HATUN WILLAKUY

ABBREVIATED VERSION OF THE FINAL REPORT OF THE TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION

PERU

HATUN WILLAKUY

ABBREVIATED VERSION OF THE FINAL REPORT OF THE TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION

PERU Hatun Willakuy Abbreviated version of the Final Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission Peru

First English edition: First Spanish edition: February 2004

Press run: 20,000 copies

© Transfer Commission of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission Tomás Ramsey 925, Magdalena Lima, Peru www.cverdad.org.pe

Under Laws 27806 and 27927, this text, entitled Hatun Willakuy, is a public document. The contents may be reproduced in part or in full as long as they are cited accurately and the source is properly credited: Transfer Commission, Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Hatun Willakuy. Lima, 2004.

Transfer Commission members: Javier Ciurlizza Contreras, Arturo Perata Ytajashi and Félix Reátegui Carrillo.

Publication coordinator: Félix Reátegui Carrillo

Editing coordinator: Estrella Guerra Caminiti

Cover and inside design: Egard Thays

Infographics: Carla Gonzales

This text is an abbreviated version of the Final Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. The lector should refer to this report if more complete information is needed. This version was prepared by the Transfer Commission of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission at the request of the commissioners at their final session on August 31, 2003.

Legal deposit: 1501372004-0921

ISBN: 9972-9816-4-9

Printing: Corporación Gráfica NAVARRETE S.A.

Printed in Peru TABLE OF CONTENTS

EDITORIAL 9 PREFACE 10

PART ONE: THE TRAGEDY AND THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR IT 15

CHAPTER 1 THE EVENTS: MAGNITUDE AND SCOPE OF THE CONFLICT 17 “FOREIGN TOWNS WITHIN PERU”20 THE LEGAL DIMENSION OF THE EVENTS 26 MAGNITUDE AND COMPLEXITY OF CRIMES AND HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS 36 PERIODS OF THE INTERNAL ARMED CONFLICT 56 THE ARMED CONFLICTS AND THE REGIONS 72

CHAPTER 2 SUBVERSIVE ORGANIZATIONS 93 THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF PERU – SHINING PATH 93 THE TUPAC AMARU REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT 183 CHAPTER 3 THE CIVILIAN GOVERNMENTS IN THE FIRST DECADE OF THE VIOLENCE 201 THE ADMINISTRATION OF PRESIDENT FERNANDO BELAUNDE TERRY AND THE POPULAR ACTION PA RT Y 201 THE APRA GOVERNMENT 216

CHAPTER 4 THE STATE SECURITY FORCES 235 THE POLICE FORCES 235 THE ARMED FORCES 251

CHAPTER 5 ALBERTO FUJIMORI’S ADMINISTRATIONS 299

PART TWO: THE LEGACY OF THE CONFLICT AND THE WAY TO PEACE 321

CHAPTER 6 THE FACTORS THAT MADE THE VIOLENCE POSSIBLE 323

CHAPTER 7 THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE CONFLICT 343 PSYCHOSOCIAL CONSEQUENCES 343 SOCIO-POLITICAL CONSEQUENCE 361 SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES 372

CHAPTER 8 THE CVR’S PROPOSALS: TOWARD RECONCILIATION 397

GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 419

BIBLIOGRAPHY 453

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 459 EDITORIAL

This text is an abbreviated version of the Final Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. It was prepared by the Transfer Commission, which was appointed at the final meeting of the commissioners on August 31, 2003. Hatun Willakuy summarizes that principal ideas and findings of the Final Report. All of the events described and the assessments presented are documented in the complete report and its appendices. More detailed information can be found in the Final Report. The Quechua phrase Hatun Willakuy can be translated into English as “great story.” We have chosen this title as a tribute to the main victims of the violence described in these pages, whose testimony helped us recount the events. In effect, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission’s Final Report is a great story, an account of a tragedy whose worst aspects were largely ignored and, at the same time, a exemplary demonstration of the resistance of human dignity in Peru.

Lima, December 2003 PREFACE

There are a number of difficult and painfully low points in Peruvian history. None, however, can compare with the shame and dishonor of the fragment of history that we recount in these pages. The final two decades of the 20th century are – to put it bluntly— a stain of horror and dishonor for the Peruvian state and society. We were asked to investigate and make public the truth about the 20 years of political violence that began in Peru in 1980. Now that our work has concluded, we can report a fact that, while shocking, still does not fully convey what occurred. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (Comisión de la Ver- dad y Reconciliación, CVR) has concluded that the number of deaths in those two decades probably exceeds 69,000 Peruvian men and women who were killed or forcibly disappeared at the hands of subversive organizations or state agents. We were given the task of recording and gathering, one after another, year upon year, the names of Peruvians who are no longer with us. This number is too great to enable our nation to continue talking about errors or excesses committed by the people who directly participated in these crimes. It is also too overwhelming for authorities or citizens to plead ignorance as their defense. This report exposes a double scandal: assassinations, disappearances and mass torture on the one hand, and on the other the apathy, ineptitude and indifference of those who could have stopped this human catastrophe but did not. We have said that the numerical data are overwhelming, but inadequate. That is true. No number can express the asymmetries, responsibilities and methods of horror experienced by the Peruvian people. Nor can it illustrate the suffering that was indelibly inflicted on the victims. In the Final Report, we conclude the task that we were assigned, as well as an obligation that we voluntarily assumed: to publicly expose the tragedy as the work of human beings who inflicted suffering on other human beings. Three out of every four victims were peasant men or women who spoke Quechua as their native language. The victims, as Peruvians well know, form part of a population that historically has been ignored by the state and urban 11 society, which has enjoyed the benefits of our political community. The CVR has not uncovered evidence, as some sources have claimed, that this was an ethnic

conflict. There are, however, grounds for stating that the death and destruction REFACE P over those 20 years would not have been possible were it not for the profound disdain for the country’s most dispossessed people demonstrated by both the members of the Communist Party of Peru – Shining Path (Partido Comunista del Perú - Sendero Luminoso, PCP-SL) and state agents. This disdain is woven into the fabric of Peruvians’ daily lives. The 17,000 testimonies freely given to the CVR have allowed us to reconstruct, even if only in rough form, the history of the victims. It is overwhelming to hear in these testimonies that racial insults and verbal abuse of the poor were like a refrain that preceded beatings, rapes, kidnappings of sons and daughters, or seeing a loved one shot point blank by a soldier or police officer. It is equally infuriating to hear the leaders of subversive organizations explain how it was strategically opportune to annihilate this or that peasant community as part of their war against the state. While a great deal has been written about the persistent cultural, social and economic discrimination in Peru, state authorities and common citizens have done little to combat this stigma in our society. This report shows the country and the world that it is impossible to live with disdain, that this is a disease that represents very tangible harm. From this day forward, the names of thousands of people who died and disappeared are recounted in these pages so that we can remember them. No one can hide behind the defects of our society or the events of our history to evade their responsibility. It is true – and this is one of the principal lessons of this report – that there exists a generalized crime, that of omission, which involves all of us who allowed things to happen during the years of violence without asking questions. We are the first to accept this. At the same time, however, there are concrete responsibilities that must be faced, and Peru, like any society that has lived through this kind of experience, must accept this and cannot allow impunity to reign. Impunity is incompatible with the dignity of a democratic nation. The CVR has found numerous people responsible for crimes and human rights violations, and it will let the country know this through the pertinent channels, respecting the requirements and restrictions in Peruvian law for accusing someone of a crime. The CVR calls on and encourages Peruvian society to demand that the criminal justice system act immediately, without vengeance but energetically and unwaveringly. Nevertheless, the Final Report goes far beyond assigning guilt for parti- cular actions. We have found that the crimes committed against the Peruvian population were not, unfortunately, perpetrated by perverse subjects who acted outside the norms of their institutions. Our fieldwork, complemented by the testimonies we received and a meticulous review of documents, forces us to 12 HATUN WILLACUY law thatregulatethecivilizedlife this. Inthecourseofourinvestigations, andbasedonthenormsofinternational people. Thepeoplechargedwithdefendingorder, however, didnotunderstand concentration camps,butthatwhichensurestherighttolifeanddignityofall is clearthattheorderdemocraticpeoplessupportanddemandnotof the population,whichisitssupremegoal,withtoolsprovidedbylaw. It and civilizednationthatPeruvianswanttobuild. principles, thePCP-SLisanorganizationthathasnoplaceindemocratic inherently criminalandtotalitariancharacteristics,whichscornallhumanitarian extreme formsofcrueltyastoolsforachievingtheirobjectives. As aresultofits representatives, whodidnothidetheirwillingnesstoinflictdeathandthemost encountered thisstrategicreasoninginthestatementsmadebyorganization’s indistinguishable fromtheorganization’s natureduringthese20years.We have citizens. We foundthiswillingnessrooted most elementalrightswerelikeadeathsentenceforthousandsofPeruvian objective –powerthatwasmoreimportanttothemthanhumanlife. part ofthemethodologyhorrorusedbygroup’s memberstoattainan populations, systematicabuse,anduseofassassinationtoinstillfearwere also indifference, passivityorsimple ineptnessofthosewhoheldthehighestpublic convinced thatthesituation would nothavewere beensograve itnotforthe many thingstoexplain Peru. We have reconstructedthishistoryandwe are The politicalclassthatgoverned orhadsomelevelofpowerduringthistimehas or atleastconsentamong those incommand,whohadthepowertostopthem. these crimestohavebeencommitted,therehad beenalevelofcomplicity because institutionsororganizationswereblindto whatwashappening.For rectifying whathappened. abuse thatthePeruvian state anditsagentsmustrecognizeasasteptoward of theirrecurringnatureandwidespreadoccurrence, apatternofhumanrights violence againstwomen andother Extrajudicial executions,forceddisappearances, torture, massacres,sexual of massiveviolationtherightsPeruvians,including therighttolife. that humanbeingsarethesupremeendoforder. Instead,theyadoptedastrategy we havetheobligationtomakeitknown.Foryears, theforcesoforderforgot humanitarian law. accusation ofcrimesagainsthumanity, aswellviolationofinternational or widespreadhumanrightsabuses,andthattherearegroundsforthe certain periodsandattimesthearmedforceswere involved insystematic of peoplewerepart We demonstrateinthesepageshowthedestructionofvillagesandannihilation or plannedbyorganizationsinstitutionsthatinterveneddirectlyintheconflict. categorically denouncetheperpetrationofmassivecrimesthatwerecoordinated Faced withthischallenge,thestateanditsagentshaddutytoprotect The primacyofstrategicreasoningandthewillingnesstotramplepeople’s So muchdeathandsosufferingcouldnothave occurredsimply As Peruvians,wearemortifiedtohavestatethis,butitisthetruthand the ShiningPath’s equally condemnablecrimesconfirm,because ofnations,we strategy. Theenslavement ofdefenseless in the PCP-SL’sthe in doctrine,whichis have concludedthatduring beings areessentiallymagnanimous. Thereporttellsofpeoplewhodidnot acts ofcourage,selflessgestures andsignsofdignitythatshowushuman reconciled withitspotential. itself, thetruthandrights ofeach This purificationisindispensabletoachieveasociety thatisreconciledwith autocracy, itmustnowshowitspower andpurifyourrepublic. a similareffortnow. Ifthetruthhelpedusunmaskephemeralnatureof an by millionsofPeruvians, demonstrated theefficacyoftruth.We mustmake corruption, andcrime,crime.Theseupright acts,whichwere echoed regime, thosewhowerenotafraidto of thosewhodarednotbelievetheofficialtruthpropagated bythedictatorial with peace. ple excesses,imprisonmentisthepriceofinnocenceand, finally, deathisconfused orientation. Statesofexceptionbecomethenorm,massive abusesbecomesim- reason islostandconceptsareinverted,deprivingcitizensofallethical being shedforitsdemise.Inthemoralvacuuminwhichdictatorshipsthrive, basis losestheallegianceofcitizensandfallsbywaysidewithoutatear know howtodefendit.Ademocracythatisnotstubbornlyexercisedonadaily its ownaccord.Democracywasabandonedlittlebylittlerthosewhodidnot we believeitisindispensableforustorememberthatdemocracywasnotlostof democracy whentheCVRbeganitswork.Forthisenthusiasmtohavemeaning, vehemence, butpracticewithsuchinconsistency. ourselves closer were char truth asharshtheonewe out justice.We a areconvincedthatrecovering thetruthaboutpast–even In acountrysuchasours,combatingthisoblivionispowerfulformofcarrying to oblivionvoiceofthosewhoaremosthumble. replicating thepracticethatcanbefoundthroughoutourhistoryofrelegating in theend,werelookeddownupontopointthattheircries ignored, constitutional principlesarenoblebutinadequateforgoverning apeoplewho, installed democracycameunderthecareofmilitary. Thisfedthenotionthat bestowed onthembythenation.Asaresult,institutionsofourrecently to upholdtheConstitution,readilycededarmedforcespowers Peru forthehonorofgoverning ourstateanddemocracy, thosewhopledged govern. the misfortunesufferedbycitizenswhomitwanted,andmaystillwant,to class, which,wemustremindthem,hasyettofullyassumeitsresponsibilityfor offices duringthistime.Thisreportthereforeassignsresponsibilitytothepolitical The FinalReportspeaksof shameanddishonor, butitspagesalsorecord Peru isagainontheway tobuildingademocracy. Thisisduetotheefforts Peru wasonceagainenthusiasticallyattemptingtorecoveritslost It ispainful,buttrue:thosewhosoughtthevotesoftheirfellowcitizens to theidealofdemocracythatPeruvians proclaimwithsuch callthedictatorshipadictatorship,to ged withuncovering –isaway ofdrawing

and every oneof

itsmembers. A society 13 PREFACE 14 HATUN WILLACUY story beginstoday. and whowe mustnolongerbe.Thisstoryisaboutwhatwe needtodo.This the nation.Thehistoryrecountedhereisaofourpeople,whowewere as atestamenttothosewhoarenolongerwithusandhavebeenforgottenby uprooted todefendlife.Theyarefoundintheheartofourmemory. responsibility todefendthenationwithoutviolatinglaw;whorefusedbe authority asaweapon;whowereunjustlyimprisoned;assumedtheir neighbors; whostooduptoabandonmentdefendtheirfamilies,using renounce theauthorityandresponsibilityconferreduponthembytheir We presentthisstoryasatributetothesemen Truth andReconciliationCommission and women. We presentit Salomón LernerFebres President PART ONE

THE TRAGEDY AND THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR IT

CHAPTER 1

THE EVENTS: MAGNITUDE AND SCOPE OF THE CONFLICT

The internal armed conflict fought in Peru between 1980 and 2000 lasted longer, extended over more territory and had higher human and economic costs than any other conflict in the country’s history since independence. Its death toll was vastly higher than those of the war of independence or the war with Chile – the principal armed conflicts fought by the country. During its investigation, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, CVR) received testimonies that enabled it to identify by name 23,969 people who were either killed or disappeared during the internal armed conflict. Nevertheless, statistical calculations and estimates demonstrate that the number of victims in the conflict was 2.9 times greater than the recorded dead and disappeared. Using a methodology known as Multiple Systems Estimation, the CVR calculates that the number of Peruvians killed or disappeared in the internal armed conflict was probably closer to 69,000.1 Based on this statistical methodology, the CVR estimates that 26,259 people were killed or disappeared in the department of Ayacucho between 1980 and 2000 as a result of the internal armed conflict. If the proportion of victims calculated for Ayacucho, which is based on the population in 1993, were extended to the entire nation, the internal armed conflict would have taken the lives of 1.2 million people in all of Peru. This would have represented approximately 340,000 victims in Lima, equivalent to the total populations of the districts of San Isidro, Miraflores, San Borja and La Molina in 2000. The statistics shed light on much more than just the intensity of the violence. They also demonstrate the ethnic-cultural inequalities that are still

1 The calculation of 69,280 victims has a 95-percent accuracy rate, with the lower calculation at 61,007 victims and the higher calculation 77,552 victims. prevalent in our nation. The violence did not affect all Peruvians in the same 18 way, but had an unequal impact on different geographic areas and social classes. The immediate and fundamental cause of the internal armed conflict was the decision of the Communist Party of Peru — Shining Path (Partido CONFLICT Comunista del Perú — Sendero Luminoso, PCP-SL) to launch its «people’s war» THE

against the state. This decision was made at a time when Peruvian society was OF beginning a transition to democracy, which had broad support from the SCOPE country’s citizens, as well as the main political parties and civil society AND movements, after 12 years of military dictatorship. Unlike other internal armed conflicts in Latin America, where state 2 agents were responsible for the greatest loss of human life — especially of MAGNITUDE : unarmed civilians – in Peru it was the PCP-SL that caused the largest number of EVENTS casualties, above all among the civilian population. According to the testimonies HE received, the PCP-SL was responsible for 54 percent of the victims reported to T the CVR.3 The group’s strategy was based on the systematic and massive use of extreme violence and terror and a deliberate disregard for basic norms of war and principles of human rights. Faced with the war unleashed by the PCP-SL, the state had the obligation to defend constitutional order and citizens within the framework of unconditional respect for the rule of law and basic human rights. Paradoxically, the country was governed by democratically elected civilian governments at peaks in the conflict, when the death toll was highest and when state agents committed the most human rights violations. The state was incapable of stopping the growth of armed subversion, which expanded throughout most of the nation within a few years.4 Civilian governments accepted the militarization of the conflict and, giving up their role, allowed the armed forces to take charge of the anti-subversive effort. While it was inevitable that the elected governments would declare states of emergency and use the military to combat subversion given the magnitude of the events, the CVR found that this was done without taking the necessary precautions to prevent violations of people’s fundamental rights. Worse still, for long periods of time civilian authorities disregarded the accusations of human rights violations committed by the security forces in the areas hardest hit by the conflict. In addition, there are several cases in which authorities facilitated and guaranteed impunity for the people responsible for these violations. State agents (the armed forces and police), self-defense patrols and paramilitary groups were responsible for 37 percent of the deaths and disappearances reported to the CVR. Of these cases, members of the armed forces were responsible for 75

2 For example, the cases of the military dictatorships in Argentina and Chile, or the internal conflicts in Central America (Nicaragua, El Salvador and Guatemala). 3 Along the same lines, it is important to mention that, with respect to the CVR’s statistical estimate on the total number of victims, the PCP-SL was responsible for 46 percent of the deaths and disappearances. 4 The CVR received testimonies about deaths and disappearances in the armed conflict from all departments except Moquegua and Madre de Dios. In Tacna (1) and Tumbes (4), the numbers of victims reported to the CVR were in single digits. 5 of Peruvians tobeoverlooked bythepublicandprivate sectorsforsev allowed of power, especiallyinacountrythatisextremelycentralizedthecapital, subversive threathadsubsided.The distancefromthedecision-makingcenters afterthearmed remained undermilitarycontrolforlongstretcheseven political andeconomicpowerstructures.Thepopulationinseveral areas affected areasandsocialclassesthatdidnothave stronglinkstothecountry’s with differentlevelsofintensityandgeographic organization inrelationtothenumberoffatalities. and private attributed tothePCP-SL.Becauseofthis,earlierprojectionsbybothofficial had beenidentified, As aresult,theinvestigationsbyCVR to documentandidentifyvictimsofeventsattributedsubversive groups. documentation ofaccusationswas inadequate,andtherewere insufficientefforts information wascollectedandinvestigationscarriedout.Thesystematic application ofsanctionsagainstthoseresponsiblefortheseactions. Nevertheless, pressreportingandinvestigations hadlittleimpactontheeffective rights groupsandvarious investigations bythelegislatureand judiciary. areas andmomentsduringtheviolencewhenpresswas attacked),human committed. Thiswas dueto wide coverage oftheevents andthehumanrightsviolationsthatwere being other countriesoftheregion,especiallyChileand Argentina. few grosshumanrightsviolationscomparedtothemilitarydictatorshipsin dictatorship between1968and1980,thePeruvian militarycommittedrelatively unprecedented inthemilitary’s conductpriorto1980.Duringthe12-year percent ofthevictims. 7 6 in Peruvian history. late 1980sandearly1990s,whichledtoaperiodofhyperinflation unparalleled economiccrisisofthe different problems,itisimportanttohighlightthesevere of thecountry’s historyinthefinal April 1992and,yearslater, thepresident’s decisiontoabandonoffice inthe the so-called«independents.» A corollarytothispo politicalpartiesandpavedthewayweakened fortheriseof politicaloutsiders, #55. Lima:HumanRightsOmbudsman, 2001. agents. which were The annualinflationratein1990was 7,658percent. in adatabase.See,forexample,Ladesaparición forzadade These includevictimswhosenamesand caseshave beendocumentedbyinstitutionsand systematicallyrecorded This biaswas It isimportanttoanalyzethetwo decadesofpoliticalviolenceasaprocess The CVR hasfound,nevertheless, thattherewas abiasintheway It shouldbenotedthatduringthedecadesofviolencetherewas relatively The responseofthearmedforcestosubversive threat was The analysisofthisperiodviolencemustalsoconsider certainelements for the«problemofviolence»thataffecteddaily lives ofthousands geared toward registering andinvestigating humanrightsviolationscommittedbystate institutions underestimatedtheresponsibilityofthissubversive due totheinstitutionaldefinitionof theorganizationsthatdocumentedviolentactions, 7 6 lessthan5percentofthedeathsordisappearanceswere The countryalsoexperiencedadeeppoliticalcrisis that the existenceofafreepress(therewerespecific decades ofthe20thcentury. Among the determinedthatofthevictimswho personas enelPerú scope, andasonethatmainly litical crisiswas thecoupof 1980-1996, Ombudsman’ eral y s Report ears. 5 19 THE EVENTS: MAGNITUDE AND SCOPE OF THE CONFLICT 20 PART ONE: THE TRAGEDY AND THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR IT «Foreign townswithinperu» the accompanyingcorruption. all thepartiestoconflictinthiszonewere affectedbydrugtraffickingand was River transformedintothelargestcommongraveincountry. As aresult, become oneoftheprincipalscenesinternalconflict,andHuallaga drug traffickingemerged.Bythemid-1980s,UpperHuallagaValley had where thestatereduceditspresence,whileirregulararmedgroupslinkedto crops tofeedthedrugtrade,particularlyinjungleregions,createdareas and therepressionunleashedbystateagentstocontrolit.Thespreadofcoca of drugtrafficking,whichcoincidedwiththeriseandspreadsubversion, faced two militaryconflicts,in1981and1995,withneighboringEcuador. Another factortoconsideristhatduringthedecadesofviolence,Peru also midst ofonethemostseriousco 9 8 years investigated bytheCVR 20 significant impactonpublicopinion. at thecenterofconflict,althoughactionsperpetrated inthosecitieshada from thecapital.Even whenthe regions hardesthitbytheviolence,whichwere thepoorestandfarthestremoved happeningin«anothercountry.»was economic andpoliticalpower, whathappenedintheirtowns,homesandfamilies of themfeltthatfortherestcountry, especiallyintheprincipalcentersof communities thatwere theprincipalvictimsofinternalarmedconflict.Many light onthesenseofexclusionandindifferenceexperiencedbypeople Phrases repeatedinthethousandsoftestimoniesrecordedbyCVRshed these areas. the centralpartofcountry. Thegreatestnumberof victimswas recordedin like adarkstainthatspreadsthroughoutthehighlands andjungleregionsin speakers. shown onthescreenwere notQuechua-speakingpeasants,but urbanSpanish began tofocusattentiononthetragedy, theemblematic imagesofthevictims and memoryoftheviolenceins cities inthelate1980sandearly1990s,itwas difficult toreconciletheexperience Report was finished. The fatalitiesincludepeoplewhoremained disappearedasaresultofthearmedconflictwhenFinal CVR. Publichearingsoncasesin Ayacucho, One elementofutmostimportanceduringthisperiodwas theexpansion For many years,many themodern,urbanP For As The country’s maincities,particularly those alongthecoast,were not When shownonamapofPeru, theintensityofviolenceappears Figure 1 9

shows , thedepartmentof Ayacucho registered thehighest uch differentw conflict beganaffectingthe affectedthenation’s poorestregions. April 8,2002.T Themassive lossofhumanlifeduringthe rruption scandalsin So, mytownwasatown,Idon’tknow… eru ofLimawas indifferenttothe orlds. When estimony ofPrimitivo a foreign townwithinPeru. the nation’s history. television coverage county’s principal Quispe. 8 CVR inruralzones isnearlythreetimesthe percentageofthenational population (see Figure3).Thepercentage ofdeathsanddisappearancesreportedtothe within thedepartmentsthat werehardesthitbytheinternalarmedconflict of deathsanddisappearances occurred,notonlyatthenationallevel butalso was preciselyinruralareas andamongpoorpeoplewherethelargestnumber affected. violent processerupted,thepoorestsectorswere themostvulnerableand was theprincipalcauseofconflict,butitdoesshowthatwhen poverty percent ofthevictimswere inwealthiest20 percent.Thisdoesnotmeanthat census, wereamongthepoorest20percent percent ofthefatalitieswererecorded the fivepoorestdepartmentsincountry. As Figure2shows,morethan35 and Huánuco)arerankedbydifferentstudies(INEI,1994a; UNDP, 20002)among hardest hitbytheinternalar intensity oftheviolence. FIGURE 1 (UNDP, in 2002accountedforonly9percentof the U.N.DevelopmentProgram(UNDP),peoplelivinginthesedepartments recorded inthetestimoniesreceived bytheCVR. According tostatisticsfrom Huancavelica, Apurímac andSanMartínregistered85percentofthevictims percent). Togetherwith Ayacucho, number ofdeathsanddisappearancesreportedtotheCVR(morethan40 Social exclusionandpoverty inPeru havethefaceofaruralpeasant. It There was anobviousrelationshipbetween so 2002). PERU 1980-2000:NUMBEROFDEA TOCVR, THE ACCORDING TO It wasnotacoincidencethatthefourdepartments med conflict(Apurí DEPARTMENT THS AND the departmentsofJunín,Huánuco, in districtsthat,accordingtothe1993 the incomeofallPeruvian families inthecountry, whileless than10 DISAPPEARANCES REPORTED WHERE EVENTSOCCURRED mac, Ay cial exclusionandthe acucho, Huancav elica 21 THE EVENTS: MAGNITUDE AND SCOPE OF THE CONFLICT 22 PART ONE: THE TRAGEDY AND THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR IT internal armedconflict,and notallregionswere affectedatthesame time. the numberroseto68percent amongthevictimsdocumentedbyCVR. above age15didnothave a highschooleducation,accordingtothe1993census, national average. Whilecloseto40percent oftheeconomicallyactive population In addition,thevictimsreportedtoCVRthe hadeducationallevelsbelow represented thehighestnumberoffatalitiesreported totheCVR(seeFigure4). departments, peoplewhospokeQuechuaoranother indigenouslanguage language otherthanSpanishastheirmothertongue. Inthethreehardest-hit more than75percentofthedeadanddisappearedreported totheCVRspokea only one-fifthofthepopulationspokeQuechuaoranother indigenouslanguage, of thecountryareeven moredramatic. According tothe1993census, while agriculture in1993,whichstoodat28percent. percentage oftheeconomicallyactivepopulation dead anddisappearedworked infarming-relatedactivities,nearlydoublethethe living inthesezones,accordingtothe1993 FIGURE 2 (METHOD: NBI–1993CENSUS) ACCORDING TOPOVERTY THE OF THE RANKING PERU 1980-2000:PERCENTAGE OF The intensityoftheviolence was notdistributedevenly duringthe Nevertheless, theculturaldifferencesbetween thevictimsandrest DEATHS A ND DISAPPEARANCESREPORTED TO THE CVR, DISTRICTSWHERE THE EVENTSOCCURRED Census. Similarly, 55percentofthe nationwide employed in FIGURE 4 FIGURE 3 AGE 5 IN THE 1993 CENSUS, 1993 ACCORDING TOIN THE HARDEST5 DEPARTMENTSHIT THE AGE RURAL TOCVR THE AND COMPARISION BETWEEN THE DEATHS AND BETWEEN DEATHS AND PERCENTAGE OFPEOPLEWHODIDNOT ZONES, ACCORDING TO TH THE RURAL POPULATION DISAPPEARANCES REPORTEDDISAPPEARANCES TOCVR THE POPULATIONAND THE OVER E HARDEST HIT DEPARTMENTS SPEAK SPANISH AS A DISAPPEARANCES INRURAL ZONESREPORTED RECORDED IN THE 1993NA NATIVE LANGUAGE:COMPARISON TIONAL CENSUS IN 23 THE EVENTS: MAGNITUDE AND SCOPE OF THE CONFLICT 24 PART ONE: THE TRAGEDY AND THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR IT until 1992,when Abimael GuzmánReinoso for asecondtimein1989.Thelevels ofviolencewouldhigh remainrelatively low pointin1986,thelevels ofviolencebegantoincreaseagainuntiltheypeaked FIGURE 5 combating subversion. After a government’s decisioninDecember 1982toputthearmedforcesinchargeof Ayacucho. Therewas anoticeablerise phase oftheconflictandwas concentratedprimarilyinthedepartmentof recorded bytheCVR (19percentofthevictims).Thiswas partoftheinitial intense periodandprovoked thegreatestnumberofdeathsanddisappearances marking differentphasesinthearmedconflict.The1984peakwas themost 10 internal armedconflictbetween 1989and1992. with thehighestnumber ofvictims,whilemoreareaswere affected bythe area wheretheviolentactswere committed. As canbeseen,1984 was theyear disappearances reportedtotheCVRbeginincrease, butsodidthegeographic violence between1985and1986,notonlydidthe numberofdeathsand the conflicttodifferentgeographicareas. not ashighin1984,theconflictexpandedover committee disbanded.Whilethelevels ofviolenceinthissecondphasewere vertical axis). the violence(leftvertical axis)andthenumberofdistricts whereviolentactsleftbehindvictims(right The indicatorsusedarethenumber ofdeathsanddisappearancesreportedtotheCVRforintensity As Figure5shows,thelevels ofviolencepeakedin1984and1989, Figure 6comparestheintensityofviolencewith theexpansionof REPORTED TOCVR, THE ACCORDING TO YEAR PERU 1980-2000:NUMBEROFDEATHS AND DISAPPEARANCES period ofdecliningfatalities,whichreachedits in theviolence1983,following 10 Thisshowsthatafterthedeclinein was arrestedandthe a widerareaofthenation. PCP-SL’s central FIGURE 7 number ofvictimsinruralareasandthose departments ofHuancavelicaand Apurímac) begantodecline,sodidthe (formed bythedepartmentof Ayacucho andneighboring provinces inthe FIGURE 6 in ruralareasandspoke times whentheconflictwas mostintense,theabsolutemajorityofvictimslived but alsocomplexsocialsituations.Itisimportanttonote,however, thatatthe notonlydifferentgeographicareas, This demonstratesthattheconflictinvolved AND NUMBEROFDISTRICTSWHERE THE EVENTSOCCURRED,BY YEAR south-central region(%south-central) Indicators: quechuaasnativelanguage(%quechua);eventsinruralzonesrural); eventsin TOINDICATORS,BY CVR THE ACCORDING TOOCCURRED EVENTS THEYEAR PERU 1980-2000:PERCENTAGE OFDEATHS AND DISAPPEARANCESREPORTED Figure 7showsthatastheimportanceofsouth-centralregion PERU 1980-2000:NUMBEROFDEA a nativelanguage. THS AND DISAPPEARANCES REPORTEDDISAPPEARANCES TOCVR THE whose native language w as Quechua. 25 THE EVENTS: MAGNITUDE AND SCOPE OF THE CONFLICT 26 PART ONE: THE TRAGEDY AND THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR IT DETERMINATION OFEVENTS to betreatedwithrespectandjustice: they aretoooftenexcludedandremoved fromotherPeruvians, theydemand Mamanis, Taypes, Yupanquis, Condoris, TintimarisandMetzoquiaris. Although who mayhave beeninvisible,butwhowere real:theQuispes,Huamáns, «foreign landwithinPeru.» the restofnationpayingattentiontotruedimensiontragedythis Asháninka, peasant,poorandwithlittle country needstoacceptthetruththatPeru thatisrural, Andean, Quechua, calculations mayseemunlikelytoaconsiderablesectorofPeruvian society, the internal armedconflict,accordingtothe 12 11 Peruvian Constitution,inplacesince1993,thisbody ofirrevocable rights human being. This bodyof human rightslaw, internationalhumanitarianlawor criminallaw. are imperative normsofinternationallawingeneral,included of irrevocable who mayberesponsibleforit. allows ustoseethelegalconsequencesofwhathappened andidentifythose certain areas.TheCVR offersthecountryaglobalvisionofevents that actors inageneralizedandsystematicmannerduring certainperiodsandin and demonstratesthescopeofcriminalconductpracticedbyvarious historically mostmarginalizedpopulation,butalsohelpsobservers understand the armedactorsinconflicttargetedcountry’s leastprotectedand The analysisoftheinformationgatheredbyCVRnotonlyillustrateshow T HE LEGAL DIMENSIONOF THE EVENTS database. CVR. PublichearingsinHuanta, Ay Quispe andHuamánw month. Wem humble people,orphansandpoor, peasantsearningjusta fewcoinsa want theretoberespect.IwantI ni pipaskanikuchu.Señores,chaytaya totalmente ñuqañaykuchukaniku,hukrealllapaskillapiganaq,mana masque imayrikullakaptiykupas, Señores, chaymiñuqamunanikachunrespeto,kachunyámanchakuy, These arethePeruvians who arenolongerpartofournation,Peruvians As was statedearlier, approximately69,000peoplewere killedinthe In accordancewiththeFourth FinalProvisionand Article 3ofthe In itslegalexaminationofthe

irrevocable rightsisderived fromandbasedonthedignityof

human rightsrecognizedbytheinternationalcommunity. These ere thetwo ay be no one, sirs, but this is the justice we ay benoone,sirs,butthisisthejusticewe most commonlastnamesamongthe victimsregisteredintheCVR’s acucho, April 11,2002.T events, theCVR tookintoaccountabody formal educationbledforyears without wakcha pobrikaptiykupas,campesino there tobefearofGod.Weonly are CVR’s calculations.Whilethese justiciyata mañakuykiku.[Sirs, estimony ofMs.SabinaV seek.] alencia. 12 11 what were originallytwo mean thatterroristcrimes cannotbeclassifiedashumanrightsviolations. courts arenotcompetent tojudgeterroristcrimes.This,however, doesnot they bejudgedbyinternational courtsspecializingintheseareas,because based ontreatiesandthereforereferonlytotheresponsibility ofstates.Norcan violations ofinternationalhumanrightsinstruments becausetheseinstruments We cannotexpecttosolve anethicalproblemwithalegalargument. bodies, butabouttheethicalcriteriathatshouldbeused tojudgeterroristactions. who areconcernednotaboutproblemsrelatedto the competenciesofthese the socialsphere.Inotherwords,itdoesnotcreatemeaningful rulesforpeople in the instrumentsandcompetenciesofdifferentlegal bodies,hasnovalue exclusively tothelegalsphere.Theobjection,which isbasedonthecontentsof international treaties. humanitarian law, asonlystateshave theprerogative tosignandratify conduct ofnon-stateagentsisregulatedbythenormsinternational employed bythestateviolatehumanrights.Jurisprudenceindicatesthat no exceptions. public officialoraprivate individual,whoisresponsiblefortheviolation,with right.» Inthiscase,thestateshouldtakelegalactionagainstanyone, whethera reparation fortheharmproducedbyviolationofafundamentalhuman and ensure,whenpossible,there-establishmentofviolatedrightoffer state must«prevent,investigate andsanctionallviolationsofrecognizedrights, As aconsequenceoftheobligationtoguaranteerightsinthesetreaties, and libertiesrecognizedbyhumanrightshumanitariantreatiesingeneral. obligations torespectandguarantee–ensurethattheyarerespectedtherights specific obligationsunderinternationalhumanrightslaw. Thesearethe competenceofthestateinvolved.internal issueortheexclusive 2/82, N°29).Third,humanrightsviolationsperpetratedbyastatearenotan «the protectionofthefundamentalrightshumanbeings»(I.A.C.H.R.,OC— human rightstreatiesdifferfromotheronacentralpoint:thegoalis treaty ortheimperative normsofgeneralinternationallaw invoke provisionsofnational lawasjustificationforfailingtocomplywitha for Peru. First,accordingtotheprincipl American levels. form thebodyofinternationalhumanrightslawatandinter- rights thatarerecognizedattheconstitu Constitution mustbeinterpreted,andispartofthesetspecificfundamental determines howthecontentsandscopeofallrightsrecognizedin International humanitarian law(IHL),initscontemporaryform,covers The CVRmaintainsthatterroristactionscannot beclassifiedas The CVR believes thatthisdebateisnot,andshouldnever be,relegated beenlegaldebatesabout There have statehasother Besides thegeneralimplicationsalreadymentioned,every The existingbodyofhumanrightslegislationhasspecificimplications Peru hasratifiedtheprincipaluniversal andregionaltreatiesthattoday branches oftheso-calledrights ofwar. Thesearethe tional levelinourlegalsystem. es ofinternationallaw, nostatecan whether agentswhoarenot (jus cogens). Second, 27 THE EVENTS: MAGNITUDE AND SCOPE OF THE CONFLICT 28 PART ONE: THE TRAGEDY AND THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR IT insurgent orarmedgroupstheirmembers. armed conflictdoesnotaffectthenationalorinternationallegalstatusof for theirapplication. Cross hasstated,anexplicitdeclarationofwar isnotanecessary prerequisite govern anykindofarmedconflict. As theInternationalCommitteeofRed «automatic application»of Article 3Common and,ingeneral,thenormsthat circumstance, thedeathorinj that commitactionsofthisnature.Nordotheyjustify, inanycaseorunder the useofterroristactionsormethods,organizationarmedgroups times andinallplaces.Inaddition,thenormsofIHLdonotjustifyorauthorize of internalarmedconflict,areobligatoryforstateandnon-stateagentsatall without exception. norms ofinternationallaw, whichareobligatoryforstatesandindividuals asthoseincludedin well Article 3Common,aresanctionedbytheimperative Nuremberg Tribunal (1945-1946),war Yugoslavia, bothofwhichconfirmedthejudgmentInternational and, morerecently, theInternationalTribunals forRwanda andtheformer the two Additional ProtocolsofJune8,1977. core ofIHL,specificallythefourGeneva Conventions of August 12,1949,and combat, andnon-militarytargets. involved inthehostilities,prisonerswhohave surrenderedorarenolongerin apply tothevarious partiestoaconflictregardingpeoplewhoarenotdirectly that applyduringhostilities;thesecondoutlineshumanitarianrules Hague Convention andtheGeneva Convention.Thefirstconcernstherules 13 1, 2002.Thestatutecannot beappliedretroactively. Plenipotentiaries, tookeffect forthesignatoryparties,includingPeru, onJuly community inRome(1998) attheendofU.N.DiplomaticConference allow fornon-violentstrategiestobringaboutrationally acceptablechanges. existing publicarenasthat,withintheframework ofrespectforhumanrights, in statesthatguaranteethebasicfreedomofcitizens, becauseitdestroysthe exterminate theenemy. hasnomoraljustification Inaddition,armedsubversion resorts tosuchactions,itisstatingthatitsgoalnot toendtheconflict,but fights, itcommitsterroristactionsoranyothercrime againsthumanity. Ifit law isessentialforclassifyingcertainactsascrimesand humanrightsviolations. application ofinternationalhumanrightslawand international humanitarian shall notaffectthelegalstatusofParties totheconflict.” The lastparagraphof Article 3Commonof theGenev The secondclarificationisthattheapplicationofIHLduringaninternal Two importantclarificationsarenecessaryhere.Thefirstreferstothe The rightsandprohibitionsin Article 3Common, According tothejurisprudenceofInternationalCourtJustice Peru hasratifiedthemaininternationaltreatiesthatcurrentlyform The InternationalCriminalCourtStatute,adoptedby theinternational it An armedforceorgroupismorallydisqualified if,bytheway Following thisargument,theCVR ury thatt a Conventions states:“Theapplicationofprecedingprovisions crimes andseriousviolationsofIHL,as hese groupsmayprovoke. 13 believes thattheconcurrent which covers all types whichcoversall the ruleoflawbutasaspecialformit. empire ofarbitraryactionwhereanythingispermitted, notasthenegationof of exceptionoremergency, therefore,arenotandcannotbeacceptedasan these normscannotbewaived, cannotbederogatedandareintangible.States to allhumanbeingsandthatare equal,whichmeansthat arose fromthehorrorsofpastcenturies,common beliefthattheyareinherent all peoplesoftheworld. Thesenorm in anyplaceisarelatively recent fundamental rightsofallhumanbeingsthatcannotbe derogatedatanytimeor derogated. protection), whichareindispensablefortheprotectionofrightsthatcannotbe banned fromsuspendingjudicialguarantees(habeascorpusandcivilrights not authorizeanysuspensionofthefollowingarticles[...].»Statesarealso provision,» andthe ACHR (Article27)statesthat«theforegoingprovision does (Article 4)statesthat«noderogationofarticles[…]maybemadeunderthis Rights (ACHR).Inthecaseofwar, publicdangerorotheremergency, theCCPR Civil andPolitical Ri orduringaninternalarmedconflict. war inthecourseofaninternational fundamental rightscannotbederogatedeven increasing clarity, imperative normsofinternationallawthathold Since World War II,theinternationalcommunityhas been establishing,with Fundamental rights ofthepersoncannotbederogatedevenduringarmedconflicts international crimes. Statute, becausetheyfacilitateabetterunderstandingofthecontextcertain its mandatetotheseevents, theCVR willuse Criminal Courtinrelationtotheevents thattook placeinPeru ordirectlyapply war crimes,committedduringinternalarmedconflicts. as classification ofcertaintransgressionsinternationalhumanitarianlaw, such Criminal Tribunals in thecaseofcrimesagainsthumanity. codify commoninternationalnorms,thuscontributingtogreaterlegalprecision community. To agreatextent, occurred beforeitsstatutetookeffect,itisvitallyimportantfortheinternational laws, which are meanttoensureimpunity forviolationsofinternational law CourtofHumanRightshasexpresslydeclaredthatamnesty The Inter-American violations Invalidity ofamnestyandother procedural obstacleswithrespecttocrimesand human rights Recognition bytheinternationalcommunityofa body ofintangible morepreciseintheInternationalCovenantThese normsareeven on While notattemptingtoinvokethecompetencyofInternational The RomeStatutealsoreaffirmsthejurisprudenceofInternational While theInternationalCriminalCourtcannotjudgeeventsthat for Rwandafor andtheformerYugoslaviathe regarding ghts (CCPR)andthe its definitionsofdifferentinternationalcrimes historical event ofthe s aregroundedintheconvictionsthat American Convention onHuman American Convention definitions suppliedbytheRome utmost importanceto 29 THE EVENTS: MAGNITUDE AND SCOPE OF THE CONFLICT 30 PART ONE: THE TRAGEDY AND THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR IT on themeritsinBarrios Altos Casehasgenericeffects.» defined throughajudgmenthandeddownbythecourt. on HumanRightsbecausethey«lacklegaleffects.» and gravehumanrightsabuses,areincompatiblewiththe American Convention 15 14 violations. investigate, tryandsentencepartiesresponsibleforserioushumanrights norms thatthestateitselfhaspassedtoavoid itsinternationalobligationsto According tointernationallawgoverning humanrights,thestatecannotuse punishment ofthoseresponsibleforserioushumanrightsviolations.» inadmissible, becausetheyareintendedtoprevent theinvestigationand the establishmentofmeasuresdesignedtoeliminateresponsibilityare Rights declaredthat«allamnestyprovisions,provisionsonprescriptionand state’s obligations.IntheBarrios Altos case,theInter-American CourtofHuman grounds thatthestatuteoflimitationshasexpiredtobeincompatiblewith international lawthatconsiderstheprescriptionofcriminalprosecutionon The Inter-American Court’s decisiontorejectamnesty lawsfollowsatrendin as cannot beinvoked imposed byinternationallawmustbefulfilledingoodfaithandinternal is basedontheprincipleofinternationallaw, accordingtowhichobligations consultative opinionsissued bythecourt.Thedoctrineestablishedcourt the fightagainstimpunityandisconsistentwithearlierjurisprudence who benefitedfromtheamnestylaws. committed inBarrios Altos, aswell asagainstpeopleimplicatedinother cases started criminalproceedingsagainstthepresumedauthorsofcrimes with theInter-American Court’s decision,Peruvian courtshavecontinuedor including theproscriptionof states bytheuniversal declarationoftherightspeopleafterWorld War II– and fullprotectionofhumanrights. has specificlimitation:thedefenseofperson,with respectforhumandignity Tribunal hasaffirmed,thatthepower tograntamnestiesisnotabsolute,but The approachtoconstitutionalprovisionsdetermines, astheConstitutional of thestatetoguaranteefullrespecthumanrights, power tograntamnesties. articles thatcouldposeaconflict–personaloption, righttojustice,obligation areas. within internationallawofthelimitsstate’s sovereign powerinthese rights ofallhumanbeingsattimesandin places –istherecognition al vs.Peru), of March 14, Altos Case(Chumbipuma Inter Inter The corollarytotheimportantlimitations There shouldbeauniforminterpretationofthediverse constitutional -American CourtofHumanRights, InterpretationoftheJudgmentonMeritsBarrios -American CourtofHumanRights, judgmentof The court’s judgesunanimouslyruledthat«thedecisioninthejudgment The judgmentoftheInter-American Courtopenedanewchapterin a reasonfornon-compliancewithinternationallaw. 2001. Paragraph 51,No.4. Aguirre etalvs.Peru), ofSeptember3,2001.Section VII,Number2. jus adbellum and theprotectionoffundamental the Barrios Altos Case imposed onthe 14 Thispositionwas further (Chumbipuma 15 Incompliance sovereignty of Aguirre et 16 17 is, thewidespreadcommissionofanactin result intherepeatedorcontinuouscommissionof inhumaneacts.» International LawCommission,isdefinedasa«plan orpolicy»that«could armed conflict. systematically orrepeatedlyduringtimesofpeace or withinthecontextofan this definition,theymustbecommittedagainst thecivilianpopulation physical integrity, tortureand humanitarian law. international criminallawandinaccordancewiththenormsof internal armedconflictmustbeconsideredinlightofthestandards violations thatcouldalsobeclassifiedasasystematicorwidespreadpractice. with nolinkstothestatewereresponsibleforthousandsofhumanrights terrorist groups.Thiswas auniqueelementofthePeruvian case,inthatagents as asynonymfor inaninternalarmedconflict. avoid systematic practicesandarenotisolatedactsoractionsthatdifficultto disappearances, theCVR believes thatcertainterroristactionsalsoconstitute partofasystematicpractice.Besidesthereferencestotortureandforced were disappearances duringtheperiodbeinganalyzedwerenotisolatedacts,but and theOrganizationof American Stateshave statedthattortureandforced (OAS, 1965). (United Nations,1967)or«ageneralizedpatternofhumanrightsviolations» «situations thatrevealconstantandsystematicviolationsofhumanrights» systematic orgeneralizedpracticeonthepartofstateandnon-stateagents. unavoidable inthecontextofinternalarmedconflict,orresulta the CVR hadtodeterminewhetherthesewere isolatedactsthatwere Faced withasituationinwhichillicitactionscausedtensofthousandsdeaths, widespread The classificationofcertaincrimesandhumanrightsviolationsassystematicor kind ofpreconceived planorpolicy requirement thatthispolicymustbe adopted formallyasthepolicy pattern onthebasisofacommon of victims.Theconcept‘systematic' maybedefinedasthoroughlyorganizedandfollowingaregular large scaleaction,carriedoutcollectively with Tribunal forRwanda, whichdeclared: Security ofMankind,”1996,paragraphs 94and95. Along thesesamelines,seetheInternational Criminal paragraph 648. International CriminalT The term«widespread»characterizestheconduct, not theagent;that The term Crimes againsthumanityrefertoactionsaperson’s lifeand inthe The criminaloffensescommittedbyterroristgroupsinvolved By virtueofitsmandate,theCVRhadtoexaminecrimes—understood In thecaseofPeru, thehumanrightsbranchesofUnitedNations The systemsforprotectinghumanrightspayspecialattentionto Also seetheInternationalLawCommission’s “Draft

systematic violations ofthePeruvian CriminalCode—committedby ribunal fortheFormerYugoslavia, sentence , accordingtointernationaljurisprudenceandthe .” CaseofJean-Paul Akay policy involving substantial publicor other actionsagainstindividualfreedom.To meet “The conceptof‘widespread’ may considerable seriousnessanddirected againstamultiplicity no way impliesthatallindividual esu, ICTR-96-4,September2,1998. of astate.Theremust Code ofOffenses against DuskoT be definedas private resources.Thereisno Against thePeace and adic, May7,1997, massive, however 17 frequent, be some 31 THE EVENTS: MAGNITUDE AND SCOPE OF THE CONFLICT 32 PART ONE: THE TRAGEDY AND THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR IT in combatingsubversion, ledt executions andforceddisappearances,aswell asth through ageneralamnestyafterdemocracywas lost. were guaranteeddiverseformsofimpunity. Impunitywas institutionalized of theanti-subversive strategytofallintothehandsofarmedforces,which theweight, designandimplementation The abdicationofcivilianpowerallowed obstacles insteadofalegitimatecourseactioninthefightagainstsubversion. an increasinglywidespreadandintensive conflictwould favor itscause. organization refusedtochangeessentialelementsofitsstrategy, believingthat humanitarian values, butwithoutconsideringthesituationofcountry. The that were carriedoutnotonlywithcompletedisregardforelemental norms. law, crimesagainsthumanity, andviolationsofPeru’s legalandconstitutional to commitactsthatconstitutedseriousinfractionsofinternationalhumanitarian because oftheapplicationwar strategiesthatoftenassumeditwas necessary deliberate coursesofaction.Theinternalarmedconflictwas especiallyonerous typical conductofthearmedactors.On excesses, thatis,isolatedmistakesanderrantbehaviorstrayed fromthe by subversive organizationsandstatesecurityforceswere farfrombeingsimple The CVRisconvincedthatthecrimesandhumanrightsviolationscommitted directed againstasinglevictim.» an isolatedinhumaneactperpetratedbysomeoneactingonhisorherownand the actsaredirectedagainstamultiplicityofvictims.Thisrequirementexcludes «requires thattheinhumaneactsbecommittedonalargescalemeaning agents areimplicatedinit.Thetermwidespread,accordingtothesourcescited, 18 hostage-takings, violenceagainstchildren,andviolation ofcollective rights. sexual violenceagainstwo executions, assassinationsandmassacres,inhumane anddegradingtreatment, documented includethefollowing:forceddisappearances, extrajudicial as partoftheirrespective strategies.Thecrimesandviolationsfound that were committedbysubversive organizations andtheanti-subversive forces unresolved problemsinterms this changedthepatternofexistinghumanrightsviolations, itstillleftserious action, carriedoutcollectively victims.” CaseofJean-Paul Akayesu, ICTR-96-4,September2,1998. for Rw and SecurityofMankind,”1996,paragraphs 94and95.Inthissense,theInternationalCriminalT paragraph 648. International CriminalT Nevertheless, thepoliticalcostofpracticessuchasextrajudicial State agentsconsidereddemocracyandrespectforhumanrightstobe The PCP-SL’s ideologyledittoapplyextremelyviolentandbrutaltactics The CVRhasidentifiedpatternsofcrimesandhuman rightsviolations anda, statedthat“Theconceptof Also seetheInternationalLawCommission’s “Draft ribunal fortheFormerYugoslavia, sentenceagainstDusko with considerableseriousnessand directedagainstamultiplicityof men, violationofdueprocess,kidnappingsand he securityforcestoreviewtheirstrategies.While of legalandprison ‘widespread’ 18

the contrary, theseviolationsreflected

may bedefinedasmassiv

issues. e needforgreaterefficiency Code ofOffense Ag e, frequent,largescale Tadic, May7,1997, ainst theP ribunal eace challenges thatwereresolved bytheCVR basedonthefollowing: ( carried outinthe stem fromtestimonies,various documents towhichithadaccess,andresearch responsibility ofindividualsforcrimesorhumanrightsviolations.Theelements with clarifying.To this responsibility forthecrimesandhuman competent sectorstomakethedetermination. The CVR’s mandatewasrestrictedtoprovidinginformation toenablethe and definingwithintheframeworkofinternationalhumanrightsstandards. stated law, whichincludesthedetermina jurisdictional function.Jurisdiction,byitsnature,isexercisedinfunctionof responsibility indeterminingforcrimes.TheCVR didnothave a wentjustice hasvarious beyond dimensions,theCVR thestrictlimitsofcriminal The determinationofresponsibilitiesisnecessaryforjusticetobeserved. Because following criteriarelative tothecas non-state agents,thePCP-SL commission hadtodealwithaconsiderablenumberofcrimescommittedby when assigningresponsibilities.Unlikeothertruthcommissions,thePeruvian the rightofrebuttal. offer theirperspectiveonwhathappenedthroughadocumentequivalent to mentioned aspresumablyresponsibleforcrimeswere given theopportunityto the personwasheardoratleastcalledtooffertestimony. All ofthepeople oftheevents.opportunity topresenttheirversion TheCVR made certainthat people whowerecitedaspresumablyresponsibleforcrimes given the A Movimiento RevolucionarioTúpacAmaru TTRIBUTION OFI • • • crime wascommitted. between theself-defensecommitteeand stateauthoritiesatthetime carried outonacase-by-case basis,verifying therelationship thatexisted to bepartofastateapparatus,whileinthelattercase, theanalysiswas paramilitaries andself-defensecommittees.TheCVR considerstheformer existed whenthecrimeswere committed; consideration thechainofcommandandhierarchical structuresthat state agentsornon-stategroups; human rightsviolations,regardlessofwhetherthey were committedby Special mentionmustbemadeoftheevaluation ofcrimescommittedby The determinationofresponsibilityincertain casestakesinto From theCVR’s pointofview, thereisnodifferencebetween crimesand The CVR wasThe CVR establishedtoidentify, wherepossible,presumed It isimportanttohighlight, asasummaryofthe The specificnatureoftheviolenceinPeru mustbetakeninto account In generalterms,theCVRmadeallreasonableeffortstoensurethat NDIVIDUAL course of RESPONSIBILITIES end, itgatheredevidencetodeclarethepresumed its investigation. and Tupac Amaru Rev es presentedbytheCVR: , MRTA). Thisposedvarious technical rights violationsthatitwas charged tion ofresponsibilitiesasdefinitive olutionary Movement Final Report , the 33 THE EVENTS: MAGNITUDE AND SCOPE OF THE CONFLICT 34 PART ONE: THE TRAGEDY AND THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR IT and jointauthorship. response incomparative jurisprudenceislinked tointermediateauthorship authorship, inducingauthorship ornecessarycooperation.Themostcommon diverse approaches:intermediate authorship,jointcollateral of command. To resolvethesedilemmas,criminaldoctrinehasdeveloped It isrelevant inthesecasestostudytheorganizationanditsstructure orchain respond creatively whenattemptingtopro or preparingit).Thesearenotnewproblems.Criminal doctrinehashadto the action,participatedtosomedegree(conceiving, planning, leading,ordering around theresponsibilityofleaderswho,while notdirectlycarryingout partofanorganization. Innearlyallofthesecases,theproblemrevolves were within thecategoryofcomplexcrimes,inwhich authorandparticipants organized apparatusofpower. by theuseandapplicationoftheorydominion ofevents inrelationtothe question ofwhoshouldbeaccusedcommittingacrime.Thisiscomplemented Statute, whichprovidethemostcompleteandconsistentapproachto that thecourtstakeintoconsideration Articles 25,26,27and28oftheRome of dominionevents andtheorganized individual. Thiswas based criminal doctrinefordeterminingwhenresponsibilitycanbeattributedtoan committed. Similarly, theCVRusedmostadvanced andwidelyaccepted position inconnectionwiththegrouporapparatuswithinwhichactwas determination ofestablishedpatterns,aswell asthepresumedperpetrator’s individual andtheactcommittedbythatperson.Thiswas basedonthe reasonable andproportionateuseofthecausalrelationshipbetween an • • • circumstances underwhichtheywerecommitted. to systematicallyinterpretthecontentofcriminalactions,aswell asthe judges andprosecutorsmustconsidertheprovisionsofRomeStatute human rightslawandinternationalhumanitarianlaw. Inparticular, contemplated intheCriminalCode,butalsoelementsofinternational The courtsmusttakeinto disappearance occurredbefore1991. disappearance tothecategoryofsimplekidnapping,evenif the crimewascommitted.Itisneitherlegalnormoraltoreduce that theaccusationispresented,notnecessarilyoneineffectwhen which meansthatthecaseisgovernedbylawineffectattime The forceddisappearanceofpeople,inparticular, isanongoingcrime, against humanityinlightoftheInternationalCriminalCourtStatute. rights violations. As such, eachof consistent withpatternsofsystematicandwidespreadcrimeshuman The casesformpartofamuchbroaderandcomplexwholethatis The majorityoftheevents examinedundertheCVR’s mandatefall The CVRhasdefinedthecriteriaforattributingresponsibilityby on theprovisionsofRomeStatuteandtheory account notonl these events mustbeconsideredacrime apparatus ofpower. secute organizedcriminalbehavior. y aggravating circumstances The CVR suggests the organizationthantoother actions.Inthesecases,ashasbeenstated,there event, therefore,canbeappliedmorereadilyto the kidnappingscarriedoutby themselves andtheconsequences theyproduced.Thetheoryofdominion differences aremainlyrelatedtothestrategicbasis of theiractions,theactions There aredifferencesandsimilaritiesbetweenthe MRTA andPCP-SL.The todeterminethecriminal responsibilityoftheShiningPath’sof events leaders. Jurisdictional bodies,therefore,musttakeintoaccount thetheoryofdominion illegality, even if national liberation.Moreover, itsactionscontributedtotheorganization’s considered aguerrillagroupthatwas fightinga totalitarianregimeinawar of was to objective The PCP-SLwas anorganizedpower apparatusthatwas outsidethelaw. Its the PCP-SL or localstructuresactedoutsidetheConstitutionandinviolationoflaw. in theemergencyzones.Itisfairtoassumethatonmanyoccasionstheseregional repeatedly howtheruleoflawandconstitutionalguaranteesweresuspended for reasonsofnationalsecurity. The military commanderinazoneorsub-zoneplacedunderstateofemergency Final Report chain ofcommand.Thepatternshumanrightsviolationsincludedinthe a detailedanalysisoftherel combination ofconstitutionaldemocracyandhumanrightsviolationsrequires violations were comm the political power. Exceptfortheperiodusheredinbycoupof April 5,1992, humanrightsviolationstothose who wereresponsibility forgrave holding of thetheorycannotbemechanical,norcanitaloneusedtoassign freedom ofexpressionandguaranteeconstitutionalrights.Theapplication occurred duringdemocraticallyelectedregimesthatincludedperiodicelections, 19 • • • • Metropolitan LimaCommittee. Responsibility fallstotheheadof PCP-SL, theCentralCommitteeandRegionalCommittees,suchas Final Report opted insteadforthecriminalroute. of thepersonincharge; which impliesthatthisisaconsistentdimensionwithintheorganization; structure; That thepowerapparatusnotbelinkedtojuridicalorder, having Responsibility oftheauthor, whichisderived Verification oftheeffective responsibilityofintermediateauthorship, That therebeanorganizedpower apparatuswitharigidhierarchical Continuing alongthislineofreasoning,therearedifferences between The humanrightsviolationscomm Application ofthetheorydominionevents correspond,inmanycases,tothepolitical-militarycommandsor and MRTA, asw details theway inwhichconsist the politicalmotivations behind theseactionsarerecognized. destroy thestatethatupheldlaw. Innoway canitbe itted bystateagentswithinacontextofdemocracy. The ell asbetween theseorganizationsandstateagents. ationship betweenthespecificviolationand Final Report itted bythePeruviangenerally state ent patternsofhumanrights andothersourcesdescribe from theeffective control

