Case Studies and Theories of the Arms Race

Matthew Evangelista* Political Science Department, University of Michigan

1. Introduction: theory and policy one theory of the arms race is indisputably For several decades, students of the better than another. It does, however, of- Soviet-American arms race have sought to fer a way to evaluate competing explana- understand its main determinants by un- tions in a more rigorous fashion and come dertaking detailed case studies of indi- to more meaningful (albeit, still tentative) vidual decisions on weapons. At times it conclusions than does the approach that seems that there are more arms-race relies on single case studies.’-2 ’theories’ than there are weapons decisions Finally, if one is interested not only in to explain. Social scientists have called this theory, but in policy as well, one seeks an problem ’overdetermination’ - the fact that explanation that helps to indicate how to there are too many plausible explanations effect change. If an explanation is as com- for the same phenomenon and no clear plicated as reality itself, it provides no way of choosing between them.’1 guidance. Thus, a method for identifying A more promising approach to case the strongest explanatory factors influenc- studies would focus on key factors that are ing the production of weapons should be of claimed to influence the production of new interest whether one defines one’s goals as weapons, according to a particular theory ’military reform’ or ’stopping the arms or explanation of the arms race. One could race . then evaluate the competing theories and The purpose of this study is to describe identify the more powerful explanatory the problem of ’overdetermination’ as it factors by conducting parallel case studies appears in explanations for NATO’s of similar types of decisions, both for weapon production and to illustrate a com- weapons that were produced and for those parative case-study method for eliminating that were not. the weaker explanations in favor of one Those factors that are found both in de- with greater explanatory power.33 cisions for and decisions against produc- tion should logically be considered less 2. Competing explanations crucial than those that are present in deci- Four decisions on nuclear weapon produc- sions for, yet are missing in decisions tion for NATO will be discussed here, and against. two explanations that seem - superficially Such a method, based on a ’structured, - to account equally well for the outcomes focused comparison’, cannot prove that of the decisions. The four cases are: (1) the production and deployment of Thor and * Matthew Evangelista is Assistant Professor at Jupiter missiles in 1959-1960; (2) the deci- the Political Science of Department, University sion not to produce and deploy the Mul- Michigan, Ann Arbor; he was previously Re- the mid- search Fellow at Cornell University, Stanford tilateral Force (MLF) during University and at the Brookings Institution. 1960s; (3) the decision to begin production 197 of the enhanced-radiation warhead (ERW) The military fix explanation seems to or ’neutron bomb’ in 1978; and (4) the 1979 work for the same cases. It apparently fits NATO decision to produce and deploy Thor-Jupiter. The decision has been de- cruise and Pershing II missiles. scribed as an attempt to pull the alliance The explanations both fall into the back together after the Suez crisis of 1956. category of responses to external de- The MLF could be explained as a military velopments. The first - ’action-reaction’ - fix which was unnecessary and therefore tries to explain production of new nuclear unsuccessful. The explanation would go as weapons for NATO as responses to Soviet follows: Although the Kennedy-Adenauer initiatives. The second - the military ’fix’ - conflicts of the early 1960s were an alliance sees production of new nuclear weapons as political problem of sufficient seriousness an attempt to restore alliance cohesion to warrant a ’military’ solution (and the through largely symbolic military means. MLF was explicitly considered in this These two explanations do not represent light), many observers felt that alliance the entire spectrum of theories of the arms doubts about the American commitment race. It is argued here, however, that they diminished in the aftermath of the Cuban have figured most prominently in attempts missile crisis (because American resolve to to explain NATO nuclear decisions. It risk nuclear war was demonstrated), and should be noted that this study does not for this reason the MLF was no longer deal