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World Englishes, Vol. 21, No. 2, pp. 217±230, 2002. 0883±2919

Hybridized discourse: social openness and functions of English media in post-Mao China

GUO ZHONGSHI* and HUANG YU**

ABSTRACT: This study investigates the real and potential functions of English media in the milieu of social openness in post-Mao China. The unique position of China's English media reflects key characteristics of a `hybridized discourse' and a style of reporting which seems both keen to control and eager to please. Three socio-political functions emerge from this mixed product. Consensual functions denote conformity to official ideology, with the media assuming the double role of political advocates and economic `boosters'. Conflictual functions, on the other hand, enable the media to promote cosmopolitan worldviews, pluralistic opinions, and occasionally alternative voices. Somewhere in the middle of the two opposing platforms are the Instrumental functions that emphasize media's role as an information conduit, a language-learning tool, and a professional role model. This article examines the varying degrees to which China's English media perform all three sets of functions, identifies conditions and timing for selective emphasis, and discusses the social and theoretical implications of studying the English media's functions.

INTRODUCTION The English-language media are assigned a special place in China's mass communication system. They peg into the web of the country's superstructure apparatus with a set of distinct roles stemming from the state's need to interpret events, frame issues, promote policies, mobilize support, and package images to outsiders such as foreign nationals in China and various overseas audiences. Perhaps due to such intrinsic unison in advocacy goals, English media are sometimes lumped together under the pejorative label of `instrument of ideology export' (Chang, 1989; Howkins, 1982). But beyond that, the actual performance of China's English media defies sweeping generalizations. The post-Mao social openness, masterminded by the late Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping and sustained by the current administration, has not only led to the increase in the number and size of print and broadcasting English media outlets, but also contributed to the expansion of their reach to include a sizable segment of the English- speaking home audience, mostly intellectuals. More importantly, the recent wave of reforms has routinized a pseudo-Western content style in the English media that incorporates audience-friendly narrative strategies unfamiliar to journalists of Chinese language media. The general objectives of ideological indoctrination remain firmly in place, with the state imposing on mass media a substance identified as ideological, didactic, hortatory, and partisan (Liu, 1988). However, English media are bestowed a measure of editorial flexibility by virtue of their very different target of persuasion. Foreign and overseas audience members, who are regularly exposed to a variety of information, ostensibly from independent sources, containing conflicting views, and often casting a negative shadow on

* Department of Journalism, Hong Kong Baptist University, Kowloon Tong, Hong Kong. E-mail: [email protected] ** Department of Journalism, Hong Kong Baptist University, Kowloon Tong, Hong Kong. E-mail: [email protected]

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China, categorically view communist media with strong skepticism and even disdain (Richstad and Anderson, 1981; Markham, 1967). These special audience characteristics make message appeal a particularly salient pursuit for China's English media, more so than any other forms of information channels in the country (Yu, Chu and Guo, 2001). Official permission for audience-oriented message embellishment creates a rarely granted institutional space for the English media that holds a liberalizing potential for political communication in China in three aspects. First, the necessity to build audience rapport tends to soften the party line in English media. In a significant way, English media and their intended user clientele could become mutually constituted through what may be termed `lukewarm proselytizing' or `buffer content' between ideological extremes. We coined these terms to refer to articles written with journalistic skills unique to the English media, including topic selection, style of reporting, story placement, and story-telling tactics reflective at least in part of Western news values (Lent, 1982). Considerations of audience needs and interest by the mass media in an authoritarian state are themselves a facilitating force for the democratic process. Second, English media, by definition, are several degrees removed from media at the core of the party's grip, whose main task is to mobilize domestic support for policies and shape public perceptions at home. Distance from the power center, coupled with the use of a language incomprehensible to many power holders, relegates English media to a peripheral status, much to the delight of the practitioners. As a result, English media enjoy a broader scope of coverage and greater latitude for deviation from the norms of propaganda than the Chinese language party institutional media. Through this stretched realm of discourse, English media have gained legitimacy, albeit limited, in using Western news sources, carrying alternative views, and taking non-mainstream angles in some topic areas. Third, the government's aspiration to have its voice heard worldwide has generated unintended domestic effects conducive to a liberal mindset on both sides of media production. Central to these effects lies the very nature of using English as a language of dissemination. On the production side, knowledge about most audience members being native speakers predisposes English media journalists to emulate Western publications in quality and expression, an inclination largely condoned, if not encouraged, by the authorities. This leads to an adoption of reporting style that inevitably links English language and thinking with their `original' cultures. However, to some (e.g. Lull, 2000; Kachru, 1986), molding a language for new contexts implies a process of fostering new beliefs and value systems. On the consumption side, domestic audiences are typically avid English learners, who are driven to the English media not so much by a thirst for news as by a keenness to learn the language. The reverence for the English language is showing signs of advancing worldviews that are at odds with those promoted in the arcane official rhetoric. This coincides with Kachru's (1986) observations that `whatever the limitations of English, it has been perceived as the language of power and opportunity, free of the limitations that the ambitious attribute to the native languages' (p. 292). Although it is far from being a lingua franca even in urban China, English is the dominant staple in progressive education, a necessary qualification for many respectable jobs, a required skill for exposure to the influx of English audio and visual materials, and a stepping-stone to an education abroad. For many people, proficiency in English is synonymous with the promise of well-being. A zealous public quest for the command of