requires: 19 35 THE EVENTS: MAGNITUDE AND SCOPE OF THE CONFLICT 36 PART ONE: THE TRAGEDY AND THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR IT inflicted harmonthecivilianpopulation. attenuate themoralandpoliticalresponsibilityofvarious agentswho proportionate participationinthenumberoffatalities(seeFigure8)cannot legal explanationofanysortforthecrimescommitted.Likewise,different Understanding thesestrategies,however, doesnotallowamoralexcuseor to analyzethestrategieschosenbyactorsandtheirconsequences. population atanycost. which were aimedatachievingtheacquiescenceorsubmissionofcivilian Underlying theseactionswere ideologies,politicalwillandstrategies,someof CVR’s mandateraisesquestions about An examinationofthecrimesandhumanrightsviolationscovered underthe T committees tomilitaryauthorities. zone inquestionwhenthereisevidenceoftheeffective subordinationofthese specific case,thisresponsibilitymayalsoextendtothemilitaryleadersin material events, aswell astheleadersoftheseorganizations.Dependingon conceived are elementstoaffirmthattheMRTA’s centralleadershipdirectly planned, FIGURE 8 HE MAGNITUDE AND COMPLEXITY OFCRIMES AND HUMANRIGHTSVIOLATIONS PERU 1980-2000:NUMBEROF REPOR BY YEAR EVENTSOCCURRED To understandtheunprecedentedmagnitudeofconflict,itisuseful The assigningofresponsibilitytoself-defensecommitteescovers the and organizedthesecrimes. TED TOCVR, THE ACCORDING TOPARTIES THE RESPONSIBLE, DEATHS the reasonsbehindtheseevents. AND DISAPPEARANCES translate intosupportfor the PCP-SL’s cause. that thepopulationwould rejectthesecurity forces,andthatthisrejectionwould by securityforcesthatwould resultinmassive damage.Thestrategy assumed organization’s at defendingthe«people’s supportbases»theycreated,becausethe degrading treatment. violations suchassexualviolence,slavery, torture,andcruel,inhuman and forced disappearancesattributedtothePCP-SL,generated aseriesofcollateral This formofviolence,whichexplainsthelargenumber ofkidnappingsand organization didnothesitatetouseforcedrecruitment, includingthatofminors. where itmanagedtoreplace and isolatedmilitaryunits. armed conflicts,suchassabotage,propaganda andambushesofsmall «way offighting,»indistinguishablefromothertacticsnormallyusedininternal a resistance, apolicyofdisproportionateretaliation. Assassinations wereseenas PCP-SL opted for a policy of selective whether stateortraditional,andconstructing«people’s supportbases,»the supremacy. – andanticipatedabloodyprolongedconfrontationtodetermine the militaryviolentlydestro powers. Thestrategyforesaweffortsbythearmed forcestore-establishorder– under itsdirectcontrolthroughwhichitwouldexercisetotalover state total destructionofexistingpoliticalstructuresandthecreationinstitutions claimed torepresent,takepower. considerations weresecondarytotheneedofoppressedsectors,whichthey individuals hadrightsashumanbeingsandstatedthatallhumanitarian value inguidingtheorganization’s actions. ideological constructionoftheexistingsocialorderand,assuch,wereno spectrum wereconsideredlegitimatetargetsof religious menandwomen,politicalleadersatanyleveloftheelectoral them intov or socialgroupsoutsideitscontroltobeabsoluteenemies,therebyturning basedonanextremeversionwas ofManichaeismthatconsideredallinstitutions law. TheShiningPath’si method forreachingitsobjectivesandexplicitlyrej – ShiningPath astrategythatconsciouslyincorporatedterroras developed In thecaseofpartythatinitia C RIMES AND HUMANRIGHTSVIOLA When itwas necessarytomaintainthepopulation’s logistical support Nevertheless, thearmedunitsorganizedbyPCP-SLwere notaimed Similarly, thePCP-SL optedtoquicklyformarmedunitsinthose areas Withof theobjective The principalstrategicobjective oftheShin The PCP-SL’s alid militarytargets. Authorities, civilsocietyleaders,businesspeople, strategy was based rhetoric unequivocallystatedthathumanrightswere an deology, TIONS RESULTING FROM THE yed manyofthePCP-SL’s originalbasecommittees totally andradicallydestroyinglocalpower, encapsulated inso-called«GonzaloThought,» local authorities.To ted theconflict,th on provoking disproportionaterepression assassinations and,inordertorepressall The PCP-SL rejectedtheidea that the organization’s violentactions. ected therulesofinternational PCP-SL e CommunistPartyPeruof ing Path’s actionswas the accomplishthis,the ’S STRATEGY 37 THE EVENTS: MAGNITUDE AND SCOPE OF THE CONFLICT 38 PART ONE: THE TRAGEDY AND THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR IT from peoplewhohaddecidedtoassumethestate’s roleanddefendthemselves. saw as«feudalvassals» rather confrontations betweenitsarmedcolumnsandself-defensegroups,whichit they hadnotwon over thepopulation,PCP-SL calledfor massive communities thatrejectedthePCP-SL’s politicalideas.Unable toacceptthat strategy, from thelocalpopulationoractionsbystate,lednottoareviewof that raisedquestionsaboutthestrategy’s effectiveness, becauseofresistance increased theintensityofitsactions,suchasduring«armedstrikes.»Situations varying onlyquantitativelywhentheorganization expandedtonewzonesor in theirowndestruction. their ownlives evenifthisdidnotresultinamilitaryadvantage andonlyended Shining Path’s triumph.Thismeantthatmilitantshadtobewillingsacrifice concept thatthepopulationhadtopaya«bloodquota»inorderachieve the however, «GonzaloThought» elevated tothecategoryofscientifictruth provoking create ageneralizedsenseoffearthatwould supposedlybenefititsgoalof by otherarmedgroupsininternalconflicts,itdidsowithcalculatedcrueltyto of settinganexample.Even whenthePCP-SL carriedoutactionsgenerallyused carry outextremelybrutalactionsandpermanentlyemployviolenceasaway followed by conditions towhichpeoplewere subjectedintheseimprovisedcamps. the movetoescapestate’s presence,withnoregardfortheinhumane and slavery thatkeptthecivilianpopulation(whichitcalled«themasses»)on for importantmilitaryunits,thePCP-SLoptedapolicyofforceddisplacement Percentage distributionofcases,byyear PERU 1980-2000:METHODSUSEDBY THE PCP-SL INITSSUBVERSIVESTRATEGY. FIGURE 9 The PCP-SL’s Provocation was aconstantinthePCP-SL’s tactics.Forittobeeffective, The differencesbetween thePCP-SL’s militarystrategyandthatnormally but toincreasedviolence.Thiscanbeseenintheresponse a disproportionateresponsefromitsdemoralizedenemy. other insurgentgroupsinLatin America explainsitspropensityto strategyremainedunchangedthroughouttheconflict, than whattheyreallywere,adesperateresponse forcibly recruit followers. Thesemet kidnappingto part ofitsmethodsinthe «armedstruggle,»andemployed pattern. Thisorganization usedassassinationandtortureonamassivescaleas by thePCP-SLandreported totheCVRfollowsanextremelysynchronized fight. more selectiveattacksandinvolved thepeasantpopulationinanti-subversive anti-subversive strategythatreinforcedintelligence gathering,calledformuch committees. At communities inPunoandthespreadofruralpeasant patrolsandself-defense much stronger, which can beseeninthesuccessfulresistancebypeasant the population,authoritiesandcivilsocietyleaderscame muchearlierandwas causes similartothoseofthefirstcycle.Nevertheless, thistimeresistancefrom committed bythesubversiv beginning in1988.Themagnitudeofthecrimesand humanrightsviolations the citiesofHuancayoandLima. intensified itspoliticalworkamongradicaluniversity groups,particularlyin Valley andpeasantcommunitiesin as welltourbanareas,bytryinglinkupwithcocagrowers intheHuallaga committees» andspreaditswartothecentral,northeasternsouthern Andes, Ayacucho. Between 1985and1987,the PCP-SL attemptedtocreate«people’s from thestate–andbeganpenetratingothersocialgeographicareasoutside the battlefield–astrategythatwas plannedinantic political andmilitaryapparatus.Thesubversiveorganizationretreatedfrom number ofinnocentvictimsin department of Ayacucho andwas linkedtothreeprocesses: violence intheinternalarmedconflictwasmainlyconcentrated reported totheCVRoccurredduringtheseyears.Thisfirstcycleofintense Nearly one-thirdoftheassassinationscommittedbyPCP-SL thatwere subversive organization.Thefirst,between 1982and1985,was themostintense. the CVR.Thegraphshowstwomajorcyclesofviolenceunleashedby and humanrightsviolationscommittedbythePCP-SL thatwere reportedto Figure 9showsthedistribution (each dottedlinerepresents6%ofthecasesreportedtocvr.) • • • committing violentandindiscriminateactsofrepression. the subversiveorganization’s strategyofprovokingthemilitaryinto in Ayacucho tothePCP-SL’s totalitarianideas; on the Ayacucho countrysidethroughits«people’s committees»; The intervention ofthearmedforcesininternalconflictand The increasingresistance(especiallyafter1983)ofthepeasantpopulation The PCP-SL’s As Figure9shows,thedistribution oftheprincipalcrimescommitted Another cycleofintenseviolencewas unleashedinthesenewareas The violentrepressionbythesecurityforces,whichresultedinalarge the sametime,stateandsecurityforcesdesigned anew attempt toimposeitsmodelforsocialandstatestructures e organizationduringthisperiodwas sparkedby Ayacucho, dealtaserious blowtothePCP-SL’s over theyearsofprincipalcasescrimes andJunín.Italso Apurímac, Huancavelica hods created fearamongthepopulation ipation ofaviolentreaction 39 THE EVENTS: MAGNITUDE AND SCOPE OF THE CONFLICT 40 PART ONE: THE TRAGEDY AND THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR IT that translatedintotheirstrategiccapitulation. began negotiationswithadictatorialregimeinexchange forpoliticalconcessions did notresistarrestandacceptedaseriesofprivileges fromtheircaptors,and who hadrejectedalldialoguewithconstitutionalgovernments duringthe1980s, they demandedoftheir principal leadersofthePCP-SLwere arrested andfacedwiththesamedecisions was relative. Nevertheless, itisnecessarytohighlightwhatoccurredwhenthe main leaders,thevalue ofhumanlife—itsenemiesorowncombatants insurgent groupsgreaterthan5percentofthetotalnumberdeaths. armed conflicts.Innoothercasewas thepercentage ofvictimsattributedto the findingsofothertruthcommissionsincountriesthatexperiencedinternal the PCP-SL(54percentofvictimsreportedtoCVR)doesnotcompare armed conflictsinLatin America. Thehighproportionofkillingsattributedto costly intermsofhumanlivesandunprecedentedthehistoryinternal disputes intoarmedconflicts,th gradual increaseinthelevels ofviolenceandtransformationoldcommunity TABLE 1 which arecondemnedbyPeruvian andinternationallaw. widespread useofthesemethodsconstitutedgrave crimesagainsthumanity, and were partofaterroriststrategy. At thesametime,systematicand 20 and consistentlyover time. positive, whichsuggeststhatthesepracticeswere committedsimultaneously kidnappings committedbythePCP-SL between1980and2000ishigh lower. opposite relationship.Forexample,when theincidenceoflegalarrestsishigher, theincidenceoftortureis another. For positive variabthe closercoefficientistounit (+1or-1)thegreaterassociationbetween the two changes inonevariable influencetheother. variables,This statisticalcorrelationindicates the closeassociationoftwo thatis, thelevels atwhich According totheideologyandpracticesestablishedbyPCP-SL’s Following arationalethatincl As Table 1shows,thecorrelation association thatisclosetotheindicated unitindicates example, kidnappingiscloselylinked toassassination. A followers. Abimael Guzmánandhisclosestfollowers, e PCP-SL developed astrategythatwas very Pearson’s c uded assassinations,provocation, a oefficient “r” isaway ofmeasuringthisassociation: oefficient “r” 20 amongassassinations,tortureand that the two variablethat thetwo directlyinfluenceone negative association indicatesthe les. A a reactiontothePCP-SL’s attacks.Thepoliceforces’ initialeffortsdidnothave groups inLatin Am guerrilla insurgencysimilar tothatof1965oroneresembledotherarmed by thePCP-SL.Foralong time,authoritiesbelieved theyweredealingwitha The Peruvian statewas not preparedtodeal C democratic orderandthesocialmovement itclaimedtodefend. people, addedtothenumberofhum organization’s armedactivityundeniablyincreasedthesufferingofPeruvian percent ofthedeathsanddisappearancesreported totheCVR), victims. creating newrisksforthecivilianpopulationand increasingthenumberof led toconfrontationswiththe leaders w way fortheMRTA toresolve internalconflictsinthemonthsbeforeitsprincipal This conductwas echoedwithintheorganization,andassassination becamea businesspeople; kidnappingvictims;andpeopletheyconsidered«disreputable.» government employees withnolinkstotheadministration inpoweratthetime; indigenous people,forhisallegedactionsagainstMIRguerrillasin1965;retired lesson. Victims ofMRTA assassinationsincludedaleaderofthe Asháninka with nomilitaryconnectionforthesolepurposeofteachingpopulationa began adoptingtacticsusedbythePCP-SL,includingassassinationofpeople the MRTA hadlittleopportunitytodevelopitsownarmedstrategy. Ittherefore to respect. is specificallybannedbytheinternational used byotherarmedgroupsin throughtacticssuchaskidnapping.Kidnapping,whichwasto resolve also however, theorganizationfacedseriouseconomicchallengesthatitattempted establishedlinkstothesocialmovementsitclaimedrepresent, Because itnever ambushes andtheorganizationofarmedmilitarycolumnsincountryside. which ithadcontact. insurrectionist strategycomparabletothatofotherLatin American groupswith becoming akindof«armedbranch» Revolucionario Tupac Amaru investigation, duringtheperiodofCVR’sactions oftheotherarmedgroupactive The magnitudeofthePCP-SL’s crimes should not overshadow areviewofthe C RIMES AND VIOLATIONS CAUSEDBY RIMES AND HUMANRIGHTSVIOLATIONS CAUSEDBY THE STRATEGIES OFSTATE AGENTS While theMRTA’s responsibilityforfatalitiesisproportionately low(1.5 In addition,theMRTA’s effortstoopenfrontsinruralareasinevitably Faced withslowgrowth,increasinglevels ofviolence andmilitarization, The MRTA’s militarystrategycombinedurbanarmed agitationwith ere arrested. the T the erica. As a erica. As upac , MRTA). TheMRTA, whicharosewiththeideaof Amaru Rev THE PCP-SL thatcomplicated theconflicteven further, result, theinitialpoliceresponse was, above all, Latin American, w Latin American, MRTA an rightsviolationsand ’S STRATEGY olutionary Move humanitarian lawthe with the armed subversion launched with thearmedsubversion social mov as employed eventhoughit ements, followed an ment ( further weakened MRTA claimed Movimiento 41 THE EVENTS: MAGNITUDE AND SCOPE OF THE CONFLICT 42 PART ONE: THE TRAGEDY AND THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR IT permitted humanrightsabuses tooccur. of emergencyweakened the suspensionofconstitutional guarantees.Thepermanentnatureofthestate measure becameapermanent fixtureinvarious partsofthecountry, leading to for designingatrulydemocratic ignore andsilenceaccusationsofabusesinsteadassuming theirresponsibility thatinevitablystemmedfromconflict.Civilianauthoritiestendedto work» in suchaway thatonlythe equivalent toadecisionbycivilianleadersorganizetheanti-subversive fight commanders intheemergencyzonesas«political-military» authoritieswas failed toimplementsafeguardsprotectthepopulation. Appointing military civilian leadersabdicatedtheirauthorityinfavor ofamilitaryresponseand legitimacy ofdemocracytoconfrontanddefeat the civiliangovernments,withsomenotableexceptions, didnotusethe population. SL, thearmedforcesactedasthoughtheywere tryingtoprotectPeru from that many cases,insteadofprotectingthepopulation Ayacucho fromthePCP- a generaldisdainforthepeopletheywere supposed differences betweentheofficersand Military officersgenerallycamefromurbanareas,andtheculturalsocial replicated patternsthatexistedintheoverall rural-urb on blindloyalty andawillingness tocommitactsofcruelty. population, avoiding abusesthatmightalienateit,butasindoctrination based and politicaltrainingfortroopsthatwould havetowinover thecivilian in complexgeographicareas.Theirpreparationwas notseenasideological military areas,withanemphasisonpreparingthesoldiersphysicallytooperate university studentsandleft-wingpoliticiansbecamesuspectsbyassociation. where thesubversive groupoperated.People from Ayacucho, Quechuaspeakers, targeting entirepopulationsaspotentialenemiesbecausetheylived inthearea other groups.Stateagenciescompensatedforthislackofinformationby where theycamefrom,ortheideologicaldifferencesthatseparateditfrom information aboutthesectorswhereitoperated,whoitsmilitantswereand the remainderofinternalarmedconflict. violence thatincreasedthenumberofcasualti that was placedunderastateofemergency, andadrasticworsening ofthe militarily –was subversion ondifferentfronts–ideologically decision, whichwas adoptedwithout forces inchargeoftheanti-subversive fight.Theimmediateresultofthis time tomatureorproduceresultsbeforeauthoritiesdecidedputthearmed The conceptofastateemergency lostitsmeaning,andthisexceptional Although thePCP-SLhadtakenuparmsagainstademocratic regime, The situationwas Similarly, theanti-subversive unitswere trainedonlyintechnicaland The PCP-SL remainedanunknownorganization.Therewas little the abdicationofcivilianauthorityinabroadswath ofterritory complicated byracismwithinthearmedforces,which Peruvian democracyandcreatedaclimate that military leaderswereresponsibleforthe«dirty anti-subversive a comprehensive strategyfordealingwith population wereimmenseandproduced subversion ideologically. es tolevels unparalleledduring , politically strategy. to winover anddefend.In an relationshipinPeru. , economicallyand Instead, stages oftheanti-subversive fight. behind bars. process andthemassincarcerationofinnocentpeople whospentlongyears rights violationsafterthischangeincludedarbitrary arrest,violationofdue extrajudicial executionsandforceddisappearances.Themostcommonhuman groups andthegrowingnationalinternationalfocusonpracticessuchas the implementationofnewlawstoundermineinternalloyalty ofsubversive extrajudicial executionsandforceddisappearances,butmoreselectively. use legalmethodstoarrestorprocesssuspects.Itcontinuedcarryout wasSL tryingtowinsupporters.The to emphasizeintelligenceworkandidentifythesocialsectorswherePCP- The securityforcesreducedthenumberofindiscriminateactionsandstarted crossfire andthatthestatehadtoadoptmeasureswinover thepopulation. their strategybasedontherecognitionthatpopulationwas caughtinthe authorities assumedresponsibilityfortheconflict. Congress anddidnothaveasignificantimpact abuses. Unfortunately,were carriedoutbyasmallminorityin theseinitiatives there werecongressionalinvestigations intotheaccusationsofhumanrights massive humanrightsviolationsandterroristactions. the viabilityofPeruvian statewas indoubt other zones,butalsogrewincreasinglycomplicated,reachingapointwhere Path’s strategyofprovocation andpolarization. totheanti-subversiv democratic alternative the prisonmassacresinJune1986,whichreducedpossibilitiesofa human rightsabusescommittedbythearmedforces.Thatperiodendedafter the creationofPeace Commissionandawillingnesstoaddresstheserious Belaúnde Terry. Pérez, whotookacriticalviewofth examined duringtheearlymonthsadministrationofPresident Alan García 21 March 13,2003);datafrom1993-2000 1983-1992 was the CVR.Theinformationonofficial arrestsbysecurityforcescamefromthefollowingsources:data The dataonextrajudicialexecutions, disappearancesandtorture Inmates fromthe Attorney General’ Figure 10showsthemethodsappliedbystateagentsduring thedifferent A newchangeinstrategycameafterthearrestoftopPCP-SLleaders, The militaryandpoliceforcesdidtheirownassessmentreoriented Congress attemptedtoreorientthestate’s anti-subversion actions,and That policyofindiscriminatelygivingcontroltothemilitarywas re- provided bytheNational The mostimportantdevelopments camein1985and1986,with s Office(Communiqué106-2003-MP-FN-RENADESPPLE). was provided bytheNationalRegistryofDetainedandSentenced Anti-T 21 errorism Bureau(Communiqué55-DIRCOTE-COMASE of state securityapparatus,however, did not e effortsofhis e strategyandplayed Theconflictnotonlyspreadto ontheway inwhichcivilian were providedintestimoniesanalyzedby andcreatingconditionsfor predecessor, Fernando into theShining 43 THE EVENTS: MAGNITUDE AND SCOPE OF THE CONFLICT 44 PART ONE: THE TRAGEDY AND THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR IT Percentage distributionofcasesbyyear(eachlinerepresents6%thereportedtoCVR) PERU 1980-2000:METHODSUSEDBY ST FIGURE 10 acted undertheguidanceof oracquiescedtostateagents,producedasignificant organized peasantcommunities inself-defensecommitteestofightsubversion. involve presumed membersofsubversive organizationsandanefforttoactively on subversive organizations,whichled tomoreselective operationstoeliminate subversion moredirectly. Greateremphasiswas placedongatheringintelligence evaluated theiractionsanddesignedanewstrategyaimedatcombatingarmed between 1985and1989stateagents inchargeoftheanti-subversive strategy Given thecontinuedexistenceofsubversion anditsspreadtootherregions, reflected inalower numberofcrimes law andPeru’s lawsandConstitution. constitute crimesagainsthumanityandviolationsof international humanitarian they supportedsubversion. Someofthesepracticeswere widespread and inaneffort to showpeasantsthehighcosttheywould payif networks family suspects, assumedcollaboratorsand,inmanycases, thesepeople’s socialand with theobjective members ofthesecurityforceshithardatcertainsegmentspopulation repression, especiallyintheruralareasof Ayacucho. Duringtheseyears, the This stagewas characterizedbyawidespreadandindiscriminate strategyof over internalorderandanti-subversive effortsinthedepartmentof Ay conflict, between 1983and1984,whenth and torturereportedtotheCVRwere concentratedinthefirststageof Members ofself-defense committees, whowerenotstateagentsbut The intensityoftheinternalarmedconflictsubsided somewhatin1985, A largepercentageoftheextrajudicialexecutions,forceddisappearances of eliminatingpotentialPCP-SL militants.Theyeliminated ATE AGENTS IN THE FIGHT ATETHE IN AGENTS and humanrightsabusesbystateagents. e armedforces AGAINST were giv SUBVERSION. en control acucho. remained constantduringthetimeswhenexecutions, thenforced 10 shows,thepatternoftortureduringperiod investigated bytheCVR from allegedsubversives orasaformof systematically usedtortureasaninterrogationtechnique toobtaininformation terrorism legislation»passedundertheFujimoriadministration. Peru’s ConstitutionalTribunal struckdownasunconstitutional mostofthe«anti- ruled thatthissystemviolateddueprocessinPeru. InaJanuary2003ruling, a legalmechanismknownas«repentance.» the quantitativesuccessofaprogramtodisarmpresumedsubversives through leader’s strategiccapitulation,thedemoralizationofmanyhisfollowers and intelligence workbytheNational SL, Abimael GuzmánReinoso,whowas caughtinSeptember1992thanksto of thesubversive organizations, includingthefounderandleaderofPCP- obtaining informationaboutthesubversive forced disappearance.Thispracticewas also weremoresecretiveeliminate allegedsubversives by thesubversiveorganizations,especiallyurbanareaswhereoperationsto The changeinstrategywas alsorelatedtothenewareasofconflictopenedup Forced disappearancesincreased, was anabsolutedecreaseinextrajudicialexecutions(comparedto1983-1985). particularly the«RodrigoFranco»Command( number ofhumanrightsabuses.Thiswas alsotrueofparamilitarygroups, 23 22 people tobereleasedfromprison. to establishamechanismforpardons,whichallowed hundredsofinnocent accused ofterrorismandtreasond minimum respectfordueprocessandinsufficientevidence. PCP-SLthe andMRTA. administration, ledtothearrestofthousandspeopleaccusedbelonging «repentance» lawsenactedbyformerPresident Alberto Fujimori’s well asthatprovidedbymembersoftheseorganizationswhoacceptedthe as detainees’ righttodueprocesswas violated. was,There however, anotorious decline inthenumberofextrajudicialexecutionsandforceddisappearances. substantial increaseinthenumberofarrestsallegedsubversives andarapid (4,085 arrests)and1994(4,948arrests). however, didnotcover allcasesofinnocentpeopleinprison(Human RightsOmbudsman,2000). Between 1996and1999,thestate pardoned502 According tothe Throughout thesethreemajorstrategiccycles,the securityforces The thirdphaseintheanti-subversiv One ofthehighpointsthisstagewas thearrestofprincipal leaders As aresultofthestrategicchangesmadeinsecondphase,there Numerous mistakesweremadewithinthesystemcreatedtotrypeople Information obtainedthroughthearrestsoftopsubversive leaders, Attorney General’s Office,the years with 22 Manyofthesedetaineeswereprocessedwithout however, particularlybetween 1989and1992. 23 increase inthenumberofcaseswhich TheInter-American CourtofHumanRights uring this time, eventually leading the state the leading uring thistime,eventually Police. ThearrestledtotheShiningPath people whow punishmentandin organizations’ plansandstructures. the highestnumberofofficialarrests w e effortwas Comando RodrigoFranco linked to torture as a way of linked totortureasaway ere unjustlyimprisoned.Thismechanism, and involved actionssuchas timidati characterized bya on. As Figure on. As ). ere 1993 45 THE EVENTS: MAGNITUDE AND SCOPE OF THE CONFLICT 46 PART ONE: THE TRAGEDY AND THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR IT impunity forhumanrights abusesandrampantcorruption. execution were «crimescommittedinthelineofduty.» idea thatcrimessuchastorture,forceddisappearance andextrajudicial accusations ofabusestothemilitarycourts.Thisdecision was basedonthe In thevast majorityofcases,theSupremeCourtcededjurisdictionover to applythelawthoseresponsibleforcommitting humanrightsviolations. forces tousestrategiesthatincludedhumanrightsabuses. the impunityunderwhichtheyoperatedonlyserved toencouragethesecurity without havingtoinflictsomuchharmonthecivilianpopulation.Inaddition, better positiontoadaptmorerapidlythestrategicchallengesofsubversion abdicated theirresponsibility, thestatesecurityforceswould havebeenina obstacle totheiractions.TheCVR believes thatifcivilianauthoritieshadnot however, didnotusethesemechanismsandfrequentlyconsideredtheman organizations, astheyhadtheruleoflawattheirdisposal.Thesecurityforces, cases oftorture. arrests andexecutionsdisappearance agents between 1980and2000.Inversely, thereisaweak correlationbetween extrajudicial executions,forceddisappearancesandtorturecommittedbystate correlation inthedistributionofcasesreported disappearances, andfinallylegalarrestswere attheirpeak. forces closedallthedoors foroversi vision. Thealliancebetween the face, adheringto–orsubmitting to–thearmedforces’strategicandpolitical forcing anamnestylawthroughtheDemocraticConstituent Congress. even foundaway tobypassthegenerallyacquiescentjudicialauthoritiesby tried, thesentenceswere almostalways lenient.TheFujimoriadministration courts, thesecaseswereusuallydropped.Inthehandful ofcasesthatwere It isimportanttonotethatthejudicialsystemdid fulfill itsobligation The statesecurityforcesnaturallyhadanadvantage over thesubversive According totheresultsshowninTable 2,thereisasignificant Under Fujimori,theabdication ofcivilianauthoritytookonadifferent Fujimori government andasectorofthearmed ght andopenedthe s, as well asaweakcorrelationwith to theCVR involving

Once inthemilitary way for widespread associated witharrestsand, toalesserdegree,torture.Thisconfigurationofthe executions, forceddisappearances andtorture,whilethesecondisparticularly TABLE 3 analyzing orientations –theeliminationofpresumedsubversives ortheirarrest–by with differentlevels ofseverity: orientations, eachassociatedwithacertainpatternofhumanrightsviolations waythroughout theanti-subversiveto fightgave have helpedimprove itspublicimage. ideologically itdidnotrecognizetheconceptofhumanrightsevenifthatwould the conflict.ThePCP-SLdidnotrespondtoanysortofcontrols,because scientific advancement withuniversal v follow 24 people accusedofbelongingtoarmedsubversive groups). torture andlegalarrests)withthetwo orientations (eliminationorarrestof correlation ofeachvariable (extrajudicialexecutions, forceddisappearances, the principalcomponentsofth disappearances, tortureandarrestsregisteredannually. This analysisrevealed evolution ofmultiplevariables. This was Thesecondorientationledtothearrestofpresumedmembers • Thefirstorientationresultedinthemorefrequentuseofmethods,such • violations ofdueprocess. subversive groupsandrapidsummaryproceedingsthatresultedin or sympathizers,andinmanycasestheirsocialfamilynetworks; physically eliminatingpeopleconsideredtobesubversives, collaborators as extrajudicialexecutionorforceddisappearance,thatwere aimedat ers andtheideologicalmystificationthatattemptedtoportrayitasa As thetableshows,firstorientationhasapositive correlationwith The CVR attemptedtov The complexitiesofthestrategicchangesadoptedbystate The PCP-SL’s militarystrategy, done withafactorialanalysis,which isdesignedtodeterminethegeneralfactorsunderlying 24 theircorrelationwithcasesofextrajudicialexecutions,forced erify statisticalinformationrelatedtothesetwo e two orientations.Tablee two 3demonstratesthe alidity, remained unchanged throughout despite thefascinationitheldforits two mutuallyexclusive 47 THE EVENTS: MAGNITUDE AND SCOPE OF THE CONFLICT 48 PART ONE: THE TRAGEDY AND THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR IT used intheanti-subversive fight. investigated bytheCVR.Thesequadrantsrepresentfourkindsofstrategies subversives. the degreeofemphasisbystateagentsoneliminationorarrestalleged Figure 11showsthedistributionofyears investigated bytheCVR,reflecting actions todetermineinwhichyears orperiodsthe two orientationspeaked. cases oftorture. executions anddisappearances,butdoeshaveasignificantcorrelationwith centered onthearrestofpresumedsubversives suffered bythevictimsbeforetheywere killedordisappeared.Theorientation designed toeliminatepresumedsubversives andwere stronglylinkedtotorture extrajudicial executionandforceddisappearancewere rel consistent withtheaccusationsreceivedbyCVR:practicessuchas both orientationsandpersisteddespitethechangesinstrategy. Theresultis orientation gearedtoward principal componentsindicatesthattorture–althoughmorefrequentinthe 25 FIGURE 11 location ofeachcase(practiceemployed eachyear) alongtheaxes. The values ofeachaxiswere calculatedusingtheregressionmethod.Theyrepresentstandard values ofthe The intersectingaxesformfourquadrantsencompassingtheyears A finalstepinthisanalysisisadiagramshowingthedistributionof 25 eliminating opponents–was is notascloselylinkedto a commonpracticein ated toastrategy P virtual endofPCP-SLactivities. giventime representedbymassarrests–andfinallyadecline inalllevels the by atransitiontomoreselectiveformsofviolence, anothertransition–this theroadmapmoves from words, then Quadrant«C,»«D»andfinally «A»again.Inother from Quadrant«A»to«B,»followedbythe intersectionoftheaxes, followed by state resurgence withanewwave ofhumanrightsviolations. country witnessedarelative declineintheintensityofconflictbeforea represented intermediateperiodsintheinternalarmedconflict,when 1987 and1988arelocatedneartheintersectionofbothaxes.Thoseyears which thestrategieschanged.Itisimportanttohighlightthatyears1986, organization. Abimael Guzmán,whichallowed thepolicetodismantlePCP-SL’s is consistentwiththesituationthatoccurredafterarrestandcapitulationof highest peakis1994,whenthenumberofarrestswas made.Thisresult executions andforceddisappearancesreportedtotheCVR.Theyearwith which correspondedtoadecreaseinthenumberofcasesextrajudicial most prev withanincreaseinthenumberoflegalarrests.Thisstrategywassubversion combine thephysicaleliminationofpeoplesuspectedparticipatingin state agentswas registered information gatheredbytheCVR,greatestnumberofdeathsattributedto As thegraphshows,highestpeakis considered collaboratorsorsympathizers,andtheirfamilysocialnetworks. agents carriedoutactionsaimedateliminatingpresumedsubversives, people the anti-subversive strategyimpliedgrave humanrightsviolationsandstate weresubversives elimi actions (1998,1999and2000). declined considerablyandthestatedidnotcarryoutsignificantrepressive inwhichthesubversive threat 1982). Thisquadrantalsoincludestheyears there was noclearstrategyfordealingwitharmedsubversion (1980,1981and because in whichstateagentsneithereliminatednorarrestedallegedsubversives victims fromcertainpopulations. internal armedconflictemployed anumberofdifferentpracticestoselect their bytheCVRThe testimoniesreceived indicatet ROFILES OF THE VICTIMS The quadrantsinFigure11canalsobereadasatemporary «roadmap» Years withlevels atornearzerooneachaxismayrepresentpoints Quadrant Drepresentsperiodsduringwhichlegalarrestsincreased, Quadrant Crepresentsachangeinstrategy. Itshows atendencyto Quadrant Brepresentstheyears whenlargenumbersofalleged In acertainsense,quadrant A representsalackofstrategies,orperiods alent between 1989and1992. agents intheanti-subversive effort.Thesequencewould be nated, butfewarrestsweremade.Duringtheseyears, during theseyears. uncertainty toindiscriminateviolence,followed in 1984, followed by in 1984,followed hat theprincipalactorsin the 1983. A ccording to 49 THE EVENTS: MAGNITUDE AND SCOPE OF THE CONFLICT 50 PART ONE: THE TRAGEDY AND THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR IT Peru 1980-2000:NumberOfDeaths And Disappear FIGURE 12 reported totheCVR,whilew ages 20and49accountedforthemajorityofdeaths(morethan55percent) same way andwas notuniformlydistributedamongagegroups.Menbetween FIGURE 13 ages 20and49(seeFigure13). on Peru in 1985showsevenmorevividlytheconcentrationofvictimsbetween As Figure12shows,theviolencedidnotaffectmenandwomen inthe A comparisonofthevictims’agestothoseestimatedpopulation Peruvian Population In1985 Disappearances Between1980 And 2000Reported To Double Histogram:Relative Distribution,By Age Group,OfDeaths And omen accountedfor20percentofthevictims. ances ByS ex And Age R Ageex And The CVR The eported ToCVR The And The Estimated And The generally endinextrajudicial executions.TheCVR hasdeterminedthatbetween abuses (arbitraryarrest, torture, sexualviolence).Forceddisappearances specific personfromhisor herenvironmentsoastocoveruphumanrights forced disappearancebystateagents.Disappearance involvesremovinga FIGURE 14 unleashed againsttheMaya bystateagents. on HistoricalClarificationofGuatemalatoclassifyasgenocidetheviolence 65-67). ThelevelofindiscriminateviolenceinGuatemalaledtheCommission Maya communities,werekilledin in more thanhalfofthepeopleassassinatedbetween1969and1995,particularly victims.Bycomparison,inthecaseofarmedconflictGuatemala, five conflict (68percent)werekilledin 14 that theperpetratorshavetakentime When peopleareassassinatedorexecutedinsmallgroups,itgenerallymeans Another indicatoristhenumberofindividualexecutionsorassassinations. responsibility incommunities. dependent childrenandthatbearstheprincipaleconomicpolitical headsofhouseholds,thepopulationthathaslargest number of were living withapartner, theinternalarmedconflictprincipallyaffectedmenwho group. Consideringthat75percentofthevictimsov were inthatage 66 percentofthedeadanddisappearedreportedtoCVR 26

shows, themajorityofpeopleassassinatedorexecutedbypartiesin 1985. As areference,theCVR usedtheage estimates Reported To The CVR, According To SizeOf The GroupInWhich They Died Peru 1980-2000 In Peru, theselectionofvictimsreflectedimportanceplacedon While the20-to-49agegrouprepresented38percentofpopulation, : Percentage OfPeople Assassinated OrExtrajudiciallyExecuted operations oractionsinv groups ofmorethan50(Balletal,1999: projected bytheINEIfor to identifyspecificvictims. er age15were married or the Peruvian populationin olving few As Figure er than 26 51 THE EVENTS: MAGNITUDE AND SCOPE OF THE CONFLICT 52 PART ONE: THE TRAGEDY AND THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR IT attributed tostateagents. 1980 and2000,forceddisappearancesrepresented61percentofthedeaths mechanisms forselecting targets were moresubtleand dependedonthelevels communities were themostvisibletargets own militants. as partofitsstrategytocreate apower vacuum that itwould laterfillwithits generation oflocalpoliticalleaderswas intentionallyeliminatedby thePCP-SL participation intheareasaffectedbyinternal armed conflict. An entire ushered inbythereturntodemocracy1980,was amassiveblowtopolitical whom weremembersofthepoliticalpartiesthatformed thelegalpoliticalsystem the CVR,were localauthorities orcivilsocietyleaders. approximately 1,503people,or23per civil societyleaders,etc. According totestimoniesreceived bytheCVR, members, sub-prefects,governors, lieutenant governors, justicesofthepeace, society leadersinconflictzones.Thesetargetsincluded mayors, towncouncil of thePCP-SL’s violentactions,afterpeasants,werelocalauthorities andcivil enemies andthereforevictimsofthePCP-SL’s actions. level ofsocialorpoliticalleadershipintheircommunitieswere seenaspotential this meantthatpeoplewhoheldpositions SL attackedpeoplewho,initsview, a totalitarianregime. armed strugglebydestroyingtheinstitutionsofPeruvian state andinstalling armed conflictwasin the actors’ objectives andstrategies. characteristics thatwould m selected victimsindicatesthatthematchedaprofileorhad children arenotaswell knowninthecommunityasadults. assassinations, minorvictimsaregenerallyunderreportedbywitnessesbecause minor victims,becauseonlyidentifiablevictimsareregistered.Incasesofgroup armed conflicts(Balletal,1999:94-98),thereissignificantunderreportingof the percentageofminorsto21percent. more people,however, thepercentageoffemalevictimsrisesto31percentand children underage15represent2percent.Whenthetargetisagroupof10or 15. Women represent14percentofindividualassassinationsorexecutions,while increases, sodoesthepercentageofdeathswomen andchildrenunderage communities. As thenumber the victimsofindiscriminateviolence,suchasmassacresorrazing Women andchildrenkilledin While thepeoplewhoheld politicalpostsorleadershiprolesintheir The assassinationofalargenumberlocalauthorities, themajorityof One indicatorofthisstrategyisthatthesecondmostimportanttargets Within thisstrategyoftakingpower througharmedstruggle,thePCP- As hasbeenstatedearlier, theCVR hasconcludedthattheinternal The way inwhichtheprincipalactors intheinternalarmedconflict It isimportanttorememberthat, itiated bythePCP-SL’s attempttoseizepower through ake themtargets.Theprofileiscloselylinkedto of peoplekilledinanoperationorincursion the internalarmed represented the«oldstate.»Inpractice, cent ofthePCP-SL’s victimsreportedto as withotherinvestigations ofinternal ofrelative importanceorhadacertain of thePCP-SL’s armedaction, the conflict w ere generally developed a profile of its victims in terms of its own armed actions as well as developed aprofileofitsvictimsintermsown armedactionsaswell supporters. SL usedforced recruitmentincommunitieswhereitwas unable toattractyoung people animportantrolein thenewsocialorderitplannedforPeru. ThePCP- to manyyoungresidents making theradicalsocialandpoliticalchangeoffered bythePCP-SL attractive opportunities intheircommunitiesturnedtheseexpectations intofrustrations, being abletoclimbthesocialladder. Nevertheless, thescanteconomic university educationbetween 1960 of theseyoung people heavily amongyoung peopleof thereby creatingartificialtargetsforthearmedactions ofitsmilitants. of socialrelationshipsinthecountrysidetofitinto itsideologicalcategories, oligarchy inthePeruvian countryside.«GonzaloThought»twisted thenewstate masters andIndians,peasantslandowners,basicallyeliminatingtherural undertaken inthe1970s,whichprofoundlychangedolddivisionsbetween second halfofthe20thcentury, includingtheagrarianreformprocess context ofmajortransformationsinruralPeruvian societythatbeganinthe and bureaucraticstate»thereforehadtobe were «enemiesoftheproletariatandpeasants»or«agentsfeudal levels attheregionalandnational market andpoliticalinstitutionalnetworks greaterconnectionstothe determined thatthosesectorshadrelatively actions.» its methodsforselectingthevictimsofso-called«revolutionaryarmed CVR demonstratetheimportanceofthesefactorsinPCP-SL’s strategyand SL triedtouseitsadvantage. The various in-depthstudiescarriedoutbythe relative differences are difficult tofindastandardthatcanbeuniformlyapplied.Nevertheless,these on relativeandspecificsocialdifferencesineachindividualcase,itis are generallyappliedinquantitativestudies.Theydepend,largemeasure, are notunderstoodorpreciselymeasuredinthesocio-economiccategoriesthat a uniformconceptionthatallruralareasarepoorandprecarious. economic, politicalandsocialdifferencesbetweenruralurbanPeru leadto nuances aredifficultforurbanPeruvians toperceive, becausethemassive political) andthosewhowerecompletelyexcludedfromthesystem.These between thosewithlinkstolocalor nuances betweenrelatively prosperousfarmers PCP-SL’s internal armedconflictunfolded. of localpowerandsocialstatusthatexistedintheruralcommunitieswhere By definingtheconflictaccording toitowninterpretations,thePCP-SL The politicalwork ofmarshallingsupportledthePCP-SL torecruit When appliedtoruralPeru, thestressonideologyin«GonzaloThought» These subtledifferencesintheruralworldof Andes andthejungle According tothetestimoniescompiledbyCVR,57percentof victims were farmers.Thispercentage,however, doesnotreflectthe what createdtheconflictsinruralsocietythatPCP- had benefitedfromtheexpansionofhighschooland of Ayacucho. TheShiningP peasantancestry, principallyin Ayacucho. Many and 1980,increasingtheirexpectationsof regional power netw destroyed. Thisoccurredinthe and impoverished peasants,or ath alsoofferedyoung orks (economicand 53 THE EVENTS: MAGNITUDE AND SCOPE OF THE CONFLICT 54 PART ONE: THE TRAGEDY AND THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR IT the ageof40. of stateagents,whilethePCP-SL principal actorsintheconflict.Thelargestnumberunderage30were victims the reactionithopedtoprovoke 27 FIGURE 15 student whowas detainedonterrorismchargesin subversion. Thiscanbeseeninthefollow characteristics ofthosetheybelieved hadthegreatestpropensityforsupporting populations, thesecurityforcesselectedtheirvictimsbasedongeneral armed conflictwas unconv CVR. Testimony 100191. us?» Figure 15showstheagesofvictimskilledordisappearedby inCallao.Y live San Marcosandyou ‘You arethesonof Ayacuchans, you speakQuechuamoreorless,you studyat [prison], whenIwas assignedtotheShiningPath cellblock,theysaidtome, Marcos NationalUniversity] andlivedinCallao.[...]Finally, inCantoGrande from Ayacucho, moreorlessspokeQuechua,studiedat theUNMSM[San my profilewas idealfor amemberoftheShiningPath: Iwas theson ofpeople [In theNational Anti-Terrorism Bureau,DINCOTE]thepoliceofficerstoldme By Group Age ResponsibleAnd Those Reported ToAs CVR The Peru 1980-2000: 27 Percentage OfDeaths entional andthePCP-SL militantsmingledwithlocal assassinated ordisappearedmorepeopleover from thesecurityforces.Becauseinternal ou fittheprototype,whydon’t you ing testimony of a young univ ing testimonyofayoung And Disappearances 1991 andeventuallypardoned: ersity join under Peruvianlaw. PCP-SL members,extrajudicial executionandforceddisappearanceareillegal ShiningPathdid notmeantheywere militants. And even ifthevictimswere led toserioushumanrights abuses,becauseevenifvictimsfittheprofile,that based ongeneralcharacteristics (agegroup,educationlevel).Thisinevitably it isevidentthattherewas awidespread,systematicstrategyofselectingtargets disappeared bystateagentsandthoseservingsentences onterrorismcharges, FIGURE 16 education. on terrorismchargeswhogave testimonytotheCVR hadsomelevel ofhigher ages 20and29whentheywerearrested.Inaddition,45percentofthosedetained sentences onterrorism sentences onterrorismchargesinthecountry’s prisons. can alsobeseeninthesocio-demographiccharacteristicsofpeopleserving the percentagekilledbyPCP-SL(35percentvs.22percent). school-educated peoplekilledordisappearedbystateagentswas higherthan victims between ages20and29reportedtotheCVR,percentageofhigh- people fromtheirpositionsofpowerandprestigeincommunities.Ofthe educated thantheirparents,sawsubversionas peop conflict, inwhichyoung the internalarmedconflictprov Beyond thesimilaritiesbetweenprofilesofpeoplekilledor Beyond The CVR interviewed slightlymorethan1,000peopleservingprison A confirmationofthisprofilethePCP-SLmilitantorsympathizer Taking intoaccountthevictims’ ageprofile,it canbeconcludedthat Percentage By Age Group At Time Of Arrest Time Group At By Age Percentage Inmates HeldOn Terrorism ChargesWhoGave Testimony To The CVR, charges. As le ofruraldescent,whoweregenerallybetter oked bythePCP-SLwas alsoagenerational Figure16

shows, morethanhalfwere between a way toviolentlyremove older 55 THE EVENTS: MAGNITUDE AND SCOPE OF THE CONFLICT 56 PART ONE: THE TRAGEDY AND THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR IT FIGURE 17 Ayacucho. departments thatwere notasheavilyaffectedby imprisoned onterrorismcharges,however, were fromLimaorother state agentswere born repression. strategy, the anti-subversive other level ofeducationwere centralelementsoftheprofileusedbystateagentsin process, aswell asthedifferentpositionsadoptedbyrepresentatives ofpolitical of theevents andthestrategiesusedby theactorsdirectlyimplicatedin analyzed theintensityand scopeoftheviolenceinrelationtointernallogic To provideamoredetailedexplanationoftheinternal armedconflict,theCVR P society. the mistakesmoreoftenirreversible inthemoremarginalized sectorsofPeruvian was notuniformforallsocialgroups.Theconsequences were more seriousand with aserioushumanrightsabuseortheapplication of anti-terrorismlegislation characteristic. tongue, only24percentofthepeopleinprisononterrorism chargessharethis or disappearedspokeQuechuaanotherindigenous languageastheirnative ERIODS OF THE INTERNAL ARMED CONFLICT As Figure17 While itisclearthatbeingayounghigh adultandhavingarelatively The probabilitythatthestate’s anti-subversive actionwould conclude In addition,whilemorethan70percentofthepeople who were executed Terrorism ChargesWhoGave T State Agents Reported To The CVR And InmatesServingSentencesOn Birth DepartmentOfPeople ExtrajudiciallyExecutedOrDisappearedBy

shows, themajorityofpeoplekilledordisappearedby in thedepartmentof Ayacucho. Mostofthepeople estimony To The CVR(Percentage ByDepartment) variables arealsoassociatedwiththe the internalarmedconflictas following periods: findings andresearch.Usingthisapproach,theCVRhasestablished periods thatshowtheeventsaspartofanationalprocessandreflectitsown in selectingthecriteriausedtodefinedifferentstages,CVRhasdefined parties.» of Alberto Fujimori tolaunchapoliticalattackagainstso-called«traditional Path tojustifythe«people’swar» orthoseusedduringthefirstadministration from «official»versionsoftheviolence,suchasthosecreatedbyShining away By analyzingtheprocessinthismanner, theCVRattemptedtomove consequences, takingintoaccountthecontextinwhichactionsunfolded. itself, thestrategiesemployed by down theperiodbetween 1980and2000providesaninterpretationoftheconflict most Peruvians andwere notfollowedcloselybythenationalmedia.Breaking the events investigated bythe consequences forthenext. decisions aboutanti-subversivestrategyadoptedbyoneadministrationhad substantial changesinstrategyfromonepresidenttothenext.Infact, and decisionsadoptedtookintoaccount and socialsectors.Thatanalysisrecreatedthecontextofprincipalactions 28 country betweenMay1980andNovember 2000. that donotnecessarilycorrespondtothetermsofgovernments thatranthe light ofinformationthatwas unav the principalactorsattime,inordertoavoid interpretingpasteventsin and July28,2000,toNovember 20,2000). Fujimori ( 1986-March1989),fromthe Thenationwidespreadoftheviolence(June • Themilitarizationofthe conflict(Janu • 28, 1980,toJuly1985), Morales Bermúdez(May17toJuly 28, 1980)and The processanalyzedbytheCVR thefinal monthsofthegovernmentcovers ofGeneralFrancisco Thestartofarmedviolence (May1980-December1982),whichbeganwith • department ofSanMartín; by thePCP-SLanddrugtraffickersonpolicestation inUchiza,the June 1986prisonmassacresthoughMarch27,1989, the dateofattack ran throughtheprisonmassacresonJune18-19,1986; ral RobertoClementeNoelMoralin Ayacucho onJanuary1,1983,and with theinstallationofpolitical-militarycommand headedbyGene- put thearmedforcesinchargeof on May17,1980,andranthroughDecember29,1982, whenthepresident the firstactofviolencecommittedbyPCP-SLinChuschi,Cangallo, While anyattempttoorganizeeventsinvolves somelevelofdiscretion theprincipalactionsandmajorityof In addition,asnotedabove, The internalarmedconflictcanbeorganizedintofive definiteperiods July 28,1990,to April 5,1992; April 5,1992,toJuly28,1995;1995,2000; Alan García Pérez (July 28,1985,toJuly1990),and Alan GarcíaPérez(July CVR occurredinareasthatwere outofsightfor ailable whenthe the principalactors,victimsand the administrationsofFernandoBelaúnde combating ary 1983-June1986),whichbegan the differentoptions 28 events occurred. subversion in Therewerenotalways Alberto Fujimori Ayacucho; available to Terry (July 57 THE EVENTS: MAGNITUDE AND SCOPE OF THE CONFLICT 58 PART ONE: THE TRAGEDY AND THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR IT advocating armed insurgency, anditslimitedmilitary capacity before1980. organization’s smallsize,itssimilaritytoother radical left-winggroups avoiding theeventual courseofevents were limitedbecauseofthesubversive unable toclearlydefinethenatureofenemy.were Thepossibilitiesfor the time.Intelligencework atthetimewas misguidedbecausethesecurity forces with armedgroupssimilarto had received preparedthemforthattypeofactionor, atbest,confrontation guerrilla actionsthathadoccurredin1965.Theanti-subversive training they forces offguard.Ingeneral,thesecuritywere expectingarepeatofthe armed conflict,thephenomenoncreatedbyPCP-SL caughtstatesecurity other Latin American countries. actuallyactionsbystateagentstosabotagetheleft,ashadhappenedin were by legalleft-wingparties,withsomeofthegroups believingthattheattacks government’s firststeps.ThePCP-SL’s initialactionswere viewed withsuspicion to aciviliangovernmentafter12years ofmilitarydictatorshipandthenew Huancavelica. In1980and the PCP-SL to growincertainar national impact.Thereactionwas amixofconcernanddismissal,whichallowed from thestatetocreateaninternalarmedconflict. and attacksonlocalpoliceforces.Thegoalwas toprovoke aviolent reaction slowly increaseduntilmilitantsbegancarryingoutsystematicassassinations public property, aswellarmedpropaganda.Theseriousnessofitsactions subjecting Peruvian societyto launched aviolentcampaignwiththegoalofdestroyingPeruvian stateand marginalized itselffromthedemocraticprocessthatbegandayand coincided withthegeneralelections. As aresultofthisaction,thePCP-SL boxes inthedistrictofChuschi(Cangallo, Ayacucho) onMay17,1980,which armed strugglewas markedbythesymbolicactionofpubliclyburningballot decision todeclarewar on the Peruvian state.ThestartoftheShiningPath’s The internalarmedconflictsufferedbythecountrybeganwithPCP-SL’s T HE FIRST PERIOD: THE START OF ARMED VIOLENCE(MAY Thedeclineofsubversive activityandtheriseofauthoritarianism • Theextremecrisis,subversive • Fujimori’s decisiontofleethecountryinNovember 2000. of Abimael GuzmánandotherPCP-SL leaders,andended with Alberto corruption (September1992-November 2000),whichbeganwiththearrest a specialunitoftheanti-terrorismpolice; arrest inLimaof Abimael GuzmánandmanyofthePCP-SL’s leadersby on theUchizapolicestationandendedwithSeptember12,1992, 1989-September 1992),whichbeganimmediatelyafterthePCP-SLattack While several radicalleft-winggroupshaddiscussedthepossibilityof The firstShiningPath actionswere seenasisolatedevents withlittle At first,thePCP-SL engagedinsporadicattacksagainstprivate and 1981, publicattentionwas focusedonthetransition those active inotherLatin American countriesat an authoritarianandtotalitarianregime. eas ofthedepartments Ay offensive andstate 1980 -DECEMBER counteroffensive 1982 ) acucho and (March offices inSanMartíndePorres. By tossed incendiarybombsat thetombofGeneralJuanVelasco andthemunicipal as LimaandLaOroya. was seenasanisolatedact,smallerattackswerecarried outinotherareas,such with aspecialemphasison Ayacucho. While burningtheballotboxesinChuschi series ofbombingspublicinstitutionsindifferent areasofthecountry, but and cedingtheconstitutionalimperatives ofademocraticregime. government thatcouldnotturntot handle thefirstShiningPath actionswas thereactionofanewly installedcivilian studied bytheCVR.PresidentBelaúnde’s its plansandcorrectingmistakesthanthosethatexistedinthefirst30months Morales Bermúdez.In August 2002, threat ontheoutgoingmilitarygovernment headedbyGeneralFrancisco the lackofpreparationandinadequateintelligenceaboutnewsubversive start ofthe1980s.Represent information» was Nevertheless, asin2003,thedebateoversupposed«lackofintelligence 30 29 government, stated: CVR. InterviewwithGeneralFrancisco MoralesBermúdez.Lima,October3,2002. 2002. CVR. InterviewwithLuisPercovich, interior minister during arrived In theweeks aftertheMay17, 1980, The PCP-SL beganitsself-styled«people’s war» against thestatewitha PCP-SLThe could not ha information. the intelligenceserviceshadinformation,becausetheycompared and theintelligenceservice,theydidn’t havethatinformation.What! All It isimpossible.IcalledBelaúnde,thecommandersofthreemilitarybranches how isitthatthegov generals whoserved mewere thecommandinggeneralsunderBelaúnde,so swear onmylife.[…] A system[ofintelligence]hadbeenestablishedandthe that toldus«becareful,there’s aproblemhere.»Thatnever, ever happened,I detected, butatnotime[in1979and1980]was thereintelligenceinformation Some elementsoftheShiningPath, individualswithcertainleanings,were Asked aboutthoseissues,MoralesBermúdezresponded: of espritdecorps,buttheconstitutional know ifthearmedforceskeptanydocumentation.Ithinktheydidasamatter with itatthecriticalmoment.TheydismantledInteriorMinistry. Idon’t discovered andnotcombatedthismovement earlyon,buttheyrefusedtodeal What ismostseriousthatthey […]. important tothoseinvolvedinthepoliticaltransitionat 29 30 ernment didnothave the atives ofP ve askedforbetterconditionsdeveloping July 28,whenthegover he militaryright LuisP opular Action ( opular Action not onlyavoidedresponsibilityforhaving attack, groupsofSh ercovich, interiorministerinthe AP decision tohavethepoliceforces government found intelligence toendthisproblem? the AP gov the AP away withoutlookingweak Acción Popular, nment changedhands, ernment. Lima, ining Path cadres nothing whenit AP), blamed August 28, 59 THE EVENTS: MAGNITUDE AND SCOPE OF THE CONFLICT 60 PART ONE: THE TRAGEDY AND THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR IT electricity tower inHuancavelica, electricity to thePCP-SL.Therewas apartialblackout,duetothedestructionofan registered. Duringthattime,themilitarygovernment didnotresponddirectly various hadbeen propagandaactionsandthetheftofdynamiteweapons transfer ofpower fromamilitarytocivilianregime. which seemedirrelevant comparedtotheimportantdebatesrelated tothe In general,themediararelycovered thePCP-SL’s initialpropagandaactions, headquarters inPasco onthedayFernandoBelaúndew Peruvian Workers ( Trabajadores enlaEducacióndelPerú, such asUnifiedUnionofEducationWorkers ofPeru ( the administrationwas facedforthefirsttimewithstrongunionorganizations, that was unprecedentedinitsradicalpositionsandsize.Inthesocialsphere, Belaunde hadfacedduringhisfirstadministration,butwithaleft-wingbloc have to dealwitharight-wing APRA-UNO congressionalcoalitionliketheone deal withentirelynewpoliticaland from theonehehadgoverned duringhisfirstterm(1963-68),andhehadto Peasant ConfederationofPeru ( organization placedagreat dealofemphasisonLima.Inthewords of Abimael Left ( linking thePCP-SLwithlegalleft,refusingtorelease militantsoftheUnited inoffice,the years branch. Throughoutitsfive AP administrationinsistedon Police ofPeru), whichwere fueledbytheindividualidentitycultivated byeach the differentpolicedivisions(CivilGuard, widespread corruptioncausedbydrugtraffickingandinternaltensionsamong were affectingthepolice’s war performance.Theprincipalproblems were the «terroristcriminals.» At thetime,however, factorsunrelatedtotheinternal agenda. Itwas seenasacriminalmatterthatwoul state. For severaly understand thechallengethatPCP-SL andits«people’swar» posedtothe close linkstoleft-wingsectorsinCongressandtheoppositionmedia. strength throughtheirstrugglesagainstthemilitary Mining Federation( limited toonlyafewprovinces in Ay and theprecariousnessofrural policestations.ThePCP-SL’s presencewas never however, progresswas nearlyimpossiblegiven thesmall numberofofficers members ofthePCP-SL, almostalloftheminurbanareas.Inruralareas, response ofthestate.TheInv from thelegalleft,whileleft-wingsectorssaw«dirty war» asaninevitable unrelated tothesubversive threat.SomesectorsrefusedtoseparatethePCP-SL original plans.ThestateandPeruvian societyrespondedinways thatwere continue buildingitsorganizationwithoutanysignificant alterationstoits Izquierda Unida, The incomingpresidentfounda The AP government, likethemajority ofthecountry’s actors, didnot The PCP-SL,meanwhile,usedallavailable politicalopportunitiesto ears, theissuedidnotoccupyanimportantspotonstate Confederación GeneraldeTrabajadores delPerú, IU) who were jailedonterrorismcharges. who IU) Federación Minera estigative Policeestigative ofP Confederación CampesinadelPerú, social actors.The AP government didnot acucho. Fromthestartof the conflict, SUTEP), theGeneralConfederationof and abombingat ), whichhadgainedunprecedented country thatwas radicallydifferent Republican Guard,and d bedealtwithbyneutralizing eru arrestedseveral hundred government andmaintained as swornas inaspresident. Sindicato Unitariode Popular CCP) andthe Investigative CGTP), the Action’s strategy. Aware AP’s policy, butproposednoalternatives totheadministration’s anti-subversive Path «people’swar.» Between1980and1985, APRA lawmakersharshlycriticized oftheShining also underestimatedtheimportanceofriseanddevelopment APRA), alsoknownastheP Progressive Revol Guzmán: 31 prison raid)was killedinashootoutwithpolice.Her deathsparkedmassive September, Edith Lagos(oneoftheShiningPath militantsfreedduringthe stationed in Ayacucho ina unique casethatoccurredseveral months later. In force andthevictimofundeniablepolicebrutality. condemned, theorganizationwas presentedinthemediaasbothaguerrilla PCP-SL combination ofactions,theprisonattackandassassination ofhospitalized three ShiningPath militantswhowererecovering fromunrelatedinjuries.The at thetime,went tothe hospital inHuamangaand,retaliation,executed officers fromtheRepublicanGuard,policeunitin chargeofprisonsecurity and thattherewas noturningback. told theCVRthatprisonraidconvincedthem theconflicthadchanged the aisle,radicalleft-wingmilitants General Noelbegangatheringintelligencefromthefield.Onothersideof situation tookonamuchmoreserioustone,andfromhisbaseinHuancayo, much greaterthreat.Forsome Army generals,suchasSinesioJarama,the changed theview wayanalysts the citywereunabletoactwithoutdirectordersfromLima.Theprisonbreak because ofaninadequatepoliceresponseandthefactthatsoldiersstationedin Huamanga, releasingmilitantsheldthere.PCP-SL cadreswere abletoescape CentralCommittee,aShiningPathPCP-SL unitraidedtheprisonin the dimension. InMarch1982,inanattackunparalleledatthetimeandplannedby armed forces. party’s leadersoperatedwithdiscretiontoavoidanyconfrontationthe CVR. Interview. The principaloppositionforceinthe We sawitlikethis.We start, butduringthefinalphase. which iswhyitbecomesthecatapult.Butcannotbeacityconqueredat from throughoutthecountry. focus onLima,we willfindalargecitywithpeoplefromdifferentprovinces party, forv It isimportant.Thereason:«Ayacucho isthecradle,Limacatapult.»The The PCP-SLcapitalizedontheabusescommitted bypoliceofficers Hours aftertheattackandescapeofPCP-SLinmates, agroupof Two eventsassociatedwiththePCP-SL gavetheconflictanew militants, gavethePCP-SL itsfirst of thetraditional utionary Alliance ( utionary Alliance arious reasons,willmaketheleaptoLimainafewyears. Whenwe had beenponderingthe eruvian APRA ed theShiningPath; theybegan viewingitasa Working theremeansworking intheentirenation, rivalry betw Alianza Progresiva RevolucionariaAmericana, 31 who wouldgoontoformtheMRTA Party ( media victory. Even whileitwas een APRA andthemilitary, the political system,the work inLima.IsLimaimportant? Partido ApristaPeruano, American PAP), 61 THE EVENTS: MAGNITUDE AND SCOPE OF THE CONFLICT 62 PART ONE: THE TRAGEDY AND THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR IT task hewas given inthefollowingterms: took ontheroleofpolitical-militarycommanderin the zone.Noelrecalled prefect ofLimain1979andheadthe zone tothearmedforces. Army GeneralRobertoC.NoelMoral,whohadbeen on December30thegovernmenthandedcontrolof the Ayacucho emergency the PCP-SL 72hourstolaydownitsweapons. ThePCP-SL did not comply, so Shining Path’s provocations. OnDecember27,1982,PresidentBelaúndegave into constantpressureonthegovernment todealmoreforcefullywiththe At thesametime,theyabletoimprove theirpoorpublicimage.Thistranslated incapable ofcontrollingthespreadPCP-SL inruralzoneslike Ay not aproblemthatneededtobeaddressed. saw accusationsofhumanrightsabusesasanoppositionployandtherefore rights andtarnishingtheimageofsecurityforces.Second,government democratic institutionstheydidnotbelieve inasaway ofdefendingtheirhuman all coststhattheywere members(thiswas the«goldenrule»),whileusing Path attemptedtomaintaintheorganization’s clandestinenaturebydenyingat Two issuesbecameclearaftertheCoxincident.First,membersofShining taken suchastrongstandonabusescomm harshly tothebishops’ criticism,wanting was thenephewofaprominentCatholicbishop.Theadministrationreacted Cox BeuzevilleafterhisarrestonJuly6,1981,inCusco.Cox,aPCP-SLmilitant, protest fromCatholicbishopswhodenouncedthepolicefortorturingEdmundo the initialstageofconflict.Onefirstdiscussionswas motivated bya allegedly havingvisitedhertombinHuamanga. APRA’s historicleaders,was stronglycriticizedinthepresslate1980sfor Ayacucho adoptedhernameand Armando V unknown PCP-SL.Theimagewas image astheyoung rebel(shewas 19atthetimeofherdeath)putafaceon PCP-SL Shining Path symbols.Indeath,EdithLagosbecameoneofthebest-known Ayacucho. Herfuneralendedwithahugeburialprocessionthatincluded demonstrations inHuamanga,includingaMasscelebratedbythebishopof anything, soItookthemicrophone andI said totheheadofJoint Chiefs ofStaff,«What’s goingon?»Noonesaid The policeforcesdemonstratedthroughout1982thattheywere Human rightsabuseswere asubjectofnationalpoliticaldebatefrom plans areapproved, butyou willactwiththesupportofpolice forces.»So p.m., thepresidentdecided to endtheevent and hetoldme,«General,your make apresentationtothecouncil, soImadeapresentationtothecouncil. At 5 the plans,hehadaskedcommandergeneralof2nd InfantryDivisionto Chiefs ofStafftoldthepresidentthattoensurenothing gotintheway of [following] Article 118oftheConstitution.» ThegeneralinchargeoftheJoint of the Armed Forces,SupremeHeadoftheRepublic, PresidentoftheNation, president oftherepublicthathisorders In theNationalDefenseCouncil,headofJointChiefs ofStafftoldthe figures. Whileshewas not an i such thatacongressof youthAPRA in mportant leaderintheorganization,her Army IntelligenceServicefortwoyears, itted duringthemilitarygovernment. had beenfollowed [as]«SupremeHead to knowwhythechurchhadnot said, «Mr. President,excuseme, I illanueva del Campo,oneof acucho.