with NATO nuclear relations per se. necessary. because it does not see alliance decision- Again the ERW case is an anomaly. making procedures as crucial in determin- Carter’s decision to ask the Europeans to ing whether or not the US produces nuc- request the weapon before he would agree lear weapons for NATO4 to produce it was not viewed as a military Action-reaction appears to work for solution to political problems. Rather, it three out of four cases: Thor-Jupiter and became a major alliance problem in itself cruise-Pershing II were produced because (one of many that justified the 1979 NATO they were reactions to Soviet programs decision on political grounds, making that (emerging ballistic missile systems and the decision also seem to fit the military fix SS-20, respectively); MLF was not pro- explanation). Reagan’s decision to go duced because there was no Soviet threat ahead with production after Carter had that was not already countered by existing changed his mind and deferred it certainly US strategic systems (and general US was not intended to mend alliance rela- strategic superiority). The neutron bomb tions, and the effect was indeed the oppo- production decision is not explained by site. action-reaction, however. Although it was justified as an anti-tank weapon intended 3. Technological entrepreneurship - to offset Soviet superiority in numbers of We shall now focus on the anomalous case tanks, this superiority has existed since ~ of the neutron bomb and try to construct 1945 and enhanced-radiation technology it- an alternative explanation to account for self has existed since the late 1950s. Ac- those developments that action-reaction tion-reaction does not explain why Pres- and the military fix fail to explain. The ident Carter approved production of ERW explanation emphasizes internal determin- components for the Lance warhead in ants for most of the decision process, in 1978, why President Reagan approved full particular the bureaucratic forces that production and assembly of enhanced- promote new weapons technologies. It radiation weapons in 1981 or why Congress tries to incorporate external factors at the funded the W-82 ER-capable warhead in later stages of the process, suggesting that 1984. they provide a ’window’ through which the 198 new weapon can be promoted. By incor- Through his contacts in the Air Force, porating both internal and external factors Teller was able to get its Science Advisory the explanation seeks to avoid the unpro- Board to establish a panel to investigate ductive debate that followed the original the technical feasibility of the enhanced- presentation of the Eigendynamik (self- radiation concept. The panel, chaired by generating, internal dynamic) model.5 Cohen, presented its findings to the Air Clearly the arms race is driven by both Force in the fall of 1958, to an unen- internal and external determinants. The thusiastic response.9 important task is to identify which factors Teller, Cohen, and the other ERW sup- come into play at which stage, and to be porters next tried to sell their idea to the willing to set aside those factors that do Navy. Despite some initial interest, how- not have great bearing on the decision. ever, the Navy did not pursue enhanced- radiation warheads for its weapons. The 3.1. The neutron bomb: internal pressures likely reason is that by the late 1950s most The neutron bomb is a particularly useful of the navy’s nuclear programs centered case for evaluating competing explana- around nuclear-powered missile-carrying tions. One needs to address the question, submarines which had no use for ERWs ’why was a weapon that was invented in and did not need the budgetary competi- 1958 not produced until the late 1970s?’ If tion. 10 the conditions for an action-reaction or When Teller’s efforts to interest the Air military-fix explanation existed during this Force and Navy in producing ERWs period, they were not sufficient to lead to proved futile, he turned to the executive the weapon’s production. An alternative and legislative branches of the US gov- explanation is needed - one that can ac- ernment and to the civilian leadership of count for the weapon’s lack of success for the Defense Department. Captain John twenty years as well as its ultimate pro- Morse, in his capacity as assistant to the duction. chairman of the AEC, tried to reach the The concept of a warhead that kills President directly through drafting a primarily with neutron radiation was con- memorandum in support of ’clean’ sidered during the development of the hyd- weapons for tactical use.