Arms Control and Arms Race cal science, and the seminal works here are the ARMS CONTROL AND Nichomachean Ethics and the Politics. ARMS RACE In most of the contemporary social sciences a fact- Arms control is a form of international security coopera- value dichotomy is observed. That is, the researcher must tion, or “security regime,” aimed at limiting, through tacit carefully distinguish between facts based on empirical or explicit agreement, the qualities, quantity, or use of observation and values based on personal preferences. weapons. The term arms control has been used loosely to This distinction is denied in Aristotle’s works, however, denote many things in international politics involving the and one must read the Nichomachean Ethics and the reduction or elimination of weapons or the tensions that Politics as one extended work. Thus, Aristotle distin- lead to their use, and even as a euphemism for militarily guishes six types of states, according to qualitative as well enforced disarmament, like that imposed on Iraq by the as quantitative considerations. Monarchy is the rule of United Nations in the 1990s. But such phenomena often one in the interest of all, while tyranny is a corrupted form do not reflect the conventional meaning of the term as it of monarchy. Similarly, aristocracy is the rule of the few in is used by arms control scholars and practitioners: a mean- the interest of all, while oligarchy is the selfish rule of the ing that implies a cooperative relationship involving reci- few. Polity, finally, is the rule of the many in the interest procity and mutually agreed restraints. of all, while democracy is the decayed rule of the many in The three most important goals of arms control are their own interest. To Aristotle, human beings are politi- (1) to lower the likelihood of war; (2) to reduce its cal by nature, for they develop in association with oth- destructive effects; and (3) to curtail the price of prepar- ers—beginning with the household, progressing through ing for it. The first aim can be met by encouraging mili- a village organization, and coming to full maturity in the tary postures that enhance deterrence and defense and polis, or city-state. This teleological approach to the thus make aggression less attractive; by reducing the insta- human or social sciences pervades all of Aristotle’s writings bilities of arms racing that may lead to war (see below); on the practical sciences. and by taking steps that make military “accidents” or Aristotle’s influence in Western civilization is such unauthorized uses of force less liable to happen or to lead that he was considered “the philosopher” throughout the to war if they do. As for the goal of limiting damage when Middle Ages. His influence has also been considerable in wars do break out, arms control measures may forbid the Christian theology, especially through the works of production, deployment, or use of certain military tech- Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274); in philosophy, especially nologies. Finally, cost-savings can be garnered through in his teachings regarding intellectual and moral virtues; quantitative or qualitative arms limitation agreements. Such economies are an important policy consideration, in the physical sciences, notably as the target of extensive for resources not sunk into certain types of weapons can criticism by modern giants such as Galileo Galilei be used to promote security in other ways, or put toward (1564–1642); and in the modern social sciences, with other welfare-enhancing activities. particular reference to political science. Regardless of how it mixes or prioritizes these objec- SEE ALSO Philosophy; Plato; Political Science tives, arms control has a few essential interrelated charac- teristics. First, it is a political relationship between actors: BIBLIOGRAPHY Unilateral arms control is an oxymoron. This does not preclude unilateral steps toward disarmament or demobi- Jaeger, Werner. 1960. Aristotle: Fundamentals of the History of His lization that one state may take in order to elicit reciproc- Development, 2nd ed. Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press. ity from others and thus launch an arms control process: Voegelin, Eric. 2000. Order and History: Plato and Aristotle. In The determining factor is the conception of an end-state The Collected Works of Eric Voegelin. Ed. Dante L. Germino. involving mutual reductions, limitations, or other Vol. 16. Columbia: University of Missouri Press. restraints. Second, arms control involves strategic interde- pendence—the parties engaged in it are sensitive to each Timothy Hoye other’s postures and actions, and their decisions to agree and comply with arms control depend on their beliefs about each other’s willingness to do likewise. Third, it involves at least tacit if not explicit bargaining because the incentives to cooperate that infuse the relationship are ARMED FORCES always mixed with some degree of conflict and incentives SEE Military. to compete.

