Weaponization of the Cultural Revolution in the 2019 Hong Kong Protests

SOCIALSTEM | Astronomy SCIENCES | East Asian Studies VOL.VOL. 1.1 1.1 | |Nov. Nov. 2020 2020

“Hong-Kong Style Cultural Revolution” — Weaponization of the Cultural Revolution in the 2019 Hong Kong Protests

Yat I Fung1 1Yale University

Abstract The pro-democracy protests in Hong Kong started in June 2019 received international attention as clashes prolonged. A peculiar phenomenon has been observed in the textual space of both the pro-democracy camp and the pro-government camp, which is a shared set of terms surrounding the Chinese Cultural Revolution amid the camps’ antagonism. This essay thus investigates the comparisons between either the pro-democracy protests or the pro-government movement, with the Cultural Revolution, made by Hong Kong writers who position differently in the political spectrum. This essay aims to analyze the use of the Cul- tural Revolution as an idiomatic weapon to attack the opposing camp to draw insights to both Hong Kong’s perception of the Cultural Revolution and the characteristics of the current protests. The border goal of the essay is to show how the Cultural Revolution’s impact is still echoing.

the Cultural Revolution to draw direct analogies to the on-go- I. ing situation, the general social ambiance, as well as particular The on-going pro-democracy protests in Hong Kong actions of individuals and parties. This shared application of have lasted for half a year by now and show no sign of termina- vocabulary not only poses a peculiar case due to the polarization. In June 2019, the protests were sparked by the opposition tion of the language in the current protests, but also due to the to the extradition bill, which would have permitted extradition sensitive nature of the Cultural Revolution, which has been a to mainland China, leading to worries that Hong Kong’s au- taboo for the Communist Party of China (CPC). tonomy would be undermined by exposing the locals to the le- Comparisons between the pro-democracy protests or gal system of mainland China. While the protesters claim their the pro-government counter-protests, with the Cultural Revo- rights in defending the democratic system of the city against the lution, made by Hong Kong writers who position differently in Chinese authority, their opponents denounce their ideals and the political spectrum, thus worth our investigation. This essay their actions for damaging the city’s socio-economic stability. aims to analyze the use of the Cultural Revolution as a rhetor- The antagonism between the pro-democracy camp ical device by Hong Kong people in online media platforms to and the pro-government camp constructs two completely dif- draw insights on locals’ perception of the Cultural Revolution. ferent sets of vocabulary adopted by the media of the opposing This essay suggests that the use of the Cultural Revolution as camps. However, a set of terms can be found in the textual an idiomatic weapon to attack the opposing camp reveals Hong space of both camps — the Cultural Revolution. The Cultural Kong people’s multilayer conceptions of the Cultural Revolu- Revolution, a socio-political movement initiated by Mao Ze- tion, which continues to play a role in the current society. dong in China from 1966 to 1976, resulted in a “severe setback II. of China culture and social development”1. Both camps in the current Hong Kong society employ terms specifically tied to During the Cultural Revolution, Mao mobilized the