&dquo; Samuel Cohen rogen bomb in the late 1940s.6 During the was also in direct contact with the White debate over whether to build the hydrogen House, through the President’s aide, Major bomb, its opponents - most notably, J. John Eisenhower. In November 1959, the Robert Oppenheimer - argued in favor of President himself was briefed on the development of tactical nuclear weapons ERW. 12 as an alternative to strategic bombing. The extensive briefings conducted by Proponents of the H-bomb, including Ed- Samuel Cohen and other weapons lab sci- ward Teller, in turn argued that fusion entists attracted some public attention, and weapons themselves could have high tacti- information concerning enhanced-radiation cal value on a battlefield,.7 Thus, while weapons and the scientists’ lobbying ef- much of the research conducted at Teller’s forts appeared in the Washington Post and Livermore Laboratory from its founding in other publications, as early as 1959. Teller 1952 involved high-yield fusion weapons, and his colleagues were by this time mainly by the late 1950s considerable work was trying to convince the Army to adopt being done on lower-yield weapons for ERWs as tactical weapons. The fact that tactical use. The main breakthrough came Teller and Cohen turned to the Army only in 1958, as a result of the work of Samuel after unsuccessful attempts to interest the Cohen, then a physicist at the RAND Cor- Air Force and Navy in ERWs belies the poration.8s popular impression that Cohen created the 199 ERW primarily as a battlefield anti-tank very elite group that meets with outside in the defense weapon for European use. As Cohen him- people community and in the various think tanks. They are working very self writes, in mind that it was in the ’keep aggressively, trying to influence the DOD context of Asian scenarios that the neutron (Department of Defense) to consider using bomb was first conceived’.&dquo; these (deleted) weapons which could be very In any case, Teller and Cohen were not decisive on a battlefield, yet would limit col- lateral that is associated with secure damage usually able to Army support for produc- <’ nuclear weapons tion of the ERW as a tactical weapon. Army officials were particularly skeptical Here Agnew spells out the basis for the about the ERW’s effectiveness as an anti- ’technological entrepreneurship’ explana- tank weapon, based on experimental data tion used in this comparative study. Es- indicating ’that only within a relatively sentially, it refers to a technological pro- small area near the explosion would the gram of long standing and development enemy troops be instantly incapacitated. being actively promoted by weapons de- Troops occupying a much larger area signers until it finds support among think- would be injured, though before death they tank analysts, elected officials, and US and would remain capable of fighting for at NATO military leaders. At a later stage, least some time after the irradiation. 14 this process is often facilitated by the ap- Thus, the scientific promoters of the pearance of a ’window of opportunity’ in neutron bomb were unable to interest any the form of a Soviet military program or of the military services in adopting it as a alliance crisis, by which the weapon can be battlefield nuclear weapon. The Air Force justified. preferred its strategic missile and bomber In this case of the neutron bomb, it was programs: the Navy favored its Polaris not an ’external factor’ of this sort, but an system; and the Army was preoccupied internal development that provided the with the Vietnam War and later with window. The main problem for the stewardship of the Sentinel ABM program. weapon’s promoters was the lack of a The scientists were able to gather enough military sponsor. The Army continued to support for ’clean’ enhanced-radiation reject ERWs in favor of standard nuclear weapons to defeat the comprehensive test warheads, on grounds of military effec- ban, but not enough to produce the tiveness. In 1973, for example, the Army weapons themselves. They had the backing submitted a request to modernize its nuc- of the Atomic Energy Commission, the lear artillery, but was turned down by the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, and joint Committee on Atomic Energy, led by the Defense Department, but without the Senator Stewart Symington. sponsorship of a particular service they The Army somewhat reluctantly came to could not proceed. 