-

most total opposition which he had confronted in Mecca.

According1y the decision was made to move. At this point

the Jewish tribes of Medina began to play a large ro1e

in Mu~arnmad's plans for his acceptance and for the spread

of Islam in his future home.

Mu~arnmad be1ieved himse1f to be in the same line of

prophecy as the prophets of the Jews and the Christians.

He held that the revelation transmitted through him was

essential1y the same revelation which God had in ear1ier

times sent to the Jews and the Christians. Thus it was

only natural for him to expect that the Jews would acknowl-

edge this and would accordingly grant him recognition as

a true prophet. Hia theory, then, was that the Jews and

the Muslims were brothers who should be able to live and

work side by side in harmony. The move to Medina, with

the resultant close contact with the Jews, would show

whether this theory would be proven by practice.

When Mu~ammad arrived in Medina the hope of the pop-

ulation of the oasis was that through him dissension would

be overcome and the city would be unified. There may well - 22 -

have been sorne disaffection and opposition among the Jews and other non-Muslim elements of the population, but if

this was the case the opposition was either concealed or

sirnply went unnoticed amid the general favorable reaction.

There was, after all, little cause for any Jewish opposition

at this time. M~arnmad accepted the Pentateuch as valid

revelation, and the Jews were not likely to be quick to

offer opposition to one who so strongly supported their

scriptures. Indeed it is quite likely that the Jews were

very pleased with the monotheistic and even Jewish elements

of Mu~ammad's position.

For sorne time after the hiirah things went very well

for Mu~ammad. He exercised absolute control over his own

people, and there was no active opposition frorn outside

the Muslim community. The people of Medina had pledged

to protect the exiles, and this pledge was honored. But

as time passed jealousy and discontent--from both religious

and temporal causes--produced opposition among the non-

Mus lim Arabs and the Jews.

This early Jewish opposition was largely centered

around M~ammad' s role as a prophet. Mul)ammad went farther

than merely asserting the validity of the Pentateuch, and - 23 -

cited from it evidence of the truth of the Qurl~n and of his prophetie mission. There was among the Jews of Medina an expectation of a coming propheti M~ammad exploited this messianic expectation (which must have influenced the non-Jewish population as well as the Jews themselves) and suggested that he was in fact this expected prophet. 3

In taking this step Mu~ammad displayed his considerable talent for making the most of a situation, a talent which he displayed repeatedly throughout his careèr. The Jews were not too pleased by this ploy, and began to feel that

Muhammad. was mere~y making use of their religion for his own purposes. Thus the seeds of Jewish opposition were

sown, although this opposition was not at first manifested.

Rather the Jews watched while the Arabs of Medina converted

to Islam. They may have felt sorne amazement as they saw

those people whom they had for generations tried to win

over to monotheism willingly discard their idols and em-

brace Islam.

The refugee Muslims themselves, while no doubt pleased

with their religious success, found life in Medina to be

harde They possessed no lands by which to support them-

selves through agriculture, and were thus dependent upon - 24 -

.~ their hosts for food and shelter. The money-lending activ-

ities of the Jews, as well as their obvious comparative

wealth, carne to cause resentment. It happened that tha . Muslim women bore no children for many months after the

bijrah, and the rumor spread that the barrenness of the

women was the result of Jewish sorcery and enchantments.4

This incident, if true, would indicate the existence of

animosity towards the Jews at a very early time in the

history of the Muslim community at Medina.

The few Jews who converted to Islam were explo~ted to the fullest by Muhammad. in an attempt to counteract the steadily developing Jewish opposition and further

demonstrate the validity of his mission. Through these converts Muhammad. accused the Jewish community of con- cealing the proofs of the truth of his mission, or at

the least of failing to understand their own scriptures.

The Slrah relates the story of ~Abdallah b. Salam, a Jewish

rabbi who converted to Islam. ~Abdallah converted to

Mu~ammad's religion secretly, and the Prophet questioned

the Jews about him before they had received reports of

his conversion. He was given glowing reports of cAbdallah's

character. But when the Jews learned of his conversion •• - 25 -

they began to revile him, just as cAbdallah had predicted they would. 5 The point here is obviously to place the

Jews in a bad light, and this is in line of Mu~ammad's general policy of using Jewish converts against their former co-religionists.

Most Jews, however, did not become Muslims. Not only did they fail to embrace the new religion, they took up a defensive attitude in opposition to it. This in- creasing hostility must have made it clear to Mu~ammad that he was not going to win from the Jews the acceptance whiph he had expected. Seeing this, he altered his tactics.

Instead of relying on Jewish acceptance merely because of his obvious merits he embarked on an active campaign to win the support of the Jews, It has been suggested that Muhammad. had at this time already decided to break completely with the Jews and wanted to obtain close knowledge of their doctrines only in order to destroy them completely.6

Whether or not this is the case, he began to pattern the practices of Islam after the model provided by Judaism.

This course of action was not really a radical de- parture, but served to reinforce the notion (expressed well before the hijrah) that Jews and Muslims were brothers. - 26 -

A big step had already been taken towards coexistence with Judaism in the choice of Friday as the day for pub-

lic worship in Islam. During the year before the hijrah

Mus'ab. b. C Umayr, Muhammad's. representative in Medina, asked permission of the Prophet to hold a meeting of wor- ship. Muhammad. granted permission, ordering that the meet- ing be held on Friday, the day on whichthe Jews prepared for their Sabbath. 7 It appears that Muhammad. himself be- gan regular observance of Friday worship only upon his

arrival in Medina, so the suggestion is that the insti-

tution of Friday as the day for public worship in Islam

represents an effort to avoid conflict with Judaism through

making the Islamic practice different from that of Judaism.

But now Mu~ammad began simply to take certain Jewish prac-

tices and observances and to incorporate them w1thin Islam.

The Jewish fast of the Atonement was adopted by the Muslims,

perhaps introducing for the first time fasting as a reli-

gious ordinance in Islam. The choice of Jerusalem as the

giblah (direction of prayer) also represents a borrowing

from Judaism. Another example is the acceptance of the

Jewish dietary restrictions; permitting Muslims to marry

Jewish women also points to brotherhood between the ad- - 27 -

herents of the two religions:

Today the good things are permitted you, and the food of those who were given the Book is permitted to you, and permitted to them is your fooa. Likewise believing women in wedlock, and in wedlock women of them who were given the Book before you if you give them their wages, in wedlock and not in licence, or as taking lovers. 8

The probable motives lying behind this patterning of Islam after the model provided by Judaism are not dif- ficult to perceive. Mu~ammad needed to establish the validity of his prophetie mission, and this could be ac-

complished at least in part by demonstrating in this way the essential unity of his message with that of Judaism.

This course of action also provided a means for cementing

good relations with the Jews and stopping effectively the

beginnings of Jewish opposition.

These airns had a political as weIl as a religious

character, for acceptance of Mu~ammad as an authentic

prophet implied acceptance of him as temporal leader as

weIl. Within the Muslim community these aspects of autl"lor-

ity were not differentiated at aIl, for Islam offered a

total system of life. It was thus much more than simply

a set of religious beliefs: it might be more ace urate to - 28 -

say it was a basic attitude towards life, an attitude which extended to all areas of life, including those usu- ally thought of as secular (e.g. econornics and politics).

This provided the Muslirn cornrnunity with a deep unit y, in which all these are as of life were equally religious in . . nature. Such was not the case arnong the non-Muslirns (both

Arabs and Jews) of Medina. They viewed these areas of life as being discrete. After the hiirah the Jews were able to differentiate politics and religion; religion was for them one thing, and politics quite another thing.

Thus the hiirah created a situation of confrontation be- tween the non-Muslims who, in the broadest terrns, drew a distinction between the religious and the secular, and the Muslirns, who would admit of no such distinction. Most of the Arab non-Muslirns converted to Islam, but in failing to follow their exarnple the Jews presented Mu~arnrnad with a very difficult and serious challenge. His conflict with the three Jewish tribes represents a part of his efforts to meet this challenge and to draw the Jews into his com- munity.

A Mu~ammad had been surnrnoned to Medina for the purpose of bringing about order through his authority. The pop- - 29 -

ulation was thus more or less willing to acknowledge his political authority, but the Jews (and the Arabs who did not convert to Islam) would not recognize his spiritual authority. In order to deal with the people of the oasis, then, the Prophet made use of the traditional Arab means of securing authority and set about making agreements with the various tribes and clans of the oasis. These agree- ments are not discussed with any clarity of detail in the sources, and they may have been no more than unwritten working agreements. One agreement about which we have more knowledge is that which is usually referred to as the Constitution of Medina (within the document itself the word sahïfah is used). The Constitution has survived • • in the form of a formaI document, but even here there is much ambiguity.

The earliest source in which the text of the Consti- tution is to be found is Ibn Hishâm's recension of the

Sïrah of Ibn Is~aq: there it is referred to as a document composed by MUQammad, dealing with the emigrants

(~-Muhajirün) and the helpers (al-Ansar)• and containing an agreement with the Jews~9 This is an accurate descrip- tion of the nature of the document, for while the~Arab - 30 -

groups are mentioned by name the Jews are referred to only indirectly, in their roles as allies of the Arabs

(e.g. "the Jews of al-Najjar," or "the Jews of the B. 'Awf").

The three main elements (emigrants, helpers and Jews) are said to he one community (ummah), but the method of ref- erence which is used still indicates clear distinctions between them.

The use of indirect reference to indicate the Jews may reflect the ebbing of their political influence within the oasis. If this is the case--and the Jewish tribes certainly were becoming relatively weaker--the Constitution may have actually had the effect of improving the Jews' position by giving them legal parity with the other ele- ments of the comm~~ity. This may have been an attempt by MUQammad to boost the status of sedentary (~agarl groups in relation to that of the nomadic tribes. 10 It is clear, however, that the Jews were still set apart. In earlier references the word "believer" {mu'minl was employed to mean both Muslims and Jews, but in the Constitution we find the word "Muslim" used to indicate clearly that the

Jews are considered a group apart.

The Constitution itself is a political treaty which - 31 -

" , forms a sort of tribal union or confederation of the tribes

of Medina, and in form it is typical of such treaties of

the time. ll If Mul].anunad concluded separate formal agree-

ments with the Jews we have no clear record of them. Ref-

erences are sometimes made to treaties with one or another

of the Jewish tribes, but these may well refer to the ob-

ligations entered' into in the Constitution. The Our'an

refers to an agreement (~ahd) with the Jews:

Children of Israel, remember My blessing wherewith l blessed you, and fulfill My covenant and l shall fulfill your covenant. 12

It has been suggested that this too is a reference to the

Constitution, since this agreement may be regarded as an

agreement of God (Cahd All~h).13

The difficulty of interpreting the Constitution is

compounded by the fact that the precise date of the con-

clusion of the agreement is not known. The Jews associated

C with the B. Khazraj, namely the B. Oaynuqa , are not men-

tioned, and this suggests that the document dates from a

l4 C time after the expulsion of that tribe. The B. Qaynuqa ,

however, were artisans who held no lands, so lack of ref-

erence to them in this political treaty is not particularly - 32 -

~·I-···~. surprising. In any case, other considerations suggest

an earlier date for the document. The Constitution does

not make much of Mu~arnrnad's authority, the main provision

in this regard being that disputes were to he brought be-

fore hirni this would seem a reflection of Mu~amrnad's

position at a very early stage of his career at Medina.

