Popular Protest in China: Playing by the Rules
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Integration of Grey with Neural Network Model and Its Application in Data Mining
716 JOURNAL OF SOFTWARE, VOL. 6, NO. 4, APRIL 2011 Integration of Grey with Neural Network Model and Its Application in Data Mining Changjun Zhu College of Urban Construction, Hebei University of Engineering, Handan, 056038, China [email protected] Qinghua Luan College of Water Conservancy and Hydropower, Hebei University of Engineering, Handan, 056038, China Zhenchun Hao, Qin Ju State Key Laboratory of Hydrology-Water Resources and Hydraulic Engineering, Hohai University, Nanjing, China Abstract—Because of Boundary types and geologic which include advection, diffusion, dispersion, sorption, conditions, which possess random and obscure decay and biodegradation. In the courses,there is not characteristics, groundwater heads vary with the conditions. only the known information but also uncertain The prediction of groundwater level is one of the main work of hydraulic government, which is predicted based on the information, therefore, it can be seen as one gray system. history data and the relative influence factors. Therefore, Groundwater trends are related to atmosphere prediction precision depends on the accuracy of history precipitation. There is obvious seasonality variation of data. Data mining has provided a new method for analyzing atmosphere precipitation. Therefore, the groundwater massive, complex and noisy data. According to the level is changed by the seasons and periods. In this case, complexity and ambiguity of groundwater system, a new we needed to use the original data of the groundwater in integration of grey with neural network model is built to order to predict the groundwater level. In this paper, we forecast groundwater heads, which were used to judge calculated the cycle groundwater, trend groundwater, and whether future groundwater heads were extraordinarily random groundwater separately after isolating the three over the history range or not. -
April 28, 1969 Mao Zedong's Speech At
Digital Archive digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org International History Declassified April 28, 1969 Mao Zedong’s Speech at the First Plenary Session of the CCP’s Ninth Central Committee Citation: “Mao Zedong’s Speech at the First Plenary Session of the CCP’s Ninth Central Committee,” April 28, 1969, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao, vol. 13, pp. 35-41. Translated for CWIHP by Chen Jian. http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/117145 Summary: Mao speaks about the importance of a united socialist China, remaining strong amongst international powers. Credits: This document was made possible with support from the Leon Levy Foundation. Original Language: Chinese Contents: English Translation What I am going to say is what I have said before, which you all know, and I am not going to say anything new. Simply I am going to talk about unity. The purpose of unity is to pursue even greater victory. Now the Soviet revisionists attack us. Some broadcast reports by Tass, the materials prepared by Wang Ming,[i] and the lengthy essay in Kommunist all attack us, claiming that our Party is no longer one of the proletariat and calling it a “petit-bourgeois party.” They claim that what we are doing is the imposition of a monolithic order and that we have returned to the old years of the base areas. What they mean is that we have retrogressed. What is a monolithic order? According to them, it is a military-bureaucratic system. Using a Japanese term, this is a “system.” In the words used by the Soviets, this is called “military-bureaucratic dictatorship.” They look at our list of names, and find many military men, and they call it “military.”[ii] As for “bureaucratic,” probably they mean a batch of “bureaucrats,” including myself, [Zhou] Enlai, Kang Sheng, and Chen Boda.[iii] All in all, those of you who do not belong to the military belong to this “bureaucratic” system. -
An Analysis of the Death Mystery of Huo Qubing, a Famous Cavalry General in the Western Han Dynasty