I in Uchuraccay. Heclaimedthat the Cubanexperiencearevolutionary process. PCP-SL, whichwould nev That kindofactionwould beunthinkableforaMaoistorganizationlikethe oftheassaultonMoncadaFortinCubabyrebelforces. 30th anniversary Shining Path attackonJuly26, stated duringaninterviewwiththeCVRthatmilitary hadspoiledasupposed international politicaldivisions.Forexample,20years aftertheconflict,Noel responsible forthePCP-SL’s actionsandtherewere nodifferences basedon the country. According tothislogic,all They sawtheorganizationaspartofalargercommunist conspiracyattacking they lackedanadequateunderstandingoftheShining Path anditsstrategy. registered intheconflict. grew exponentially. Thisperiodw became moreprominent,thenumberofvictimsandhumanrightsviolations armedtactics departments. Inthefollowingmonths,asunconventional violence thathadgrippedthehighlandsof Ayacucho andneighboring point intheconflictasnationalmediapublishedgraphicimagesof armed forceswere putinchargeofthefightagainstPCP-SL ledtoaturning assassinations andbombings. military patrols,whilenever guerrilla army,» subversion. At thesame time,thePCP-SL createdwhatitcalledthe«people’s the creationofpolitical-militarycommandstoleadstate’s response to the conflict.» At noothertimeinthe20thcenturyhadcountrywitnessed remain inchargeformorethan15years.Thischangemeanta«militarizationof the fightagainstPCP-SL.Inseveralareasofcountry, themilitarywould The conflicttookanewturnwiththedirectparticipationofarmedforcesin S the departmentsof Ayacucho and Apurímac. supporters ofthe«oldorder»ininitialareasarmedconflict,principally 33 32 ECOND PERIOD:MILIT Revolution. Fidel Castro’s CVR. Interview. Noel hadseriousdisputes withthemedia,particularlyafterevents When thearmedforceswere putinchargeofcombatingsubversion, The murderofeightjournalistsinUchuraccayfourweeks after the At thetime,PCP-SL’s violencewas aimedatrepresentativesand you.» all your going tofight?»PresidentBelaúndetoldme, changedthemission. Am Ioramnot have want toaskaquestion,becauseyou 32 attack ontheMoncadaFortin1953 was energy andallthesupportofconstitutionalgov March 18,2003. carrying outguerrillaattacksonpolicestationsandambushing ARIZATION OF er celebratethatanniv THE CONFLICT (JANUARY abandoning itsterroristtactics,suchasselective 1983,thatwas plannedtocommemorate the the mediawas tacitlyencouragingsubversive as markedbythelargestnumberofvictims left-wing militantswere one ofthehistoricmoments Cuban «General, you go ersary, 1983 -JUNE as itdidnotconsider 1986 ernment.» «Thank into combatwith ) equally 33 63 THE EVENTS: MAGNITUDE AND SCOPE OF THE CONFLICT 64 PART ONE: THE TRAGEDY AND THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR IT Izquierda Revolucionaria-ElMilitante, parties, theMovement oftheRevoluti an interviewwiththeCVR,oneformergov authorities hadnotadequatelyaddressedtheneedsofpeasantcommunities.In subversion. Thepoliticaloppositionsecondedhiscriticismthatcivilian improving socialconditionsinpeasantcommunitiesasaway ofstopping took over thepolitical-militarycommandandimmediatelyfocusedon anti-subversive campaign.Huamán,aQuechuaspeakerofpeasantdescent, the government,whichheclaimedwas notofferingenoughsupportforthe Huamán, however,was duenottotheincreasedviolence,buthiscriticismof registered duringthe20-year periodstudiedby of dutyin August 1984,theyear inwhichthelargestnumberofvictimswas activity whenitquestionedthearmedforces’actions. García definedhisgovernment’s positioninthefollowing terms: commanders, whohadpreviously operatedwithoutanyconstitutionalsupport. in June1985,whichregulated (andincreased)thepowers ofthepolitical-military efforts, GarcíadidnotstrikedownLegislative Decree 24150,signedbyBelaúnde Mori, aftertheevents in Accomarca. Despitehiscriticismoftheanti-subversion Sinesio Jarama,andthepolitical-militaryco the decisiontorelieve theheadofsecondmilitaryregion,Division General military approachtofightingsubversion. The mostdifficultpointcamewith the problemofviolence.Theadministrationattempted tochangethepurely being committedbythearmedforcesandcreatedaPeace Commissiontoaddress García. Forthefirsttime,government criticizedthehumanrightsabuses The officiallineontheinternalwar changedwiththeelectionofPresident Alan years toprepareforitsarmedstruggle. ML), tooktwo Revolutionary Party ( etc.). Thisorganization,firstformedin1982by (its militantswore uniforms,lived part ofthePeruvian leftandexplicitlydistancingitselffromtheShiningPath The MRTA formallylauncheditsarmedactionsin1984,presentingitselfas in LucanamarcaandHuancasancos(April1983). committed someofitsworst atrocitiesduringthisperiod,suchasthemassacres (Army, December1984)and Accomarca former CivilGuard,November 1983),Pucayacu (Navy, August 1984),Putis attributed tothesecurityforces,suchasmassacreinSocos(Sinchisof This phaseofthemilitarizationproducedmassive humanrightsabuses aimed atunderminingtheciviliangovernment.» government was doing.Itreachedthepointwherehewas makingcomments criteria. Hegave theimpressionthathedidnotagreewithwhatcivilian bypass civilianauthority[…].Hewanted to Roca, explainedthedecisiontorelieve Huamán:«He[Huamán]wanted to Noel’s successor, Army General We hadtwo stagesintheanalysisofShiningPath. Thefirstwas a Partido SocialistaRevolucionario-MarxistaLeninista in guerrillacamps,tookcreditforactions, MIR-EM) andtheMarxist-LeninistSocialist onary Left-TheMilitant( Adrián HuamánCenteno,was relieved (Army, August 1985).ThePCP-SL also runthingsaccordingtohisown mmander in Ay ernment official,Luis the CVR.Thedecisiontoreplace the mergeroftw acucho, W Movimiento de o left-wing Percovich ilfredo , PSR- very and theHuallagaV offensive, expandingtonew frontsoutsideof Ayacucho, suchasPuno, Junín been carriedoutinitially, buthadspreadnationwide. armed conflictwas nolongerlimitedtothedepartmentswhereactions had own strategiesinthefield.Beginning1986,however, itwas clearthatthe the conflictcreatedanewcontextinwhicharmed actorsdeveloped their forces’ participationintheanti-subversive fightandtheMRTA’s entranceinto The militarizationpromptedbytheescalationin and areasofext possiblepeasantsupportthroughdevelopmentpolicies forthepeasantry away 34 T government’s a the capital.Inpracticalterms,prisonmassacreended APRA firsthand imagesofmassacresthatuntilthenhadseemedfarremovedfrom which hadanimpactonalltheactorsinconflictandbroughttoLima wasstage this themassacreof APRA government assumednoresponsibilityinthecase.Thefinalmoment evident duringanuprisingatLima’s LuriganchoprisoninOctober1985.The rights abusesdidnotprovokeareactionwithintheadministration.Thatwas tense atfirst,butthesituationgraduallychangedwhenaccusationsofhuman MRTA when APRA tookpower. military offensivein1983and1984,theunilateralceasefiredeclaredby theShiningPath’ssuccessful atthestart,given decisiontopullbackafterthe reduce thePCP-SL’s possibilitiesforexpansion.Thatpolicymayhave seemed in 1985and1986.Thepartyalsoassumedthatits«grassroots»appealwould administration hadstoppedthePCP-SL,becauseofdeclineinarmedactions that thecountry’syears ofits economicgrowthduringthefirsttwo HE NATIONWIDE SPREADOFVIOLENCE(JUNE CVR. Interview. In thewake oftheprison massacre,thePCP-SL graduallyincreasedits The Garcíaadministration’s mainideaw killing, tostopallthebadnewsinnewspapers.» had todealwithcallsfromthepeoplestopblackoutsinLima, changed perspectives orattitudes,butwe society willunderstandandofferasolution.» As of for somanycenturiesandarereactingthisway sothatthecentralized,white in thesensethatwesaid were abittolerantwiththisexplanation. And standpoint, ashavingbeenstimulatedandmotivatedbymisery. Naturally, we what itwas orthescopeofwhatwas tocome,weviewed itfromsociological vague analysisduringthegovernment The relationshipbetweenthegovernmentandarmedforceswas ttempt to develop itsowninternalsecuritystrategy. May 7,2003. reme pov alley. At erty. the time,organization claimed tohaveentered inmates in several prisons (June 18-19,1986), inmatesinseveralprisons(June The they were«poor APRA governmentwas overlyoptimistic 1986 of FernandoBelaúnde. – MARCH now hadthejobofadministering.We as todefeatsubversionbytaking perhaps wewere abitpaternalistic people whohave 1989 PCP-SL’s action,thearmed ) 34 July 28,itwasn’t thatwe Without knowing been abandoned 65 THE EVENTS: MAGNITUDE AND SCOPE OF THE CONFLICT 66 PART ONE: THE TRAGEDY AND THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR IT a newstage,whichitcalled«dev ( Intelligence Bureau,littleattentionw these priorities,whichincludedthecreationof Interior Ministry’s General in thew Abimael Guzmán,was thesesessionsandpublished doneatsomepointbetween between February1988andJune1989. An interviewwiththePCP-SL’s leader, have muchofamilitaryimpactandwas quicklyturnedbackbythearmy. the media.WhileMRTA campaigngrabbedheadlines,however, itdidnot colleague ofGarcía’s in APRA inth to the APRA gov campaign was enormous,takingadvantage ofthewidespreadmediaopposition produced amajorbacklashagainstthegovernme after theadministration’s attempttonationalizethecountry’s banks,whichhad actions toattractthegreatestpublicity. TheMRTA move cameonlythreemonths opened anewguerrillafrontintheSanMartíndepartment1987,staging consolidation ofthe«bureaucraticmodel APRA fascism.» 1987. According tothePCP-SL’s logic,Francowas killedtoimpedethe party. Oneexample,alsoinLima,was theassassinationofRodrigoFrancoin in 1985were stillunderway. ThePCP-SL begantargetingmembersoftheruling National ElectionsBoard,whilepreparationsforapossiblepresidentialrunoff important attackwas stagedagainstDomingoGarcíaRada,presidentofthe assassination ofauthoritiestoinstillterrorandweaken thestate. An extremely principally Lima,theShiningPath developed astrategybasedontheselective support bases»inruralareastoexpandits«people’swar.» Inurbanareas, within the especially inLima,sinceitscreation1981aspartof theStateSecurityBureau Special OperationsBureau( oversight capacities,and theunificationofseveral specialized unitsintothe among thevarious policeforces, reinforcementoftheInteriorMinistry’s general policecommandandregionalcommands,direct mediationofconflicts coordination ofanti-subversive efforts.Thesechangesincludedamergerofthe to theinternalarmedconflict,several aimedatimproving ofthechangeswere officers. Whilethedecisiontoreformpoliceforces was not directlylinked sparking intensedebateover aninitialproposaltoretirealargenumberof authorities andthepressover theyears. dispel allrumorsofhisdeath,whichhadbeenannouncedperiodicallyby explanation todateofhisorganizationanditsgoals.Theinterviewalsohelped Command ( paramilitary groupthatwould unfortunately callitselftheRodrigoFranco linking membersofcertain policeunits,suchastheDOESDeltaGroup,to Dirección contraelTerrorismo, The PCP-SLhelditsfirstpartycongressinthreeseparatesessions The MRTA suspendeditscease-firewiththeGarcíagovernment and Discussions aboutthereorganizationofpoliceforcesbeganin1985, While thesediscussions eekly Investigative Police. Comando RodrigoFranco, El Diario. ernment. MRTAl In theinterview, Guzmánoffer Dirección deOperacionesEspeciales, DIRCOTE were underway, accusationssurfacedin1988 e 1970s,became eloping theguerrillaw eader VíctorP CRF as focusedonthe Anti-Terrorism Bureau ). ) Thiswas thefirsttime intheinternal , aunitthathadgainedexperience, nt. TV coverage oftheMRTA a well-known figurethrough olay, who hadbeenaclose ed themostcomplete ar andconquering DOES). Despite E the PCP-SLfrompeasantcommunities. was putincharge,andhedevel him tocreateapolitical-militarycommandinthearea. General Alberto Arciniega Garcí beleaguered policeofficersfurtherweakened the cooperationofdrugtraffickers.Thelackastate responsetoassistthe largest militaryoperationsundertakenbythePCP-SL, andwas carriedoutwith the armedforces. to supportthegovernment’s system. Whiletheywereopposedtothe that didnotsupportarmedsubversion withoutrepresentationinthedemocratic affected thepartiesinleft-wingalliance,leavingmostradical electoral presencethelefthadmaintainedsince1978.Thesedivisionsseriously strikes andsocialprotests. of OsmánMorote.Thepoliticalsituationgrewmoredifficultwiththespread especially inLimaandothercities,thatresultedimportantarrests,like however, maintainaspecialized forces freetodictatepolicy policy,abandoned itsattemptstocontrolanti-subversive leavingthearmed attempt tonationalizethecountry’s bankingsystem.Theadministrationalso the right-wingopposition.Thisbecameparticularlyapparentafterfailed caused thegovernmenttolosepoliticalinitiative, whichwas assumedby branches’ controlover over theJointChiefsofStaff.Thenewministrydidnotreducemilitary Defense Ministryin1987.Despiteefforts,theministrywas unabletoexertcontrol carry outcriminalactivities. actors whowerenotnecessarilylinkedtoeachother, butwhowere tappedto not acentralizedorganization,butloose-knitgroupthatinvolved different 1992 APRA government. TheCVR Mantilla, themostpowerful figureintheInteriorMinistryduringfive-year its actionsto APRA andmembersofthepoliceforceundercontrol Agustín arrested thatyearbyDIRCOTEofficers.Differentsourcestiedthegroupand for killingManuelFebresFlores,theattorneyOsmánMorote,aPCP-SLleader war thatattackswereattributedtoaparamilitarygroup.TheCRFwas blamed economic crisis,almostunprecedented inthecountry’s history, reached itsworst One ofPeru’s mostdifficultyears asanindependent nationcamein1989.The XTREME CRISIS,SUBVERSIVEOFFENSIVE,STATE COUNTEROFFENSIVE(MARCH ) The attackonthepolicebaseinUchizaMarch1989 was oneofthe The divisionswithintheUnitedLeftin1989endedimportant A periodofhyperinflationandgeneralizedeconomicmismanagement In addition,therewereanumberofproblemswiththecreation nationaldefenseissues. anti-subversive policiesbecausetheydidnottrust in theemergencyzone believes thattheRod police intelligenceandinv oped anew Army strategyaimedatisolating Shining Path, thosepartiesalsorefused rigo FrancoCommandwas a’sgovernment andforced s. Thegovernmentdid, estigative 1989 – SEPTEMBER operation, 67 THE EVENTS: MAGNITUDE AND SCOPE OF THE CONFLICT 68 PART ONE: THE TRAGEDY AND THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR IT point, andtheinternalarmedcon that thearmedforcesdidnot distinguishbetween thesubversive organizations. of MRTA guerrillaswhohadsurrendered demonstratedtotheorganization confrontation withthearmed forcesinMolinoson April 28,1989.Thetreatment best fighterstothecentral highlands.Theoperationfailed,endingin a Tarma, thecitychosenforitsmilitary operation,theMRTA moved someofits founder, VíctorP strength becauseofthemajorblowithadsuffered earlyintheyear whenits achieving anationwideimpact.Theorganization needed todemonstrateits in thecentralhighlands.Theplanwasof totakeoveramajorcityasway the Uchizapolicebase,MRTA decidedtolaunchamajormilitaryoperation never emerge.In would April 1989,onemonthaftertheShiningPath attackon shantytowns. SL’s «people’s committees,»aswell astocellsinuniversities andurban «selective elimination,»particularlyin1990.Thatpolicywas appliedtothePCP- This centralzonewas thesceneofanintenseapplicationnewstrategy operations pushedtheconflicttoward theMantarofrontbeginningin1989. departments ofJunínandPasco asthe«centerofgravity»foranti-subversive the finalstageofconflict.Thearmedforces’strategyfocusingon population hadalreadybeguntocombatthePCP-SL.Thesechangesdefined the formationofself-defensecommitteesinhighlandareaswhere protection from subversives.subversion orreceived subversion fromdrugtraffickingandcombattraffickerswhosupported on frontswheredrugtraffickingalsoexisted,themissionwas toseparate divided bymilitaryregionsbutbasedonananalysisofPCP-SLactions.Second, armed forceswere reorganizedintoanti-subversion fronts,whichwere nolonger decisions formilitaryactionsduringtheremainderofconflict.First, December 1989byGeneral Artemio Palomino Toledo, laidout two strategic (DVA 017CCFUERZAS ARMADAS-PE-DI). Thedirective,whichwas signedin was detailedinDirective 017oftheJointChiefs ofStafffortheInteriorMinistry human rightsviolations,butfarmorepremeditatedactions.Thisnewstrategy «comprehensive» strategythatresultedinadecreasetheoverall numberof peak inthenumberofvictimsinternalwar. more violent,visibleandfrequentattacksincities.Thisdecisionledtothesecond population inthehighlandsandjunglewhilemobilizingitsurbanbasesfor increased itsattacksandterroristactions,hardeningapproachtothe of itsoffensive onurbanareas,principallyLima.TheShiningPath dramatically war.» To dothis,thesubversive organizationproposedconcentratingthebulk equilibrium toshaketheentirenation»asnewobjective ofthe«people’s of thetwo mainforces. in theinternalwar occurredin1989,dueprincipallytothedecisionsandactions The MRTA, meanwhile, got caughtinadownward spiralfromwhichit As partofthatstrategy, thedecisionwas madetofomentandsupport At thesametime,armedforcesbeganapplyinganew During itsfirstcongress,thePCP-SLdefinedneedtoreach«strategic olay, was a rrested inthecityofHuancayo.Inordertotake flict grewincreasingly violent. Another change violent. Another continued, includingthose perpetratedbythedeathsquadknownasColina over anti-subversive actions. Serioushumanrightsabusesbystateagents increased thesecurityforces’ discretionarypower, reducing democraticcontrols forces intheemergencyzones andinthefightagainstsubversion. Thelegislation to augmentthepowerof the military, vastly increasing theroleofarmed minimum guaranteesofdueprocess. D (Legislative order. TheFujimorigovernment passedaseriesofanti-terrorismlaws the clocktickingfornextcoup. package oflegislativedecreesthat as aresultoftheprisonescape.InNovember, theadministration passeda offensives indifferentareasofthecountry, tryingtoshow thatithadrecovered was livingunderastateof administration rejectedtalks.In1991,morethanhalf thePeruvian population kidnapped alawmakerfromFujimori’s partytogiveitanedge,butthe leaders escapedfromLima’s CastroprisoninJune1990.Theorganization MRTA attemptedadialoguewiththenewgovernment aftertheorganization’s expanded quicklyinLimaamidthegeneralpoliticalandeconomiccrisis.The system thatfittheneedsofanti-subversive efforts. designed byasectorwithinthearmedforces,whichcalledfordemocratic to complementtheapproach.Healsoacceptedpolitical-militaryplan strategy thathadbeendevelopedbythearmedforces,proposinglegalinitiatives subversive «the beginning of the end of the Shining Path» (Jiménez 2000:721). «the beginningoftheendShiningPath» (Jiménez Information obtainedintheraidprovidedvaluable leads,andisconsidered victory, raidingasafehousewhere Abimael Guzmánhadrecentlybeenliving. shortly beforethegovernment changedhands, eventually leadtotheprincipalfiguresintwoorganizations.OnJune1, keeping suspectedsubversives undersurveillance inthehopethattheywould in Lima,theGEINengagedexclusivelyundercover intelligenceoperations, groups, continuedthelegalwork ofinvestigatingattacksandterroristactions GEIN) withinDIRCOTE.WhileDIRCOTE’s operationalgroups,suchastheDelta formedtheSpecialIntelligenceGroup( government PCP-SL, whichhadcalledforaboycottoftheelections. successfullyheldthroughoutthecountry,were representingafailureforthe the stateposedbyShiningPath andMRTA. Localandregionalelections country’s politicalforcesbegantomobilize,exposingthelimitsofthreat campaign forthenextyear’s presidential Enrique López Albújar inLima. The MRTA retaliatedafewmonthslaterbyassassinatingretired Army General On April 5,1992,Fujimoriledacoupthatviolatedtheconstitutional The PCP-SL,whichwas sufferingimportantsetbacksinruralareas, Strictly speaking,thenewgovernmentdidnotdesigna In March1990,withthepresidentialelectiononlyamonthaway, the With municipalandregionalelectionsscheduledfor1989the strategy. Alb ecrees 25475,25499,25659and25744)thatdisregarded the erto Fujimoribasicallymaintainedthecomprehensive emergency. Thatyear, the MRTA launchedseveral sparked fiercedebateinCongress,starting In addition,several otherlawswerepassed election alreadyunderway, the the GEINscoreditsfirstmajor Grupo EspecialdeInteligencia, new anti- 69 THE EVENTS: MAGNITUDE AND SCOPE OF THE CONFLICT 70 PART ONE: THE TRAGEDY AND THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR IT that itcouldprovoke apossibleU.S.milita another 150.Byincreasingitsterroristactivities,thePCP-SL leadershipbelieved Lima’s MirafloresdistrictinJuly1992.Thecarbombkilled25peopleandinjured serious ofwhichwas thebombingofan intensified itsoffensive inthecapitalwith subversives intheearly1990s.TheorganizationledbyGuzmán Reinoso revealed thevulnerabilityofgrassrootsorganizationsthattriedtoconfront demonstrated thecrueltywithwhichPCP-SLwas capableofacting,italso and localpolitician,representedanotherturningpointofsorts.Whilehermurder forces. planning andcarryingoutactionsonitsown,usingpersonnelfromthearmed the NationalIntelligenceService( 1990s. Taking advantage ofthebroadpowersitwas given underthenewlaws, Barrios Altos andLaCantutaUniversity), whichbeganoperatingintheearly Group (emblematiccasesattributedtothisgroupincludethemassacresin PCP-SL, withpartofthe organization’s lead to theproposalsofferedby Guzmán.Inpractice,therewas aruptureinthe government, however, didnotattempttoestablish adefinitive peaceorrespond overshadowing factionsthatwanted tocontinue the«people’swar.» TheFujimori leader’s positionwas accepted byth the eve ofthereferendumtoapprove the1993Constitution.TheShiningPath accord was neverreached,butitserv government, Abimael Guzmánpropo discussions withotherShiningPath leadersfacilitatedby Alberto Fujimori’s on a campaign «to save thelifeofPresident Gonzalo.» image thattheorganizationwas unaffectedbythearrests,while concentrating actions. TheShiningPath’s principalobjectiv vacuum createdbyGuzmán’s arrestwas evidentinthequickdecreaseterrorist forces andself-defensecommittees.Thelackofnational leadershiptofillthe organization was forcedoutofitstraditionalareasoperationbythesecurity of thePCP-SL,whichhadbeguntodeclinethreeyears earlierwhenthe The arrestof Abimael Guzmánandothersubversive leadersmarkedthedefeat 2000 D Brigade, and Abimael GuzmánReinoso,capturedbytheGEIN. those arrestedwereVíctorPolay Campos,caught bytheSpecialDetectives subversive leaders,strategicallyd special unitssurprisedthecountrybyarrestingmostofhigh-ranking transform theconflictfromaninternalwar tooneofnational liberation. ECLINE OFSUBVERSIVE ACTION, ) The PCP-SL’s assassinationofMaríaElenaMoyano, agrassrootsleader In October1993,fromhisprisoncellontheCallaoNavy Baseandafter Amid thisextremecrisis,thepoliceofficersworking intheDIRCOTE’s RISE OF AUTHORITARIANISM Servicio deInteligenciaNacional, efeating subversionandterrorism. Among e majorityoftheorganization’s militants, ed asapropagandatoolforFujimorion sed apeaceaccordwiththestate.The apartment buildingonTarata Streetin numerousterroristattacks,themost AND CORRUPTION(SEPTEMBER e inthisphasewas topresentthe ership rejectingthepeace accord ry interventi on, whi 1992 SIN) began ch would -NOVEMBER serious internaldisputes,theinexperienceofitscadres separation ofpowers inordertoguarantee impunityforstateagentsimplicated continued implementing a seriesoflegislativechangesthateliminatedthe grave. UsingtheSIN asitsprincipal discredit andharassthepeoplewhohadreported andlocatedthecommon government notonlyrefusedtoassum professor whohadbeendisappearedfrom ofcommongraves1993 discovery holdingtheremainsofninestudentsanda The constantaccusationsofhumanrightsabusestook anewturnwiththeJuly experts workingwiththeSIN,suchasGeneralEduardo Fournier. which was largelydeactivated afterGuzmán’s arrest,orby Army intelligence with theShiningPath leaderswere important militaryfigureatthetime)metwith PCP-SL leaders.Interviews to notethatneitherFujimorinorGeneralNicolás HermozaRíos(themost which were interruptedin1995.Itisimportant framedbypolitical interests,were other PCP-SL leadersinarole as of conductingthepersonalinterviewswithGuzmán,ElenaIparraguirreand The PCP-SL,however, provided Fujimoriwithpolitical The peaceaccordproposedbyGuzmánandtheShiningPath leadership maximum-security prisons,aswellisolatingtheremainingarmedcolumns. possible numberofsubversives andholdingthemunderextremeconditionsin In concreteterms,thepacificationpolicybasicallymeantjailinglargest even thoughtherewas nolongerasubversive threat. the numberofemergencyzonesandmaintainedanti-subversive structures administration highlightedinitsofficialpropaganda,theregimedidnotreduce Despite theobviousdeclineinnumberofsubversive actions,whichthe frameworklegal andstrengtheningitsrelationshipwiththearmedforces. new hard-line regimethatwouldmakeno continuedtoplay up itsimageasa At thesametime,Fujimorigovernment hostages foritsjailedleaders. the organizationdecidedtoplanakidnappingthatcouldbeusedexchange free itsjailedmembers.UnabletorepeattheprisonbreakfromCastroCastro, decided thatitsprioritywas torebuilditsnationalleadershipbyattempting launched bythestateandbackedmedia.Giventhissituation,MRTA left-wing partiesandtheoffensiveagainstsubversive organizationsthatwas «repentance» law. Externally, theorganizationwas affectedbythecollapseof not seemtobeascrippledtheShiningP andattemptedtodev Moyobamba as after Polay’s part ofthecentraljungle.UnderleadershipNéstorCerpa,whotookover proposed byGuzmán. 35 and recruitingnewmembers. In thetraditionofrevolutionary organizations, theterm“cadre”referstoamilitantcapableoftraining The MRTA, meanwhile,continuedmilitaryactionsinSanMartínand arrest, theorganizationlaunchedimportantattacksoncitiessuch did notdisappear. VladimiroMontesinoswas incharge capital whilelowering tensionsintheprisons. «academic interlocutor.» Thoseconversations, not conductedbymembersofDINCOTE, elop urbanguerrillacells. Although itdid concessions tosubversives byenactinga e anyresponsibility, political apparatus,thegovernment ath, theMRTAw La CantutaUniv 35 andtheeffectsof as unableto ersity. but attemptedto The Fujimori overcome 71 THE EVENTS: MAGNITUDE AND SCOPE OF THE CONFLICT 72 PART ONE: THE TRAGEDY AND THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR IT Corruption continuedthroughoutth abuses, therebyguaranteeingfullimpunity. amnesty lawin1995thatprotectedstateagentswhocommittedhumanrights spokespeople todownplaytheaccusationsand,mostimportantly, passan Democratic ConstituentCongressallowed theadministrationtousedifferent in humanrightsviolations.ThemajorityheldbyFujimorisupportersthe the other–intensityof theviolence,formsofviolenceemployed andthe structures —thePCP-SL and MRTA involved organizations withcentralizeddecision-makingandleadership geographic regions. The internalarmedconflictevolved d structure forelectoralandpoliticalgain, the administration’s permanenceinpower. Thegov T exist inremoteareasofthecountrythatwere alsohometodrugtrafficking. did notofferafinalsolutiontotheproblemofsubversion, whichcontinuedto on subversion, policyand Fujimoripaidlittleattentiontotheanti-subversion More interestedinremainingpower andproclaiminghishard-lineposition large. had beenlaunchedin1980.Hewas thelasthigh-rankingPCP-SL leaderstillat accord proposedbyGuzmánandcontinuedfighting the«people’swar» that Ramírez Durandwas adissidentShiningPath Óscar RamírezDurand, in July1999,afteramassiveandhighlypublicizedoperation,PCP-SL leader government usedthehostagerescueasaway military setbacksintheborderconflictwithEcuadorearly1995, with thehostagesbeingrescuedduringChavíndeHuántarmission. After Néstor Cerpa,inwhich72hostageswere held formorethanfourmonths,ended in December1996byanMRTA columncommandedbythegroup’s leader, the government. TheassaultontheJapanese ambassador’s residenceinLima regime; atworst, theywereaw of thePCP-SL notaimedatarrestingsubversivewere leaders anddecisively endingtheactions manipulate thepopulationthroughfear. Anti-subversive operations,therefore, the mediaforpoliticalgain.Thethreatof«terrorism»was alsousedto internal conflict,whichendedsuccessfullyforthegovernment, hypedin were even thoughsubversionhadbeenreduced drastically. The finalactionsofthe The finalhigh-impactactionsofthe state funds. gained nearcompletecontrolover the and distractionwere largely and crimesthatwere beingreportedwithincreasingfrequency. Thepropaganda HE INTERNAL ARMED CONFLICT AND THE REGIONS THE CONFLICTINTERNAL AND ARMED HE While thehistoryoftwo decadesofviolenceanalyzedbytheCVR and MRTA. At best,theywerepropagandatoolsusedbythe Feliciano possiblebecausetheadministrationhadgradually ay ofdistractingpublicattentionfromtheexcesses , was arrestednearthecityofHuancayo. internal war on theonesideandsecurity forceson e decadewith mass media,whichwereboughtoffwith maintaining theanti-subv ifferently in of regaininglegitimacy. leader whohadrejectedthepeace were successfullyexploitedby ernment usedthemilitary the objectiveofensuring the country’ ersive strategy In addition, s distinct was mostintense: was active. objectives particular characteristicsofeachregionbeforetheconflict,aswell asthe involved. depending onthestrategiesusedandways inwhichthepopulationwas high levelsofviolence,theconflictevolvedaccordingtodifferenttimelines, long periodsofhorror, sufferinganduncertainty. Inaddition,inregionswith lives, destroyed infrastructure,alteredresidents’ dailyroutinesandlaunched various actorshadasporadicpresenceinsomeareas,others theywipedout configuration oftheactorsdifferedgreatlyfromregiontoregion.While infrastructure andthegreatest deteriorationoforganizations,trust,relationships testimonies receivedbythe CVR,aswell asthemostwidespreaddestruction of Thesouthern Andes, formedbythedepartmentsofCuscoandPuno, • Lima,theseatofpower Metropolitan • Thecentralregion,formedbythedepartmentsofJunínandPasco, and • Thenortheastregion,formedbythedepartmentsof Huánuco,SanMar- • Thesouth-central region,formedby • of Apurímac. and theprovincesof Abancay, GrauandCotabambasinthedepartment organization inlow-incomeneighborhoods. national strategieswere plannedand attention focusedonattacksinthecapital.Itwas alsotheplacewhere of whatitrepresentedandbecausethenational andinternational nation. Itwas permanentlytargetedfromthestartofconflict because jungle. companies. Italsoservedasarestareaforsubversives operatinginthe complex forthenationalenergygrid,aswellnumerousmining communication routestothecapital.Itincludedmajorhydroelectric Ayacucho yLima,thiswas astrategicregionforsupplyand Castrovirreyna inthedepartmentofHuancavelica.Locatedbetween Tayacaja,the provincesofHuancavelica, Huaytará,Churcampaand complicated byotherfactors,especiallythoselinkedtothedrugtrade; llo) andLoreto.Thearmedconflictlastedlongestinthisregionwas tín, Ucayali (particularlytheprovincesofPadre Abad andCoronelPorti- from thisregion; unparalleled intherestofcountry. Thelargestnumberofvictimscame Apurímac. Theinternalarmedconflictbeganherewithalevel ofviolence and theprovincesof Andahuaylas andChincherosinthedepartmentof provinces of Acobamba and Angaraes inthedepartmentofHuancavelica, The CVR definedfivelargeregionswheretheinternalarmedconflict The diversityofthehistoryviolenceinregionsisrelatedto These regionswerehome to91 and strategiesofthearmedgroupsinareaswheretheywere percent ofthevictimsreported in the departmentof and theeconomiccenterof a focalpointforagitationand Ayacucho, the 73 THE EVENTS: MAGNITUDE AND SCOPE OF THE CONFLICT 74 PART ONE: THE TRAGEDY AND THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR IT owning structures,changing ruraldemographicpatternsandpower structures. the attraction. At began, particularlyfrom the highlands,withLimaasprincipalpoleof changes inthenation’s the mostprofoundandradical demographic,economic,politicalandsocial sectors ofthepopulationorbetween residentsandthestate. in areaswheretheycouldtakeadva achieved theirgreatestcontrolandhadanimportantlong-lastingpresence Cajamarca GROUND PREPARED AND SEEDS FIGURE 18 and solidaritywithincivilsociety(seeFigure18). (Madre deDios),aswell (Amazonas, northernCajamarcaandpartofLoreto) andthesouthernjungle category alsoincludesalargepartofthelower jungleregion,thenorthern 19, representinglessthan10percentofthevictims reportedtotheCVR.This to themostpopulateddepartments,islistedin category of than inothers.Thecoastalregion(withtheexceptionofLima),whichishome The PCP-SL and MRTAwere abletoestablishagreaterpresenceinsomeregions By RegionBy Where They Occurred Peru 1980-2000:P During thesecondhalfof20thcentury, Peruvian societyexperienced The CVR’s investigations showthatthesubversive organizations and Arequipa. same time,peasantmobilizations alteredtraditionalland- ercentage OfDeaths And history. Inthe as mostoftheprovincesindepartments A OF THE CONFLICT IN THE REGIONS BEFORE REGIONS IN THE CONFLICT OF THE ntage ofchronicconflictsamongdifferent 1950s, aprocessofmassrural migration Disappearances R eported ToCVR, The 1980 others inFigure ncash, without publicinstitutions toguaranteesecurityororder. this process,dozensofsmall townswereformed,creatingadisorganizedsociety the axesofregionaldevelopment pr public servicesandinternal communicationroutesanddidnotformpartof ethnically mixed,poorandeagertoprogress,settled inareasthatlackedbasic awarding land titlesasaway ofexpandingtheagriculturalfrontier.by Besides investinginthehighway, the highlands andonthecoastredirectinternalmigration away fromLima. Basin intothenationaleconomy, butalsotosatisfythedemandsforlandin the in the1960swas anattemptnotonlytoincorporatetheresources ofthe Amazon them. population andthecapacityofeconomicstate structurestorespond produced ahugegapbetween thedemands andexpectationsoftheexpanding impoverished centralandnorthernhighlandsmigratedthere.Thismigration multiplied severaltimesoverlasthalfofthecenturyaspeoplefrom region. Thenortheasternjungleisanareaofcolonization,anditspopulation into anewcontextofdevelopmentandsocialwelfare,canbeseeninthenortheast people’s bydisruptingtheirtraditionalpatternsbutdidnotintegrate them lives A tellingexampleoftheincompleteprocessmodernization,whichaffected The northeast:integration, highway, to takerootandgrow. significant conflictsorfrustrations,preparingtheterrainforsubversive groups those spaceswherethelimitationsofmodernityhadgeneratedmost group frustrations.Theviolentprocessthatwaslaunchedin1980occupied conflicts tolingerandcreatednewsocialproblems,aswellindividual population, thelimitationsofPeruvian modernizationprocessallowed old significant changesinthedailylivesandexpectationsofmajority inthedifferentregionsofnation.Whiletherewereand development opportunities. was manifestedbytheagrarianreformandexpansionofeducational massive hydroelectricprojects. Inthehighlands,modernization,orpartofit, the highlands.Therewere noimportant similar impact.Thepromiseofmodernity, however, bypassedalargepartof the region. A highway intothejungle,whichwas startedinthe1960s,hada along thecoast,whichchangedlandscape,economyanddemographicsof alsoundertaken,includinglargeirrigationprojects modernization projectswere particularly thelife,economyanddemographicimportanceofLima.Massive and agrarianbanks,protectionisttariffs,etc.)transformedthenationaleconomy, Policies toprotectindustriesandencourageinvestment (industrialdevelopment Two parallelstoriesemergedfromthisarea. Thefirstwas intheHuallaga During the1970s,thisgrowingmigrantpopulation, whichwas rural, The massive efforttobuildtheMarginalHighway throughthejungle In manyways, thesechangesmeantunequallevels ofmodernization government activelypromotedcolonization omoted bythestate. As aconsequenceof colonization anddrugtrafficking investments, nohighway linksandno 75 THE EVENTS: MAGNITUDE AND SCOPE OF THE CONFLICT 76 PART ONE: THE TRAGEDY AND THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR IT resources andlandtitles. numerous conflictsbetweenindigenouspeopleandsquattersover natural many years, gained indigenous peoples.Theprocessofcolonizationintheregion,whichdatesback Asháninkas, therearealsosmallercommunitiesofYanesha andNotmasiguenga to theprovinceofLaConvención,Cusco,south.Inaddition the Asháninkas, whoinhabitanareafromtheGranPajonal plainsinthe north from thecentralhighlands,moved tothearea. of urbanareas.Thepopulationalsogrewrapidlyinthe1960sascolonists,mainly had strongerlinkstothenationaleconomyandamoreconsolidatednetwork Unlike thenortheastregion,centraljungle,whichisclosertocapital, The Ashánink PCP-SL in the immediatecontextinwhichsubversive groupsputdownroots–the particularly intense,especiallybetween 1978 social movements, theconflictsbetween thestateandlocalpopulationswere exchange withtherestofnation. here, therewere alsoconstantregionalbattlestoimprove thetermsofeconomic had linkstothecoastthroughJaén-Chiclayo. Whilelicitagriculturedeveloped the placeofstate.Thesecondwas intheprovincesofSanMartín,which Valley, population, reorganizingit aroundthewar effort. withclan elders,andtheShiningPath well tookroot amongthe over went had notfullyarrived. Itsmessageof that was ablendof very traditionalorganizations andamoderneconomythat teachers, healthpromotersandeven the native communitiesandnationalsociety–colonistsfrom Ayacucho, bilingual in agriculturaltechniquesorashealth-carepromoters. an airstrip.Thecommunitiesalsoreceived assistanceformemberstobetrained pumps, tools,chainsaws,medicalanddentalsupplies, and,inonecase,build community centers,purchasefarmanimalsandequipment, radios,electricwater Many communitieshave outsidefinancialsupport tobuildschoolsor received throughschools,bilingualeducationprograms,healthcarecenters,etc. years Institute ofLinguistics(SIL)—have had national educationalsystem.CatholicandProtestantmissionaries —theSummer colonists (despiteconstantconflictsov urban areasandcommercialzonesmaintainsmoothrelationshipswiththe the centraljunglearenotisolatedfromrestofnation.Theyhave linksto where drugtrafficking,withitsowneconomy, cultureandnorms,took Unlike otherlowland Amazonian societies, The regionishometotheoneoflargestlowlandindigenouspeoples, In bothareas,whetherbecauseofdrugtraffickingorthepressure The complexrelationship between theMRTA and the Asháninka The PCP-SL recruitedpeoplewhofunctionedasakindoflinkbetween the coca-growingareasandMRTA inSanMartín. as andcolonistsinthecentral jungle speed withtheexpansionofroadsystems,sparking equality, justiceand indigenous leaders–toinfiltrateasociety er territorialboundaries),aswellthe a presenceintheregionformany and 1982.Theseconflictscreated thenative communitiesin especially social welfare at atimewhentheoldlandowningclasswas disappearing. university fosteredprogressive ideasandwa point ofcultural,politicalandeconomicdevelopmentintheregion.The professors andstudentsfromoutsidetheregion,Huamangabecameafocal process intherestofcountry. ThereopeningoftheUNSCHattracted UNSCH) in1959,revitalizedthecityandconnectedittomodernization Huamanga National inthecityandsurroundingareas. weight to workersandfinallytheagrarianreformerodedthisgroup’s influenceand the region’s poverty anddepression.Peasant movements, thesaleofhaciendas The landowners,however, lostmost in theregion,cityofHuamangawas theundisputedseatofregionalpower. and greatestmigrationtootherdepartments. A traditionalcenterforlandowners visible signsofeconomicdepression, constructed roadsystem–midway through investment oradynamiceconomicpole–duemainlytothesparseandpoorly major modernizationprojects. Unlike thejungleandcoastalregions,highlandswerenotfocusofany Andean modernization:thecities,universities,marketeconomyandmining and colonistsmixedwiththeinternalarmedconflict. the onlycaseincentraljunglewhichconflictbetween Asháninkas population intheareaaroundOxapampa,whichendedopenconflict,was rapid growthoftheuniv region’s problems.Thishigh-quality, UNSCH focusedontrainingtechnicians,researchersandteacherstosolve the Without theadministrativeproblemsfacedbyotherstateuniversities, the educational organizationintermsofitsstructureandacademicconception. institutions orculturalinfluences, theuniversityhadavirtualmonopolyon for theradicalideasof 1960sand1970s.Without thepresenceofother free education,aprotestthat was violentlyrepressed. Huamanga andHuantaagainst adecreeby of the Ayacucho DefenseFront.Thisw cut theuniv important socialprotestsintheregion.Thegovernment’s decisionin1966to and theuniv communities. the opportunitytoenvisionnewsocialmobility fortheirfamiliesand did provideyoungpeoplefromruralareas,thechildren ofpeasantfamilies, 6,059 in1980.Whilethatgrowthledtoadeterioration ofuniversityservices,it After anearly50-yearhiatus, An educationalinitiative,thereopeningofSanCristóbalde Like otheruniversities aroundthecountry, SanCristóbalwas acenter The importanceofeducationasatoolforprogress and socialmobility ersity’s budgetsparkedmajordemonstrationsandledtothecreation ersity’s roleasaregionali University ( ersity, which Without anyresourcetoattractnationalorforeign Universidad NacionalSanCristóbaldeHuamanga, of theirsocialandeconomicpower amid with amongthelowest per-capita income modern approachwas expanded from228studentsin 1959to the UNSCHwasviewed as a nstitution were manifestedinthemost as followedas byan the 20thcentury Ayacucho showed s removedfromtraditionalsectors the militarygovernment tolimit uprising in1969 sustained bythe modern 77 THE EVENTS: MAGNITUDE AND SCOPE OF THE CONFLICT 78 PART ONE: THE TRAGEDY AND THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR IT ideas thathadtaken by adeclineinservices.Therewere alsoattemptstodevelopthesameradical from poorurbantoruralsectors,and Like theUNSCH,university expandedbyincreasingaccessforstudents One exampleisthecityofCuscoandSan Antonio de Abad NationalUniv in the1950sand1960s,accompaniedby although withlessintensitythan Ayacucho, had particularly inruralareas. positions thatwere beingcreatedbytheexpansionofeducation intheregion, influence theteachers’union(SUTE)inHuamangaandoccupynewteaching spread toGuamánPoma de Ayala HighSchool,allowingtheorganizationto in 1971.ThestrongPCP-SLpresencetheUNSCHEducationDepartment expanding rapidly, withenrollmentrisingfrom1,500studentsin1968to3,319 Bandera Roja, split withtheCommunist Guzmán Reinoso,gottheirstart.ThePCP-SL’s presenceattheUNSCHaftera presentations tostudentsandunionsthereduringthe1970s. UNSCH professors,aswell asShiningPath leaders,wereinvitedtooffer extended totheNationalUniversity oftheCenterPeru inHuancayo, and Its influenceasamoderneducationalinstitution–atleastinitsrhetoric public opinionandhelpedmoldacommonperceptionamongthepopulation. of thecityPuno,departmental capital. in thedepartment.Itswork, however,was only reflectedinthemodernization administrative agencyresponsible fororganizingandplanningdevelopment Puno was set Corporation toFomentandPromotetheSocial Economic Development of flooding followedbyintense 1950 and1960,Punoexperiencedaperverse combinationofexcessive rain and the state. radical, didnotjointhesubversives’ ranksorcollaborateintheirwar against counterbalance forthecity, itsuniv generates ideasandservicesaroundahighlymobile, foreignpopulation,was a operators inLimaandabroad,thepresenceofthis dynamicactivity, which not benefitingthecityandthatmajorbenefits were beingreapedbytour depressed ruraleconomy. Whilelocalauthoritiescomplained thattourismwas restoration effortsfollowed 176,000 by1975.Expansionofthehotelbusiness,artsandcraftsindustry there were only6,903touristarriva achieved alevel ofeconomicactivityandmodernitythrough tourism.While Other regionsofthehighlandsthatwere affectedbytheviolence, The UNSCHwas theplace where thePCP-SL anditsleader, Abimael As partofthismodernization, thecrea Modernization inPunowas alsoconcentratedinurbanareas.Between Cusco was alsocharacterizedbytheurbanizationofpovertyanda Unlike Huamanga,Cuscowas amuchmorecomplexsocietyand PCP-BR) camejustatthemomentwhenuniv up in1961andoperated until1972asanautonomous root in Party ofPeru-Red Flag( that trend. Ayacucho. droughts. Amid thesenaturaldisasters,the ls inCusco1954,thenumberincreasedto ersity anditsyoung peoplewho,although increased enrollmentw the modernizationof tion of a university in Puno wasPuno tion ofauniversityin also undergoneurbanization Partido ComunistadelPeru- their universities. as accompanied ersity was ersity. of Peru inHuancayo, thepresenceofPCP-SL andMRTAwas notas strong, rhetoric andrecruitingfuture militants. University becameapolitically importantcenterforspreadingthePCP-SL’s from theearlyyears ofthearmed rural backgrounds.InCerro dePasco, wherethePCP-SL’s presencewas felt discourse was successfulinattractingyoung people,manyofwhomwerefrom contrast, theregion’s universities proved fertileground,and theconfrontational unions were hithard,buttheynevercapitulatedpoliticallyto subversion. In targetedbytheRodrigoFrancoCommand. Theminingsectorandits were assassinated importantleadersofthemineworkers’ union.Otherunionleaders unions. Facedwithrejectionbytheunionmovement, thePCP-SL harassedand disputes, buttheyfailedinthateffortaswelltheir effortstoinfiltratethe frequent attacks.Thesubversive groupsattempted totakeadvantage ofunion which was thesceneofopen university inHuancayo,wherethestudentbodywas extremelyradical, and communities andthecities,particularlyHuancayo.Thiswas evidentatthe with tiestotheMantaroV the MRTA. Whiletheyfailedintheirattemptstoinfiltratethecommunities Control ofthecentralregionwas astrategicobjective ofboththePCP-SL and higher altitudes,suchasinPasco, dedicatedprincipallytoanimalherding. with thestate-ownedcompanies,aswell asextremelypoorcommunitiesat markets oftheMantaroV differentiated ruralareathatincludedurbanizedcommunitieslinkedtothe companies, active CerrodeP Oroya, La base. Theregionwas formedbyanetwork ofurbanareas(thecitiesHuancayo, Ayacucho andLima,itsuppliedfood andenergytothecapitalitsindustrial control oflargelivestockoperations. areas andconcentratedbasicallyinruralthathadoncebeenunderthe a rhetoric. As and whohadasmallerpresenceincommerce,wereuninterestedradical organized inanetworkofcommunitiesthatextendedtotheBolivianborder in thedepartment,whichwerehometo replaced thedeclininglandowningclass.Inaddition,southernprovinces led totheformationofamixed-raceandindigenousclassmerchantsthat This the modernexpressionofprovincialsectorslinkedtopeasantworld. and theopeningofCaracotocementfactoryin1963,cityJuliacabecame urban areainthedepartmenttomodernize.Thanksinfluenceofarailway for socialmobility. 1970s, attractingthechildrenofpeasantfamilieswhosawitasanopportunity Technical ofthe University createdtheNational seen asanexampleofprogress.In1961,thegovernment The miningcitiesofLaOroya andCerrodePasco were thetargetsof The centralregionwas offundamental importance.Locatedbetween The cityofPuno,however,was neitherthemostdynamicnoronly result, thepresenceofsubversion inPunowas sporadic inurban unions andwarehouses fullofexplosives), andahighly asco, Tarma alley. In Highlands. Theuniversity expandedrapidlyinthe conflicts between thetwo subversive organizations. alley, they and Jauja),miningactivity(largestate-owned addition, therewere communitiesinconflict conflict, Daniel Alcides CarriónNational At theNationalUniversity oftheCenter primarily Aymara indigenousfarmers carried outactionsinthehighland 79 THE EVENTS: MAGNITUDE AND SCOPE OF THE CONFLICT 80 PART ONE: THE TRAGEDY AND THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR IT services, thepoliticalfight tocontrollocalgovernmentwas intense.Inthe which were inthe process of their ownleadersandbegan exercisinglocalcontrol.Inthenewurbanareas, municipal elections.Forthe firsttime,thedistrictsinMetropolitanLimaelected the UnitedLeftcoalition, andthepoliticalchangein1980thatushered strangle thenation’s politicalandeconomiccenter. key tothesubversive strategy, Pan-American Highway NorthandtheP shantytowns alongthethreemajorroutesintoLima – theCentralHighway, the and neighborhoodsubsistenceorganizations,such assoupkitchens.The infiltrate shantytownswiththegoalofwinningover localleadersofunions, armed conflictunfoldedinLima. deterioration oflaborunions.Thatwas thebackdropagainstwhichinternal model hitacrisisinthe1980s,generatingmore unemploymentanda existing infrastructureandsocialservices.Inaddition,theimport-substitution new work far exceededthecapacityofeconomy’s formalsectorstoabsorbsomany combined withunplannedanduncontrolledurbanization.Urbanmigration industrialization encouragedbypoliciesprotectinglocalindustries,but strategy ofthearmedsubversive groups. was thepoliticalandmilitary that surroundedthecenterofnationalpower the revolution incommunistideology–andtheresidentsof«poverty belt» the shantytownsringingcity. Capturingtheworking class—thesubjectsof propaganda andrecruitmentforthesubversive or heightened visibilityfortheiractions,Limawas alsoanareaofintense frustration afterabandoningtheircommunitiesforthecapital.Besidesproviding the ruralmigration,withmillionsofPeruvians seeingtheirhopesturned to had thelargestconcentrationofw and thesensethatsecurityforceshadlostcontrol. box» formagnifyingtheimpactoftheiractionsandcreatingafeelingpanic the subversive organizations,especiallythePCP-SL, sawthecapitalasa«sound by theattentiontheywould prov lines andattacksonshoppingcentersfinancialinstitutions,were motivated officers andbusinesspeople,aswellcarbombings,thedowningofpower assassination ofhigh-level governmentauthorities,politicalleaders,military most violentareas.Manyofth Lima, thecenterofpoliticalandeconomicpower inthecountry, was oneofthe Metropolitan Lima:urbanization,industrializationandmarginalization but was extremelyviolent. It isimportanttohighlighttheimportanceoflegal left,reflectedin The armedinsurgentgroupsundertookasystematic campaignto The modernizationofMetropolitanLimawas aprocessof Metropolitan Limawas thecenterofcountry’s industrialbaseand ers, andthecitywas unabletointegrate the newpopulationinto expanding andwere plaguedbyinadequate basic seen asakindofsteelbeltthatwould beusedto e subversive actionsinthecity, suchasthe oke. Throughthesekindsofterroristactions, orkers. Itwas alsothedestinationofmuch an-American Highway South–were ganizations, particularlyin ( by theagrarianreform,especially thePublicInterestFarmingCooperatives had creatednewformsofdisenfranchisementorreopened oldconflicts. affectedbytheagrarian reform,butwheretheprocess communities thatwere because therewas nothingtoredistribute.Italsohadanimpactinsome have linkstothemarketorthathadnotbenefitedfromagrarianreform was successfulininfiltratingextremelypoorpeasant communitiesthatdidnot example) tendedtoremainonthemarginsofviolence. Cusco) orareaswithwell-establishedtiestothemarket (theMantaroV (valleys alongthe coast, inthenorthofCajamarcaandSacredValleyin actions. Ruralsocietieswherepeasantshadbenefited fromtheagrarianreform Reinoso’s expressions. PCP-SL m to winoverthepeasantpopulationpolitically. With ruralsupportbases,the support bases,whichiswhyoneofthe officers, theycouldmovewithrelativeease.Controllingthearearequired city.» Inthewide,sparselypopulatedhighlands,wheretherewere fewpolice Maoist tradition,thePCP-SL beganwagingwarits «fromthecountrysideto support baseamongpeasantsformilitaryandpoliticalreasons.Inspiredbythe subversive groupsattemptedtotakecontrolofthecountrysideandcreatea The armedconflictunfoldedinanimportantcontextruralareas. Conflicts inthewakeofagrarian reform considerably tothedramaticnumberofdeadleftbyinternalarmedconflict. and invisiblestrategiestouchedthelivesofmillionspeopleadded of representativesthestateandpoliticalparties.Nevertheless, boththevisible visible thanthebombingsofstrategic the informaleconomy,was thesceneofanarmedconflictthatwas muchless of socialdemands,alsohithardatthelegalleftandexistingorganizations. efforts, whichattemptedtoeliminateorganizationsandpotentialfocalpoints organizations intheshantytownsascompetition.Thestate’s anti-subversive organizations. Thearmedgroupssawtheleft,otherpoliticalandsocial by theleft. all thedistrictsofLima’s governed eastern,northernandsouthernconeswere organizations torunninglocalgovernments.Between 1980and1983,practically fromitstraditional roleinunionsandneighborhood shantytowns, theleftmoved local peasantcommunities tookanactive part. of thearmedactionstodestroy theSAIShadbroadsupport,andinmanycases aimed atdestroyingthem. Whatwas surprisingabouttheseattacksisthat many Sociedades AgrícolasdeInterés Social, The infrastructureandhigh-qualityliv The regionalhistoriesanalyzedbytheCVRdemonstrate thatPCP-SL Not allruralareaswere Lima, acityformedbymigrantsinmarginaldistrictsoperatingwithin The riseoftheleftprovoked anopenconflictwiththesubversive ilitants moved «likefishinthewater,» touseoneof Abimael Guzmán receptive tothearmedgroup’s rhetoricand SAIS), were the symbols andtheselective assassinations organization’s p estock ofcooperativescreated targets ofsystematicattacks rincipal objectives was rincipal objectives alley, for 81 THE EVENTS: MAGNITUDE AND SCOPE OF THE CONFLICT 82 PART ONE: THE TRAGEDY AND THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR IT and Cajamarca. Huamanchuco, Cajabamba andSanMarcosinthedepartmentsofLaLibertad in thenorthernpartof country, suchasthose locatedinSantiagodeChuco, infrastructure destroyed andlivestock distributed SL militants.ManyoftheSAISmanagersandtechnicianswereassassinated, political cause.SAISinstallationswere thetargets ofsystematicattacksbyPCP- won officials andotherantisocialelements,thePCP-SL quickly promised. With itspledgeoforderandjustice,aswell asthedeathofcorrupt arguing thattheagrarianreformhadnotproduced the benefitstheyhadbeen managed, partnercommunitiesagainbegandemanding rightstotheland, managers’ lackedlegitimacyandfarmersw selling offlandatartificiallylowprices. Amid this the communitieswhereSAISleaderswere accus PCP-SL beganitsactionsinthisareaaround1987,itfound fertilegroundamong into improvedstandardsoflivingfortheparticipating communities.Whenthe river basins).Thecompanies’ economicprosperity, however, didnottranslate located inthehighlandsofJuníndepartment(theCanipacoand Alto Cunas to demandlandrights.Thisgave risetoaconflictwithnoviable solution. the directbeneficiariesalsofearedpeasantcommunities,whichcontinued accused managersofcorruptionandquestionedtheefficiencyoperations, property rightsoftheSAIS,how to eliminatethecooperatives anddividethelandintoindividualparcels.The Production Cooperatives onthecoast mismanagement. Intheearly1980s,communitiesthatformed Agrarian during theVelasco y of thelate1970sandmove todismantlethecontrolmechanismsimposed areas wheretheyoperated.Thisw receive aportionofthecompanies’ profits. communities aspartnerswithoutdecision-makingpower, butwiththerightto were createdasakindofbusinessventurethatincorporatedthe SAIS state-owned companies,theSAIS,whichbenefitedworkers andcolonizers.The or redistributelandtothecommunities.Instead,itfusedranchesintolarge demands ofthepeasantcommunities,butdidnotdivideuplargeranches modern ranches.Theagrarianreform,whichbeganin1969,recognizedthe communities hadbeendemandingpropertyrightstothepasturesusedby use over-grazed pastureshadbeenconflictive foryears.Fromearlyon,the –andthepoorpeasantcommunitiesaroundthemthatcontinuedto workers development, includingimproved livestock andpasturesthatrequiredfew the 20thcentury. Therelationshipbetween theranches–islandsoftechnological experienced importantdevelopments inthelivestock industryfromthestartof Libertad departmentandthesouthernreachesofCajamarca A similarsituation,although onasmallerscale,occurredwiththeSAIS The country’s largestandmosttechnologicallyadvanced SAISwere The companies’ deepenedthesocialdivisionsin economicpower The centralhighlands,thedepartmentofPuno,highlandsLa ears, whichledtoaccusationsofcorruptionandfinancial ever,were muchmorecomplicated.Whilethey as complicatedbytheeconomicdepression and intheinter ere questioningtheway landswere or, insomecases, slaughtered. situation, inwhichtheSAIS -Andean v ed ofcorruptionand alleys decided conv erts toits where thegreatestloss ofhumanlifeanddestructionfamilies andthearmedforces –occurredand population –byboththe subversives of creatinganewpower. Itisalsowherethemost violentattacksonthecivilian areas thatthePCP-SL controlled territoryandcreated numerous«people’s committees.»Itwas in those most marginalized.ThatiswherethePCP-SL began,won over sympathizers, The sectorofruralsocietyhardesthitbytheinternal armedconflictwas the Extreme rural early 1980s,facilitatingtheor the moreradicalpositionofPCP-SL andtheyjoinedthesubversives inthe the landoccupations,suchasJulioCésarMezzichand LinoQuintanilla,toward turned overthelands.Thesituationpropelledleaders ofthefederationand and communities.In1978,afternewprotests,conflicts andarrests,authorities model, whilefarmersdemandedthatthelandbedivided upamongindividuals the authoritiesresponsibleforagrarianreformattemptedtopromoteSAIS the landtakeovers failed,givingway toa over simultaneouslybythousandsofpeasant the landowners. As aresult,68ofthe118haciendasinprovincewere taken communities toapplythereformontheirown,takingover landsandevicting the ProvincialPeasant Federationof Andahuaylas called onitsmember announced, thelargelandownerscontinuedtocontrolhaciendas.Thatyear, years afterthereformwas influences andlackofpoliticalinterest.In1974,five process inthezonehadbeenextremelyslow, hamperedbybureaucracy, local in anintenseconflictbetweenthestateandcommunities.Theagrarianreform topeasants–hadresulted solution –thelandsfromoldhaciendashadbeengiven resolved by1980,whentheinternalarmedconflictbegan.Nevertheless, the Andahuaylas, inthedepartmentof Apurímac. Landproblemstherehadbeen that was less intensethanthatofthecentralhighlands. department becameanotherscenarioofconflictin1989,althoughonascale were abletoestablishsomebasesofsupport.The which thesubversives forces, andthefightbetween the legal organizations, thatconflict,therepressionofpeasantmobilizationsbystate While thePCP-SLwas unsuccessfulinitsefforttowinoverpeasant the managersofstate-ownedliv conflict over the PCP-SLthe attemptedtot wellwith thesubversivesas asthepoliceandarmedforces.Bymid-1980s, organizations linkedtotheCatholicChurchwere alsopresent,andclashed The DepartmentalPeasant FederationofPuno,legalleft-wingpartiesandsocial of pastures.Thesituation,however, was aroundcontrol department onPuno,theinternalarmedconflictalsorevolved One particular case in the conflict over agrarianreformoccurredin One particularcaseintheconflictover In theprovincesof Azángaro andMelgar poverty: privatizationofpowerandcommunityconflicts restructuring oflandownership,whichpittedpeasantsagainst achieved its achieved ake advantage ofthesituationandmilitarize ganization’s expansion inthezone. estock companiesandthecentralgovernment. greatest successinimplementing itsstrategy leftandthePCP-SL created conditions in long andconflictive processinwhich much morecomplexintheseareas. farmers. An attempt farmers. An , inthenorthernpartof to putdown 83 THE EVENTS: MAGNITUDE AND SCOPE OF THE CONFLICT 84 PART ONE: THE TRAGEDY AND THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR IT had beenundergoinginthesecondhalf be runbyeducatedpeople. egalitarian societythatwould political causethatwas presentedinthemostelementalterms.Itproposedan power) andlandownerswhostilllived intheareasattractedpeasantstoa belonging to access toresources,assassinationsandthedistributionofgoodslivestock where therewere highlevels ofinternalviolenceandresentment over lackof eliminated antisocialbehavior, theftandlivestock rustling. Inthesesocieties, authoritarian formofsocialorder, which,tothesatisfactionofresidents, justice andwas accompaniedbythe implementationofanextremely presence withapoliticalmessageofequalitythatappealedtoidealssocial channelsusedbythePCP-SLwere toentercommunities.Itlegitimized its differently, the onlylinktoprogress.Whileeachcommunityexperiencedprocess children whostudiedinprovincialcapitals,withtheprestigethiscarried,were thoughindividualswhomigratedorhadaccesstoeducation. Teacherswas or communities (withnumerousinternalproblems),theonlyhopeforprogress by theinternalarmedconflict. Tulumayo Riverbasinsharedthosecharacteristics,aswelltheviolencespread provinces ofCusco.ThehighlandsPasco andtheareaofJunínknownas central highlands(Ay subjected toabuses. markets, immersedintheirownproblems,destabilizedbylanddisputesand Because ofthat,theyhadnever takenpartinelections.Theywere cutofffrom communities wherethemajorityof guaranteeing peaceandsecurityprotectingproperty. Thesewerepoor, rural to infrastructureorbasicpublicservices.Italsofailedfulfillitsrolein the state’s development plans.Thestatewas absentanddidnotguaranteeaccess communities were recorded. been underway since the mid-20thcenturyinwhichfamiliespeasant had beeninthehandsof peasant farmersforsometime.Thusaprocesshad Víctor Fajardo,theonlyhacienda stilloperatingwhentheagrarianreformbegan lands. Manyofthecommunities inVilcashuamán werecreatedinthisway. In by communitiesortheirworkers, wholatercreatednewcommunities onthe temporary migrationamongpeasants,manyofthe haciendas were purchased behind inamoremodernizedeconomy. Inthe still existed.Mostofthehaciendaswere unprofitable, however, havingfallen Huamanga andLaMar),thetraditionalhaciendasystem ofthemid-20thcentury Huancasancos andVilcashuamán) andinthenorthernprovinces(Huanta, particularly inthePampas River b These societies,however,were unaware ofthechangesthatcountry In theseareasofruralpov This was theareaknownas«Indianstain,»andincludedsouth- These sectorswere consideredirrelevant tothenationaleconomyand teachers inlocalschoolsandvisitsbyyounguniversity students the rich (localresidentswithgreater acucho, Apurímac impose strictauthoritarianjusticeandthatwould residentsspoke erty, while asin (provincesofVíctorFajardo,Cangallo, and Huancavelica) andthehighland and Huancavelica) of the20thcent the populationwas organizedin 1970s, withgreatermobilityand resources and,generally Quechua andwere illiterate. ury. In Ayacucho, , more power»was establishedin the subversivesthroughharassment,threatsandassassinations.The«new incapable ofcombatingthe appointed lieutenantgovernors andwidelydispersedpolicestationsthatwere took root.Theweak presenceofthestate,representedbyjusticespeace, and itslinkswithlocalpowerstructures, own benefit. nation –powerremainedinthehandsoflocalagentswhooftenuseditfortheir (SINAMOS), anetworkofauthoritiesthatreachedallthecommunitiesin and 1975whenthestatecreatedNationalSocialMobilizationSystem modern statebureaucracy–theexceptionbeingshortperiodbetween1970 resources. justice, was partially replacedbypeasantfarmerswhohadsomeaccessto owners. Theoldpowerofthelandowner, withcontrolover authoritiesand to monetaryresourcesandacloserrelationshipwiththeformerhacienda communities andinequalitieswithinthem,dependingonwhohadmoreaccess collapsing haciendas.Thisexpansion,however, hadcreatedconflictsbetween communities hadbeenincreasingtheirpropertybyacquiringpiecesof 36 approach fromindiscriminate repressiontoamoreselectiv attemptingtoimposethroughbloodandfire.When thestatechangedits was signsofresistingthetotalitarianplanthatPCP-SL communities showed SL. Even beforetheanti-subversive campaignwas launched,however, peasant destroy the«supportbases»and«people’s committees»organizedbythePCP- forces wereputinchargeoftheanti-subversive fightin1983andattemptedto implacable counter-i «reactionaries.» the PCP-SL’s message,againstolderadu people, whohadmoreeducationbutlittleaccesstoresources andwere attracted preached bythePCP-SL createdakindofgenerationalconflict, pittingyounger sectors. Inothers,thepeasantfarmers’ lack ofacceptancethe«newpower» attacks andassassinations(«people’s trials»)thatweresupportedbypoorer which monopolizedlocalpower andwere hometowealthierresidents,sparked communitiesand districtcapitals, spread. Insomecases,oldconflictsbetween livestock rustling,helpedsubversion spreadinthesecondhalfof1980s. with theabuseoflocalpowerandsubversives’ controlofproblems,like as away ofgettingahead,whichcreatedgreatersocialdifferentiation, along the earlyy context w This isprobablyirrelevant to anoutsideobserver, This was repeatedinmanyot Amid theconflictscreatedbythisnewinequality was notreplacedby As withthelandowners,whosepersonalpower The responsetothePCP-SL’s «newpower» inthecountrysidewas an situationsofconflictanddiscontentallowed the PCP-SLDiverse to ould beapoorpersonin ears, andlaterinCusco Apurímac. Greateraccesstoeducation nsurgency effort.Thiswas particularlytruewhenthearmed the vacuum thathadsoeasilybeencreated. ft and livestock rustlers,was quicklyeliminatedby the lowestthe quintileofincomedistributioninthecountry. her areas,firstinPasco and Tul lts (theirparents),whomtheyconsidered for whomapersonwhow the PCP-SL’s messageandpractices 36 inaccesstoresources, as considered“rich”inthis e strategyaimedat umayo in 85 THE EVENTS: MAGNITUDE AND SCOPE OF THE CONFLICT 86 PART ONE: THE TRAGEDY AND THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR IT of Ayacucho. As concentrated mainlyinthesouth-centralregion,particularlydepartment authorities. conflicts, hopingtoturnthemintoconfrontationswiththestateandits subversive organizationsandtheirattempts totakeadvantage ofregionalsocial expansion todifferentpartsofthecountrywas relatedtotheinitiative of the The internalarmedconflictdidnotspreadtoallregionsatthesametime. T urban areasandthejungleregion. SL fromthe toward grouptomove Andean provinces,forcingthesubversive coordination withthesecurityforces,thesecommitteeshelpedexpelPCP- winning over thelocalpopulation,self-defensecommitteeswereformed.In Figure 19 correspond thecurrentpagewherefigure5islocated Figure 5onpage8and20below).NOTE:Changethereferenceto bloodiest periodintheconflictregionandcountryasawhole(see established «supportbases»and«people’s committees,»made1983-84the use ofviolencetoimposetheir«neworder»oncommunitieswheretheyhad ambushes ofmilitarypatrols),aswell asthesubversives’ increasinglyintense PCP-SL’s on itstotalitarianideology. The generations withincommunitiestoimposeanegalitarian,autarkicorderbased PCP-SL HE SPREADOFVIOLENCEIN THE REGIONS As Figure 19 shows, the first five years theviolenceanditsvictimswere As Figure19shows,thefirstfive took advantageofconflictsbetweencommunitiesand actions (assassinations,bombings,attacksonpolicestationsand By Region Peru 1980-2000: has beenmentioned,duringtheseyearsandinareas,the And YearR As Percentage OfDeaths eported ToCVR The reaction ofthearmedforces,provokedby And Disappearances conflicts createdbytherestructuring oftheSAISandconfrontationsamong prisons inJune1986. massacre ofPCP-SLinmates intheLurigancho,ElFrontónandSantaBárbara box» tomagnifytheimpact. An example was theprisonriotandsubsequent launched anumberofactionsinLima,attempting to usethecityasa«sound 1986 andthroughouttherestof1980s. Around 1986,thePCP-SL andMRTA areas ofthecountry. its armedactionsinthecitiesand,aboveall, northeasternandcentral over supportersinnew regionsandcontributedtotheMRTA’s decisionto begin harsh repressionagainstthepeople.Thatimagewas usedbythePCP-SL towin groups werechallenginganillegitimatepower thatdidnothesitate tounleash people atnationaluniversitiesinLimaandtheprovinces –thatthesubversive helped createtheimage–especiallyamongmost radicalsectorsofyoung human rightsabusesinthe Ayacucho regionin1983and1984,stateagents organization’s actionstootherareas.Bycommittingwidespreadandsystematic region weakenedthePCP-SL’s pr FIGURE 20 In otherregions,thesubversive groupsattemptedtotake advantage of New regionsbecametheprincipalscenarioofconflict beginningin The intensecounterattacklaunchedbythestateinsouth-central By YearR And Peru 1980-2000: egion As Reported egion As Percentage OfDeaths esence there,provokinganexpansionofthe ToCVR The And Disappearances 87 THE EVENTS: MAGNITUDE AND SCOPE OF THE CONFLICT 88 PART ONE: THE TRAGEDY AND THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR IT the MRTA. At thattime, ( Revolution, whichincluded membersof scene ofthedevelopment inspired bytheCuban ofa guerrillamovement in 1989and1990.Inthemid-1960s, theareaaroundOxapampahadbeen Asháninkas) andsettlementsofcolonists. organizations togaincontrolover lowlandindigenouscommunities(mainly subversive organizations. execution ofdozensuniversity studentsandstaffsuspectedofhavingtiesto between 1991and1992,reflectedintheforced disappearanceandextrajudicial violence, thesecurityforcesundertookavast campaignofselective repression terrorist attacksinthecityandsurroundingcommunities. Facedwithsuch the CenterofPeru. Thatwas organizations (principallyontheleft)for as themainhegemonicforceinitsbattleagainstMRTA andotherpolitical committees, or months, untilthearmedforcesandrecentlyorganizedpeasantself-defense PCP-SL not benefitedfromtheagrarianreform. SAIS, whichwas carriedoutwiththeparticipationofcommunitiesthathad Concepción andHuancayo provinces.Theresultwasthedestructionof the down inthe Alto CunasandCanipacoareas,aswell asinthehighlandsof the centralregion.First,PCP-SL offensive againsttheSAISwas winding organizations were aimed atwinningover thepopulation inareaswherethesubversive strategy, subversive whichbecamemorefocusedandselective, andwhichwas As notedabove, thisperiodwas alsomarkedbyachangeinthestate’s anti- this periodwere thecentralandnortheasternregionsMetropolitanLima. by theviolencewas registeredin1989.Theprincipalareasoftheconflictduring number ofvictimsreportedtotheCVR.Thelargestdistrictsaffected during thisperiodtheregionsaffectedbyviolenceregisteredhighest the violencecomingbetween 1989and1992.Exceptforthesouth-centralregion, and drugtraffickers,replacingthestateinroleofenforcingsocialcontrol. areas oftheUpperHuallagaV department ofSanMartín,whilethePCP-SLworked tocontrolthecoca-growing In thenortheast,MRTA triedtoidentifywiththedemandsoffarmersin areas wheretensionsbetween indigenouscommunitiesandcolonistswere high. south (EneValley) andtheMRTA inthenorth(Oxapampa)triedtocontrolnew little success)andlaterinJunín.Inthecentraljungleregion,PCP-SL member communities,managersandthecentralgovernment, firstinPuno(with Movimiento deIzquierdaRevolucionaria, There was a The thirdprocessinthecentralregioninvolved Second, inthecityofHuancayo, thePCP-SL managedtoestablishitself The intensityoftheconflictwas relatedtothreedifferentdynamicsin A periodofextremecrisisbeganattheend1980s,withanewpeakin control overtheregion. rondas campesinas active. direct confrontationbetween theMRTA andthe Asháninkas one ofthe alley, accompanied byawave ofassassinationsand , respondedwithforce. The subversive hegemonylastedaboutfour acting as a middleman between cocafarmers acting asamiddlemanbetween principal Asháninka leaders, Alejandro principal Asháninka MIR). The MIR would laterformpartof MIR). TheMIR That wasfollowed control oftheNa the Revolutionary Left Movement efforts bythesubversive tional Universityof by abriefperiodof forces andNationalPolice. Nevertheless,itisimpossible toreferthesubversive PCP-SL militants,despite theirfundamentalism,justasithadonthearmed that drugmoneyhadacorrupting effectonthenormallyrigiddisciplineof Committee» inrelationtothe organiza the greaterlevelofautonomy apparentlyexercisedbythe«HuallagaRegional had animportantimpactonthePCP-SL’slo victims. farmers andviolentlyrepressanyopposition,which ledtoahighnumberof the PCP-SL’s what thegroupconsideredantisocialbehavior. Followi also meantimposingitsbrandof«socialjustice,»imparting harshreprisalsfor growing farmersand«protect»thefrom state actions.Thatcontrol «social order»toregulatetherelationshipbetween drugtraffickersandcoca- control over 1989 and1992. As hasbeenstated,thePCP-SL attemptedtoconsolidateits Guzmán. armed struggledespitethe«peaceaccord»calledforin1993by Abimael of thoseareasstillshelterremnantsthePCP-SLfactionthatcontinued maintain apresenceinhigh,inaccessiblejungleareasforyears.In2003,some constituted genocide. transpired theremustbefurtherinvestigatedtodeterminewhetherthecrimes territory was atragedyfortheindigenouspeople.TheCVR believes thatwhat population was caughtinthecrossfire.The confrontations withself-defensecommitteesandthesecurityforces.Thelocal enslavement andexterminationofentireindigenouscommunities andviolent leadtothe and colonists,unleashingalongprocessofviolencethatwould the south.To doso,thesubversive groupbegancapturinggroupsof Asháninkas penetrating theprovinceofSatipothroughEneRiver anditstributariesto areas ofrefugeforcombatantsinthecentraljungleregionearly1990s, in anareaknownasMolinos. personnel totheregion,butitsmilitantswerecrushedby Army inabattle thecityofTarmataking over in groupattempted Campos, thesubversive by itsconfrontationswiththePCP-SL andthearrestofitsleader, VíctorP eliminated fromtheregion. MRTA militantsintheprovinceofOxapampa,andMRTAwas practically Asháninka leaders.Themurdersunleashedawar between the Asháninkas and Calderón payforhisearliercollaboration, guerrillas. Nearly25years later Calderón, collaboratedwiththePeruvian Army inthearrestofMIR The complexityofdrugtraffickingandtheamount of moneyinvolved The northeasternregionwas anothermainareaoffightingbetween The ruggedterraininthispartofthecountryallowedPCP-SL to The PCP-SL,meanwhile,attemptedtoconsolidatesupportbasesand The MRTA sufferedmultiplesetbacks principal effortwas tocreatesupportbasesamongthecoca-growing the populationinHuallagaValley byimposingitsversion of , in1989,theMRTA decidedtomake Alej April 1989.TheMRTA assigneditstopmilitary tion’s central command.Itisnotsurprising tostrikea«high-impactblow»by cal strategy, whichwas reflectedin assassinating himandtwo other intheregion1989.Weakened PCP-SL’s presencein Asháninka ng itsnationalstrategy, andro olay 89 THE EVENTS: MAGNITUDE AND SCOPE OF THE CONFLICT 90 PART ONE: THE TRAGEDY AND THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR IT may have turnedtheHuallagaRiver the CVR describetheintensityofviolenceinthispartcountry, which remained highbetween 1989and1993.Hundredsoftestimoniesreceivedby specific years (1984or1989),theintensityofconflictinnortheastregion disappearances. resulted insystematichumanrightsabuses,especiallytortureandforced region. forces, nearly45percentofthedeathsoccurredinoperationsnortheast the listofmilitarylossesininternalarmedconflictprovidedby forces andsubv of theself-defensecommittees.Importantconfrontationsbetween thesecurity with coca-growingfarmers,whichopenedthedoorsomewhatforcreation subversives. Thesechangesallowed the anti-drug componentandfocusedexclusively northeast, beginningin1989theanti-subversive strategynolongerincludedan effectively. through violence)thatrequirespecificmeasuresinordertobecombated an illiciteconomicactivityandthoseofapoliticalcauseaimedattakingpower fails todistinguishbetween very different phenomenon intheregionusingsimplisticterm«narco-terrorism,»asthat 37 The principalscenariosof theconflictinthisfinalstagewere inthenortheast reducedtosmallareas.Nevertheless, thesituationwas stillcomplicated. were of theorganization’s principal leaders. its peakin1992withawave ofbombings.Italsoendedthat year withthearrest byaspiralofhyperinflation.ThePCP-SL weakened situation ofpanicandextremecrisisforthePeruvian the organization’s actionsinurbanareas,particularlythecapital,tocreatea most ruralareas. As aresult,thePCP-SL Central Committeedecidedtointensify subversive groups onthedefensive andinamuchmoreprecarious positionin win over thelocalpopulation high jungleandmoreremoteareasof Ayacucho, CuscoandJunín. which, togetherwiththesecurityforces,forcedPCP-SL to move the toward Valley. especially theprovincesofHuantaandLaMar, and conflict between 1989and1992,theviolencecontinuedinanumberofareas, reported totheCVR. central region,even thoughthis In contrast,lessthan20percentof themilitarylossesinconflictoccurredactionssouth- In 1993,weakened andwithout leadership,theremainingPCP-SL cells 37 This zonewas thesceneofintenseactivitybyself-defensecommittees, As Figure20shows,unlikeoth Nevertheless, theanti-subversive strategyappliedintheareaalso In anefforttodealmoreeffectivelywiththearmedgroupsin In theearly1990s,state’s newanti-subve While thesouth-centralregionwas not ersive groupsoccurredbetween 1989 region accountedforthehighestnumber ofdeathsanddisappearances and self-defensecommittees’ actionsputthe into thenation’s largestcommongrave. er regionswherep security for actors, logicandmotivation (thoseof on identifyingandeliminating the principalscenarioof ces toavoid confrontations offensiveinLimareached rsive strategy, t state, whichwas already and 1993. According to in the Apurímac River eaks wereeaks recordedin he effortto thousands ofPeruvians, continue toexist. justify theimpositionoftotalitarianismandtheirideasocialchangeon and integration,whichthesubversive organizationsmanipulatedandusedto regional andlocalconflictsrelatedtothetruncatedprocessesofmodernization idea ofsocialtransformationthroughviolence.Nevertheless, manyofthe beenattractedto the might have massive costinhumanlives hascausedcertainsectorsofthepopulation,which constitute athreattothestabilityofPeruvian state.Inaddition,theconflict’s stage significantactions. limited thesubversive organization’s abilitytocoordinateanationalstrategyor These isolatedareaswere importantfor propaganda actionsandsomearmedincursions,buton the Apurímac River Valley northof Ayac in isolatedareasoftheHuallagaV stillinfavorofthearmedstrugglecontinuedtomaintain«supportbases» were SL intheregion. where thereisevidenceofextrajudicialexecutions),furtherweakened thePCP- River (anareaknownasVenenillo, wheresev with thearmedforces’«cleanup»operationsalongleftbankofHuallaga region. Between1993 Today thegroupsthatcontinuearmedstruggleareweakanddonot Guzmán’sDespite Abimael capitulation and 1994,theeffectsof«repentancelaw,» together PCP-SL’s causeearlyon,toloseinterestinthe alley, the centraljungle(Satipoprovince)and prolonged resistance,buttheyalso ucho. Theycarriedoutsporadic eral confrontationsoccurredand in 1993,t he PCP-SL factionsthat a very limitedbasis. 91 THE EVENTS: MAGNITUDE AND SCOPE OF THE CONFLICT