The fact that in the document the Jews are included

within the ummah justifies dating the Constitution before

the Battle of Badr. It is extrernely unlikely that the

Prophet would have granted such congenial terrns to the

Jewish tribes after Badr, when he made a clear break with

Judaism. This is not to deny that he may have known be-

fore Badr that he was going to break with the Jews even-

tually. The point is that at this tirne he was not strong

enough to break with them, and the political unit y of the

oasis was a high-priority item in his plans for the ful-

fil~ent of his goals.

Alongside M~amrnad's drive for unification there was

developing more intense Jewish opposition. At first they

may well have looked hopefully towards Mu~amrnad as a sup-

porter of their faith, but as the ramifications of his

position became evident the Jews became increasingly hos- 1 - 33 -

tile. To the extent that Mu~ammad emphasized the unique­ ness of Islam and of his prophetie mission he·widened the gulf between himself and the Jews. It became a vicious circle psychologically as weIl, for when he began to re­ buke and reproach the Jews they quite naturally resented it. The more he tried to draw them into the fold, the more steadfastly they opposed him. Because they did not possess much political power at this time the Jews were forced to be relatively discreet in expressing their op­ position, but they were nonetheless able to make their feelings known. Maintaining their position of religious opposition and political cooperation, the Jews of Medina seem to have considered Islam as a cult to which it was expedient to pay at least token tribute. 15 The Jews were not strong enough to openly fight Islam, but neither were they weak enough to have to accept it completely.

It would seem then that there was no serious obstacle to a sort of peaceful coexistence in Medina between the

Muslim community and the Jews--in fact it can be seen that

the Jews had already agreed in principle to such an ar­

rangement. But Mu~ammad's prophetie mission (and the

recognition of this mission) was central to his universal - 34 -

system and was in fact the basis of his plans for unifying the oasis; the Jews l refusal to confirm the validity of his revelation made peaceful coexistence impossible.

The Jews maintained their relationships with the Arabs of the oasis even after most of the latter had converted to Islam. 16 There is reference to this in the STrah:

Ibn Is~aq said: Sorne of the Muslims main­ tained their friendship with sorne of the Jews because of the alliances (al-hulf) and pro­ tective agreements (al-jiwar)wbetween them which dated from the period of the Jahiliyah. God sent down word forbidding them from taking them as close friends. 17

The Qur'ânic message referred to above is:

o believers, take not for your intimates outside yourselves; such men spare nothing to ruin you; they yearn for you to suffer. Hatred has already shown itself of their mouths, and what their breasts conceal is yet greater. Now We .have made clear to you the signs, if you understand. 18

This revelation makes it clear that the Jews are to be considered outside the community of Muhammad,. and that the Muslims were not to associate with them. The attempt

to win the support of the Jews had failed, and now M~ammad

began to take steps to counteract their opposition. Up - 35

to this point his defense against the Jews had been more or less passive in nature, but now it began to become active.

Sorne of the Jewish rabbis are said to have gathered frequently at the mosque in order to listen and make fun of the Muslims. In earlier times Muhammad. would have seized this opportunity to speak to these men about the validity of his revelation and the way in which it complemented that of Judaism, but now he had them thrown out of the mosque.19 Another story tells of a certain Fin~as, who was a rabbi of the B. Qaynuqa':'. 20 Speaking to Mu~anunad' s companion Abü Bakr, Fin~as criticized MUQamrnad for asking financial aid from the Jews for his struggle with the

Meccans. If Allah needed money from the Jews for His cause, argued Fin~as, then Be must be poorer than they and dependent upon them. These charges enraged Abu Bakr, and he struck the Jew on the face. Fin~as went immediately to the Prophet to show hirn what Abü Bakr had done. Be lied to Mu~amrnad, denying that he had said what Abü Bakr reported, but God sent down a revelation vindicating

Abû Bakr: 2l

God has heard the saying of those who said, "Surely God is poor, and we are rich." - 36 -

We shall write down what they have said, and their slaying the Prophets without right, and We shall say, IITaste the chastisement of the burning-_1I22

The reference in this Qur'anic verse to the Jews' killing of the prophets who had been sent to them is sig- nificant, for it points to the theme Muhammad. took up in response to the unrelenting Jewish opposition. Muhammad. was unquestionably sincere in his prophetie mission and in his efforts to win the support of the Jews. Since he knew that he was in the right, he had to conclude that the fault lay with the Jews.

The Prophet's course of action against the Jews at this time resembled a hostile press campaign. Even had he wished to, it would have been both difficult and dan- gerous for him to move more actively against the Jews during this period because of the many connections which remained between the Ansar. and the Jews. Instead he had to be content to criticize. Accordingly Mugammad counter-

acted the adverse testimony of the Jews through repeated reference to their own history of rebellion and unbelief.

The Jews had struggled against Moses, killed their prophets,

suppressed the truths of their own script ures and rejected - 37 -

the Messiah. In view of the Jews' past, the Muslims could not expect much from them. Since they had already suc- cessfully resisted the word of God (as revealed in the

Torah) they were not very likely to accept the revelation of Islam. Thus the Jews were written off as potential members of Mu~ammad's community. This was underlined by the equating of disbelief in Islam with sympathy for the

Jews. The Sïrah reports that sorne of the Aws and the

Khazraj only pretended to accept Islam, and the conclusion is drawn that they were in league with the Jews.23 One of these converts who was accused of being pro-Jewish

(literally, of loving the Jews) was al-D~ak b. Thabit, who was made the subject of a poem by ~ssan b. Thabit:

Who will he the one to tell al-D~~ that his veins were unable to be honored in Islam? Do you love the Jews of t~~ ~ijaz and their faith, o assis liver, and not love MUQammad? Upon my life, ~their-1 faith shall not he compatible with ours as long as people wander in the open land. 24

These criticisms of the Jews were supported by the

deliverence of revelation which further stressed the un- belief and disohedience of the Jews' ancestors, the Israelites,

and suggested that the Jews could not he expected to change - 38 -

their ways. As has been shawn in the fel-' Qur l anic pas-

sages quoted above, the Qur'anic attack on the Jews was as complex as were the non-Qur'anic polemics. Muhanunad. carne to concentrate on just a few elernents of this elaborate

response, but its very complexity indicates that the prob-

lem of Jewish opposition was taken very seriously indeed.

Perhaps the major element of MU9anunad's attack was the

charge that the Jews denied the truth, even after they

knew it to be the truth. 25 Several passages in the Qur'an

support this charge, e.g.:

When there carne to them a Book from Gad, confirming what was with them--and they aforetirnes prayed for victory over the unbelievers--when there came to them that they recognized, they disbelieved in it; and the curse of God is on the unbelievers. 26

-In view of this developing policy of severe criticism

of the Jews it is not surprising that MUQamrnad set about

abrogating those rneasures he had taken to make his religion

more appealing to thern. The Jewish practices had heen adopted by Muhammad. because if he were accepted as the continuation of the Jewish line of prophets (as he insisted

he was), then the Jewish regulations and observances would

,.. -, logically he normative for the Muslirns. But he was not f - 39 -

accepted by the Jews, so their laws and practices were not normative for the Muslim community. It was now in

Mu~ammadls interest to stress the uniqueness of Islam in order to make clear its superiority over Judaism.

The most dramatic alteration in religious observance was the changing of. the giblah (the direction of prayer)

from Jerusalem to Mecca. 27 The Jews had been taunting

Mu~ammad, saying the Muslims did net know which direction

to pray until they took direction from the Jews: this would have greatly irritated a man so sensitive to criticism

as Mu~ammad. He defended the changing of the giblah by

saying it was a test to determine who would obey Godls

commands witheut question. 28

The changing of the giblah had an anti-Jewish char-

acter, but equally important was the positive effect on

Islam which M~ammad brought to this action. The cheice

of the ancient shrine of the Kacbah in Mecca as the new

direction of prayer enabled Mu~ammad to point back to

Abraham (the father of both the Arabs and the Jews) for

the early roots of Islam, thus affirming the new religionls

independence of Jt:tdaism. Is lam thus became at the same

time more Arabian in char acter and more independent of _ 40 _

other religions. Abraham was called the first Muslim, and Islam was represented as the uncorrupt continuation of the religion of Abraham. The other side of this posi- tion, of course, is that the religion of the Jews is a corruption of the religion of Abraham. The Jews were somewhat upset by the changing of the giblah, and it is reported that they criticized the Muslims for praying towards a pagan shrine. But the establishment of the new giblah was important primarily because in more ways than one it marked a change in direction for Islam. No longer would Muhammad. attempt to demonstrate the truth of Islam by emphasizing its essential identity with the other great monotheistic faiths. Instead the ties were cut, and Muhammad. and his religion took a more independent atti- tude, relying on their own merits. With respect to the

Prophet's relations with the Jews the changing of the giblah, dramatic as it was, did not really mark a turning point of any kind, for both sides has already determined their courses and positions. Mu~ammad's goal-conscious theocratic politics (or political theology) was to a large extent forced upon him by the situation in Medina and was

greatly frustrated by the Jewish opposition. Viewed from - 41 -

the other side, M~ammad represented a serious threat to the Jews l religious beliefs and attitudes as well as to any aspirations to political power they might have had, and he was thus unacceptable to them.

This situation of uneasy tension continued for a few months until the battle at Badr, which took place in the month of Ramagan, A.D. 624. This battle was fought sorne eighty or ninety miles to the southwest of Medina, and there Muhammad. and his Muslim force defeated a much stronger Meccan force. This was Islam's first military victory, but its psychological effects were far more important than

its military significance. The victory was viewed as a

token of God's support for Mu~ammad and his mission, and

as a result the Muslim community gained new spirit, unit Y

and, most important of ail, confidence. It has been shawn

that the rupture with the Jews was virtually made several

months before Badr, but the victory over the Meccans re-

moved Mu~ammad's last hesitations and placed him in a po-

sition to use stronger means to put an end to the Jewish

opposition. Badr marks the end of the period of polemical

fencing with the Jews and the beginning of the period of

direct and decisive action. M~ammad now prepared to - 42 -

eliminate, one by one, the centers of opposition formed by the three Jewish tribes. In each case he acted only when he was able to set forth political justifications for his moves against the Jews, but close examination makes it clear that in fact he acted to eliminate the centers of opposition and thereby unify the oasis. - 43 -

Çhgpter Three: The Aftereffect of ~: ~

~ulsion of the B. Qaynuga'

By the mere fact that the Jewish tribes of Medina were not with Mu~ammad, they were against him. Their op- position was religious in nature, but it had the effect of greatly increasing their political significance. The

Meccans were certain to undertake further military actions against the Muslims, and because of their stance the Jews can almost be said to have held the balance of power.

The Prophet must have been well aware that a concerted move against him by the Jewish tribes and the Meccans would mean defeat for the Muslims. Muhammad. was forced to act against the Jews in order to insure the survival of his community: his dramatic moves against the Jews stemmed from their religious opposition, but these actions were not the actions of a disappointed man so much as those of a man who was threatened.

Strengthened and ernboldened by his victory at Badr,

Mu~amrnad turned first against the Jews of the B. Qaynuqa-.

Many factors suggest that this was not an arbitrary choice.

Since they were artisans and held no agricultural lands, _ 44 _

the B. Qaynuqa~ lived within the city itself: this was in contrast to the other two Jewish tribes, whose dwellings were away from the city, near their land holdings. The

Muslims thus had daily contact with this tribe and were especially vulnerable to their taunts and criticism, 50 it is not surprising that Muhammad. took steps to rid him- self of this aggravation and danger within his own city.