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English has made the language so commercially viable that several Chinese media have recently launched English editions, supplements, or subsidiaries with an eye on competing for domestic audiences. Several socio-political functions emerge from this mixed product. Consensual functions denote conformity to official ideology, with media assuming the double role of political celebrants and economic boosters. Conflictual functions, on the other hand, enable the media to facilitate cosmopolitan worldviews, pluralistic opinions, and occasionally alternative voices. Somewhere in the middle of the two opposing platforms are the instrumental functions that emphasize media's role as an information conveyor, a language-learning tool, and a professional role model. This article addresses the varying degrees to which China's English media perform all three sets of functions, identifies conditions and timing for selective emphasis, contrasts the content of English and Chinese language media empirically, and discusses the social and theoretical implications of studying the functions of English media.

CHINA'S ENGLISH MEDIA: AN OVERVIEW One way to survey China's English media landscape is to separate the news outlets into divisible categories by format, institutional affiliation, administrative rank, and region of coverage. At present, at least one English-language medium can be found in every form of information conduit: daily, weekly, and semi-weekly print newspapers; periodicals; partial and whole time slot broadcast and telecast; wire service, and loosely scattered Internet publications. Without exception, editorial boards running these English news outlets are institution- ally affiliated to a party office either at the regional (e.g., Shanghai Daily, Guangzhou Morning Post) or central (e.g. CCTV, China Daily) level. Unlike some Chinese language news media that are subordinate to a government bureau, English media are positioned as propaganda missionaries to outsiders and are therefore structurally under the direct scrutiny of the party, although this does not always indicate closer chaperon on daily operations. The administrative ranks of an English news media outlet have serious implications to an organization in terms of symbolic and material resources. Those with ministerial and quasi-ministerial ranks (e.g., Xinhua News Agency; China Radio International) not only enjoy high prestige, preferential treatment, and special privileges for covering major political events that are off limits to the lesser media, but also receive handsome subsidies from the state coffers. As a tradeoff, however, they are forced to take special precautions to constantly toe the line on sensitive political issues. In contrast, local English media (e.g., Shenzhen Daily English Supplement; Shanghai Daily), are relatively freer of an ideological straitjacket, and seek greater audience appeal and financial gains from advertising to make up for their loss in symbolic power status. Administrative ranks also are a determining factor of English media's region of coverage. Centrally-controlled news outlets typically dwell on national scoops, breadth of coverage, and the heavy presence of top-ranking officials to attract attention. Provincial or municipal level English media, on the other hand, rely on a parochial focus and in-depth reporting as fodder for growth. At both levels, the English media are locked in a rather paradoxical obsession of seeing each other as competitors and often engage in petty exchanges on `who got to the scene first' fuelled by professional vanity. Rivalry among

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English media has a significant bearing on a recurring pattern of each cultivating its own market niche rather than fighting turf wars.