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TYPES OF ARMS CONTROL agreements have been carried forward by groups of states It is useful to distinguish between rivalry-specific and gen- in the General Assembly; the current locus of these efforts eral arms control measures. In the rivalry-specific form, is the sixty-six-member Geneva Conference on adversaries seek to manage their security competition Disarmament (CD). Begun in 1979, the CD has been the through agreements that are tailored to the shape of their forum for adoption of the 1992 Chemical Weapons strategic relationship, in order to make a more stable or at Convention and the 1996 Comprehensive Test-Ban least less costly military balance. By contrast, general arms Treaty, and for negotiating various additions to the 1975 control measures aspire to universality: With a broad Biological Weapons Convention. ambit and generic guidelines, they are meant to exert The most recent general effort was the tightly focused desired effects over the multitude of strategic relationships 1997 Ottawa “Landmines” Convention, which prohibits in international politics. the use, stockpiling, production, and transfer of antiper- The 1922 Washington Naval Treaty, for example, was sonnel mines and mandates the destruction of existing rivalry specific. In it, the United States, Britain, and Japan stocks. As a general measure with aspirations to universal- agreed to reductions in battleship fleets according to spe- ity, the treaty has had mixed success. As of 2007, 155 cific ratios of strength between them, and to a ten-year member states had joined, while 37 had not, including 3 hiatus on new construction, as well as limitations on bat- permanent members of the United Nations Security tleship tonnage and armaments. The goal was to stabilize Council: the United States, Russia, and China. However, the existing balance of naval forces at lower levels, and to although the United States has not signed the treaty, it has forestall an arms race among the three parties. Similarly, in funded and supported demining efforts worldwide. Thus, even though many important countries have not signed 1972, at the peak of cold war détente, the United States the convention, it has had a tangible humanitarian and the Soviet Union pledged in the first Strategic Arms impact. Demining efforts catalyzed by the convention Limitation Talks agreement (SALT I) to limit the number have resulted in the removal of hundreds of thousands of of ballistic nuclear missile launchers to then-current levels, mines, saving a large number of lives worldwide. and to abide by major limitations on the deployment of strategic missile defense systems. Behind these arrange- General and rivalry-specific characteristics of arms ments were mutually held cooperative and competitive control can overlap—for example, when a rivalry-specific goals: to slow down the arms race and reduce worrisome formula is nested within a more general arms control instabilities and to maximize restraints on the other side agreement. The most important and contentious arms control agreement of the early twenty-first century—the while minimizing those on one’s own side. Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)—is a good illus- As for general arms control measures, the most exten- tration of this. The NPT, which first came into force in sive early efforts were the conventions produced at the 1970, has a nearly universal membership (by 2007, 188 of Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907. Those widely the 192 members of the United Nations were signatories). endorsed conventions promulgated, among other things, Its general aims are to reduce and eventually eliminate the prohibitions on the use of certain types of arms, such as role of nuclear weapons in international politics. Behind “dum-dum” bullets, poisonous chemical weapons, or these sweeping generalities are a variety of undertakings bombs dropped from balloons. In 1925, during the hey- that apply specifically to two different “classes” of signato- day of the League of Nations, the Geneva Protocol was ries—the Nuclear Weapons States (NWS) and the Non- added to the conventions, reinforcing the prohibition on Nuclear Weapons States (NNWS). The NWS parties the use of deadly gases. Later in the interwar period, par- “legitimately” possess nuclear weapons, but must work to ticipants in the World Disarmament Conference in reduce them (eventually to zero), and must not share Geneva (1932–1936) tried to enact a blanket prohibition them with states that do not possess nuclear weapons. The on the use and development of “offensive” weapons, NNWS cannot “legitimately” possess nuclear weapons, which were (and still are) thought to be conducive to war. but in return for foreswearing them, they are entitled to The effort was ill fated for many reasons, but chief among develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and to them was the bane of many such qualitative exercises— international support for those efforts channeled through the thorny and politicized issue of distinguishing between the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Thus, offensive and defensive weaponry. At the Geneva confer- although the NPT is a nearly universal and general agree- ence, for example, Britain, France, and the United States ment, it is politically oriented toward managing a danger- argued that aircraft carriers were essentially defensive; con- ous and difficult imbalance between the nuclear haves and versely, Germany, Italy, the Soviet Union, and Japan have-nots. Similarly, the parties to the 1990 Conventional asserted that they were inherently offensive because they Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty were all members of either were useful for launching surprise attacks. In the era of the the NATO or Warsaw Pact alliances. Although a general United Nations, similar attempts to foster far-reaching aim of the treaty was to reduce conventional forces in