That this aggravation was considerable is suggested by the statement that of all the Jews the B. Qaynuq-a,c. were the bravest and the most audacious. l This tribe is usually referred to as the weakest of the Jewish tribes of Medina, and this would seem to have been another factor in the prophet's decision to act against them. But while the

B. Qaynuqa' may have been lacking somewhat in political

influence and social status their numbers and military

strength were respectable. Their forces consisted of sorne

seven hundred soldiers, three hundred of whom were equipped

with armor. 2 Mu~ammad knew he was not dealing with a meek,

defenseless tribe, but he did not hesitate.

When he returned to Medina on the day of Badr the

Prophet called upon the B. Qaynuqa' to gather in their

marketplace. There he urged them to accept Islam before - 45 -

God's vengeance struck them as it had struck the unbelieving

Quraysh. Despite the fact that this was obviously given as a last warning, the B. Qaynuqat were equally blunt in their reply:

o Mu~ammad, do not delude yourself~ You have killed a band of Quraysh, but they were inexper­ ienced and did not know how to fight. By God, if you fight us you will find that we are men, and that you have met none like us~3

This answer reflects the Jews' self-confidence and was

obviously not calculated to promote amitYi the Muslim reaction was predictable. The Sïrah reports that the fOl-

lowing revelation was sent down and directed against the

B. Qaynuq~:

Say to the unbelievers: nyou shall be overthrown, and mustered into Gehenna-­ an evil cradling~n4

There is in the above passage no obvious reference to or

connection with the B. Qaynuqa~, so it is hard to form

a j udgment as to whether or not such re.ference was made

in retrospect to provide divine justification for actions

against this tribe. Barring further evidence, however,

this seems likely. - 46 -

The extremely tense situation erupted into armed con- flict through a street incident which occurred a few weeks after the battle at Badr. A Muslim woman, visiting the market of the B. Qaynuq~, was sitting in a goldsmith's shop when a Jewish man secretly attached her skirt to the upper part of her dresse When the woman stood up she found to her horror that she was exposed. Because of this great insult to the Muslim woman a Muslim man who learned of the incident killed the offending Jew, only to be killed in turn by the brethren of the Jew. 5

The sources say that as a result of this incident the

B. Qaynuqà< broke their covenant with Mul}ammad. The nature of the indicated agreement is not clear. The Jewish tribe had not broken any of the terms of the Constitution of

Medina (as the document has been preserved to us), so this agreement may have been sorne sort of two-party treaty be- tween Mul}ammad and the B. Qaynuqâ<'. One source uses the word cahd for the agreement, and the others are even more vague, referring only to " what was between them and Mul)anunad. 1I 6

Not much is made of this alleged treaty violation.7 It

is only mentioned briefly, as though to underscore the

faithlessness of the Jews, and it may even represent a - 4.7 -

later insertion into the historical record.

The skirt-pinning incident does represent a clear violation of the traditional tribal law of the time, and as such was a justification for violence. It was to the prophet's advantage to honor this system of law, for the precepts of the traditional law were those most closely identified with the IIcommon decencyll or IIlaw and orderll of the period and were universally accepted in contrast to special treaties and other types of private, limited agreements. Violent retaliation for a violation of the traditional tribal law would likely be accepted more sym- pathetically by the population as a whole than similar

action in response to a violation of a private agreement.

A parallel would be a flagrant violation of the conven-

tional morality, which would be viewed by the population with more alarm than would an infringement of a private contractual agreement. Thus Muhammad. followed the tra- ditional tribal standards whenever possible, making use

of them to advance his cause and justify his actions.

'On the rare occasions when he broke with the traditional

law the prophet usually resorted to revelation in order

to justify his actions. - 48 _

It is clear, however, that while the skirt-pinning incident led to a wider conflict between Muhammad. and the B. Qaynuqa', it was the cause of this conflict only in- asmuch as it played the role of a catalyst in setting off what was an already explosive situation. The sources re- port that conflict followed the street incident (and the breaking of the covenant), but no direct causal relation- ship is more overtly suggested. The real cause of the ensuing violence was the bitter resentment and fear which had been built up on both sides. According to a tradition from al-Zuhr! a divine revelation was received giving instruction concerning the B. Qaynuqa~:

And if thou fearest treachery any way at the hands of a people, dissolve it with them equallYi surely God loves not the treacherous. 8

This revelation served conveniently as divine justification

for action against the Jewish tribe, for when the angel Gabriel had finished delivering the passage Muhammad. ex- claimed to him, "1 shall make them afraid~1I9 The Prophet

then set about marhalling his forces against the B. Qaynuqa',

who had by this time taken refuge within their fortified

dwellings. 10 Attribution of the revelation of this verse - 49 -

to Mu~ammad's action against the B. Qaynuqa' is suspect

because the historical sources do not allege treachery

on the part of this tribe.

None of the allies of the B. QaynuqaC (either the

other Jewish tribes or their Arab allies) carne forth to

offer help against the Muslims, nor were there any offers

of help in reaching a rnediated settlernent. Rad the

B. al-Na~Ir and the B. Quray~ah chosen to provide rnilitary

aid the Jews could have ~ounted a force several tirnes the

size of the Muslirn force, but they declined the opportunity.

This suggests that the Jewish cornrnunity of the oasis rnay

have been internally divided and thus unable to forrn a

united front against Mu~ammad. Such a situation, coupled

with fears concerning the consequences of being defeated

by Mul}ammad, can explain the abandonrnent of the B. Qaynuqac.

by their Jewish brothers. Their Arab confederates like-

wise failed to corne to their aid, supporting Mu~ammad to

the extent that sorne of them actually joined his force.

The actual siege of the B. Qaynuqa~ began in the mid-

dle of the rnonth of Shawwal, sorne twenty months after the

hijrah. and continued until the beginning of the month 11 of DhU al-Qacdah. After this siege of two weeks the ( - 5'(1 -

Jews surrendered.

There is sorne confusion in the sources as to whether

M~ammad himself took part in the siege of the B. Qaynuqa~.

Al-waqidi reports that the Prophet appointed Abü Lubabah b. ~d al-Mundhir to take his place as leader of the city during the engagement. l2 But this suggestion that he was a participant in the siege is countered by the fact that the action against the B. Qaynuqa~ is absent from Ibn Is~aq's

list of MUQammad's military campaigns. 13 This aeeming contradiction most probably means that the Prophet was present but did not actually take part in the siege.

The surrender of the B. Qaynuqa~ marked Mu~ammad's

supremacy over at least one of the Jewish tribes of the

oasis. The Jewish opposition which had so irritated and

threatened him was now considerably diminished. The victory

also had the effect of weakening sorne non-Jewish opposition,

and while the action had not been undertaken with this

aim there is little doubt that Mul].arnrnad was aware it would

have this effect.

The B. Qaynuqac were confederates of cAbdallah b. Ubayy,

who was a leader of the Khazraj and a cause of sorne con-

cern for Mu~ammad. Despite the fact that Ibn Ubayy played - 51 -

an important ro1e in Medina the sources do not provide much information about him. He becarne a Mus1irn, but since his narne is absent from the 1ists of those present at the meeting at a1-G Aqabah it is apparent that he was not arnong the very early converts. 14 Even before the hiirah Ibn Ubayy had disp1ayed po1itica1 ambitions, and he achieved a meas­ ure of success. As a po1itica1 leader he received unprec­ edented acknowledgrnent from both the Aws and the Khazraj.

They rallied behind hirn as they did behind no one man with the exception of Mu~amrnad.l5 During the period irnrnediately preceding the hijrah there had even been a plan to make hirn king over the oasis, and the cc.llapse of this project explains at least in part why he did not give M~ammad his wholehearted support. He offered no opposition to

Mu~amrnad as prophet, and may have accepted Islam in hopes of gaining political power through the Muslim cornmunity.l6

But Ibn Ubayy soon discovered--as the Jews soon discovered-­ that recognition of Mu~arnrnad as a prophet led inevitably to acceptance of him as temporal ruler of the community as welle Faced with this realization he did not renounce his status as a Muslirn, but maintained a certain independ­ ence and was accordingly distrusted by Mu~arnrnad. In vie", - 52 -

of this it is virtually certain that the attack on the

B. Qaynuqat was in part a political calculation~ Mugammad's

victory deprived Ibn Ubayy of at least seven hundred pos-

sible allies and served as a warning to any other dis loyal

Muslims.

The defeat of the B. QaynuqaC failed to silence Ibn

Ubayy, however, and after the surrender he interceded on

behalf of his Jewish confederates. He first approached

al-Mundhir b. Qudamah al-Salamï (who had been placed in

charge of the Jewish prisoners) and demanded that the Jews

be released. When this demand was refused he literally

forced his way into the presence of Mugammad himself and

urged the Prophet to treat his allies kindly. Mugammad

was angered by this and told him to go away, but Ibn Ubayy

grabbed the Prophet's cloak and refused to leave until

Mul}ammad agreed to spare the lives of the B. Qaynuqa&.

Finally Mu~ammad agreed to settle for deportation of the

tribe, saying, "Free them, God curse them and him with ,,,17 them.

The Prophet placed ~adah b. al-~àmat in charge of

c the evacuation of the B. Qaynuqa • 'Ubadah, like Ibn Ubayy,

had been an ally of the Jewish tribe, but when they reminded

( . - 53 _

""' ..'''' " t.~ him of this fact he simply answered that Islam broke aIl

the old bonds. 18 The Jews of the B. QaynuqiiC. left Medina,

the men on foot and the women and children carried on carnels.

They set out in a northerly direction towards Syria, stop­

ping at WâdY al-Qura for a month's rest on the way.19

The B. Qaynuq~ were forced to leave most of their

property behind, and this was treated as war bootYi Mugammad

took a share of one-fifth and divided the rest among his

companions.

Muharnrnad's drarnatic action against the B. Qaynuqâ~

did not greatly affect the behavior of the remaining two

Jewish tribes. The B. al-Na9!r and the B. Quray~ah, who

had taken no action to help the B. Qaynuqa<, maintained

their passive stance while remaining intransigent versus

Mugarnrnad. One of the centers of Jewish opposition had

been eliminated, but the opposition was still present and

rnay even have been intensified because of the harsh treat-

ment given their coreligionists and allies, the B. Qaynuqii<.

In view of this it is not surprising that further steps

were taken against the Jews. - 54 -

Approximately four months after the deportation of

the B. Qaynuqa< Muhammad became angered by a poet who was

writing satiric verses directed against him and erotic

poetry about the Muslim women. This poet was Kacb b. ) al-Ashraf: his father was an Ar ab , but his mother was a member of the Jewish tribe of B. al-Nadir. and Kacb had been raised in his mother's tribe. 1 His poetical attack

on the Muslims had begun shortly after the battle at Badr,

and he was active in Mecca as weIl as Medina. Muhammad. became increasingly exasperated by Kacb's verses and finally invited his assassination by asking

who would rid him of the troublesome poet. In response

to this request Mu~ammad b. Maslamah gathered four other 2 men and killed KaC.b. .. Sorne of the assassins, including Muhammad. b. Maslamah himself, were allies of the B. al-NaÇïr and were no doubt selected to insure that the assassination

would not trigger a blood feud.