YURJ | yurj.yale.edu 1 SOCIALSTEM | Astronomy SCIENCES | East Asian Studies VOL.VOL. 1.1 1.1 | |Nov. Nov. 2020 2020 mass to consolidate his leadership in the party and revive the self-perceived image of Hong Kongers that has been edu- the revolutionary spirit by struggling against party enemies, cated and sensible, which has been consolidated by the unpop- overthrowing local authorities, and destroying traditional rel- ularity of the 1967 riot. There have been copious attempts to ics. Factory productions halted and schools were closed amid draw similarities between the Cultural Revolution and political a stateless and lawless society. Student organizations known movement in Hong Kong in this decade, like the 2014 Um- as the Red Guards were mobilized by Mao to catalyze terror brella Movement and the 2016 Mongkok Riot. This essay thus by going on a rampage, destroying state property and beating extends the academic conversation on the longlasting effect of up people. Local fractions divided by political differences and the Cultural Revolution as a serious part of the local anti-Bei- personal vendetta had large-scale militant clashes. It resulted in jing and anti-China sentiments in nowadays. millions of death, socio-political chaos, and permanent loss of III. historical artifacts2. The Cultural Revolution spilled over the Shenzhen The term “Cultural Revolution” appearing in articles border to Hong Kong, which had been under British colonial about the recent protests of both pro-democracy and pro-gov- rule since 1841. While many Mainlanders escaped to Hong ernment camps. The term is unanimously perceived negatively, Kong from the chaos and gained residency from the loose im- which is peculiar itself given the “multiplicity of standpoints migration policy, communists and their supporters in the crown on historical events.” While it may be understandable for the colony rallied and put up “big-character posters” to stand in anti-Beijing camp to use the radical Revolution to embarrass solidarity with their Mainland counterparts. In May 1967, riots the authority, the same action is surprising for the pro-gov- broke out as a result of the heightened political climate and so- ernment camp. The CPC has adopted a policy of evasion and cial tension, and was put down by the royal police force. Most treated it as a sensitive issue. The Hong Kong pro-government pro-Communists organizations were outlawed by the govern- camp’s, as well as the pro-democracy camp’s, high-profile de- ment and marginalized by the public3. nunciation of the Revolution, may be explained by their effort The 1967 Riot has been well-studied, but scholars’ in weaponizing the Cultural Revolution as a silver bullet. analysis of the ramifications of the Cultural Revolution to the The weaponization works on the foundation that most city usually ends here. However, the ripples of the Revolution of the Hong Kong people know about the Cultural Revolution can still felt as strong evidence of the failure and brutality of and have an aligned negative view on it. Articles of both camps the CPC leadership. Locals weaponize the incident by mak- refer to the situation roiled by the protests now in Hong Kong ing analogies between a certain aspect of the Culture Revolu- as “Hong-Kong style Cultural Revolution,” or “Cultural Rev- tion and that of their opponents, so as to highlight and attack olution 2.0.”6 Titles that asserts the Cultural Revolution with each other’s wrongdoings. This process of weaponization, in “gory,” “wail” and “losing people’s heart” display explicit which an idea, concept, or object is translated into an effective negative connotation7. This negativity is well developed in the propaganda message and used as a rhetorical assault, operates articles when writers parallel it with the damaging phenomena on several levels politically, socially and culturally4. Weapon- of the current protests. ization can be used to legitimize one’s cause and attack the The term “Cultural Revolution” is used more than as a enemies, empowered by the virality of verbal and visual com- buzzword in the titles but is employed to describe the destruc- munication. It creates a battlefield where enemies competed tion and violence occurred in the current movement by writers for justification, favors, and influence5. In this case, most Hong of both sides. The anti-protesters camp stresses the physical Kong people have believed that Mainlanders in the Cultural assaults made by young students during the strikes. For exam- Revolution were uncivilized and irrational, in comparison to ple, in his opinion piece that advocates the need to terminate

the youngsters’ violence, Yu Pinghai condemns the university the rich people and property owners in Hong Kong.”12 She is students, just like the Red Guards in the Cultural Revolution, mainly referring to the government and its official media’s -ac in destroying stores, beating up opponents, and throwing pet- cusation against the wealthiest merchant in Hong Kong, Lee rol bombs and claims such actions recreated the lawlessness Kashing. Her sentence ends with a prophecy of a soon occur- society in the Cultural Revolution8. On the other side of the rence of a “Cultural Revolution 2.0” in Hong Kong. Siding coin, Luo Xiaoran denounces police sieges in universities ssnd with Qu and the protests, Guan Jianwen scorns at Fang’s label condemns the destruction of the grave of Principal Cai Yuan- of the Cultural Revolution on the protesters when he literally pei in Hong Kong9. He labels the renowned Chinese educa- highlights in his blog post the mob attack in Yuen Long on 21 tor-politician Cai as the leading figure in pursuing academic July against the supporters of the protests13. Like many critics freedom in China, thus labels the destruction of the grave as an of the police force and the government, he identifies the mob act of demolishing freedom. Luo compares this act to “ destroy as criminal gangs. He implies that the anti-protester crimes the Four Olds” during the Cultural Revolution in which his- group’s struggle against ordinary citizens is the prelude to soon torical monuments were eradicated. The Cultural Revolution reappearance in Hong Kong of bloody struggle sessions in the becomes a symbol of political violence and the writer’s weap- Cultural Revolution. on depends on their denunciation of the Cultural Revolution The struggling campaigns mentioned by the writers — the more violent they can make the Cultural Revolution shed light on their denunciation on extreme identity politics. appear, the more uncivilized their current opponents are. In the Cultural Revolution, the PRC government used “label- Aside from smashing properties, writers also ap- ing” to create two camps – the “Reds” and the “Blacks.” The ply the historical metaphor to the struggling campaigns now. “Blacks” were portrayed as villains from rich families who con- “Struggling session” was a public collective plot in the Mao- stantly plan to revolt against the regime14. Similarly, “political ist era to attack the Party’s enemies with verbal humiliations labeling” was used in the police force in Hong Kong and polit- and physical assaults10. It created unbearable harm to the body ical hatred was fostered against the “new black five categories” and mentality of victims, who ranged from top party leaders to – students, layers, journalists, medical personnel and social local landowners and teachers. In the current discourse, for in- workers. In the same vein, protestors point their swords to ev- stance, Fang in his article highlights the “wind of struggling.”11 ery policeman and pro-government citizens regardless of their He denounces radical protesters who struggled against every- actual behavior and speech. In these articles, the rhetoric of em- one who had different political opinions with them, even when ploying the term “struggle” to substitute every personal assault they were their closest teachers, colleagues, and parents. The made by the opposing camp was not only to raise the level of struggles against the university principal and staff, as well as harm created but accuse the opposing camp in their political im- government officials, which include spreading hate speech and morality and incorrectness. The struggling campaigns not only online vigilantism, also are the targets of Fang’s condemna- polarize society, but also questioned the morals like respecting tion. “Struggle,” (批鬥 pidou) a term Fang uses repeatedly, is a elders since many victims of the “struggling campaigns” in both specific vocabulary that is contextualized with socio-political eras have been close family members and teachers. movements in the early PRC era and popularized in the Cul- I V. tural Revolution. Meanwhile, the pro-democracy camp also alleges The weaponization of the Cultural Revolution is based their opposing camp of performing “struggling.” Qu Weilin’s on a consensus that the majority of Hong Kong people have article, which brings the severity of the current government op- similar knowledge of the Cultural Revolution. The quotation pression of citizens to light, asserts Beijing’s “struggles against of slogans and borrowing of vocabulary in the Cultural Revo-