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Europe, its organizing principle was military balance Although effective verification may make it harder for between the two blocs. There was thus a strong rivalry- cheaters to covertly “break out” of agreements, the basic specific core within the broader general agreement. political problem of when, where, and how to counter Yet another form of arms control is the supplier-car- their threatening military power remains, and will be tel regime, in which participants who share a leading posi- decided by the parties that are both willing and able to do tion on a given weapons technology agree to restrict its something about it. Thus, although it is a form of inter- transfer to other parties outside the cartel. A formula of national cooperation, arms control does not transcend this sort is wired into the NPT in that the NWS agree not power politics. to transfer nuclear weapons to NNWS. But the purest There is one more note of caution: Effective arms example is the Missile Technology Control Regime control agreements that do produce mutual verifiable cuts (MCTR), which enjoins parties possessing advanced bal- will expose new gaps and asymmetries in the balance of listic missile capabilities not to export the technology to forces among potential rivals, and, as a result, may encour- other states. Begun in 1987 by the United States and six age them to channel new investments into other—and of its closest allies (Britain, Canada, France, West potentially more destabilizing—weapons systems. This is Germany, Italy, and Japan), the MCTR cartel grew to most likely to occur when, despite major agreements, the thirty-three members, including Russia, and also attracted embers of political competition continue to smolder. One the “unilateral” adherence of a number of other key play- of the important effects of the Washington Naval agree- ers, most notably China and India. ments was to facilitate the parties’ shift of focus and resources to competitive aircraft carrier development— PROBLEMS AND CRITIQUES OF with portentous consequences for the outbreak and con- ARMS CONTROL duct of World War II in the Pacific. The most important general critique of arms control is Proponents of arms control do not deny that these that if states become or threaten to become aggressive, problems exist, but they point out that arms control is not arms control is rendered irrelevant and even pernicious: It always hostage to the vagaries of the political environ- encourages false hopes, wastes political energies on ment—it can shape that environment too. Arms control is panaceas, and, worst of all, lowers defenses that need more than just a means by which states press fixed rather to be raised. By the same token, critics contend, national interests; it involves a political process that may arms control is most readily achieved and likely to work permit them to learn more about each other, to deflate when it is least needed—that is, when international poli- exaggerated images of “the enemy,” and to conceive of tics are placid or when foes concur that the weapons in interests in more compatible ways. If it is folly to pursue question lack utility. In the 1991 Strategic Arms arms control with irredeemably aggressive states, it is just Reduction Treaty (START I), struck after the cold war as foolish not to pursue it when the situation is less clear- evaporated with the end of the Warsaw Pact and the with- cut, for arms control itself may help not only to bring clar- drawal of Soviet forces in Eastern Europe, Washington ity but also to prevent potentially aggressive states from and Moscow achieved stunning success in agreeing to 30 becoming aggressors. to 40 percent cuts in the number of deployed strategic nuclear weapons: Such cuts had been impossible in the hostile and distrustful atmosphere of earlier decades. ARMS RACE: CONCEPT AND Once the political bases for enmity are removed, arms CONTROVERSIES control can seem easy. An arms race occurs only when parties for whom war is a In circumstances of rivalry, in which trust and confi- possibility engage in strategically interdependent increases dence-building is most needed, solutions to the verifica- in the quantity and/or quality of weapons: Their respec- tion problem (of measuring compliance with arms control tive acquisitions and buildups are meant to match or over- agreements) can prove elusive. Insistence on highly intru- come the strengths of the other side. The element of sive forms of verification, moreover, can mask a basic strategic interdependence is central to the identification of unwillingness to reach agreement and negotiations can the arms race as a phenomenon of international politics, become a charade: Here the goal is not to find common which requires states to rely ultimately on their own mili- ground but merely to avoid taking the blame for the fail- tary forces for security, because the military forces of other ure to do so. Assuming a workable verification mechanism states may threaten them and there is no world govern- can be agreed on, there remains, as Fred Iklé famously ment to protect them. In such a milieu, where falling observed, the enforcement problem—how to punish the behind one’s competitors can potentially lead to the cheaters that are caught. There is nothing about an arms gravest consequences, arms racing can be seen as a normal, control treaty that can make sanctions automatic: survival-enhancing behavior.