Although Kacb b. al-Ashraf was of the B. al-Na~r

his assassination was not an action directed against the - 55 -

, '" .'" Jews. It was the removal of a troublemaker and potential

center of opposition who simply happened to have Jewish

connections. Despite this the killing had a powerful ef-

fect on the Jews, for it demonstrated the length to which

Mu~ammad would go to defend his position. They began to

fear for their lives, and their fears were intensified

when a Jewish merchant was killed a short time after Kacb's

death. 3 The Jews, while still offering opposition to

Mu~ammad, now became much more subdued in their opposition

than had formerly been the case. The Medinan community

was far fr?m unified, but with the enhancement of Mu~ammad's

authority resulting from the recent events the situation

became more bearable for the Muslims. Still the Jews re-

maining in the oasis were toc powerful and too inassimilable

a group for this situation to endure very long. More

dramatic changes came about when only seven months after the assassination of Kacb b. al-Ashraf Muhammad. received

a major setback at ~ud.

In the month of Shawwal in the third year after the

hij~ (early in A.D. 625) a large force of Quraysh pre-

pareû to march against Mu~ammad.4 The Prophet immediately

began organizing an expedition to meet the Meccan force, - 56 -

but his confidence was not shared by everyone. 'Abdall~ b. Ubayy advised Muhammad. to keep his forces within the oasis and not venture out to engage the Meccans. When

his advice was rejected Ibn Ubayy withdrew his contingent

and took no part in the expedition, once again showing less than total support for Muhammad.. 5 :.

The An~ar are said to have suggested to Mul)ammad that

he seek help from the Jewish tribes, but the Prophet said

he had no need of their help.6·- It was the day of the

Sabbath, and M~ammad May have felt that the Jews would

refuse to fight. Even if they would have agreed to join

the Prophet's military expedition they would have created

a serious problem, for they would not have been trusted.

Those who were not Mu~ammad's ardent supporters were by

this time considered his enemies. The self-sufficiency

of the Muslim community was stressed: Mu~ammad's power

base had been broadened considerably, and with God on their

side the Muslims had no need to seek aid from outsiders.

The news of the advancing Meccan force was undoubtedly

cause for considerable excitement within the Jewish com-

munity. The sympathy of the Jews was with the Meccans,

and the presence of a Jewish contingent within M~ammad's _ 57 _

.j ... " force would have made it impossible for that_force to be

unified and secure within itself. It cannot be said with

certainty that the Jews would have betrayed the Muslims

on the battlefield, but even if they rendered faithful

assistance to the Muslim cause MutJ,anunad's position would

have been weakened by his being placed in indebtedness

to the Jews for their help. These were likely the factors which led Muhanunad. to refuse assistance from the Jews • The Muslims encountered the Meccan force at UtJ.ud,

and were defeated. MutJ,anunad's defeat once again altered,

or at least strongly called into question, the power struc-

ture of the Medinan oasis. The earlier Muslim victory

at Badr had been loudly hailed as proof of God's support,

but application of the same reasoning to the outcome of

the battle at ~ud would tend to destroy Mu~anunad's claim

to prophethood. It is not likely that Mu~ammad's opponents

missed this opportunity to criticize him by using his own

argument against him. The predictable result would have

been increased resentment directed against the critics.

Ibn Ubayy was no doubt remembered unkindly for having with-

drawn with his contingent before the battle, thereby weak-

ening the Muslims. The Jews themselves had taken no overt - 58 _

"' .... ' action, but after the Meccan victory they were probably

viewed with increased fear and suspicion as possible trai-

tors.

After ~ud MUQammad waited sorne five months before

again moving against the Jewish tribes of the oasis. His

action carne after an incident in which a party of Muslims

were killed at Bi 1 r Macünah. A Muslirn narned 'Amr b. Umayyah

al-~arnrï, wrongly believing that the B. cArnir had cornrnitted

the massacre, killed two mernbers of that tribe to avenge

the Muslirn's deaths. When MU9ammad learned of this he

declared that blood-money would have to be paid the wronged

B. cArnir, and he asked the Jewish tribe of the B. al-Na~rr

for a contribution in this matter. 7 This request was some-

what unusual, for all the sources indicate that the B. al-

Nagrr were allies of the B. cArnir. A more normal course

of action would have been for the B. al-Na~rr to aid their

allies the B. LArnir in obtaining redress from the wrong­

doers, rather than giving the redress themselves. 8

Papyrus fragments indicate that the B. al-Nagïr had

been in communication with the Meccan force at ~ud, giving

them information as well as encouragement. Thus MUQammad's

request that they pay a part of the blood debt to the - ~9 -

B. cAmir was in effect a demand for retribution for this suspicious action and for their hostile stance towards the prophet. 9 The B. al-Na9ïr may not have in fact given such aid to Mu~ammad's enemies at ~ud, but the story does suggest that the Prophet's actions were not due solely to the event at Bi'r Ma&ünah. They rather represented just another manifestation of Mu~ammad's talent for fur- thering his long-term aims through expert exploitation of unplanned occurrences.

After making the request for a contribution towards the payment of.blood-money due the B. cAmir, Mu~ammad went ,. to have dinner with the B. al-Na9ïr in their settlement in the southwest part of the oasis. As the Prophet was sitting within one of the Jews l houses the leader of the

B. al-Na9ïr, ~yayy b. Akh~ab, decided to take advantage of the situation. He suggested to his tribesmen that one of them climb to the top of the house and drop a stone on Mu~ammad, thereby freeing them once and for aIl of the

Muslim prophet. One of the Jews urged against betraying

Muttammad, but his arguments were not heeded. c Amr b. Ji~ash volunteered to do what ~uyayy suggested, but just as he

had the stone in position above M~ammad the Prophet re- _ 60 _

ceived a message from heaven telling him what the B. al-

Nagïr were planning to do to him. After receiving this message the Prophet immediately stood and left the house, setting out towards the city. The Muslims who had been with him in the house were puzzled by this strange behav-

ior and followed him, still unaware of his reason for

leaving. IO

After the abrupt departure of Mu~amm~d and his party

the men of the B. al-Na9Tr realized that through their

unsuccessful (and almost unnoticed) assassination attempt

they had placed their tribe in a very dangerous position.

Through their actions they themselves had provided the

Prophet with the justification for stern measures against

them. Al-waqidï reports that one of the Jews, Kin~ah b.

~uwayra', argued for acceptance of M~ammad as a true

prophet. ll According to the account Kinanah's argument

was that only a true messenger of God could have received

a warning of the attempt planned on his life. This may

be discounted as being just one of the many assertions

by non-Muslims of the truth of Islam which are to be found

in the sources (one of several, in fact, which are attrib-

uted to this same Kinanah); it is not at aIl unlikely, _ 61 _

however, that at sorne point the Jews realized that accept- ance of the validity of Mu~ammad's prophetic mission was the price to be paid for security. At any rate, the B. al-

Nagïr did not offer Mu~ammad the recognition he desired, and it was not long before the Prophet moved against them.

Mu~ammad's companions caught up with him on the way back to the city, and in reply to Abü Bakr's questions

the Prophet told them of the Jews' plans to kill him and

of God's message of warning. Be sent M~ammad b. Maslamah

(one of the assassins of Ka~b b. al-Ashraf and a member

of the Aws, allies of the B. al-Na~~r) to the Jews with

a command to leave the oasis within ten days on penalty

of death. This harsh ultimatum was justified by the claim

that through their treacherous scheme the B. al-Nagïr had

broken the covenant between them and Mu~ammad. (Once again

no details are given concerning the indicated covenant.)

When the Jews reproached M~ammad b. Maslamah for under-

taking such a mission against the. allies of his own tribe

he replied s imply, Il Bearts are changed. Il 12 The Mus lim

attitude towards the B. al-Nagïr may be summed up by a

Qur'anic verS"e'which is said to refer both to them and

the expulsion of the B. Qaynuqa~:13 - 62 -

, ....., Like those who a short time before them tasted the mis chief of their action; there awaits them a painful chastisement. 14

The stone-dropping story is so fanciful that it cannot

be accepted at face value. It is obvious that.. Muhammad.

wished to rid himself of the B. al-Na~Ir. By exiling them

he could free the city of a great number of his enemies,

thereby weakening his opposition and strengthening the

unit y of his community. Further, such a move would free

a considerable amount of land, and this would be welcome

booty for the poor emigrants. The story of the Jewish

attempt on the Prophet's life is doubtless in large part

a construction to help bring about these aims by providing

justification for strong action against the Jewish tribe.

Sorne elernents of the story may be true; perhaps M~ammad

did rneet with the Jews. The alleged assassination scheme

so neatly provides a dramatic excuse for action against

the Jews that its truth must be suspect. The divine warning

to Mu~ammad of the attempt on his life served to bring

God into the picture, and made it the divine des ire that

the B. al-NaçYr he expelled.

In response to MU9ammad's ultimatum the B. al-NaçYr - 63 -

at first began making preparations for evacuation, but

Ibn Ubayy sent to them two messengers whourged them to defy the Prophet's cornrnand and take refuge within their fortifications. He promised to support them'with two thousand fighting men of his own and other Arab tribes and assured them that their coreligionists of the B. Quray~ah 1S would likewise never desert them.

Not everyone believed Ibn Ubayy. ~uyayy b. Akh~ab was warned that Ibn Ubayy had no intention of helping the

B. al-Na~îr and that he only wanted to cause them trouble by inciting them to fight against M~arnrnad--at which point he would abandon, them and observe the spectacle while sit- t ~ng, w~'th' ~n h'~s own h ouse. 16 ~uyayy paid no heed to these warnings, however, and was finally persuaded by Ibn Ubayy.

He sent his brother, Judayy b. Akh~ab, to tell Mu~arnrnad that the B. al-Na9Yr would not leave their land and prop- erty. After sending this message ~uyayy sent another to

Ibn Ubayy, telling him of his decision and requesting hirn to hurry with his promised support. But after delivering his brother's message of defiance to M~arnrnad, Judayy b.

Akh~ab went to Ibn Ubayy and did indeed find him sitting

~n, h'~s, h ouse. 17 This was only the beginning of the dis- - 64 -

illusionment.

Mugammad moved quickly in response ta this challenge.

Ibn Umm Maktüm was placed in charge of the city, 18 and a siege of the B. al-Nadïr. was launched with ~Alï in com- mand of the Muslim army.19

When Huyayy appealed ta the B. Quray~ah for help he • found that Ibn Ubayy had lied about their willingness ta give assistance. Kacb b. Asad, the leader of the B. Qurayzah,.

refused ta help the B. al-Na~ïr, saying that not a single

man of his tribe would break their covenant ('ahd) with

Mu~ammad by fighting against him. Ka~b also chided ~uyayy

for having believed such a man as Ibn Ubayy, who had not taken the religion of the Jews, the religion of Muhammad,. or even the pagan religion of his own people. 20

It is obvious that the B. Quray~ah were extremely

wary of becoming involved in the power struggle going on

in the oasis. One Jewish tribe had already been expelled

and another was now under siege by the Muslims, and for

the B. Quray~ah to break their agreement wi th Mul.:tammad

would certainly be to invite trouble. They were firmly

opposed to M~ammad in that they refused to acknowledge

his spiritual authority, but they were still not willing - 65 -

to take overt hostile action against him. Further, any action they might have taken against the Prophet would have been (at least indirectly) in support of Ibn Ubayy, who was equally unacceptable to them. Unfortunately for the B. Qurayzah,. they were trapped so that whatever they did would work against them. By choosing not to break their agreement with Mu~ammad through aiding the B. al-Na9Yr in their struggle against the Muslim siege they forestalled immediate war with Mu~ammad. But this abandonment of their brother Jews was clearly a rep- rehensible act, a violation of the traditional tribal law, and thus was used against the Jews by being held up as proof of their faithlessness.