FUNCTIONS OF ENGLISH MEDIA Given these characteristics, we propose three distinctive functions or roles that the English media might play under the current social transition. Although none of these functions, other than language learning, is uniquely performed by English media, the degree to which they are amplified or mitigated nonetheless is revealing of shifting interplays between English media and China's ongoing drive toward modernization in both the economic and political domains. Consensual functions are characterized by an unwavering compliance with the dominant ideology for all mass media in China, whereby they must assume roles within the confines of their capacity as the `mouthpiece of the party' (Lee, 1990; Polumbaum, 1990). The part±whole relationship between media institutions and the larger power structure has traditionally been sealed with two other effective measures: state ownership of means of production and designation of chief editors and publishers by the party. The English media are no exceptions. In their daily routine operations, English media workers, who are clearly aware of the boundaries of legitimate news discourse, harbor no illusions about press autonomy and attempt no overt violations of political norms (Zhang, 1999; Zhong, 1999). As a result, stories about major national issues, policies and decisions, political and economic development, and international relations must hew closely to the party line and are uncompromisingly reported. The party's goal of disseminating ideology to foreign and domestic audiences has been effortlessly achieved through journalists' self-direction. The advocacy roles of the English media also serve as a unifying force to bring different aspects of performance into one coherent editorial practice. For most English media workers, their product blends nominal political image packaging and the actual agenda of promoting economic development that in turn could yield tangible returns in foreign investment. The ultimate ambition of English media's consensual functions is to craft commonality in perceptions about China and, at least potentially, guide actions such as political and economic support for the country's reforms and open policy. Despite the overtone of political advocacy and economic boosterism, the tongue-in- cheek party lines do not always backfire because to foreign audiences the patterns of fact selection, manners of coverage, placement of stories, editorial opinions, and public views expressed in English media represent the Chinese government truth criteria that are habitually marginalized, delegitimized or otherwise ignored in the Western media. To some discerning members of the audience, any abrupt changes in content and subtle deviations from norms could be a signal of shifts in political climate (Beard, 2000). Economic reforms have unleashed market forces that often run amok and trigger remedial political actions, which depend on media for publicity. Waging major or minor political movements, a favourite pastime for the top leadership, also requires massive consensual information campaigns (Ruan, 1990). At times like these, China's English media are often the most frequently cited sources by foreign press as the basis for understanding and interpreting the situation. Conflictual functions, on the other hand, pit professional ideals against the accepted standard of political discourse. Conflict denotes deliberateness. Here, for the purpose of

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this research, `conflictual' connotes intentional activities to disobey or sidestep certain prevailing norms defined in communist journalism rather than media's conscious intent to present political dissent. Influenced by the Western style of reporting couched in the English language, journalists across different English news media are more inclined toward providing factual, balanced, and objective accounts of daily events than those in the Chinese-language party press. All too frequently, the mass media are under command from superior authorities to carry verbatim a news release from an official source (e.g., Xinhua News Agency or the Foreign Ministry). When constraints take the form of strict orders, English media journalists tend to suffer more intense frustrations than their party press counterparts. And legitimate editorial flexibility and distance from the power center have been a major source for English media's attempts to push the ideological limits and test authority tolerance. However, the labile nature of China's economic and political environment has trained the English media to keep potentially offensive coverage at a minimum during shou (tense) periods and to let loose during fang (relaxed) times. Constant experience of this cycle of adjustment has nurtured a special kind of political acumen among English media journalists. Reflected in content, English media's aim for professionalism has found expressions in multiple-source stories, inverted pyramid writing style, diversified opinions and, on some mildly controversial issues, alternative views. Related to the covert endorsement of Western-style news values is the English media's ability to promote open-mindedness and cosmopolitan worldviews. Largely unintended, this ingredient of conflictual functions is particularly appropriate for a domestic audience. In addition to the logic of thinking, cultural values and belief systems associated with the English language, a diversity of perspectives manifest in articles written by foreigners and China's intellectual elites. Instrumental functions, which emphasize learning by mere exposure, are unique to the English media. As described earlier, domestic audience members tend to approach English media with the explicit purpose of improving their English. They view the media content as a product of trained professionals, offering handy English equivalents to prevailing Chinese concepts, a way of describing current events in English, and a collection of simple and straightforward English expressions. To some extent, this process of learning, incidental or intentional, cannot be gained completely from Western media even when the ban on access to them is lifted (Ross, 1993).

