Summer 2017-18

Dr Brendan Taylor and Dr H. D. P. Envall Dr Brendan Taylor is an Associate Professor Speculation is rife that North Korea’s burgeoning and Acting Director of the Coral Bell School of nuclear and ballistic missile programs will Asia Pacific Affairs at ANU. Specialising in great spark a dangerous new Northeast Asian power strategic relations in the Asia-Pacific, arms race. In May of this year, senior officials the US-Australia alliance and regional security in United States President Donald Trump’s architecture, he served as Head of the Strategic administration reportedly confided in Australian

04 A nuclear arms race in & Defence Studies Centre from 2011-2016. Foreign Minister Julie Bishop their fears that He has published over 100 scholarly papers, such an arms race was “inevitable” should including in a number of the world’s leading the international community fail to rein in Northeast Asia? journals such as the Washington Quarterly, Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile advances. Survival and International Affairs. He has also During an interview on CNN in October 2017, authored or edited eight books. His current former US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton research focuses on flashpoints in Asia, to be agreed, asserting that “we will now have an published as a book by Black Inc in 2018. arms race–a nuclear arms race in East Asia”. H. D. P. (David) Envall is a Research Fellow in Senior political figures like Minister Bishop and the Department of International Relations at Secretary Clinton have encountered no shortage ANU. In addition to having worked as a copy of strategic analysts willing to substantiate editor and corporate editor/writer, David their claims. The prominent American has formerly held appointments at Tokyo commentator Michael Auslin, for instance, International University and La Trobe University. argued recently that “North Korea is ensuring a David has a BA (Hons) from the University of nuclear arms race”. Similarly, the late Desmond Melbourne, an MA from Hitotsubashi University, Ball pointed presciently to a predominantly and a PhD from the University of Melbourne. naval Northeast Asian arms race–through His research interests include Japanese one with clear nuclear dimensions–in a paper political leadership, Japan’s post-war security published just over half a decade ago. politics, and security in the Asia-Pacific. The arms race concept is widely employed. While its precise meaning remains contested, most experts agree that, used correctly, it applies to a relatively rare phenomenon in international relations. Dr Brendan Taylor and Dr H. D. P. Envall P. and Dr H. D. Taylor Dr Brendan

Pyongyang is clearly in a hurry to develop its inter-continental ballistic missile capability, to enable it to deliver a nuclear strike on the continental US. North Korea’s leader, Kim Jong-un, has authorised more missile tests in 2017 alone than his father, Kim Jong‑Il, did during his entire reign from 1994-2011.