Al-waqidI lists two Qur'anic passages as referring to the abandonment of the B. al-Na9ir by their friends 2l and allies:

Hast thou not regarded the hypocrites, saying to their brothers of the People of the Book who disbelieve, "If you are expelled, we will go forth with you, and we will never obey anyone in regard to you. If you are fought against, we will help you." And God bears witness that they are truly liars.

If those are expelled, they will not go forth with them, and if they are fought against they will not - 66 -

help them. Even if they helped them, they would surely turn their backs, then they would not be helped. 22

Whether these verses were in fact revealed before or after the refusaI of the B. Quray~ah to go to the aid of the

B. al-Na~ir makes little difference, for the passage shows how the B. Quray~ahls dilemma was used against them.

The disheartened B. al-Na9Yr did not fare weIl in the siege, and were brought even lower when Muhammad. or- dered the cutting down and burning of their prized date 23 palms. This unusual measure represented--at least in economic terrns--a particularly vicious attack, and it had a strong effect on the Jews. Their women struck thernselves and tore their clothes, and the men cried out, "0 Muhammad,. you have forbidden wickedness and you have censured those who do it. Why then this cutting and burning of our palm 24 trees?"

It is clear that the burning of the trees was an exceptional act of war. The Pentateuch contains an injunc- tion against the act:

When you besiege a city for a long tirne, making war against it in order to take it, you shall not destroy its trees by wielding - 67- -

an axe against themi for you may eat of them, but you shall not cut them down. Are the trees in the field men that they should be besieged by you?

Only the trees which you know are not trees for food you may destroy and cut down that you may build siege~orks against the city that makes war with you, until it falls. 25

The cutting and burning of the date palms is justified by revelation, and the very existence of this Qur'anic

justification attests to the extreme seriousness of the act:

Whatever palm-trees you cut down, or left standing upon their roots, that was by God's leave, a%d that He might degrade the ungodly.2

It is significant that al-waqidï reports that the Jews were not alone in complaining about the destruction of

the trees. Even the companions of the Prophet were in

disagreement on the matter until the justifying revelation 27 was received. Thus once again M~ammad justified his

transgression of the traditional law through revelation,

and it is noteworthy that the revelation was received after

the fact. _ 68 _

"" .. The B. al-Nagïr surrendered after seeing their trees

destroyed. The siege had lasted fifteen days, and ended

sorne th1r" t y-seven mon ths a ft er t,eh ~~.h"" h 28 The terms

of surrender were that the B. al-Na~ïr were to leave Medina

at once, taking with them only what their camels could

carry (with the exception of their arms and armor). ~uyayy

b o Akh~ab agreed to these terms, but still firmly denied

any treachery towards Mu1J.anunad. 29 M~anunad b. Maslarnah

supervised the actual evacuation of the tribe, and the

Jews proceeded north to Khaybar. 30

As might be expected, the booty left by the wealthy

B. al-Nagïr was considerable. In armaments alone this

booty amounted to fifty sets of armor plate, fifty helmets 3l and 340 swords. The abandoned lands were of course the

most valuable portion of the booty, and good care was taken

of these. After the B. al-Na~Ir had left the oasis Muganunad

called together all the An~ar (i.e. those members of his

community who were natives of Medina and who had welcomed

and helped the Prophet and his companions after the hiirah).

When they were assembled he praised them and thanked them

for their aid and hospitality, then asked them to choose

the method of distribution of the spoils of the B. al-Na~Ir. _ 69 _

He offered them two alternatives, the first being an equal distribution of the booty between themselves and the

Muhâjirun (i.e. those MuslLffis who had corne from Mecca with Muhammad. on the hijrah). The second alternative was for the Muhajirun to take all the spoils for themselves, move out frorn arnong the An~ar and live in the dwellings of the B. al-Na9ïr. The An~ar chose the latter proposal, but asked that the Muhajirun remain living arnong them. 32

Until this time the Muhâjirüh had no lands with which to support themselves, and instead relied on aid from the

An~ar. With the acquisition of the lands of the B. al-

Na9Yr they becarne self-sufficient for the first tirne since

the hiirah. And since such extensive and protracted charity

is rarely given without at least sorne resentment the new

arrangement probably made the unity of the Muslim com-

munity less strained.

When ~Umar asked why Mu~amrnad broke with his own

precedent by failing to take for himself one-fifth of the

booty as he had done with the booty from Badr and the B. Qaynuqâ', Muhammad. said he only did as God directed • A revelation was delivered concerning this: 33

Whatsqever spoils of war God has given to His Messenger from the peoples of the cities belongs - 70 -

to God, and His Mess enger , and the near kinsman, orphans, the needy and the traveller, so that it be not a thing taken in turns among the rich of you. Whatever the Messenger gives you, takei whatever he forbids you, give over. And fear God; surely God is terrible in retribution. 34

There were, however, sorne exceptions made to the an- nounced plan for distribution of the booty. Shares were given to two members of the An~ar because they were very poor men. Much more interesting is the report that two members of the B. al-Nagïr were allowed to keep their lands and property. These were ramïn b. Umayr b. Ka~b b. c-Amm

Islam. 35 The Sïrah clearly suggests that the only reason these men converted was to save their property, and it is significant that they were given this right despite their doubtful sincerity. In view of this it is doubtful that

Mul}ammad (as has o:f:ten been alleged) was bent on physically removing all Jews from the oasis. It was opposition, not

Jews as such, which the Prophet wanted to eliminate, and

this is clearly indicated by the ready acceptance of these

late converts, even when he had just finished fighting

them and their tribe.

The victory over the B. al-Na9!r served to offset - 71 -

the defeat suffered by the Mus1ims at ~ud. The va1idity of MUQammad's prophetie mission was once aga in affirmed 36 by reve1ation:

It is He who expe1led from their habitations the unbelievers arnong the People of the Book at the first mustering. You did not think that they wou1d go forth, and they thought that their fortresses would defend them against God; then God carne upon them from whence they had not reckoned, and He cast terror into their hearts as they destroyed their houses with their own hands, and the hands of the be1ievers; therefore take heed, you who have eyes~37

That is because they made a breach with God and His Messenger; and whosoever makes a breach with God, God is terrible in retribution. 38

MUQarnrnad's opposition had been shawn to be re1atively powerless, largely because of disunity. The Prophet had fai1ed in externa1 warfare at ~ud, but in his action against the B. al-Naç!r he showed that he was as skilled as ever in dealing with internal opposition. The expu1- sion of this tribe represented a continuation of Mu~ammad's policy of breaking up the centers of opposition within

Medina and weakening the cause of hostility. In doing this he showed no little skill, for almost any cornbination

of these centers of opposition would have presented a - 72 -

grave threat to his safety in the oasis. This explains why he delivered such a harsh ultimatum to the B. al-Na91r.

He saw them as a potential threat, increasingly 50 after

the assassination of Kacb b. al-Ashraf, and 50 seized upon

the first opportunity to rid himself of them; in 50 doing

he rid himself of a dangerous center of opposition and

further increased the security and self-sufficiency of

the Muslim community through the acquisition of the Jews'

lands. Some of the Muslims even felt that the. B. al-Nadïr. deserved death, and complained because their lives were

spared. They were answered by revelation: 39

Had God not prescribed dispersal for them, He would have chastised them in this world; and there awaits them in the world to come the chastisement of fire. 40

Since an effective combinat ion of the centers of op-

position would have posed a very serious threat to the

Muslim community, one must ask why Ibn Ubayy did not deliver

the support he had promised the B. al-Nagïr. One is limited

to conjecture, but it is possible that he thought the Jews

capable of withstanding a siege. Then, after the Muslim

force was weakened by the Jews' resistance, Ibn Ubayy would

have been in a position to mount a rear attack upon Mu~ammad. _ 73 _

The quick collapse of the B. al-Na9ïr would have ended hopes for the success of such a scheme. On the other hand, Ibn Ubayy may simply have had second thoughts about the fighting effectiveness of the Jewish tribe and chosen to keep aloof rather than become involved in a losing effort.

Despite his caution it is obvious that Ibn Ubayy was an ambitious man with high political aspirations. The tolerance shawn by Mu~ammad with respect to his machina­ tions indicates that the Prophet did not view Ibn Ubayy as a very serious threat. The Jewish tribes were organized centers of opposition, while Ibn Ubayy was only an individ­ ual. Bad he been able to attract an appreciable degree of popular support Ibn Ubayy might have provided formidable opposition to M~ammad, but he was never able to do this.

Even after the B. al-Na9îr were sent into exile they con­ tinued to pose more of an actual threat to the Muslim com­ munit y than did Ibn Ubayy. - 74 -

Çhgpu.:~: The Oas is l.§.. Made

Secure: The Massacre of the B. Qurayzah •

Mu~ammad was not able to free himself entirely of the B. al-Na9Ir through banishing them from the Medinan oasis. From their new settlement at Khaybar these Jews continued to offer opposition to Mu~amrnad and the Muslim cornrnunity. It is reported that they sent a delegation to·Mecca with the goal of persuading the Quraysh to launch a major military action against Mu~amrnad.l In the course of their discussions the Qurayshi leader Abu Sufyan asked the Jews which was the better religion, the religion of the Meccans or the religion of Mu~arnrnad. The men of the

B. al-Na~Ir replied that the Meccan religion was superior 2 to that of Mu~arnrnad. This statement of support for idol- atry over Mu~amrnad's monotheistic faith had the desired effect both on the Meccans and on MuQamrnad. The Quraysh, their confidence no doubt bolstered by this implicit prom-

ise of aid from the Jews, began plans for a military ex- pedition against Medina. The Muslim community, meanwhile,

had their low opinions of the Medinan Jews reinforced by

the outrage of the Jewish delegation's support of the - 75 -

Meccan idolatry over Islam.

After finishing their efforts in Mecca the delegation of B. al-Naçïr went to the tribal confederation of the.

Ghatafan and urged them also to attack MuOammad. When the Prophet learned of ail this and saw that an attack on his oasis was a virtual certainty, he directed that a trench be dug to protect against the Meccan force. 3

In his p~ep'~ations for the coming siege Mugammad did not dis play significant concern about the only remaining large bloc of Jews in Medina, the B. Quray~ah. This tribe had remained steadfast in their opposition to the Prophet,

.. bu.t had .. ne.ver expressed_ their sentiments through hostile actions. It is probably because of this that Mugammad did not at once treat them as potential, if not probable, allies of the advancing Meccan force. They were viewed with concern, but were not treated as enemies. The Muslims borrowed many tools and shovels from the B. Quray~ah for use in the excavation of the defensive ditch, but the ~ews do not seem to have provided any manpower for the project. 4

The only indication of Muslim apprehension towards the

B. Quray~ah is a report that MUQammad insisted that the party with which he was working on the ditch be armed for - 76 -

fear of the Jews. 5

During the preparations for the siege of Medina the

Meccans were trying to consolidate and strengthen their attacking force. Abü Sufyan sent ~uyayy b. Akh~ab (leader of the B. al-Nagïr) to the B. Quray~ah seeking their aid in the coming action against Mu~ammad. According to the sources the B. Quray~ah had a treaty (Cahd) with Mu~ammad which forbade them from moving against him and required them to help him against whoever attacked him. 6 Seeking a renunciation of this treaty, ~uyayy went to call on

Ka'b b. Asad, a leader of the B. Quray~ah: his arrival was not welcomed. Kacb refused to let him in, saying that

~uyayy evidently wanted his tribe to perish. Kacb said he regarded the Quraysh and their allies as clouds--dis- playing thunder and lightning, but having no solid sub- stance. His fear was that the attack would fail and when the Meccans retreated he and his tribe would be left alone to suffer Mu~ammad's reprisals. ~uyayy offered repeated assurances of the certain success of the endeavor, and at length persuaded Kacb to break his tribe's pact with 7 Mu~ammad.