15 support development of neutron warheads as the only possibility of getting any nuc- 3.2. The neutron bomb: a window opens lear artillery at all. Having had its moder- During the early 1970s, the nuclear nization proposal rejected by Congress, it weapons laboratories, which had continued could not simply come back with the same work on enhanced-radiation weapons, proposal. Therefore, on 29 August 1973, launched a vigorous campaign to promote immediately following the congressional their use on the battlefield. In congres- rejection, the Army Chief of Staff drew up sional testimony in 1973, Harold Agnew, a memorandum directing a study to director of the Los Alamos lab, clearly ’reexamine’ nuclear-warhead requirements referred to ERWs when he said: for artillery projectiles. According to Samuel Cohen, the memorandum ’re- I know we at Los Alamos have a small, but questing the study is full of radiation-dose 200 requirements for incapacitating military on the W70-3 enhanced-radiation warhead personnel’, with the concomitant require- for the Lance missile. Several hundred ment to ’minimize collateral damage’, i.e., have now been built and are stored in the ’damage to civilian structure’. ’In other United States, ready to be deployed to words’, Cohen writes, ’the memo directed Europe in the event of war or if NATO a neutron bomb study’.&dquo; allies request them. 20 Despite the new-found support of the The latest chapter in the neutron-bomb Army, a key obstacle to production of saga further confirms the validity of the ERWs remained - in the person of Senator ’technological-entrepreneurship’ explana- Symington. When Symington retired from tion. During the spring of 1984, General the Senate in 1976, there was nothing Bernard Rogers, Supreme Allied Com- further to hinder the approval of ERW mander, Europe, engaged in a major lob- production. Symington’s Joint Committee bying effort to get congressional approval on Atomic Energy was dissolved and its for the W-82 warhead for NATO’s 155-mm duties assumed by the Senate Armed Ser- artillery - a warhead that can be made into vices Committee; its chair was Senator an enhanced-radiation weapon through the John Stennis and its membership included simple insertion of a tritium module. At an Senators Henry Jackson and Strom Thur- estimated cost of 2.6 million dollars each, mond - all strong proponents of tactical the new warhead was not popular with the nuclear weapons. With Symington out of Congress. Its proponents were able to the way, the Energy Research and De- convince a couple of key senators to sup- velopment Administration (successor to port the weapon. These senators then at- the Atomic Energy Commission) was able tached an amendment to the Defense Au- to include a production request for ERWs thorization Bill to fund the W-82. By de- for the Lance missile in the President’s ceptively characterizing the amendment as annual stockpile review of 24 November one that would prohibit production of en- 1976. President Ford approved the request, hanced-radiation shells (in fact it only pro- as did the Senate Armed Services Com- hibits their final assembly), and by intro- mittee in hearings the following March. 18 ducing the amendment during an all-night The ERW production request was first session, the sponsors were able to get it discovered and publicized by Washington passed without a roll-call vote at 3:00 A.M. Post reporter Walter Pincus, who found on 21 June 1984. 21 mention of it in Senate Appropriations Thus, the technological-entrepreneurship Committee hearings on ERDA’s Fiscal explanation emerges as the most convinc- Year 1978 public works bill. Pincus pub- ing in accounting for the ERW production lished a story in the Post on 6 June 1977 decisions. entitled ’Neutron Killer Warhead Buried in ERDA Budget’. This was the first that 3.3. Internal pressures and NATO’s nuc- most people had heard of the ERW. lear weapons The rest of the neutron-bomb story has The main elements of the technological been covered well elsewhere.19 President entrepreneurship explanation are the fol- Carter’s indecision about whether to pro- lowing : (1) a longstanding technological duce the weapon - while quite divisive for program strongly backed by the private or the NATO alliance - did not ultimately governmental weapons laboratories re- affect ERW production. Carter decided in sponsible for its development; (2) support April 1978 to defer production, but six within the military, the academic com- months later ordered the Department of munity of ’defense intellectuals’, the State Energy to produce ER components. In Department, and the relevant committees October 1978, production activities began of the Congress; and (3) justification for 201 the weapon on the basis of long-term dictated - according to some views - by NATO plans. The factors which appear NATO’s doctrine of ’flexible response’. less important are ( 1 ) support from alliance Cruise missiles had also been promoted for political (or even military) leaders in many years, especially by military analysts Europe: (2) public support: or (3) a who favored their use as conventional genuinely new Soviet threat (as opposed to weapons. 