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Nevertheless, arms races are often considered harmful others do not, are certain types more conducive to war because they lead states that are trying to outpace each than others? Do the dynamics of qualitative races (in other to devote more resources to military preparations which competitors seek innovative capabilities that will than would otherwise be necessary for their security. render their rival’s obsolete) differ from quantitative races Increased military buildup, in turn, means that fewer (in which competitors seek a numerical advantage in rela- resources can be devoted to other, welfare-enhancing tively comparable weapons)? Samuel Huntington’s answer activities. When the competitive dynamic of arms racing to these questions blended the two concerns by arguing comes to dominate other principles for controlling acqui- that quantitative arms races are more dangerous than sitions, the buildup (and concomitant waste) can mount qualitative ones because, among other reasons, quantita- precipitously. For example, during the most dramatic tive races require increasingly costly sacrifices that put upswing of the cold war nuclear arms race, as the Soviet pressure on states to seek a quick and violent escape from arsenal grew and American planners became ever more the competition. Others have suggested that arms races ambitious in their target selection, the U.S. nuclear war- that generate large swings back and forth in relative head stockpile climbed from approximately 1,000 in strength (thus creating tempting opportunities for aggres- 1955, to 18,000 in 1960, to 32,000 by 1967. It was very sion by the temporary leader) are the most dangerous. Still hard to understand why a much smaller (and cheaper) others have made the intuitive point that arms races which arsenal of warheads would not have been sufficient to give big advantages to states that favor the status quo are achieve the main strategic purposes: deterring a Soviet more likely to result in peace than those which give big nuclear strike on the United States, or a conventional advantages to states with aggressive intentions (although assault on Western Europe. this ignores the possibility that a status-quo state may want to use its temporary margin of strength to defeat an The worst fears about arms races, however, are not aggressive adversary before it, in turn, becomes stronger). that they are wasteful but that they can cause wars by feed- ing conflict-spirals that do not just reflect enmities, but cre- During the cold war, these concerns were amplified ate and reinforce them. In this view, arming itself may by the fact that the arms race in question was nuclear: If become the stuff over which states fight. The conflict-spi- it had led to war, it would truly have been a “race to obliv- ral premise is what makes many figurative uses of the term ion.” The survival of human life—let alone civilization— arms race inapt. It has, for example, been used to describe following a major nuclear exchange between the cold war rivals would be questionable. Furthermore, it was clear the spike in steroid use among the “slugger-elite” of pro- that unless effective arms control measures were taken to fessional baseball, and also the steady pace of miniaturiza- interrupt the competitive dynamic, the superpowers’ tion and computing-capacity innovation among nuclear race would metastasize, creeping into other rival- microchip developers. But few would argue that the great- ries throughout the international system. Even if arms rac- est danger of steroid use in baseball is that the supersized ing increased the likelihood of war only by small margins, sluggers will eventually fall on each other