ENGLISH MEDIA VERSUS PARTY PRESS: A CONTENT ANALYSIS Sample description To substantiate our argument with empirical evidence, we conducted a content analysis on a sample of news coverage by two English-language daily newspapers, China Daily and Shanghai Daily, and one major Chinese-language party newspaper, People's Daily. Other than their language differences, we also selected these three newspapers for their repre- sentation of party, national, and regional media. China Daily, launched on June 1, 1981 in the wake of burgeoning economic reforms and open policy, was the country's only national English-language daily newspaper for almost 20 years before the advent of Shanghai Daily. At the latest estimate, the paper claims a circulation of 350,000, covering more than 150 countries and regions. In comparison, Shanghai Daily is a latecomer and a much smaller enterprise. The first issue appeared on the newsstand in October 1, 1999 and its current circulation has reached more than 40,000. As a

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regional newspaper, the municipal paper was built on a vision that an English-language daily newspaper is needed to match Shanghai's rapid ascent into the international spotlight. Both papers have a young staff trained in English language and Western-style journalism either at home or abroad. Although Shanghai Daily is administratively attached to the municipal party office and China Daily is centrally controlled, they have more or less the same degree of editorial freedom and share a moderate approach to news reporting. The content of both newspapers contains Western wire service stories, their own staff reports polished by native English speakers, and contributions from foreigners and domestic intellectuals in addition to the official Xinhua news releases and translations from the domestic media. People's Daily, the highest-ranking party institutional press, is the state's most author- itative voice both at home and abroad. With a circulation of more than two million across the country, its intended readers are all members of the public, although party and government officials whose subscription used to be subsidized are particularly encouraged to the point of compulsory reading. Founded in the late 1940s, the paper's staunch party line content is widely regarded as the epitome of propaganda. In a relative sense, contrasting People's Daily and the two English papers could generate maximized variance since they are located at the two extreme ends of the liberal-conservative continuum in the political context of China. Specifically for the content analysis, we chose all issues of the three newspapers within a constructed week from June 11 to June 17, 2001, and had two trained graduate students code the news articles independently after reaching a desirable inter-coder agreement (Cronbach's = 0.85; Cronbach, 1951). People's Daily has seven issues for the week, China Daily six, and Shanghai Daily five.

Measurement We were mainly interested in detecting differences between the two English newspapers and People's Daily across the three functions described above. However, the constructed week may not be sufficient for observing all possible discrepancies. And certainly not all aspects of the three functions are amenable to content analysis. As a result, our analyses focus on prominence, nature, locus, and sources of news, presence of different opinions and background information, style of reporting, coverage tone, and news captivity. News prominence is indicated by whether a story is placed on the front page. The nature of news is indexed by four categories: `hard news', `soft news', `picture story', and all `other types'. News locus, the primary site of a news event, tells of media's regional attachment and tends to have a salience-enhancing effect to local residents. Sources of news differ- entiates various modules of information, exhaustively covering own staff, Xinhua News Agency, foreign wire services, domestic press, contributions, Internet, and combinations. Presence of different opinions is a measure of plurality in views and is comprised of questions counting the total number of official and non-official opinions cited or quoted in the news story. Background information, deemed a necessary news component to put the story in perspective, is considered to be an important criterion for professionalism. Style of reporting has a single measure, lead style. It is used to discriminate stories whose lead follows the inverted pyramid format or the prototypical party clicheÂ intro. Coverage tone requires coders to make an overall judgment of a piece of news in terms of positive, negative, or balanced treatment. News captivity is a summary measure of the attention- grabbing quality of news stories. To some extent it can be statistically derived from some of