93

CHAPTER 2 RGANIZATIONS O UBVERSIVE S

SUBVERSIVE ORGANIZATIONS

The Communist Party of Peru-Shining Path (Partido Comunista del Perú -Sendero Luminoso, PCP-SL), which took up arms against the Peruvian state and society when the country was returning to democracy after 12 years of military dictatorship, is the principal actor responsible for the tragedy described in the preceding pages. The PCP-SL was not the only group to challenge the nation’s decision to have a democratically elected government. The Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (Movimiento Revolucionario Túpac Amaru, MRTA) rose up in arms in 1984. While their approaches were different, as explained below, both organizations committed grave human rights abuses, including crimes against humanity, which left thousands dead and had painful repercussions for the Peruvian population, especially the poorest sectors.

THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF PERU-SHINING PATH

The subversive and terrorist organization that calls itself the Communist Party of Peru, and is also known as the Shining Path, launched a war on the Peruvian state and society in May 1980. Throughout the conflict, the PCP-SL committed violent actions that can be categorized as crimes against humanity and was responsible for the highest number of victims caused by the internal armed conflict. The Shining Path was responsible for 54 percent of the deaths and disappearances reported to the CVR during its investigation. Based on our calculations, the CVR estimates that this subversive group was responsible for

1 The calculations have a 95-percent accuracy rate, with numbers possibly ranging from a low of 24,823 to a high of 37,840 people, which would represent at least 46 percent of the fatalities in the internal armed conflict. 94 31,331 deaths.1

THE ORIGINS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF PERU-SHINING PATH IT

FOR The PCP-SL got its start during internal purges within Marxist-Leninist revolutionary parties, aligning itself with the dogmatic and sectarian ideology RESPONSIBLE

that emphasized the notion of vanguard as the principal force of revolution and violence as the way of achieving it. THOSE The Shining Path adopted Lenin’s thesis of the construction of «a party AND of select and secret cadres,» an organized vanguard that could impose a «dictatorship of the proletariat» through armed struggle. From Stalin, a minor TRAGEDY figure within the historic processes recognized by the PCP-SL, the subversive HE

: T organization inherited the simplification of Marxism as dialectic materialism 2 ONE

and historic materialism, as well as the thesis of a single party and personality

ART cult around the leader. From Mao Zedong, the PCP-SL took the idea of how P power is achieved in semi-feudal nations: a prolonged people’s war from the countryside to the city.3 Above all, however, the PCP-SL borrowed from Mao the notion that the people’s war is inevitable for achieving socialism and that «cul- tural revolutions» are a necessary step after the triumph of the revolution. The PCP-SL arose through successive divisions within Peruvian communist and socialist parties, which reflected the dispute within the international communist movement. The most important split stemmed from the rupture between China and the Soviet Union in the early 1960s over the issue of violence as a necessary step for revolution. While the parties aligned with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union – until that time the hegemonic power within the communist world – accepted the thesis of peaceful transition to socialism proposed by the party in 1956, the followers of the Chinese Communist Party, led by Mao Zedong, held to the idea of violence and the need for a «people’s war.» This dispute was reproduced in different countries and on different scales. In Peru, it led to a split in the Peruvian Communist Party. The majority of the country’s union organizations remained in line with the Soviet position, while younger members, teachers and some sectors of the peasantry opted for the Maoist approach. To distinguish themselves, each faction used the name of its newspaper: PCP-Unity was the pro-Soviet faction, while PCP-Red Flag represented the pro-Chinese faction. At the time of the schism, Abimael Guzmán Reinoso — who would become the founder, ideologue and maximum leader of the PCP-SL— was the head of the Regional PCP Committee in Ayacucho, known as the «José Carlos Mariátegui» Committee. Guzmán came down on the side of the PCP-Red Flag, led by lawyer Saturnino Paredes. The unity among the Maoists lasted only a

2 Made popular by the books on Marxism published in the Soviet Union. 3 In these cases, the peasants were considered the “principal force” and the proletariat, which had been given the central role in Marxist revolutions, became the “leadership force” of the revolution. short while. In 1967, the younger members of the party and an important sector 95 of the base organizations within the teachers’ union separated from Red Flag and formed the Communist Party of Peru-Red Homeland. Guzmán remained in the group led by Saturnino Paredes, even though he had already formed his own «red faction» in Ayacucho.

A conflict soon ensued between Guzmán and Paredes, and a new division RGANIZATIONS occurred between late 1969 and February 1970. Paredes scored a victory in the O short term, remaining in control of the majority of the PCP-Red Flag’s base groups, UBVERSIVE while Guzmán was isolated with his Ayacucho committee. The Guzmán faction S also lost a large number of the base groups that had been established among peasant communities, in theory the most important sector for a Maoist party. The PCP-SL emerged in 1970 with its foundations in the «José Carlos Mariátegui» Regional Committee in Ayacucho, taking its name from a slogan used among students in Huamanga — «for the Shining Path of Mariátegui.» According to Guzmán, the organization had only 12 militants in Ayacucho and 51 militants in the entire nation after the split with Paredes. Nevertheless, the new party was able to survive at the university in Huamanga, and throughout the 1970s it was one of many small, radical, left-wing parties that fought to lead the «reconstruction» and «refoundation» of the Communist Party and, in some cases, prepare for the armed struggle.

THE PCP-SL IN THE 1970’s

To better understand the PCP-SL’s actions over the next decade, it is necessary to consider two important issues: a) the construction of its ideological and pedagogical plan; and b) the absolutely vertical and oppressive relationship between the party and society or between the party and the «masses,» to use the organization’s terminology.

Dominant ideology

After the schism with the PCP-Red Flag, the Shining Path maintained its presence among students, university professors and schoolteachers in Ayacucho. At the UNSCH, Guzmán concentrated on «refounding» the PCP by focusing the political struggle on allegiance to the thinking of José Carlos Mariátegui, who was recognized as the legitimate source of ideology by the entire Peruvian left. Between 1971 and 1972, PCP-SL cadres formed the Mariátegui Center for Intellectual Work (Centro de Trabajo Intelectual Mariátegui), which was led by Guzmán, to carry out an exhaustive review of the Marxist classics and the works of José Carlos Mariátegui. After nearly two years of intensive study, the PCP-SL produced a publication that converted Mariátegui, a versatile thinker who was uninterested in systematic thought, much less orthodoxy, into the forerunner of Maoism and the founder of «general line» orthodoxy. The publication covered all possible issues, from «Mariátegui and the problem of literature» to «Mariátegui and the military problem.»4 The transformation of Mariátegui into 96 the forefather of Maoism was presented by the PCP-SL as a «development» of Mariátegui’s thinking. From then on, the Shining Path talked about «Mariátegui and his development,» but without mentioning who was responsible for this IT development — Abimael Guzmán. FOR Armed with an ideology, PCP-SL militants concentrated on spreading what they believed was a manual for Marxism through the university. It was a

RESPONSIBLE simplistic vision that was easily transmitted to students. At the same time, the Shining Path developed what it called a pedagogical project. The main efforts were THOSE aimed at controlling the UNSCH Student Federation, expanding the reach of the AND

Guamán Poma School to the university and participating in the teachers’ strike in 1973. The PCP-SL began to spread throughout the region as students graduated TRAGEDY

and were sent out as teachers to secondary schools in different district and HE provincial capitals. While this was occurring, the Shining Path tried to develop : T

ONE its national connections, particularly in Lima through the Enrique Guzmán

ART National Teachers College and in Huancayo at the National University of the P Center of Peru.

Verticality as principle

During the third plenary session of its Central Committee in 1973, the PCP-SL decided to come out of its seclusion in the university. To do this, it decided to create «generating organizations,» internal movements that were considered «organizations generated by the proletariat» in the different fields in which the party operated. The PCP-SL went about building cells, which were generally small, but ideologically solid and closely linked to the party. In this manner, it created the Classist Neighborhood Movement (Movimiento Clasista Barrial), Grassroots Women’s Movement (Movimiento Feminino Popular), Classist Workers and Laborers Movement (Movimiento de Obreros y Trabajadores Clasistas) and Poor Peasants Movement (Movimiento de Campesinos Pobres), among other groups that would gain notoriety in the coming decade. The members of these organizations were called «masses,» which distinguished them from the «cadres.» Both the masses and the cadres, however, had to submit to «democratic centralism» and «adhere to Mariátegui,» that is, the party. Under this structure, society was absolutely subordinated to the party, which «decides everything without exception.» The only thing that existed outside the PCP-SL and the organizations of the masses that it controlled were its enemies. Once the armed struggle began, the «masses» had to submit to the party’s scientific direction or pay a high price. This concept would lead to the future «militarization of society» proposed by the PCP-SL, a concept the CVR believes played a significant role in increasing the number of victims of the internal armed conflict.

4 Among the issues analyzed were: “Outline for the Study of Marxist Philosophy,” “Application of the Materialistic Dialectic to Society,” “The People’s War,” “Outline for Studying the Thinking of José Carlos Mariátegui» (Mariátegui Center for Intellectual Work, Ayacucho, 1973). THE GREAT RUPTURE: RECONSTITUTION AND ARMED STRUGGLE 97

Between 1977 and 1979, the PCP-SL made a major break with the predominant social and political dynamic in the country and transformed into a fundamentalist group with a potential for terrorist acts and genocide. For PCP-

SL militants, this rupture meant «the reconstitution of the [communist] party» RGANIZATIONS and the decision to move forward with the armed struggle. The issue of O «reconstitution» was particularly important in the Shining Path’s ideological UBVERSIVE definition at that time. In 1975, the party had decided that: S

[…] to reclaim the Path of Mariátegui is to Reconstruct the Communist Party, his party; to work for its ideological-political construction, developing the fundamentals given by its founder and, simultaneously, work for its organizational construction, readjusting the organic and political structures. Reconstructing the party today, in summary, is to push for its reconstitution by Reclaiming Mariátegui and aiming for the development of the people’s war (PCP-SL 1975).

In March 1977, the PCP-SL’s Central Committee held its second National Meeting of Generating Organizations and addressed the issue of building the party under the banner of «Constructing the Armed Struggle.» The PCP-SL believed that the reconstruction of the party had progressed sufficiently and that it had enough trained cadres to initiate the «people’s war.» The task of drafting a National Construction Plan was assigned to the National Coordinating Committee. Before launching its «people’s war,» however, the PCP-SL had to deal with a number of intense internal struggles, because a sector of its leadership favored social protest and taking advantage of the political openings that were emerging during the transition to democracy after nearly 12 years of military dictatorship. Guzmán needed to defeat this sector in order for his plans to prevail in the party. To do so, he imposed on the party a number of radical definitions, including: a) converting ideology into a kind of religion; b) seeing militancy as a kind of purification and rebirth; and c) identifying revolutionary activity with terrorist violence. These ideas were expressed in four important texts published in 1979 and 1980.5 The first important element visible in the texts is the change in Guzmán himself. He began to use religious references, specifically biblical references, to attack his enemies, as well as to offer a message of faith and hope

5 The first text is called “For a New Flag” and was read during the IX Plenary on June 7, 1979. Peru celebrates Flag Day on that date and the presentation of the text was an explicit challenge to the state and its symbols 11 months before the “start of the armed struggle.” The second text is “On Three Chapters of our History,” and was presented on December 3, 1979 at the First National Conference of the PCP-SL to “forge the events” of the First Campaign of the First Division of the “People’s Guerrilla Army.” The third text, “We Begin Tearing Down Walls and Unleashing the Dawn,” was presented on March 28, 1980, during the Central Committee’s Second Plenary Session. The fourth text, the most important, was entitled “We Are the Initiators.” It was read during the closing ceremony of the PCP-SL’s First Military School on April 19, 1980, less than one month before the armed actions began. 98 to his followers, most of whom were young adults. The publication, «For a New Flag,» began with the biblical phrase, «Many are called, but few are chosen.» That was followed by, «The wind carries off the leaves, but the seeds remain IT […]. How can the seeds stop the mill? They will be turned to dust.» Guzmán FOR states that the god of this bible is matter, and that the movement toward communism is inevitable. Through shrewd use of rhetoric, Guzmán seems to

RESPONSIBLE embody this movement:

THOSE

[…] the earth has needed fifteen billion years to generate communism. How

AND long will man last? Much less than the simple blink of an eye; we are nothing

more than a pale shadow and we aim to rise up against this process of matter

TRAGEDY [...] arrogant bubbles, is that what we want to be? An infinite particle that

HE wants to rise up against fifteen billion years? What arrogance, what decay! : T ONE

In this exhortation, Guzman’s rivals not only appear as insubordinate ART

P to the leader, but opposed to the universe. In Guzman’s discourse, the rise of the party is a cosmic event. At the start of the 20th century, «the purest light began to emerge, a resplendent light, a light that we hold in our breasts, in our souls. This light was fused with the earth and mud became steel. Light, mud, steel, and the PARTY emerged in 1928 [...]» (capital letters are in the original). Thus militancy in the party is a religious experience, which implies both a collective and an individual rupture. «Two flags [struggle] in the soul, one black and the other red. We are the left, we must provoke a holocaust of the black flag.» To do this, it is necessary «[…] to cleanse our souls, cleanse ourselves thoroughly [...] enough of rotting individual water, abandoned waste.» It is a purification that allows for rebirth in a privileged work, but one fraught with pitfalls. The enemy is within; therefore, as internal struggles arise and the start of the armed struggle approaches, the tone of the discourse grows frenetic:6

We need to pull up the poisonous weeds, which are pure venom, cancer of the bones that corrupt us; we cannot allow this, it is decay and sinister and we cannot permit it, even less so now [...] we must expel these sinister vipers [...] we cannot allow cowardliness or treason, they are poisonous snakes [...] We will begin to burn, to drain this puss, this venom, burning is urgent. It exists, and this is not good, it is harmful, it is a slow death that will consume us [...] Those who are in this situation are the first to face the fire, to be pulled up, squeezed like pimples. If this does not happen, the poison will spread. Venom, purulence that must be destroyed [...]. (PCP-SL 1980b)

This tone is an indication of the future «struggle between two lines» within the PCP-SL, the verbal «slaughtering» among the militants to remain within the party structure that now has as its pinnacle Abimael Guzmán. The opponents who believed the armed struggle was an inappropriate option appear as non-believers: «Some have such little faith, charity and hope

6 The tone allows one to understand why Guzmán believed that “the essence of the cultural revolution is to change the soul” (PCP-SL 1991a: 2-3). [...] we have taken the three theological virtues to interpret them. Paul said, 99 ‘men of faith, hope and charity.’» It is an argumentative process in which the speaker defeats all resistance and molds things to his image and likeness, more as a potter than a blacksmith, because, as he would repeat in the years to come when discussing those who did not see the light of the party: «It will not be easy for them to accept it [...] they require overwhelming acts [...] it needs to be RGANIZATIONS hammered into their head, their speculations must be torn to pieces, their souls O forced to dwell in the reality of our homeland.» UBVERSIVE The discourse announces the methodology the Shining Path would S employ with the so-called «masses.» For the «class enemies,» the prospects are much worse:

The people will become furious, will take up weapons and will rebel, putting a noose around the neck of imperialism and reactionary forces; they will be grabbed by the throat, choked and, when necessary, strangled. The flesh of the reactionaries will wither and be shredded, and the black scraps will be submerged in the mud, what remains will be burned [...] and the wind will scatter the ashes across the land so that all that is left is the sinister reminder of what should never return, because it will not and cannot return. (PCP-SL 1980b)

The virulence of the language foreshadowed the violence to come, because after the meeting called for the «Initiate the Armed Struggle» (Inicio de la lucha armada, ILA), «the destruction of [the party] has been averted.» The reconstruction of the party has concluded and the militants are now alchemists of the light:

We are a rising torrent at which they will launch fire, stones and mud; but our power is great. We turn everything into our fire, the black fire will become red and red is the light. This is who we are, this is Reconstitution. Comrades, we are reconstituted (PCP-SL 1980b).

What comes next is the apocalypse. The participants in the First Military School, which was held in Lima and not in Chuschi, as the PCP-SL’s official history maintained for many years, signed an agreement stating:

The communists of the Party’s First Military School, a symbol of the end of times of peace and the start of the people’s war, are on the verge of combat as the initiators, under the direction of the party and bound to the people, to forge the invincible legions of steel of the Red Army of Peru. The future is in the barrel of our guns! The armed revolution has begun! Glory to Marxism- Leninism-Mao Tsetung! Long live the Communist Party of Peru! For the path of Comrade Gonzalo, we begin the armed struggle! (Gorriti 1990: 67)

What Guzmán defined as the «reconstitution of the Communist Party» and its militarization not only led to the «initiation of the armed struggle,» but constituted a decisive step in the personality cult created around him. Mariátegui was slowly forgotten and the «development» of his thinking became the «guiding thought» of Guzmán, who had not yet proclaimed himself «president.» 100

THE CASES OF CHUNGUI AND OREJA DE PERRO IT

FOR

RESPONSIBLE The district of Chungui is located the extreme eastern corner of Ayacucho’s La Mar

THOSE province, bordering the departments of Apurímac and Cusco. The violence unfolded in two different ways in the community Chungui, to the west, and the area known as Oreja de AND Perro (literally «Dog’s Ear,» because of its shape on the map) to the east. The only land routes to Chungui are through San Miguel to the west or Andahuaylas to the east. The TRAGEDY

distance between the district and the city of Huamanga is approximately seven hours HE by car. The communities of Oreja de Perro have little contact with the district capital. : T The best route to Oreja de Perro is through Andahuaylas. ONE

In the 1980s, the community of Chungui had access to considerable resources ART

P thanks to the sale of coffee and cocoa in the farmers’ market in Sacharaccay in the district of Anco, in La Mar province. Until the 1970s, residents of Chungui also received income from land rented to non-residents, principally from the jungle. Oreja de Perro is linked to districts in the province of Andahuaylas (Apurímac), including Ongoy, Ocobamba and Andarapa. The commercial relations with Andahuaylas were based primarily on the sale of livestock. In general, traders from Ongoy and Andarapa would buy livestock in Oreja de Perro for resale in the city of Andahuaylas. Many residents of Oreja de Perro would also travel to the districts of Andahuaylas to sell their livestock directly at a higher price than that paid by middlemen. Chungui was characterized by a lack of haciendas and constant land conflicts, especially in the jungle zone. In contrast, Oreja de Perro was home to large haciendas that produced sugarcane alcohol. The hacienda system in Oreja de Perro had collapsed because of guerrilla activity in 1965 and land takeovers staged in 1974 to protest the slow pace of agrarian reform in the provinces of Chincheros and Andahuaylas. Border conflicts intensified as land changed hands and new communities were formed. The conflict also included fights over pastures and arable land in the jungle, where the area’s principal crops, coffee, cocoa, sugarcane and coca, were grown. The change in land ownership enabled local farmers to improve their earnings by directly managing crops, pastures and livestock. Economic development increased because of trade with Andahuaylas and La Mar, where livestock was sold and local farmers acquired products such as sugar and clothing. Another important change during this time was the development of educational opportunities as more schools were built in the region. The residents of Oreja de Perro — especially those with more economic resources, that is, more livestock – began sending their children to study in schools in Andahuaylas, Ongoy and Andarapa.

FIRST STAGE: THE PCP-SL INFILTRATES THROUGH THE EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM

The principal vehicle for PCP-SL infiltration in these communities was the educational system. The subversive group took advantage of the greater access to educational opportunities that these communities achieved in the wake of the major changes in property structure in the 1960s and 1970s. The Shining Path began working in Chungui by recruiting young people in schools. Between 1975 and 1980, the PCP-SL’s Andahuaylas Zone Committee Of all of the meetings summarized above, the one that stands out most 101 clearly is the IX Plenary of the Central Committee, held between May and July 1979. At the plenary, Guzmán was recognized as the «head of the party and the revolution,» which is much more important than the title of «general secretary,» which he always disdained. At the plenary, in a move replicating Mao’s actions during the Cultural Revolution, Guzmán purged the Central Committee and RGANIZATIONS formed the Permanent Historic Committee, which was authorized to guide the O party during a crisis. This committee included Guzmán, Augusta La Torre, Nora, UBVERSIVE his wife, and Elena Iparraguirre, Miriam, his future sentimental partner. That S was the leadership committee that launched the ILA the following year.

It is generally accepted that the PCP-SL began exclusively in Ayacucho. Since 1970, however, the PCP-SL had small cells of militants in Lima and other cities. On November 14, 1972, the June 14 Regional Committee met to begin building the generating organizations among workers in different sectors. After the third plenary session in February 1973, the Metropolitan Committee decided to strengthen its work among sectors of the «petit bourgeois,» which led to the formation of the Lima affiliates of the Mariátegui Center for Intellectual Work, the Grassroots Women’s Committee, which later became the Grassroots Women’s Movement in May 1973, and the Center for Worker Self-Education. The party’s work in Lima did not have clear direction, and Guzmán would criticize the committee for taking on «obvious working-class nuances.» In June 1975, Guzmán, now in Lima, decided that the party’s urban work would be guided by the formation of a broad front of «masses,» with the idea of «workers as leaders, neighborhoods as masses.» One sector, however, insisted that it was necessary to strengthen the party’s presence in the union movement – «impart more ideology to the working class» – so that it could be the principal motor of the revolution, which is not Maoist dogma. This internal debate took place during the rise of the union movement, which reached its peak with the nationwide strikes of 1977 and 1978. The Shining Path, however, distanced itself from the unions, which it considered «revisionist.» In November 1975, during the fifth plenary of the Central Committee, which was part of the VI National Conference, Guzmán expelled the «Bolshevik faction» from Lima, considering it part of the «liquidation of the left.»7 In the following years, the PCP-SL carried out very little work in Lima. On May 11, 1976, the first PCP-SL workers cell clandestinely passed out fliers in various Lima districts. That same year, amid internal struggles, the party held the XIII Convention of the Metropolitan Coordinating Committee. It decided that the Grassroots Women’s Movement and the Revolutionary Student Front, as well as the Center for Worker Self-Education, would become pillars of the reconstruction of the party in Lima to prepare for the people’s war. The party

7 That is, they used far left-wing language but with no practical application that would allow the party to progress. See the explanation of this process in PCP-SL 1986a. 102

focused on forming young cadres and recruiting high school students in Ongoy,

IT Ocobamba and Andarapa. The children of peasant farmers from communities in

FOR Oreja de Perro, such as Tastabamba, Oronqoy, Putucunay, Socco, Santa Carmen and Mollebamba, also studied at these schools. «My older brother studied in Ongoy [...] teachers from the party took over the school. I also studied there, but only for one year because I was afraid; the teachers forced me paint graffiti and talk RESPONSIBLE about that party; they [PCP-SL] talked about equality.»1 The teachers at these

THOSE secondary schools were educated at the UNSCH, where they had contact with the PCP-SL. AND The Shining Path’s presence in Oreja de Perro first came to light because of an apparently isolated action. After suffering from a wave of robberies, the wealthier TRAGEDY

residents of Mollebamba filed a complaint in Andarapa. Simultaneously, on September HE 27, 1982, the police station in Erapata (district of Incahuasi, Cusco, on the right bank of : T the Apurímac River) was attacked and one officer was killed. The National Police in ONE

Illahuasi (district of Andarapa, province of Andahuaylas, Apurímac) went to Mollebamba ART

P and arrested seven people.

THE START OF THE ARMED CONFLICT

After working quietly through the schools, the PCP-SL began to form its «principal force» after declaring the «start of the armed struggle.» The principal force took over communities to form «people’s committees.» The local population recalls the PCP-SL entering Chungui in different ways, first from Andahuaylas to Oreja de Perro, and later, around 1984 after the Army had established its presence in Ayacucho, from Cangallo. The PCP-SL, however, had made earlier incursions into communities in Oreja de Perro. These incursions were from Andahuaylas and Chincheros and began in the second half of the 1970s. They were aimed at proselytizing communities in Andarapa, Ocobamba and Ongoy, all of which are close to Oreja de Perro. According to one testimony from Oreja de Perro, «[…] the terrorism [subversion] first began in 1982, when the subversives entered the community of Chapi. They burned down the sugarcane alcohol factory and organized the people to support and follow them.»

The massacre in Santa Carmen de Rumichaca

A group of armed, uniformed people entered the community of Santa Carmen de Rumichaca on December 8, 1982, looking for the local authorities.2 They returned three days later and gathered the residents for an assembly. People who claimed to be police officers – they were actually PCP-SL militants— separated the women from the men in two classrooms and asked: «[…] who are the people in the peasant patrol, because they were going to receive an award.»3 The people who were part of the patrol were assassinated that night by the PCP-SL. The Shining Path brutally murdered the local authorities:

So we followed. All the people were gathered, even the children were gathered. A trader from Talavera was there and they took away his tape player and they went to the

1 CVR. BDI-I-P627. Chungui, Chungui. Woman, age 40. 2 CVR. Testimony 201316. Chungui, La Mar, June 24, 2002. 3 CVR. Testimony 201316. Chungui, La Mar, June 24, 2002. began to create support groups and reinforce its work in certain universities, 103 particularly San Marcos and La Cantuta. In addition, it once more analyzed the role the cities would play in the «people’s war.» Unlike Ayacucho, however, not all party members in Lima recognized Abimael Guzman’s absolute leadership. Some members believed it was necessary to strengthen the organization and disagreed with the idea of launching the RGANIZATIONS armed struggle in the short term. These were the people, according to Guzmán, O who wanted to unfurl the «black flag» at the historic IX Plenary in 1979. He saw UBVERSIVE the party leaders in Lima as part of the «opportunistic right-wing line» opposed S to armed struggle. That sector would be violently attacked and expelled from the party. After the Central Committee’s IX Plenary Session, the PCP-SL agreed to intensify its efforts to recruit new workers. Shortly thereafter, during the First National Conference of the Central Committee held between November and December 1979, the Metropolitan Committee began implementing its plan to form «armed groups without weapons.» Finally, between April 2 and 19, 1980, the First Military School, led personally by Guzmán, was held in Lima’s eastern sector. At the end of the event, the participants agreed to carry out the first of six military plans designed by the PCP-SL that would be launched between May 1980 and November 1999.8 These military plans were:

• First plan: Initiate the armed struggle (May 17 to December 1980) • Second plan: Begin the guerrilla war (January 1981 to January 1983) • Third plan: Conquer support bases (May 1983 to September 1986) • Third plan: Conquer support bases (May 1983 to September 1986) • Fourth plan: Develop support bases (November 1986 to July 1989) • Fifth plan: Develop support bases for the conquest of power (August 1989 to August 1992) • Sixth plan: Construct the conquest of power (September 1992 to November 1999)9

8 “The Party, in the Second Plenary Session of the Central Committee, has defined the “development of the militarization of the party through actions; it agrees that through belligerent actions the party will unleash the powerful and recognized vanguard of the working class of Peru, the recognized center of the Peruvian revolution. The Second Plenary Session has agreed to a ‘plan to initiate the armed struggle’ that will solve an unresolved problem: the start of armed struggle” (PCP-SL 1980a). 9 The sixth military plan was mentioned by Guzmán when he was presented to the press on September 24, 1992, after his arrest on September 12. At that time, Guzmán called on his organization to “proceed” with the plan. The end of this plan was supposed to come in November 1999. The arrest of Óscar Ramírez Durand, Feliciano, in 1999 marked the definitive end of this plan. 104

school. I don’t know what they were doing, but the ladies were there and they were

IT dancing to the music with the children. Everyone was happy, dancing huaynos (traditional

highland dance). That was done so there would be noise and no one would hear the FOR screams. I was in the kitchen and there was a little window, so I could see what was happening. There were some people in one meeting and others in a different room. I was hiding in my aunt’s kitchen and saw what happened. We did not suspect this would RESPONSIBLE

happen. A man came, but he did not tell us who he was. He wore a mask. Who could it have been? He asked our names and like idiots we let him write down everything. The THOSE other people with him also had things written down. They had a big book and they AND

called from a list. They called my father; they called out XZ and asked for the person to repeat his name. They called XZ and my father said, «Present, chief.» They said, fine,

TRAGEDY you are being called, run, run, they are calling for you there. He ran to the school and

HE several of them were waiting for him, maybe six or seven of them were waiting for him

: T near the wall. My father had just arrived and one of them grabbed him from behind and

ONE began to kick him. My father tried to defend himself and then they stabbed him. They

ART stabbed him in the back and my father started punching and kicking and then «pow, P pow, pow.» They threw him on the ground and they kicked him. My father did not die, so they stabbed him again in the stomach and the heart. My father cried out, «Ay, no.» He cried out only three times. And then they called another man from the list. He said, ‘Here,’ and ran to the school. They kept calling and the men kept running. Eight people were killed. The eight people were the leaders. I think the president of the peasant patrol was PJ.4

A week later, on December 15, a group of 12 uniformed people arrived when the residents of the Santa Rosa peasant community (an annex of Santa Carmen de Rumichaca) were in a community assembly. They separated the men from the women. At 8 p.m. «[…] they killed my father with no explanation, stabbing him in the head outside the school. They killed my sister the same way.»5 During a third incursion, the subversives killed more than 30 people, including children and infants, and «forced the people to flee into the jungle, because they didn’t want to live in their homes any longer. It was necessary to abandon the village, because they said the repression would come to the zone and that would also make us suffer.»

The PCP-SL takes Chungui by storm According to the testimonies of Chungui residents, the PCP-SL entered the community in 1983. The indoctrination stage ended that year, and the course of events changed in December, when a column of approximately 30 subversives arrived.6 They came right to the school, to our classroom. They introduced themselves, saying, «We have come, we are in the armed struggle and we want you to study. The things being done by the Belaúnde government must be stopped. There is no sugar, there is no kerosene, there is nothing and the cost of living goes up each day. We have to change this; we are the final option. We have to live in equality, and these miserable people, who have money, must die. The people have been chosen to govern.» The teacher left and they [PCP-SL] wrote a hymn on the blackboard so that we could learn it.7

4 CVR. BDI-I-P641. In-depth interview. Oronqoy, Chungui. Woman, age 37, witness to the massacre in Santa Carmen. 5 CVR. Testimony 201316. Chungui, La Mar, June 24, 2002. 6 CVR. Testimony 202695. Chungui, La Mar, July 22, 2002. 7 CVR. BDI-I-P610. In-depth interview. Chungui, Chungui. Man, age 30. 105 DEVELOPMENT OF THE SHINING PATH’S SO-CALLED «PEOPLE’S WAR»

The beginning

On May 17, 1980, in the town of Chuschi in Ayacucho, five armed fighters wearing RGANIZATIONS hoods broke into the building where ballot boxes and voter rolls were being O stored for national elections scheduled for the next day, burning 11 of the boxes. UBVERSIVE The event merited little attention in the daily newspapers in Lima. The PCP-SL, S however, took credit for the action and stated that it was the start of the armed struggle, which included the first phase of the «plan to initiate the armed struggle» mentioned above, as well as the second phase, «begin the guerrilla war.» The first phase of the Shining Path’s war lasted from the attack in Chuschi until December 29, 1982, the day the armed forces were called up to fight subversion in Ayacucho. As will be seen, while actions were carried out in different parts of the country, the first stage of the armed conflict was concentrated in what the PCP-SL called the Principal Regional Committee, which included the provinces in northern Ayacucho, as well as Andahuaylas, in Apurímac, and the department of Huancavelica, except for the Tayacaja province. This stage was marked by the Shining Path’s military advance. It began with the so-called «armed groups without weapons,» which got their weapons by stealing dynamite from isolated mines or taking guns after attacks on police officers. The objective was to form «guerrilla detachments.» In mid-1981, the organization stepped up its actions and began assaulting police stations. On March 3, 1982, cadres attacked the jail in Huamanga, the most important military action during this period. The attack included the main detachments formed by the PCP-SL in the Principal Regional Committee. Attacks on police stations would multiply in the coming months, first in isolated district capitals and later in important towns like Vilcashuamán, where several officers were killed in a second attack on the police station on August 22, 1982. On December 3, 1982, Abimael Guzman’s birthday, the PCP-SL officially launched the «people’s gue- rrilla army» («Ejército Guerrillero Popular,» EGP).10 Shortly thereafter, the armed forces were sent to Ayacucho to take over the anti-subversive effort. On the political front, after the agreements reached during the IX Plenary and the launching of the ILA, the most important decision was the approval of the second military plan, «begin the guerrilla war,» which lasted from January 1981 to January 1983 and consisted of campaigns called «conquer weapons and resources,» «beat the countryside with guerrilla actions» and «strike to advance toward the construction of support bases.» Two decisions in the development of

10 The “people’s guerrilla army” was formed by three kinds of forces: principal, local and base. “An important situation is how President Gonzalo conceives the People’s Guerrilla Army incorporating the people’s militias formed by three forces, principal, local and base, which act mainly in the countryside, and in urban areas as a complement. This is the great leap toward the sea of armed masses” (PCP-SL 1988c). 106

Leoncio, the president of Chungui, was heading to his potato fields on the

IT other side of town when he was detained by a group of subversives on December 14,

8

FOR 1983. He was stabbed to death. The same morning, PCP-SL militants assassinated the justice of the peace in the community of Marco, which is close to Chungui, hanging him from a tree. Finally, Ramiro, considered a well-off businessman, was detained and killed by a group of 20 male and female subversives who used knives and axes to RESPONSIBLE murder him. Later, a member of the PCP-SL, David, told the population that those

THOSE miserable residents, ñam sucarunñ, were dead and had gone to see St. Peter. The PCP-SL then forced the population to celebrate. They distributed the AND merchandise that had belonged to Ramiro, and they took with them clothing, cloth and tape players. Before leaving, they left a local resident, Gregorio, in charge. They

TRAGEDY 9

changed his name to «Comrade Pepe.» They also chose as leaders Justo, who became HE David; Noel, whom they called Carlos; and other young people, such as Modesto. : T Pepe was later identified as the leader who took charge when the community was forced to

ONE 10 retreat. According to information received in Oronqoy and Chungui, the population did ART

P not rebel. Nevertheless, not all resident followed; some hid on the farms, while others fled to the city.

THE PCP-SL AND SCHOOLS IN CHUNGUI

The PCP-SL’s presence in 1983 was not only more aggressive and open, but also more persistent. The subversives overran communities, killed authorities, and eliminated or punished anyone who represented «disorder» (rustlers, womanizers, unfaithful women), the «old state,» illicit wealth or abuse. In Chungui, the community assembly had approved spending community funds to build a secondary school, Túpac Amaru II, in 1978. The person behind the effort, Helí La Rosa, was born in Chungui and believed it was necessary to develop educational opportunities in the community. She invited Chungui natives living in Lima and Ayacucho to return to the community (minutes from community meeting in Chungui, 1977). In both the primary and secondary schools, the presence of teachers linked to the PCP-SL was extremely important for recruiting students and indoctrinating young adults and their families, especially those from the poorer sectors. Besides the teachers, there were young local residents who maintained close ties with urban areas and who supported the PCP-SL’s efforts.

THE «NEW POWER:» COMMUNITY RETREATS AS STRATEGY (1982-1987)

After gaining control of the population by using the methods described above, the Shining Path imposed one of the worst tactics of the two decades of violence – «forced retreats.» These retreats were organized by the PCP-SL not only to confuse security forces, but to create the «support bases» of the «new state.» The population in Oreja de Perro lived through «forced retreats» for nearly five years. Between 1982 and 1987, the residents of Oronqoy, Santa Carmen, Tastabamba, Putucunay and the other annexes were dispersed into groups in the jungle and valley. «They made us pull back quickly and they began to organize with the people they put in charge. That is

8 CVR. Testimony 202660. Chungui, La Mar, September 24, 2002. 9 CVR. Testimony 202695. Chungui, La Mar, July 22, 2002. 10 CVR. Testimony 202660. Chungui, La Mar, September 24, 2002. this plan must be highlighted because they demonstrated the extremely violent 107 path the PCP-SL’s «people’s war» would take. The first decision was the agreement in May 1981 on the so-called «quota» (of blood) necessary for the triumph of the revolution. Guzmán incited his followers to «live their lives on their fingertips» and be willing to die.

Furthermore, he told them that they had to be willing to kill for the revolution RGANIZATIONS and that this had to be done in the most brutal way. This brutality began to O manifest itself almost immediately in the assaults on police stations – throwing UBVERSIVE acid in the faces the officers guarding the police station in Tambo, in Ayacucho’s S La Mar province – and the attacks on state authorities and community leaders. The second decision was to «beat the countryside» (to the PCP-SL, «beat» meant «raze and leave nothing behind»), creating a power vacuum and forming the people’s committees that would constitute the seeds of the PCP-SL’s «new power.» The decision to direct its violence at the peasant society where it wanted to establish its base fueled resentment that the subversive group was unable to contain and created the conditions for rebellion among the people who were supposed to be its main allies — poor Ayacucho peasants.

1980-1982: Surprising progress The PCP-SL was an unexpected enemy for the outgoing and incoming governments. There were warnings about the organization, however, that went unheeded. In October 1979, the military commander in Ayacucho, apparently acting on his own initiative, undertook a special intelligence operation and found evidence of Shining Path influence in Vilcashuamán and Vischongo. There was no evidence of traditional guerrilla activity – training camps or caches of weapons – so he did not pay much attention. In addition, in the months leading up the burning of the ballot boxes in Chuschi, Navy and Army intelligence cables reported subversive propaganda in Pomacocha, Vilcashuamán and Vischongo, as well as the possibility «of acts of sabotage, confrontations with the security forces and probable attacks on C[civil] G[uard] police stations» (Gorriti 1990: 82). Graffiti appeared in Ayacucho and surrounding towns announcing the start of the «people’s war.» In Lima, the PCP-SL announced the war on May 1 through a pamphlet, «Celebration of May 1 by the Revolutionary Proletariat,» which was prepared by the Movement of Workers, Laborers and Peasants. No one paid attention to these warnings, which were overshadowed by the first presidential election campaign in 17 years and months of social agitation. Besides attacks and assaults, ideology was the most important weapon in the Shining Path’s arsenal. The militants who embraced the party line did not need weapons. That is clear from a Central Committee document that states that its military organization «is based on men, not weapons» (PCP-SL 1989b). That explains one of the banners of the ILA, which claimed that the party was «beginning the war unarmed,» and that the militants were responsible for procuring their own weapons. The party had such excessive confidence in its ideology that it believed that modern weapons were unnecessary for the «people’s war.» On August 8, 1980, three months after burning the ballots in Chuschi, 108

how the ‘retreats’ started, and they spread us out here and there. We were completely 11 IT organized.»

FOR The PCP-SL ordered the population in Oreja de Perro to organize in four groups, which were supposed to spread to the surrounding areas. During the «retreat» we had to leave. For example, those of us who lived in Oronqoy joined

RESPONSIBLE those living in the lower area. We were organized in four groups, and each one was in a different place. Before, we all lived on our own land in Puquiora, Jabas Huayco, Jerona,

THOSE Sarachacra and Ccanjahua, but we also had our houses in town. In the «retreats,» we were separated from our place. We were sent to Sarachacra, Ccanjahua, Puquiora and Accopampa, AND together with the people from those places. There was a political commander and a military commander in each group.12 TRAGEDY A «retreat» was organized in Chungui two years later, in February 1984, when the HE Army was preparing to launch an incursion in the zone. : T ONE

The soldiers began to come to the town [Chungui]. The Shining Path told us that we

ART had to escape to the hills and jungle. Some people began to flee to the jungle. In P 1984, we began the «retreats.» It was the month when we harvested the potato crop – in June. They made us «retreat» during the middle of the harvest.13

The PCP-SL organization during the «retreats»

Within the Shining Path’s organizational structure, the population recruited in the «retreats» was organized in «support bases,» which represented the PCP-SL’s form of government in the zone. The population became what PCP-SL called «the masses,» which were the people’s support bases for the PCP-SL government. In addition, these families provided «local forces» for the party militants. All the people in the masses were treated equally. Couples, widows and single mothers slept together with the children who were not yet old enough to form part of the «local force.» The women were in charge of caring for orphans. «As in other communities, there were abandoned children. When their parents died, we gave them food and clothing.»14 The «principal force» was a traveling group that supervised the actions of the «local force» and the «masses» throughout the zone. This group was also made up of young people, but the leaders were not from the area. They were «strangers,» as the people in Chungui would say. In general, they had only a few makeshift weapons and they did not wear uniforms. They tended to arrive with food and clothing for the «masses,» which they obtained in raids on other communities. These goods were handed out when they arrived to supervise the development of the armed conflict in the zone. We wore the little clothing we brought with us and the clothing that the group traveling with Comrade Aurelio gave us. They gave us clothes and sandals. Comrade Aurelio would give them to the commander of our group and he would hand them out as needed.15

11 CVR. BDI-I-P638. In-depth interview. Huallhua, Anco. Man, age 58. 12 CVR. BDI-I-P657. In-depth interview. Oronqoy, Chungui. Man. 13 CVR. BDI-I-P606. In-depth interview. Chungui, Chungui. Man, age 30. 14 CVR. BDI-I-P608. In-depth interview. Huallhua, Anco. Man, age 35. 15 CVR. BDI-I-P606. In-depth interview, Chungui, Chungui. Man, age 30. the PCP-SL leadership evaluated the first few months of the «armed struggle.» 109 Guzmán exuded enthusiasm as he underscored the successes:

The Initiation Plan, its application and the first results of the first actions are brilliant and a resounding success of transcendental importance and

repercussion […] the application of the plan to start the armed struggle […] RGANIZATIONS

has shaken the country, placing the Party at the center of the class struggle, O in the center of the political arena […] we have entered a superior form of

struggle, the armed struggle, to destroy the old order and build a new society UBVERSIVE S (PCP-SL 1980c).

His discourse took on messianic tones when he talked about the future of the war:

It will be long but fruitful; cruel but brilliant; hard but vigorous and omnipotent. It is said that the world is transformed by the barrel of a gun, and we are doing it […]. For all Communist Parties there comes the time to assume their role as vanguard of the proletariat with arms to tear away the centuries, let out a resounding war cry and storm the heavens, the shadows and the night. The old and rotting walls of the reactionaries begin to crumble, crack and bend like leaves in the tender and new flames; young but crushing bonfires. The people’s war is starting to sweep away the old order to inevitably destroy it, and from the old will rise the new, and, like a glorious Phoenix, communism will be born forever (PCP-SL 1980c).

The state did not have a planned response to the first stage, mainly because of an inadequate analysis of the problem. While some members of the armed forces blamed the legal left for the problem, left-wing politicians accused the head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Army Intelligence Service of using the dynamite attacks to orchestrate a campaign against them. The ruling party insisted that the violence was part of an international conspiracy. The PCP-SL intensified its actions in 1981, including carrying out assaults to obtain weapons. The sense of urgency in the police forces was reinforced early in the year when it became clear that rural police stations were quickly becoming the principal targets of Shining Path attacks. At the time, the PCP-SL was a highly disciplined organization with an efficient communication network and centralized leadership. The PCP-SL began carrying out its second military plan, «begin the gue- rrilla war,» in January 1981.11 Also known as the «the great wave,» this plan was carried out in two stages. The first wave of the second military plan involved opening «guerrilla zones to serve as support bases,» while the second wave was called «begin the guerrilla war.» The first wave ended in April 1981. Attacks moved from targeting state offices in rural communities to downing high-tension

11 There are different names for the plan in existing bibliographic information. “Begin the guerri- lla war” was the name used by Guzmán in an interview with the CVR at the Callao Naval Base on October 21, 2002. 110

Instructions were handed down through a complex network of commanders, from

IT the central leadership through the regional and zone committees. The groups were

FOR led by a political commander and a military commander who named the people responsible for production, organization and oversight. There was also a person in charge of the women. The men were responsible for clearing the jungle to grow corn, squash and sweet potatoes. The population also began collecting fruit in the jungle, a RESPONSIBLE task that was also performed by children. The fields were tended collectively and the

THOSE production distributed equally among all the members of the «retreat.» In theory, no one received more than another, not even the commanders. «The commanders had AND us bring food, told us what to plant and sent us to other places to deliver food to the mobile group. We had lookouts to let us know what was happening [...]. There was

TRAGEDY 16

also someone in charge of the organization.» According to another testimony, «We HE also planted on the outskirts of Chapi. After setting up lookouts on the edges of the : T land, we burned off the brush to plant corn and squash. That is what we ate. We also

ONE 17 planted cassava and sweet potatoes.» ART

P The children between ages 8 and 10 were called «pioneer children.» They helped their mothers fetch water, food and firewood for the camps. They also attended «people’s schools.» One of the leaders taught them songs about the internal armed conflict, as well as how to draw a hammer and sickle, the symbol of the revolution, and strategies for escaping a military incursion. All of the classes were oral and some graphics were used, because most of the children did not know how to read or write. Yes, I was with the pioneer boys and girls. They taught us songs and constantly told us that we would take power and that that military would kill us if we escaped.18

They did not teach us how to read or write; everything was verbal. Only they [subversive leaders] had a notebook for drawing. They drew pictures of how to get away from the military, how to dodge bullets, those kinds of things.19 From an early age, children were taught about confrontations with the security forces. The PCP-SL became a kind of protective blanket for them. When they reached the age of 12, boys and girls were separated from their parents and incorporated into the «local force,» where they received training to join the «principal force.» Only the best prepared and the strongest were recruited and trained to tolerate the tough conditions that they would endure as part of the «principal force.» This group consisted mainly of young adults, adolescents and some boys and girls of about age 12. They traveled through the jungle with the political and military commanders and slept in camps where they were tended to by the «masses.» They slept apart from the «masses,» men and women together. They called this knifing. «We had to sleep close together, man, woman, man, woman. That is what they called ‘knifing.’»20 A pregnant woman received no special treatment. She would be taken to a cave when she was about to give birth, and then returned to the «masses.» If the woman was part

16 CVR. BDI-I-P613. In-depth interview. Huallhua, Anco. Man, age 60. 17 CVR. BDI-I-P616. In-depth interview. Chungui, Chungui. Woman, age 50. 18 CVR. BDI-I-P667. In-depth interview. Oronqoy, Chungui. Man, age 38. 19 CVR. BDI-I-P606. In-depth interview. Chungui, Chungui. Man, age 30. 20 CVR. BDI-I-P665. In-depth interview. Oronqoy, Chungui. Man, age 33. electricity towers in the Mantaro Interconnected Hydroelectric System in the 111 central highlands, the country’s main source of power. The Shining Path began the second wave, which lasted from May through July 1981 and included three phases and three objectives: «conquer weapons and resources,» «beat the countryside with guerrilla actions» and «strike the enemy.» According to Guzmán, the party was surprised at the ease with which RGANIZATIONS it was able to create a power vacuum in the vast area where it operated. This O «success,» however, forced the PCP-SL to make a decision that was not originally UBVERSIVE included in the ILA and which distanced it from the Maoist experience by S creating «people’s committees» in areas where «power vacuums» emerged. A third wave was undertaken between August and September, basically replicating the characteristics of the first and second waves. At the fourth plenary session of the Central Committee in May 1981, the PCP-SL specified the initial plans for the development of the «guerrilla war» and agreed to intensify the levels of violence. If the goal was to create a power vacuum, then it was necessary to apply a plan of selective assassinations. In addition, if the number of actions had to be increased, it was necessary for militants to become bolder and take on greater challenges. This referred to «the quota» that had to be paid. The plan also included inciting the state to respond disproportionately to the PCP-SL’s actions as a way of unmasking «its anti- democratic character.» By the end of 1981, the cadres in the PCP-SL’s detachments had acquired a certain level of military experience. On October 11, 50 people led by armed subversives overran the police station in Tambo, in Ayacucho’s La Mar province, killing three officers and stealing two machine guns and three revolvers. The call to obtain weapons by «striking» at the police forces was carried out in the countryside and cities, where officers were killed for their revolvers. On October 12, the government declared a state of emergency in five of Ayacucho’s seven provinces (Huamanga, Huanta, Cangallo, La Mar and Víctor Fajardo), suspended constitutional guarantees related to personal liberties and security for 60 days, and dispatched members of an anti-subversive police brigade known as the Sinchis to Ayacucho. The state continued with a disinformation campaign. Interior Vice Minister Héctor López Martínez stated that the terrorist groups had international support and blamed the subversive actions not only on the PCP-SL, but also on the PCP Pukallacta and MIR Stage IV, an organization that had ceased to exist in 1979. In a second review of the war in February 1982, Abimael Guzmán cited as important achievements of the «people’s war» having forged the temper of the party, the formation and construction of an armed forces led by the party, and «the great quantity and increasing quality» of the armed actions. The country became aware of the magnitude of the problem with the attack on the jail in Huamanga on March 2, 1982. According to Guzmán, the original idea was to coordinate prison breaks around the country, but it was impossible to coordinate a project of that scope. Nevertheless, the action allowed 304 inmates (of whom approximately 70 were PCP-SL militants) to escape, including Hildebrando Pérez Huarancca and Edith Lagos. It was the most important 112

of the «local force,» she would live with the «masses» during her pregnancy, but

IT return to the force after the child was born. «The women in the jungle would give

FOR birth in caves, and often, because of malnutrition, the children would be born retarded or would not survive.»21 As the violence worsened, communication among the three PCP-SL forces deteriorated, particularly between the «principal force» and the «local force.» As RESPONSIBLE time went by, the visits by the «principal force» became more sporadic, which

THOSE allowed the «local force» and the «masses» to gain more autonomy and power. According to the interviews, most abuses came from the «local force.» These AND were abuses against their own people, often ending in executions with rustic weapons, grenades or shotguns. Personal animosities and family squabbles were TRAGEDY

also cause for executions in the name of the Shining Path. In addition, sexual HE violence, theoretically prohibited and punishable by death, became more frequent. : T The PCP-SL imposed fierce control and order. The party did not forgive any form of ONE

betrayal or suspicion of betrayal, and there was no room to question the «new order.» ART P The [PCP-SL] would come to see if we were following orders, if we were well organized, if everyone was eating the same thing. They came to see if we were making mistakes. Those who made mistakes were tied up and killed.22

I was concerned because the comrades called an assembly and those who did not attend would die. I went to the assembly very fearful. My husband and my father did not go, and they were whipped until they became ill. Later, we had to cook together, because if they found you cooking alone you were admonished and punished.23

Life in the «retreats» was hell. One witness, who was 7 years old at the time, tells how the «masses» suffered more than the «principal force» or the «local force» as they tried to survive and escape the security forces:

I was very sad. There were very few of us left in my base, and we escaped to the highlands where we ate potatoes. When we found out the Sinchis had left, the survivors returned to Achira, where the Shining Path militants came back to organize us again. They told us: «We are many, like the sand in the river and the soldiers are like the big rocks in the river.» The organization of the masses in my base was divided, with the women in charge of cooking and bringing food to the adults who worked in the fields. The adults and the young people participated in the principal forces and were also farmers. We all worked for the collective; there was no individualism. The older children helped where they could, and the younger ones were taught to read and write by the Shining Path’s SF. He let us sing and play. I was seven years old at the time. What hurts to remember is how the masses died, because they could not escape from the military attacks. The members of local and principal forces were almost never killed. The young people over 12 and the adults over 40 had the easiest time escaping from the military, but they could not fight. There were only 20 combatants armed with sticks, slingshots, two rifles and two

21 CVR. BDI-I-P643. Focus group of women. Oronqoy, Chungui. Woman, age 60. 22 CVR. BDI-I-P633. In-depth interview. Huallhua, Anco. Woman, age 60. 23 CVR. BDI-I-P608. In-depth interview. Huallhua, Anco. Woman, age 35. 24 CVR. Testimony 202014. Chungui, La Mar, March 22, 2003. military action undertaken by the PCP-SL at the time and was carried out with 113 surprising efficiency. While the attack was under way, soldiers stationed in Ayacucho remained at the Los Cabitos base on the outskirts of Huamanga, awaiting orders from Lima to intervene. The call never came. The security forces responded with violence. Republican Guard (Guardia

Republicana, GR) officers assassinated three detained PCP-SL militants who were RGANIZATIONS recovering from wounds at the hospital in Huamanga. In April 1982, the O government ordered inmates arrested on terrorism charges to be transferred to UBVERSIVE El Frontón, an island prison off the coast of Lima, to prevent other assaults like S the one in Huamanga.

Lima: Difficult complement Documents from the PCP-SL show that during the IX Plenary in 1979, militants in the Metropolitan Lima Committee were opposed to launching the armed struggle, but «[…] the party [...] smashed fully and completely this opportunistic right-wing line» (PCP-SL 1986a). The party was militarized after that purge. In the urban areas, this meant building groups without weapons and «[…] from these burning seeds will spring burning sunflowers.» The most important work in the cities would be carried out by a «unified front.» To do this, the PCP-SL proposed recruiting residents through «generating organizations,» such as the Grassroots Women’s Movement, Classist Movement of Workers and Laborers, Teachers’ Movement, People’s Intellectual Movement and Movement of People’s Artists. It was also at this time that the party created the People’s Support Committee (Socorro Popular), initially conceived to provide medical and legal assistance to PCP-SL militants. The first phase of this Shining Path campaign began to take shape in Lima in 1982. Among the actions that created the most commotion in the capital were the attacks on the high-tension electricity towers, which caused widespread blackouts. Through these and other attacks, the Metropolitan Committee gained importance in the organization and began to expand its actions by strengthening its presence in universities and extending its network to Lima’s shantytowns, as well as in the workers’ unions in industries along the Central Highway, the main route from the city to the central highlands. Despite these actions, Guzmán believed that the so-called «Metro» was not sufficiently committed to the armed struggle. This was reinforced by organizational problems and the inability to prepare large-scale attacks, demonstrated by some significant failures. The «Metro» was still a problem for the organization.

The «new power» in the countryside and the participation of the armed forces The first campaign, «beat the countryside (Strike 1),» ended around October 1982. It was part of the second military plan, «begin the guerrilla war,» which was launched in July under the banner, «fight against the exploitation of landowners and local power, and annihilate the forces of reaction.» From 114

shotguns. That is how the masses died until only a few of us were left.24 IT

FOR

Women with children could not hide or escape quickly. «Escaping with children was harder. They caught you and they killed you.»25 The situation in the «retreats» got much worse when the soldiers arrived to eliminate them. RESPONSIBLE When they began the search, we would hide in the jungle, in holes, caverns, lagoons, etc. We faced all kinds of hardships. In the end, only a few of us survived THOSE and we returned to our village, even though they were searching for us and we were AND

wanted. Later, we fled to the cities. Only a few people have returned home over the years. Many people died of hunger or were shot in the head, the body, etc., during those forced marches out of our villages. Some people would fall when we had to TRAGEDY

run, breaking their legs. They would die. Others lost their arms, their hands because HE of the bullet wounds. We were injured and malnourished. I can tell you that even : T today I am still malnourished; we do not eat well and have little blood. The women ONE

in the jungle had to give birth in the caves. Because of malnutrition, many of the

ART children were born retarded. The children who did survive are still unhealthy and P they continue to suffer from the effects of the malnutrition. Many people’s children died of gunshot wounds from the soldiers and many parents were assassinated by the subversives. Others died when we were escaping; they fell into the rivers and were swept away. We went to different villages with nothing, with only the clothes on our backs. We didn’t have blankets or other clothes; that’s how we would arrive. The people from our village who returned earlier took advantage of our absence and kept our animals and the things we left behind.26 The infants were malnourished and cried from hunger, so the leaders of the «masses» and the «local forces» decided to eliminate them. In several of the camps in Oreja de Perro, mothers were forced to kill their own children. Some smothered their children by holding them tightly against their chests. If a woman refused to follow the order, the camp’s political leader would take the child by the feet and slam his or her head against a rock. In other cases, they tied a rope around the neck and strangled the child. The infants were killed because their cries might attract military patrols. The mother had to kill her own child. She killed him in Patawasi. It was nighttime, and I don’t know where they left him or if they even buried him [...] he was only a baby, maybe about six months old [...] He cried a lot. They called the mother and said, «Pathetic woman, quiet your son» so he wouldn’t alert the soldiers. They forced her to make him stop crying. The woman held him tightly against her breast and the baby smothered. He stopped breathing.27

THE ARMY’S PRESENCE

The Army carried out its first incursion in Chungui in March 1984, and a military base was established the following month.28 The PCP-SL did not achieve control over the population. Several families returned to the community immediately after the first Army incursion and organized a civil defense patrol to combat the subversives. Each time they went on patrol, the

25 CVR. BDI-P633. In-depth interview. Huallhua, Anco. Woman, age 60. 26 CVR BDI-I-P643.Focus group with women. Oronqoy, Chungui. 27 CVR. BDI-I-P606. In-depth interview. Chungui, Chungui. Man, age 30. 28 CVR. Testimony 204052. November 1982 to March 1983, the PCP-SL carried out its second campaign, 115 «shake the countryside (Strike 2),» which included distributing confiscated land and forcing peasant communities to plant collectively. The subversive organization’s actions, particularly the attacks on the Civil Guard police stations, forced the state to pull back from vast areas of the

Ayacucho countryside, as well as from some areas of Huancavelica and Apurímac. RGANIZATIONS The PCP-SL began to present itself as the new local power. O Between 1980 and 1982, the PCP-SL formed a large number of people’s UBVERSIVE committees, «the seed of the New State,» which organized the communities’ S social and economic life and attempted to impose a new autarkic economy. Beginning in 1982, the PCP-SL prohibited farmers from selling products and closed some farmers’ markets, such as the one in Lirio, in the province of Huanta, and the market in Huancasancos. At its Second National Conference, held in 1982, the PCP-SL proposed:

[...] with the formation of people’s committees we have taken another step in establishing new productive relations, collective farming, collective work and collective harvest. One thing is distributing lands, another is collective work and in the country there is a tradition of this, the ayni, and with this we are introducing the concept of mutual help and planting socialism. The distribution of land happens when there is a certain level of grassroots support. We have proposed organizing the entire community in collective work by convincing them that it is right. There are individual and communal lands and both are worked collectively, but whoever has more land has to pay a kind of tax and set aside part of production for the poorest families and another part to feed the army. We have suggested how to improve production, because the peasants have to see the benefits of the revolution, planting prickly pear, improving seeds, cochineal and fertilizer. There is a Production Commissary to look after the problems [of] commerce, bartering, plowing and improving feed for guinea pigs. We have proposed that the Support Bases be self- sufficient and shown that the countryside supplies all that is needed to live, what are missing are matches and kerosene, for the autarkic economy. Take over agriculture and livestock production. Where there is a lack of land, open new lands and build terraces for planting. We can develop an economy and maintain the New State based on our efforts. A policy directly related to the war.