Journal of Frontiers of Society, Science and Technology DOI: 10.23977/jfsst.2021.010410 Clausius Scientific Press, Canada Volume 1, Number 4, 2021 An Analysis of the Death Mystery of Huo Qubing, a Famous Cavalry General in the Western Han Dynasty Liu Jifeng, Chen Mingzhi Shandong Maritime Vocational College, Weifang, 261000, Shandong, China Keywords: Huo qubing, Myth, Mysterious death Abstract: Throughout his whole lifetime, Huo Qubing created a myth of ancient war, and left an indelible mark in history. But, pitifully, he suddenly died during young age. His whole life was very short, and it seemed that Huo was born for war and died at the end of war. Although he implemented his great words and aspirations “What could be applied to get married, since the Huns haven’t been eliminated?”, and had no regrets for life, still, his mysterious death caused endless questions and intriguing reveries for later generations. 1. Introduction Huo Qubing, with a humble origin, was born in 140 B.C. in a single-parent family in Pingyang, Hedong County, which belongs to Linfen City, Shanxi Province now. He was an illegitimate child of Wei Shaoer, a female slave of Princess Pingyang Mansion, and Huo Zhongru, an inferior official. Also, he was a nephew-in-mother of Wei Qing, who was General-in-chief Serving as Commander-in-chief in the Western Han Dynasty. Huo Qubing was greatly influenced by his uncle Wei Qing. He was a famous military strategist and national hero during the period of Emperor Wudi of the Western Han Dynasty. He was fond of horse-riding and archery. -
Deng Xiaoping in the Making of Modern China
Teaching Asia’s Giants: China Crossing the River by Feeling the Stones Deng Xiaoping in the Making of Modern China Poster of Deng Xiaoping, By Bernard Z. Keo founder of the special economic zone in China in central Shenzhen, China. he 9th of September 1976: The story of Source: The World of Chinese Deng Xiaoping’s ascendancy to para- website at https://tinyurl.com/ yyqv6opv. mount leader starts, like many great sto- Tries, with a death. Nothing quite so dramatic as a murder or an assassination, just the quiet and unassuming death of Mao Zedong, the founding father of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). In the wake of his passing, factions in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) competed to establish who would rule after the Great Helmsman. Pow- er, after all, abhors a vacuum. In the first corner was Hua Guofeng, an unassuming functionary who had skyrocketed to power under the late chairman’s patronage. In the second corner, the Gang of Four, consisting of Mao’s widow, Jiang September 21, 1977. The Qing, and her entourage of radical, leftist, Shanghai-based CCP officials. In the final corner, Deng funeral of Mao Zedong, Beijing, China. Source: © Xiaoping, the great survivor who had experi- Keystone Press/Alamy Stock enced three purges and returned from the wil- Photo. derness each time.1 Within a month of Mao’s death, the Gang of Four had been imprisoned, setting up a showdown between Hua and Deng. While Hua advocated the policy of the “Two Whatev- ers”—that the party should “resolutely uphold whatever policy decisions Chairman Mao made and unswervingly follow whatever instructions Chairman Mao gave”—Deng advocated “seek- ing truth from facts.”2 At a time when China In 1978, some Beijing citizens was reexamining Mao’s legacy, Deng’s approach posted a large-character resonated more strongly with the party than Hua’s rigid dedication to Mao. -
For Whom the Bell Tolls: the Political Legacy of China's Cultural Revolution
For Whom the Bell Tolls: The Political Legacy of China’s Cultural Revolution Yuhua Wang∗ May 10, 2017 Abstract Does the use of repression undermine authoritarian rulers’ legitimacy? I argue that state repres- sion can make individuals internalize a strategy (trust or distrust) as a heuristic in situations where information acquisition is either costly or imperfect, so repression has a long-lasting negative ef- fect on people’s trust of authoritarian rulers. I test this proposition by studying one of the most tragic episodes of authoritarian repression in the modern era–state terror during China’s Cultural Revolution. I show that individuals who were exposed to more state-sponsored violence in the late 1960s are less trusting of their political leaders at all levels today. The adverse effect of vio- lence is universal irrespective of an individual’s age or class background. Evidence from a variety of identification strategies suggests that the relationship is causal. My findings contribute to our understanding of how repression affects the long-term legitimacy of authoritarian regimes. ∗Assistant Professor, Department of Government, Harvard University ([email protected]). I want to thank Andy Walder for sharing his dataset on Cultural Revolution violence, James Kung and Shuo Chen for sharing their dataset on the Great Famine, and Bruce Dickson for sharing his 2014 survey data. Iza Ding, Xiaobo Lu,¨ Jean Oi, Liz Perry, Andy Walder, Yiqing Xu, Fei Yan, and Boliang Zhu have provided helpful comments. All errors remain my own. 1 What is the long-term effect of state-sponsored violence on citizens’ trust of authoritarian rulers? Autocrats use repression to maintain political order, promote economic development, and lengthen their term in office (Haggard 1986; Davenport 1995; Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2011; Svolik 2012; Bhasin and Gandhi 2013; Greitens 2016; Hassan 2016). -