in sudden bat- as the number of nuclear “racers” multiplied so too would wielding melees, or that the technology race among the prospects for nuclear holocaust. Concerns such as microchip producers will lead to a cataclysmic collapse of these provided the impetus behind the rivalry-specific and the high-tech economy. general nuclear arms-control efforts discussed above, and Two objections to the conflict-spiral conception of while the politics of the NPT remain contentious, and a arms racing are often raised. The first and most intuitive number of crucial nuclear-weapons states are not mem- is that arms races do not cause hostility but are its conse- bers (Israel, India, Pakistan, and North Korea), the NPT quence. They reflect the maneuvering of rivals consciously does appear to have helped stem the contagion of nuclear seeking a margin of advantage that will permit aggression arms and arms races among states. or deter it, not some unfortunate misunderstanding—and As the cold war recedes, and with it the chilling that being the case, buildups may prevent war, because imagery of a nuclear-arms-race-spiral, the concept of an they reinforce mutual caution. Second, even if an arms arms race remains useful. It has striking relevance to an race between status-quo-oriented states does sometimes important issue of international security today: the milita- culminate in war, their decisions to fight are based on con- rization of outer space. From the 1960s to the 1980s, the crete stakes and complex political judgments that simply Soviet Union and the United States experimented with cannot be reduced to reciprocal fears caused by the arms weapons designed to destroy earth-orbiting satellites, race itself. which have tremendous civilian and military utility. The Nevertheless, there is an impressive amount of feared arms race in such weapons did not then material- research on the connection between arms races and war, ize, and the end of the cold war put the issue on ice. In most of which has tended to focus on a few key questions: 2007, however, China surprised the world by testing an Given that some arms races culminate in wars, whereas antisatellite weapon, challenging the presumption of the

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United States’ military preeminence in space. Thus, the Downs, George W. 1991. Arms Races and War. In Behavior, prospect of a space arms race was resurrected, and the Society, and Nuclear War, vol. 2, ed. Philip E. Tetlock, Jo L. question of whether such a race could become so intense Husbands, Robert Jervis, Paul C. Stern, and Charles Tilly, as to raise the probability of war was reopened—along 73–109. New York: Oxford University Press. with the question of whether arms control could serve to Fairbanks, Charles H., Jr., and Abram N. Shulsky. 1987. From prevent war. ‘Arms Control’ to ‘Arms Reductions’: The Historical Experience. Washington Quarterly 10 (3): 59–72. Still, in the early twenty-first century concerns over the arms-race-spiral as a potential cause of nuclear war Falkenrath, Richard A. 1995. Shaping Europe’s Military Order: The Origins and Consequences of the CFE Treaty. Cambridge, seemed to decline relative to fears of another nuclear MA: MIT Press. nightmare scenario—that of “loose nukes” getting into the hands of terrorists. This perceived and perhaps real Garthoff, Raymond L. 1994. Detente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan. Rev. ed. shift in nuclear risk raises important questions about the Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press. future agenda of arms control concerning nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction: Can the Garthoff, Raymond L. 1994. The Great Transition: American- Soviet