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Table 1. Descriptive statistics: dimensions of news coverage in China Daily and Shanghai Daily (percentages)

Newspapers

Coding category China Daily Shanghai Daily People's Daily

1. Story position Front page 36.6 39.8 25.9 2. News nature Hard news 59.1 69.9 87.8 Soft news 21.5 18.3 5.4 Picture story 19.4 11.8 6.8 3. Story locus Local 9.7 33.3 21.8 National 55.3 30.1 38.8 Bilateral 35.0 36.6 39.5 4. News source Own staff 73.1 63.3 60.5 Xinhua News Agency 18.3 20.4 36.1 Foreign wire services 2.2 6.5 0.0 Domestic press 1.1 0.0 0.0 Combined sources 1.1 3.2 0.0 Unclear 4.3 6.9 3.4 5. Nature of opinion Official 63.4 59.1 77.2 Non-official 14.0 33.3 0.7 6. Presence of different opinions 22.6 20.47.7 7. Presence of background information 63.5 62.4 23.8 8. Lead style professional 70.0 68.5 32.0 9. Proportion of illustrations 33.3 36.6 14.3 10. Tone of coverage Positive 63.4 50.9 62.2 Balanced 24.3 34.8 0.7 Negative 3.2 4.3 2.0

N = 93 for China Daily (six days a week), N = 93 for Shanghai Daily (five days a week) and N =147 for People's Daily (seven days a week). Figures down each column do not add up to one due to rounding errors or excluded item categories not shown in the table.

the measures above (e.g., lead style, diversity of views, etc.). But we also used a more direct item: whether the story has any forms of illustrations such as photos, charts, and comics.

Results Table 1 presents the frequencies of appearance for major content attributes included in the analysis across the three newspapers. Looking down the three columns and contrasting among them, distinct patterns surface: (1) The two English newspapers have a fair share of

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commonality across practically all coding items with slight variations, demonstrating significant homogeneity, despite their very different regional audience reach; (2) People's Daily diverges, quite dramatically in some cases, from both English papers with but a few exceptions; and (3) the English press shows an overall `liberal' leaning whereas People's Daily is unmistakably bounded in party-line rigidity. Specifically, about a quarter to one third of the coded news stories appear on the front page (first block) for all three newspapers, which are not expected to be dissimilar in the first place. However, later analysis probes into the kinds of stories that are put on the front page, where differences are anticipated. The nature of news (second block) distinguishes the papers. While the majority of news stories (87.8 percent) are classified as hard news for People's Daily, the same coding criterion results in much smaller proportions for the English press (59.1 percent for China Daily and 69.9 percent for Shanghai Daily). The space thus vacated in the English press is left to approximately the same fractions of soft news (around 20 percent) and picture stories, although it appears that China Daily is keener on carrying independent picture stories than Shanghai Daily. In contrast, People's Daily only commits 5.4percent of its total news page to human-interest stories and 6.8 percent to picture stories. As for the story locus (third block), one of the few aspects where the two English newspapers are set apart, the news content of Shanghai Daily has the heaviest regional coverage (33.3 percent) followed by People's Daily (21.8). Local stories account for barely 10 percent in China Daily. It is somewhat unexpected that People's Daily should carry fewer national stories (38.8 percent) than China Daily (55.3). Not surprisingly, though, all three newspapers print an identical proportion of stories on bilateral relations between China and other countries or communities. Sources of news (fourth block) have been considered a mirror of contention among a medium's own views, other media's stances, and public opinion in general, a reflection of media's service as the `marketplace of ideas'. Even under authoritarian political systems, source diversity can be a valid indicator of liberal tendencies. Our analysis shows that news stories with staff by-lines account for the highest percentages for all three newspapers (over 60 percent) with China Daily at the top (73.1 percent). The figures move apart when it comes to stories made available by the Xinhua News Agency. China Daily and Shanghai Daily regularly devote some 20 percent of their news space to Xinhua wire stories, while People's Daily uses 36.1 percent. As a rule, foreign wire service stories (e.g., AP, UPI, Reuters, AFP, etc.) can be received but not published by most of the Chinese-language media, let alone party press. That explains the total absence of such stories in People's Daily. In terms of the nature of opinions expressed in the news story (fifth block), we were mainly interested in the cluster of official versus non-official origins. As was expected, well over 77 percent of the opinions in news stories in People's Daily are quoted from officials speaking as an institution (e.g. a Foreign Ministry spokesperson) or for an institution (e.g. a bureaucrat interviewed by a journalist). In comparison, although the two English papers also have around 60 percent of views in the news from official sources, their willingness to provide a forum for non-official opinions is evident (14percent for China Daily and 33.3 percent for Shanghai Daily). Given the prohibitive restrictions on oppositional viewpoints or news angles for all mass media in China, the sheer presence of inconsistent opinions marks a qualitative change in media's craving for professionalism. Our measure of references to different opinions (sixth block) dramatically separates the two English newspapers from the party press. More than