The people’s committees (Co. Po.) were formed by several commissaries. The secretary commissary «leads the Co. Po., meets with the other four commissaries to establish the government plan and each carries out the agreements.» The security commissary «plans and proposes [the] defense plan for the Co. Po., organizes the security detail in daytime and nighttime shifts that include men, women and children [...].» The production commissary «is in charge of planning and organizing collective planting and distributing seeds.» The community affairs commissary applies «elemental justice to resolve problems of damages and conflicts, and impose sanctions.» The people’s organizations commissary «organizes the generating organizations in the communities» (PCP- 116

soldiers would be sandwiched between members of the civil defense patrol, who

IT would form the columns in front of and behind the soldiers. When they brought in

FOR someone from the jungle who had been arrested – in the cases when they were brought in still alive – the entire population of Chungui was forced to line up and insult and hit the prisoner. If they refused, they were punished. The men who participated in the civil defense patrol in Chungui – all men and RESPONSIBLE boys over age 14 had to participate— state that the worst years of the armed conflict

THOSE were between 1984 and 1988, especially because of the number of extrajudicial executions by the Army. The members of the civil defense patrols constantly attempted AND to avoid responsibility for those actions, blaming the violence on the soldiers or the local residents who were killed. TRAGEDY The captain blamed us and as punishment sent me off with two terrorists [PCP-SL HE militants]. They were hung from a tree and we started to light logs, sticks and trunks : T to burn them, but they wouldn’t die. They were naked, with their hands tied. That ONE was our punishment because we let some terrorists escape.29 ART P According to residents, Captain Samuray — who was in charge of the base in 1985— was one of the cruelest and most violent commanders of the base in Chungui. The first president and vice president of the civil defense patrol, Maurino Quispe and José Jaycur, respectively, were killed in 1985 on Captain Samuray’s orders. The reasons are unclear, but the people in Chungui believe that Captain Samuray ordered them killed because he suspected that they were subversives. The communities of Oreja de Perro were also the scene of incursions by the Sinchis based in Andarapa, who entered the zone sporadically after 1982 to supervise the system of community lookouts, which had disappeared from most communities after executions carried out by the PCP-SL in 1983. The lookouts existed only in Mollebamba, where they continued until they were transformed into a system of civil defense patrols. A military base for the Apurímac region was established in the area in 1985. Another base was established in Pallqas in 1986, but it was moved to Chapi in 1987 after a PCP-SL attack. Between February and March 1984, soldiers from the Army based in Andahuaylas entered Oreja de Perro through Mollebamba, where they organized a civil defense committee. From then on, the Army and members of the Mollebamba civil defense patrol carried out systematic incursions in Oreja de Perro. Numerous massacres and razings of whole villages followed. Not a community or annex in the area was spared from the military incursions and what they implied – theft of property and animals, extrajudicial executions and the destruction of homes. According to testimonies, the violence came from the soldiers and the civil defense patrol members. The people from Mollebamba said, «Kill them. Kill the thieves, kill the terrorists who stole our food and massacred the people.» That’s what the people from Mollebamba said.30

People remember that the Army’s attitude changed after Army Major Miguel Semi- nario31 was named head of the base in Chapi between October and December 1987. They said: «This major is from Ayacucho; he doesn’t allow soldiers to beat the

29 CVR. BDI-I-P602. In-depth interview. Chungui, Chungui. Man, age 60. 30 CVR. BDI-I-P619. In-depth interview. Hierbabuena, Chungui. Man, age 38. 31 CVR. Testimony 202678. 32 CVR. Testimony 202678. Chungui, La Mar, November 5, 2002. SL 1989a). 117 In the area of Huancasancos, the production commissary led the «razings»12 and distributed the goods and animals, which the families were forced to receive:

[…] it was obligatory [to participate in the distribution] if you didn’t receive RGANIZATIONS

the meat, you were marked. We would go out of fear, men, women and even O children. We all got something, but it depended; for example, the ones who had fewer sheep got two kilos of meat. They knew everything; some got one UBVERSIVE kilo, and others got half a kilo.13 S

The largest PCP-SL offensive in the early years of the internal conflict came in July 1982: 34 terrorist actions and five massive incursions in small communities, attacks on municipalities in Ayacucho and the assassination of the mayor and a businessman in Hualla, Víctor Fajardo, who were accused of being «snitches.» Cadres attacked the GC police station in Vilcashuamán on August 22. Seven officers were killed in the five-hour battle. Edith Lagos was killed on September 2 in Umacca, in the department of Apurímac, in a shootout with members of the Republican Guard. The auxiliary bishop of Ayacucho celebrated her funeral Mass with approximately 10,000 people on hand for her burial. In the following years, Lagos, who was 19 when she died, would become a kind of icon in the country’s south-central region. The growing sense that the government was losing control, which was fed by the assassinations of public officials and the continuing assaults on police stations in Ayacucho, led to the decision to involve the armed forces in combating subversion. On December 27, 1982, President Fernando Belaúnde gave a 72-hour ultimatum «for the terrorists to lay down their weapons» before the armed forces were given control of the emergency zone. The PCP-SL did not comply. General Roberto Clemente Noel Moral was named political-military commander of the new emergency zone, and on December 31, 1982, soldiers took up positions in Ayacucho. The Navy, under the leadership of Commander Juan Carlos Vega Llona, was given control over the provinces of Huanta and La Mar. The cruelest stage of the internal armed conflict was about to begin in the south-central highlands.

The PCP-SL between 1983 and 1985 The PCP-SL’s first two military plans – «initiate the armed struggle» and «begin the guerrilla war» — were carried out between May 1980 and January 1983. In two years, the PCP-SL had established a solid presence in the Ayacucho countryside and a significant number of social sectors, particularly peasants, either accepted or were neutral to its radical, autarkic plan. They were persuaded by the subversives’ message about justice, without imagining the levels of violence

12 “In striking,” according to a PCP-SL document, “the key is to raze. And razing means leaving nothing behind“ (PCP-SL 1982). 13 CVR. Testimony from a 45-year-old resident of Sacsamarca. 118

detainees. He brought in the people who had fled to the jungle and repopulated Chapi 32

IT before December 25, 1987.»

FOR

The central mission of the security forces was no longer to execute anyone they came across in the «retreats.» The new mission was to save and rescue the residents [from the PCP-SL].33 RESPONSIBLE

The soldiers came from Chungui, Mollebamba, and the civilians [civil defense patrols] also came from the same places and annexes. They captured all of us, but they THOSE

treated us well. They said to us, «Stop. Do not run away, we are not going to kill

AND you.» They took us to the fields, where the potato crop was ready. We had a place

near the fields that we had built, and the women began to cook so we could eat potatoes. That’s when we began to recover from our hunger. Next they took us to TRAGEDY

Chapi, where there were helicopters that transported the soldiers. After that we HE were happy, because they didn’t kill us. They took statements from the subversive

: T leaders and then took them away in the helicopters. They were taken prisoner and

ONE 34

sent to jails in different places. ART P As of 1987, there were different factors that influenced the Shining Path’s failure in the zone. The population that had been forced to live in the «retreats» with the PCP- SL, the «masses» as well as the «local force,» began deserting and showing up at different military bases. Living conditions in the jungle had become unbearable. The children died of hunger and thirst. They ate only squash seeds and raw corn, and they didn’t have salt. Malnutrition was chronic and death frequent. The Army began to make significant incursions. They took charge of the people in the jungle and protected them from the peasant patrols, which often wanted to kill people, accusing them of being subversives. That was prohibited by the military leaders. The base in Chapi was deactivated in 1988 and the people returned to Andahuaylas. A re-population program began in 1992 so that people could return to Yerbabuena, Putucunay, Belén de Chapi, Oronqoy, Santa Carmen, Chillihua and Tastabamba.35 According to data recorded by the CVR, 1,381 people were killed or disappeared in Chungui between 1980 and 2000, representing nearly 17 percent of the entire population registered in the 1981 census. Comparative data from the 1981 and the 1993 censuses in the district of Chungui show a 47.5 percent decline in the population, from 8,257 people in 1981 to 4,338 in 1993. In the surrounding rural areas, the population decreased by 51 percent, from 7,682 people in 1981 to 3,797 in 1993. There are no exact statistics on how many of these people were displaced to other areas and how many were assassinated or disappeared.

33 CVR. Testimony 202660. Chungui, La Mar, September 24, 2002. 34 CVR. BDI-I-P606. In-depth interview. Chungui, La Mar. Woman, age 30. 35 CVR. Testimony 201316. Chungui, La Mar, June 24, 2002. to which they would be subjected in the coming years. 119 The Navy took control of the province of Huanta on January 21, 1983. One of the first steps it took there was to group peasants in communities and organize Civil Defense Committees similar to the Strategic Hamlets organized by the U.S. Army in Vietnam or the Civil Self-Defense Patrols in Guatemala. In the majority of cases, the measure provoked resentment among the peasants, RGANIZATIONS not only because of the economic uncertainty created by having to move, but O also because of the profound rivalries that existed between communities that UBVERSIVE were now forced to live together. S The PCP-SL did not retreat, despite the violent anti-subversive strategy launched by the military. On the contrary, it decided to take a further step because Guzmán believed that the organization had won over a solid social base among peasants in the previous two years:

How come they were unable to hit us hard, even with such a genocidal policy? How can 1983 and 1984 be explained? [...] The relationship with the people has to be examined, the kind of relation that existed.14

The PCP-SL’s Central Committee met in March 1983 and agreed to move forward with the third military plan, «conquer support bases.» Four political tasks were decided at the meeting: general reorganization of the party, formation of the «people’s guerrilla army,» formation of the organizing committee of the People’s Republic of the New Democracy, and formation of the Revolutionary Front to Defend the People. In other words, the PCP-SL decided to begin building its «new society.»

In the Central Committee in March 1983, President Gonzalo further developed the idea of building the Front-New State. He proposed levels at which the New State would be organized: People’s Committees, Support Bases and the People’s Republic of the New Democracy. The work of the Support Bases and the Organizing Committee of the People’s Republic of the New Democracy are leadership, planning and organization, and each base drafts its own specific plan. The People’s Committees are the pillars of the New State, they are Committees of the Unified Front, run by commissaries who take on state roles and are elected in Representative Assemblies and are subject to removal. They remain clandestine and operate with commissions directed by the Party and use the principle of «thirds» – one-third communists, one- third peasants and one-third progressives – and are supported by the army. They apply the dictatorship of the proletariat, coercion and security by firmly and decisively exercising the violence necessary to defend the New Power from its enemies and protect the rights of the people. The People’s Committees constitute the Support Bases and the Support Bases are the foundation that the will support the People’s Republic of the New

14 CVR. Interview. Callao Naval Base, October 29, 2002. 120

THE CASE OF THE ASHÁNINKAS OF THE CENTRAL JUNGLE IT

FOR

RESPONSIBLE

Peru’s central jungle region is the ancestral home of the Asháninka, Yánesha and THOSE

Nomatsiguenga indigenous peoples. According to its research, the CVR estimates

AND that of the 55,000 Asháninkas, approximately 6,000 were killed, 10,000 were displaced

from their communities in the Ene, Tambo and Perené River Valleys, and nearly 5,000 were enslaved by the PCP-SL. In addition, between 30 and 40 Asháninka communities TRAGEDY disappeared during the internal armed conflict.1 HE : T CENES OF THE INTERNAL ARMED CONFLICT IN THE CENTRAL JUNGLE ONE S

ART P Four large areas in the central jungle region felt the impact of the internal armed conflict in different forms. The first was the Gran Pajonal plains (Ucayali), home of the Asháninka, where the PCP-SL was categorically rejected. The second included the province of Oxapampa (Pasco), which was home to Asháninkas and colonists. The MRTA had a strong presence in that area, but in the early 1990s, MRTA militants assassinated Alejandro Calderón, the pinkátzari (highest-ranking leader) and president of the Asháninka organization Apatyawaka Nampitsi Asháninka (ANAP). He was killed for his alleged participation in the 1965 murder of Guillermo Lobatón, a MIR guerrilla leader at the time. Calderón’s death led to the formation of the «Asháninka Army.» The MRTA admitted its mistake and pulled back from the region, carrying out only sporadic attacks in urban areas and against Army bases. The third zone included the province of Chanchamayo (Junín), which was home to colonists, Asháninkas and Yáneshas. The MRTA was also very active there, but was eventually displaced by the PCP-SL. The PCP-SL presence, however, was mainly through sporadic incursions. The fourth zone included the province of Satipo (Junín), where the PCP-SL arrived early in the conflict. The Satipo zone can be divided into three sub zones:

• The first basically encompasses the districts of Río Negro, Satipo and Mazamari, and includes the principal cities connected by the Marginal Highway and the rural hinterland. There are numerous Asháninka and Nomatsiguenga indigenous communities, as well as settlements of colonists. • The second includes the district of San Martín de Pangoa, which is connected to the district of Río Tambo through the upper Ene River basin. The largest number of Nomatsiguenga communities is located here. • The third is the district of Río Tambo, where 97 percent of the population is Asháninka. The Ene and Tambo rivers link all the communities. The Ene River connects Ayacucho to the central jungle. It is the continuation of the Apurímac River, which runs through the Ayacucho jungle region. This text focuses on events in the area of the Ene and Tambo rivers.

1 In 1995, the National Human Rights Coordinating Committee published a report on the disappearance of these communities. Democracy, which is in formation (PCP-SL 1988c). 121 The party also defined the primary and secondary lines of the struggle, which was how the PCP-SL columns would spread throughout the country with the objective of maintaining the organization’s presence in areas where the armed forces had assumed control over the population. They also defined «four forms of struggle and eleven procedures» and agreed to «defend, develop and RGANIZATIONS construct the new power.»15 Plans were outlined to expand the party’s work by O opening the Huallaga Front and broadening the struggle in urban areas. UBVERSIVE While the armed forces launched an energetic anti-subversive campaign S in Ayacucho, Guzmán decided to install «people’s committees» and replace local authorities with commissaries as the foundation for creating the new power. The «people’s committees» in each area formed a «support base» and the network of support bases formed the «People’s Republic of the New Democracy in formation.» According to Guzmán, the committees were clandestine structures to protect the party militants.

The police, unprepared for these conditions, were defeated. The first operation police officers carried out against us, an operation carried out in intervals, was condemned to failure because of the amount of territory and the limited number of officers involved. This forced the police to leave the area. [...] What happened next? A power vacuum. What did we do? That was discussed at a party event, because everything was determined that way in an organization such as ours. We proposed the creation of a state model. [...] But because we did not have sufficient forces to manage that, because it involved territory the size of a department, the power was clandestine. It was a clandestine committee, it was not power that was openly installed. That is how it began and functions were assigned. It was a necessity dictated by circumstances.16

In some cases, the authorities imposed by the PCP-SL had to prepare the population for the military response the party leadership expected. This implied building an infrastructure where the peasants could seek refugee when they retreated. The decision to form the «Organizing Committee of the People’s Republic of the New Democracy» indicates that the PCP-SL did not believe it was facing state offensive that would defeat them. On the contrary, it was at this time that Guzmán became «President Gonzalo,» the name he would use in all party documents and the way party members would refer to him from them on. The Shining Path began to build its «new state» and «President Gonzalo» was the undisputed leader of the new republic in formation.17 In addition, Guzmán was

15 In a plenary session in 1984, the party outlined 11 procedures: guerrilla action, counter- reestablishment, harvests, razings, ambushes, sabotage of highway system, disruption of trunk lines, disruption of airports, psychological war, harassment to break movements, and selective terrorism. The four forms of struggle were agitation and propaganda, sabotage, selective annihilation, and guerrilla combat. 16 CVR. Interview. Callao Naval Base, January 27, 2003. 17 According to diverse testimonies, it was Guzmán’s wife, Augusta la Torre, Nora, who defended the proposal that he be named “president” of the new state in formation. 122

THE FIRST PCP-SL ACTIONS IT

FOR Many Asháninka families began moving down the Apurímac River toward the Ene River starting in the 1960s to escape pressure from colonists in the jungle of Ayacucho. Years later, another wave of colonists arrived to plant coca along the left bank of the river, forming the Ene River Colonization Committee. The first PCP-SL cadres arrived RESPONSIBLE with the committee, fleeing the military counteroffensive launched in Ayacucho in the

THOSE early 1980s. Between 1985 and 1988, PCP-SL commanders began killing alleged criminals AND and «snitches» among the colonists in the Ene Valley. The Asháninkas’ reaction was a combination of fear and attraction, because they considered many of the colonists TRAGEDY

land invaders and «delinquents» who had brought drug trafficking, prostitution and HE abuse to the area. The Shining Path expelled a group of drug traffickers from the valley : T during those early years. ONE As in other areas, the PCP-SL leaders initially approached Asháninka teachers ART

P and community leaders, who had higher levels of education, contact with urban areas and mobility throughout the zone. The visits became much more frequent in 1988, and the PCP-SL’s presence was widespread and open by 1989. The commanders arrived each weekend to coordinate and «raise awareness» among community authorities.

OTICA, THE ROLE OF THE LEADERS AND INITIAL ATTRACTION TO THE PCP-SL

HP, a leader in Otica, was a well-known health-care promoter and technician, which allowed him to travel frequently to the various communities along the Tambo and Ene Rivers. HP was recruited by the PCP-SL in the mid-1980s. Thanks to his credibility in Otica, HP won over the population for the PCP-SL. «HP told us about policies for the poor people, that everything could be different [...].»2 The first PCP-SL incursion in Otica took place on October 29, 1987. The guerrillas sacked the health post and the home of people who worked for two non- governmental organizations. The people of Otica repudiated the attack, but HP convinced them that the PCP-SL incursion had been a «mistake.» That year, HP was elected president of the community and Javier, the PCP- SL’s military commander and the godfather of HP’s child, began visiting Otica. They worked together to «politicize» the various clans. Two other PCP-SL commanders arrived and began offering political courses. After a few months, HP told the families that the PCP-SL was going to create a «new state» and that the community had to accept it. «He was the chief and you had to accept what he said. How could you not accept what the chief said?»3 Nevertheless, not all the Asháninkas accepted the PCP-SL. Many did not understand the ideology, and some who had lived in urban areas doubted the organization’s promises. Others, who had heard of assassinations perpetrated by the PCP-SL, were afraid of the subversives. Most of the colonists who disagreed with the PCP-SL had already fled the valley out of the fear. Displacement to urban areas was not an option for most of the Asháninkas, who did not have relatives in cities. In addition, the Asháninkas traditionally sought refuge in the deep jungle rather than

2 CVR. Interview with Carlos. Otica, September 2002. 3 CVR. Meeting with women. Otica, November 2002. named president of the party and president of the Military Commission. The 123 concentration of power was absolute. The concentration of power reflects the image that Abimael Guzmán had of himself when he fought to impose this decision and illustrates the role he believed he was destined to play in history. At a party meeting, Guzmán recalled certain attributes of Mao Zedong that may shed light on his motivation: RGANIZATIONS O

We cannot forget that Chairman Mao was president of 800 million people UBVERSIVE

and the repercussions of his ideas were greater than that of Lenin; and he S held three positions: President [of the Chinese Communist Party], President of the Military Commission in the Armed Forces, and Head of State. This is why he had 50,000 men to protect the leadership.18

This vision of the historic role that Abimael Guzmán felt he was called to fulfill fed a personality cult around him that grew over the following years. At the start of 1983, he began to emulate the «Third Sword of Marxism,» at least within the organic structure of the PCP-SL. His concern for the universal resonance of his ideas grew continuously throughout the years. Beginning in 1983, when the third military plan, «conquer support ba- ses,» was launched, the party militants adopted a much more coercive attitude toward the peasants. As a consequence, they increased selective assassinations of opponents, including community authorities and peasants who were better off economically, whom they labeled «enemies of the people.» After community leaders were assassinated, the organization installed young militants with little political formation to run communities. These new leaders often mixed the effort to establish the «new power» with personal or family interests. Their arrogance provoked immediate rejection among the population.

Because they named very young people, students with no life experience, they sometimes got involved in their own kind of cannibalism, so the people wanted nothing to do with them. That is how it started.19

The communities in the province of Huancasancos —Sancos, Lucanamarca and Sacsamarca— formed one of the Shining Path’s first «liberated zones.» Beginning in 1982, they began building their «new power» in these communities, forcing authorities to resign or face execution. The PCP-SL was accepted by some sectors of the population, because it imposed order and all people were «equal»:

Damn! The people with money were sweeping the streets, everything was orderly, no one slacked off. There were no longer any waqras, they were punished. Everything was clean and orderly in those days.20

18 Guzmán made these remarks during a preparatory meeting for the National Meeting of Leaders and Cadres. 19 CVR. Testimony of a self-defense patrol member from Chupacc. 20 CVR. Testimony of a 70-year-old resident of Sancos. 124

urban areas. Finally, the PCP-SL had encircled the area, forced the closure of local

IT airstrips and restricted river travel.

FOR The PCP-SL employed different methods to control the communities. One of the principal tools was fear. «[…] We will kill whoever does not support the party.»4 The leaders and supporters acted as the «party’s thousand eyes and thousand ears.» A sense of mistrust spread throughout the communities and even within family groups. RESPONSIBLE The PCP-SL also convinced the Asháninkas that the military was trying to kill them. In

THOSE this way, the subversives were able to physically and psychologically isolate the communities. The subversives then began to recruit children between the ages of 10 AND and 15 as fighters. By 1989, the PCP-SL had formed two people’s committees in Otica. The people no longer used [the form of address] nosháninka,5 but «comrade.» I would TRAGEDY

get angry when they would greet me as «comrade,» but the people accepted it. One HE of them said we are living in the new state.6 : T The Shining Path increased the frequency of its incursions and attacks in the ONE

communities throughout 1989, targeting areas where there were religious missions, ART

P development projects or business operations. On February 13, 1989, in Tzomaveni, the PCP-SL assassinated Isaías Charete, president of the Central Asháninka Organization of the Ene River, which included all the communities in the valley.

EXODUS FROM CUTIVIRENI

The PCP-SL began indoctrinating the population and recruiting young people in Cutivireni in 1988. The incursions, attacks, forced recruitment of young people and assassinations increased until the Asháninkas who did not fall into step behind the PCP-SL fled to the deep jungle to an area known as Tzibokiroato. They were attacked there on several occasions. On November 14, the PCP-SL killed six people in Cutivireni. In September 1991, 169 Asháninkas, with the support of the Rev. Mariano Gagnon, a Franciscan missionary priest, were airlifted to Matsiguenga territory on the other side of the Urubamba mountains. They found refuge in the community of Kiriketi and would eventually set up their own autonomous community. A group of Asháninkas still lives there, while others have relocated to the Tambo River area. In 1991, the Army installed a base in Cutivireni and formed a self-defense committee. Cutivireni became a place a refuge, a «population center» that eventually housed more than 2,000 Asháninkas who had been displaced from their own communities.

«ARMIES» OR SELF-DEFENSE COMMITTEES

By the end of 1990, the PCP-SL controlled the entire Ene River Valley and the headwaters of the Tambo River up to the bend in the river at Poyeni. That area was called the «frontier,» because it was where the «Asháninka Army» or Poyeni self- defense committee was formed. The creation of «armies» was a traditional Asháninka practice. All of the adult males formed the indigenous self-defense committees or ovayeriite.7 The

4 CVR. Interview with Ernestina. Puerto Ocopa, November 2002. Woman, approximately 30 years old. 5 Nosháninka means friend, brother Asháninka. 6 Man, age 36. Testimony recorded by CAAAP. Puerto Ocopa, 2000. 7 The name the Kunuja indigenous organization gave to the self-defense patrols in Pangoa. The punishment of powerful people who had committed abuses and 125 the apparent elimination of differences between rich and poor are still stamped into the peasants’ memory. The order imposed by PCP-SL was symbolized by the decision to force local residents who had some degree of power or wealth to clean the communities.

The people’s committees in Huancasancos were formed by young people RGANIZATIONS between ages 12 and 30 who were in charge of maintaining order and controlling O the movements of residents. They were drawn by the PCP-SL’s message offering UBVERSIVE them power and equality. These young men and women began to feel the enormous S power conferred upon them by the party; the illusion of always being obeyed fascinated them. Traditional ideas about hierarchy were replaced by a discourse of equality: «They [the young people] were pleased at being called ‘comrade,’ never sir, or amigo, nothing like that. ‘Comrade!’ That was it.»21 The «new order» implied a radical transgression of traditional Andean structures, in which power was wielded by elders who were respected by the population. Under the PCP-SL, youths, women and even children replaced the elders:

[…] the new power, everyone was afraid because the students said they would kill anyone who let them down, you had to obey the weapons. The community had no authority over them [...] the students were not the authority. They became activists, workers, with strong interventionist language.22

«Their word was law … it was unbearable,» said another community member. Discontent increased when the PCP-SL restricted people’s movements and prevented them from leaving or returning to the community. That occurred not only in Huancasancos, but in other areas where the organization exercised control:

In the beginning, they were well behaved, but I don’t think three months passed before they started to pressure us and we could not move around, we could not go to Ayacucho or even Vinchos to visit our relatives. They also prevented us from receiving visitors. All of this made our lives impossible. We peasants are free and can go where ever we want, and that is what hurt us.23

The use of children in hostile actions was a widespread and systematic practice imposed by the PCP-SL from the start of the «people’s war,» and it grew more intense after 1983.

Make children participate actively in the people’s war. They can carry out different tasks that will make them understand the need to transform the

21 CVR. Testimony of a businessman from Sancos. 22 CVR. Testimony of a 68-year-old resident of Sancos. 23 CVR. Testimony of a resident of Paqcha, Vinchos, Huamanga. 126

Asháninka self-defense committees reported directly to the Army and patrols formed

IT by colonists in the Ene River Valley, while in the Tambo River Valley they were more

FOR autonomous. Each community in the Tambo River Valley created its own patrol, and all participated in the central self-defense committee. The PCP-SL therefore could no longer move up the Tambo River, and Poyeni became the «frontier.» RESPONSIBLE THE ASHÁNINKA MARTYRS OF THE TAMBO RIVER THOSE At the end of 1989, a group of leaders in the Central Organization of the Tambo River AND Asháninka (Central Asháninka del Río Tambo, CART) decided to form an «Asháninka Army» to fight the PCP-SL. The plans did not get off the ground because the PCP-SL TRAGEDY

leader HP was also a CART member. HE In 1990, at the Sixth CART Congress, the organization officially declared its : T opposition to the PCP-SL. A column of 60 Shining Path cadres, including colonists ONE

and Asháninkas and led by HP, entered the community of Mayapo, where the congress ART

P was being held. Most of the delegates managed to escape, but the PCP-SL captured Pablo Santoma and the leaders of two other groups, Óscar Chimanca of the Nomatsiguenga and Asháninka Confederation of Pangoa, and Dante Martínez of the Confederation of Amazonian Nationalities of Peru. The PCP-SL took the prisoners to the community of Anapati, where they were executed. «Pablo Santoma was calm, drinking masato and singing. My father-in-law, Andrés Torres, said to him: ‘Why don’t you escape, no one is watching.’ Pablo responded that if he escaped they would blame us and kill my father-in-law and the whole family. ‘If I am going to die, I will die alone for my people.’» Santoma, Chimanca and Martínez became Asháninka martyrs in the war against the PCP-SL, and their names are recalled at every Asháninka congress. The murders led to the formation of the Asháninka Army under the leadership of the Poyeni community, which became a refuge for Asháninkas seeking protection from the subversives. The Asháninka Self-Defense and Development Central Committee No. 25, which was recognized by the Army, was formed on September 23, 1990. The first president was Emilio Ríos, who adopted the name Kitóniro (Scorpion). The committee played a key role in the organization and leadership of the communities in the lower Tambo River Valley over the next four years. The Asháninkas attacked the PCP-SL’s «principal force» several times during 1990, forcing the subversives to retreat. The Shining Path took the «base committees» with them. As a result, 14 of the 35 Asháninka communities in the upper Tambo River Valley disappeared and nearly 10,000 Asháninkas either followed the PCP-SL or fled from it.

THE «NEW STATE»: THE LIFE OF THE «MASSES» IN THE DEEP JUNGLE

Once in the high jungle, the PCP-SL regrouped the Asháninkas into camps that had been set up previously and which were located away from the rivers and on higher ground for greater security. The communities were divided into small groups known as «platoons.» Two or three platoons would form a «people’s committee.» Each family had a hut, and the huts formed a circular pattern. The platoons had a common area for food storage and a field for meetings and exercise. A control tower was located about 15 minutes from the camp. The passwords for entering and leaving the camp were changed each week. world [...] change their ideology and let them adopt the ideas of the proletariat 127 (PCP-SL 1988a).

Recruitment of young people was generally done through coercion, lies and violence. Many people participated under pressure or out of fear of reprisals.

When a community or family refused to hand over the «quota» of children RGANIZATIONS voluntarily, the PCP-SL took the children by force after threatening or O assassinating those who opposed them. UBVERSIVE

The Shining Path’s practice of kidnapping young people, interrupting S peasants’ daily lives, undermining their families’ livelihood and the local economy, forcing them to attend assemblies and leave their herds unattended, and restricting mobility combined to create a general sense of rejection among the communities. There was also general resentment over the murder of authorities, closing of the farmers’ markets, forced systems of production for family consumption and the conversion of people into «masses» managed by the party. The initial violent reactions in the communities began at the end of 1982. The first rejection of the Shining Path was probably the action by Iquichanos in the highlands of Huanta, who killed seven PCP-SL cadres in January 1983 in the community of Huaychao in response to the murder of community authorities. The testimonies of residents in this community recorded by the CVR show that the plan to construct the «New State» was not well received by the peasant communities in the highlands surrounding Huanta. The authorities in Huaychao, including the lieutenant governor, varayocc and municipal leader, began to argue [with the PCP-SL cadres], telling them that they were members of the government and that they would not oppose the government.24 Several days later, the country was stunned by the murder of eight journalists in the neighboring community of Uchuraccay. The journalists had gone to report on the situation in Huaychao. There was an uprising in Sacsamarca in February 1983, which was the beginning of the end of the Shining Path’s control over the province of Huancasancos. Enraged by the abuses inflicted by local PCP-SL leaders, some residents got the subversives drunk and then beat and stoned them to death. Similar reactions were recorded in the following weeks in other communities in Huancasancos and Lucanamarca, where community members also killed local PCP-SL leaders. The early rebellions against the PCP-SL were isolated and uncoordinated, however, and always provoked a violent response by the subversives. In the months following the murder of the journalists, the PCP-SL targeted Uchuraccay, launching incursions on three occasions — May 20, July 16 and December 24, 1983. Of the 470 people registered in Uchuraccay in the 1981 census, 135 were killed in PCP-SL’s reprisals against the community. In all, one-third of the population was wiped out by the violent actions of the PCP-SL, as well as by

24 CVR. Testimonio 201700. 128

The day would begin at 3 a.m. The leaders would wake up the «masses» to

IT bathe and pack their things in baskets «to be ready to escape if the miserable ones

FOR [from the Army] showed up.» The women would prepare food. To avoid detection, they were forbidden to light fires. The food was served at 5 a.m. The commanders ate first. «When they [the commanders] take a spoonful, they say, ‘Long Live Gonzalo.’ The others [the masses] eat after them.»8 The «commanders» ate the best food. The RESPONSIBLE «masses» ate what they could, «watery soup, chalanca leaves, even snake, that’s what

THOSE they ate.» From 8 a.m. to 3 p.m., the «masses» worked in the fields, returning to the camp at 5 p.m. Elderly and infirm people remained in the camp, making weapons. What AND was produced or caught – cassava and fish – was given to the commanders to be distributed. TRAGEDY

Children between ages 8 and 10 attended a «people’s school» for one hour each day. They HE were taught «subjugation to and respect for President Gonzalo, self-criticism and subjugation : T to the party and many songs.» The older children, or «pioneers,» had one hour of military ONE

training each day. They had rudimentary weapons, generally bows and arrows. At ART

P best, they would have some old rifles. Only the «commanders» had revolvers and automatic weapons. They ate and bathed at the end of the day. The women were forced to braid their hair like the female colonists from the highlands. They all had to wear clean clothes, «rags, really, but they had to be clean.» During the first months, the day ended with a family meeting. Sometimes they sang Andean songs in Spanish, which the PCP-SL commanders taught them. As the committees’ situation worsened, family meetings and visits were restricted. Even signs of unhappiness or lack of appetite were punished. «[…] If you were quiet, they would say, ‘What are you thinking about? Surely you must be thinking about escaping.’»9 During the weekly meetings called by the «local force,» those present «accused» other members of the platoon, including their own family, of making mistakes. Everyone knew how to do «self-criticism.» We learned by force. We learned how to salute their president, subjugation only to President Gonzalo. «I would like to speak, comrades, beginning with a declaration of my total subjugation to the teacher and guide, the dear and respected President Gonzalo, who is the head of our party and the revolution.» If you didn’t comply [with the tasks], talk about what you thought and felt, you’d have to offer self-criticism. «I am a bum, I’m lazy. What the hell, I sometimes think. That is what I have to say.» You could do that three times, but after that they would apply violence.10 Different forms of resistance were developed in the camps. «You had to suffer alone in the jungle, where no one could see you, to avoid punishment.»11 When they could, people would conceal food so they could eat it later with their family.12 Others hid their children so that they would not be taken away «to wage war.» When they went out to do their chores, they would check on the children. This was extremely risky and could lead to physical punishment or even death. When the PCP-SL «applied

8 CVR. BDI-P737. In-depth interview. Male resident of Quempiri. 9 Testimony recorded by CAAAP. Puerto Ocopa, 1994. 10 Woman, age 48. Testimony recorded by Leslie Villapolo (CAAAP). Puerto Ocopa, 1995. 11 CVR. Interview with Carlos. Otica, September 2002. 12 CVR. BDI-P. In-depth interview. Woman, resident of Quempiri. confrontations with peasant patrols and disputes with neighboring communities. 129 On April 3, 1983, approximately 80 PCP-SL cadres, both men and women, launched a violent attack on Lucanamarca. As the subversives moved down the hills, they killed men, women, children and elders. A total of 69 people were executed. Some residents who escaped the massacre went to Huancasancos to ask the Army for help. Others stormed the home of the parents of the local PCP- RGANIZATIONS SL commander, whom they had killed earlier, and murdered them. O The PCP-SL claimed responsibility for the massacre in Lucanamarca in UBVERSIVE 1988, in an interview with Abimael Guzmán published in El Diario, which was S dubbed the «interview of the century.» In the interview, Guzmán said the massacre was a decision by the PCP-SL’s central command25 to quell the peasant rebellion.

Faced with the use of troops and the reactionary military action, we respon- ded with an overwhelming action: Lucanamarca. Neither they nor we will forget, because they witnessed a response that they did not imagine, more than 80 were annihilated and that is real. There were excesses, as we would state in 1983, but there are two sides to everything in life: our problem was a strong blow to quiet them, to make them understand that things were not easy. In some cases, like this one, it was the central leadership that planned the action and ordered things, that is how it happened. The main thing was for us to strike a massive blow and reprimand them, making them understand that they were dealing with another kind of people’s combatants, that they were not dealing with the kind of combatants that operated earlier, that is what they understand. The excess was the negative aspect. Understanding the war, basing our ideas on what Lenin says, and taking into account Clausewitz, in the war of the masses combat can be excessive and express hate, the profound sense of hate of classes, of condemnation, that was the root. That was clearly expressed by Lenin. Excesses can be committed, the problem is to reach a point and not go beyond it, because if you go beyond it you can deviate. It is like an angle, it can only open to a certain level and cannot go beyond that point. If we are going to put restrictions, demands and prohibitions on the masses, in the end it is because we do not want the waters to overflow; here we needed the water to overflow, for the landslide to wipe everything away, certain that the water would return to the riverbed once it was over. I repeat, this is explained perfectly by Lenin; and this is how we need to understand this excess. I insist that the goal was to make them understand that we were a hard bone to chew, that we were willing to do anything to gain everything (Guzmán 1988).

A willingness to do anything against unarmed civilians. Twenty years later, the CVR found no remorse among the Shining Path’s principal leaders. For them, «these are things we said were mistakes, excesses that were committed.

25 According to Óscar Ramírez Durand, Feliciano, this was a decision made by Guzmán. “He decided it. For me this was something that was more in line with what the armed forces did. It was a signal for us to attack the civilian population, which began the divorce from us as they withdrew support” (CVR. Interview. Callao Naval Base, October 4, 2002.) 130

violence» to snitches, rule-breakers or «individualists,»13 the accused would be placed

IT in the center of a circle and a member of the «principal force» would be chosen to kill

FOR him or her with a rope or knife. While the «masses» did not witness most of the assassinations, the commanders forced the platoon, especially the victim’s family, to celebrate the death by drinking masato, laughing and shouting, «Long live the party and President Gonzalo!» RESPONSIBLE The number of people who died of malnutrition and disease was high. «[…] There

THOSE was nothing to eat; there was no longer any salt […]. Sometimes the children just ate dirt, and a lot of them died.»14 The dead were sometimes dumped in common graves. AND «They would make a deep hole or sometimes a hole with a rock on top; that’s where they threw the bodies [...].»15 The people ended up living «[…] like pigs, hiding in the

TRAGEDY 16

jungle, sleeping in mud and eating watery soup [...].» «You were an animal. You no HE longer had a family. Sometimes you had to kill your family, your child, because they : T were no longer your family. ‘That is the will of the people,’ which was a lie — it was

ONE 17 his [the PCP-SL commander’s] will.» ART

P The number of Asháninkas fleeing from the zone increased between 1992 and 1993. Some left behind children and relatives who were too weak to escape. They also had to overcome their fear of the Army and the self-defense patrols, which had been instilled during the PCP-SL’s indoctrination, to seek refuge in «population centers.» The Asháninkas who escaped took advantage of their knowledge of the forest to survive. Mass escapes were less frequent.

ESCAPE FROM THE WACAPÚ AND VISTA ALEGRE DE OTICA «PEOPLE’S COMMITTEES»

In February 1993, Máximo and Javier, the commanders of the Wacapú and Vista Alegre people’s committees, decided to flee with their respective groups. According to Javier, «there was a lot of fear. Because everyone had to offer self-criticism, we didn’t tell anyone. We only told them to make canoes and hide them in the jungle. We told them not to tell their wives or children [...].»18 The night they had chosen to flee, the «local force» commanded by Javier’s brother, Jesús, arrived. The PCP-SL leader discovered his brother’s plan and wanted to accuse him. Faced with this danger, Javier tied up a woman from Ayacucho who had arrived with the «local force» and another group grabbed Jesús. When Javier reached the river, he found his brother dead. «I looked at him, but had to go on. … We escaped and I didn’t think about it until later.»19

13 The PCP-SL defined “individualists” as those who did not follow the order to “centralize” all the food that was produced in the fields, the fish that were caught or the fruits and other products gathered in the jungle by the “masses.” People were also considered “individualists” if they did not want to participate in group tasks assigned by the commanders. 14 CVR. BDI-P737. In-depth interview. Quempiri, September 2002. Man, approximately 40 years old. 15 CVR. Interview with Ernestina, approximately 32 years old. Puerto Ocopa, November 2002. 16 Woman, age 28. Testimony recorded by CAAAP. Puerto Ocopa, 2000. 17 Man, age 41. C.N. Testimony recorded by CAAAP. Puerto Ocopa, 2000. 18 CVR. Interview with Javier. Road between Puerto Ocopa and Satipo. December 2002. 19 Ibid. But they were not a problem with the party line.» Lucanamarca was one of the 131 major events of the «people’s war,» because it was the first indiscriminate massacre and would set a pattern that characterized the PCP-SL’s actions, making the Shining Path the bloodiest subversive group in the history of Latin America. In April 1984, when the PCP-SL was still implementing its third military plan, Guzmán announced the start of the «great leap plan,» with a «political RGANIZATIONS strategy to establish and develop support bases» through four campaigns. The O campaigns included, «put into place the widespread guerrilla war, extend our UBVERSIVE zones, mobilize the masses and hit hard at the troops to withdraw the social S base for their next reactionary plan to defeat it» (PCP-SL 1984). The security forces responded with brutal force to the escalation of the PCP-SL’s actions. Among the best-known cases is the murder of six young members of the Evangelical Presbyterian Church in Callqui on August 1, 1984. The following day, August 2, 1984, Jaime Ayala Sulca, a journalist from Huanta working with the daily La Republica in Ayacucho, was detained and disappeared on the Navy base set up at the local municipal stadium. On August 23, the bodies of 49 people were found in common graves in Pucayacu, several kilometers north of the city of Huanta. All had been detained by the Navy in the Huanta Stadium and then transported in a kind of «caravan of death» to an area in the province of Acobamba, Huancavelica, where they were killed between August 16 and 19, 1984. In September 1984, 117 men women and children were killed in the community of Putis, district of Santillana, province of Huanta, allegedly by soldiers. It is important to highlight that the majority of the communities in this zone had been forced by PCP-SL, present in the area since 1983, «to retreat» to the hills to avoid military patrols. Under the guidance of PCP-SL columns, they were placed in groups in strategic spots among the hills. «They were careful so that the people would not leave and warn the military in San José de Secce. If they knew that someone planned to escape, they immediately slit their throat.»26 The peasants remained in the hills for six months. When the military base was established in Putis, a group of peasants decided to surrender and went down to the community. The soldiers made them dig their own graves and then shot them. At the time the CVR’s Final Report was written, the common grave in Putis was one of the largest in Ayacucho, and possibly the entire nation. PCP-SL documents circulating around the nation at the time, as well as the blows it was receiving from the armed forces, revealed a complex reality. Guzmán minimized the reversals, writing about «an inflection» in the party. As was later learned, the PCP-SL strategy was to leave the population unprotected in the face of the military counterattack. The organization believed that the abuses committed by the security forces would provoke a profound resentment in the population, which would later be used by PCP-SL detachments to regain control. The macabre dynamic of massacres that began in 1983 was part of a strategy designed by Abimael Guzmán to «oppose the re-establishment (of the

26 CVR. Testimony 200919. 132

Community members recall the events differently, maintaining that Javier

IT killed his brother so that they could escape. He is seen as the «savior» of the group.

FOR «Jesús arrived at the river and Javier had to kill him so that we would not reveal our plans [...].»20 The night before, they said, they dreamed of the color white, which was a good sign. Approximately 187 people fled to Poyeni. «We were lucky, because it was a windy day and that helped push the boats. [...] We arrived in Poyeni [...].»21 RESPONSIBLE Another 147 adults and children did not flee.

THOSE Faced with mass escapes, the PCP-SL leaders began to separate family members so that if someone escaped, they could take revenge on his or her relatives. AND The number of executions multiplied. At the same time, the Army and civil-defense patrols intensified their operations in the Tambo and Ene Valleys, slowly rescuing TRAGEDY

Asháninka communities that had been kidnapped by the PCP-SL. Nearly 3,000 Asháninkas HE in the Ene Valley were rescued in 1993 alone. : T ONE

THE «POPULATION CENTERS» ART P The people who escaped or were «recovered» by the Army were taken to «refugee communities» or «population centers,»22 such as Puerto Ocopa, Poyeni and Betania in the Tambo River Valley, and Cutivireni and Valle Esmeralda in the Ene River Valley. In many cases, the people who were «recovered» were subjected to intense questioning by the military. The centers were overcrowded and isolated and lacked basic resources. In addition, constant harassment by the PCP-SL made life in the centers extremely difficult. None of the residents could leave the centers without protection. Fishing, hunting and farming were restricted and could only be carried out with the self-defense patrols serving as guards. Overcrowding led to outbreaks of cholera, tuberculosis and malaria. Many people, especially the elderly, died in the centers, while young families preferred to flee into the jungle to try to survive. There were also tensions and conflicts between families from different communities, as well as because of differences in the communities’ degree of sympathy with or rejection of the PCP-SL.

MARGINALIZATION OF THE OTICA REFUGEES IN POYENI

The civil defense patrol members allowed the refugees from Otica to enter Poyeni only because they had contacts in the community. «My child’s godfather was there when we arrived. He recognized me and defended me to the civil defense patrol members [...]. That is why they allowed us in.»23 If that had not happened, «[…] the patrol members would have killed the male and female leaders, as they did with refugees arriving from other communities [...]. We would later see the bodies float by in the river [...].»24

20 CVR. Interview with Carmen. Otica, September 2002. 21 CVR. Interview with Máximo. Otica, September 2002. 22 Some experts use the term “population center” because international legislation does not recognize the existence of “internal refugees,” only “displaced” people. 23 Testimony from the political commanders at the Wacapú Base Committee, Otica. November 2002. 24 Information provided by a professional who worked in the community in the 1990s. Lima. November 2002. old order) with a counter-reestablishment» (of the Shining Path’s control). 133

When the armed forces arrived, we had to undertake a difficult fight. They applied a strategy to re-establish the old power, while we applied a strategy of counter-reestablishment to re-launch the New Power. A cruel and merciless genocide was produced; we fought very hard. The reactionaries and the RGANIZATIONS

armed forces, in particular, thought they had us beat in 1984 [...] but what was O the result? The people’s committees and support bases multiplied, this led us to develop bases, which is where we are today (Guzmán 1988). UBVERSIVE S The «counter-reestablishment» called for by Guzmán consisted of attempts to recover «support bases» in zones close to where military bases were placed. Predictably, that decision led to worsening levels of violence and exposed the population to attacks from both sides. Curiously, Guzmán saw this as a «creative contribution» to revolutionary military thought. The number of dead during this period in the provinces Huanta and La Mar, in northern Ayacucho, was equal to the number of people who would die in the remaining years of the internal conflict. In the mid-1980s, more and more peasants were dragged into the conflict at a high social cost. From the start, the PCP-SL had wanted to end the neutrality among the population and the military responded with same tactic, so the peasants could not remain on the margins and were left to decide which side to join. Nevertheless, peasant communities responded differently in the face of the intensifying conflict. PCP-SL’s «re-establishment and counter- reestablishment» strategy sparked an exodus of tens of thousands of people, who fled their homes and their possessions to save their lives. Those without resources or contacts were the victims of incursions by the PCP-SL and the armed forces. When they talk about this period, residents expressly recall the feeling of being at the mercy of events, subjected to the arbitrary decisions of the armed actors: «Viday carajo valenñachu, quknin qamun wañuchin, quknin qamun payakun» («Life was worth nothing, damn it. One comes to kill you; the other comes to hit you»).27 It was a kind of nightmare from which, unfortunately, it was impossible to awaken. «Were we even considered people? It was like we were in a dream. [...] The PCP-SL militants killed us, the soldiers killed us, who wants to look at us now [all remember and weep].»28 In 1984, the military began pressuring communities to form peasant patrols. The first anti-subversive patrols were formed in the province of Huamanga and the Apurímac River Valley. They quickly gained fame in the fight against the Shining Path and achieved a level of strength that somewhat neutralized the subversives. The PCP-SL recognized the «nefarious role» the peasant patrols played in the «people’s war.» According to the PCP-SL, the «troops» applied a corollary to the «re-establishment» strategy by «using masses against masses.»

27 CVR. BDI-P17. Field notes. Anonymous informant. 28 CVR. BDI-P30. Focus group in Loqllapampa. Accomarca, Vilcashuamán, June 2002. 134

A group of soldiers was sent from the Navy Base in Atalaya to interrogate

IT the people from Otica, settling them in different «sectors» of the community. The

FOR orphans were placed in different homes, and many showed signs of physical abuse, including rape. The people from Otica were discriminated against when aid from private and public sources was distributed. The residents of Poyeni treated them like terrorists RESPONSIBLE and feared that the refugees from Otica would organize and attack them, believing that

THOSE they still followed the PCP-SL. That fear lingered even after the people from Otica returned to their own lands. AND The internal armed conflict produced a demographic upheaval. Women and children outnumbered men, many of whom had died in conflicts. Many of the elders died TRAGEDY

in the «support bases» or the «population centers.» Some of the agricultural tasks normally HE performed by men were taken over by women, adding to the workload they had at home : T and in the community. The men also had much more work, because they had to participate ONE

in the self-defense patrols. The availability of adult males for the patrols was limited, ART

P because of the large number of men who had been killed. There were about 500 patrollers in the Ene Valley and another 1,000 in the Tambo Valley in 1993. The number was relatively low for a population of approximately 20,000 people. Entire communities participated in the self-defense efforts. In many cases, the civilian population paid a high price for military support. Most of the soldiers were from the coast or the highlands and did not understand the customs of the jungle. A large number of abuses were committed because of that lack of cultural understanding. Soldiers routinely took advantage of the women or stole the belongings of families or communities. The lines between military and civilian life were blurred because of the presence of military detachments in some of the «population centers.» The civil defense patrol members had to fall into formation, raise and lower the flag, and sing the national anthem every day at 6 a.m. and 5 p.m. That militarization was reflected in the language used by patrol members, teachers and authorities, as well as the communities’ ways of resolving conflicts.

THE RETURN

The PCP-SL retreated toward the Ene River around 1995. As peace took hold in the Tambo River Valley, residents in the «population centers» began returning to their lands. The people who returned were not the same people who had fled. Many had died, others had escaped into the jungle, and some had decided to remain in the communities that had received them, where they had met new partners and started families. In some cases, entire communities moved without adequate resources for their relocation or survival. In other cases, the relocation was gradual to ensure survival. Several communities also received assistance from outside institutions to help with the return. The most effective approach was a gradual return organized by the community itself. Homes in the original communities had been destroyed by the PCP-SL or the passage of time, and the forest had reclaimed many of the fields. CART was reactivated and held its Seventh Congress in 1994. The self-defense patrols in Poyeni and Puerto Ocopa joined forces at the same time. Land and river traffic began to return to normal in 1995. Toward the end of the decade, some families were able to replant crops, such as coffee, for sale and began to market products. Non-governmental organizations returned to the zone, but so did colonists, loggers and petroleum companies. The processes reignited old conflicts and sparked new problems between communities. Because of the PCP-SL’s concept of peasants, it was impossible for the 135 group to believe that the peasants were acting of their own accord. If the peasants were revolting, they had to be influenced by the military and the «agents of the rotten feudal order.» In contrast to the province of Huamanga and the Apurímac Valley, the self-defense committees encouraged by the armed forces did not prosper in the RGANIZATIONS Huanta Valley in 1984, mainly because of the indiscriminate military repression O there. Faced with the pressure to join self-defense patrols, young people in the UBVERSIVE region chose to migrate to the city of Huanta, the jungle or Lima. Communities in S the south-central provinces — Cangallo, Víctor Fajardo and Vilcashuamán — were also reluctant to organize against the PCP-SL. The varying responses to the PCP-SL by Ayacucho peasants can be explained by the different ways in which the subversives and soldiers acted in certain areas. In general, the PCP-SL’s aggression against peasant communities was much more brutal in the northern part of the department, while the most brutal massacres in the central area were caused by the military (Umaro and Accomarca in 1985, and Cayara in 1988). Nevertheless, in the long run the relationship between the state and peasant communities was much better in Huanta and Huamanga than in Cangallo and Víctor Fajardo. Available information indicates that the PCP-SL invested more efforts in preparing its war in the central provinces of the department, using, above all, access to education, which had been one of the principal demands of peasant communities in decades past. The PCP-SL had its laboratory for forming cadres in two of the most important schools in Ayacucho’s south-central region: the General Córdova School in Vilcashuamán and the Los Andes Schools in Sancos. In the Huanta Valley, the other zone where the Shining Path remained strong until the end of the 1980s, the subversives built a solid base in schools and among students. In other areas, such as the highlands of Huanta or the province of La Mar, where school attendance was not as great, the links between the peasants and PCP-SL broke much earlier in the conflict. 136 Unlike the case of the high Andean areas of Huanta and Huancasancos, the PCP-SL appears to have had more respect for local authorities in the south- central region. In Vilcashuamán, one of the strategies to protect its military IT base and prevent possible incursions by security forces was to install «front FOR authorities.» In other words, the PCP-SL maintained secret control, while the community president, governor and other authorities acted as a facade,

RESPONSIBLE informing military authorities that everything was normal in their communities and reporting that the Peruvian flag was raised each Sunday morning in the THOSE district capital’s central square. Guzmán criticized this strategy from Lima, AND

because he believed that it only served «to maintain the situation» and was a refusal to combat the enemy. TRAGEDY

Thus there were different war scenarios in Ayacucho by the mid-1980s. In the HE valleys of the Pampas and Qaracha Rivers, where the PCP-SL had managed to : T

ONE consolidate numerous support bases through early indoctrination, the

ART subversives were able to maintain a presence, although weak, into the 1990s. P

MAP

AYACUCHO 1980-2000: PROPORTION OF DEATHS AND DISAPPEARANCES REPORTED TO THE CVR BY PERPETRATOR AND PROVINCE In the highlands of the Huanta province, where the first communities revolted against the PCP-SL, the military installed several «multi-community anti- 137 subversive bases.» One of these was in Ccarhuahurán, the historic center of Iquicha. When the Navy arrived in the community in August 1983, it set up a civil-defense committee based on the self-defense groups that had been established in the community at the end of 1982, shortly before the assassination of the seven PCP-

SL cadres in Huaychao. The Navy installed a 36-man detachment in the town, RGANIZATIONS which grouped together eight annexes – in this case, the annexes joined of their O own accord – with a total of 600 families (Coronel 1996: 51). Another enclave of UBVERSIVE resistance was the former Chaca hacienda, located in the Huanta district of S Santillana, that included seven neighboring communities. While some residents moved to these multi-community centers, others migrated to the valleys of Huanta, Tambo and the Apurímac River Valley, or to the cities of Ayacucho and Lima. By mid-1984, the highlands of Huanta were abandoned. The displacement affected entire communities, and about 68 communities simply ceased to exist. In November 1983, families from 10 communities, which would later join others from Uchuraccay or Iquicha, gathered in Ccarhuapampa, outside the town of Tambo, to form the first multi-community hamlet of displaced communities. From the start, Ccarhuapampa was organized around a civil-defense committee that operated with a military mindset. The committee established a strict protection system that included restrictions on movement, issued passes for people to travel and physically punished anyone who disobeyed the norms. More and more communities in the northern highlands of Ayacucho followed suit and organized along the same lines. The Apurímac River Valley witnessed the formation of Anti-Subversive Civil Defense militias (Defensa Civil Antisubversiva, DECAS), as the peasant self-defense patrols there were known. The DECAS were the first peasant groups to form a network that included an entire region, in this case the Apurímac River Valley. By mid-1985, the armed forces and the DECAS had forced the PCP-SL columns to retreat from the zone. One of the Shining Path’s refuges in the area was the «people’s committee» known as the Sello de Oro, which was located in Simariva in the district of Santa Rosa. The PCP-SL organized its peasant «masses» in the area based on its idea of the «New State.» Nevertheless, it was a human shield that only existed because of the PCP-SL’s authoritarian way of wielding power. The fear of losing its social bases because of rejection from the communities and pressure from the military and the DECAS led the PCP-SL to further oppress the population it considered «masses» within its «people’s committees» in the Apurímac River Valley.

The families lived under plastic tarps, exposed to the elements and without clothing. Food was an even bigger problem. In the final years, they had virtually no salt, sugar, vegetables or grain to eat. In the 10 years, about 100 children and adults died from lack of food (Del Pino 1999: 178).

On October 24, 1993, when the «masses» killed the PCP-SL commanders in Sello de Oro and turned themselves in at the Santa Rosa Military Base, «100 percent were anemic; many had tuberculosis, severe bronchitis and malaria. Many 138 of the children between ages 2 and 3 were still unable to walk because of malnutrition» (Del Pino 1999). A similar way of controlling the population was through «retreats» in IT the area known as the Oreja de Perro (literally «dog’s ear» because of its geographic FOR shape) in the Ayacucho district of Chungui. The «retreats» were forced displacements from communities, in which the residents were taken to hide in

RESPONSIBLE the hills or in the high jungle forest, where access was difficult. That meant that the PCP-SL moved its «support bases» to avoid military incursions. To the THOSE Shining Path, a «support base» was a group of several «people’s committees,» AND

which were communities where the local authorities had been forced to flee or had been killed and replaced by «commissaries.» In the area to which the TRAGEDY

communities «retreated,» the subversive organization imposed fierce order and HE complete control, making life unbearable: : T ONE I was very sad. There were very few of us left in my base and we escaped to ART P the highlands where we ate potatoes. When we found out the Sinchis had left, those of us who remained went back to Achira, where the Shining Path militants returned to organize us again. They told us: We are many, like the sand in the river and the soldiers are like the big rocks in the river. The organization of the masses in my base was divided, with the women in charge of cooking and bringing food to the adults who worked in the fields. The adults and the young people participated in the principal forces and were also farmers. We all worked for the collective, there was no individualism. The older children helped with what they could and the younger ones were taught to read and write by the Shining Path member SF. He let us sing and play. I was seven years old at the time. What hurts to remember is how the masses died, because they could not escape from the military attacks. The members of Local and Princi- pal Forces almost never were killed. The young people over 12 and the adults over 40 had the easiest time escaping from the military, but they could not fight. There were only 20 combatants armed with sticks, slingshots, two rifles and two shotguns. That is how the masses died until there were only a few of us left.29

Between 1983 and 1985, Ayacucho continued to be the area hardest hit, but it was not the only department to feel the effects of the «people’s war.» In Huancavelica, particularly in the provinces of Angaraes and Acobamba, the PCP-SL applied its strategy of creating a vacuum in the countryside, assassinating authorities who would not resign and attacking police stations. They also targeted the peasant population, killing people accused of being «snitches,» but they did not «raze» communities. The military, however, attacked the PCP-SL columns in these areas more directly, killing numerous subversives. In Pasco, particularly in the province of Daniel Alcides Carrión, the PCP- SL managed to establish a large number of «support bases.» In 1983, the zone had not yet been declared under a state of emergency and the PCP-SL continued its strategy of «shaking the enemy,» assassinating local authorities and

29 CVR. Testimony 202014. landowners. In May 1983, a contingent of 200 peasants led by a PCP-SL platoon 139 entered the district of Páucar, attempting to mobilize the population with harangues and threatening local authorities. A month later, local authorities and the principal of the local school, who had refused to resign, were assassinated in a second PCP-SL incursion in the district. Four other authorities were killed in the neighboring hamlet of San Juan de Yacán. In testimonies, the residents said RGANIZATIONS that there were adolescents and children among the PCP-SL troops and that O they marched wearing red armbands and shouting slogans praising «President UBVERSIVE Gonzalo.» The district fell into the hands of the PCP-SL, and Óscar Ramírez S Durand, Feliciano, was the principal subversive leader. The province of Daniel Alcides Carrión was not declared an emergency zone until July 1984, when it was placed under military control. Another area of expansion at that time was the Mantaro Valley, where Shining Path cadres carried out numerous acts of sabotage and infiltrated the local university. The PCP-SL’s first public appearance in the area came on January 20, 1983, when four subversives burst into the student dining hall at the university to ask for «donations.» Such events became commonplace at the university in the following years. Municipal authorities and political parties were also the targets of attacks. Saúl Muñoz Menacho, mayor of Huancayo and a member of the United Left (Izquierda Unida, IU), was assassinated on July 16, 1984. In March and April 1985, there were dynamite attacks against the party headquarters of Popular Action (Acción Popular), the Popular Christian Party (Partido Popular Cristiano), APRA and the IU, as well as the Provincial Election Registry. Subversive actions continued to increase throughout the year. In the central jungle, Asháninka indigenous people living in the Ene River Valley testified that they first heard about the «party» in their area in 1982. In 1984, the PCP-SL began penetrating the area systematically, forcibly recruiting native communities and the heads of family clans. In October 1984, the subversives attacked the Franciscan mission, a farm and neighboring homes in Cutivireni, in the Río Tambo district of Satipo province. The harassment and terrorist techniques used by the PCP-SL against the Cutivireni mission were highlighted by the PCP-SL in a 1991 document:

Another situation with similar repercussions, and one that has been used often by the Peruvian reactionary [forces] as part of the psychological action they are using in the low-intensity conflict, is the action against the religious mission in Cutivireni and the Franciscan [priest] Magnon, in the Ene Valley, who works with the Asháninkas. He [Magnon] has worked in the region since the 1970s, but adopted a position against the ILA in 1980, taking a particularly strong stand in 1985 when the Party installed a support base in the place and his followers began joining our ranks. He sent a written request to the reactionary army, which installed an anti-subversive base. The policy of our Party was to invite him to subject himself to the New Power and to limit his work to strictly religious tasks and abstain from counter-revolutionary activities. We carried out several acts of sabotage and razings until we forced him to leave the place (PCP-SL 1991c). 140 In 1985, news that the PCP-SL was killing pimps and other criminals created some level of sympathy among certain sectors of the population. The PCP-SL’s violent actions in the Huallaga Valley began in 1983 with IT the murder of an employee of the Agriculture Ministry and a high school student FOR accused of collaborating with the police. In 1984, the PCP-SL carried out two major incursions in the city of Aucayacu, attacking the police station and killing

RESPONSIBLE 20 officers. On April 19, the mayor of Tingo María, Tito Jaime Fernández, was assassinated, and on September 20 the mayor of Pumahuasi, a member of APRA, THOSE was killed. That same year, three cooperatives were attacked in the district of AND

Crespo y Castillo. Shining Path columns attacked the city of Tocache, the Experi- mental Farming Station in Tulumayo, the GC police station in Santa Lucía and TRAGEDY

the Palma del Espino plantation and factory in Uchiza. As a result, the HE government declared a state of emergency in the departments of Huánuco and : T

ONE San Martín.

ART In Lima, the PCP-SL campaign expanded gradually, with ups and down. P The operations in Metropolitan Lima stabilized in 1981 and 1982, registered a peak in 1983, and then gradually increased over the following years. The urban campaign played the important role of placing the PCP-SL at the center of political attention. Although at the time the organization’s urban network included only a few detachments, their actions destroyed the myth, particularly among the urban elite, that Lima was separate and distinct from the rest of Peru. In 1984, the Metropolitan Committee was composed of a leadership cell and three zone committees: east, west and center. There were two detachments: The special detachment, which carried out actions in the eastern part of the city, and the central detachment. As generating organizations, the party formed the Movement of People’s Intellectuals, the Classist Movement of Workers and Laborers, the Classist Neighborhood Movement and the Youth Movement. Of the three organizational structures created by the PCP-SL at the start of the armed struggle (the party, the army and the front), the front was the most important in urban activities. The principal task was to recruit people through the generating organizations, which were created taking into account the different characteristics of the targeted population. Even when the start of the armed conflict appeared to be taking shape in Lima, serious criticism was raised about the Metropolitan Committee, particularly in 1985 when there was a noticeable reduction in its actions compared to the rest of the country. That showed that the regional organization was not responding to the criteria established by the central committee, and a series of «bottlenecks» are mentioned in the evaluations conducted by the party. The leadership concluded that the «Metro» needed to be reinforced to act as a «sound box,» given that any action in Lima, regardless of its magnitude, had national and international repercussions.

29 CVR. Testimonio 202014. The Great Leap 141 The Third Conference of the Central Committee, held in 1983, approved the great leap phase, which corresponded to the third military plan, «conquer support bases,» and would last until September 1986. The phase was to begin in June 1984 and consisted of four campaigns: RGANIZATIONS O • Build the Great Leap (June-November 1984)

• Develop the Great Leap (December 1984-April 1985) UBVERSIVE S • Strengthen the Great Leap (June-November 1985) • Finish the Great Leap (December 1985-September 1986).