Regime Inclusion and the Resilience of Authoritarianism: the Local People’S Political Consultative Conference in Post-Mao Chinese Politics
REGIME INCLUSION AND THE RESILIENCE OF AUTHORITARIANISM: THE LOCAL PEOPLE’S POLITICAL CONSULTATIVE CONFERENCE IN POST-MAO CHINESE POLITICS YAN Xiaojun∗ Conventional wisdom holds that authoritarian regimes are inherently fragile, due to their lack of political legitimacy and excessive reliance on state coercion. The recent unrest in Tunisia and Egypt seems to confirm such a view. However, the past decade has witnessed the stubborn persistence of authoritarian rule in a rapidly rising China. While political rebellions have challenged dictators from Central Asia to North Africa, the Communist regime in China has not only survived the political, economic and ideological crises of the 1990s but has thrived, to an extent that some outside observers began to perceive its method of operating as a fledgling “consensus” that might one day threaten the appeal of the dominant Western model of market capitalism with electoral democracy.1 Scholars who examine the persistence of regimes like China’s argue that political institutions are “essential for understanding authoritarian politics”.2 Beatriz Magaloni suggests that political institutions “shape bargaining between the dictator and his ruling coalition” and serve as “the instruments through which dictators spy, co-opt, or repress opponents”.3 Under Communist systems, many of these functions are undertaken by a specific kind of political institution, which I refer to in this article as inclusive regime institutions. Kenneth Jowitt defines regime inclusion as “attempts by the party élites to expand the internal boundaries of the regime’s ∗ For invaluable comments and suggestions, I am indebted to Elizabeth J. Perry, John P. Burns, the editors of The China Journal and two anonymous reviewers. -
The Cultural Revolution
The Cultural Revolution The “Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution,” usually known simply as the Cultural Revolution (or the Great Cultural Revolution), was a “complex social upheaval that began as a struggle between Mao Zedong and other top party leaders for dominance of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and went on to affect all of China with its call for “continuing revolution.” 1 This social upheaval lasted from 1966 to 1976 and left deep scars upon Chinese society. Background The roots of the Cultural Revolution date back to the early 1960s. After the catastrophic Great Leap Forward, in which more than 20 million people died, Chairman Mao Zedong decided to take a less active role in governing the country. More practical, moderate leaders, such as Vice-Chairman Liu Shaoqi and Premier Zhou Enlai, introduced economic reforms based on individual incentives—such as allowing families to farm their own plots of land—in an effort to revive the battered economy. Mao detested such policies, as they went against the principles of pure communism in which he so firmly believed. Nevertheless, China’s economy grew strongly from 1962 to 1965 with the more conservative economic policies in place. At the same time, Mao started to worry that local party officials were taking advantage of their positions to benefit themselves. Rather than resolving such cases internally to preserve the prestige of the CCP, Mao favored open criticism and the involvement of the people to expose and punish the members of the ruling class who disagreed with him; he framed this as a genuine socialist campaign involving the central struggle of the proletariat versus the bourgeoisie. -
List of 143 Chinese Invitees to the Nobel Peace Prize Award Ceremony