Mu~ammad soon learned of Kacb's action through a report - 1'1 -

by c Umar b. al-Khattâb, and immediately sent to the

B. Quray~ah to confirm the breaking of the treaty. The

Prophet's delegation, which consisted of Sacd b. GUbâdah,

Sacd b. Mu'âdh and Usayd b. ~uQayr, found that Ka~b b.

Asad had indeed broken the treaty. They warned the Jewish leader that the Quraysh would abandon them, and reminded him of the fates of the B. QaynuqaC and the B. al-Na9Tr.

This set off an angry and obscene exchange between the

Muslims and some of the Jews, following which the delega- tion returned to M~ammad with the news of the Jews' treachery.8

The news of the defection of the B. Quray~ah became public knowledge quickly, and it caused great concern in the Muslim community. The Muslim defenses on the side towards the Jews (i.e. to the rear) were relatively weak, and the prospect of simultaneous frontal siege and attack from the rear was most unsettling to Mu~ammad's followers.

The Meccan force advanced confidently, and there was a period of almost twenty days during which the Muslims and the Quraysh stood face to face with almost no fighting. 9

M~ammad had grown skilled in dealing with non-violent opposition, but now he was confronted with real danger. In this situation it was not necessary for him to drama- tize his plight in order to arouse the concern of his fol- lowers, as he had done many times in the past. An attack by the B. Quray~ah would have placed the Muslims· women and children in grave danger (the Muslims· dwellings lay between the battle area and the settlement of the Jewish tribe), and could well have brought about Mu~ammad·s de- feat.

In such a situation Mu~ammad had to act quickly and confidently in order to avoid defections from among his own community, for in the face of such odds many of the

Muslims must have questioned their faith and support for the Prophet. Mu~ammad immediately began dealing with the

B. Quray~ah as an enemy tribe, which meant that all Medinan

Jews were now considered enemies of Islam. The Sïrah tells of the killing of a Jew who was seen moving around the 10 fortress of ~ssan B. Thâbit. This man is not identified by tribe or clan but just as lia Jew·, and in this context this information is sufficient to indicate that he was an enemy.

The means of dealing with the very serious problem posed by the defection of the B. Quray~ah was given to - 79 -

Mu~ammad in the person of NuCaym b. Mascüd, an Arab of the Ghatafan. Nucaym converted to Islam and then went to Mu~arnmad and offered his services. He pointed out that since his own people knew nothing as yet of his conversion he could be of unique value to the Prophet. After meeting with Mu~ammad NuCaym went to the dwellings of the B. Quray~ah, where he was given a very warm welcorne. He warned the

Jews that their Meccan allies might not be able to defeat

the Muslims. If this turned out to be the case they could very well simply give up and go home, for their lands and

properties were elsewhere and they would not really lose

anything by failing to defeat Mu~amrnad. The B. Quray~ah,

on the other hand, would be left helpless with their homes

and property, wornen and children at the mercy of Mu~ammad.

In order to avoid such a situation Nu'aym urged the Jews

to refuse to fight alongside the Quraysh and Ghatafan until

they took sorne of the Meccans' leaders as hostages to in-

sure the trustworthiness of their allies. NuCayrn thus

exploited the fears which the Jews had felt when their

treaty with MuQarnmad was broken, and his warnings fell

on receptive ears. The B. Quray~ah thanked him for his

advice and assured him that they would do as he suggested. - 80 -

Next Nueayrn called on the Quraysh and told Abu Sufyan that the B. Qurayzah. regretted having broken with Muhammad. and wished to reestablish good relations with the Muslims.

He further said that the Jews had told MU9ammad that they would hand over to him for execution sorne seventy of the

leading men of Quraysh and Gha~afan, and would then join with the Muslims against the Meccan force. In keeping

with this story Nueayrn warned Abü Sufyan not to hand over

any hostages, should the Jews demand them. He called next

on the Ghatafani he pointed out that he was one of them,

and then gave them the same story which he had given to

the Quraysh. They too believed him.

In due course the B. Quray~ah did ask the Quraysh

for hostages, and this naturally lent credibility to Nueaym's

warnings. New NuCayrn returned to the Jewish tribe and told

them that Abü Sufyan would not give them the requested

hostages because the Quraysh feared that the Jews would

hand them over to Mu~ammad to he killed. Convinced that

the Meccans would desert them, the Jews still insisted

on being given hostages.

The Quraysh helieved that the B. Quray~ah had lied

and betrayed them, and accordingly sent a representative - 81 -

to them, asking the Jews to join the Quraysh and fight on the following day. He was told that the Jews could not comply because the next day was the Sabbath and further that they would not join with the Quraysh unless they were given hostages. All this served to convince the Quraysh of the truth of what NuCaym had told them. The Ghatafan also sent an emissary to the Jewish tribe, and he met the same reception as had the representative from the Quraysh.

These two messengers had the effect of convincing the Jews

that what Nueaym had told them was the truth. ll Both sides were firmly convinced that Nueaym had told them the truth.

Through this clever artifice Mu~ammad was able to

divide his enemy and avert the great danger of a coordinated

attack on his community from two sides. The support ini-

tially given by the B. Quray~ah to the Meccan force was

translated by Muhammad into no more than a withholding o

of support for the Muslim community. The siege of Medina

failed, and the besieging force retreated. But unfortunately

for the B. Quray~ah the Jewish tribe was left in the exact

situation they had most feared and the prospect of which

had caused them to withdraw their support of the Meccan

force. They were left alone to suffer Mu~ammad's reprisals

for the siege of Medina and for their treachery: they pro- - 82 _

vided a most convenient target for the anger and frustra- tions of the Muslims.

When the besieging force withdrew the Muslims did . 12 not 0 ff er pursu~t. Instead Mu~ammad commanded his forces to abandon the ditch, put aside their arms and prepare to return to their dwellings. The sources report that Muhammad. himself also returned to the city, and while per- forming the noon prayers was visited by the angel Gabriel.

Gabriel chided him for his performance and said, "Why have you put down your arms, when the angels have not yet done so? God has commanded you to move against the B. Quray~ah; l3 l am going to them to shake their fortress." Muhammad. responded to this by ordering his followers not to perform the afternoon prayers until he had reached the dwellings of the Jews; he began preparations for a siege of the B. Qurayzah. • The traditional justification given for the attack

on the B. Quray~ah is that they were in collusion with

the Meccan attacking force, as indicated in the following poem of ~san b. Thâbit:

Quray~ah met their misfortune And shameful humiliation befell their cast les. Saed had warned them, saying - 83 -

Your God is a majestic Lord. They soon broke their treaty so that The apostle slew them in their town. With our troops he surrounded their fort Which resounded with cries from the heat of the battle. 14

The traditional law would have supported the attacking of a tribe which had betrayed an agreement, so if the Jews had in fact broken a pact with Mu~ammad this would have been sufficient justification. But it is significant that the operative justification does not seem to have been a treaty violation but rather a divine revelation commanding the Prophet to attack the B. Quray~ah. This divine com- mand has the effect of overruling any and all possible objections to such an action, while at the sarne time re- lieving Mu~amrnad hirnself of any personal responsibility for the campaign.

Mu~amrnad's campaign against the B. Quray~ah took place in Dhü al-Qacdah and Dhü al-~jjah (the eleventh and twelfth months of the year), in the year 5 A.H. 15 MUQamrnad hirnself took part in the campaign, and actually fought during the siege. 16 During bis absence fram the Muslim settlement the Prophet placed Ibn Umm MaktÜffi in charge of the city.17

When the siege was just beginning one of the Muslirns, - 84 -

...... Usayd b. ~u9ayr, stepped forward and called out to the

Jews, nO enemies of God, we will stay here until you ail

starve to death~ Il The Jews answered, Il 0 Ibn al-~uc}ayr,

we, not the Khazraj, are your allies ~ Il Usayd dismissed

this appeal by replying, "There is no agreement or alli­ 18 ance between us (literally, neither 'ahd nor ill>."

This anecdote clearly indicates that by their actions the

Jews had abrogated ail rights accorded them by their var-

ious treaties and other agreements with their Arab neigh-

bors. They stood as enemies of Mu~ammad and the Muslims

and of God as weil, and they could not look to anyone for

help.

Mu~ammad's siege of the B_ Quray~ah lasted fifteen

days according to al-waqidï and·· twenty-five days according 19 to the Sïrah. During this period the Jews were struggling

against a much superior force, and despair set in weil before

the surrender. A story in the Sïrah shows Kacb b. Asad

urging his fellow tribesmen of the B. Quray~ah to take

extreme measures. Kacb told them that it was clear by now

that Mu~ammad was indeed a prophet, and that the Jews must

take one of three alternatives in order to maintain any .. hope at ail for survival. The first alternative was to _ 85 _

accept Mugammad as a prophet and follow him, but the Jews rejected this saying they would never leave their religion.

The second choice offered by Kacb was for the Jews to kill all their wives and children and face Mugammad in combat, letting God choose between them. (If the Jews should emerge victorious, argued Kaeb, they could always obtain other wives and children, and if they should suffer defeat they would not be filled with anxiety over leaving behind women and children.) This option was also refused. The final possibility offered by KaC.b involved a surprise attack on the Muslims to be carried out on the Sabbath, when the

Prophet would not be expecting any rnilitary action from the Jews. This too was refused, for the Jews were not 20 willing to profane the Sabbath. It is very unlikely

that Kaeb b. Asad actually behaved as portrayed in this

anecdote, but it must be argued that the story does con-

tain much truth concerning the thoughts of the Jews during

the weeks of the siege. The options offered by Kacb in

the story are the possible actions which must have occurred

to the Jews--it was probably not necessary for anyone to

openly suggest them.

Ultimately the B. Quray~ah had no choice but to sur- _ 86 _

:; ...... render, and they sent out Nabbash b. Qays to talk to the

Prophet. Nabbash asked for the same terms as had been

given to the B. al-Na91r--to be allowed to leave the oasis

with their women and children, taking with them all they

could carry on their camels ex~ept weapons. Mu~ammad re-

fused to grant these terms, and in fact refused altogether

to negotiate the terms of surrender. Nabb~sh returned to 2l his people, having accomplished nothing. Mu~ammad's

refusal to negotiate likely increased the Jews' depression,

and it was not long before they again contacted the Muslims.

This time the Jewish tribe asked that Mu~ammad send

Abü Lubabah b. cAbd al-Mundhir to them. In 50 doing the

B. Quray~ah were once again appealing to loyalties remaining

from old alliances, for Abu Lubabah was a meffiber of the

B.

in accordance with their request and Mu~ammad's command

the men of the B. Quray~ah rushed to greet him, saying,

Il 0 Abu Lubabah, we are your allies ~ Il They reminded him

of how they had come to the aid of his people in the past,

then asked him if they would be permitted to leave the

oasis for Syria or Khaybar as had the other Jewish tribes. - 87 -

He told them they would not be allowed to leave, and when he was asked what judgment they could expect Abü Lubabah made a gesture towards his throat, signifying slaughter.