These campaigns were extremely important for subversive activity in Lima. Under the banner «militarize the party,» the PCP-SL decided to totally revamp its various organizational levels. Because of the weakness of operations in Lima, the reorganization focused especially on the capital. The purpose was to promote a growth strategy for zones and subzones, special detachments, centers of resistance, generating organizations and support groups. A six-month pilot plan was devised for the «Metro.» The goal was to launch a new stage of recruitment of masses in shantytowns, low-income neighborhoods and factories. In addition, special attention was placed on attracting the «petit bourgeois» (intellectuals, artists, teachers and students). A particularly important element was the recruitment of domestic employees, who could be used as informants. It was during this stage that the People’s Support Committee, a generating organization, began to acquire importance. It would go on to overshadow the Metropolitan Committee.

FIGURE 1 142 Expansion of the armed conflict IT The situation in 1985, according to Guzmán FOR

Despite the losses inflicted on the subversives between 1983 and 1985, the PCP-

RESPONSIBLE SL not only maintained its presence in what it considered its principal front, Ayacucho, but spread to new areas in the Peruvian highlands and, with renewed THOSE confidence in its forces, began an expansion in 1986 that would alarm the Peruvian AND

state. Expectation of a change in the state’s anti-subversive strategy was TRAGEDY

heightened with the inauguration of Alan García on July 28, 1985. Abimael HE Guzmán, however, had no intention of offering a truce to the incoming : T

ONE administration. Instead, his plan was to undermine it as quickly as possible. He

ART therefore defined the party’s fundamental strategy as «unmasking» the APRA P party to «remove its progressive facade» and ensure the continued expansion of the «people’s war.»

Peru is burning, in the principal region, the south, center, north, Lima and the northern and southern areas around Lima. These actions, combined with our military actions such as the fire at Maruy, forced APRA’s hand, as we expected, to declare a state of emergency in the capital. It did it and went even beyond what we expected, announcing a curfew.

Guzmán did not propose waiting for APRA to show its «repressive underside,» but insisted that the governing party be forced to do so. Despite the new government’s initial willingness to investigate the massacres at Accomarca, Umaro and Bellavista and punish those responsible, Guzmán saw the need to provoke violent repression. «We must induce APRA to genocide,» was one of the agreements at the IV Plenary. «This is part of forcing APRA’s hand. It is not advocating death, but, as Marx stated, is part of the reaction that occurs every day in a constant civil war» (PCP-SL 1986b). An uprising by PCP-SL inmates in June 1986 in several prisons in Lima led to a massacre that dashed any hope of an anti-subversive strategy that respected human rights, which is what President García had offered. The action actually favored the PCP-SL, as the massacre not only fit into its strategy of «inducing genocide,» but strengthened the will to fight and fortified the role of the «shining trenches of combat» within the PCP-SL strategy. While there was internal criticism that the «quota» had been too high, Guzmán argued that the massacre of prisoners was a political defeat for the APRA government and, therefore, a victory for the PCP-SL. Guzman’s evaluation of the situation contradicted the opinions of his opponents within the PCP-SL. He considered the strategy to have been a «nota- ble, resounding and complete success,» while others held the opposite opinion. «There are reports that reveal a contradictory opinion, of people who do not see it as a success but as a minimized (sic) situation, even something black and negative. That is the case with N. in the north and H. in Cangallo, who expressed negative judgments; in the south there is similar pessimism in Huancavelica, 143 they express concern and don’t know how to manage it» (PCP-SL 1986c). Guzmán wanted to consolidate the concentration of power he had achieved at the IV Plenary of the Central Committee, and accused dissidents of being on the fringes and opposing the party’s decisions: «The IV Plenary defined the specific political content of the First Campaign, which was to undermine the RGANIZATIONS show mounted by the APRA government. Both N. and H. have shown that they O do not recognize the IV Plenary» (PCP-SL 1986c). According to Guzmán, his UBVERSIVE opponents were afraid of APRA, and that fear had turned them against the S party’s leaders. The discrepancies with the dissidents suddenly became a serious threat to the party: «Our mistakes redound on the party to which we belong and which allows us to participate in the glorious task of transforming our nation» (PCP- SL 1986c). The responsibility assigned to those who were suddenly considered enemies did not stop with the party; instead, the threat they posed was given a global dimension. «Our errors hamper the Peruvian revolution, the emancipation of the proletariat and harm the development of the world revolution.» The dissidents were crushed and forced to offer self-criticism three times. The Cen- tral Committee agreed «to call to attention C. [comrade] Noemí and learn a lesson so that these difficult situations are not repeated.» The incident was attributed to «situations of personal power» (PCP-SL 1986c), and the Politburo agreed not to open a full debate, but to «learn the lesson that incidents such as these generate a separation between base and leadership that exposes the revolution to serious risks, learn the lesson and never generate actions that separate the base from the leadership, because this leads to defeat.»

TABLE 4 144 National deployment 1986-1989 The perception of the PCP-SL as a monolithic organization that was highly IT

structured, with smooth ties between its leadership and local and regional FOR

groups, must be nuanced by the specific conduct that local and regional situations required of local commanders. Because of their extreme ideology, PCP-SL leaders were unable to RESPONSIBLE understand the errors in their strategy. After six years of war, that blindness

THOSE could be attributed to the way in which Abimael Guzmán imposed his ideas on

AND other leaders, who presented much more critical reports and interpretations that were based on the actual situation in their regions and organizational structures. TRAGEDY

HE In 1986, when the self-defense committees had turned the PCP-SL into

: T the principal enemy and the target of their «sweeps» through villages, Guzmán ONE does not seem to have understood the significance of that massive mobilization ART

P of peasants against the party’s cause. The PCP-SL continued to see the peasant patrols as nothing more than an «armed retinue» and «canon fodder» at the service of the armed forces, and the peasants under their control simply as «masses» in service to the revolution. The situation of the «people’s guerrilla army,» according to an analysis by Guzmán in 1985, revealed a reduced military capability, which was also seen in the statistics provided to PCP-SL leaders by the Cangallo-Fajardo Zone Committee, also known as the fundamental committee of the Principal Regional Committee, Ayacucho. Only 48 combatants formed the principal force – the force capable of attacking police stations and ambushing military patrols — of the most important zone committee within the PCP-SL. This force was a detachment of the «people’s guerrilla army» and was armed with weapons. The local force, on the other hand, only had basic weapons, while the base force, or masses, were unarmed. While the anti-subversive forces increased their control over rural areas in south-central Peru between 1986 and 1989, the PCP-SL also demonstrated that it was capable of spreading its violence to the central, northeast and southern Andean regions, as well as to the shantytowns of Lima, where it began an intense proselytizing campaign. Guzmán’s tragic call to «induce genocide» became a cruel reality in new areas around the nation. In the south-central region, the principal scene of PCP-SL activities between 1980 and 1985, the gradual increase in the armed forces’ control was due to the establishment of anti-subversive bases and the consolidation of the self-defense committees, which were established in areas that had originally opposed the committees, such as the provinces of Vilcashuamán and Cangallo. To counteract the military offensive, Guzmán proposed a series of actions:

[…] this third campaign is very important, it must be a clear demonstration that Ayacucho continues to be the center of the armed struggle, that it continues and challenges the government and the armed forces; the armed forces will eat their words and the new government will be forced to apply an iron fist. In that way we will remove the «democratic» facade, it will be unmasked and they will 145 once more debate how to combat us (PCP-SL 1985b).

Guzmán was referring to the third campaign of the great leap, the plan to «develop the people’s war» that the PCP-SL had scheduled for July through

November 1985. It was to end with the «great leap sealed in gold» in 1986. RGANIZATIONS The peasant patrols stepped up their activity in the jungle area of the O Apurímac River Valley, where the PCP-SL was trying to use its «retreats» as a UBVERSIVE way of dealing with the constant attacks by self-defense patrols, strengthening S its «camps,» continuously mobilizing its forces and increasing its pressure on the «masses» and its violence against most of the people in the valley. In the provinces of Huancavelica, which are in the south-central region, the partial pacification that resulted from the establishment of anti-subversive bases in rural areas was similar to the situation in Ayacucho. In an analysis of the reports from the PCP-SL committees mentioned above, Guzmán wrote that the principal base in Huancavelica «was surrounded, see how to recover it.» An example of how Guzmán deceived his mid-level leaders was the report that he gave to the Huancavelica zone committee after the events in Cayara: «Erusco is the largest ambush so far, 30 members of the armed forces dead, the sinister response of useless hate unleashed on the masses.»30 By 1986, the south-central region was not the only theater of war. The conflict had spread to other areas of the country, particularly the central region, the Huallaga Valley and Puno. Abimael Guzmán gave clear instructions to the Center Regional Committee in 1985:

[...] we must reclaim this principal axis [...] Develop the work around mining; develop the peasant invasions, breaking the fences and letting their livestock graze; destroying the production units, razing the SAIS so that they have no capital and can no longer repair the system. This will allow us to move a large number of peasant masses. If they are unable to move their livestock by breaking the fences and completing the invasion, then we will burn the pastures (PCP-SL 1985b).

Beginning in 1987, there was a rapid increase in the levels of violence in the central region, exceeding that of Ayacucho. The high Andean zones of Canipaco and Cunas, and the Tulumayo basin on the eastern slopes toward Satipo, became the principal scenario of the «destruction of the old state,» with an increase in attacks on police stations, and threats and assassinations of local authorities. In January 1988, the first «people’s committee» was installed in Chongos Altos (Canipaco), and the example spread throughout the high Andean region. In Alto Cunas, subversives destroyed the SAIS and public institutions, such as PROCAD in San Juan de Jarpa. The murder of authorities and other leaders, as well as people who were considered well-off or abusive, was frequent.

30 Meeting of the Huancavelica Zone Committee, September 21, 1988. 146 In Tulumayo, on the eastern slope of the Andes, the PCP-SL started building «people’s committees» in three districts in 1988. By 1989, however, the presence of the «principal force» became more violent and overbearing. The IT demand for goods became frequent and the PCP-SL’s measures more drastic. FOR This created the conditions that eventually led the PCP-SL to lose control. In the Mantaro Valley, where the main cities are located, and in the

RESPONSIBLE mining zone of the Junín department, the conflict took on different characteristics. «People’s committees» were not established, probably because the zone had THOSE strong ties to markets. The areas of violence were the cities and mining camps, AND

while the principal target of sabotage was the electricity grid that supplied the country from the hydroelectric plant in Quichuas, Tayacaja, on the Mantaro TRAGEDY

River. HE There were numerous attacks on public institutions in the city of : T

ONE Huancayo. The National University of the Center of Peru was the scene of intense

ART proselytizing, which was accompanied by acts of agitation and armed propa- P ganda in surrounding shantytowns. The organization also began calling armed strikes, which were added as a fifth form of struggle to the four that already being used: agitation and propaganda, sabotage, selective assassination and guerrilla combat. The increased violence in led the government to declare a state of emergency in the department of Junín on December 30, 1988, giving the Army responsibility for combating subversion. The PCP-SL attempted to take advantage of a number of mining union conflicts in 1988, assassinating union leaders who opposed the organization. Guzmán proposed concentrating the party’s efforts in the Mantaro Valley, although he recognized that the PCP-SL had been dealt serious blows in the region:

Where are we after the first part, in which we were hit hard and which led to the process of 1989 and 1990? Was it simply in Cerro and, above all, in taking Yanahuanca and Chaupihuaranga? What should we think? Was it just a small thing? Did it make sense? Yes it made sense, because it was part of our development. Have we progressed? Of course. Was it good? They forced us to advance. Later, in the second phase of our work in the center, when we took the provinces of Concepción, Jauja and Huancayo, the higher regions, […] did that not imply working in the Mantaro Valley? They hit us hard, committing genocide, forcing us to pull back and retreat. They beat us, but did they wipe us out? No. Were they able to stop us from moving to other places and developing? No. We expanded to a much wider area with greater prospects […] they have not wiped us out and since they have not annihilated us, there is no definite defeat (PCP-SL 1991d).

Concerning his comments about «taking of the provinces of Concepción, Jauja and Huancayo,» Guzmán specified that he was referring to the «upper regions,» the high plains of those provinces where the PCP-SL attacked the SAIS. The party had much less success in the lower regions of those provinces, where there were prosperous small haciendas, and in the cities, particularly Huancayo, where the PCP-SL placed particular emphasis on the national university. The PCP-SL took over the university on November 29, 1987, and began to developing 147 its organization and propaganda machine the following year, creating a spiral of violence that would last until 1993. One of the most important areas for the PCP-SL’s organizational development at this time was the central jungle, which was home to colonists and indigenous people, particularly the Asháninkas, a major lowland indigenous RGANIZATIONS people with 50,791 members, according to the 1993 Census. The Asháninkas represent O nearly one-fourth of the country’s lowland indigenous population. UBVERSIVE By October 1988, the department of Junín and the province of Oxapampa S had been put under a state of emergency. The PCP-SL had organized numerous «people’s committees» in the Ene River Valley, where it had «support bases» for its incursions. It expanded to the districts of Río Tambo, Pangoa and Mazamari, installing checkpoints in key areas to monitor river traffic, and near Puerto Ocopa, capital of the Río Tambo district, which allowed access to the three large valleys (Ene, Tambo and Perené). The Shining Path had a presence throughout the Satipo province. While its first settlement was linked to colonists,31 the PCP- SL gained strength in certain native communities, especially Asháninka communities, enrolling the population, often though force, and razing communities that resisted. In the northeastern region, particularly in the Huallaga Valley, the history of the PCP-SL demonstrates the unique characteristics of its ties to coca-growing farmers and the rise in the price of illicit drugs made from the coca leaf. The Upper Huallaga is one of the few areas where the PCP-SL managed to control an extensive amount of territory for a long period of time, between eight and 12 years. It is also the zone with the highest number of deaths after Ayacucho, with the worst violence registered in the provinces of Leoncio Prado (Huánuco) and Tocache (San Martín). The presence of drug-trafficking organizations in the region forced the PCP-SL commanders to develop a policy of coexistence that included charging fees for planes ferrying drug shipments, protecting drug shipments and eventually forming alliances for territorial control. Beginning in 1987, the PCP- SL started to create «liberated zones,» forcing the police to retreat from their stations. It forced the drug traffickers to disband their hit squads and created a system to regulate drug trafficking and ensure that farmers received a fair price for their coca. In 1987, as drug trafficking continued to spread, the PCP-SL launched a second phase, which included the assassination of political leaders, mayors, community leaders and public authorities, as well as the destruction of public buildings, bridges and other infrastructure, and takeovers of towns and cities. It also held «people’s trials» to publicly assassinate opponents. In the final stage of this phase, subversive activities extended to two provinces in the Loreto department. Aguaytía, capital of the province of Padre Abad, in the department

31 In this context, the term colonist refers to the non-indigenous population, especially people from the Andes who began migrating to the central jungle region in the 1960s, when the state supported «colonization» of the jungle, promising incentives and access routes, such as the Marginal Highway. 148 of Ucayali, became the PCP-SL’s center of operations. At the start of the 1990s, an estimated one-third of the principal and local forces of the «people’s guerri- lla army» were active in the region. IT In the southern Andes, a new front in the war was opened in 1986 in the FOR highlands of Puno, where the PCP-SL attempted to take advantage of tensions between communities and cooperatives created through the agrarian reform.

RESPONSIBLE These tensions increased at the start of the García government. The bishops of Puno met with García and demanded a solution to the land problem to keep the THOSE tragedy that was unfolding in Ayacucho from being avoid repeated in their AND

department. In 1986, the government passed a supreme decree restructuring the cooperatives and ordering the redistribution of land. President García pledged TRAGEDY

to redistribute 1.1 million hectares of land to communities. The initiative, HE however, was blocked by sectors that would lose out in the deal, and the situation : T

ONE grew more explosive. Besides the questions raised by technicians in charge of

ART carrying out the land redistribution, there were also problems caused by the P creation of «communities in formation,» phantom entities created to circumvent the demands of peasant communities. At the end of 1985, tired waiting for the central government to act, peasants began a wave of land occupations in Azángaro and Melgar, which lasted through 1986. It was in that social context that the PCP-SL decided to attack cooperatives, just as it had in the north (La Libertad and Cajamarca) and center (Junín) of the country. Subversive actions in Puno were concentrated in the provinces of Melgar and Azángaro —where the largest number of deaths occurred – and intertwined with the land takeovers sponsored by the Departmental Peasant Federation of Puno. The destruction of cooperatives and harassment and murder of local authorities continued in 1986 and 1987. Meanwhile, the PCP-SL column led by Comrade Anselmo was practically eliminated in April 1987 as a result of the murder of Zenobio Huarsaya, a peasant leader and left-wing mayor from the community of Salinas. His murder, which provoked widespread opposition to the PCP-SL among peasants, helped lead to the military defeat of the PCP-SL column. Nevertheless, only a year after the elimination of Anselmo’s column, the PCP-SL set up a new column in Melgar and Azángaro, which began operating in May 1988 with the goal of destroying the SAIS. That column took over communities and hamlets to execute «enemies of the people» and authorities who refused to step down. Using the same tactics it had applied in other areas, the PCP-SL created a power vacuum and began its plan of building the «new power.» In January 1989, the PCP-SL column began an offensive to finish off the cooperatives and destroy the Waqrani Institute of Rural Education, a training organization run by the Ayaviri Prelature. On January 20, the column attacked the Sollocota SAIS, but it was defeated by the local police. The PCP-SL’s control also spread in the department of Apurímac, especially the highland regions. Assassinations were recorded in the province of Aymaraes beginning in 1987, and there were attacks and confrontations with security forces in the provinces of Antabamba and Cotabambas. The Shining Path set up «people’s committees» in Cotabambas, which became the first province in the southern Andes to be placed under a state of emergency to combat the PCP-SL, which had been assassinating lieutenant governors, peasant leaders 149 and livestock rustlers. Subversive activity in the department of Cusco was also aimed at creating a power vacuum so that the organization could fill the void with its new power. In Metropolitan Lima and the surrounding area, there were two clear examples of increased PCP-SL actions in 1985: the attack on Domingo García Rada, president RGANIZATIONS of the National Elections Board, on April 24, 1985; and a blackout followed by O sabotage, including car bombings near the presidential palace and Palace of UBVERSIVE Justice, on June 7, as outgoing President Fernando Belaúnde was hosting a state S visit by Argentine President Raúl Alfonsín. It was the first time the PCP-SL had used car bombs. As noted above, the People’s Support Committee began playing a much more important role in Lima at this time. In addition, the 1986 prison massacres seriously shook the Metropolitan Committee and allowed the People’s Support Committee to displace it as the principal force. In June 1986, there were coordinated uprisings by inmates accused of terrorism in the Lurigancho, El Frontón and Santa Bárbara prisons. The uprisings ended with the intervention of the armed forces and the massacre of inmates. The history of the prison uprising and subsequent massacre began unfolding a year earlier. As the PCP-SL started the campaigns of the «great leap,» inmates in the Lima prisons, following orders from party leaders, turned the jails into «shining trenches of combat.» On July 13, 1985, inmates in the El Frontón, Lurigancho and Callao prisons launched simultaneous uprisings, demanding that the government consider them «special prisoners.» While they pressed for special benefits, the real reason for the uprising was to protest the decision to transfer inmates to a new maximum-security facility, Canto Grande, which would have disrupted the communication network they had created within the prisons. On October 4, the tension led to an intervention by the armed forces, which left 32 inmates dead in the Lurigancho prison. In keeping with their plan to «induce genocide» and «unmask the fascist government of García Pérez,» PCP-SL militants began a wave of selective assassinations. On October 24, 1985, they killed Miguel Castro Castro, warden of El Frontón. On January 15, 1986, a confrontation between inmates’ relatives and the Civil Guard during the inauguration of the Canto Grande prison left one person dead and 14 injured. On January 31, a Civil Guard captain was assassinated, and on February 5, retired Army Commander Rubén Izquierdo, who had worked for the intelligence service, was killed. The seriousness of these events led the government to declare a state of emergency in Lima and Callao on February 7. That decision was seen as a «success» by the PCP-SL leaders, who announced that «we have forced him [President García] to declare a state of emergency in the capital of the republic» (PCP-SL 1986c). According to their calculations, the genocide they were expecting would soon begin and the government «would have to impose terror on the poor neighborhoods, because in Las Casuarinas they will not knock on the doors, they suck up [to people 150 there]. If this kind of a plan is developed, it would imply […] a more favorable situation for us» (PCP-SL 1986c). In the wake of those events, selective assassinations became more frequent. IT Between January and May 1986, PCP-SL militants in Lima killed Navy Officer FOR José Alzadora, who had been stationed in Ayacucho (March 14); Ica Prefect Ma- nuel Santana Chiri (March 24); Navy Admiral Carlos Ponce Canessa (May 5);

RESPONSIBLE and retired Civil Guard Major Felipe Delgado, who had served in Ayacucho (May 9). On May 26, subversives attempted to assassinate Alberto Kitasono, THOSE APRA’s national secretary. AND

After a peak in 1986, PCP-SL actions declined until 1988. The fewest attacks in the capital during the 1980s were registered during this period. Between TRAGEDY

November and December 1988, to commemorate the birthdays of Guzmán and HE Mao, the Shining Path began a new stage. The launch of new actions could have : T

ONE come earlier, but the arrest Osmán Morote on June 11, 1988 revealed the fragility

ART of the PCP-SL’s security systems in Lima. P The PCP-SL’s main presence in Lima between 1986 and 1988 was through the work of the People’s Support Committee. This organization, which until 1985 had only carried out tasks related to militants’ health, legal assistance and some propaganda campaigns, was transformed into a «party committee» and came under the direct control of the party’s leadership. Guzmán’s decision to strengthen the People’s Support Committee stemmed from the weakness of the party’s structure in Lima, the importance of the city in the Shining Path’s plan to create a front and the central committee’s doubts about the «Metro.» The People’s Support Committee grew notably beginning in 1985, when, on orders from the leadership, it militarized and created its own detachments and militias. It had a pyramid structure and each level was divided into three parts: Party, Army and Front. In the northern provinces of the Lima department (Cajatambo, Oyón) and the southern provinces of Ancash (Ocros, Bolognesi), which was home the Mid- Northern Zone Committee, the initial work of reconnaissance and establishing contacts grew into actions aimed at taking direct control of territory and creating a power vacuum by killing authorities and attacking police stations. Nevertheless, as with other areas, that stage ended with increasing conflicts between communities and local PCP-SL commanders after the principal force withdrew.

Massive flight forward: 1989-1992 From the start of the «people’s war,» the PCP-SL developed a deliberate and systematic personality cult around its leaders. Unlike other historic processes, however, Guzmán himself played a key role in creating the cult, declaring that «the head of the revolution» (himself) was an irreplaceable guarantee of final victory. The personality cult was similar to the ones that grew up around Stalin and Mao Zedong, for whom Guzmán publicly proclaimed his admiration. When referring to «President Gonzalo,» the PCP-SL’s propaganda machine employed only superlatives: «the greatest living Marxist on the earth» or «the fourth sword of Marxism.»32 151 In addition, the style of the party’s debates, which were based on a «clash between two lines» in which the «correct line,» that of the proletariat, crushed the bourgeois «erroneous line» and supporters of the latter were publicly humiliated and forced to offer self-criticism, reinforced Guzman’s supremacy as party leader. RGANIZATIONS O

The clash between two lines is transcendental, it is the class struggle within UBVERSIVE

the party, the motor of the party, because it is the contradiction within the S party [...] How do we proceed? Reviewing our party experience, we are going to adopt the methods used in the IX Plenary when we approved the ILA [...] A first method is piercing it and the next is separating it. The first step, piercing, means piercing and defining it within the party, which will be done by the following people, Comrades Nicolás, Juana, Sara and Augusto. The order implies responsibility, they must destroy the positions, destroy them among themselves so that there is no trace of the gang, and then define the position to the party. The second, separating and adopting a position, will be done by Feliciano, Noemí and Arturo. The order implies responsibility, they need to separate positions to ensure that there is no trace of convergence. They must rip to pieces the nefarious criteria presented here and supported in the past and take a position. After this, they will be judged by the Congress (15 votes, because four will not offer an opinion). The Congress will decide if the comrades supporting the first or second methods have resolved the problem. If the problem is not resolved, the Congress decides who signs the accords (PCP-SL 1988e).

The figure of «President Gonzalo» was basically divine. The party militants sacrificed their individuality to him through «letters of subjugation» in which they promised in writing to offer their lives for the party’s cause and its maximum leader. This unconditional support produced a kind of religious bond between the cadres and their leader. A party militant jailed in Lima said, when discussing the historic significance of the party leader, that he «takes over the ego, moves the soul and enchants the spirit, giving the individual, as part of the whole, a reason to live. As an individual I am nothing, but with the masses and applying Gonzalo Thought, I can be a hero; physically dying for the revolution, I will live eternally» (Roldán 1990: 116). Toward the end of 1983, Abimael Guzmán was transformed into «President Gonzalo» for three basic reasons: He was president of the Central Committee, president of the National Military Commission and president of the Organizing Commission of the New Democratic Republic. «President Gonza- lo» replicated the structure of the Chinese Communist Party, in which Mao Zedong was president before taking power.

32 The first three swords were Marx, Lenin and Mao; «Doctor» Guzmán (the title was constantly highlighted in party literature) was the rightful successor. Although Guzmán maintains that there are no party documents referring to him as the «fourth sword,» that designation was widely used by party militants and in the propaganda tools of the time, including El Nuevo Diario. 152 The providential role played by «President Gonzalo» was consecrated by the PCP-SL within the party’s name. In January 1983, the party’s official name became the «Communist Party of Peru, Marxist-Leninist-Maoist-Guiding IT Thought.»33 That definition was fundamental for addressing any ideological FOR discrepancy that might arise. The basic way of handling differences was to turn to the party’s orthodoxy, invoking fidelity to the scientifically established

RESPONSIBLE revolutionary principles. In that view, Marxist-Leninist-Maoist theory is science, and scientific understanding is supreme; everything else is wrong. THOSE

AND

The First PCP-SL Congress in 1988: «Gonzalo Thought» The First PCP-SL Congress was held in 1988 under the absolute leadership of TRAGEDY

HE Guzmán. Eight years after launching the armed struggle, the PCP-SL held its

: T first congress in Lima in three sessions: one at the end of January and beginning ONE of February 1988, the second in August-September 1988, and the third and final ART

P session in June 1989. Abimael Guzmán called the party leaders together for a congress in the midst of the armed conflict, when he believed that conditions were ripe for consolidating his role as «indisputable head of the PCP-SL» and for approving the declaration by which «Gonzalo Thought» would contribute to the Peruvian revolution and, according to his logic, world revolution. The surviving members of the Central Committee that had launched the armed conflict participated in the first session of the First Congress, which was called the «son of the people’s war and the party.» They included Augusta La Torre and Elena Iparraguirre, who were members of the Permanent Committee, as well as leaders who had proven themselves in the field, such as Óscar Ramírez Durand, Feliciano, who was in charge of the «Principal Regional Committee.» Also present were the heads of the regional committees and the party’s principal organizations. Approximately 30 people, including participants and «supporters,» attended the session. At the end of the third session of the First Congress, the party «selected» 19 full members and four alternates for the Cen- tral Committee. The end of the Congress was videotaped, and Guzmán and the rest of the national leadership can be seen doing «Zorba’s Dance,» from the movie Zorba the Greek. Based on a review of documents, the fundamental objective of the PCP- SL’s First Congress was to reaffirm Guzman’s leadership and elevate «Gonzalo Thought» to party dogma, a proposal that produced significant debate among the participants. Guzmán, referring to himself in the third person, presented the thesis that he was the bearer of a new kind of thinking that would allow for a «scientific» understanding of social and political phenomena, as well as the development of the revolutionary struggle in the country and in other nations. Guzmán’s central ideas about «Gonzalo Thought,» or his own way of thinking,

33 In the years leading up the armed struggle, Abimael Guzmán claimed he had given the PCP-SL an ideological identity, strategy and tactic by creatively applying Marxism-Leninism-Maoism to the specific conditions of the Peruvian revolution, which he called “the path of Mariátegui and its development.” He would later talk about “guiding thought.” were presented during the first session of the party congress. It is enlightening 153 to see that Guzmán himself presented «Gonzalo Thought» and called on the other participants to accept it as a continuation of the «guiding thought» used earlier.

When the document on the general political line was written and addressed RGANIZATIONS in the CP, I maintained that the principal problem of this document is Gonzalo O Thought. I reconfirm this. The majority of you here present have been in

open conflict [...]. Gonzalo Thought is the creative integration (I have not UBVERSIVE S come here to talk about desire and whoever sees this as personal desire is a bastard), the fusion of the universal truth that today is the Maoism for which we labor, the Maoism against which they clash. Nothing is chance, everything has a cause. That they have clashed with Maoism, that is the limit of stinginess, the stupidity of class. In summary, as a transcendental and fundamental issue we need to approve the Foundation of Party Unity: Marxism-Leninism-Maoism-Gonzalo Thought, General Political Line and Program, and that is what we are going to approve even if the heavens were to split open, that is something I am absolutely certain that we will do.34

In addressing the Congress, Guzmán returns to this idea over and over:

We need a CC [...] committed to studying the theory indicated by the party, because that is the way we will penetrate the united formation we must have. Why? Because Marx, Lenin, Mao: Are the leaders of the world revolution, and whoever belongs to the party is a subsidiary. A leader is a necessity [...] leaders are chosen in intense struggles [...] but a leader is only a symbol of a revolution or the world revolution. An example: the prisoners of war in the Spanish Civil War kept up their optimism looking at an image of Lenin, these are things we must understand.

The First Congress allowed the party to move from «Guiding Thought» – the improved continuation of Mariátegui’s thinking and its development» – to «Gonzalo Thought.» There were criticisms, but they were beaten down by Guzmán:35

34 Guzmán’s presentation at the first session of the First Congress. 35 “If we look at, for example, the Interview [of the Century] the debate can be centered initially on the first part and everyone has an opinion. There are ideas that clash with each other, they are separated and differentiated, isolated so that they can be reduced for attack, and in this way the scope of education is broadened. They need to offer self-criticism as many times as is demanded by the assembly. They need to see the ideological, historical and social roots of their errors and deviations, and how to correct them. And those who criticize must also offer self- criticism and show that they are different from the others; those implicated could generate an LOD (línea oportunista de derecha, or opportunistic right-wing line), because each one will offer something to structure it. This is not a simple struggle between two lines, but a way developed so that it could be lived by the militants. It is aimed at ideas, at remolding militants to the party’s life in general; one has to adjust one’s own ideas, to see what blocks the BUP (base de unidad partidaria, or foundation of party unity), consider the circumstances, see the contents of the mistake and find the social, historical and class reasons for it; [analyze] the attitude, how the class struggle is unfolding and see oneself not as an individual, but as part of a class. Apply what President Mao teaches us: A conflict of ideas.” Speech by Guzmán during the second session of the First Congress, 1989. 154 Compare President Gonzalo to Mariátegui and President Gonzalo to President Mao Tse Tung [...] First, it is absurd to compare historical figures, we could IT never compare Marx with Lenin or with President Mao [...] FOR

To raise Mariátegui to oppose Gonzalo Thought is to fail to understand that in the world there exists Maoism [...] I have said that only through President Mao have I been able to gain a greater understanding and appreciation for RESPONSIBLE

Mariátegui. Another thought [...] implies that there are other ways of thinking, and that THOSE runs counter to Gonzalo Thought. AND A higher fusion [...]. Other fusions? There is no other. Mariátegui is not, because he is the fusion of Marxism-Leninism with reality, and it is President TRAGEDY

Gonzalo who has proposed similarities between some of the theses presented HE by Mariátegui and the laws established by President Mao.36 : T ONE The formalization of «Gonzalo Thought» as an extension of the existing ART P «isms» was the first step. Guzman’s idea, we now know, was to later approve «Gonzalism,» and institute it as a universally accepted doctrine within revolutionary theory. The PCP-SL, therefore, would be the birthplace of Marxism- Leninism-Maoism and «Gonzalism.»

Ism has a clear meaning. Thought is nothing more than a collection of ideas, and ism is a doctrine that correctly interprets all the material in its three forms: nature, class struggle and understanding. It is not a problem of terminology, the problem is whether or not it has universal truth; if it is an ism, it has it [universal truth]; if it is not an ism, it does not.

The First Congress discussed and approved «Gonzalo Thought,» not only as an application of a «universal truth,» which is Maoism, but as the bearer of «creative aspects» that could become «a contribution to world revolutionary doctrine,» a necessary condition for it to one day become «Gonzalism.» In other words, the implicit objective of the PCP-SL Congress was to affirm the leadership of Abimael Guzmán, who was no longer just the head of the party, but its ideological inspiration, opposed to debate because his words were irrefutable. With his thought now party dogma, the only thing militants were allowed to do was repeat what «President Gonzalo» said. For the PCP-SL, the Congress that began in 1988 was the end of a long process of creating an omnipresent leadership based on an internal dictator. From that time on, «President Gonzalo» had sole power to choose party leaders, independently of any formal process. In the first session of the Congress, the leadership was defined after the reports from the different committees and base groups were presented. That transcended party structures, as Guzmán not only saw himself as the leader of the party, but as the bearer of a way of thinking that was the culmination of the praxis of millions of communists in the world and which revealed the laws that

36 Guzmán during the first session of the First Congress. guided the development of nature, society and the thinking of all people. Gon- 155 zalo was the absolute leader of the PCP-SL and secretly hoped to become a reference point for true communists around the world who had been left without a leader after Mao’s death. Some of the provincial leaders present at the Congress stated that

Guzman’s proposal was a negation of Mariátegui, and that by placing himself RGANIZATIONS above Mariátegui, Guzmán also putting himself before Mao. The Congress was O the scene of a debate in which those who opposed Guzman’s proposal, which UBVERSIVE was camouflaged as an initiative of the Politburo, were forced to undergo a S process of «self-criticism» using the «piercing method,» facing fierce criticism so that they would «recognize» that it had been an error to question the canonization of «Gonzalo Thought.» The other significant points approved at the Congress indicated that the PCP-SL was moving further away from reality. If reality had been taken into account, Guzmán would have been forced to do two things: First, go to the countryside, because «the leadership must direct the war,» and the PCP-SL’s war was in the countryside (he only needed to recall Mao in Yenan); and second, present a plan that would have permitted an alliance of forces strong enough to govern the country once the party came to power. The First Congress did approve a plan, but it was extremely general and basically repeated earlier proposals, such as «struggle against the bourgeois,» «totally and completely destroy the armed forces of the enemy» and «destroy the bureaucratic, landowning state.» In addition, the final agreement to achieve «strategic equilibrium» was defined as a military offensive without taking into account the force needed for this or a plan for the future. After the First Congress, the PCP-SL further defined the party with the tag «principally» added before Gonzalo Thought in the official name, «Communist Party of Peru, Marxist-Leninist-Maoist, Principally Gonzalo Thought.»

Adopting position: The participants of the I Congress of the Communist Party of Peru adopt the following position: For Marxism-Leninism-Maoism-Gonzalo Thought, for the Congress, for the fundamental documents of the party and assuming the solemn commitment to study, debate and apply them, for the brilliant success of the Congress, for the development of the people’s war in function of world revolution, recognition and subjugation to the leadership of President Gonzalo, unifying center of the party and guarantee of its triumph, subjugation to his leadership and the party (1988e).

Adopting «Gonzalo Thought» as the new orthodox principle created complications for the PCP-SL at the international level, specifically with the Revolutionary Internationalist Movement (Movimiento Revolucionario Internacio- nalista, MRI), an organization of small Maoist parties around the world that offered the PCP-SL some support for its international propaganda even though 156 it maintained discrepancies with the thesis of «Gonzalo Thought». Finally, one of the conclusions of the First Congress would have crucial implications for the course of the armed conflict: IT

FOR We must move from a guerrilla war to a war of movements. It is with this great plan that has been definitively approved, not only its greatness but also its objectives and development, that we will achieve strategic

RESPONSIBLE 37 equilibrium. THOSE

AND One of the visible consequences of the First Congress was the regaining of the PCP-SL’s presence in Lima. After a noticeable decline in its actions in 1987-

TRAGEDY 88, a new phase began in 1989 and increased in strength until it peaked in 1992.

HE Determining factors in the renewal of the PCP-SL’s actions in Lima were

: T the adjustments made to its internal organization and the decision to «move ONE forward» after the Congress approved the decision to fight for strategic ART

P equilibrium. The party had started to implement the fourth military plan, «develop support bases,» and as part of that strategic framework it launched the Revolutionary Movement for Defense of the People (Movimiento Revolucionario de Defensa del Pueblo, MRDP) in August 1987. The PCP-SL saw the «movement» as consolidating the different organizations active in Lima to provoke coordinated actions (armed strikes) and move ahead with what they defined as the «incorporation of masses.» The fundamental strategy for urban areas was organizing the work with the masses. This was to be carried out by the MRDP through an unending war against «revisionism.» The «foundations for discussion of the general political line,» developed at the First Congress in 1988, stated:

Organize the masses so that they go beyond the legally established order, struggle to destroy the old order and not maintain it. These are the three instruments of the revolution: party, which incorporates few; army, which incorporates more; and state-front, which gathers the masses by leaps and progressively into people’s committees in the countryside and in the Revolutionary Movement for Defense of the People in the cities. In this way, break the electoral tradition of the revisionists and opportunists, which igno- res the peasants and does not take into account what is most important in the cities, power through the war (PCP-SL 1988a).

In this way, the PCP-SL had to take advantage of the demands being made by the population and infuse them with the party’s political objectives: «We must develop the struggle in function of Power, this is the political principle of work with the masses» (PCP-SL 1988a). The same document went on to highlight the role of the proletariat and the immediate political objective for that sector: «we cannot leave them in the hands of revisionism or opportunism.» It was necessary to «sweep away the

37 Third session of the First Congress, 1989. colossal mountain of trash.» It emphasized that the shantytowns had always 157 been important to the PCP-SL, reflected in a 1976 directive that stated: «take neighborhoods and shantytowns as bases and the proletariat as leaders.» That meant «mobilizing, politicizing, organizing and arming» the people for «combat.» In other words, the masses needed to be educated for the «people’s war.» In relation to the cities, the document stated: RGANIZATIONS O

In the cities, the work of the masses is carried out through the army and what UBVERSIVE

matters is the struggle for power, with local struggles as a necessary S complement in function of power, obviously including diverse armed actions to solidify new forms of organization. We must strengthen the Revolutionary Movement for Defense of the People (MRDP), gathering the masses of workers, peasants, neighborhood groups and petit bourgeoisie, neutralizing the mid-level bourgeoisie and incorporating the democratic forces in favor of the war. The objective is to lead the masses to resistance and elevate their struggles to the people’s war to block, undermine and attack the old state and serve the future insurrection by preparing a specific people’s war as a complement in the cities. We will use the dual policy to develop our own form, which is the most important, and penetrate all kinds of organizations. We will apply the strategy of combat and resist (PCP-SL 1988a).

According to the document, there was a clear connection between the accelerated campaign in the highlands and the work of the PCP-SL in the capital. While the information presented above demonstrates that the PCP-SL was still too weak to sustain a high-intensity conflict in the city, its ability to mobilize around specific political objectives appears to have been greater at this point than at any time in the past. PCP-SL militants began to exert a visible presence in unions, neighborhood associations, student organizations, sporting clubs and other groups. In the same way, it strengthened its generating organizations, always using the slogan, «combat and defeat revisionism and reformism that oppose the people’s war.» This was particularly evident in the industrial zone along the Central Highway. The PCP-SL attempted to influence the unions by having members of the generating organizations run in internal union elections. The efforts to elect union leaders failed, however, because of the strong presence of the General Confederation of Peruvian Workers and the United Left among workers in the area. In mid-1987, after a phase of recruiting supporters through a campaign of discrediting union leaders, who were accused of «conciliatory revisionism,» the PCP-SL began more direct actions that ranged from handing out pamphlets at factory entrances to sabotaging the plants (as in the case of Nylon, Rayón, Bata, Nissan and others along the Central Highway) and accusing union leaders of being «traitors.» In addition, the subversives attempted to spark confrontations between the union movement and security forces by infiltrating protest marches and strikes to promote violence. At the same time, the PCP-SL tried to create its own union base and recruit the heads of the union «struggle 158 commands» for joint actions. The party called its first armed strike along the Central Highway on January 19, 1989. Lima, in the words of Guzmán, was the «drum» of the PCP-SL actions, it IT was a like a sound box with national and international reverberations, which is FOR why it became the principal scenario for the party’s high-impact activities. It is also known that Guzmán and the rest of the PCP-SL’s central leadership never

RESPONSIBLE left Lima, which allowed them direct links to the Metropolitan Committee and the People’s Support Committee. THOSE

AND

1990-1991: «Strategic equilibrium» After solidifying his leadership in the First Congress, Guzmán proposed an TRAGEDY

HE objective for the PCP-SL that would have a direct influence on the armed conflict:

: T He forced the Congress to approve what he had outlined in several documents ONE as «strategic equilibrium.» ART P […] we began and solidified the armed struggle (ILA 80), today we begin conquering power in all the country. We call this strategic equilibrium and we specify it and highlight it more than ever before: «Equilibrium and preparation for the counteroffensive; the enemy is regaining positions to maintain its system so we must prepare the strategic offensive to build the conquest of power.» We have to insist on this, on how to solidify equilibrium with the enemy (PCP-SL 1991d).

The proclamation of «strategic equilibrium» in the revolutionary war was very important to Guzmán:

We are, since the Congress, proposing to build the conquest of power and we are building this conquest. Strategic equilibrium is a political fact, not a mere statement; we are building the conquest of power […]. We have also embarked on «preparing the strategic offensive by ‘Building the Conquest of Power,’ given that strategic equilibrium leads to the next stage, our strategic offensive […] We insist, it is a material fact, real, it exists in matter, in society, in the class struggle in this country, in the people’s war and it is reflected in ideas. Make the people know it and live it: We have entered the stage of strategic equilibrium (Guzmán 1988).

This idea did not take into account the changes in the armed force’s anti- subversive strategy – which had shifted from indiscriminate repression and razing communities in the «red zones» to selective assassinations through intelligence work and the policy of winning back the population under the PCP- SL’s control – or the magnitude of the peasants’ rebellion against the party. It also ignored the weight of the self-defense committees throughout the country, which were stronger at this point than in 1983-84 because they were receiving weapons from the state. In fact, the initial alliance between peasant communities and the PCP-SL had been broken in much of the countryside, and peasants were forming alliances with the security forces at different levels and with varying amounts of independence depending on the particular characteristics of the regions. This reality went unnoticed by the PCP-SL leaders, for whom the party 159 was the authentic representative of the interests of the proletariat and the peasantry. For Guzmán and the top leadership, if the peasantry was rising up against the PCP-SL that was a consequence of the intervention of outside agents, the yanaumas («black heads»), who were coerced and instigated by the military.38

According to Guzmán, the PCP-SL had reached «strategic equilibrium» RGANIZATIONS because it had always maintained the initiative and had carried out its political O and military plans. Guzmán was incapable of seeing anything that contradicted UBVERSIVE his plans, including the selective elimination of PCP-SL militants and S sympathizers that was part of the military’s new anti-subversive strategy. For Guzmán, this was only a desperate move by the state to attempt to contain the victorious spread of the «new power.» After the First Congress, the PCP-SL implemented the plan to achieve «strategic equilibrium» by increasing the number of subversive actions. That plan, however, would lead to the party’s defeat. In the words of Feliciano: «We left the Congress and we had to carry out operations, operations, operations» — ambushes on military patrols and attacks on military outposts that escalated the armed confrontations. The PCP-SL, however, did not have the forces to combat the military in each regional committee. The PCP-SL’s bases or committees were able to survive as long as they were not mobilized or were used only to attack other communities or recruit new followers. To achieve «strategic equilibrium,» however, the armed columns of the «people’s guerrilla army» were forced to carry out constant attacks, which led to numerous losses for the Principal Force in each region. That dynamic eventually forced Feliciano to take refuge in the Ene River area in 1992 in order to survive. In short, Guzmán introduced a change that had massive consequences for the political line just as the PCP-SL was entering a critical phase from which it would not recover. It is relevant to note that among the more than 100 theses put forth by Mao Zedong on the «people’s war,» only one refers to «strategic equilibrium,» defined simply as a transition period from a defensive to an offensive strategy. For Guzmán, however, «strategic equilibrium» became the central point of discussion and the key element for the PCP-SL. What was implied by that decision? According to Guzmán, it meant a different kind of military action in Ayacucho, which would include assaults on cities such Huanta and Ayacucho, as well as an increase in actions in Lima. The aim of his strategy was to surround the cities from the countryside, but taking «the countryside as a base and the city as a complement.» In order to achieve strategic equilibrium in the countryside, the emphasis had to shift from the Fundamental Zone Committee

38 Note the similarity between this situation and the one that existed at the start of the war, when President Belaúnde blamed the violence on the presence of outside agitators trying to destabilize Peru. In an interview on the Callao Naval Base, Abimael Guzmán, when asked about the use of coercion with the masses and the precariousness of the number of followers he attracted, stated that, according to President Mao, the active support of the masses was only needed immediately before taking power. Asked about his authoritarianism, he said that the question reflected a lack of knowledge of how to interpret the objective interests of the «masses». 160 — the provinces of Cangallo and Victor Fajardo – to the Ayacucho Zone Committee —Huamanga, Huanta and La Mar — while in Lima the party needed to build the «people’s committees for struggle,» which were equivalent to the IT «people’s committees» in the countryside. Raucana and María Parado de Belli- FOR do, shantytowns along the Central Highway, would be models for developing revolutionary support bases in the city.

RESPONSIBLE At the start of 1989, the regional PCP-SL leaders reported serious difficulties caused, among other things, by the new relationship between the THOSE armed forces and the self-defense committees and the peasants’ opposition to AND

the PCP-SL’s directives. Despite these reports, Abimael Guzmán forced the PCP- SL Congress to adopt his proposal to «fight to achieve strategic equilibrium» as TRAGEDY

the central element of the new military plan. HE The notion of «strategic equilibrium» as an imminent possibility can be : T

ONE found in Abimael Guzman’s political and military analysis throughout the armed

ART conflict. Guzmán broke the elemental norms for understanding conflict with the P armed forces, since he knew the PCP-SL had not achieved equilibrium with the state’s security forces. Years later, Guzmán would state that «strategic equilibrium» was not centered on conflict with the security forces, but instead on destroying the governance of the nation. In 1993, when he proposed conversations for a «peace accord,» which produced an internal division within the PCP-SL, he stated that the organization was incapable of taking power: «we prepared to induce the participation of Yankee imperialism. Did we think we would take power in three or four years? No. And we did not think that Lima would become the center of combat» (PCP-SL 1993a). The evolution of Guzmán’s ideas about «strategic equilibrium» are nothing more than a reflection of his cynicism and the manipulation he demonstrated during and after the First Congress.

[...] from the point of view of power, we achieved a great leap. What was our goal? The People’s Republic of Peru [...] From the point of view of the development of the people’s war, we evolved this way: From guerrilla war to a war of movements (with four key moments) and we reached strategic equilibrium. As a consequence, through the plan followed and completed, including the initial plan and the three campaigns of the people’s war, we achieved strategic equilibrium and began preparing for insurrection in the cities. Considering the plan to surround the city from the countryside, the initial plan, principally strategic equilibrium and the development of the third campaign, we proposed transferring the center of our efforts from the countryside to the city. How has this worked? It must be studied very seriously taking into account concrete realities above all (PCP-SL 1993a).

From the military standpoint, his assessment was equally subjective: «We are building the conquest of power. Why has this become more urgent? We have passed the four key moments in the leap from guerrilla warfare to the war of movements and this demonstrates how the process is unfolding» (PCP-SL 1993a). This position assumed that the subversive organization had a regular force (an army) that was capable of moving from irregular actions or «strategic 161 defense» (armed propaganda, sabotage, attacks, terrorism, guerrilla warfare) to the first stage of a regular war, the war of movements, with regular confrontations with security forces that included a military based on divisions (artillery, logistics, engineering, etc.), even if it was not capable of defending territory and had to combine actions with «guerrilla» tactics. «Another of the RGANIZATIONS changes is that guerrilla war becomes a war of movements, which is the princi- O pal war, but this does not exclude guerrilla warfare as the fundamental action UBVERSIVE in the immediate term» (PCP-SL 1993a). This would be the prelude to the final S stage of the revolutionary war, the «strategic offensive,» in which armed actions would take on the characteristics of a war of positions and the subversives would be in a position to defend territory. For Mao Zedong, the transition from countryside to city as the principal scenario of war is associated with highly developed military and political work in the countryside. The idea of «surrounding the cities» and the fall of cities is the final stage of the war, the prelude to the final victory. As is evident, these conditions were not present in Peru at the end of the 1980s. On the contrary, the massive development of self-defense committees throughout most of the country and the peasant rebellion against the PCP-SL’s «people’s power» were a clear setback for the subversive organization compared to the conditions in the mid- 1980s. Abimael Guzmán’s proclamation of «strategic equilibrium» represented a kind of flight to the future. The PCP-SL had to deal with the loss of strength in the countryside, given that massacres of peasant communities were no longer useful for stopping an organized, armed rebellion against them by the peasantry. Guzman’s response was to intensify armed actions in the city. In 1993 and already behind bars, Guzmán reinterpreted the «offensive» in Lima – reflected in the number of car bombs detonated in the city between February and July 1992 – as an attempt to force the United States to intervene in Peru. With that objective, he gave the PCP-SL militants a sense of false expectation, encouraging them to continue their actions because «power was just around the corner.» As part of his fantasy, before his arrest Guzmán proposed changing the names of the PCP-SL’s principal structures: The EGP would become the People’s Army of National Liberation, ready to fight the U.S. invasion; the Republic of the New Democracy would become the People’s Republic of Peru, given that the Unified Front built to fight the imperialist army would include the nation’s bourgeoisie. For that reason, according to Guzmán, the massive car bombing on Tarata Street in Lima’s Miraflores district was a mistake, because it undermined the PCP-SL’s ability to recruit the nation’s bourgeoisie. The fifth military plan, «develop support bases to serve the conquest of power,» which was launched after the First Congress, obeyed the order to achieve «strategic equilibrium» and move from the «guerrilla war» to the «war of movements.» Actions were no longer carried out by columns but by «battalions,» even though these existed in name only. A Shining Path battalion may only have 162 had five armed fighters from the principal force and 40 peasants from the local or support force. Feliciano summarized this stage with one phrase: «Abimael Guzmán was fighting a Nintendo war.»39 He talked about fictitious battalions IT and campaigns, and forced the «people’s guerrilla army» in different areas of the FOR country to call on its «strategic reserves» to fight the armed forces on unequal footing. RESPONSIBLE

FIGURE 2 THOSE

AND

PERU 1980-2000: SHINING PATH MILITARY PLANS AND THE SCOPE OF ASSASSINATIONS COMMITTED BY THE SUBVERSIVES, BY YEAR TRAGEDY

HE : T ONE

ART P

What led Guzmán to declare that the «protracted war» – the stage of «strategic defense» —had concluded, cutting short the «war of one hundred years» that he had proclaimed in 1980? The principal factors were the organization’s actions in Lima and its setbacks in the countryside. Between 1988 and 1989, the self-defense patrols were extending throughout the country to take on the PCP-SL. The party’s advance in the countryside was thus curtailed by massive resistance that could not be broken by razing communities or assassinating peasants who no longer took its orders. Peasants established alliances with the armed forces and, in many cases, turned to them for support and training to combat the PCP-SL. The second reason was the worsening social crisis and the evident signs of decay within the Peruvian state, which Guzmán saw as an opportunity to provoke the collapse of the state and force U.S. military intervention. This hypothetical intervention would allow the PCP-SL to transform the «guerrilla war» into a «war of national salvation.»

39 CVR. Interview. Callao Naval Base, May 28, 2002. A third reason that pushed the national leadership to proclaim strategic 163 equilibrium was the expectation created among PCP-SL militants that «the party» would take power in the first few years of the 1990s. Economic collapse and the unraveling of Peruvian society that occurred during the second half of the APRA government – expressed most vividly in hyperinflation, a moral crisis caused by accusations of rampant corruption and RGANIZATIONS the bankrupt state – led Guzmán to think that the moment had come to take O power. When he realized that he was wrong, he attempted to provoke a U.S. UBVERSIVE military intervention, announcing the start of the fifth military plan, «develop S support bases to serve the conquest of power,» which was the final stage before the triumph of the revolution. The next stage, «construct the conquest of power,» was the sixth and final military plan. Based on the number of victims in the internal armed conflict, the second «peak» coincided with Guzman’s order to reach «strategic equilibrium» as the immediate step before the «strategic offensive» that would lead the party to power. The Shining Path columns unleashed a much harsher campaign to con- trol the population in areas where militants were active, especially the central region and southern Andes, becoming more intolerant and violent. The cycle repeated itself, with a large number of deaths (although fewer than in 1984-85), and the PCP-SL was either expelled from or defeated in those regions. In short, the conflict slowly moved from rural areas in the highlands to the cities and the jungle areas of the Huallaga and Ene valleys. Significantly, the event that closed this period, Abimael Guzman’s arrest, took place in Lima, the city the PCP-SL leader had never left throughout the entire conflict.

Regional scenarios 1989-1992 During this period, the PCP-SL was lying in wait in Ayacucho, carrying out «exemplary» actions in communities that organized self-defense committees. The PCP-SL, however, had lost much of its support among the local population and did not have the firepower to take on the armed forces. It did have armed columns that were constantly on the move to avoid attacks and still had the capacity to launch ambushes, such as the attack in Challhuamayo on June 19, 1992, when it dynamited a vehicle from the municipality of Huancasancos, killing 17 people. In the rural zones of the northern provinces (Huanta, Huamanga and La Mar), the Shining Path attempted to regain lost ground, constantly attacking the civil defense patrols between 1989 and 1990. One of the worst massacres occurred in January 1990, when 48 people were killed by the PCP-SL in Acosvinchos. Two other massacres during this time were perpetrated by the Army: In May 1990, the Army destroyed the village of Yahuar Machay (Ayahuanco), killing 47 people; and in January 1991, 18 corpses were found after an Army incursion into San Pedro de Cachi. Those were the last major destructive actions in the region. After that, the violence in northern Ayacucho was basically confined to more urban areas. In the Apurímac and Ene Valley, PCP-SL militants began seeking refuge 164 in Viscatán and along the Ene River in 1992 to escape a military offensive. They staged sporadic attacks on nearby communities. That was the area to which Feliciano fled. The proximity of drug traffickers in the area allowed the PCP-SL to IT obtain the economic resources that it would use to survive in the coming years. FOR In the central region, in the highland areas of Cunas and Canipaco, as well as in Tulumayo, a cycle of violence similar to that of Ayacucho in 1984 and

RESPONSIBLE 1985 was unleashed. Communities that had once enthusiastically embraced the PCP-SL and were under the party’s control began forming alliances with the THOSE armed forces. The highest numbers of deaths and disappearances in the central AND

regions during the armed conflict were recorded in 1989. It was within this context that the PCP-SL attempted to take control of the Mantaro Valley. TRAGEDY

This was an extremely violent period in the urban areas of the valley, HE especially in the city of Huancayo: 82 percent of the deaths reported to the CVR : T

ONE in the Mantaro Valley occurred during these years. The PCP-SL columns turned

ART to the cities after they were forced out of highland communities. Acts of sabotage P and armed propaganda multiplied in the second half of 1989. The National University of the Center of Peru continued to be a focal point of violence for all the players involved. People connected to the university and accused of belonging to the PCP-SL were the victims of disappearances and extrajudicial executions by security forces and paramilitaries. In 1989, the PCP-SL launched a major offensive aimed at decapitating the mining unions in the region, which they were never able to control. The principal objective of the subversives, however, was the destruction of the SAIS. They destroyed the SAIS in Cahuide, distributing land and livestock to member communities. Guzman’s idealized vision of an autarkic peasantry that was removed from the marketplace and only interested in subsistence was not based on reality, not even in the most backward zones of Ayacucho and certainly not in the cen- tral highlands, where peasant communities had some of the strongest ties to the market economy. The real result was that 17 communities in the Altos Cunas region reached an agreement with the military and organized peasant patrols in 1990. Shortly thereafter they would be among the first communities to receive weapons handed over personally by then-President Alberto Fujimori. The self-defense committees slowly took control of the region and eventually expelled the PCP-SL. In Alto Canipaco alone in 1992, the Army registered 1,568 civil defense patrol members, who had adopted military-style organization and discipline. Social order was restored and the communities once more elected their own authorities. The war was over for them. In the central jungle, the armed conflict expanded throughout Asháninka territory along the Ene and Tambo rivers. The PCP-SL’s control over this zone resulted in the destruction of communities throughout 1989. According to reports received by the CVR, 62 percent of the deaths and disappearances recorded in the central jungle region occurred between 1989 and 1992. The region was strategically important to the PCP-SL. The Tambo, Ene and Pichis rivers were a natural corridor that allowed the subversives to connect their work in the 165 Ayacucho jungle and Apurímac River Valley with the Huallaga region. The area was also the natural refuge for PCP-SL militants when they had to retreat from the central highlands. The PCP-SL’s presence in the region, however, was not only based on the coercion and terror inflicted on the indigenous communities.

As had happened in other regions, a large number of Asháninkas voluntarily RGANIZATIONS joined the PCP-SL, believing that the subversives offered an effective strategy to O help them defend their communities and territories from colonists invading the UBVERSIVE region. The PCP-SL wielded total control, using even small children to carry out S dangerous tasks as part of the process of forming future combatants. The Shining Path reached its peak in the region between 1989 and 1990. The collapse of its power would come after the arrest of Abimael Guzmán and the subsequent weakening of the party structure. The escalation in abuses by the PCP-SL began to provoke a reaction among the indigenous population, which the subversives answered with increased violence. On August 18, 1993, in an incursion in hamlets along the Sonomoro River, PCP-SL militants murdered 62 Asháninka men, women and children and left another 2,500 homeless. The violence unleashed by the subversives and the state security forces had a common thread: The level of brutality in the interventions was proportionate to the isolation of the communities and the physical and symbolic distances that separated them from the centers of power. The indigenous populations in the central jungle were as isolated as the people living in the regions of Chungui and Oreja de Perro in Ayacucho, and the suffering in both regions was tragically similar. An estimated one-fifth of the Asháninka people were displaced by the war, and their traditional social structures were seriously affected. The Asháninkas were also victims of the armed forces. There are multiple accusations of human rights violations, abuses that were allowed because of the ethnic and racial prejudices that viewed enlisted soldiers from the highlands and coast as superior to the «savages» – or «chunchos» — of the jungle. The impunity permitted because of these prejudices was compounded by general suspicion that the Asháninkas, most of whom lacked the required national identification cards, supported the subversives. In the northeastern region, the PCP-SL attempted to use its solid bases in the Upper Huallaga to extend to the Central Huallaga and dominate the southern part of the Bellavista and Mariscal Cáceres provinces. Faced with the need to solidify its territorial hegemony, the PCP-SL focused on the Ponaza and Miskiyacu valleys in the Central Huallaga. The subversives suffered a serious setback in July 1991, when they failed in an attempt to take the city to Tingo María by assault. The case is exemplary of what had been happening since the creation of the political-military command in the Huallaga in 1989, which increased military control at bases in Uchiza, Santa Lucía, Tocache, Madre Mía, Tulumayo, Nuevo Progreso, Pizana, Punta Arenas and other areas, and a new military strategy that prioritized fighting terrorism over eliminating coca crops. The self-defense committees also began to spread in the region. As of 1992, the strategy of encouraging the population to help in the war on terrorism had 166 another important element, the repentance law. The new law not only reduced the number of subversives, but also increased the amount of intelligence information in the hands of state agencies. IT The third phase for the PCP-SL in the region began with the arrest of FOR Abimael Guzmán in September 1992 and legal norms that allowed militants to quit the party by «repenting.» That legislation became an escape route for many

RESPONSIBLE PCP-SL militants, who had been pressured by their commanders and forced to take part in a final offensive for which they were unprepared. In addition, the THOSE price of coca began to fall in 1989, and by 1995 it was at levels that did not allow AND

farmers to cover the costs of planting it. But the fundamental reasons for the collapse of the PCP-SL in that region, as in others, were abuses and its attempt to TRAGEDY

control all aspects of peasant life, which led to resentment among peasants, HE followed by the subversives’ isolation and eventual defeat. : T

ONE As in other regions, the efforts by the armed forces and the military-

ART supported self-defense committees not only took territory away from the PCP- P SL, but also increased the violence affecting the population, as well as the number of victims. During those years, the Navy was in charge of combating subversion in Ucayali from the base in Aguaytía. The conflict took a different path in the southern Andes. In the highland provinces of Cusco (Canas, Canchis and Chumbivilcas) and the department of Apurímac, the number of victims reached a high point in 1988. The violence began to diminish after that, with the PCP-SL retreating after the installation of anti-subversive bases in Antabamba and Haquira. The subversive organization continued selective attacks on members of the peasant civil-defense patrols, which the PCP-SL saw as enemies even though they were originally created to prevent livestock rustling. The party also carried out selective assassinations of local authorities and continued to create its people’s committees to install the «new state.» Subversive activity continued to expand in Puno, with 65 percent of the deaths registered during the 20 years of armed conflict occurring at this time. The PCP-SL’s principal force was located in the center of the province of Azángaro, deploying from there to Melgar, Carabaya and Lampa. Despite its activities and the murder and intimidation of authorities, the PCP-SL never managed to con- trol the rural zones, where it came up against the Peasant Federation, left-wing parties and the social outreach programs of the Catholic Church. The PCP-SL was unable to establish «people’s committees» in Puno and had to depend on a network of sympathizers. While this network allowed it to operate in a large area, it had the same weakness as the central leadership – the network collapsed as soon as the principal leader was removed from action. The network, however, was strong enough to offer the support needed for the PCP-SL to stage a series of attacks in May 1989. In January 1990, the PCP-SL’s principal column suffered a decisive loss, failing to destroy the SAIS in Sollocota during an attack. That failure led not only to the collapse of the principal column, but to the unraveling of the support network. Similar military defeats were complemented by police intelligence work, which allowed the security forces to arrest sympathizers who were len- ding support to the PCP-SL. 167 The resolution of the struggle for land in favor of the peasant communities helped isolate the PCP-SL. The government gave 1,274 communities in Puno nearly 2 million hectares of pastures. As a result, the communities were more interested in registering their new lands than in attacking police stations.

The call for strategic equilibrium had greater importance in Metropolitan RGANIZATIONS Lima, because the plan was aimed at transforming the city into the principal O target of subversive activity. According to various PCP-SL documents, Lima UBVERSIVE was never considered the principal front; Guzmán himself states in several S documents that he was unable to control the activities of his own base groups. Although Gonzalo never left Lima, sometimes months would go by without him having contact with the Lima regional structure, and he learned what the subversives were doing in the capital … by watching television. The Shining Path’s offensive in Lima, in accordance with the plan for reaching strategic equilibrium, was out of his control, and he apparently was aware of that. The starting point for this new period in the capital came on November 3, 1989, during the development of the first campaign of the fifth military plan, «develop bases to serve the conquest of power.» During this campaign, called «promote the development of support bases,» the Revolutionary Movement for Defense of the People organized an armed strike in Lima under the banner «develop the boycott of the 1990 general elections.» This was the start of the major terrorist offensive against the city. Three areas of actions – unions, universities and shantytowns – and one method – armed strikes – were the PCP-SL’s focus in Lima as of 1989. In the unions, the subversives attempted to take control of strikes called by workers. The goal was not to help the workers attain their objectives, but to radicalize the protests as a way of creating conditions to «feed» the «people’s war.» The PCP-SL contributed to this by assassinating managers the companies involved. The result was that the unions were destroyed without having achieved a positive response to their members’ demands. In the universities, especially San Marcos National University, the PCP- SL launched an intensive campaign to win recruits who would spread the party’s message and, eventually, become part of its military detachments. At the La Cantuta Teachers College, the local organization was part of the PCP-SL’s zone structure and, as such, was involved in military actions. The PCP-SL’s activity expanded to the shantytowns on the outskirts of the city, in the areas known as «cones.» The main target was the Eastern Cone, where the subversives engaged in intensive proselytizing, following years of systematic penetration of shantytowns in the area. The most important activity came in 1990, when the party formed the Committee for the People’s Struggle of Raucana, a land takeover promoted by the PCP-SL where it planned to install an open people’s committee that would announce to the world the «new power» in Lima and the imminent triumph of the revolution. The PCP-SL also intensified its work in Villa El Salvador, in the Southern Cone. At the start of the 1990s, the Maoist organization had gained significant ground in Villa El Salvador and it began to control traditional organizations, such as the Self-Governing Urban 168 Community, Women’s Federation, and Association of Small and Micro Enterprises. The PCP-SL’s objective in Villa El Salvador was to demonstrate the ineffectiveness of peaceful strategies for social change, undermine the left-wing IT parties the PCP-SL saw as its principal rivals and enemies, and guide social FOR struggles toward an inevitable confrontation with the state. In the Northern Cone, the PCP-SL took advantage of shantytowns created by people fleeing the

RESPONSIBLE political violence in the countryside, attempting to use them as «masses» for its political goals. THOSE The armed strikes were planned, organized and carried out by the AND

organizations that formed the Revolutionary Movement for Defense of the People, of which the People’s Support Committee was the main group. Days before an TRAGEDY

armed strike, PCP-SL militants laid the groundwork by sabotaging or burning HE buses to intimidate public transportation workers. : T

ONE In 1992, the violence reached its high point. To reach strategic equilibrium,

ART the PCP-SL needed to instill a general climate of fear in Lima, the country’s P economic and political center and its most visible point. The actions in the city had to come from the so-called «steel belt» formed by the shantytowns ringing Lima. Widespread terror was needed downtown and in the city’s middle-class and business districts In the neighborhoods that formed the cones, the PCP-SL not only stepped up propaganda activities, but increased pressure on local leaders (harassment, assassinations) in an effort to take over grassroots groups, something it had failed to accomplish with the unions. The CVR’s research on Lima’s three cones found that the PCP-SL, through its facade organizations, infiltrated neighborhood assemblies in an attempt to influence participants and gear debate and actions toward a radical extreme. In the Northern Cone, the Maoist group attempted to infiltrate the new shantytowns with militants who posed as couples or families when lots were distributed. The increased PCP-SL presence in neighborhood groups, combined with its violent actions and assassinations of local leaders opposed to the party, came when the climate was favorable because of the hyperinflation that had marked the end of García’s presidency and the structural adjustment program instituted by the new administration of Alberto Fujimori. Efforts to influence neighborhood groups were more successful in Villa El Salvador than in Huaycán, the two self-managed communities with the greatest levels of grassroots organizing. In Villa El Salvador, the PCP-SL increased its activities throughout 1989 and 1990 with acts of sabotage and propaganda, including burning buses and bombing the police station, local office of the ruling party and power and water utilities. Militants waged intensive propaganda campaigns in markets and schools, and intercepted trucks carrying food, distributing their cargo to residents. On February 14, the day of a PCP-SL «armed strike,» María Elena Moyano, president of the Women’s Federation, called a peace march. The march attracted few people, but the PCP-SL responded by detonating a 500-gram dynamite charge at the home of former Villa El Salvador Mayor Michel Azcueta. The next day, a PCP-SL assassination squad shot María Elena Moyano and dynamited her corpse. Why was Moyano eliminated? It is very good that this reactionary was 169 unmasked. She was eliminated not because she was a grassroots leader, but because she was a declared an open agent of imperialism (PCP-SL 1992).