Chinese Human Rights Defenders (CHRD) 维权网 Web: http://chrdnet.org/ Email: [email protected] Promoting human rights and empowering grassroots activism in China List of 143 Chinese invitees to the Nobel Peace Prize award ceremony As the restrictions facing these individuals is subject to rapid change in the days and hours before the Nobel Peace Prize award ceremony on December 10, please see our website, www.chrdnet.org, for the latest updates. 1. Ai Xiaoming (艾晓明), Guangzhou human rights activist and Sun Yat-sen University professor, under tight surveillance and restriction on movements 2. Bao Tong (鲍彤), former political secretary to CCP General Secretary Zhao Ziyang (赵 紫阳), under soft detention at home in Beijing 3. Cha Jianguo (查建国), Beijing democracy activist, under tight surveillance and restriction on movements 4. Che Hongnian (车宏年), Jinan human rights activist, under tight surveillance and restriction on movements 5. Chen Fengxiao (陈奉孝), Beijing author, under surveillance and restriction on movements, unable to leave the countryi 6. Chen Guangcheng (陈光诚), Shandong human rights defender, under soft detention at his home 7. Chen Kaige (陈凯歌), Beijing director, current situation unknown 8. Chen Mingxian (陈明先), wife of detained Sichuan democracy activist Liu Xianbin (刘 贤斌), under tight surveillance and restriction on movements, unable to leave the country 9. Chen Wei (陈卫), Sichuan human rights activist, under tight surveillance and restriction on movements , unable to leave the country 10. Chen Xi (陈西), Guizhou human rights activist, under tight surveillance and restriction on movements, unable to travel 11. Chen Yongmiao (陈永苗), Beijing internet writer, under surveillance and restriction on movements 12. -
Wang, Prefinal3.Indd
creators of an emperor aihe wang Creators of an Emperor: The Political Group behind the Founding of the Han Empire he enthronement of Liu Bang Ꮵ߶ initiated China’s first lasting em- T pire, the Han ዧ (206 bc–220 ad), and created a model of emperor- ship for over two millennia of subsequent dynasties. Han emperorship was a mode of Chinese authoritarianism different from the extremism of the Qin, and Liu Bang’s shadow can be recognized in many later monarchs, from Zhu Yuanzhang to Mao Zedong.1 The founding of the Han was achieved by a large group of people, addressed at the time -who sup ”,פ and in subsequent history as “Meritorious Officials ported Liu Bang in the civil war and enthroned him as the emperor. This group was, in essence, responsible for founding the Han dynasty and instituting its particular model of emperorship. To understand the formation of the Han dynasty, and more importantly, of the political culture that breeded authoritarianism, we need to understand the na- ture of this political group and its members’ divergent interests in pro- moting emperorship. Rather than focusing on the position of the group in the institu- tions of the empire, I study the participants’ own understandings and interpretations of the process of creating an emperor. My focus is not so much on the facts of events, as much as on how events were under- stood and interpreted by the participants and subsequent writers of the time. In other words, I want to bring to the analytical foreground the multitude of thoughts and words that motivated the actions and con- structed the events involved in creating an emperor, since it is through both words and deeds that we can allocate responsibility among those who created monarchy.2 To do so, I investigate three specific ques- This article was completed with the support of a research grant from the University of Hong Kong. -
Chinese Cultural Revolution
Chinese Cultural Revolution Background Guide Written by: Sruthi Venkatachalam and Patrick Lee, Case Western Reserve University The Rise of Modern China The reign of the Chinese dynasties ended in 1911 leading to China’s emergence into the modern world. China’s weakness in the 20th century, as seen in the devastating loss in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95, stirred unrest and murmurs of uprising among the population. In 1911, armed rebellions broke out in response to the nationalization of railways in the Sichuan province, word of which spread across China. This snowballed and lead warlords to rebel against the weak imperial regime. Such rebellion in Wuchuan led to the overthrow of the provincial government and revolutionary leader Sun Yixian took advantage of the regime’s weakness. He later returned from exile, elected provisional president He saw that the emperor be abdicated, and resign power allowing Yuan Shikai, imperial minster entrusted with full power via the courts, to become the nation’s first president.1 In early 1912, the reign of Imperial China, Yuan Shikai’s attempt to become military dictator was thwarted and the Nationalist party, the Guomindang, also known as the Kuomintang (GMD) took control of the country in 1923. Sun Yixian, now president, reorganized the party that made it a centralized, democratic party. The GMD worked with the nearly formed Chinese Communist Party, with Soviet assistance, to reunite China and end the control of warlords running rampant in the 1 Wang, Yi Chu. “Sun Yat-sen : Chinese Leader.” n.d. Britannica. Accessed November 9. 2018. https://www.britannica.com/biography/Sun-Yat-sen country. -
Why Did the Communists Win the Chinese Revolution?