According to the story Abü Lubabah immediately regretted having done this, and when he returned to the Muslim set- tlement he bound himself in the Mosque as a gesture of repentence. There he remained until the Prophet himself released him. 23

It is difficult to determine the significance of this story of Abu Lubâbah. It seems unlikely that the tale of the furtive gesture followed by self-chastisement reflects historical fact. Watt also reflects on the mystery sur- rounding this anecdote, suggesting that perhaps Abü Lubabah committed sorne serious misdeed which is not recorded in our sources: he may have failed to repudiate his old clan

alliance, instead acting in sorne way to aid the Jews in

e ffect1ng· a saf· e w1t hdr awa 1 f rom t h e Me d·1nan oaS1S.. 24

The old tribal alliances were brought once again to

the fore at the time of the actual surrender of the B. Quray?ah,

when the Aws attentpted to inter cede on behalf of their

old Jewish allies. They reminded M~ammad that the B.Quray~ah

were their allies and pointed to the lenient treatment - 88 -

which had been given to the Jewish allies of the Khazraj; since the Jews had not "actually engaged in combat agàinst Muhammad. and regretted having broken their treaty with him it was urged that they be treated mercifully. In order to appease them Mu~ammad offered to allow one of their tribesmen to stand in judgment over the B. Qurayzah,. and this satisfied them. The Prophet selected Sacd b. MuGadh, a member of the Aws who had been seriously injured during the siege of Medina. 25

It will be seen that this incident in all probability had no effect on the eventual fate of the B. Quray~ah, but the influential role played by the Aws in the mechanics of the judgment of the Jewish tribe reflects the continuing importance of the traditional clan and tribal system.

Mu~ammad himself might have rendered judgment on the Jews, but he chose to avoid the possible enmity of the Aws, at the same time preserving the basic principles of the tra- ditional law. Sorne have felt that in this compromise with

the Aws MU~~~~4d revealed weakness in his position. Watt,

for example, feels that in this episode, "Mul}anunad is seen

to be the chief of one of several co-operating groups, 2 with little to mark him out from the others. 11 6 Such a - 8.9. - view fails to take into consideration the fact that Muhammad. did not place himself in complete opposition to the old social and legal systems. Rather he made use of these systems whenever possible to accomplish his goals, tran- scending them only when absolutely necessary and then only after giving elaborate justifications for his actions.

In the particular case discussed here the Prophet had noth-

ing to lose by offering to let Sa~d b. MuGadh pass judg- ment on the Jews. Even if Mu~ammad was not able to direct

Saed's judgment (and it seems most likely that Sa

under his direct control), the fact that Sa~d was at the

time lying very badly wounded by the alleged allies of

the B. Quray~ah was probably enough to make the judgment

perfectly predictable. Thus by giving weight to the claims

of a tribal alliance Mu~ammad was able to satisfy everyone.

After everyone agreed to abide by his judgment Sacd

pronounced his sentence on the B. Quray~ah: the men (lit-

erally, "those who had had the knife," i.e. the circumcised)

were to be killed, the women and children taken captive

and the property divided. Mu~ammad immediately confirmed

this judgment, saying it was also the judgment of God,

and directed that large burial ditches be dug in the market- _ 90. _

place of the Jewish tribe. 27 The Jewish men were brought to the sides of these ditches and were beheaded. Reports of the number of Jews executed range from six hundred to nine hundred, but al-WaqidI indicates preference for a figure between six and seven hundred men. 28

Much was made of Sa'd b. Mucàdh after he had rendered judgment over the B. Quray~ah. He died shortly after the judgment, and the sources report that his death was ac­ companied by divine symbols of approval for his actions.

Mu~ammad walked before the bier during Sa'd's funeral pro­ cession, and those carrying the bier expressed amazement at the fact that although Sa'd had been a stout man the bier was so light that they could not tell that his body was there. Mu~arnmad replied that this was because angels were helping to carry the coffin. 29 Such praise of Sa'd b.

Mucâdh was of course useful to the Prophet because it pro­ moted the notion that the harsh fate of the B. Quray~ah

had been ordained by God. Mu~ammad himself was taking

neither credit nor blame for the treatment given the Jewish

tribe, but he advanced his values through the praise he

caused to be given to Sa'd. The following section of a

poem by ~san b. Thabit suros up succinctly thosepoints - 9-1 -

which Mu~ammad wished to promote through praise of Sa~d:

You, 0 Saed, have returned (to God) with a noble testimony And garmentsof honour and praise. By pronouncing on the two tribes of Quray~ah the (sarne) judgment Which God had decreed against them you did not judge of your own volition. Your judgment and God's were at one And you did not fongive when you were reminded . of a covenant. 3

All this does not serve to relieve Mu~ammad of respon-

sibility for the massacre of the B. Quray~ah. Sa&d b. Mu~dh

almost certainly was not acting as an independent agent

in his sentencing of the Jews. The tribe's fate had been

decided long before, even according to the traditional

accounti if the story of Abu Lubabah is to be accepted

at face value (as the historians intended) it can only

indicate that the future of the B. Quray~ah had been set-

tled in advance. Further, Sacd was not made a scapegoat,

allO\fling the blame to he transferred from Mu~ammad to him.

Instead Sacd was made a hero, and the judgment was said

to have heen God's. This suggests that the primary reason

for making Sa~d judge over the Jews was the need to appease

the Aws.

Mul}ammad was no doubt angered against the B. Quray~ah ( - 92 -

because of their failure to accept him and join his com- munit y, but there were also purely political reasons for ridding himself of them. The Jewish tribe had posed a grave threat to the Muslims during the siege of Medina, and be- cause of this allowing them to remain within the oasis was out of the question. Deportation was not acceptable either, for if he allowed them to leave they would almost certainly go to join in the anti-Muslim activities at Khaybar (the new home of the B. al-NaQïr). Thus Mu~ammad chose the only solution which gave him permanent freedom from the threat which they posed.

The harshness of the fate of the B. Quray~ah seems most reprehensible by modern western standards, but even

this is not so clear cut as it seems. The treatment given

the Jewish tribe was not at great variance with the practice

according to traditional law, and the major reason for

dealing so harshly with this tribe may have been no more

than the fact that they were attacked at a time when they

had no allies or even potential allies. The Jews did have

an alternative to death and slavèry, for they could keep

their lives and property by converting to Islam. This

option was for the most part disregarded, however, and it

is likely that any signs of mass conversion among the - 93 -

B. Quray~ah would have met with disbelief and suspicion on the part of Mu~ammad. The massacre of the Jews may have been intended in part to underline the defeat of the

Meccans and to serve as an example to those who continued to offer opposition to Mu~ammad. The ostensible grounds for the attack were political rather than religious, but it is clear that underlying the accusations of political treachery was the Prophet's urgent desire to achieve a strong and unified base from which to expand his influence.

The elimination of the three Jewish tribes simply stemmed

from M~ammad's recognition of the fact that to succeed he could not allow the survival in the oasis of those who refused to acknowledge the truth of his mission. With the

de~eat of the B. Quray~ah the Prophet reigned supreme

at Medina, and with no compelling reasons to temper his

actions he disposed of this last center of opposition as

expediently as possible. * * * When Mubammad first arrived at Medina he began to work

towards unifying aIl the peoples of the oasis. To this

end agreements were drawn up which provided a framework

for political unity. At the same time the Prophet was _ 94 _

.~.. " striving for religious unit y, and found himself frustrated

by the Jews whose tribes formed three relatively strong,

wealthy and organized centers of opposition. Lengthy and

extensive efforts at conciliation failed to convince the

Jews of the truth of his faith and the validity of his

mission, and by the time of the battle at Badr M~ammad's

attitude towards the Jews became one of reluctant toleration.

This was soon followed by threats and actions against the

Jewish tribesi the justifications for these actions were

always political in nature, but in reality Mugammad acted

in order to unify the society through religion. He saw

clearly that his prophetie mission was the basis for unit y,

and to him the Jews' rejection of this was a life and death

matter. His disappointment was very great when he realized

that there was no hope of gaining the acceptance and sup-

port of the Jews, and it is understandable that because

of this he came to view them as the enemies of God (and

of the Prophet of God). Mercy was not required towards

such people.

In his confrontations with the Jews MuQammad displayed

great flexibility. No doubt w~y of his actions were per-

formed according to a plan or policy, but for the most - 95 -

part he seems to have acted in response to other events.

Because he acted in this way it is difficult to point to certain events as turning points; instead we see a graduaI changing of aims and means, with Mu~ammad exploiting every situation to the fullest. In his ingeniously pragmatic way the Prophet seems to have ignored theoretical solutions

to problems in favor of practical solutions dictated by

the circumstances and the means available to hirn. Acting

in this way he elirninated, one by one, the centers of Jewish

opposition which represented the only significant antago­

nistic elernents in his new home. Then, unthreatened and

in firrn control at last, he began to look outward beyond

Medina. - 96 -

Notes i2 Chapter ~.

1. A. Sprenger, ~ Leben ~ ~ Lehre -des Mohammed (Berlin, 1861-6S). .

2. Sir William Muir, The ~ of MOhamma.d (Edinburgh, 1912).

3. D.S. J.V.J.argo1iouth, Mohammed ..ë.!!!! the Rise 2f Islam (Ne\-l York, 1906). C. Snouck Hurgronje, Mohammedanism (New York, 1916). A.J. Wensinck, !-lOhammed ~ ~ Joden ~ Medina (Leiden, 1928); "Mohammed und das Judentum," ~ Islam 2 (1911), 286-291.

4. In ~ Berceau ~ l'Islam (Rome, 1914), Lammens says, "Il n1uhamrnad 7 avait l'antisémitism féroce: tel le dépeigne~t le Qoran et le ~"(p. 44). This theme is found throughout his \·lorks.

5. Leone Caetani, Anna1i de11'Is1am (Milan, 1905-26).

6. Frants Buhl, ~ Leben Muhammads (Heidelberg, 1955), (re-pub1ished) •

7. Tor Andrae, Mohamma.d: ~ ~ ~ .&2. Faith (Ne"" York, 1960).

8. Hanna Zakarias, L'Islam, enterprise juive, de 101oïse à Mohammad (paris).

9. C.C. Torrey, ~ Jewish Foundation .9i. Islam (Ne\ol York, 1933). Abraham Geiger, ~ ~ z.tohammed .2.!:!.2. .2 Judenthume Aufgenommen? (Bonn, 1833).

10. Régis B1ach~re, ~ Problème ~ Mahomet (Paris, 1952). Rudi Paret, ~lohammed ~ ~ Koran (Stuttgart, 1957).

11. Haurice Gaudefroy-Demombynes, Hahomet (Paris, 1957). ~'l. Montgomery Hatt, Nuharnmad ~ l>1ecca (London, 1953); l·lu.harnrnad II Medina (London, 1956). Francesco Gabrieli, lolahomet (Paris, 1965). Haxime Rodinson, 1·1ahomet (Paris, 1967). - 97 -

12. MuQarnrnad b. Ishaq, SIrah Rasül Allah, ed. F. Wüstenfe1d {Gottingen, 1858-1860}. Al-vlâqidî, Kitab a1-l-1ag~, ed. Marsden Jones {London, 1966}.

13. Sorne have taken the position that the SIrah is not in fact a biography, but is rather a work of tafsÏI. There is sorne justification for such a view, but this 'does not affect the work's usefulness as a historica1 source in a research project such as this.

14. On this subject see J.M.B. Jones, "Ibn Isl}~q and a1-vlaqidï: The Drearn of ~Atika and the Raid to Nakhla in Relation to the Charge of P1agiarisrn," BSOAS 22 {1959}, 41-51.

15. AlI Qur'anic quotations are frorn A.J. Arberry, The Koran Interpreted (London, 1955). The numbering of the verses fo1lows that of the official Egyptian edition.