23 an old threat used as a pretext). At a later The military-fix rationale has its difficul- stage these factors may come into play and ties as well. First, one has to consider improve the prospects for the new weapon. whether the concern about the US com- The other cases considered in this paper mitment to Europe originated with Euro- reveal a similar pattern. Analysis of these pean elites, or was induced by certain cases calls into question the action-reac- American opponents of arms control. As tion and military-fix explanations. In the one analyst has argued, ’(i)n view of the case of the Thor and Jupiter missiles, for transatlantic interchange of ideas among example, both had received wide support the small group of government officials and within the government long before the first observers who are involved in nuclear is- detection of Soviet missile tests in 1955. sues, and taking account particularly of the By the same token, the military-fix sniping at the SALT process by various rationale seems weak. Even before the Americans, it is difficult to apportion re- British-French-Israeli invasion of Suez in sponsibility’ for the missile decision to the 1956, the US had secured an agreement in Europeans. ’If some European became principle to deploy Thor missiles in Bri- concerned over America’s intentions it is tain. The countries that received the Jupi- necessary to ask who encouraged and at ter missiles - Italy and Turkey - were not times fuelled these suspicions. ’24 The re- involved in the Suez crisis; their relations ference here is undoubtedly to Helmut with the US had not suffered; so there was Schmidt, who many still erroneously be- nothing to ’fix’. One major study of the lieve called for the missile deployment in issue argues that the effect of the decision 1977. In evaluating the military-fix expla- was in fact to worsen relations. That study nation, one also has to ask why a military finds the sources of the Thor-Jupiter deci- solution was deemed necessary, when in sion mainly in the promotion of a novel the past alliance cohesion has been re- technology (ballistic missiles) by military stored through political means. 25 One is bureaucracies - in other words, what is drawn to the conclusion that problems of termed here ’technological entrepreneur- alliance cohesion are not sufficient to ship explain the emergence of Pershing II and Arguments against the action-reaction cruise missiles. and military-fix explanations are more The case of the Multilateral Force is familiar for the case of the Pershing II and particularly interesting because it shares cruise missiles. They were not developed many elements with the cases in which as responses to the Soviet SS-20 and new nuclear weapons were produced. Yet Backfire bombers or as solutions to al- in this case a decision was made to aban- liance political problems. These later don the MLF. Do the action-reaction and events provided a ’window’ through which military-fix explanations account well for supporters could push weapons that they the decision? The analysis presented in this favored for other reasons. The Pershing II, paper suggests that they do not. An action- for example, originated with a 1969 con- reaction interpretation would argue that tract to the Martin-Marietta Corporation, there was no military need for a European- intended to fulfill a broad requirement for based nuclear force, owing to overall US accurate, low-yield, nuclear weapons, strategic superiority. Many prominent ob- 202 servers argued, however, that the US did 4. The ’requirements’ of alternative not have meaningful or useful superiority explanations after the Soviets had managed to build a Readers may not agree with the explana- force of long-range bombers and missiles tion that emerges from this analysis as the that could attack the United States during strongest - what is called here ’technologi- the early 1960s. This was Secretary of De- cal entrepreneurship’. Any competing fense Robert McNamara’s view during the explanation should, however, be able to Cuban missile crisis, for example. At the account for the same phenomena at least same time, a number of officials - includ- as well. ing General Lauris Norstad, Supreme Al- One explanation that claims to do so lied Commander, Europe - advocated focuses on the ’requirements’ of US or achieving a ’theater balance’ in Europe in NATO doctrine. This explanation has been order to make NATO a ’fourth nuclear put forward most recently to justify the power’. He spoke of Soviet superiority in production of Pershing II and cruise mis- land-based medium- and intermediate- siles.’