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First and foremost, a defining characteristic are indeed reactive. Rather, they appear to of any arms race is the notion of “reciprocal reflect nothing other than the culmination interaction”. In other words, two or more states of a decades-long determination to establish need to disagree over the “proper” balance North Korea as a fully-fledged nuclear power. of military power between them and they There is certainly some evidence to suggest, need to be self-consciously increasing their 04 however, that South Korea has been responding arsenals–quantitatively or qualitatively, or both– to Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile advances specifically in response to that disagreement. in ways consistent with the arms race concept. Second, for arms-racing in any genuine sense of Much to China’s chagrin, for instance, Seoul in the term to occur, this action-reaction dynamic July 2017 confirmed that it would proceed with ought to be occurring rapidly. The classic the installation of the US Terminal High Altitude historical example of the arms race phenomenon Area Defense (THAAD) missile defence system is that involving Britain and Germany in the immediately following a North Korean ICBM period prior to the First World War. Then, the test. Similarly, in September 2017 in the wake British responded to Germany’s naval build-up of North Korea’s sixth nuclear test, the Trump by developing a powerful new class of warship administration acceded to a request from Seoul called the dreadnought, which the Germans to remove the 500-kilogram weight limit in place subsequently copied. In the decade preceding the on conventional warheads provided by the US First World War, the number of dreadnoughts to South Korea. Removing these restrictions built by Britain was influenced significantly by affords Seoul much greater capacity to strike the numbers built by Germany, and vice versa. against the North in the event of conflict. Pyongyang is clearly in a hurry to develop Yet South Korean responses to Pyongyang’s its inter-continental ballistic missile (ICBM) advancing nuclear and missile programs have capability, to enable it to deliver a nuclear strike not been as rapid as the arms race concept would on the continental US. North Korea’s leader, anticipate. THAAD deployment, for instance, Kim Jong-un, has authorised more missile was politically fraught and proceeded fitfully. tests in 2017 alone than his father, Kim Jong‑Il, The decision to deploy was initially announced did during his entire reign from 1994-2011. by the US and South Korea in July 2016. Yet this Likewise, three of North Korea’s six nuclear decision was called into question by the May tests have taken place under Kim Jong-un’s 2017 election of President Moon Jae-in. Whilst watch. Consistent with the arms race concept, on the campaign trail, Moon had pledged North Korea’s foreign minister Ri Yong Ho has to review THAAD deployment. Likewise, Envall P. and Dr H. D. Taylor Dr Brendan indicated that Pyongyang’s pursuit of nuclear while South Korean conservatives have called weapons is intended to realise a “balance for the redeployment of US tactical nuclear of power with the US”. Moreover, there has weapons removed in 1991 to the Peninsula, been an evident action-reaction dynamic to South Korea’s Defense Minister Song Young- the increasingly vitriolic statements traded moo dismissed this as a potential reaction to between Kim and Trump. Beyond the rhetoric, Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile advances however, there is very little evidence to suggest following a meeting with his US counterpart, that Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile advances Defense Secretary Jim Mattis, in October 2017.

North Korea’s foreign minister Ri Yong Ho has indicated that Pyongyang’s pursuit of nuclear weapons is intended to realise a “balance of power with the US”.

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There is some evidence to suggest the What such prognoses fail to account for, that both superpowers maintained provided however, is the tradition of self-restraint them with a reaction time of approximately existence of action-reaction dynamics in the which has long been a feature of Asian 30 minutes”. In Northeast Asia today, strategic culture. Writing in the late 1980s however, “the region is simply too compact, responses of Seoul and Tokyo to those North and challenging the conventional wisdom such that warning times of a pre-emptive that arms control measures were next to first strike will be virtually non-existent”. 04 Korean advances. Again, however, those non-existent in this region, for instance, the Growing speculation notwithstanding, the respected strategic commentator Gerald Segal reactions have not occurred with the degree of spectre of a Northeast Asian nuclear arms race concluded that informal and inherently more thus still appears some way off. To be sure, flexible arms control measures “based as much rapidity anticipated and required by the arms Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile capabilities on unstated self-restraint” constituted one are advancing faster than most analysts race concept. of “the hallmarks of Asian arms control”. anticipated. Yet there is little evidence of Three decades on, it would be worth exploring reciprocal interaction–the very essence of arms- further whether Tokyo and Seoul’s thus racing–as a driver of North Korean behaviour. far quite measured responses in the face of There is some evidence to suggest the Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile advances are, existence of action-reaction dynamics in in fact, a product of this deep-seated culture of the responses of Seoul and Tokyo to those self-restraint. Is China’s still relatively modest North Korean advances. Again, however, Tokyo’s reactions to North Korea’s nuclear nuclear and missile advances have been nuclear arsenal a reflection of this culture those reactions have not occurred with and missile advances have followed a similar highly incremental and protracted. Contrary too? Will North Korea continue to expand the degree of rapidity anticipated and pattern. Over the course of the past quarter to the expectations of the arms race concept, its nuclear and missile forces indefinitely, required by the arms race concept. century, these advances have steadily pushed it is thus hard to sustain the contention that or will a measure of self-restraint appear Japan into reforming key elements of its national Japan’s reactions to Pyongyang’s provocations from Pyongyang at some point also? Further, Japanese and South Korean responses defence policy. The August 1998 Taepodong constitute a major qualitative or quantitative can also be seen as the product of the continued Should such a culture of self-restraint today missile test fired by North Korea over Japanese shift, as opposed to reflecting a more considered erosion of American extended nuclear exist, the Singaporean practitioner Bilahari territory, for instance, pushed Tokyo into military modernisation process. Mounting deterrence. In other words, Tokyo and Seoul Kausikan calls for its abandonment. In a further reviewing its defence capabilities and, speculation that Japan “going nuclear” will be are not simply engaging in an arms race with provocative, yet sophisticated contribution to ultimately, cooperating with the US on ballistic a central element in Northeast Asia’s emerging North Korea but are also hedging against the Northeast Asian nuclear arms race debate, missile defence. Likewise, North Korea’s nuclear arms race runs into similar difficulties. the risk of abandonment by the US. Indeed, he asserts that regional stability would be best October 2006 nuclear test prompted open Beyond the political and public arguments it is not altogether inconceivable that either served by Japan and South Korea pursuing discussion in Japan about the utility of that would have to be made within Japan, or both might ultimately embark down the nuclear weapons. Following a Waltzian logic,