16. Ibn Sa~d, Kitâb a1-Tabaqat ~-Kabïr, ed. Edward Sachau {Leiden, 1905-l9U}:

17. A1-Tabari, Ta'rïkh ~-Rusu1 ~ ~-Mulük, ed. M.J. de Goeje {Leiden, 1964}. - 98 -

Notes !2 Chapter ~.

1. Ibn Is~~q, pp. 286-287.

2. Ibn Is~aq, on pp. 286-287, uses the ''lord mawalj: to signify this relationship, \tlhile on p. 178 the word hulafa~ is used. Both passages suggest that the men of the Khazraj had been prepared for Islam through living with the Jews.

3. A.J. Wensinck, "Mohammed und das Judentum," ~ Islam 2 (19ll), p. 287.

4. Sir William l-luir, The Life of Mohammad (Edinburgh, 1912), p.199. l have be~~e~o v~rify this story in the Arabie sources.

5. Ibn Is~aq, pp. 353-354.

6. A.J. Wensinck, Mohammed ~ de Joden ~ Medina (Leiden, 1928), p.s.

7. W. Montgomery ~'latt, Muhammad ~ Medina (London, 1956), p. 198.

8. Our 'an 5:5.

9. Ibn Is~aq, pp. 341-344.

10. R.B. Serjeant, "The 'Constitution of Medina'," Is1amic Quarter1y 8 (1964), 15.

Il. In fact Serjeant (IQ 8, 12) says it is exact1y the type of agreement \',hich Arabian tribes conc1ude today. Ho\tlever \'le1lhausen (Skizzen .!:!!!.f!. Vorarbeiten, Vol. ];2., Berlin, 1889) argues that the Constitution did not constitute a trcaty bet\'leen l>lu1)ammad and the Je\tlS. 12. Qur'an 2:38.

13. Serjeant, ~ 8, 7.

14. ~., p. 10. Serjeant's position is that no single àate can be assigned to the document, for it consists of a number of separate agreements dating from a period of severa1 years. 15. rnn Ishaq,. .D. 363. - 99 -

16. Watt (in Medina, pp. 193-194) suggests that those Arab groups which at first refused to convert did so because of their close relations with their Jewish neighbors. 17. Ibn Ishaq,. pp • 387-388. 18. Qur1an 3:114.

19. Ibn Isl,;taq, p. 362.

20. Ibid. , p. 352.

21. Ibid. , pp. 388-399.

22. Qur1an 3:177.

23. Ibn Is~aq, po 351. The sarne statement is made in another section of the SYrah (p. 355), but here doubtfu1 veracity is expressed by the use of the phrase, "But God knOW's

best (about the truth). Il

24. Ibid., p. 360.

25. Ibid., pp. 364, 365, 378-379.

26. Qur'an 2:83.

27. Ibn Isl,;taq, pp. 381, 427. The Sïrah gives two different dates for the changing of the qib1ah. The first date given is the month of Rajab, at the beginning of the seventeenth month after the hijrah, and the second

date is a month 1ater o This wou1d place the change two or three months before the batt1e at Badr and the action against the B. Qaynuqa •

28. ~., pp. 381-382. - 100 -

Notes for Chapter Three.

1. Ibn Sa'd, II, l, pp. 19-20.

2. Ibn Is~aq, p. 546.

3. Ibid., p. 383. Para11e1 accounts of this confronta­ tion are found in Ibn Is~aq, p. 545, and a1-t abarï, l, pp. 1359-1360.

4. Our1an 3:10.

5. A1-Waqidï, pp. 176-177.

6. Ibn Is~~q, p. 545. A1-~qidï, p. 176. Ibn Sa-d, II, l, pp. 19-20. A1-TabarI,. l, p. 1360 •

7. A1-Waqidï, p. 135. It is reported here by a1-W~qidl that Our l sn 8: 55 refers to a11 three Jewish tribes,:

"Sure1y the worst of beasts in God's sight are the unbe1ievers, who will not be1ieve, those of them with whom thou has made compact then they break their compact every time, not being godfearing."

8. Our'an 8:58.

9. A1-waqidï, p. 180.

10. It appears that a11 the dwe11ings of the oasis were bui1t to withstand siege: there were no separate ram­ parts or fortifications.

11. A1-waqidï, pp. 3, 176. A1-tabarï, l, p. 1360.

12. A1-~qidï, p. 180.

13. Ibn Is~~q, pp. 972-973. This 1ist is reproduced in a1-tabarï, l, pp. 1756-1757. - 101 -

14. Ibn IS9aq, pp. 286-288, 305-313.

15. Ibid., p. 411.

16. Watt, Medina. p. 177. 17. Ibn Ishaq,. p • 546. A1-waqidr, p. 177. A1-Tabarï, I, p. 1360.

18. A1-waqidï, p. 179.

19. Ibid., p. 180. - 102 -

Notes tQ. Chapter ~.

1. Ibn Is~q, pp. 548-550. A1-TabarI, l, p. 1368.

2. Ibn Ish~q,. pp. 550-552.

3. ~., pp. 553-554. This Jewish merchant was ki11ed by a man who was one of his own confederates. The assassin's brother was greatly irnpressed by this act of allegiance to Islam and hirnse1f became a Mus1im. The story may have been inc1uded in the Sïrah sirnp1y to indicate the power and persuasiveness of Islam, but it a1so ref1ects the uncertain position of the Jews after the kil1ing of Ka9b b. al-Ashraf.

4. Ibid., p. 555.

5. ~., pp. 558-559.

6. Ibid., p. 559.

7. Ibn Is~aq, pp. 392, 648-652. A1-Waqidï, pp. 363-364. Ibn Sa~d, II, l, pp. 40-42. A1-Tabar1, l, p. 1448.

8. Unfortunately the Constitution document sheds no light on this, and our general lack of know1edge of treaty agreements of the tirne renders impossible close analysis of this incident.

9. M.J. Kister, "Notes on the Papyrus Text about Mul}arnrnad's Campaign against the Banu a1-Nac;lir," Archiv Orientalni 32 (1964), 234-235. 10. Ibn Ishaq,. p. 392. Al-~qid!, p. 364. Nabia Abbott, in Studies in Arabic Literary Papyri, Vol. l, pp. 66-70, reports on a papyrus ragment giving the sarne story with the additional detail that the Jewish plot was the result of advice fram Satan. Satan - 103 -

had reminded the Jews that by ki11ing MU9ammad they cou1d make secure their ho1d on their property.

11. A1-waqidY, pp. 364-366.

12. Ibid., p. 366. The Sïrah gives no report of Mu~ammad's order that the B. a1-Na9Yr 1eave the oasis. Instead the Prophet simp1y orders a siege after the attempt on his 1ife (Ibn Is~~q, pp. 652-653). The subsequent events, however, make it c1ear that a command to 1eave the oasis had in fact been issued and was mere1y 1eft out of the account in the Sïrah.

13. A1-waqidï, p. 383.

14. Qur' an 59: 15. 15. Ibn Ishaq,. p • 653. A1-waqidI, p. 368. A1-'!'abarï, l, pp. 1452-1453.

16. A1-Waqidï, p. 369.

17. Ibid. , pp. 369-370.

18. ll2i.d. , pp. 8, 37l.

19. Ibid. , pp. 370-37l.

20. Ibid. , p. 369.

21. ll2i.S.. , pp. 382-383.

22. Qu~'an 59:11-12.

23. Ibn Is~aq, p. 653. A1-waqidï, p. 372. A1-,!,abarî, l, po 1449.

24. Ibn Is~aq, p. 653.

25~ The ~ Bible (RSV) , Deuteronomy 20: 19-20. - 104 -

~ Jo' 26. Qur 'an 59:5.

27. A1-\'1aqidi, p. 38l.

28. A1-\'laqidI, p. 4. Ibn SaC.d, II, l, pp. 40-42.

29. Ibn Ishaq, p. 653. A1-w~qldi, p. 373.

30. Al-~qidï, pp. 374-376. In paraphrasing these Arabie passages Tor Andrae provedes an exquisite picture of the going out of the B. a1-Nagir: "They departed to the accompaniment of drums and the music of str ing s. Their wives were decked in festive costumes, and they dazz1ed the warriors of the Prophet by their beauty and e1egance." Mohammed: ~ ~ and His Faith (New York, 1960), p. 152.

31. A1-~qidï, p. 377.

32. A1-Waqidï, p. 379. Ibn Is1]aq, p. 654.

33. A1-Wciqidï, pp. 377, 38l.

34. Qur '§Il 59:7.

35. Ibn Is1]aq, p. 654. A1-Tabarï, l, pp. 1452-1453.

36. A1-miqidï, pp. 380-381.

37. Qur 'an 59:2.

38. Our 'an 59:4.

39. A1-Waqidi, p. 381.

40. Our 'an 59:3. - 105-

Notes .t.Q. Chapter Five.

1. Since there is no contrary evidence the B. al-Nagïr may have in fact done this, but the story may be no more than an invention with the aim of displaying the continuing treachery of the Jews and providing some justification for the fate dea1t the B. Quray~ah.

2. Ibn Isl].~q, p. 669. Al-waqid1, pp. 441-442.

3. Ibn Ishaq, p. 669.

4. Al-WaqidY, p. 445.

5. Ibid., p. 451.

6. Ibid., pp. 454-455. This agreement is not described in further detail; it was not part of the Constitution.

7. Ibn Is~âq, p. 674. Al-waqid!, pp. 455-457.

8. Al-waqidr, pp. 458-459. Two other versions of this incident are reported in which the personnel of the delegation vary, but al-W~qid! indicates that this is the most reliable account.

9. Ibn Isl].aq, p. 675.

10. lhl.Q.., p. 680.

11. Ibn Isl].aq, pp. 680-682. Al-waqidi, pp. 480-487.

12. Ibn Is~~q, p. 684. A likely reason for this laCk of pursuit was Mul].ammad's desire to avoid a battle on an open field. In fact, it was probably the lack of such an opportunity (caused by the siege situation and the ditch) which caused the Meccans to retreat •

.t ~ 1 - 106 -

~... ,. 13. Ibn Is~aq, p. 684 • Al-~qidî, pp. 496-497. Ibn Sa~d, II, l, pp. 53-56. A1-!abarï, I, pp. 1485-1486.

14. Ibn Is~aq, p. 712. Translation from A. Guillaume, The Life of Muhammad (translation of Ibn Is~~q),' (Karachi, 1955), pp. 480-481.

15. A1-WâqidI, p. 4.

16. Ibn Ish~q, pp. 972-973. A1-Wâq idï, p. 7. A1-!abarï, I, p •• 1765.

17. A1-Waqidï, pp. 8, 496.

18. ~., p. 499.

19. A1-waqidI, p. 496. Ibn Ishaq,. p • 685.

20. Ibn Is!l~q, pp. 685-686. A1-W'a':qidî, pp. 501-503.

21. A1-~qidï, pp. 501-503.

22. Ibn Is!laq, p. 686.

23. Ibn Is!laq, pp. 686-687. A1-Waqidi, pp. 506-508.

24. Watt, Medina, p. 214.

25. Ibn Is~aq, p. 688. A1-waqidï, pp. 510-511.

26. Watt, Medina, p. 229.

27. Ibn Is~, p. 689. A1-waqidï, pp. 511-515. A1-!abarï, I, pp. 1491-1493. - 107 -

28. Ibn Is~aq, pp. 689-690. A1-waqidï, pp. 517-518. 29. Ibn Isnaq,. pp • 697-698. A1-waqidï, pp. 525-528. 30. Ibn Ishaq,. p. 711. Translation from Guillaume, p • 479. - 108 -

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