In Huaycán, a shantytown in the Eastern Cone that was created as a

self-managed community under the municipal government headed by the United RGANIZATIONS

Left, the PCP-SL found it very difficult to take root among the population despite O the constant pressure of propaganda actions aimed at creating fear and projecting UBVERSIVE

an image of strength. Its actions included unannounced marches, passing out S fliers and taking over municipal loudspeakers to broadcast its message. In the early 1990s, the PCP-SL increased its presence in the hills above Huaycán and its columns could often be seen moving through the area. It intensified its propa- ganda campaigns and tried to gain legitimacy with the population by assuming security tasks that state was not carrying out. The subversive organization had more success in Raucana, another small shantytown in the Eastern Cone. To maintain order, the PCP-SL imposed strict rules and punishment that some people viewed as positive. This public control by the «committee for the people’s struggle» (similar to the «people’s committees» in rural areas) lasted until September 1991, when a military base was installed. The base remained in place until 2000. Nearly all of Lima’s poor districts experienced PCP-SL violence and were victims of attempts to take over local organizations. The subversives killed 27 community leaders in 1992 alone. In commercials districts and upper- and middle-class neighborhoods, the only relationship between residents and the PCP-SL was violence, and its only objective was terror. The only tactics used were assassination squads, car bombs and armed strikes. There was a decline in the levels of violence between August and September 1989, apparently as the subversives prepared a campaign against the municipal elections held in November of that year. Subversive actions began to increase again in October, but there was another downturn in December, which would last until March 1990. The number of actions began to increase once more as the May 1990 runoff elections approached. That upswing would last until August 1990. The principal targets of that campaign were shopping centers and public transportation vehicles. The highest levels of violence were recorded in Lima in 1992. The car bomb that exploded on Tarata Street in Miraflores on July 16, 1992, with the resulting death and destruction, was the most visible and dramatic action.

Guzman’s arrest The event that would lead to the end of the armed conflict transpired in Lima amid this climate of spiraling violence. On September 12, 1992, after years of painstaking work by the Anti-Terrorism Bureau (Dirección Contra el Terrorismo, DINCOTE), Abimael Guzmán Reinoso was arrested in Lima. The arrest of the PCP-SL’s top leadership followed a series of blows against the subversive organization by the security forces. The arrests, along 170 with the «repentance law» and the call for a «peace accord,» led to a considera- ble decline in subversive activity. Between 1990 and 1992, the DINCOTE’s Special Intelligence Group (Gru- IT po Especial de Inteligencia, GEIN) made a series of arrests that were crucial in FOR dismantling the PCP-SL’s central operations and its Metropolitan Lima commands. While the subversive group attempted to demonstrate through

RESPONSIBLE armed actions that it had not been weakened, the continual blows against it by the police took their toll. THOSE On June 1, 1990, the GEIN got its first major break with a raid on a house AND

in Lima’s Northern Monterrico neighborhood, where officers seized books, ar- chives, a model of the El Frontón prison and other documents belonging to the TRAGEDY

PCP-SL’s central committee. The raid on the house, which apparently served as HE a «museum,» allowed the police to detain 31 members of the PCP-SL, including : T

ONE Sybila Arredondo. It was later learned that the PCP-SL had held the First Congress

ART in the house in 1988 and 1989. Among the documents seized was a list of five P pseudonyms, contact points and telephone numbers of key leaders of the main PCP-SL organizations. The police were able to identify Luis Arana Franco, Ma- nuel, who ran the César Vallejo Preparatory Academy. Earnings from the academy were used to support the party leadership. The raid also helped identify Yovanka Pardavé, Olga, and Jenny Rodríguez, Rita. All PCP-SL militants «moved» after the raid except one, who used the name Ricardo. By tailing him, the police were led to Arana Franco. Through Arana Franco the police identified Angélica Salas, Lucía, as well as Nelly Evans. Through Angélica Salas, officers located a PCP-SL house on Buenavista Street, in the Chacarrilla del Estanque neighborhood of the San Borja district, as well as another safe house in the Balconcillo neighborhood of La Victoria. On September 19, the police struck at the subversive organization’s propaganda apparatus and arrested Deodato Juárez Cruzatt. He had been arrested in March 1995 with Tito Valle Travesaño, Sybila Arredondo and other PCP-SL militants, but was released for lack of evidence. On January 31, 1991, anti-terrorism officers raided several safe houses used by the PCP-SL, including the one on Buenavista Street. At the house, they arrested Nelly Evans and seized a videotape of Guzmán dancing. The tape would later be shown publicly by President Fujimori on national television. The raids enabled officers to determine the identities of the members of the PCP-SL Cen- tral Committee. On May 8, 1991, the anti-terrorism bureau dismantled the People’s Intellectual Group, and in a June 1, 1991, raid on Casma Street, in the Rimac district, officers arrested the people who formed the Metropolitan Committee, including Mariela and Juan Carlos Rivas Laurente, Rosa Carmen Paredes Laurente, Pastor Cocha Nevado, Rosaura Laurente Ochoa and Juan Manuel Yáñez Vega. The police dealt the party another blow on June 22, 1991, arresting Tito Valle Travesaño when he arrived from Ayacucho. Along with Valle Travesaño, whom police officers had been expecting for six months, they arrested Yovanka Pardavé. On June 23, Víctor Zavala Cataño was arrested in the Santa Luzmila neighborhood in the district of Comas. These arrests virtually dismantled the 171 leadership of the People’s Support Committee. On November 27, 1991, officers arrested four people, breaking up the Support Committee’s Defense Department. Months later, on February 26, 1992, the police struck at its Health Department, arresting 19 subversives in an operation known as Hippocrates I. The Health

Department was headed by Francisco Morales Z., a medical student at San Mar- RGANIZATIONS cos University. O On April 14, 1992, police launched an offensive to dismantle the network UBVERSIVE in charge of publishing El Diario, a PCP-SL newspaper. Officers raided several S buildings in the Lima districts of San Juan de Miraflores and Surquillo, arresting 23 militants, including Jorge Luis Durand Araujo and Danilo Blanco. On June 21, 1992, officers dismantled the party’s logistics and economic units in a raid on the César Vallejo academy. They arrested 11 teachers and seven administrative staff members, including Arana Franco. During a riot at the Canto Grande prison in May 1992, which was put down by security forces, a number of inmates were killed, including Yovanka Pardavé, Tito Valle Travesaño, Janet Talavera and Deodato Juárez Cruzatt. The final chapter in this sequence was the arrest of Abimael Guzmán, Elena Iparraguirre and Laura Zambrano in September 1992.

THE PCP-SL AFTER THE ARREST OF ABIMAEL GUZMÁN Guzman’s arrest was catastrophic for the PCP-SL. The myth of the PCP-SL’s invincibility was destroyed and the image of success that Guzmán had cultivated was undermined even further by the circumstances surrounding the arrest. It is important to recall that DINCOTE officers had raided two safe houses where Guzmán had lived for some time, seizing important information about him and his life. No one imagined at the time that the feared «President Gonzalo» did not have a strong armed command protecting him. In the operation that ended with Guzman’s arrest, DINCOTE officers were surprised when they met no resistance.40 The fall of the man the PCP-SL militants called «President Gonzalo» worsened the party’s internal political conflicts and unleashed public conflicts with the best-known representatives of the PCP-SL in Europe. Those conflicts continue today. Guzmán was presented to the world press on September 24, dressed in a striped prison suit and held in a cage. From the cage, he called on PCP-SL militants to go forward with the planned revolutionary actions:

[…] we will continue carrying out the IV Plan of Strategic Development of the People’s War to Take Power, we will continue developing the VI Military Plan to Construct the Conquest of Power. We must form the People’s Liberation Front, we must form and develop a People’s Liberation Army from the People’s Guerrilla Army. This is what we must do and this is what we will do!

40 According to statements by Guzmán at the Callao Naval Base, he did have a security detail. The problem was that it needed to be mobilized, which was impossible because of the surprise nature of the raid. 172 Slightly more than four years had transpired between Guzman’s arrest and the decision to adopt «Gonzalo Thought» as the orthodox doctrine of the IT PCP-SL. This contributed to the crisis that the arrest triggered within the party, FOR given that in the PCP-SL it was necessary to use the orthodox doctrine to distinguish between the «correct line» of the proletariat and the «incorrect line»

RESPONSIBLE of the bourgeoisie, as well as to «separate the chaff from the wheat.» Since the First Congress in 1988-89, this orthodox doctrine had officially been «Gonzalo THOSE Thought.» Guzman’s arrest, therefore, deprived the PCP-SL of its ideological AND

guiding force, which was considered infallible, and forced the militants to use a «thought» whose creator was jailed and isolated. The final blow, however, came TRAGEDY

two years after his arrest, when Guzmán asked President Fujimori to negotiate HE a peace accord. : T

ONE The new PCP-SL leadership did not change the organization’s way of

ART acting, but its terrorist actions were no longer effective. The party needed to P adopt more violent and authoritarian practices to remain viable, which only deepened its isolation and forced militants to seek refuge in areas far removed from the centers of power. In addition, the continued terrorist acts helped unify the population; no longer paralyzed by fear, people mobilized against terrorism. In the years that followed, the organization was hit by the desertion of militants, which was stimulated by the «repentance law» that encouraged members to abandon the party. The strategic change proposed by Guzmán, who announced that the war must end because of the new conditions, and that the struggle was for a peace accord, surprised the party’s leadership. Two months before his change was made public, the PCP-SL’s Central Committee issued a public communiqué reaffirming its «full, voluntary and unconditional subjugation to the just, correct and magisterial leadership and firm embrace of the glorious, historic and transcendental discourse of 24-IX-92» (PCP-SL 1993b). The Central Committee reaffirmed its commitment «to the Third Plenary of the CC, personally led by President Gonzalo, whose victorious application demonstrates its glorious, historic and transcendental character, second only in importance to the Congress» (PCP-SL 1993b). The decision by the PCP-SL leadership to continue applying the plans of the «people’s war» was simply aimed at following the instructions that «President Gonzalo» had issued from his cage. Based on Guzman’s discourse, the leaders still at large decided to:

Develop the second campaign to Construct the Conquest of Power under the banner of «Defense of the Leadership, Down with the Genocidal Dictator!» This follows the First Campaign, for which we must salute the Peruvian people, the combatants of the People’s Liberation Army and all the armed militants who have applied Gonzalo Thought against wind and tide» (PCP-SL 1993b).

The PCP-SL leaders who were still free had no way of knowing that this position, which had been announced to the world, was no longer part of the plan being followed by «President Gonzalo.» Even when the caged Guzmán launched his discourse about continuing the people’s war, he had already completely changed his position and had adopted a new line in which he denied 173 everything he had held to earlier. This can be seen in the following testimony from Elena Iparraguirre:

The public presentation in DINCOTE was aimed at maintaining action to

keep up morale and protect against dispersion. On San Lorenzo Island and RGANIZATIONS

in the custody of the Navy and separated [from Elena Iparraguirre], on October O 20, 1992, President Gonzalo began calling on authorities to discuss a solution

(PCP-SL 2003). UBVERSIVE S

According to the document cited above, only one month after his arrest, Guzmán was asking the government to negotiate the end of the war and hold conversations to sign a «peace accord.» The organization’s militants, unaware of their leader’s actions, considered his call to continue the war «a great political, military and moral victory for the Party and the Revolution, dealing a massive blow to Yankee imperialism and the genocidal-traitor Fujimori dictatorship» (PCP-SL 1993b). During the following years, while Guzmán negotiated with Vladimiro Montesinos, the government’s «academic interlocutor,» to reach an accord, the still-active PCP-SL leaders talked about the glorious victories of the «people’s war» and the unstoppable progress of the Peruvian Revolution while the organization created by Abimael Guzmán was in its final phase.

Days of uncertainty The unimaginable change in Abimael Guzmán put to the test the faith of his followers, who could not believe that he was contradicting everything he had once preached. In the document, «Let us begin to tear down walls and unleash the dawn,» dated March 28, 1980, Guzmán wrote: «Those who are called to stand up, rise up in arms, embedding this in their will, respond: We are ready, guide us, organize and we will act! Either we comply with what we have promised to do or will be laughingstocks, liars and traitors (emphasis added). In the «Interview of the Century,» published in July 1988, Guzmán rejected any possibility of negotiating under the current conditions in Peru:

[…] in diplomatic meetings the only things signed at the table are those gained in battle, because no one hands over what has not already been lost (emphasis added), which is obviously understood. One could ask, has this moment arrived in Peru? No, this moment has not arrived, so what reasons are there for dialogue? Dialogue is only aimed at stopping, undermining the people’s war, nothing more. I insist [...] this is our condition: complete, total and absolute surrender [of the state], but are they willing to do this? What they want is our destruction, and dialogue is nothing more than cheap demagoguery (Guzmán 1988).

The PCP-SL propaganda units attempted to minimize the blow, proclaiming that «Gonzalo Thought is free!» The idea was to put into practice what Guzmán had said from his cage. The leadership at large held to that position until Guzmán was shown on national television in October 1993, calling 174 on the government to start peace conversation to end the war. That had an enormous impact on the PCP-SL militants who were still free, sowing confusion among the ranks. IT Huge mistakes made by the terrorist organization allowed for the FOR dismantling of the national leadership and the collapse of the PCP-SL. First, as we has been noted, was the proclamation of «strategic equilibrium» – which

RESPONSIBLE implied a level playing field with the state – when the reality was much more adverse. The second element was the organization’s growth, which brought THOSE with it the increased possibility of infiltration, which is what effectively AND

happened. Third was the decision to send party and support militants into the battlefield, which led to the arrest of some leaders and the seizure of valuable TRAGEDY

information by the security forces starting in mid-1990. The videotape of the HE closing session of the First PCP-SL Congress not only allowed the police to identify : T

ONE the members of the Central Committee who had been unknown until then, but

ART also provided current images of the historic leaders, such as Abimael Guzmán. P Finally, the scene from that video that showed the PCP-SL leader dancing were extremely useful for the psycho-social campaigns developed by the government as part of the anti-subversive strategy. Nevertheless, Abimael Guzman’s arrest was not only the product of errors committed by the PCP-SL. Those mistakes coincided with a significant change in the anti-subversive strategy developed by DINCOTE, particularly the intelligence work by the GEIN, which opted for the painstaking process of identifying PCP-SL leaders to reach into the heart of the organization instead of being satisfied with periodically presenting arrested mid-level leaders before television cameras. GEIN Commanders Marco Miyashiro and Benedicto Jiménez played a key role. Police General Antonio Ketín Vidal allowed the team to work, encouraging it and providing the necessary resources. The events of September 12, 1992, were the culmination of that change in the anti-subversive strategy. (Abimael Guzmán, however, maintains that his arrest was not the result of good police work, but of a tip from the director of the César Vallejo academy, Luis Arana Franco, Manuel, who provided the funds, as we have noted, to maintain the party leaders.)

«Gonzalo Thought» without «President Gonzalo» The fall of Abimael Guzmán deprived the PCP-SL of the principal element of its political-ideological arguments. «It is through a persistent, firm and astute struggle between two lines, defending the line of the proletariat and defeating all contradictory lines, that ‘Gonzalo Thought’ was forged,» according to a party text cited above. They were convinced that they were creating an invincible philosophy that would guarantee absolute unity in the PCP-SL leadership and avoid schisms. The only options for dissidents were extreme self-criticism or disappearance. Óscar Ramírez Durand, Feliciano, offers a harsh opinion about this structure: «Guzmán […] imposed a totalitarian dictatorship on the Shining Path, and so-called ‘Gonzalo Thought’ does not allow criticism. Those who did criticize suffered drastic sanctions and even death if they tried to leave the 175 movement. He was the only one allowed to ‘theorize’ (offer the line) and the rest of us had to ‘apply’ it» (Ramírez Durand 2003). Guzmán overestimated his ability to convince his followers. The change he demanded of PCP-SL militants when he proposed the peace accord was too sweeping to receive unanimous support. It is possible that this lack of objective RGANIZATIONS judgment was a result of the personality cult that he had successfully cultivated O in the organization, a cult that made even him believe that his words had a kind UBVERSIVE of demiurgical power. S While a considerable number of the party’s political leaders were arrested at about the same time as Guzmán, the organization’s military apparatus remained relatively intact. The DINCOTE had already dismantled the organization that published El Diario, the Association of Democratic Lawyers and the People’s Support Committee, all considered «generating organizations of the party.» The collapse of the People’s Support Committee was a decisive blow to Guzmán, who had made that organization more important than the Lima Metropolitan Committee in political management in the capital. In May 1992, Yovanka Pardavé, Tito Valle Travesaño and Deodato Juárez Cruzatt were killed in the uprising in the Canto Grande prison. Guzmán later told General Ketín Vidal that his «best children,» referring to Valle Travesaño and Juárez Cruzatt, were killed there. Guzmán was arrested with Elena Iparraguirre, Miriam, who a member of the Permanent Committee as were Guzmán and Ramírez Durand, Feliciano. Laura Zambrano was arrested with them. Ramírez Durand stated that his incorporation into the Permanent Committee to replace Augusta La Torre, Guzmán’s wife deceased wife, was purely formal, as he could not participate in meetings or decisions because he was active in the countryside. The Permanent Committee, therefore, was run only by Abimael Guzmán and his new romantic partner, Miriam. A few weeks after Guzman’s fall, police arrested Martha Huatay, who was in charge of reorganizing the PCP-SL leadership. The leaders of the Southern Zone Committee (Arequipa) and the Northern Zone Committee were also caught. In the following months, the PCP-SL attempted to show that the blow had not been very important, launching a bloody offensive in the interior of the country. The organization, however, was unable to carry out the offensive that it had threatened to coincide with the celebration of the 500th anniversary of Columbus’ arrival in the Americas. The arrest of Abimael Guzmán and a significant number of PCP-SL leaders was accompanied by the seizure of abundant party materials and several computers containing data on the organization. The PCP-SL had to undertake an urgent reorganization process to avoid even greater blows. Óscar Ramírez Durand reorganized the leadership with cadres who were still at large, but the police continued to strike at the organization and its actions diminished noticeably, leaving it with only two areas of operation, the Upper Huallaga and Ene River valleys. Feliciano was arrested in 1999 and Artemio, the head of the Huallaga Front, accepted Guzman’s call for a peace accord. Strategic equilibrium had been only an illusion: «Guzman’s 176 political line,» according to Feliciano, «had led the PCP-SL down a dead-end path. That is something that neither he nor his acolytes want to recognize. It was his own sectarian and ultra-leftwing policies that led to arrest of the IT leadership and the failure of the project» (Ramírez Durand, 2003). FOR

Guzmán, Montesinos and the «peace accord» RESPONSIBLE The letters Abimael Guzmán wrote to President Fujimori offering to negotiate a

THOSE peace agreement were used by the government, which took advantage of them

AND to ensure victory in an referendum on the new Constitution that was drafted after the coup in April 1992. The first letter, which Fujimori made public during a presentation before the United Nations in New York on October 1, 1993, had a TRAGEDY

HE major impact and guaranteed victory in the referendum. In the letter, Abimael

: T Guzmán openly praises the Fujimori administration. That praise, however, raised ONE suspicions even with the daily Expreso, the strongest defender of the Fujimori ART

P government, which questioned the way in which the negotiations were being handled:

Guzmán agreed to put something in his letter that was not essential to its stated purpose. One does not have to be wise to see that in addition to the principal objective, there is another: consolidate the campaign for the «yes» vote [in the referendum]. From his Marxist standpoint, Guzmán legitimizes the April 5 coup, which is absolutely ridiculous. Obviously, Fujimori did not need Guzman’s approval. Guzman’s approval of the National Intelligence Service is also unnecessary. Modesty dictates that we highlight that the peasant self-defense committees and the resistance of the population, which decided the outcome of the war, were already under way before Fujimori took power (Expreso 1993).

To be recognized as a negotiator, Abimael Guzmán had to acknowledge not only President Fujimori, but also Vladimiro Montesinos. In a text dated February 7, 1993, and written at the Callao Naval Base, Guzmán called Montesinos «a person with versatile convergent concerns, a sharp and inquisitive mind hungry for results, who makes fine instrumental use of his multi-faceted professional training as a soldier, lawyer and sociologist. This and his special talent for issues related to power have allowed him to understand the people’s war, an indelible mark in Peruvian history» (PCP-SL 2003). The most important letter recognizing Montesinos, however, was signed by Guzmán, Elena Iparraguirre, Laura Zambrano, Osmán Morote, Eduardo Cox, Martha Huatay, Víctor Zavala and others on November 3, 1993. The letter reads:

For this reason, we express our recognition of Dr. Montesinos, for his broad knowledge and astute understanding, and his tenacious effort and dedication, from our point of view, to the cause of peace whose progress requires decisive action from President Gonzalo as head and Comrade Miriam as leader of the Communist Party of Peru’s Central Committee. With them and the other signatories as militants, we state that the Party will always remember the fundamental role you [Montesinos] played and continue to play in carrying out in the historic, complex and difficult task of obtaining a Peace Accord and 177 applying it for the benefit of the Peruvian people, nation and society (PCP-SL 2003).41

This letter was one of the results of an operation negotiated between

Guzmán and the National Intelligence Service in which PCP-SL leaders were RGANIZATIONS transferred from the Yanamayo prison in Puno to the Army Intelligence Service O installations in Lima between September 15, 1993, and January 8, 1994, so that UBVERSIVE

Guzmán could convince them to follow the new line he had proposed. The S strategy was successful, and on October 28, 1993, the government released a letter signed by Osmán Morote, Martha Huatay, Rosa Angélica Salas and María Pantoja. In the letter, these PCP-SL leaders supported the initiative started by «President Gonzalo» and his partner, Elena Iparraguirre:

As militants of the Communist Party of Peru, subject to its leadership and Central Committee, and with full awareness and understanding of the undeniable historic need, we support the letters written by President Gonza- lo and Comrade Miriam that were sent to the president of the republic, Engineer Alberto Fujimori Fujimori, asking him reach a Peace Accord, whose application would end the war that the country has lived through for more than thirteen years. We accept this petition as our own and reiterate it.42

According to Guzmán, only a week after his arrest he realized that the «people’s war» would not be successful, which was why it was necessary to negotiate a peace accord to preserve the party by allowing for an orderly retreat. Iparraguirre came to the same conclusion on her own. They realized that they shared the same idea when they were allowed to speak briefly. On October 20, 1992, in the prison on El Frontón island, Guzmán asked the Navy officers guarding him to tell the government that he wanted to begin peace negotiations. What led Guzmán to ask for peace talks? A «call» to the «Comrades of the Party, Combatants of the People’s Army and the Masses,» which was dated September 22, 1992, but never circulated, contains parts of the letters that he would send to Fujimori. In it, Guzmán takes credit for the successes of the 13 years of war. He later praises the government for its accomplishments, «especially after the events of April 5, 1992.» He goes on to call on his militants to analyze the current situation and the foreseeable future, outlining the reasons why a peace agreement should be negotiated:

New, complex and very serious problems have arisen in world politics, in the country and in the war in which we are involved, questions that pose funda- mental problems for the leadership of the Communist Party of Peru, and it is precisely at the leadership level where the party has received the sharpest blow [...] in essence, the people’s war is an issue of political leadership. The

41 This letter, dated September 13, 1993, reiterates the recognition of Montesinos offered by Guzmán and Elena Iparraguirre in the name of the PCP-SL. According to Guzmán and Iparraguirre, this testimony was taped and filmed by the National Intelligence Service. 42 This text was cited by daily newspapers on October 29, 1993. 178 question of leadership is decisive and in our case it cannot be resolved quickly. As a consequence, the events show that prospects for the people’s war will not develop but will only be maintained. IT

Based on this, under current circumstances the Party, and mainly its FOR

leadership, faces a new and major decision, and just as we worked to forge the start of the people’s war yesterday, today we must fight for a peace accord with the same conviction and resolution. This is an undeniable historic RESPONSIBLE

necessity, which demands that we suspend the actions of the people’s war, except in questions of defense, with the corollary that the state also suspend THOSE it actions (PCP-SL 2003). AND

Guzmán would later refer to his arrest with the other members of the TRAGEDY

PCP-SL leadership as a «strategic turn» in the development of the «people’s HE war.» Although Guzmán refers to new and complex problems «in world politics, : T

ONE the situation in the country and the war,» these conditions are unimportant

ART when compared to his own arrest. In an interview with the CVR, Guzmán said P that if all the members of the PCP-SL had been arrested but he had remained at large, he would have been able to rebuild the leadership and continue with the war. In the opposite scenario, with him behind bars but the rest of the leadership at large, it still would have been impossible to continue the war. Guzman’s position was presented to the jailed members of the PCP-SL leadership brought together by the National Intelligence Service at the Callao Naval Base starting on October 8, 1993. They agreed to accept his position. During the following weeks, the party leaders worked as a team to formulate the «new great decision and definition,» which basically involved calling for the peace accord and planning for the Second PCP-SL Congress. Guzmán paid particular attention to drafting the texts so that they would convince the militants still at large that the new line not only expressed the interests of the party and the proletariat, but was in accordance with the dictates of the cosmos:

What should we do? Transform the negative into positive, pull what is good from the bad and strengthen our optimism and defeat our pain, pessimism and doubts [...] It is not about my life, but about the needs of the Party, the revolution, your life is nothing more than matter that is beautifully organized. It is only that, matter, and matter in a small quantity if we compare it to the immense eternity of matter in motion, so place your life at the service of the Party [...] this is the class position, not the other that is centered on the I, which is the position of the bourgeoisie (PCP-SL 1993a).

Guzmán was aware that such as radical change from his long-standing position that negotiation meant capitulation would meet with great resistance within the party, but he believed he would win over at least a minority (he would have been satisfied with 10 percent) that would eventually grow into a majority.

We know that they can reject our position and that this would mean serious problems for the Party. They could expel us or apply the highest penalties, but we believe that we have once again put the Party in motion, that the struggle between two lines will sharpen and in six months the left will retake the correct path. We believe that our opinion corresponds to the objective reality, it is not 179 the product of some elaborate abstract discussion, and therefore it will be accepted (PCP-SL 1993a).

In the meantime, conversations were held that would lead to the two

letters Guzmán sent to Alberto Fujimori and Guzmán’s presentation on television RGANIZATIONS surrounded by Elena Iparraguirre and four other members of the party O leadership. Guzmán proposed an end to military actions and that the «people’s UBVERSIVE

guerrilla army» dissolve and destroy its weapons. The people’s committees and S the peasant «masses» were to do the same, and in exchange they would receive a general amnesty and all the «prisoners of war» would be released. He offered himself and Elena Iparraguirre as a guarantee of the accord. Once again, Guzman’s vision was unrealistic. While he always insisted that the negotiations reflect the correlation of forces, he proposed a peace accord that did not reflect the situation in the country. After the blows it had received, with its organization in disarray, leaderless and demoralized and faced with a new offensive by the state, the PCP-SL was in no position to demand negotiations on equal footing. Moreover, because of his break with Feliciano, Guzmán had no way to guarantee that Feliciano would end hostilities. Offering himself and Miriam as a guarantee for the accords, given that they were already in prison, was offering the state something it had already achieved. If Montesinos continued negotiating under those conditions, it was purely to achieve results that could be presented to the general public so as to ensure a victory in the referendum on the new Constitution, written after the April 5, 1992, coup to legitimize the Fujimori dictatorship. That was achieved with the letters written by Guzmán, which the government used to its full advantage.

Fujimori read the first setter at the U.N. on October 1, 1993, responding with a complete and direct ‘No’ [to the peace accord]. The second [letter] was released in Peru with manipulative positive comments. Instead of helping the comrades analyze it, this led them to believe that is was a trick and they opposed it. They also refused to let us publicly defend our position, which is something on which we had agreed (PCP-SL 1993a).

Montesinos suspended the conversations after Fujimori won the referendum, and «from there we entered a period of waiting or standstill.»43 In December, Guzmán requested that the talks be restarted on the grounds that this «would convincingly demonstrate [...] that in no way were the talks, as the opposition has attempted to state, purely for electoral reasons or transitory.» He also proposed calling on militants to suspend military actions and, more importantly, «designate comrades in different trenches [prisons] around the country, beginning with Lima, to push for the peace accord by mobilizing inmates and their families to obtain public statements that the party and the

43 This and the following quotes are from the 1993 PCP-SL text: “Guideline for conversations for a Peace Accord” included in PCP-SL 2003. 180 masses have taken up the struggle for a Peace Accord.» Montesinos’ only concession was to allow imprisoned PCP-SL leaders to move around the prisons so that they could convince militants to fall in line IT behind Guzman’s proposal. His goal was to force a schism within the PCP-SL, FOR which he achieved. The final result of the conversation only surprised Guzmán and the

RESPONSIBLE militants who had adopted his position. «Finally, after a series of calls from Fujimori to give up and repent, campaigns by the armed forces that included THOSE fliers dropped in the emergency zones reading ‘Gonzalo gave up, turn yourself AND

in,’ and constant attacks in the media, in December 1993 Fujimori declared ‘war on terrorism’ as an answer.» Fujimori’s response came the same month that TRAGEDY

Guzmán attempted to jumpstart the conversations. That effectively ended the HE negotiations: «This led to a freezing of talks throughout 1994.» : T

ONE Montesinos briefly restarted the conversations in mid-1995 to force

ART Margie Clavo Peralta, one of the most important leaders of the «Proseguir» faction P of PCP-SL leaders still at large, and two other leaders who had recently been arrested, to support Guzman’s position. Guzmán and Iparraguirre got Clavo to join them and hoped to use this to reinitiate the peace talks and strengthen their position within the PCP-SL. They proposed that to «achieve the pending objective,» Clavo and the two other detainees be forced «to publicly offer self- criticism for ‘continuing’ and assume the call for the ‘end’ of the people’s war [...] through a peace accord.» 44 Guzmán and Iparraguirre also proposed that they and the other leaders in prison issue a public message, sign an official declaration ending the war and hold a new meeting of the leaders in favor of the peace accord. Along those lines, Guzmán sent a message to militants by way of his father-in-law, who lived in Sweden, proclaiming Clavo’s change of position as «a success of the party, of the proletariat line led by President Gonzalo and the Central Committee,» and calling for «the party to officially and publicly ask the government to begin direct talks.»45 Montesinos agreed only to the first point. The issue was put to rest after Clavo and the other two detainees were shown in televised interviews renouncing their position of continuing the people’s war. It is clear that the idea of a «Struggle for the Peace Accord» was stillborn. Nevertheless, far from admitting that he had been deceived, Guzmán embarked on the organization of his line, «position ourselves for the struggle between lines [between 1993 and 1999] so that the new strategy is accepted by the entire party.» That led to a schism in the PCP-SL between those in favor of the «peace accord» and those who decided to continue the war, a position known as «Pro- seguir» (carry on). Óscar Ramírez Durand, the most important leader of this dissident faction, is frank in his opinion:

About the ‘peace accord,’ you know that this never existed. Montesinos fooled

44 “Letter from Abimael Guzmán and Elena Iparraguirre to Doctor Vladimiro Montesinos. Callao Naval Base Prison, September 5, 1995” (PCP-SL 2003). 45 “Concerning the self-criticism of Comrade Nancy and other comrades who maintained the ‘Proseguir’ line. Callao Naval Base Prison, November 25, 1995.” (PCP-SL 2003). Guzmán as if he were a newborn baby. He [Guzmán] sold out to the dictatorship 181 so that he could live in prison with his girlfriend […] The dictatorship never wanted to dialogue with those who were still in the armed struggle, because this served as a pretext for them to continue stealing from state coffers and maintaining the anti-terrorism legislation to repress the people (Ramírez Durand 2003). RGANIZATIONS O As achievements of the negotiations during those months, Guzmán and

Iparraguirre point to some changes in prison conditions for PCP-SL inmates UBVERSIVE «and a certain amount of room for the militants in other jails to meet.» Guzmán S and Iparraguirre were allowed to meet for «several hours a day to work together» on a history of the organization and were given access to documents in the party’s archives that had been seized by DINCOTE, as well as Marxist texts from Guzman’s library. The «interlocutor» [Montesinos] brought them newspapers and magazines when he visited and also allowed them to watch television news programs. Those conditions, suspended in 1994, were reinstated in 1995, and in 1997 they were given a radio and allowed to receive various publications, including Le Monde and Newsweek. Montesinos may have opted to maintain these privileges as a way of keeping Guzmán from altering the status quo that had been achieved (PCP-SL 2003). For Guzmán, the principal achievement in the conversations with Montesinos was «having spread a great new strategy for the future IV stage of the party [...] and the documents supporting this were allowed out. From this new great strategy followed a new political line, a new general and tactical policy and specific policies» (PCP-SL 2003). He trusted that the militants who were still at large would accept his peace plan, but did state:

[…] they never made any of the responses public, except for a few superfi- cial and subjective comments that it was a «trick» and [...] they prohibited the documents that left the prisons from being read, and they did not discuss the letters that were published [...] Later, in an illegitimate event, they agreed that all those in favor of the accord were «capitulators» who «were on the margins» and that it could not be Comrade Gonzalo or Miriam, because they were «driven crazy» and «brainwashed» on the Naval Base (PCP-SL 2003).

According to Guzmán, these were simply pretexts by the leaders still at large for rejecting the proposal made by the imprisoned party leaders:

[…] If they believed that it was trick, why didn’t they politically unmask this creature that was supposedly created by the SIN? Later, if it were capitulation, why didn’t they expel the capitulators and «the snitches» they mentioned? And if anything had been done to affect the health of the leaders, why didn’t they denounce that and demand that health authorities and national and international defenders verify it, or at least check with the International Red Cross? (PCP-SL 2003).

In Guzman’s interpretation of events, the conduct of the «Proseguir» leaders demonstrated that «they were part of an opportunistic right-wing line that wanted to change the leadership, line, party and nature of the war, usurping the name of President Gonzalo and the PCP [to] create the schismatic block that 182 led to the division in 1993 and developed a covert plan to disregard the leadership, waiting for the moment and conditions to apply it» (PCP-SL 2003). Following the Stalinist tradition, Guzmán said the dissidents were right-wing IT elements that had always been present and had taken advantage of this FOR opportunity «to spring into action» (PCP-SL 2003). After Montesinos convinced Guzmán to write the two letters to Fujimori

RESPONSIBLE and had the other leaders agree to his «great decision of definition,» the other leaders were returned to their prisons to begin implementing the new party THOSE line. Guzmán and his partner remained on the Callao Naval Base, preparing AND

their documents. Óscar Ramírez Durand, Feliciano, was arrested in July 1999, basically bringing to an end the PCP-SL’s armed action. With that arrest, Guzmán TRAGEDY

believed that the «peace accord» was now inevitable and formulated a new line, HE in place since 2000, calling for «a political solution to the problems derived from : T

ONE the war.» The new position recognized that there was no correlation of forces

ART that would force the government to sign an accord. Guzmán proposed a series of P alternatives that could lead to an end to the war, and even stated that they might not depend on him.

From the «peace accord» to the «political solution of the problems stemming from the war»

The position adopted by Abimael Guzmán in 1993, as well as his party’s political line, can be explained by the changes that the leaders who had met on the Naval Base introduced into the fundamental positions of the PCP-SL. Of particular importance is the revision of the history of world revolution. In the document on this issue, Guzmán implicitly recognized that the start of the armed struggle in 1980 was a mistake. This detail merits special attention. In 1979, when the PCP-SL was debating the start of the people’s war, Abimael Guzmán stated: «Marxism elevated to the great peak of Mao Zedong’s thinking has given us a new situation. We are entering the strategic offensive of world revolution, the next fifty to one hundred years will see imperialism and the exploiters swept way» [emphasis added] (PCP-SL 1979d). The start of the armed struggle was part of a revolutionary offensive on an international scale. This position was maintained until Guzmán was arrested. Even 10 years into the war, in 1989, he stated:

[…] on the economic front [revisionism, imperialism and world reaction] maintain that capitalism has found the solution to its problems, that it is not marching toward destruction; they want the people of the world, the proletariat, to believe that capitalism is eternal. Politically, they want the people to remain dull, to think that they are stupid and that the system of bourgeois dictatorship is not heading toward ruin, that the bourgeoisie is not decaying but flourishing so as to perpetuate the bourgeois dictatorship (PCP- SL 1989c).

Guzmán changed his ideas after his arrest. The document that he signed at the Callao Naval Base with his followers shows that a mistake was made in his characterization of the world situation from a secular perspective. In a change 183 from earlier documents, this one claimed that the «revolutionary wave» of which the PCP-SL’s people’s war was part had actually ended with the defeat of the Cultural Revolution in China in 1976, four years before Guzmán launched his war. The PCP-SL began the people’s war in 1980 during a period of reflection and not as part of the «strategic offensive of world revolution» that «President Gon- RGANIZATIONS zalo» had preached (PCP-SL 1993a).46 O UBVERSIVE THE TÚPAC AMARU REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT S

Although on a much smaller scale than the PCP-SL, the Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (Movimiento Revolucionario Túpac Amaru, MRTA) was also unquestionably responsible for the violence suffered by Peru in the final decades of the 20th century. The MRTA began its «revolutionary war» in 1984, four years after Peru had returned to democracy and when the principal left-wing parties, despite their revolutionary rhetoric, were supporting the democratic process, participating in elections and even holding elected offices. To launch its subversive plan, the MRTA organized what it called the Tupac Amaru People’s Army (Ejército Popular Tupacamarista), which, unlike the PCP-SL’s armed groups, included armed, uniformed columns concentrated in camps away from populated areas. The MRTA claimed to respect the Geneva Conventions in its armed actions and its treatment of «prisoners.» The CVR, however, found that the organization committed serious crimes and human rights abuses, particularly assassinations and kidnappings. The MRTA was responsible for 1.8 percent of the deaths in the internal armed conflict.

BACKGROUND

The MRTA’s origins can be traced to a schism within APRA in the 1950s, when a group of young members led by Luis de la Puente broke with the party. Unhappy with the way the party was moving away from its radical roots and with the pact it had made with the conservative government of President Manuel Prado (1956-62), the dissidents formed Rebel APRA (APRA Rebelde). The triumph of the Cuban Revolution in 1959 encouraged a wave of radical politics throughout the continent and influenced Rebel APRA, which changed its name in 1962 to the Revolutionary Left Movement (Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria, MIR) and became part of a continental movement that believed in socialist revolution through armed struggle. In June 1965, the MIR launched a brief revolutionary adventure that ended with the death of Luis de

46 The document cited (PCP-SL 1993a) states that this period of reflection would last three decades, and that the world revolutionary movement would become active again around 2010. It was therefore necessary to pull back and wait. The «peace accord» proposal is framed within this thesis. 184 la Puente and the principal leaders over the next few months. In the following years, the survivors spread to a series of small organizations that kept the MIR name. Those groups evolved over the next decade IT and took different leanings, but they maintained the common objective of FOR «reinitiating the armed struggle.» Two of these groups, MIR-Rebel Voice (MIR- Voz Rebelde, MIR-VR) and MIR-Fourth Stage (MIR - IV Etapa, MIR-IV), had a

RESPONSIBLE presence in various organizations and grassroots movements by the end of the 1970s. It was, a much smaller fringe group, however, MIR – The Militant (MIR - El THOSE Militante, MIR-EM), that would join another organization a few years later to AND

form the MRTA. The other group grew out of the Socialist Revolutionary Party (Partido TRAGEDY

Socialista Revolucionario, PSR), which was founded in 1976 by radical Christian HE Democrat youth and military officers who supported the nationalism and reforms : T

ONE of General Juan Velasco Alvarado’s government (1968-1975). The PSR organized

ART on two levels: a public front that successfully took part in electoral politics P starting in 1978, and a clandestine front, known as the «Orga,» which undertook conspiratorial actions and ran the party apparatus. Members of the «Orga» quit the party in 1978, accusing those in the public front of undermining the insurrectionist wing. They founded the Marxist-Leninist PSR (PSR Marxista-Leni- nista, PSR ML). The 1979 victory of the Sandinista National Liberation Front in Nicara- gua breathed new life into Latin America’s left-wing guerrillas and had a major impact on the Peruvian left, which faced a difficult choice. Until 1978, nearly all the left-wing parties believed that armed struggle was a legitimate way to take power and most considered electoral politics synonymous with «reformism» and an abdication of the revolutionary cause. The call for elections to a Constituent Assembly in 1978 and general elections in 1980 forced many of the parties on the left to enter into a kind of transaction in which they decided to run candidates while maintaining that this was just part of a larger revolutionary strategy, or «[…] a tactical mechanism to accumulate forces for the objective, which is revolution.»47 Between 1978 and 1980, PSR-ML and MIR-EM participated in different efforts to unify the left, including formation of the United Left. Nevertheless, on May 18, 1980, the date of the presidential elections, both organizations released a public statement claiming that «the prolonged pre-revolutionary situation had not changed, because the causes were structural [and] implied preparing for a revolutionary war» (MRTA 1990: 15). The communiqué did not take into account that the majority of voters had opted for moderate, not radical, political options. In June – just weeks after the PCP-SL announced the start of its war – the PSR- ML and MIR-EM agreed to join forces to prepare «the conditions to unleash the revolutionary war» (MRTA 1990: 67). One of these conditions was achieving «the broadest unity possible with left-wing parties and organizations.» Over

47 CVR. Interview with Alberto Gálvez Olaechea, former MRTA militant. Huacariz Jail, Cajamarca, July 19-20, 2002. the next two years, they attempted to convince other groups — especially the 185 two other MIRs (MIR-VR and MIR-Fourth Stage), which had joined to form MIR- Confluence (MIR Confluencia, MIR-C) — to coordinate efforts to «reinitiate the armed struggle.» Nevertheless, MIR-C and Revolutionary Vanguard (Vanguardia Revolucionaria, VR) were not interested in joining forces with the others, and in 1984 they established RGANIZATIONS the Unified Mariateguist Party (Partido Unificado Mariateguista, PUM). For the PSR- O ML and MIR-EM, their reticence confirmed the lack of a «clear revolutionary UBVERSIVE plan» that had «strongly influenced reformism in the left» (MRTA 1990:25). S

Preparation for and start of armed actions (1982 - 1986) On March 1, 1982, a dozen PSR-ML and MIR-EM leaders met in a central committee and concluded that «the conditions for reinitiating revolutionary violence» existed. That judgment was influenced by the Sandinista victory in Nicaragua and the guerrilla offensives in El Salvador and Guatemala, as well as the surge in the armed conflict in Colombia. A national event, however, was the decisive factor, according to Peter Cárdenas, a former MRTA militant. «We were in a clandestine meeting in Lima, there was a blackout and we could not continue. We watched the news and found out what was going on. We could not sit back with our arms crossed when this was happening in the country.48 Cárdenas was referring to the PCP-SL attack on the prison in Huamanga on March 2, which took place in the middle of the PSR-ML – MIR-EM meeting. During the meeting, participants agreed that the central task was to develop the armed struggle (MRTA 1990: 39). In addition, they adopted the name Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement, agreeing «to keep the name secret until the new party structure is prepared to support the MRTA with weapons in hand» (MRTA 1990: 40). Throughout 1983, the MRTA worked on «accumulating forces,» which included assaults to obtain funds and weapons, political-military «homogenization» schools, and sending militants to different parts of the country. The next step was starting «armed propaganda» actions, such as the dynamite attack on the U.S. Marines barracks in Lima to protest the U.S. invasion of Grenada.49 The movement also began «the construction of movements of masses that would be incorporated into the revolutionary war process» (MRTA 1990: 43-44). The first meeting of the MRTA Central Committee was held in Lima in January 1984. The participants agreed to undertake «urban guerrilla actions» and form a «guerrilla army» in the countryside. In addition, they would make the organization known through «armed propaganda.» To that end, on January 22, 1984, an MRTA group attacked the police station in Villa El Salvador, in

48 CVR. Interview with Peter Cárdenas Schulte. Callao Naval Base, August 27, 2002. 49 The attack took place on November 16, 1983. Actions of this nature, characteristic of the MRTA, were not always related to the country’s internal armed conflict. For example, on April 21, 1986, in solidarity with Libya in the wake of a U.S. bombing raid, the MRTA exploded a car bomb at the U.S. ambassador’s residence in Lima. 186

THE MRTA’S USE OF KIDNAPPING IT

FOR

RESPONSIBLE

FROM ISOLATED ACTS TO A SYSTEMATIC PRACTICE THOSE

AND The CVR has obtained evidence that allows it to conclude that between 1984 and 1996, the MRTA carried out dozens of individual and collective kidnappings for TRAGEDY

extortion. The number of kidnappings may be much higher, because the statistics used HE here were based on cases that were filed and investigations undertaken by the security : T forces. In many cases, the kidnappings were not reported in the hope that the victim ONE

would be released quickly or out of fear that the family members could be accused of ART

P collaborating with terrorism because they paid the ransom demanded for the release of their relatives. Kidnappings occurred in various cities in the departments of Lima, San Martín, Junín, Loreto, Arequipa and Amazonas. The principal scenario was the department of Lima, where 65 percent of the kidnappings occurred. Other important areas were the departments of San Martín and Junín, with 14 percent and 9 percent, of the abductions, respectively. The departments of Amazonas, Arequipa and Loreto each registered approximately 2 percent of the kidnappings. The practice of kidnapping for extortion varied significantly in scope during the period studied. Between 1984 and 1987, the number of kidnappings was small, but significant. The MRTA began by kidnapping José Onrubia Romero, a local businessman. No other cases were reported until 1987. Kidnappings fell off again in 1988. The number of kidnappings increased yearly between 1989 and 1992. The increase was linked to the implementation of a political-military plan approved by the MRTA in 1988. The plan included various operations to be carried out by a special squad of the MRTA Special Forces. The number of kidnapping dropped in 1993, thanks to a police operation in October that led to the arrest of a large group of MRTA cadres who formed the kidnapping unit of the subversive organization’s Special Forces. Seriously weakened, the organization attempted to regroup and prepare for new kidnappings in 1995. The number of abductions increased again that year. The MRTA received another blow toward the end of 1995 from officers of the National Anti-Terrorism Bureau who raided a home in Lima’s La Molina district, arresting a large number of MRTA members and seizing a major cache of weapons. Finally, at the end of 1996, with most of its members and leaders in different jails around the country, the subversive group carried out what would be its last mass kidnapping, which was aimed at forcing the release of the prisoners. Kidnapping was a systematic practice between 1988 and 1995.

KIDNAPPING AS PART OF A PLAN The abductions between 1984 and 1987 were done for political and economic gain, but do not seem to have been part of a general plan. Starting in 1988, however, kidnapping became part of the subversive group’s policy. The decision to use abduction to obtain money was made at the second southern Lima. The media gave wide coverage to the appearance of a new 187 subversive group. As the armed actions increased, the MRTA began to gain a certain presence in factories and in the shantytowns ringing Lima. In Junín, the MRTA was active at the National University of the Center of Peru, as well as in some poor neighborhoods in Huancayo and Jauja. At the end of 1983, approximately 20 MRTA militants were transferred to Paucartambo, Cusco, to RGANIZATIONS organize an armed column. That column, however, was routed on November O 27, 1984, a reversal for the group that also reflected local opposition to the UBVERSIVE subversive movement. S In February 1985, during its Second Central Committee meeting, the MRTA reaffirmed that Peru was living through a «pre-revolutionary» period. That view, however, did not reflect what was happening in the nation. A representative of the United Left had been elected mayor of Lima and the left- wing coalition controlled other important departmental capitals. The PUM was one of the strongest parties in the IU, with a strong presence in various grassroots organizations. Despite its radical rhetoric, the party did not demonstrate any intention of joining the armed struggle. Finally, APRA appeared headed for certain victory in the 1985 general elections. Thus, while broad sections of the population were expressing themselves through political options within the democratic system, the MRTA was attempting to «ripen» the «pre-revolutionary period» to create a «revolutionary situation.» In the April 1985 elections, the MRTA presented a minimal political platform, calling for an end to relations with the International Monetary Fund, an increase in the minimum wage, amnesty for all «political prisoners» and an end to the states of emergency (MRTA 1990: 71). It also called on voters to spoil their ballots. The proposals were accompanied by an attack against then-Labor Minister Joaquín Leguía and the dynamite bombing of a Kentucky Fried Chicken franchise in Lima in March 1985. A month after the elections, in May 1985, the organization published MRTA and the Peruvian Revolution, in which it defined its so-called «revolutionary war of the people.» The principal objective of its strategy was «the conquest of political power [...] that would be achieved in a more or less prolonged revolutionary war» (MRTA 1990: 75). At the start of the war, the MRTA attempted to «accumulate and develop revolutionary, ideological, political and military forces» and focused its work on «[…] the construction of a vanguard organization capable of uniting the masses of workers and guiding their struggles within the general perspective of the struggle for power, as well as leading the armed struggle and incorporating the masses of the working people» (MRTA 1990: 75). In June 1985, after actions in the cities of Chiclayo, Chimbote, Huancayo and Lima to commemorate the 20th anniversary of the founding of MIR’s guerri- lla force, the MRTA decided that the «armed propaganda phase had been successfully completed» and that they were ready to begin «the harassment phase with guerrilla characteristics» (MRTA 1990: 79). Two actions marked the start of this phase. On July 12, MRTA militants attacked seven police stations simultaneously in Lima, and on July 25 the organization exploded a car bomb 188

Central Committee meeting in 1988. “[...] The MRTA needs to strengthen its political

IT and military preparation, because we foresee moving to a new stage in the class

FOR struggle. We have therefore drafted a plan that consists of [...] f. Obtaining a war chest to resolve the needs imposed by party tasks. We will begin by capturing one of the heads of the “12 Apostles”1 (MRTA 1990: 127). The subversives decided to launch their kidnapping plan by abducting Carlos RESPONSIBLE Ferreyros (1988) and Héctor Delgado Parker (1989), wealthy businessmen with ties

THOSE to the government. The MRTA began training a special group to be in charge of abductions. According to one former MRTA militant: AND

There were times in 1988 when we were poor, with no money for anything. What little money we managed to get was earmarked for priority sectors. [...] We had TRAGEDY attempted some bank robberies and other assaults, but the results were not HE promising. Modernity also ruled that out, because banks don’t keep a lot of cash on : T hand. The only way was through kidnapping. [Economic necessity] led us to ONE

kidnapping. There was a process and all that. At first we thought about major,

ART important kidnappings, at least a few people at a time. [...] If you could grab two, the P heads of the most important economic groups in the country, you would be able to fill the pot. A special group was formed for this, which took more than a year.2 Over the next few years, the practice continued because of the need to obtain funds to maintain the organization and acquire weapons. One former MRTA militant stated: Víctor Polay3 got caught and we didn’t have a war chest. What were we supposed to do after his arrest? We had been okay, but then we were in trouble. We had the idea that to wage war, you have to accumulate a war chest. We had robbed some banks and some of the combatants had carried out common crimes and kidnapping. There were many kidnappings. That’s a simple tactic that has also been used in other countries. That source of income enabled us to buy weapons on the black market, which is easy to do. There were times when the situation was tough, but others when the cadres, the combatants, had some comforts despite the difficult living conditions in the jungle or the mountains, where it is very cold.4

A SPECIALIZED UNIT

One of the MRTA’s units was the “Revolutionary Military Force,”5 which included the

1 The “12 Apostles” was the name given by the media to the country’s wealthiest businessmen, who had strong ties to the government. 2 CVR. BDI-II-P461. In-depth interview, September 2002. MRTA commander, former UNCP student now serving a sentence in a maximum-security prison. 3 Víctor Polay Campos, the head of MRTA, was arrested February 3, 1989, at the Tourist Hotel in Huancayo, Junín. He was sentenced to 20 years and imprisoned in Castro Castro. 4 CVR. BDI-II-P532. In-depth interview, September 2002. MRTA militant serving a sentence in a maximum-security prison. 5 According to Article 6 of the MRTA by-laws, which were approved at the second Central Committee meeting in August 1988, the “Revolutionary Military Force” was a political-military structure whose objective was direct confrontation with and defeat of the armed forces (MRTA 1988: 59). at the Education Ministry, causing damage but taking no lives. This was the 189 first time they had used this kind of terrorist action. Nevertheless, when García was inaugurated on July 28, the MRTA’s maximum leader, Víctor Polay Campos, wearing a ski mask, held a widely covered press conference during which he announced the suspension of MRTA military actions considering that the people «had overwhelmingly deposited RGANIZATIONS their hopes in the APRA party» (MRTA 1990: 95). Miguel Rincón, an MRTA leader, O recalled that at the time «the MRTA leadership believed it was correct to offer UBVERSIVE the government a truce, demonstrating its flexibility and willingness to dialo- S gue to find solutions for our country and avoid a bloodbath; the response was negative and the dirty war against us continued and intensified» (2002: 14). The suspension of military actions was accompanied by a call for dialo- gue with the government and compliance with a several conditions, including «release of all political prisoners [...], formation of a Peace Commission and esta- blishment of [a] minimum level of justice «(MRTA 1990: 99). In this way, the MRTA attempted to win the sympathy of the population that had voted for APRA and the IU. It also wanted to differentiate itself from the PCP-SL and consolidate its political presence as an armed organization that took the initiative «in the political playing field with open, mature and politically aware attitude» (MRTA 1990: 81). The unilateral suspension of armed actions caused concern among MRTA militants. For some regional leaders, the move was a decision made only by the leadership in Lima. «One day they come out and say, ‘We’re offering a truce.’ But how, when did we talk about this? In addition, we had a long anti-APRA tradition and this left a bad taste in our mouths» (Mateo50). The suspension of armed actions, however, allowed the MRTA restart its efforts to create a guerrilla column. It also sent a military command to Colombia at the end of 1985, forming the America Battalion together with Ecuador’s Alfaro Vive ¡Carajo! and Colombia’s M-19. The commandos took part in armed guerrilla actions in Colombia (MRTA 1990: 89- 91). The MRTA held its Third Central Committee meeting in Lima on February 9 to 14, 1986, making a positive assessment of the events of 1985 and stating that the organization had «conquered important political space in the national arena and even on the international front.» Despite its visibility in the local press, the MRTA did not have significant influence in the political world, nor did it lead important social movements. The prison massacres occurred a few months later, on June 18 and 19. On August 7, Polay, again wearing a ski mask, offered a second press conference to announce the end of the truce: «Starting today, the Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement considers the government of Alan García the enemy of the people» (MRTA 1990: 105). The «restart of hostilities» was accompanied by a call to form a «front for democracy, justice and peace» that would bring together all the «democrats, patriots, progressives, grassroots sectors of APRA, IU and armed organizations» to confront and defeat the

50 CVR. Interview with Mateo, the pseudonym of a former MRTA leader imprisoned in a maximum- security prison. August 2003. 190

“Special Forces.”6 This group was “[...] an elite unit formed by officers and combatants 7 IT in charge of rear-guard activities against the enemy.”

FOR The “Special Forces” operated in rural and urban areas and had been trained to carry out “commando-style”8 operations (MRTA 1988: 17). In the MRTA’s by-laws, Article 32 states that the organization’s internal structure consists of various departments, each with its own leader and structure, which report RESPONSIBLE to the General Command9 (MRTA 1988: 60). A former MRTA militant described it this

THOSE way:

AND

In the case of the commandos, the structure was like that of the English SAS. Special operations that are carried out autonomously and not linked to the army structure. It is [...] under the political leadership. There were several units, including recovery teams, TRAGEDY kidnapping teams, intelligence operations teams and even a team for police actions, if HE necessary. There was a suburban branch, which was combination of the Urban Militia : T and the Command Structure.10 ONE

ART

P The “General Command,” meanwhile, was subject to the decisions of the principal political-military structures, which were not permanent units, such as the “Central Committee.”11 That committee consisted of the “National Executive Committee” – also known as the “National Bureau” – and other appointed members.12 A former member of the MRTA “Central Committee” stated:

The large-scale operations, like the assassination of Army Gen. Enrique López Albújar, the kidnapping of Delgado Parker, and attacks on towns and police stations, were decided by the MRTA National Bureau, and each Regional Bureau was in charge of carrying out the plans according to their possibilities. The political objectives and campaigns were decided and planned by the Central Committee.13

6 In describing the “Revolutionary Military Force,” the MRTA by-laws do not expressly mention the “Special Forces.” “The MRTA Military Forces are made up of the Tupacamarista People’s Army, the urban and rural commands, the Tupacamarista militias in the countryside and cities, and the rural and urban self-defense groups” (Article 5). Nevertheless, a document entitled, “Military Guideline,” which was also prepared at the second Central Committee meeting, states that the “Special Forces” are a component of the “Revolutionary Military Force” (MRTA 1988: 57-59). 7 MRTA. MRTA by-laws , Article 21 (MRTA 1988: 59). 8 Article 22 of the MRTA Statute defines the commandos as “[…] the basic tactical combat unit within the revolutionary military force [...] they are military units with a high level of professional training and combat-readiness. Their work is direct conflict with the enemy. The commandos are dedicated exclusively to the military task. They possess technical-military training that ensures mobility, speed and solid actions [...]” (MRTA 1988: 52). 9 According to Article 23 of the MRTA Statute: “The General Command is the permanent political-military organism within the M.F. [Military Force] of the MRTA” (MRTA 1988: 52). 10 CVR. BDI-II-P532. In-depth interview, September 2002. MRTA militant serving a sentence in a maximum-security prison. 11 Article 21 of the MRTA by-laws states: “The maximum political and military bodies of the party to which the Military Forces are subordinate are: The National Congress, National Convention and Central Committee” (MRTA 1988: 60). 12 MRTA. MRTA by-laws, Article 30 (MRTA 1988: 53). 13 Statement to police by Alberto Gálvez Olaechea on June 10, 1991, in the DIRCOTE office (Police Report 119-D1-DINCOTE, June 14, 1991). «militarization» of the regime (MRTA 1990: 107). The front was never formed. 191

UNITY WITH THE MIR, SPREAD OF MILITARY ACTIONS AND POLITICAL WORK (1986-1988) The 18 months that followed the end of the ceasefire were considered successful by the MRTA for several reasons, including the unity reached with the MIR-VR, RGANIZATIONS the establishment of the first guerrilla front in San Martín, and a National People’s O Assembly that brought together unions and grassroots organizations with some

links to the MRTA. UBVERSIVE S The initial conversations in 1982 with MIR–C had failed, but the group had a crisis in 1983. While one sector joined the PUM, another, made up mainly of militants of MIR-VR, insisted on the need for armed struggle. In 1985, this group organized the Revolutionary People’s Commands and carried out a few armed propaganda actions. Alberto Gálvez Olaechea, head of the MIR-VR, recognizes that the advance of the PCP-SL was one of the elements that contributed to this decision:

We, as militants of MIR, a group with a guerrilla history and rituals honoring our heroes, were not immune to a cause that raised questions for us and forced us to define ourselves. Talk became obsolete, and actions were what spoke. Those of us who would later converge to form the MRTA were pushed to do it, to some extent, by the [PCP-] SL (Gálvez 2003: 23).

The conversations between the MRTA and MIR-VR took a positive turn in 1986. On December 9, after the First Unified Central Committee meeting, the two groups announced that they were joining forces. While the MRTA had a more developed military structure, the MIR-VR had more political experience in San Martín, Lambayeque, Ancash and La Libertad, as well as some military experience with the CRPs. The MIR-VR agreed to accept the MRTA name, as well as Víctor Polay as the secretary general. The MRTA chose the department of San Martín for its first guerrilla front, because the MIR-VR had been working for some time to establish itself among corn and rice farmers, teachers and the Front to Defend the Interests of the People of San Martín (Frente de Defensa de los Intereses del Pueblo de San Martín, FEDIP-SM) in the department’s northern provinces. A total of 60 guerrillas, 30 each from the MIR-VR and MRTA, formed what was known as the Northeastern Front. Responsibility for the front fell to Víctor Polay, which caused the first tension with the MIR-VR. The attack on Tabalosos (Lamas) on October 8, 1987, marked the start of the political-military campaign called «Che Lives.» Ten days later, an MRTA column took over the town of Soritor (Moyobamba). Neither action, however, had national repercussions. The next campaign was known as «Túpac Amaru Liberator.» On November 6, 60 guerrillas took the town of Juanjuí (Mariscal Cáceres), and the following day the same column assaulted the town of San José de Sisa (El Dorado), meeting no resistance. The organization got the national publicity it was seeking through a TV interview with Víctor Polay. The 192

The “Special Forces,” under the direction of the “General Command,” were in

IT charge of various activities, including planning and carrying out kidnappings in

FOR coordination with the MRTA’s highest-level political-military commands. The unit’s special training enabled the MRTA to carry out detailed, impercep- tible surveillance of its victims and reach a high degree of precision and speed in carrying out the kidnappings. RESPONSIBLE

THOSE

AND

TRAGEDY

HE : T ONE

ART P government responded shortly thereafter, declaring a state of emergency in 193 San Martín and sending a large contingent of soldiers after the MRTA column, which managed to escape. On December 9, the MRTA decided to end of the «Túpac Amaru Liberator» campaign and decentralize its forces. One group was sent to the eastern region, another was dispatched to the central region, and 37 guerrilla fighters remained RGANIZATIONS in San Martín. According to Sístero García, Ricardo,51 the column that remained O in San Martín was discovered by the Army in a short time and collapsed within UBVERSIVE weeks. The reconstruction of the Northeastern Front was slow, and it was not S until the early 1990s that the subversives were once again able to carry out any significant actions. By 1991, the Northeastern Front had been rebuilt and included approximately 400 armed fighters. Despite the setbacks, the MRTA was upbeat about the «Che Lives» and «Túpac Amaru Liberator» campaigns, which they believed confirmed their conversion into a real «option for power» (MRTA 1990: 136). That assessment overestimated their military force and underestimated the power of the state, as well as the strength acquired by the PCP-SL. This overly optimistic view also came shortly before the arrests of Gálvez Olaechea and Lucero Cumpa, who was in charge of operations in Metropolitan Lima and a member of the Central Committee. Although it was at its height, the MRTA began demonstrating the characteristics that would mark its actions in the coming years, including a fluctuation between successes and failures, inability to achieve sustained growth in any area of the country or sector, an image of an armed group supported mainly by volunteers, and the risks and confidence placed in media coverage of its actions as a way of accumulating political strength. As the Northeastern Front began operations, the First Congress of the National People’s Assembly (Asamblea Nacional Popular, ANP) was held in Villa el Salvador, bringing together union organizations and radical sectors of the IU- UNIR, PUM, PCP-Unity and the UDP, an organization linked to the MRTA at the time. According to Miguel Rincón:

Together with the compañeros from PUM, we led the group that wanted the ANP to become a real opportunity for centralization [...] with a plan that not only included the most important demands of the people, but that also incorporated revolutionary objectives that would open the way for the people to struggle for power (2002: 15-16).