-6 It argues that official doctrine, be it range ballistic missiles - a force that grew ’massive retaliation’ or ’flexible response’, from 500 systems in 1962 up to nearly 750 determines which weapons are produced. by 1967. By the action-reaction explana- There are a number of problems with tion, some NATO counterweight should this explanation. The nature of US and have been produced. NATO doctrine is too amorphous and even The military-fix explanation for the fail- self-contradictory to set any definite re- ure of the MLF would have to argue that quirements for weapons. Manfred Worner, problems of alliance cohesion were not West German Defense Minister, made this sufficiently great to prompt a ’military’ point clearly in regard to ’flexible re- solution. Some analysts point to the for- sponse’, arguing that the doctrine ’is for- mation of the Nuclear Planning Group in mulated as vaguely as it is because the 1967 as a substitute for military hardware. interests of all NATO countries must be This begs the question, why was a political straddled.’ rather than a military solution adopted? The technological-entrepreneurship ex- The United States is obviously interested, in the event of a breakdown of the deterrent in planation would argue that the main reason in the conflict to the MLF failed was because it was not Europe, containing military the Continent as long as possible - in keeping based on a with technological program it from escalating and prevailing on the longstanding support among weapons sci- battlefield without endangering American ter- it is in the entists, industrial R&D labs, or any mili- riroty. By contrast, European interest that the risk for the be tary service. Instead, the MLF incorpo- aggressor heightened by the prospect of a relatively a the Polaris rated technological system - quick escalation of the battle. missile - that was already being developed at full speed by Admiral Hyman Rickover Worner points out that this ’conflict of for his submarine fleet. Thus, a key ingre- interest is probably irreconcilable’.’-’ dient for successful technological entre- It seems reasonable to add that deter- preneurship was missing. Most of the other mining weapons requirements on the basis ingredients were, however, present. The of an irreconcilable conflict of interests MLF had strong backing within the State would be mainly a matter of opinion (or Department, among a number of NATO self-interest). Does filling a ’gap in the es- governments, and from General Norstad calation spectrum’ make escalation more and his colleagues at NATO headquarters. certain, or does it increase the prospects for ’decoupling’? When, according to NATO doctrine, does strategic parity 203 between the superpowers demand new movements. Rather, as this paper has at- theater and tactical weapons and when tempted to demonstrate, methodologically- does it not? Certain NATO strategists have grounded historical studies can contribute argued since the mid-1950s that the exis- both to academic debates as well as pro- tence of parity - or ’nuclear stalemate’, as vide some insights for those interested in it was often called then - demanded new influencing policy. weapons for NATO.28 These views still serve as the rationale for new intermediate- NOTES 1. For a discussion, in the context of the arms range missiles, modernized nuclear artil- race, see James Kurth, ’A Widening Gyre: lery, and enhanced-radiation warheads for The Logic of American Weapons Procure- tactical rockets. In what sense does doc- ment’, Public Policy 19 (Summer 1971), pp. trine explain the production of all these 373-404. weapons? It is argued here that 2. This method has been described and illus- trated in a number of works by Alexander is a better ’technological entrepreneurship’ George, most recently in a chapter with explanation. Timothy J. McKeown, ’Case Studies and Theories of Organizational Decision Mak- 5. Conclusion and implications ing’, Advances in Information Processing in Organizations, Vol. 2, pp. 21-58. For ear- The type of explanation one perceives as