Relations and the End of the Cold War. Washington, existing nonproliferation regimes—with some clever DC: Brookings Institution Press. rewiring—furnish satisfactory solutions? Or must a new matrix of rivalry-specific, general, and supplier-cartel Glaser, Charles L. 2000. The Causes and Consequences of Arms Races. Annual Review of Political Science 3: 251–276. agreements be contrived to manage risky relationships between states and nonstate actors? And if the latter is Glaser, Charles L. 2004. When Are Arms Races Dangerous? necessary, will the supportive international political con- Rational versus Suboptimal Arming. International Security 28 (4): 44–84. text on which arms control depends take shape and be maintained? For common danger does not make security Goldman, Emily O. 1994. Sunken Treaties: Naval Arms Control between the Wars. University Park: Pennsylvania State cooperation inevitable. Without a countervailing com- University Press. mon will, a construct entirely contingent on politics, the states that oppose this danger will make a rabble, not a Gray, Colin S. 1971. The Arms Race Phenomenon. World Politics 24 (1): 39–79. regime. Gray, Colin S. 1992. House of Cards: Why Arms Control Must SEE ALSO Cold War; Deterrence, Mutual; Gorbachev, Fail. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Mikhail; Huntington, Samuel P.; League of Nations; Hafner, Donald L. 1980–1981. Averting a Brobdingnagian Skeet Militarism; National Security; Politics; Reagan, Shoot: Arms Control Measures for Anti-Satellite Weapons. Ronald; Terrorism; Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; International Security 5 (3): 41–60. United Nations; Weaponry, Nuclear; Weapons Huntington, Samuel P. 1958. Arms Races: Prerequisites and Industry; Weapons of Mass Destruction Results. Public Policy 8 (1): 41–86. Iklé, Fred Charles. 1961. After Detection—What? Foreign Affairs BIBLIOGRAPHY 39 (2): 208–220. Adler, Emanuel. 1992. The Emergence of Cooperation: National Intriligator, Michael D., and Dagobert L. Brito. 1989. Epistemic Communities and the International Evolution of Richardsonian Arms Race Models. In Handbook of War the Idea of Nuclear Arms Control. International Organization Studies, ed. Manus I. Midlarsky, 219–236. Boston: Unwin 46 (1): 101–145. Hyman. Betts, Richard K. 1992. Systems for Peace or Causes of War? Jervis, Robert. 1982. Security Regimes. International Collective Security, Arms Control, and the New Europe. Organization 36 (2): 357–378. International Security 17 (1): 5–43. Jervis, Robert. 1993. Arms Control, Stability, and Causes of Brennan, Donald G., ed. 1961. Arms Control, Disarmament, and War. Political Science Quarterly 108 (2): 239–253. National Security. New York: Braziller. Kennedy, Paul M. 1983. Arms Races and the Causes of War, Brodie, Bernard. 1976. On the Objectives of Arms Control. 1850–1945. In Strategy and Diplomacy, 1870–1945: Eight International Security 1 (1): 17–36. Studies, 165–177. London: Allen and Unwin. Bull, Hedley. 1961. The Control of the Arms Race: Disarmament Larsen, Jeffrey A., ed. 2004. Arms Control: Cooperative Security in and Arms Control in the Missile Age. New York: Praeger. a Changing Environment. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. Buzan, Barry, and Eric Herring. 1998. The Arms Dynamic in Lavoy, Peter R. 1991. Learning and the Evolution of World Politics. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. Cooperation in U.S. and Soviet Nuclear Nonproliferation Diehl, Paul F., and Mark J. C. Crescenzi. 1998. Reconfiguring Activities. In Learning in U.S. and Soviet Foreign Policy, ed. the Arms Race-War Debate. Journal of Peace Research 35: George W. Breslauer and Phillip E. Tetlock, 735–783. 111–118. Boulder, CO: Westview.