2 YURJ | yurj.yale.edu 3 SOCIALSTEM | Astronomy SCIENCES | East Asian Studies VOL.VOL. 1.1 1.1 | |Nov. Nov. 2020 2020 lution shows a higher level of learning of the revolution. This VI. historical knowledge, and the unanimous negative resonance The current protests in Hong Kong constitute a defin- based on history, should not be taken for granted when the ed- ing moment in the city’s history. While Hong Kong’s future ucation of the sensitive political events in China, and allegedly is unclear to us, the weaponization of the Cultural Revolution starting in Hong Kong, had been tightly controlled, and they is the discourse surrounding the protests offered us some in- were not taught or euphuistically spoken of in the education of sights. The vocabulary of the Cultural Revolution is the media Chinese history. to channel denunciation, if not hatred, in multidimensions to- On top of the education of the event, Hong Kong peo- wards their opponents. Their opponents’ notorious behavior is ple’s perception of the Cultural Revolution is also based on advertised through the terms in the Cultural Revolution, thus personal or collective memory and ties. As Brickers and Yip making those acts even more sinister. This reveals that the ulti- acknowledge in the testimonies of the witnesses of the 1967 mate goals of the effective weaponization are not only to attack Riots in Hong Kong, first-person accounts “reminds us an im- the opposing camp, but also to mobilize or demobilize their portant dimension of history: an awareness of the past that is readers. This is both the cause and the result of the polarization personally felt.”15 Most of the refugees who escaped to Hong of Hong Kong society, which will possibly extend beyond pro- Kong, as victims of the Revolution, resented the Cultural Rev- tests. More than 40 years after the Revolution ended, it is still olution. The sentiment was shared by most Hong Kong locals shaping the relations between the supporters and opponents of who were horrified to see dead bodies floating on the harbors Beijing. Scholars should view the Cultural Revolution as still from the Shenzhen River16. having an ongoing impact, while the Hong Kong locals should The Cultural Revolution leaves enduring legacy in prevent the Cultural Revolution from truly reappearing. Hong Kong based on collective knowledge and memory. It continues to polarize society by strengthening the arguments WORKS CITED between pro-Communist camp and their opponents. Mean- 1. “Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Par- while, it also acts as a tool of “othering” between locals and ty Since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China,” Mainlanders. This process of othering, as proposed Elaine adopted by the Sixth Plenary Session of the Eleventh Cen- Chan, is no longer initiated by the government as she suggest- tral Committee of the Communist Party of China on June ed, but became a botton-up movement17. The characteristics 27, 1981 Resolution on CPC History (1949–81). (Beijing: of Hong Kong mentioned in the articles, including the rule of Foreign Languages Press, 1981), 32. law, the democratic system, and freedom of speech, which both 2. Roderick MacFarquhar, Michael Schoenhals, Mao’s last camps accused the other of destroying, are indicators that Hong revolution. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009). Kong is different from China and constitute the pride in Hong 3. Cheung Gary Ka-wai, Hong Kong’s Watershed: The 1967 Ri- Kong identity. The collective memory of the Cultural Revolu- ots. Vol. 1. (Pokfulam: Hong Kong University Press, 2009.) tion has provided Hong Kong people a group identity through 4. Alexander C. Cook, Mao’s Little Red Book – A Global His- the construction of narrative, which was built on victimization. tory. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 147. The Red Guards and generally Mainlanders in that era were 5. Eric Fattor, American empire and the arsenal of entertain- portrayed as aggressors and killers. Hong Kong media still ment: Soft power and cultural weaponization. (Springer, employs this generalization to distinguish the locals and their 2014,) 1-10. mainland counterparts. The weaponization of the Cultural Rev- 6. Anonymous, “Shenfang xianggangshi wenge kuangpiao olution thus displays long-lasting impact of this incident. huohai”慎防香港式文革狂飆禍害 [Beware of the scourge of Hong-Kong-style Cultural Revolution] Yazhou zhoukan

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