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20 percent of the opinions found in news stories in China Daily and Shanghai Daily are in some ways disagreeing, whereas similar occurrences in People's Daily are close to zero. By the same token, whether or not stories routinely incorporate background information (seventh block) as an essential part of the news structure also serves as a demarcation line of professional journalism. Here, both China Daily and Shanghai Daily are recorded to be nearly three times (63.5 percent and 62.4percent respectively) more likely to slot in explanatory words, phrases, and paragraphs in a piece of news than People's Daily (23.8 percent). To some extent, the fondness for news background can be credited to using English language and exposure to native English media where background information is an integral component of news. Another symbol of professional journalism is the way introductory paragraphs are presented. Western news reports typically follow the golden rule of the `inverted pyramid' in lead writing, putting the most important facts at the very beginning of a story. Until recently, lead writing in China's news media had abided by the principle of highlighting authority figures, creating a notorious tradition of the `leadership lead' news writing style. The English media's break from this bondage is conspicuous (eighth block). For both China Daily and Shanghai Daily, professional lead styles characterize 70 percent of their news stories, compared to half that figure for People's Daily. In this context, it is possible that both party-line constraints and inertia contribute to this lag in professionalism. The use of a variety of illustrations such as photos, charts, maps, or mug shots is a more recent trend in China's print media. Operating on the assumption that inserting visual elements into what has traditionally been a textual medium could drastically enhance readability, most non-party newspapers have enlivened their layout with graphics. Our analysis shows (ninth block) that the two English newspapers routinely carry illustrated news stories (around 35 percent for both) more than double in proportion to those of People's Daily (14.3 percent). The tone of news coverage (tenth block) runs the gamut from positive to balanced to negative. While `flattery reporting' prevails at about the same level for all three newspapers, the two English ones are much more likely to provide multiple sides of a news event and adopt a much more balanced treatment of news (24.3 percent for China Daily and 34.8 percent for Shanghai Daily) than People's Daily (0.7 percent). Table 2 cross-tabulates the presence of different opinions with four news attributes to locate specific place of appearance of inconsistent viewpoints among the three newspapers (block one). Shanghai Daily stands out in having the highest number of different opinions in stories about local events (27.4percent), three times that of China Daily and nearly 10 times that of People's Daily. Both China Daily and Shanghai Daily have different opinions in about one fifth of their national news, dwarfing People's Daily that has none in this category. However, by far the most likely residence for different opinions is stories involving bilateral relations for all three newspapers, particularly so for People's Daily (96.2 percent). This result gives the impression of considerable tension in China's international relations. With the dust from the US-China plane collision still settling and the frayed relations with Taiwan lingering, there may be a seasonality factor at work during our coding period. Identical proportions of different opinions are put in stories found on the front page (second block) for the two English papers (57 percent), almost five times more likely than People's Daily (12 percent). With regard to different opinions across story categories (third block), People's Daily has an overwhelming concentration of stories with different

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Table 2. Cross-tabulation: Locating presence of different opinions in news coverage (percentages)