Why Did the Communists Win the Chinese Revolution? From 1911 to 1945, China experienced a revolution, a struggle against warlords, a civil war between the Nationalists led by Chiang Kai-Shek and the Communists led by Mao Zedong, and invasion by the Japanese. After the defeat of the Japanese in World War II in 1945, a full-blown civil war erupted again in 1946. The Nationalists were backed by the United States and the Communists had support from the Soviet Union. By 1949, Chiang and the Nationalists, despite having more soldiers than the Communists, were defeated and forced to evacuate the Chinese mainland for the island of Taiwan. Historians point to a number of factors for the nationalists defeat. Chinese nationalist leader Chiang Kai-Shek. Chiang’s Kuomintang government was filled with incompetent and corrupt officials. The people especially hated the tax collectors, who were commonly called “blood-sucking devils.” Chiang himself held dictatorial powers, but his orders were often ignored. He had little success in rallying Chinese nationalism to win an unpopular war against the Communists. Chiang’s decision to go to war against the Communists in 1946 came at the cost of postponing the economic reconstruction of China. This meant diverting tax revenues, investment, and other resources to the war effort rather than to the needs of the people. Heavy taxes, a huge government debt, inflation, unemployment, and food shortages caused many, especially in the cities, to lose faith in the Nationalist government. Economic discontent in the cities led to thousands of labor strikes. Students, newspaper editors, and intellectuals protested against Chiang’s Nationalist government. -
Traveling Theory: Fredric Jameson's Interpretations of the Cultural Revolution and Maoism
CLCWeb: Comparative Literature and Culture ISSN 1481-4374 Purdue University Press ©Purdue University Volume 20 (2018) Issue 3 Article 5 Traveling Theory: Fredric Jameson’s Interpretations of the Cultural Revolution and Maoism Xian Wang University of Notre Dame Follow this and additional works at: https://docs.lib.purdue.edu/clcweb Part of the American Studies Commons, Chinese Studies Commons, Comparative Literature Commons, and the European Languages and Societies Commons Dedicated to the dissemination of scholarly and professional information, Purdue University Press selects, develops, and distributes quality resources in several key subject areas for which its parent university is famous, including business, technology, health, veterinary medicine, and other selected disciplines in the humanities and sciences. CLCWeb: Comparative Literature and Culture, the peer-reviewed, full-text, and open-access learned journal in the humanities and social sciences, publishes new scholarship following tenets of the discipline of comparative literature and the field of cultural studies designated as "comparative cultural studies." Publications in the journal are indexed in the Annual Bibliography of English Language and Literature (Chadwyck-Healey), the Arts and Humanities Citation Index (Thomson Reuters ISI), the Humanities Index (Wilson), Humanities International Complete (EBSCO), the International Bibliography of the Modern Language Association of America, and Scopus (Elsevier). The journal is affiliated with the Purdue University Press monograph series of Books in Comparative Cultural Studies. Contact: <[email protected]> Recommended Citation Wang, Xian. "Traveling Theory: Fredric Jameson’s Interpretations of the Cultural Revolution and Maoism." CLCWeb: Comparative Literature and Culture 20.3 (2018): <https://doi.org/10.7771/1481-4374.3271> This text has been double-blind peer reviewed by 2+1 experts in the field.