lier discussions, see A. L. George, ’Case strongest in accounting for weapons pro- Studies and Theory Development: The duction suggests the kinds of prescriptions Method of Structured, Focused Compari- one would make in order to change current son’, in P. G. Lauren, ed., Diplomacy: New policy. Action-reaction interpretations that Approaches in History, Theory, and Policy (New York: Fee Press, 1979), pp. 43-68; see NATO nuclear as weapons necessary and A. L. George and R. Smoke, Deterr- rational responses to Soviet initiatives, ence in American Foreign Policy: Theory logically view Soviet restraint as the only and Practice (New York: Columbia Uni- means of slowing the arms race. Believers versity Press, 1974). 3. The paper summarizes a longer study of in military-fix explanations are held hos- decisions on production of nuclear weapons tage to the vagaries of alliance relations, for NATO. See M. Evangelista, Explaining while those who accept doctrine as the NATO’s Nuclear Weapons, Occasional main determinant of new weapons must Paper of the Peace Studies Program, Cor- also accept official definitions of the ’re- nell University, and the Hessische Stiftung Friedens- und 1986. of doctrine. Konfliktforschung, quirements’ 4. For general discussions of NATO nuclear An explanation based on the notion of relations, see David N. Schwartz, NATO’s ’technological entrepreneurship’ does Nuclear Dilemmas (Washington, DC: suggest ways to influence policy. Some Brookings Institution, 1983); and Paul Buteux, The Politics of Nuclear Consulta- apparent means of the bureauc- countering tion in NATO 1965-1980 (Cambridge, UK: ratic of new con- promoters technological Cambridge University Press, 1983). For an cepts and weapons include a better in- excellent study of the domestic politics of formed public and more responsive legis- nuclear decisions in the Federal Republic of see Thomas ’Fahr- lators. In a sense, the latter follows from Germany, Risse-Kappen, Zur INF-Politik der the former. plan zur Abrustung’? Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1970-1983 Another important component of a (Frankfurt/Main: HSFK-Forschungsbericht, strategy to counter the bureaucratic and 1985). For a consideration fo Soviet deci- technological forces that propel the arms sions, see M. Evangelista, ’Why the Soviets Buy the Weapons They Do’. World Poli- race is a community of independent ex- tics, Vol. 36, No. 4 (July 1984), pp. 597- perts who can provide alternative analysis 618. of security issues. This is not to suggest 5. The explanation presented here shares that such a community should be consi- some features with the one discussed in a dered merely the servant of popular somewhat broader context by Eugene 204 Lewis, Public Entrepreneurship: Toward a Eisenhower indicated in writing on the re- Theory of Bureaucratic Political Power port that the President was briefed on 10 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, November 1959. See also the letter from 1980). For a comprehensive presentation of Cohen to John Eisenhower, 23 September the Eigendynamik model, see Dieter Sen- 1959, ibid. ghaas, Rüstung und Militarismus 13. See Edward Gemarekian, ’New A-Bomb (Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1972) "Pinpoints" Lethal Dose: Could Make Test pp. 246-259. Ban Meaningless’, Washington Post, 19 6. George B. Kistiakowsky, ’The Folly of the July 1959. See also Cohen, The Neutron Neutron Bomb’, Bulletin of the Atomic Sci- Bomb, p. 12., and The Truth About the entists (September 1978), pp. 25-29. Neutron Bomb., p. 15. 7. These views are put forward, for example, 14. Kistiakowsky, ’The Folly of the Neutron in letters to President Harry Truman from Bomb’, p. 25. Brien McMahon, Chair of the Joint Com- 15. See the discussion in Sherri L. Wasserman, mittee on Atomic Energy of the Congress, The Neutron Bomb Controversy: A Study in 21 November 1949, and from Lewis Alliance Politics (New York: Praeger, Strauss, member of the Atomic Energy 1983), pp. 24-27. Commission, 25 November 1949, in the 16. Military Applications of Nuclear Papers of Harry S. Truman, Naval Aide Technology, Hearings before the Subcom- File, Box 13, Folder: Atomic Energy, mittee on Military Applications, Joint Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Committee on Atomic Energy, 16 April Missouri. The case is discussed in M. 1973, Part I, p. 49. Evangelista, Technological Innovation and 17. Cohen, The Truth About the Neutron the Arms Race: A Comparative Study of Bomb, p. 100. Soviet and American Decisions on Tactical 18. Energy Research and Development