Presence of different opinions

News Attributes China Daily Shanghai Daily People's Daily

1. Story locus Local 9.5 27.4 3.8 National 19.0 21.1 0.0 Bilateral 71.4 51.6 96.2 2. Story position Front page 57.1 57.9 12.0 3. Story category Political 27.5 32.3 92.3 Economic 25.0 30.2 0.0 Society 27.5 22.5 0.0 Culture 5.0 1.0 7.7 Technology 2.5 3.4 0.0 Other 12.5 10.6 0.0 4. News source Own staff 23.5 38.3 46.2 Xinhua 3.5 2.3 53.8 Foreign wire services 6.8 10.8 0.0 Domestic press 4.6 5.6 0.0 Combined sources 12.2 16.6 0.0 Unclear 49.4 26.4 0.0

opinions under political topics (92.3 percent). However, this may be the result of a built-in bias in the question, since most of the opinion discrepancies appear in bilateral stories and virtually the entire body of this category of stories is political in nature. Here, China Daily and Shanghai Daily show an identical pattern of distribution, with people holding different opinions cited in more or less a quarter of stories in political, economic, and society areas each. And for both papers, different opinions quoted in culture and technology stories are fractional (5 percent or less). Interestingly, the party paper bears the brunt of expressing different opinions (fourth block) in staff written stories (46.2 percent). The figure for Shanghai Daily is 38.3 percent and China Daily brings up the rear (23.5 percent). Stories from Xinhua News Agency seem to be monotone as they appear on the two English media (3.5 percent and 2.3 percent), but not so in People's Daily (53.8 percent). We conducted a second-order cross-tabulation and found that again most of these relate to bilateral relations (not shown in the tables). Table 3 cross-tabulates the professional lead style with three relevant news attributes. While 35 percent of the front-page news is written in an inverted pyramid fashion for China Daily and Shanghai Daily, only 11 percent of People's Daily front-page stories are written with attention to the prioritized placement of important facts (first block). However, staff

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Table 3. Cross-tabulation: Contrasting news professionalism across the three newspapers (percentages)

Professional Lead Style

News Attributes China Daily Shanghai Daily People's Daily

1. Story position Front page 35.0 35.6 11.0 2. Story category Political 13.3 18.4 2.1 Economic 23.3 26.4 3.7 Society 38.3 18.4 63.1 Culture 16.7 29.2 26.4 Technology 8.3 2.3 2.3 Other 0.0 5.3 2.4 3. News source Own staff 63.3 72.4 70.0 Xinhua 23.5 18.4 19.0 Foreign wire services 3.3 2.3 0.0 Domestic press 5.0 1.1 0.0 Combined sources 1.1 1.1 0.0 Unclear 4.8 4.6 11.0

reporters at the party press may be exonerated from blame for the blatant lack of professional style of reporting in key positions because the front page is reserved for authorities' ceremonial activities or policy promulgations. For People's Daily (second block), a professional lead style is most likely invoked in stories least likely to incur superior displeasure: society (63.1 percent) and culture (26.4 percent). The proportions are miniscule in all other categories. By contrast, China Daily and Shanghai Daily register a similar aspiration for professional writing across various genres of newspaper articles. Both have respectable percentages of quality journalism in political, economic, society and culture stories. With little variation, a professional lead style (third block) imbues the bulk of stories written by their own staff regardless of the nature of the newspapers. For all three papers, around 70 percent of news articles by own staff are written by style-conscious reporters, showing an obvious preference for a professional product. Despite a reputation otherwise, Xinhua stories also demonstrate significant tendency toward professionalism. Around 20 percent of Xinhua wire stories published on the three papers have adopted Western-style lead. In sum, the three functions (i.e. consensual, conflictual, and instrumental) conceptually established as the basis for our comparison between English- and Chinese-language party press were to varying degrees measured by the content analysis of these three newspapers.

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The results are generally supportive of our expectations for media roles that divide as well as join English-language newspapers and the Chinese-language party press.