possessing an indigenous nuclear deterrent. substantial and complex operational planning nuclear path themselves if they no longer Envall P. and Dr H. D. Taylor Dr Brendan Kausikan argues that such a development would would be needed for such a development to view the US nuclear umbrella as a sufficient Pyongyang’s most recent nuclear and missile allow for “a six-way balance of mutually assured occur. As the technologically-savvy strategic deterrent to Pyongyang. Suggestions that tests appear to be triggering even more destruction (MAD) among the US, China, Russia, commentator Richard Bitzinger has recently such a development is inevitable, however, substantial reactions. They have, for example, Japan, South Korea and North Korea” to form. observed, numerous operational steps and underestimates the self-restraint which has long prompted former Japanese Minister of Defense Just as the fear of MAD served to effectively capability issues would need to be resolved, been a feature of this region’s strategic culture. Shigeru Ishiba to raise the prospect Tokyo might deter the Americans and the Soviets from and there is little evidence today that Japan has loosen its three non-nuclear principles and entering the nuclear abyss during the Cold War, even begun to put such a process in place. While a Northeast Asian nuclear arms race seems seek to have the US introduce nuclear weapons Kausikan contends, so will it ultimately unlikely at this juncture, arguments that such a into Japan. Tokyo is considering developing Commentators predicting the emergence of prove stabilising in Northeast Asia today. shift might ultimately prove stabilising should further counterstrike capabilities to provide a Northeast Asian nuclear arms race might be treated with considerable caution. Northeast However, Kausikan’s proposal underestimates a more multi-layered response strategy for argue that South Korean and Japanese policies Asia’s strategic dynamics are considerably the difficulty of applying the Cold War construct retaliating against a North Korean attack. to date have only been possible because of the more complex and fluid than those obtained of MAD to contemporary Northeast Asia. Japan’s Ministry of Defense has also requested confidence that Seoul and Tokyo have had in between the superpowers during the Cold War. The greater number of players involved here an increase in the country’s defence budget for the nuclear umbrella provided by their senior renders this region infinitely more complex and 2018, with specific items including an onshore ally, the US. Yet as the confidence of Seoul and Ensuring that a proper Northeast Asian unpredictable than the much simpler bipolar version of the Aegis missile defence system. Tokyo in US extended nuclear deterrence erodes nuclear arms race does not take off, however world which existed during the superpower in the face of North Korea’s nuclear and missile improbable one might seem, should Yet there are also important weaknesses in stalemate. Moreover, Northeast Asia’s strategic advances, these commentators would argue, so thus remain a matter of high priority for the argument that Japan is engaged in arms geography is different. As another Singaporean too are the pace of Japanese and South Korean both regional and US policymakers. -racing behaviour. As in the South Korean scholar Bernard Loo has recently observed, reactions to those advances likely to increase. case, Tokyo’s reactions to North Korea’s during the Cold War “the early warning systems

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