Ad- Nuclear Weapons, Ph. D. dissertation, ministration Fiscal Year 1978 Authoriza- Cornell University, 1986, Chapter 3. tion, US Senate, Committee on Armed Ser- 8. Samuel T. Cohen, The Neutron Bomb: vices, 25 March 1977 (Washington, DC: US Political, Technological and Military Issues Government Printing Office, 1977), pp. 4, 7, (Cambridge, MA: Institute for Foreign 30-31. Policy Analysis, 1978) p. 5; and Cohen, The 19. For example, Milton Leitenberg, ’The Truth About the Neutron Bomb (New York: Neutron Bomb - Enhanced Radiation William Morrow, 1983), pp. 34-35. Warheads’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 9. Cohen, The Neutron Bomb, pp. 4-9; The Vol. 5, No. 3 (September 1982), pp. 341- Truth About the Neutron Bomb, pp. 36, 41. 369. 10. As Cohen himself put it, Navy opponents of 20. Thomas B. Cochran, William M. Arkin, the ERW were ’spreading the world around’ Milton M. Hoenig, Nuclear Weapons the Pentagon that the Polaris submarines Databook, Volume I: US. Nuclear Forces ’were going to be doomed by neutron and Capabilities (Cambridge, MA: Bal- weapons’. The Truth About the Neutron linger, 1984), p. 72. William M. Arkin and Bomb, p. 51. For the role of Morse, ibid., Richard W. Fieldhouse, Nuclear pp. 14, 42-44, 47-55. Battlefields: Global Links in the Arms Race 11. Morse’s efforts are extensively documented (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1985), p. 60. in the archives of the Dwight D. 21. This account follows Christopher Paine, Eisenhower Library in Abilene, Kansas. ’Senator Nunn’s Shell Game’, Bulletin of See the Records of the Office of the Special the Atomic Scientists (February 1985), pp. Assistant for National Security Affairs, 5-8. OSB Series, Subject Subseries, Box 1, Fol- 22. See Michael H. Armacost, The Politics of ders : Atomic Energy Commission - General Weapons Innovation: The Thor-Jupiter (7) and (9); Box 4, Folder: Nuclear Energy Controversy (New York: Columbia Univer- Matters (3) and (4). sity Press, 1969), p. 181. 12. The report by Cohen was declassified with 23. On the domestic sources of the two deci- some deletions, at the request of this au- sions, see Christopher Paine, ’Pershing II: thor. See Samuel T. Cohen, Low-Yield Fu- The Army’s Strategic Weapon’, Bulletin of sion Weapons for Limited Wars (deleted). the Atomic Scientists (October 1980), pp. RAND Corporation Report R-347, 1 June 25-31; and Robert J. Art and Stephen E. 1959, located in the Office of the Staff Sec- Ockenden, ’The Domestic Politics of Cruise retary : Records 1957-61, Subject Series, Missile Development, 1970-1980’, in Richard DoD Subseries, Box 3, Folder: Defense - K. Betts, ed., Cruise Missiles: Technology, Classified (1), Eisenhower Library. John Strategy, Politics (Washington, DC: 205 Brookings Institution, 1981), pp. 359-413. ble Response (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 24. Simon Lunn, ’Cruise Missile and the Pros- Corp., 1983). pects for Arms Control,’ ADIU Report 27. Manfred Wörner, ’NATO Defenses and (September/October 1981), pp. 4-5. See Tactical Nuclear Weapons’, Strategic Re- also the account by Fred Kaplan, ’Warring view (Fall 1977), reprinted in Wolfram F. over New Missiles for NATO’, New York Hanrieder, ed., Arms Control and Security: Times Magazine, 9 December 1979, pp. Current Issues (Boulder, CO: Westview, 46ff; and the discussion by Raymond L. 1979), p. 259. For a good discussion of the Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation: contradictions inherent in ’flexible re- American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to sponse’ and a skeptical evaluation of the Reagan (Washington, DC: Brookings In- rationales for the Pershing II and cruise stitution, 1985), Ch. 25, esp. pp. 854-870. missile deployments, see Leon V. Sigal, 25. Jane M. O. Sharp, ’Arms Control and Al- Nuclear Forces in Europe: Enduring Di- liance Commitments’, Political Science lemmas and Present Prospects Quarterly, Vol. 100, No. 4 (Winter (Washington. DC: Brookings Institution, 1985-86), pp. 649-667. 1984), ch. 3. 26. See, for example, James A. Thomson, ’The 28. See, for example, Henry A. Kissinger, LRTNF Decision: Evolution of US Theatre Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy (New Nuclear Policy, 1975-9’, International Af- York: Harper, 1957); and the extensive bib- fairs, Vol. 60, No. 4 (Autumn 1984), pp. liography in Morton H. Halperin, Limited 601-614; and J. M. Legge, Theater Nuclear War in the Nuclear Age (New York: John Weapons and the NATO Strategy of Flexi- Wiley and Sons, 1963).

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