CONCLUSIONS AND REFLECTIONS This research identifies a set of social roles that China's English media might assume under current political and economic transformations. Unlike Western media that thrive through creating an unquestionable unity between democratic ideology and capitalist market, the mass media in China have to build marketable audience appeals by cautiously straying away from the reigning political philosophy. Viewed in this broad context, the observed functions of China's English media become immediately interpretable. As findings from our content analysis show, although sizable overlaps exist in the routine practices between English newspapers and the party press, gaps and discrepancies amongst them are clearly non-trivial. To say that the English media perform special or even unique functions is to recognize their goal-oriented manoeuvres toward greater public acceptance by way of enhanced professionalism. Rather than the by-product of a relaxed milieu, the process is actually implied in social openness. The dual tasks of responding to and facilitating social transitions have given rise to three distinct functions of China's English media. Consensual functions implicate the English media in the state's elaborate network of consent management. However strained the party±media relations and however frustrated the journalists, the English media are duty-bound to be the celebrant of authority and advocate of its policies. This is illustrated by the disproportional weight given to stories from Xinhua News Agency, official opinions in news stories, and the somewhat overly positive coverage of official policies and practices in both China Daily and Shanghai Daily. The fact that the English media appear to be somewhat reserved in their propaganda zeal speaks to the power of the embedded cultural values of the English language. It may also have something to do with the advantages of an ideological product that none but a few members in the officialdom are able to comprehend. Conflictual functions activate the potentially corrosive properties of the English media in the form of softened, diversified, and occasionally alternative views. Tensions between conflictual and consensual functions engage English media journalists in a series of activities to circumvent sanctions. We found that the two English newspapers are more adamant for carrying human-interest and illustrated stories, running articles by their own staff, including non-official opinions, and giving balanced or even negative portrayals of news events than People's Daily. These tendencies thus provide compelling evidence to substantiate our claims about English media's ability to broaden horizons and cultivate cosmopolitan worldviews through an avenue of news plurality relative to the party press. The attempt to make the best of the institutional space granted by the authority is finding full display in content manipulations in favour of journalists' liberal mentality. As a result, English media are perhaps the only category of propaganda outlets at the highest central and regional administrative levels where multiple tones of a single voice can be found. Instrumental functions highlight the utilitarian aspects of the English media as a source of information, a language-learning tool, and a professional role model. The expanded reach of English media into the home audience reinforces these roles. Our findings reveal that the two English newspapers match People's Daily in terms of informativeness with corresponding local and national news coverage. More importantly, the English press

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outperforms the party press professionally in the areas of multiple news sources, diversified opinions, background information, and quality writing. The rise of English as a culture- bridging device has augmented public perceptions and the use of English media. As a language of modernity, English transmits a mainstream and alien Western culture and ethos on the one hand, and acts as a party messenger on the other. The dual roles of the English media give birth to a structural tension marked by constant negotiations between indoctrination and value assimilation. Together, these functions assign fresh meanings to a cultural import within the receiving culture. The production and dissemination of official messages with the alien English language can be seen as hybridized political communication in post-Mao China, where the mass media juxtapose foreign culture and the orthodox indigenous discourse into a new framework of worldview and identity. This hybridized discourse is increasingly becoming the norm of the English media and, through repeated exposure, will change cultural perceptions and interpretations. Hybridization tends to dent and declassify party journalism discourse although, as Pieterse (1995) states, `cultural hybridization will not necessarily weaken existing relations of power' (p. 60). Impressions emerging from our analysis of the English media indicate tremendous content commonality, suggesting homogeneous institutional structures and production processes that distinguish them as a whole from the party press. However, the preceding descriptions of the English media do not warrant overly optimistic calculations about the sabotaging potentials of English media. The notion of `keeping tabs' on power structures is far from relevant in the current context. Variations between English media and the party press cannot be extrapolated out of the scale of marginal operation. In the event of a political campaign, a news policy, or even as little as a whimsical command from above, professional and conflictual media agendas, or any rebellious spirit for that matter, in the English media would be the first things to be compromised. Until the fundamental tensions between ideology and marketization are in some form reconciled and until the concept of mass media autonomy breaks out of its theoretical cocoon in China, the media's pursuit for deviation from the dominant sphere of discourse will remain only dormant.

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