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Case Studies and Theories of the Arms Race

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Case Studies and Theories of the Arms Race Case Studies and Theories of the Arms Race Matthew Evangelista* Political Science Department, University of Michigan 1. Introduction: theory and policy one theory of the arms race is indisputably For several decades, students of the better than another. It does, however, of- Soviet-American arms race have sought to fer a way to evaluate competing explana- understand its main determinants by un- tions in a more rigorous fashion and come dertaking detailed case studies of indi- to more meaningful (albeit, still tentative) vidual decisions on weapons. At times it conclusions than does the approach that seems that there are more arms-race relies on single case studies.’-2 ’theories’ than there are weapons decisions Finally, if one is interested not only in to explain. Social scientists have called this theory, but in policy as well, one seeks an problem ’overdetermination’ - the fact that explanation that helps to indicate how to there are too many plausible explanations effect change. If an explanation is as com- for the same phenomenon and no clear plicated as reality itself, it provides no way of choosing between them.’1 guidance. Thus, a method for identifying A more promising approach to case the strongest explanatory factors influenc- studies would focus on key factors that are ing the production of weapons should be of claimed to influence the production of new interest whether one defines one’s goals as weapons, according to a particular theory ’military reform’ or ’stopping the arms or explanation of the arms race. One could race . then evaluate the competing theories and The purpose of this study is to describe identify the more powerful explanatory the problem of ’overdetermination’ as it factors by conducting parallel case studies appears in explanations for NATO’s of similar types of decisions, both for weapon production and to illustrate a com- weapons that were produced and for those parative case-study method for eliminating that were not. the weaker explanations in favor of one Those factors that are found both in de- with greater explanatory power.33 cisions for and decisions against produc- tion should logically be considered less 2. Competing explanations crucial than those that are present in deci- Four decisions on nuclear weapon produc- sions for, yet are missing in decisions tion for NATO will be discussed here, and against. two explanations that seem - superficially Such a method, based on a ’structured, - to account equally well for the outcomes focused comparison’, cannot prove that of the decisions. The four cases are: (1) the production and deployment of Thor and * Matthew Evangelista is Assistant Professor at Jupiter missiles in 1959-1960; (2) the deci- the Political Science of Department, University sion not to produce and deploy the Mul- Michigan, Ann Arbor; he was previously Re- the mid- search Fellow at Cornell University, Stanford tilateral Force (MLF) during University and at the Brookings Institution. 1960s; (3) the decision to begin production 197 of the enhanced-radiation warhead (ERW) The military fix explanation seems to or ’neutron bomb’ in 1978; and (4) the 1979 work for the same cases. It apparently fits NATO decision to produce and deploy Thor-Jupiter. The decision has been de- cruise and Pershing II missiles. scribed as an attempt to pull the alliance The explanations both fall into the back together after the Suez crisis of 1956. category of responses to external de- The MLF could be explained as a military velopments. The first - ’action-reaction’ - fix which was unnecessary and therefore tries to explain production of new nuclear unsuccessful. The explanation would go as weapons for NATO as responses to Soviet follows: Although the Kennedy-Adenauer initiatives. The second - the military ’fix’ - conflicts of the early 1960s were an alliance sees production of new nuclear weapons as political problem of sufficient seriousness an attempt to restore alliance cohesion to warrant a ’military’ solution (and the through largely symbolic military means. MLF was explicitly considered in this These two explanations do not represent light), many observers felt that alliance the entire spectrum of theories of the arms doubts about the American commitment race. It is argued here, however, that they diminished in the aftermath of the Cuban have figured most prominently in attempts missile crisis (because American resolve to to explain NATO nuclear decisions. It risk nuclear war was demonstrated), and should be noted that this study does not for this reason the MLF was no longer deal with NATO nuclear relations per se. necessary. because it does not see alliance decision- Again the ERW case is an anomaly. making procedures as crucial in determin- Carter’s decision to ask the Europeans to ing whether or not the US produces nuc- request the weapon before he would agree lear weapons for NATO4 to produce it was not viewed as a military Action-reaction appears to work for solution to political