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Levi, Michael A., and Michael E. O’Hanlon. 2005. The Future ARMSTRONG, LOUIS of Arms Control. Washington DC: Brookings Institution SEE Press. Jazz. Lieber, Keir A. 2005. Grasping the Technological Peace: The Offense-Defense Balance and International Security. International Security 25 (1): 71–104. Mistry, Dinshaw. 2003. Containing Missile Proliferation: Strategic ARONSON, ELLIOT Technology, Security Regimes, and International Cooperation in 1932– Arms Control. Seattle: University of Washington Press. Elliot Aronson is a prominent American social psycholo- Morrow, James D. 1989. A Twist of Truth: A Reexamination of gist. Born in Revere, Massachusetts, on January 9, 1932, the Effects of Arms Races on the Occurrence of War. Journal of Conflict Resolution 33 (3): 500–529. his career has spanned nearly fifty years. He is renowned as a creative methodologist who conducts carefully Nye, Joseph S., Jr. 1989–1990. Arms Control after the Cold crafted, highly impactful experiments to explore the War. Foreign Affairs 68 (5): 42–64. causes and consequences of human social behavior. His O’Hanlon, Michael E. 2004. Neither Star Wars nor Sanctuary: style of experimentation builds on the legacy of Kurt Constraining the Military Uses of Space. Washington DC: Lewin (1890–1947) and Leon Festinger (1919–1989). Brookings Institution Press. Aronson’s textbook, The Social Animal (9th ed., 2003), is Pringle, Peter, and William Arkin. 1983. S.I.O.P.: The Secret U.S. widely used and highly regarded for its pedagogical inno- Plan for Nuclear War. New York: Norton. vations. He is also known for his work as coeditor of two Rathjens, George W. 1969. The Dynamics of the Arms Race. editions (1969, 1985) of the important Handbook of Scientific American 220 (4): 15–25. Social Psychology. He has been a highly successful mentor Richardson, Lewis. 1960. Arms and Insecurity: A Mathematical of doctoral students, including many who have made sig- Study of the Causes and Origins of War. Pacific Grove, CA: nificant contributions to the field of social psychology Boxwood Press and Quadrangle Books. during distinguished careers. Rosenberg, David Alan. 1983. The Origins of Overkill: Nuclear Aronson earned a bachelor’s degree in 1954 at Weapons and American Strategy, 1945–1960. International Brandeis University, where he was mentored by Abraham Security 7 (4): 3–71. Maslow (1908–1970). He then earned a master of arts Sample, Susan G. 2000. Military Buildups: Arming and War. In degree at Wesleyan University in 1956, and completed the What Do We Know about War? ed. John A. Vasquez, PhD program at Stanford University in 1959, where his 165–195. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield. mentor was Festinger, known for developing the theory of Schear, James A. 1989 Verification, Compliance, and Arms cognitive dissonance. Aronson subsequently held faculty Control: The Dynamics of the Domestic Debate. In Nuclear positions at Harvard University, the University of Arguments: Understanding the Strategic Nuclear Arms and Minnesota, the University of Texas at Austin, and the Arms Control Debates, ed. Lynn Eden and Steven E. Miller, University of California at Santa Cruz, where he has been 264–321. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. professor emeritus since 1994. Since 2001 he has also Schelling, Thomas C., and Morton H. Halperin. 1961. Strategy been distinguished visiting professor at Stanford and Arms Control. New York: Twentieth Century Fund. University. Siverson, Randolph M., and Paul F. Diehl. 1989. Arms Races, Beginning in 1959 and continuing through the mid- the Conflict Spiral, and the Onset of War. In Handbook of 1960s, Aronson published a number of widely cited War Studies, ed. Manus I. Midlarsky, 195–218. Boston: experiments that tested derivations from the theory of Unwin Hyman. cognitive dissonance, providing support for dissonance- Talbott, Strobe. 1979. Endgame: The Inside Story of SALT II. theory explanations of such phenomena as effort justifica- New York: Harper and Row. tion (evaluating an outcome more positively after a high Talbott, Strobe. 1985. Deadly Gambits: The Reagan degree of effort was required to attain it) and insufficient Administration and the Stalemate in Nuclear Arms Control. deterrence (devaluing a forgone pleasure when the threat- New York: Vintage. ened aversive consequence was minimal). Aronson pro- Weber, Steven. 1991. Cooperation and Discord in U.S.-Soviet posed a useful modification to the theory of cognitive Arms Control. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. dissonance by asserting that the dissonant cognitions must be self-relevant, and that dissonance reduction will be York, Herbert. 1970. Race to Oblivion: A Participant’s View of the directed at preserving one’s self image. In the 1990s he Arms Race. New York: Simon and Schuster. returned to this topic in experiments that show that mak- ing salient a discrepancy between the behavior that one Timothy W. Crawford advocates for others and one’s own behavior (hypocrisy)

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