problems. Rather, it three out of four cases: Thor-Jupiter and became a major alliance problem in itself cruise-Pershing II were produced because (one of many that justified the 1979 NATO they were reactions to Soviet programs decision on political grounds, making that (emerging ballistic missile systems and the decision also seem to fit the military fix SS-20, respectively); MLF was not pro- explanation). Reagan’s decision to go duced because there was no Soviet threat ahead with production after Carter had that was not already countered by existing changed his mind and deferred it certainly US strategic systems (and general US was not intended to mend alliance rela- strategic superiority). The neutron bomb tions, and the effect was indeed the oppo- production decision is not explained by site. action-reaction, however. Although it was justified as an anti-tank weapon intended 3. Technological entrepreneurship - to offset Soviet superiority in numbers of We shall now focus on the anomalous case tanks, this superiority has existed since ~ of the neutron bomb and try to construct 1945 and enhanced-radiation technology it- an alternative explanation to account for self has existed since the late 1950s. Ac- those developments that action-reaction tion-reaction does not explain why Pres- and the military fix fail to explain. The ident Carter approved production of ERW explanation emphasizes internal determin- components for the Lance warhead in ants for most of the decision process, in 1978, why President Reagan approved full particular the bureaucratic forces that production and assembly of enhanced- promote new weapons technologies. It radiation weapons in 1981 or why Congress tries to incorporate external factors at the funded the W-82 ER-capable warhead in later stages of the process, suggesting that 1984. they provide a ’window’ through which the 198 new weapon can be promoted. By incor- Through his contacts in the Air Force, porating both internal and external factors Teller was able to get its Science Advisory the explanation seeks to avoid the unpro- Board to establish a panel to investigate ductive debate that followed the original the technical feasibility of the enhanced- presentation of the Eigendynamik (self- radiation concept. The panel, chaired by generating, internal dynamic) model.5 Cohen, presented its findings to the Air Clearly the arms race is driven by both Force in the fall of 1958, to an unen- internal and external determinants. The thusiastic response.9 important task is to identify which factors Teller, Cohen, and the other ERW sup- come into play at which stage, and to be porters next tried to sell their idea to the willing to set aside those factors that do Navy. Despite some initial interest, how- not have great bearing on the decision. ever, the Navy did not pursue enhanced- radiation warheads for its weapons. The 3.1. The neutron bomb: internal pressures likely reason is that by the late 1950s most The neutron bomb is a particularly useful of the navy’s nuclear programs centered case for evaluating competing explana- around nuclear-powered missile-carrying tions. One needs to address the question, submarines which had no use for ERWs ’why was a weapon that was invented in and did not need the budgetary competi- 1958 not produced until the late 1970s?’ If tion. 10 the conditions for an action-reaction or When Teller’s efforts to interest the Air military-fix explanation existed during this Force and Navy in producing ERWs period, they were not sufficient to lead to proved futile, he turned to the executive the weapon’s production. An alternative and legislative branches of the US gov- explanation is needed - one that can ac- ernment and to the civilian leadership of count for the weapon’s lack of success for the Defense Department. Captain John twenty years as well as its ultimate pro- Morse, in his capacity as assistant to the duction. chairman of the AEC, tried to reach the The concept of a warhead that kills President directly through drafting a primarily with neutron radiation was con- memorandum in support of ’clean’ sidered during the development of the hyd- weapons for tactical use.&dquo; Samuel Cohen rogen bomb in the late 1940s.6 During the was also in direct contact with the White debate over whether to build the hydrogen House, through the President’s aide, Major bomb, its opponents - most notably, J. John Eisenhower. In November 1959, the Robert Oppenheimer - argued in favor of President himself was briefed on the development of tactical nuclear weapons ERW. 12 as an alternative to strategic bombing. The extensive briefings conducted by Proponents of the H-bomb, including Ed- Samuel Cohen and other weapons lab sci- ward Teller, in turn argued that fusion entists attracted some public attention, and weapons themselves could have high tacti- information concerning enhanced-radiation cal value on a battlefield,.7 Thus, while weapons and the scientists’ lobbying ef- much of the research conducted at Teller’s forts appeared in the Washington Post and Livermore Laboratory from its founding in other publications, as early as 1959.
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