MRTA militants had participated in preparatory meetings for the ANP since 1986, attempting to link the mobilizations of sectors within the ANP to the armed struggle. The paradox here is that the organization’s strength increased as the union movements lost importance on the national level. Hit hard by the crisis in industry because of the collapse of the import-substitution model and the violence that the MRTA itself was helping to stir up, the organizations in the ANP in 1987 were only a pale shade of the groups that had stopped the country

51 Former MRTA leader who took advantage of the repentance law. 194 with massive national strikes in 1977 and 1978. Without a clear evaluation of these weaknesses, the Second Unified Cen- tral Committee of MRTA was held in 1988. The meeting reiterated the apocalyptic IT assessment of the national situation and, influenced by the victories of the FOR Northeastern Front, agreed to open other guerrilla fronts because «[...] in Juanjuí we realized that we must have the audacity and decisiveness to offer a national 52

RESPONSIBLE plan with weapons in hand; there is no other way.» The MRTA therefore began to restructure the Northeastern Front and opened an Eastern Front (Ucayali, THOSE Pasco and Huánuco) and a Central Front (Junín and the jungle region of Pasco). AND

At the same time, some cadres were sent to explore the possibility of reopening a front in the southern part of the country and to strengthen the organization’s TRAGEDY

work in urban areas. It was also indispensable to tighten up the organization HE and finance its «war expenses,» and the group opted for kidnapping, arguing : T

ONE that the «costs of the war» should be paid by the «high bourgeoisie and

ART imperialism» (Desco 1989: 244). P The kidnappings were perpetrated in Lima by «special forces.» During their captivity, businesspeople were kept in «people’s prisons» – small, unhealthy cells – and were under constant supervision. The first kidnapping was carried out in September 1987 (Jiménez 2000: 868). Months earlier, the first internal «settling of scores» came in a reprisal against former MIR-VR militants of the Northeastern Front who were unhappy with the unification and had launched their own military plan. An MRTA «revolutionary tribunal» determined that they were traitors, and located and executed them on October 30, 1988. The Cusquén Cabrera siblings were also accused of «counter-revolutionary crimes.» Rosa Cusquén, accused of treason and of being a police informant, was killed on June 1, 1988, in the Arzobispo Loayza Hospital in Lima, where she was recovering from wounds she had received in the first assassination attempt two months earlier. Meanwhile, the Eastern Front began operating without adequate knowledge of the terrain or sufficient prior proselytizing and organizing. After a few initial successes, on December 8, 1989, a subversive detachment assassinated Alejandro Calderón, president of an important Asháninka organization (Apatywaka-Nampitsi-Ashaninka del Pichis, ANAP), for allegedly having committed a counter-revolutionary crime when he was a young man. The MRTA accused Calderón of having informed police authorities of the whereabouts of Máximo Velando, a MIR guerrilla leader, in 1965. Calderón’s murder led to the formation of the so-called «Asháninka Army,» which expelled the MRTA from its territory. While the MRTA admitted that killing Calderón was a mistake and withdrew its fighters without any combat,53 the damage was done. The offensive launched by the Asháninka Army and state security forces dismantled the Eastern Front. «In 1991, there was no Eastern Front, there was no one. It disappeared as quickly as it had appeared,» (Lucas54). The survivors moved to the Central Front.

52 CVR. Interview. Callao Naval Base, 2002. 53 In July 1990, Víctor Polay recognized the “mistake” (MRTA 1990: 19). 54 CVR. Interview. Lucas is the pseudonym of a jailed MRTA leader. August 2003. The central region was of particular importance in the MRTA’s strategy. 195 In September 1998, shortly after the Second Unified Central Committee meeting, the organization attempted to reinstall an armed detachment in the region. While the detachment had to deal with a hostile reaction from the PCP-SL from the start, it moved forward with its plans and began armed actions in February

1989. After some successes aimed at establishing a national presence and RGANIZATIONS positioning the organization as an alternative to the PCP-SL and the armed O forces, the MRTA decided to take the city Tarma as a way of regaining the ground UBVERSIVE it had lost in San Martín. The MRTA column was made up of 67 armed subversives, S nearly all of whom were drawn from the highland and central fronts. On the morning of April 28, on the border between the districts of Huertas and Molinos (Jauja), two trucks carrying the MRTA detachment came upon a military patrol. The shootout left 58 MRTA militants dead.55 The blow received in Molinos basically ended the MRTA’s work in the central region, but the organization’s leadership did not fully understand the impact of what had happened. «We did not have a clear idea of the magnitude of this loss [...]. We thought we would recover quickly […] with some actions, with some kind of campaign [...] the truth is, however, that the blow was so great that it deprived us of many things» (Mateo). For Gálvez Olaechea, what happened in Molinos demonstrated a tendency in the MRTA that «prioritized immediate actions over more consistent, long-term work» (2003: 36). In response to Moli- nos, on January 9, 1990, the MRTA assassinated a retired general and former defense minister, Enrique López Albújar, shooting him while he was driving his own car without a security detail. Víctor Polay said that the «execution» had been «[...] agreed upon by the revolutionary tribunal as a response to the murder of MRTA prisoners and injured combatants in Los Molinos» (1990: 19). The action appeared to corroborate what Manrique (1989: 175-80) had stated about the probable «Senderoization» of the MRTA, which was also reflected in the organization’s decision to murder its own members in Chiclayo, Tarapoto and Lima. A period of rebuilding the Central Front began with the transfer of small contingents of armed militants from urban areas. While this effort coincided with the start of the peasant revolt against the PCP-SL and the increased presence of the armed forces, a few detachments began operating again in early 1991.

REBUILDING THE CENTRAL LEADERSHIP, HARDENING THE LINE AND RUPTURE (1989-1992) On February 3, 1989, three months after the conflict in Molinos, Víctor Polay was arrested in Huancayo. The problems caused by his capture were exacerbated by the arrest of Miguel Rincón in Lima on April 16.56 As a result, Néstor Cerpa Cartolini took over leadership of the MRTA. Because most of its captured leaders

55 According to information provided by the Army, six soldiers were also killed. In addition, seven people living in surrounding villages were detained and disappeared. Three others detained by the Army were later found dead and are believed to have been executed. 56 Gálvez Olaechea was arrested in August 1987, and Peter Cárdenas and Hugo Avellaneda were arrested at Jorge Chávez Airport in Lima in February 1988. Lima. 196 were in Lima’s Miguel Castro Castro prison, the MRTA began constructing a tunnel into the prison that would take three months to build. On July 9, 1990, 47 inmates would escape through the tunnel. The escape once more thrust the IT organization into the national spotlight, inspired its militants and burnished FOR the image of its battered leadership. With the reincorporation of Víctor Polay and Alberto Gálvez, the MRTA

RESPONSIBLE held its Third Unified Central Committee meeting in September 1990. The event did not go smoothly. After Alberto Fujimori’s surprising victory in the run-off THOSE election earlier in the year, Polay entertained the idea of negotiating a political AND

solution to the armed conflict with the new government. The proposal, however, was not discussed at the meeting.57 The delegates did discuss major current TRAGEDY

events in light of the collapse of the Berlin Wall, the electoral defeat of the HE Sandinistas in Nicaragua and peace accords in the rest of Central America. The : T

ONE MIR-VR representatives maintained that the socialist current was undergoing

ART a profound crisis and that the «international rear guard» had broken down P completely. In addition, PCP-SL’s actions had undermined «revolutionary violence,» which was now rejected by the population. They claimed that the victory of Ricardo Belmont in the Lima mayoral election in 1989 and Alberto Fujimori’s presidential victory in 1990 demonstrated «the collapse of traditional parties and politicians and a people without ideologies, pragmatic and skeptical» (Gálvez 2003: 39). These factors required that the MRTA change tactics and opt for a political solution. Polay, however, offered a different assessment. «We believed that [retreat] was not the most appropriate response, because it meant leaving the playing field open to the [PCP-] SL.»58 It was therefore necessary to «[…] impose dialogue on the government, turn ourselves into a belligerent force for dialogue. We needed to show the public that the MRTA had achieved a level of development and that it was necessary for us to sit down at the table and negotiate with the government.»59 The Central Committee decided to strengthen the Northeastern Front and open fronts in the north and south «so that conversations with the MRTA would be inevitable.»60 With this objective in mind, several of the subversive who had escaped from Miguel Castro Castro prison were sent to different areas of the country and numerous members of its political structures and support groups were incorporated into the military structure. This allowed the MRTA to consolidate the Northeastern and Central fronts quickly. Nevertheless, internal tensions were heightened with the election of

57 For Gálvez Olaechea, Polay’s decision not to present the idea was meant to “guarantee the support of ideological hard-line factions [such as] Cerpa and Rincón and push out the MIR-VR” (2003:39). 58 CVR. Interview. Callao Naval Base, March 13, 2003. 59 Ibid. Nevertheless, through the intervention of Rep. Gerardo López (Cambio 90), who was kidnapped and later released at the end of September 1990, they proposed dialogue to Alberto Fujimori. The proposal was rejected. 60 CVR. Interview with Vïctor Polay. Callao Naval Base, March 13, 2003. the new National Executive Committee. Of the six members, four were from 197 the original MRTA (including Polay Campos and Cerpa Cartolini) and two were from the MIR-VR (Gálvez Olaechea and Rodolfo Klein Samanez). The election broke an agreement between the two groups on the composition of the ruling committee. In addition, the responsibilities for the regions and military fronts were given to the MRTA delegates. The Northeastern Front went to Cerpa, who RGANIZATIONS replaced the MIR-VR’s Sístero García, Ricardo. The same thing happened with the O Southern and Central fronts. UBVERSIVE Despite these differences, in the following months the MRTA stepped up S its actions in various parts of the country with renewed military strength, culminating with the second assault on Juanjuí on December 24, 1991. According to the leaders of the subversive organization, the number of people willing to join the MRTA was greater than the group’s ability to incorporate them. For example, Francisco stated: «[...] there was a lack of leadership. There were masses, there were combatants, but one leader cannot take charge of 100 people and there were hundreds of people. We didn’t know what to do.» The lack of commanders led some of the militants to take charge although they had little training. That led to tactics that included collecting bribes from drug traffickers in San Martín, assassinating dissidents, treating kidnapping victims with ex- treme cruelty and, in general, accentuating the militaristic approach. In August 1991, subversive commandos assassinated Orestes Dávila Torres, Germán, who had been Cerpa Cartolini’s right-hand man. Months later, in January 1992, Andrés Sosa Chanamé, a former MRTA militant from PCP-Unity was murdered. These revenge killings led to Gálvez Olaechea’s resignation from the MRTA in early 1992. He recalls, «[…] those who had been Robin Hoods at the beginning hardened their positions with the blows of the war and the law of an eye for an eye became a powerful temptation» (2003: 52). According to Polay, however, the image that the MRTA members «were killing each other» was a consequence of the intelligence service’s manipulation of the media and comments by former militants that were exaggerated and did not reflect reality; «[…] furthermore, in the case of Beto Gálvez [Olaechea], he was arrested and after a few months in jail he announced his resignation.»61 The kidnappings perpetrated by the MRTA during this time grew increasingly brutal. One victim, Pedro Antonio Miyasato, was found dead on April 22, 1992, and the body of David Ballón Vera found was found on February 23, 1993. The differences between the MIR-VR and MRTA militants were irreconcilable. Gálvez’s resignation in January 1992 was followed by that of Sístero García and 120 combatants of the Northeastern Front. The national MRTA leadership ordered the arrest of Sístero García, but he was saved by the Army. It is estimated that the MRTA lost approximately 400 fighters during these internal conflicts, as well as in armed confrontations with military forces. It also lost the military control it had exercised over some areas of San Martín. After the April 5, 1992, coup, many MRTA militants, especially on the

61 CVR. Interview. Callao Naval Base, 2003. 198 Northeastern Front, took advantage of the repentance law and began turning in other militants. The coup also reopened debate over the viability of the armed struggle. Some militants insisted that it was time to stop the war, but once again IT the idea of doing this «from a position of strength» prevailed. According to FOR Miguel Rincón, «[…] the retreat needed to be gradual, inflicting strong blows to show the country and the world that the struggle continued [...] show the

RESPONSIBLE dictatorship that it was not moving ahead with free rein and, with this, organize our retreat.»62 THOSE The strategy was difficult to implement, because Gálvez Olaechea’s AND

second arrest at the end of 1991 was followed by a series of other blows. Peter Cárdenas Schulte was arrested on April 9, 1992. Two months later, on June 9, TRAGEDY

Víctor Polay was arrested again in the Lima district of San Borja. By mid-year, HE only two members of the leadership committee, Néstor Cerpa and Miguel Rin- : T

ONE cón, were still at large. Cerpa again took charge of the MRTA. After the arrest of

ART Lucero Cumpa on May 1, 1993, in Tarapoto, the remaining members of the P detachment in San Martín agreed to accept the repentance law. The Northeastern Front disappeared. The MRTA’s actions were limited to the Central Front and its actions in Lima diminished.

EPILOGUE The rest is epilogue. According to Gálvez Olaechea, «the conflict came down to a war of apparatuses in which the stronger apparatus, the state, won» (2003: 53). Given the extreme situation, the MRTA began planning large-scale actions that would place it on the national map. Cerpa and Rincón were aware that the MRTA was not going to take power, even more so after Shining Path leader Abimael Guzmán announced from his prison cell that he was in favor of a peace accord. Instead, they opted to create a «situation of strength» that would allow them to negotiate the release of their militants, the suspension of hostilities and eventual incorporation into legal political life. According to Miguel Rincón, «[…] it was necessary to rescue the revolutionary cadres to continue the revolutionary struggle, but the government had closed all possibilities for legal or political resolutions.» The militants’ release, therefore, «would only be achieved through a position of strength» 63 With that goal in mind, they planned an assault on Congress, but the plot was discovered beforehand, in November 1995, and ended with the arrest of Rincón and 17 other subversives. Nevertheless, on December 17, 1996, Néstor Cerpa Cartolini, the remaining leader still at large, led a group of 14 subversives in an assault on the Japanese ambassador’s residence in Lima during a reception attended by more than 600 people. Most of the hostages were released within a few days, but 72 people remained prisoner for 136 days.

62 CVR. Interview. Callao Naval Base , March 25, 2003. 63 CVR. Interview. Callao Naval Base, April 8, 2003. Finally, after more than four months of different levels of contact 199 between the kidnappers and the government, special forces launched a rescue mission, “Chavín de Huántar,” on April 22, 1997. All but one of the hostages were freed. In addition, two of the commandos were killed, as were all of the MRTA militants. That episode marked the end of the subversive organization. RGANIZATIONS O UBVERSIVE S

forces. was responsiblefor48percent, while45percentwereattributedtostatesecurity the 7,795victimsreported between1980and1985,thesubversiveorganization the entireperiodofviolence, asreportedtotheCVR.TheCVRalsofoundthatof PCP-SL. Thisnumberrepresents 35percentofthetotalnumbervictimsfrom President FernandoBelaundeTerry asaresultoftheviolenceunleashedby The CVRrecorded7,795deathsanddisappearances duringthegovernmentof P T rule. allowing abroadsectionofthePeruvianpopulation to beplacedundermilitary renounced thecivilanddemocraticauthoritywon throughfreeelections, the population.Withexceptionofsomenotablecases, theseadministrations authorities takingsufficientstepstoensurerespectfor thefundamentalrightsof to cedecontroloftheanti-subversivefightarmedforceswithoutcivilian territory. Thiswas expanded andimposedtheirviolenceonaconsiderableamountofnational to thecomplexitiesofproblem.Thetragicresultwasthatorganizations political willtodesignandapplyacomprehensivestrategythatwouldrespond the 1980s.Initialmistakesinassessingproblemwerefollowedbyalackof responded inadequatelytothethreatposedbyShiningPath andMRTA in The civiliangovernmentsthatheldpowerinthefirstdecadeofviolence HE ADMINISTRATION OFPRESIDENT ARTY THE CIVILIANGOVERNMENTSINFIRSTDECADEOF By theendof Belaundeadministration, 32provinceswereundera state complicated bythedecisionofvarious administrations F ERNANDO CHAPTER 3 VIOLENCE B ELAUNDE T ERRYTHE AND P OPULAR A CTION 201

THE C IVILIAN G OVERNMENTS IN THE FIRST DECADE O F THE VIOLENCE 202 PART ONE: THE TRAGEDY AND THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR IT and civilrights,usedselectivedeportationsto silence theopposition.The government thathadlimitedthescopeofpolitical parties, aswellpolitical weakened by1980.Thisweaknesswasduetothe12 yearsofrulebyamilitary in thepublicsphere. transformed P T subversive fightasofDecember1982. forces, which,ashasbeennoted,weregivenbroadpowersovertheanti- actions perpetratedbythePCP-SL,aswellresponsefromarmed the bruntofviolence.Thiswasresultconstantincreaseinterrorist between 1983and1985,withtheruralpopulationofcentralAndessuffering abuses recordedbytheCVR. this departmentin1984. Ayacucho also hadthehighestnumberofhumanrights and disappearancesregisteredduringtheyearsofviolencewererecordedin maintaining internalorderinthedepartment.Thehighestnumberofdeaths beginning inOctober1981.OnJanuary1,1983,thearmedforcestookchargeof struggle» inMay1980,wasunderapartialorcompletestateofemergency emergency wasdeclaredonsixoccasionsduringhisadministration. of emergency, withfundamentalrightssuspended. A nationwidestateof 2 1 needed tomanageit. vastly increaseditscontrolover thenation’s aswell thebureaucracy wealth, and publiccompanies.Asaresultofthatmodel,in1980 thePeruvianstatehad redistributing wealthandenforcingpoliciesof«social participation»inprivate commercial andservicesectorsoftheeconomy, focusingspecificallyon that wasbasedonstateinterventioninthefinancial,production,distribution, government thatranthecountryfor12yearsinstitutedadevelopmentmodel compared to1968,whenhewasoverthrowninamilitarycoup.The was it necessarytocombattheShiningPath’s when initialactions. over thegovernmentthatmusttobeunderstood.Itwaspreciselymoment an absolutemajorityoftheseatsinHouseRepresentatives(98). 1980. HispartycontrolledaslightmajorityoftheseatsinSenate(26)and Popular, Fernando Belaunde,anarchitectandcandidateofthePopularAction( HE CONTEXT AT THE BEGINNINGOF THE INTERNAL ARMED CONFLICT 119-158). On theeconomicmodelofmilitary dictatorshipandthegrowthofstate,seeWise(2003: The publicsectorworkforcegrew from225,714to424,611employeesbetween1969and1978. Party. The majoritywonbyAPinboth houses wasincreasedbyitalliancewiththePopularChristian The 1979Constitutioncreateda60-member Senateanda180-memberHouseofRepresentatives. Second, thepartiesthathadonceformedpolitical systemwere The CVRhasconfirmedthatmassivehumanrightsabusesoccurred The departmentof Ayacucho, wherethePCP-SL beganits«armed First, thecountrythatBelaundewaselectedtogovernhadgrownquickly There arecertainelementsofthenationalcontextwhenAPtook AP) party, was electedtothepresidencyforasecondtimeonMay18, eruvian society, giving sectorsthathadlong 2 Reformswereintroducedduringthatperiod been excludedavoice Acción 1 4 3 assessing thesubversivethreat. both cases,particularlythefirst,administration madeseriousmistakesin subversive fightinthehandsofarmedforceswith littleciviliancontrol.In Ministry todealwiththeproblem.Thesecondresponse wastoleavetheanti- Republican GuardandInvestigativePoliceofPeru – controlledbytheInterior administration. Thefirstconsistedofallowingthepolice forces—CivilGuard, which wereinitiatedbythePCP-SL,provokedtwo responsesfromtheAP The CVRhasfoundthatthearmedsubversiveactions usingterroristmethods, I productive sectorandfinances,intheearly1980s. and theinternationaldebtcrisis,whichseverelyaffectedcountry’s Ecuador in1981,massiveeconomiclossesfromtheElNiñophenomenon1983, 572,000 workers. strikes involving857,000workers;andin1982;therewere809 In 1980,therewere739strikesinvolving481,000workers;in1981;871 throughout histerm. chose tokeepthethreemilitaryministries,War, Navyand Aeronautics, from thedictatorship,anditsmaintenanceofmilitarybudget.Belaundealso security issues,itscontroloftheNationalDefenseSystem,whichwasinherited office reflectedthemilitary’s highlevel ofautonomyindefense andnational military branches– Army, Navyand Air Force –inplaceduringhisfirstyear in democratic standards.Belaunde’s decisiontokeepthecommandersofthree civilian governmentandthearmedforceswasstilluncleardidnotmeet to theassembly. Most ofthepartiesthatparticipatedin1980electionshadelecteddelegates the partyofchancetotakepartindebatesovernewConstitution. Assembly, preferringtofocusonrebuildingitspartyorganization.Thatdeprived highlight, however the party’s politicalactivityhaddecreasedsubstantially. structures, ideologiesandplatformstothenewcontext. country thatprecededthereturn parties werealsoextremelyslowinadaptingtothesocialtransformation NITIAL RESPONSES TO SUBVERSION the AP gov the AP The choicebetweenthepoliceand militaryoptionswaspartofamuchbroaderdebatewithin secretaries. During themilitarygovernment,PopularActionheldonlytwoparty congressestoelectgeneral the guidelinesof multilateralfinancialorganizations. macroeconomic stabilitybyguaranteeing technocraticmanagementoftheeconomyandfollowing by theCabinetchiefandfinance minister,ManuelUlloaElías,pushedforensuring bureaucrats, aswell influence overthegovernmentby namingprefects,sub-prefects,governorsandotherlow-level Rounding outthepicturewereabriefborderconflictwithneighboring A finalcharacteristicofthepoliticaltransitionwasclimatesocialunrest. Third, thenewgovernmenttookofficewhilerelationshipbetweena The rulingpartysharedthisweakness.Duringtheyearsofmilitaryrule, ernment. Oneside,ledbySen.Javier Alva , that AP chosenottoparticipateinthe1978Constituent as exercisingtheparty’s 4 todemocracy, failingtoadequatelyadapttheir strength inCongress.Theother side, represented Orlandini, wanted to 3 Itisimportantto increase theparty’s 203

THE C IVILIAN G OVERNMENTS IN THE FIRST DECADE O F THE VIOLENCE 204 PART ONE: THE TRAGEDY AND THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR IT were stillrunningthecountry.were the armedforces,underleadershipofGeneralFranciscoMoralesBermúdez, Juan Velasco Alvarado, thefirstmilitarypresident.Thoseattacksoccurredwhile district. OnJune15,anotherexplosivedevicewassetoffatthetombofGeneral «Molotov cocktails»inthemunicipalofficesSanMartíndePorres,aLima PCP-SL. theories aboutsubversion,neitherofwhichincludedadirectexaminationthe for theseactsofterrorismandsabotage.Thegovernmenthadtwoprincipal assessment oftheproblemandconfusinglabelgiventogroupresponsible Laborers Movement ( struggle.» OnJune13,1980,militantsofthePCP-SL’s ClassistWorkers and following day. For they burnedtheballotboxesthatweretobeusedingeneralelections known isthesubversives’ attackinChuschi, The ShiningPath’s firstactionswere carriedoutin Ayacucho andLima.Thebest First actionsandassessment 9 8 7 6 5 information obtainedbytheCVR,membersof administrationadmitted it.» undermine andwipeoutdemocracy, and theyhave internationalbackingtodo that «[…]thisisafightbetweendemocracyandtotalitarianism. Theywantto part of«aplanled,organizedandfinancedfromabroad.» after thePCP-SLbeganitsactions,PresidentBelaundesaidthatattackswere of somekindforeigninterventionintheactssabotage.» Stella statedthatwhiletherewasnoproof,«therehighlysuspiciousevidence revolutionary strategiesaroundtheglobe.ForeignRelationsMinisterJavierArias network thatwaswellfinancedandorganized,capableofimplementing ongoing ColdWar, consideredcommunism expansion ofinternationalcommunism.Thisinterpretation,influencedbythe Some membersoftheAPgovernmentsawappearancePCP-SLasan The internationalplottheory El Comercio,September 6,1982.InDesco1989:383. El Comercio,September16,1981. InDesco1989:377. El Comercio,December15,1980. InDesco1989:371. of thischapter. deported bythemilitarycoupthat ledtothe12-yearmilitarygovernmentdiscussedatstart eliminated bythearmedforcesin onlyafewmonths.In1968,Belaundewasoverthrownand (1963-1968), heandhispartyhad facedaguerrillainsurgencyintheAndes1965,whichwas In consideringthishypothesis,itisimportanttokeepinmindthat duringBelaunde’s firstterm time. about thesubversiveorganizationsanditsplansfor“armed struggle”thatexistedatthe decisive bearingonanunderstandingofthegeneralprocess,given theminimalinformation incipient PCP-SL There isstilldebateoverwhethertheMoralesBermúdezgovernment leftbehindfilesonthe 9 The firstobstacletoefficientlydealingwithsubversionwasadeficient These commentswerenotsupportedwithevidence, andaccordingto 6 activity. TheCVR the PCP-SL,thatactionmarkedstartof«armed Movimiento deObreros y Trabajadores Clasistas, 5 believes that theanswer tothatquestion doesnothave a Ayacucho, onMay17,1980,when part ofanextensive international 8 Hewouldlaterstate 7 Morethanayear MOTC) exploded 10 in dealingwithsubversion, whichmeantinv the armedforcesinfightagainstterrorism.Theother calledforafirmhand had twobasicwaysofdealingwithsubversion. In additiontothesedivergentassessmentsofthecause, theAPgovernmentalso Two waysofseeingtheconflict complement tothereformsthatwereputinplace. system ofsocialmobilizationduringhisgovernment(1968-1975)asa terrorism tofollowersofGeneralJuanVelasco Alvarado, whohadcreateda subversive acts.» responsible for«alteringsocialpeacewithstrikes,workstoppagesand Civil Guard,GeneralJorgeBalaguer, statedthatleft-winggroupswere «coincidence» betweenterroristactsandlaborconflicts. labor troublesandterrorism.» been given«themissiontoseeifalinkexistsbetweenfactorytakeovers,violence, Jara statedthatthenewheadofstatesecurity, PIP GeneralEdgarLuque,had link –socialprotestswithterroristattacks.InteriorMinisterJoséMaríadela democracy.» process andpromotedmobilizationofthemassesasawayachieving«social wing politicalorganizationsthatoptedtoparticipateinthedemocraticelectoral of protestscoincidedwiththepoliticalplatformsasignificantnumberleft- urban grassrootsorganizations,particularlyinLima’s shantytowns.Thiswave the rapidspreadofsocialproteststhatwerenotconfinedtounions,butinvolved and theactsofviolence.Theend1970sstart1980switnessed the waveofsocialprotests,overwhichleft-wingpartieshadpowerfulinfluence, Another sectorwithintheadministrationbelievedthattherewasalinkbetween The theoryofconvergencebetweensocialmobilizationandsubversion privately thattheyhadnoproof. 15 14 13 12 11 and thecountryside.» «the actsofterrorisminthecentralhighlandslinkagitationworkplace maintained thattherewasacampaignagainstthedemocraticsystemand El Comercio,September6,1980. In Desco1989:367. Expreso, November28,1982.In Desco 1989:387. La República,August22,1982.InDesco 1989:382. El Comercio,September15,1981.In Desco1989:377. In Desco1981.Seetheoverviewofleft-wing thinkinginreferencetotheimportanceofsocialmobilizations. document, No.344,April20,1982. fact, Peru'sterroristsshowfew signs ofbeingparticularlywell-equipped.”DeclassifiedCIA decline tobespecificinpublic,andprivateadmitthattheyhave noconvincingevidence.In receiving supportfromforeigncountries.Cubaismostprominently hintedat,butofficials “Another widespreadclaim,bothinofficialandmediacircles,isthatPeruvian terroristsare The firstemphasizedpoliceintelligenceworkandwas waryofinvolving A variationofthistheoryattributedthefirstactssabotageand Some sectorswithinthegovernmentlinked–withoutspecifying 11 15 14 Besidesthepoliticians’comments,commanderof 12 CabinetchiefUlloaElíasstatedthattherewasa 10 olving themilitary. 13 Sen.AlvaOrlandini 205

THE C IVILIAN G OVERNMENTS IN THE FIRST DECADE O F THE VIOLENCE 206 PART ONE: THE TRAGEDY AND THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR IT terrorism.» in November1980thatitwas«anexaggerationtocallchildishactions Francisco Belaunde,backedtheinteriorminister’s position.Rep.Belaundestated exaggeration totalkaboutaterroristthreat. strength.» InNovember, despitetheincreaseinarmedactions,hesaiditwas an there wasa«guerrillaoutbreak»andsaidthePCP-SL«agroupwithout Minister JoséMaríadelaJara.OnAugust5,1980,DeJararejectedtheideathat also failedinCongress. an emergencyzoneandcallingupthearmedforcestofightterrorism.Thatbill during thefinalmonthsoffirstguerrillauprisingin1965–proposeddeclaring 17, Sen.AlvaOrlandini—whohadbeenministerofGovernmentandPolice supported byCabinetchiefUlloaElías,butrejectedCongress.OnDecember elevate thecrimesofsabotageandterrorismtotreason.Theinitiativewas October 1980.On20,Sen.AlvaOrlandiniproposedlegislationthatwould forces were putinchargeoftheanti-subversiveeffort Ay decision toinvolvethemilitarywasfinallymadeinlate1982,andarmed government positionleanedprogressivelytowardthemilitaryoption.The the endoffollowingyear. In administration inthelastsixmonthsof1980,butsituationchangedby 19 18 17 16 as onewho: norms fortryingsomeonethiscrime.Article1ofthe decreedefinedaterrorist Decree 046,whichcodifiedthecrimeofterrorismand establishedtheprocedural , theministrycouldcallupspecialpolicebattalion knownastheSinchis. done bytheCivilGuardandInvestigativePolice suspend constitutionalguarantees.» the ideaandstatedthatterrorismcouldbecontrolled«withouthavingto emergency zoneanddispatchingthearmedforces,MinisterDelaJararejected work. that actsofterrorismhad«dramaticallydecreased»thankstoefficientpolice La Prensa,December17,1980.InDesco 1989:371. El Diario,November11,1980.InDesco 1989:368. El Comercio,June21,1981.InDesco 1989:374. El Peruano,November25,1980. In Desco1989:370. 17 Other partyleaders,includingLimaMayorEduardoOrregoandRep. At thesametime,amoremoderatepositionwasspearheadedbyInterior The firstcallforaheavyhandindealingwiththesubversioncame Supporters ofthedifferentapproacheswereevenlydividedin security [...]. [...] disruptingpublictranquilityoraffectinginternational relationsorstate buildings, roads,communicationsystems,transportation, ortheflowofenergy property orthatareaimedatdestroyingdamaging publicorprivate or asectorofit,committingactsthatcouldendangerpeople’s life,healthor [Provokes ormaintains]astate ofanxiety Prior tothisdebate,inMarch1981,thegovernment passedLegislative On December17,whenSen.AlvaOrlandiniproposeddeclaringan 18 1982, asPCP-SL activitiesincreased,the According totheminister, thework being 16 Finally, , alarmorterrorinthepopulation 19 wassufficient,andifnecessary in June1981,hestated acucho. student inCusco,acceptingpoliticalresponsibilityforthecase. subversive threat.HesteppeddownonOctober28afterthedeathofauniversity resign fromofficeattheendofOctoberbecauseanincidentunrelatedto to instituteoversightmechanismswasanobviousmistake. neglecting toinstituteanysortofsafeguardsprotect thepopulation.Neglecting did nothavetomeantransferringpoliticalresponsibility tothemilitaryor response totheconflict.Thedecisionwasinevitable, but theCVRbelievesthatit internal order. With that, theconstitutionalgovernmentoptedforamilitary Huancavelica andApurímac,putthearmedforces inchargeofguaranteeing La Mar, Cangallo,VíctorFajardoandHuamanga,aswell asoneprovinceeachin 92-IN, whichdeclaredastateofemergencyinthe Ayacucho provincesofHuanta, Finally, The stateofemergencywasextended in thecapitalledtoa60-daystateofemergencyMetropolitanLimaandCallao. October 4;andacompleteblackoutofLimaCallaoonAugust19.The station inVilcashuamánonAugust22;anattacktheHuantapolice Cristóbal deHuamangaNationalUniversityonAugust3;anattackthepolice militants; destructionofAllpachacaagriculturalexperimentcenterattheSan the prisoninHuamanga, Ayacucho, onMarch2, 1982, whichfreeditsjailed department ofApurímac. one provinceinthedepartmentofHuancavelicaand government toputthemilitaryinchargeofcontrollinginternalorder Ay of thePCP-SL’s was asustainedincreaseinthelevelsofviolencethroughout1982,withseveral in theway inwhichBelaunde’ López Martínez provinces. day, PresidentBelaundedeclaredastate attacked thepolicestationinT 18 percent–werestagedinSeptember1981.OnOctober11,aShiningPathcolumn 791 attackswereregisteredbetweenMay1980andOctober1981.Ofthese,140–or a stateofemergencycouldbedeclaredifthesituationworsened. an attackontheU.S.EmbassyinLima.Forfirsttime,DelaJaraadmittedthat 22 21 20 He lefttheministryatendof 1982. 1982, Gagliardiproposed,withno Cabinetsupport,thepossibilityofdialoguewithPCP-SL. Jara’s Retired GeneralJoséGagliardi was namedinterior Huamanga, Huanta,Cangallo,La MarandVíctorFajardo. El Comercio, Major actionsduringthisperiodincluded:theShiningPath’s attackon The CVRbelievesthatthefirststateofemergencymarkedaturningpoint The situationdidgetworse.AccordingtodocumentsreviewedbytheCVR, on December29,1982,PresidentBelaundesignedSupreme Decree068- policies, includingdefendingthe roleofthepoliceinfightingsubversion. InSeptember The interiorministerbegantochangehispositioninAugust1981,after 21 ThepressreportedatthetimethatDelaJaraandViceMinisterHéctor September 24,1981.InDesco1989: 376.

encouraged thepresidenttomakethatdecision.DelaJarawould armed actionshavingmajorrepercussions.Thisledtothe ambo, Ayacucho.A s administrationaddressedtheproblem.There in Ayacucho and Apurímac inNovember. ofemergencyinfiv minister. Hemaintained fter aCabinetmeetingthenext e of Ayacucho’ 22 20 many ofDela acucho, s seven 207

THE C IVILIAN G OVERNMENTS IN THE FIRST DECADE O F THE VIOLENCE 208 PART ONE: THE TRAGEDY AND THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR IT FIGURE 1 those yearsreachedlevelsthatwouldnotberepeatedinthelongofviolence. the armedforcesentered Ayacucho. Thenumberofdeadanddisappearedin The periodofgreatestviolenceinthe20yearsreviewedbyCVRbeganwhen M 24 23 that positionduringthe18monthsheranministry: over the anti-subversion effortwithintheInteriorMinistry. One ofthedirecteffectsdecisiontocallupmilitarywaslosscontrol The InteriorMinistry intervene moreeffectivelytocontroltheseactsofviolence.” involvement in Ayacucho: “[...]Ipersonally believ Huancasancos. Thesecond,LuisPercovich,wasin favor ofthearmedforces’ resigned inApril1983afterthemassacresbyPCP-SL inLucanamarcaand ministry. Thefirstconcentratedhiseffortsonreorganizingtheministry, but Bazo, LuisPercovichRocaandGeneralÓscarBrush Noel, wereinchargeofthe ofBelaunde’syears admini ILITARIZATION OF La Crónica, zone. conflict thepolicecontinuedto carry outthemajorityofarmedactionsinemergency Nevertheless, itshouldbepointed outthatatthestartofarmedforces’interventionin the InteriorMinistrywould onlywrestauthorityfromthepolitical-military approach. Becausethereisamilitary-politicalcommander, interventionby anti-subversive strategyinthezone[...].Ibelievethat thisisthecorrect [...] theInteriorMinistrydoesnotparticipateindecisions concerningthe April 25,1983. THE CONFLICT stration (1983-85),threeministers,FernandoRincón e thatthearmedforcescan 23 Intheremaining 24 Hemaintained 25 the restofadministration. own strategyfordefenseandrestorationofcivilianauthority. threat, thegovernmentchosetohandpowermilitary withoutdesigningits the PCP-SL’s the civilgovernmentwouldundertakeasacomplement tomilitaryactivities.Given While broad,thedecreesignedbyPresidentBelaunde didnotmentiontheactions assume controlofinternalorder»inthoseprovinces«to re-establishpublicorder.» functions ofthepolitical-militarycommand.Itstatedthat the«armedforceswould in various provincesof Ayacucho, Apurímac andHuancavelica, didnotspecifythe Ayacucho,and Apurímac widespread practicesofhumanrightsabusesagainstthecivilianpopulationin terrorist attacksoreradicatesubversion.Furthermore,theyinstituted PCP-SL, accordingtoevidencereviewedbytheCVR,theydidnotstop military rule. inadequate mechanismsforprotectingthehumanrightsofpeoplelivingunder that vaguelydefinedthepowersofmilitarycommandsandprovided administration. Themilitary’s participationunfoldedwithinalegalframework zone inthecentral Andes fromJanuary1,1983,untiltheendofBelaunde’s The armedforceswereincontroloftheanti-subversivefightemergency The political-militarycommands about thesubversive emergency zone.Asaresult,civilianauthoritiesdidnotobtaininformation establish properciviliancontroloroversightoverwhatwasoccurringinthe uninterested indevelopingtheirownanti-subversivepolicyanddidnot the anti-subversiveeffort,threeremaininginteriorministerswere Noel, whohadbeenrunningtheMinistryofWar. controlling socialagitation.HewasreplacedatInteriorbyGeneralÓscarBrush police actionascomplementarytothemilitaryefforts,andconcentratedon guaranteeing respectforhumanrightsintheregion. generated muchgreaterinterestfromtheelectedciviliangovernmentin forces’ involvementinthetheaterofoperations Ayacucho shouldhave Caretas There werethreemilitarycommandersintheemergency zoneduring Supreme Decree068-82-IN,whichestablishedthe60-daystateofemergency While theactionsbypolitical-militarycommandshithardat In summary, theCVR foundthatafterthemilitarywas putin chargeof Percovich remainedonthesidelinesofanti-subversiveeffort,seeing commander andcreateconfusionaboutthedecisionsthatmustbeadopted. , May9,1984. criminal attacksoncivilianauthoritiesandofficials’ assessmentofthe organization’s nature, Huancavelica atcertaintimesandinplaces. strategies andtactics.Thearmed 25 209

THE C IVILIAN G OVERNMENTS IN THE FIRST DECADE O F THE VIOLENCE 210 PART ONE: THE TRAGEDY AND THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR IT dialogue: backing throughouthistimeasheadofthecommand. Herecountedthefollowing in thedistrictofSoccos,18kilometersfromcity Huamanga. Chuschi, murdersattheLosCabitosmilitarybase,and themassacreofpeasants state agents,includingextrajudicialexecutionsinthe communitiesofTotos and and HuancasancosinApril1983. residents over thenextmonths,andPCP-SL’s massacresinLucanamarca violence inthecommunitythatwouldleadtodeathsofdozensUchuraccay 26, 1983,whereeightjournalistswerekilled,aneventthatunleashedaspiralof to theserevolts.EmblematicexamplesweretheeventsinUchuraccayonJanuary Path bysomegroupsof Ayacucho peasantsandthesubversives’ viciousresponse the conflict.TheperiodalsowitnessedfirstviolentrejectionofShining a foreseeableresultofthegovernme localized outbreakofguerrillaactivitythatcouldbeeradicatedintwomonths. declared underastateofemergency. 31, 1982,and2,000soldiersweregiventhetaskofcontrollingprovinces Army GeneralRobertoClementeNoel.HetookchargeofthezoneonDecember The firstheadofthepolitical-militarycommandinemergencyzonewas Year one:GeneralRobertoNoel TABLE 1 27 26 officers. military tribunalinplacetodealwithexcessescommittedbypoliceand When hetookthepost,NoelsaidthatasofDecember29,1982,therewasa El Comercio, 18, 2003). three months.Whathappenedwas affirmations: “Ineversaidoptimistically thatwewouldbefinished[withsubversion].intwoor El Comercio, 27 In interviewswiththeCVR,NoelstatedthathehadPresident Belaunde’s During 1983therewerealsoseriouscasesofhuman rights violationsby Noel’s period was markedbyanincreaseinPCP-SL activity, whichwas At thetime,Noelstillbelievedthatsubversivephenomenonwasa told me,«General,yougointo combatwithallyourenergyandthesupport changed themission.AmIoramnotgoingtofight?» PresidentBelaunde «Mr. President,excuseme,Iwant to January17,1983. InDesco1989:571. January 1,1983.Inaninterview withtheCVR,retiredGeneralNoeldeniedthese that therew nt’s decisiontoinvolve the armed forcesin ere momentsofcalm”(CVR.Interview. March ask a question, because you have ask aquestion,becauseyou 26 was dismissed. Year two:General Adrián Huamán assassination, kidnapping,illegalarrestsa constitutional accusationwiththe Attorney General’s Office,accusing Noelof in thecountry. OnJuly1,1983, strategy andnottakenasaseriouswarningoftheexpandingclimateviolence accusations wereinterpretedbytheadministrationaspartofopposition’s Noel’s tenureaspolitical-militarycommanderoftheemergencyzone.Those this periodcontradictNoel’s statements. 30 29 28 demand forgreatereconomicresources: people’s economicandsocialconditions.Thisincluded,amongotherthings,a accusations sothatcorrectivemeasurescouldbetaken. military commandcalledonpeoplewhohadbeenvictimsofabusestofile jointly with Ayacucho Superior CourtprosecutorJorgeZegarra,thepolitical- that disappearancesbeinvestigatedbythepolice.Inacommuniquéreleased prohibiting soldiersfromdrinkingasawayofpreventingabusesandordering 31, 1983.Huamánadoptedadifferentstrategyintheanti-subversivefight, General AdriánHuamántookoverthepolitical-militarycommandonDecember government toexercisegreater controloverlocalauthorities.HestatedinAugust Huamán’sgovernment. slowlytranslatedintoademandforthe proposalswere Desco. CVR. Interview. CVR. Interview. August 28,2002. Politicians andthemediadenouncedhumanrightsviolationsduring Testimonies fromotherclosecolleaguesofPresidentBelaundeduring the information. Council wouldmeetthereandthepresidentgiveordersbasedon the ministerofwar andthe Army commander. TheNationalDefense president oftheJointChiefsStaff.IwenttoPresidentialPalacewith I normallycameeverytwoorthreemonthsandcoordinatedwiththe Noel saidthatheperiodicallyreportedonhisactivities: of theconstitutionalgovernment.»«Thankyou.» The call for greater investment The callforgreaterinvestment us tocarryoutthisplan. distribution offoodandotheritems,butthebudget doesnotallowfor of resources.TheArmyisreplacingtheShining Pathintermsof […] intheemergencyzonethereisnotonlyapower vacuum, butalack The newstrategyincludedrequestingmeasuresforimprovingthelocal Resumen Semanal, March 18,2003. March19,1984. 29 30 left-wing Rep.JavierDiezCansecofileda in Ayacuchowas nd abuseofau 28 thority. Theaccusation not heededbythe 211

THE C IVILIAN G OVERNMENTS IN THE FIRST DECADE O F THE VIOLENCE 212 PART ONE: THE TRAGEDY AND THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR IT increase insubversiveactivitytheemergencyzonecentralAndes. table, whiledepictingaggregatedatafrom was alsoanotoriousincreaseinthePCP-SL’s terroristactivities.Thefollowing and disappearancesrecordedbetween19802000tookplacein1984.There in theintensityofviolence.Oncontrary, thehighestnumberofdeaths commanders greaterpoliticalautonomy, butitdidnotsignifyanymajorchange 1984: 32 31 human rightsabuses;20percent oftheforceddisappearancescommittedduring an increaseinrepressive tactics bythesecurityforces.Thatledtonumerous but didprolongthenationwidestateofemergencyfor anadditional30days. forces.» Thegovernmentdiscountedthepossibilityof declaringastateofsiege, instructions «toeradicatenarco-terrorismwiththe participation ofthearmed of StaffissuedanofficialcommuniquéonJuly7stating thattheyhadgiven TABLE 2 El Peruano, La República, The increaseinactionsandcrimesbytheShiningPath wasansweredby The newapproachtakenbyHuamánbasicallymeantgivingthemilitary The solutionisnotmilitary, becauseifitwere mi In responsetothespiralingviolence,presidentand theJointChiefs across aninjustice,youcan situation. Beinginchargeofthepoliticalsituationmeansthatwhenyoucome armed forcesarenotinchargeofthepoliticalsituation,onlymilitary the samejudges,oneswhoallowedallthistohappen?[...]The subv wants tobePeru [...].We filled withinnocentpeople,thatthejudgesdonotacceptbribes[...].Lima solution, inmyopinion,istocorrectthesituationthatexists,jailsarenot 160 yearswithoutaresponse,andwearenowseeingtheresults[...] about humanlives,offorgottenpeoplewhohavebeenmakingdemandsfor in halfanhour,thesamethingwithHuancavelica[...]butwearetalking minutes [...]ifitwere onlyamatterofkilling, Ay July8,1984. ersion tohappen… Aren’t theythesamepeoplewhoallowedabuses, August27,1984. are dealingwiththesamepeoplewhoallowed change theauthoritiesimmediately. the entirecountry, demonstratesthe acucho w litary I wouldresolve itin ould ceasetoexist 31 32 and travelinnationalterritory weresuspended.Theserightsincluded constitutional rightsrelated totheinviolabilityofhomeandfreedomgather a newdecree.Thesamearticlestipulatedthatduring astateofemergency a measurewasnottolastlongerthan60days,andeach extensionwouldrequire order, catastropheorgrave circumstancesthataffectthelifeofnation.»Such a stateofemergencytobedeclared«incasedisturbance ofpeaceorinternal Article 231ofthe1979Constitution,whichwasinplace until1993,allowedfor Undermining ruleoflaw abuses. powers andrenouncedtheirroleinimpeding punishinghumanrights of thepopulation.Civilianauthoritiesgavemilitary commandersbroad effort wasmadewithouttakingthenecessaryprecautionstoprotectrights these actions.Thedecisiontoinvolvethearmedforcesinanti-subversive human rightsabusesandinformationthatthegovernmentobviouslyhadabout military commandersbetween1983and1985,despiteaccusationsofserious It isclearthatBelaunde’s administrationsupportedtheactionsofpolitical- G began in1983continuedunderGeneralMoriOrzo. in charge.Thewidespreadpracticeofcrimesandhumanrightsabusesthat motivated byaccusationsofhumanrightsviolationscommittedwhilehewas from theJointChiefsofStaff. Huamán wasrelievedofhiscommandonAugust28,1984,throughacommuniqué subversive place, shouldhaveledthegovernmenttoundertakeaseriousoverhaulofanti- tenure aspolitical-militarycommander. Human rightsabusesontheLosCabitosmilitarybasecontinuedduringHuamán’s Oropesa’s disappearance ofjournalistJaime Ayala, the 1984, includingtheassassinationofevangelicalsinCallqui-Nisperocniyoc, the 20-yearinternalconflictoccurredin1984. 34 33 OVERNMENT RESPONSIBILITY El Peruano, His murderoccurredoutsidethe emergencyzone. The CVRbelievesthattheseevents,whichareonlyafewofalltook Successive accusationsofhumanrightsviolationswerereportedinAugust The CVRfoundnoevidencethatthereplacementofHuamánwas commander oftheemergencyzone. Second InfantryDivisionCol.WilfredoMoriOrzoaspolitical-military the serviceandaccordingtocurrentnorms,onthisdateArmyhasnamed The JointChiefsofStafftheArmedForcesmakepublicthatforgood body (Puquio), strategy. This did not occur. August29,1984. 33 andthediscoveryof 34 discovery ofpeasantleaderJesús common graves inPucay acu. 213

THE C IVILIAN G OVERNMENTS IN THE FIRST DECADE O F THE VIOLENCE 214 PART ONE: THE TRAGEDY AND THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR IT were permanentrestrictionsonconstitutionalrights. definition ofthefunctionsandattributesimpliedbymilitarycontrolthere population’s fundamentalrightswere violatedbecausetherewas noclear of theBelaundegovernment. state ofemergencywouldbedeclaredsixmoretimeduringtheremainingyears extended totheentirecountryforfirsttimeonMay30,1983.Thenationwide a stateofemergencybecausestrikebypoliceofficers.Themeasurewas entire nation.OnMay25,1983,thecitiesofLimaandCallaowereplacedunder Ayacucho, theninotherdepartments(includingthecapital)andfinally order. 1981, andasofJanuary1,1983,itputthearmedforcesinchargeinternal officers inthecaseofaflagrantcrime(Article2,Section20g). the rightnottobedetainedwithoutwrittenconsentofajudgeorpolice (Article 2,Section9),therighttopeacefulgatherings10),and inviolability ofhome(Article2,Section7),freedomtochooseaplaceresidence 37 36 35 According toJavierAlva Orlandini, was officiallydeclaredbythe groupledbyGuzmán.» adding that«thewar thatwewould liketobeclean,butwhichisobviouslydirty, the discoveryofcommongraveswas«atruepolitical giftfortheextremeleft,» administration. Forexample,politicalcommentatorManuel D´Ornellasstatedthat opposition. Thatpositionwasexpressedbymedia connectedwiththe accusations, whichtheAPgovernmentsawaspart of thepoliticalfightby Vizquerra stated: publicly defendedit.InSeptember1984,MinisterofWar GeneralLuisCisneros costly intermsofhumanlife.Somepeopleconsideredthiscostinevitableand The armedforces’anti-subversivestrategyintheconflictareawasextremely Impunity CVR. Interview. August 16, 2002. Expreso, Caretas. The anti-subversivefightdevelopedunderconditionsinwhichthe That temporarymeasuretookonapermanentcharacterfirstin The APgovernmentdeclaredastateofemergencyonOctober12, The multiplehumanrightsviolationsweremadepublic throughvarious war. about humanrightsinaunilateralmanner. Therearenohumanrightsin impression thatitisthesecurityforcesshouldbeeliminated [...]wetalk to criticizeeverything themilitarydoesin Ayacucho [...]thereisthe kill thisman,thenthereisthelawyer,journalist[...]. Thereisatendency trigger herecomestheAttorneyGeneralwantingtoknowifwearegoing forces thetaskofeliminatingShiningPath,butwhentheygotopull extraterritorial, we [...] wecannotunderstandthatinawarzone,zoneispractically No. 817,September1984.InDesco 1989:378. August 25,1984. 35 must maintainruleoflaw. We given have thearmed 37 PresidentBelaundewas awareofthe 36 powers ofthepolitical-militarycommand: Belaunde administrationwasthepassageofLaw24150, whichestablishedthe authority overtheanti-subversivefight. rights violationsperpetratedbythesecurityforces,to whichhehadgivenbroad the advanceofsubversionanduninterestedinpreventing orpunishinghuman for fundamentalhumanrights.PresidentBelaundewas unsuccessfulinstopping elections asstipulatedinthe1979Constitution. state.» Theadministrationendedwithatransferofpowerafterfreeandfair the ShiningPathinsurrection,whichwasaimedat«thedestructionofold preservation ofconstitutionalorderintheseareaswasavaluabletoolresisting municipal electionsandmaintainedaclearseparationofpowers.The of thepress,whichhadbeenlimitedduringlongyearsmilitaryrule,held strengthening democraticinstitutions.TheAPgovernmentreinstatedfreedom lives. that theCVRconsidersdeplorable,becauseitledtolossofthousands with theattitudeofexecutivebranch,thathelpedcreateaclimateimpunity Congress didnotfulfillitsoversightroleintheareaofhumanrights.Coupled investigate forceddisappearances,despitenumerousaccusations.Ingeneral, Congress, inwhichAPheldthemajorityofseats,neverformedacommissionto executive branch,butalsoextendedtothelegislature.TheCVRhasfoundthat accept them.» saying: «Thelettersfrom Amnesty International gointothetrashcan[...]Idon’t people inanti-subversiveoperationstheAndes.Belaundediscardedreport, maintaining thatstatesecurityforceshadsummarilyexecutedhundredsof chose tooverlookaccusationsofhumanrightsabuses. a policythatwouldguaranteeprotectionofhumanrights.Onthecontrary, he committed bythePCP-SLandstateagents,PresidentBelaundedidnotdevelop established in Ayacucho, andin Nevertheless, theCVRfoundthatafterpolitical-militarycommandwas about declaringastateofemergencyandorderingthearmedforcestointervene. seriousness oftheeventsandsharedMinisterJoséMaríadelaJara’s doubts 38 Desco. One ofthefinaldecisionsinanti-subversivefight adoptedduringthe Constitutional order, however, was inoneessentialarea:respect weakened The administrationheadedbyBelaunde,however, didprogressin The AP government’s indifferencetothesecrimeswas notlimitedtothe In August1983,AmnestyInternationalsentalettertoPresidentBelaunde impediments tocarryingout theirfunctions[...]. authorities intheareascases ofnegligence,abdication,vacancyorother institutions, requesttheappointment ortransferofpoliticalandadministrative public agencies,departmentalcorporationsandother publicsector the emergencyzone,coordinateandsuperviseactions ofthesectors, […] coordinatetheparticipationofpublicandprivate sectorslocatedin Resumen Semanal, 38 August19,1983. the faceofincreasingnumbercrimes 215

THE C IVILIAN G OVERNMENTS IN THE FIRST DECADE O F THE VIOLENCE 216 PART ONE: THE TRAGEDY AND THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR IT political cost. paramilitary groupsinthe anti-subversivefight.Thatsupportcarriedahigh rights violations,suchasthemassacreinCayara andtheparticipationof APRA lawmakerssupportedmeasurestoblockinvestigations intoserioushuman guarantee greaterpoliticalsupport.Thiswasmostobvious inCongress,where rest ofthecountry’s political forcesandthepossibilityofformingalliancesto armed conflict. making APRAthepartywithhighestnumberof victims duringtheinternal the ShiningPathbeganacampaignofselectiveassassinations ofpartymembers, human rightsviolationsinvolving thegovernment andtheparty. Meanwhile, things, thisnewoppositionledtoanincreaseinthe numberofaccusations failed attempttonationalizethecountry’ 1989). (Junín, followed Cayara (1988)andtheextrajudicialexecutionsforceddisappearancesthat Alto andPomatambo(1986),theSantaRosamilitarybaseinApurímac(1987), and rightsviolations.ExamplesincludethecasesofElFrontón(1896),Parcco tolerance forhumanrightsabuses,whichallowedimpunitythesecrimes Callao —mainlyatElFrontón.Civilianauthoritiesadoptedanattitudeof after themassacreofShiningPathinmatesduringriotsinprisonsLimaand attributing responsibilityforhumanrightsviolationstothemilitaryin1986, on democraticinstitutionsandjudicialindependence. expanded asviolencespreadthroughoutthecountry, implyingmorerestrictions principally atthehandsofPCP-SL.Thepolitical-militarycommands and morepublicauthoritieswerekilledthanatanyothertimeduringtheconflict, in 1989.Inaddition,violentactionswereregisteredmoreareasofthecountry the conflict.Nevertheless,secondviolentpeakinnumberofvictimscame number ofvictimsdeclinedsubstantiallycomparedto1984,theworstyear forces. Duringthefirstyear ofPresident by subversiveorganizations,while30percentcanbeattributedtostatesecurity and disappearancesbetween19851990.Ofthese,58percentwereperpetrated The testimoniesreceivedbytheCVRhaveallowedittoidentify8,173deaths T for themilitarystrategythatledtomassivehumanrightsviolations. political-military commandswere theoutgoi HE APRA In response,therulingpartyclosedranksanddistanced itselffromthe APRA facedgrowingoppositionfrompoliticiansandthemediaafter The government and APRA’s mainpolitical authoritiesstopped The CVRconsidersthatthisnormandthebroadpowersgranted the confrontationbetween an Army patrolandMRTA columninMolinos GOVERMENT Alan GarcíaPérez’s administration,the s banksinJuly1987. Among other ng government’sng stampofapproval law, anditcannottreatallresidentsof Ayacucho assuspects.» sanction andpunishment withgeneralizedrepression[...]inthenameof government rectifyitspolicy inthezone:«[…]governmentcannotconfuse by thesecurityforces.He denouncedtheproblemsanddemandedthat situation intheregion.Hereceivednumeroustestimonies ofviolationscommitted 1983, GarcíavisitedHuamangatoobtainfirst-hand informationaboutthe putting thearmedforcesinchargeoffi APRA attheendof1982,sametimethatgovernment passedthedecree government. AmemberofCongress,Garcíawaselected generalsecretaryof political-military commands. administration putthearmedforcesinchargeofcombating subversionthrough of theconflict,asShiningPathsteppedupitsactivities andtheBelaunde preceded it,whichisexplainedabove.The AP’s po light ofitsoppositiontotheanti-subversivepoliciesAPgovernmentthat The APRA administration’s initialapproachtoterrorismmustbeviewedin APRA andthemilitarizationofconflict APRA andtheparty’s roleastheprinci The beginningofthePCP-SL’s «people’s war» coincidedwithareorganizationof APRA andthestartofinternalarmedconflict APRA’S 39 was inchargeofpreparingthequestions. APRA Rep.JavierValle Riestra,president oftheHumanRightsCommission, Cabinet memberstoCongressforhearingsontheincreaseinviolentactions, committed bythesecurityforces.Whencongressionaloppositioncalled Action toconfrontthePCP-SL,APRAalsodenouncedhumanrightsviolations the highlandsandLima. impose thefirststateofemergencyin Ayacucho asterroristactionsincreasedin corresponding proceduralnorms.Itwasalsohighlycriticalofthedecisionto in March1981,whichdefinedthecrimeofterrorismandestablished terrorism tobetraitors.ThepartyalsoopposedLegislativeDecree046,passed bloc objectedto onset oftheconflict.Together withotherpoliticalparties, APRA’s congressional that wouldleadtoitsdefeatintheAprilandNovember1980elections. Raúl Haya de in thepoliticalprocessduringthistime.AfterdeathofpartyfounderVíctor Assembly, APRAwas thecountry’s mainpoliticalforceandastabilizingfactor government. Duringthepoliticaltransitionthatbeganwith1978Constituent Desco. OPPOSITION DURING THE García consolidatedhispowerasleaderoftheAPRA duringtheAP In additiontoopposingthevariouslegalnormsproposedbyPopular APRA’s opposition to AP’s Resumen Semanal, la Torre in August 1979, APRA facedanumberofinternalstruggles AP’s proposal todeclarepeopleaccusedofactssabotageand August 26-September1,1983,No. 231,P. 2. POPULAR ACTIONADMINISTRATION anti-subversive policy wasanti-subversivepolicy clearfromthe ghting subversionin pal oppositionto licy ledtoa«militarization» Ayacucho. In the Popular Action 39 August 217

THE C IVILIAN G OVERNMENTS IN THE FIRST DECADE O F THE VIOLENCE 218 PART ONE: THE TRAGEDY AND THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR IT president saidthathisadministration’s replacement, GeneralHuamán,whenhewasdismissedasdescribedabove. political-military commander. Some APRA spokespeopledefendedNoel’s energy thathadcharacterizeditsinitialreactionwhenNoelwasnamedthefirst forces duringthefinalyearsofPopularActiongovernment,butwithout commits theentirecountrytononviolence»(González,1983b). rehabilitated and,mostimportantly, agreathistoricnationalvisionthat an adequateintelligenceapparatus,prisonsystemsthatallowinmatestobe governance. Inreferencetotheviolence,hesaid«[…]thereisneedcreate that astrategyforlong-termcombatwasneededalongwith (González, 1983b).«Theviolenceisdeepandlong-term,»headded,suggesting would «removethecentralleadershipusingawell-trainedintelligenceservice» through intelligenceworkanddevelopment,»actionswereneededthat happening in Ayacucho isnotaproblemtobeaddressedonthebattlefield,but by theirsocialcontextordirectcoercion.»Hesaiditwasclearthat«[…]whatis leaders whowerethecentralagentsofterrorism;italsohasmilitantspressured autonomous» (González,1983b). had beenseparatedfromitscausesandbecome«[…]chargedwithideology that theproblemwaslargelyignoredbyPeruviansocietyandviolence that itisablindalley, wronganddangerousforthecountry.» Hewent ontosay presented itselfasanalternativeandwherenooneistellingthesePeruvians political systemandthepartieshavenopresence,whereShiningPath explain it.Hesaiditwasaphenomenonthataffectedareaswhere«[…]the he neverthelesssought«historic,social,psychologicalandregionalreasons»to 41 40 insurgency.» government thatcouldimplementasocialreform woulddisarmthe There existed,accordingtohigh-rankingAPRAleaders, «[…]abeliefthat intention toimplementasocio-economicstrategy combatarmedsubversion. seats inbothchambersofCongress.Inhisinaugural address,heannouncedhis only receivedasolidbackingatthepolls,buthisparty wonamajorityofthe García wasinauguratedonJuly28,1985,inafavorablepoliticalclimate.Henot T HE FIRST Desco. CVR. InterviewwithArmandoVillanueva. October30,2002. APRA remainedcriticalofhumanrightsabusescommittedbythearmed According toGarcía,subversionhad«[…]ideologicalcomponents, While GarcíasaidthePCP-SLwasinvolvedinunjustifiableterrorism, barbarity. abuse ofauthority, who violatehumanrightswithmurder,extrajudicialexecutions, tortureand creed andChristianfaith.Thelawwillbeappliedwithseverity, even tothose [to haveno]moreconsiderationsthanthoserequired byourdemocratic Resumen Semanal. YEARS OF 40 About thegovernment’s militaryresponsetotheconflict, thenew THE 41 APRA July26-August1,1985.Year VIII,No.327 GOVERNMENT because tofightbarbarity it isnotnecessarytouse commitment was: 44 43 42 mistrust betweenAPRAandthearmedforces. zones. The laweffectivelylimitedthepowerofcivilianauthoritiesinemergency hands ofthepolitical-militarycommandsallactivitiesrelatedtointernalorder. of exceptioninwhichthearmedforcescontrolinternalorder»andplaced military commands.Thelegislativedecreeeffectivelyinstitutionalized«thestates human rightsabuses,theoutgoingpresidentincreasedpowerofpolitical- Belaunde approvedLegislativeDecree24150.Despiteaccusationsofwidespread reducing pov would beinchargeoftheanti-subversivefight,whilerestworkon kind ofdivisionlabor:«We discussedhowthemilitaryandsomecivilians «Andean trapezoid.» According totheviceministerofinterior, thatimplieda development policiesinthecountry’s mostdepressedareas,especiallythe that thepoliceforceswouldbereorganizedwithin90days. who hadparticipatedinactionsthatresulteddeaths.Healsoannounced time forterrorismandproposeoptionsthatcouldincludethereleaseofprisoners commission ofjudicialexpertswhowouldevaluatethecasesinmatesserving prison ofpeopleaccusedminorcrimes.Hesaidthatwouldbedonebya Minister AgustínMantilla: the militaryhadbeenrunningforpasttwoyears. AccordingtoformerVice carry outandthelackofciviliancontroloveranti-subversive fight,which military thatcouldmeshwiththe«historictask» that thepartyplannedto Once inoffice,however, APRA hadtoestablish smootharelationshipwiththe was harsh,itpaledincomparisontothepositiontakenbyleft-wingparties. criticism oftherolearmedforcesinemergencyzonestarting1983 on newforceasaconsequenceoftheinternalarmedconflict.While APRA’s APRA andthearmedforces,whichhadbegundecadesearlier, appearedtotake Assembly convokedbythemilitarygovernment.Themutualmistrustbetween overcome intheearly1960s,whenHaya delaTorre headed theConstituent how wewouldattackit.» forces intheyearstocome. APRA militantsaftertheuprising, fedthedeepresentmentbetweenpartyandarmed officers whomtheyhadtakenprisoner put downtherebellionandretaken controlof July 1931inthecityofT These tensionsoriginatedwiththe brutalmilitaryrepressionoftheAPRA-ledinsurrectionin CVR. InterviewwithAgustínMantilla. October24,2002. nal, police forcesandtheOrganicLawofNationalIntelligenceSystem. Desco. Organic LawandFoundationfortheInterio On August6,thelowerhouseofCongressapprovedabillallowing thegovernmenttopass July26-August1,1985.Year VIII,No.327,p.3. One oftheproblemsfacedbyGarcíawashistorytensionsand As notedabove,amonthandhalfbeforethechangeingovernment, From thestart,Garcíaratifiedhisgovernment’s priorityofimplementing One oftheconcretemeasuresannouncedbyGarcíawasreleasefrom erty, which w rujillo onthenortherncoast.When itwas obviousthatthemilitaryhad 43 ould meanthatsubv . That,alongwiththemassiv Trujillo, APRAm r Ministry, theOrganicLawsofeach 44 Someoftheproblemshadbeen ersion would decline.That’s ilitants executedsev e firingsquaddeathsof 42 Resumen Sema- eral Army 219

THE C IVILIAN G OVERNMENTS IN THE FIRST DECADE O F THE VIOLENCE 220 PART ONE: THE TRAGEDY AND THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR IT they shoulddoit,becausewe don’t knowhow[...].» military issue;that’s true.Ifthem because «[…]everyoneinAPRAranfromtheissueanditcontinuedtobea to García,besidesalackofspecialinitiativesthepartyhadseriouslimitations unacceptable topoliticalleadersofvariousparties,notonlyAPRA.According could defendthemselvesagainsttheShiningPath,butthatin1985ideawas and sayshe«[…]wasright»inhisearlycalltoarmcommunitiessothatthey blind withrespecttothephenomenonofviolence[...].» position; itdidnothaveathesis.Whenwecametothegovernment,were The proposalwasnotdiscussed.Inhisopinion,«[…]thepartydidhavea specifically howtoinvolv first meetingwithGarcía,heaskedthattheydiscusstheanti-subversiveissue, A former APRA lawmakerfrom Ayacucho statedthatinthecongressionalbloc’s militants trainedinsecurityissueswhocouldorganizeinitiativesthatfield. fight asitdidwithitssocio-economicpolicies.Itnothaveproposalsor 48 47 46 45 forces. Notonlywerethepolice forcessufferingfromcorruptionrelatedtodrug at thetimeranintoanumberofdifficulties,including problemsinthepolice As noted above, when thePCP-SL launchedthe«people’swar,» thegovernment Changes intheInteriorMinistryandPolice Forces murder. on theAPRAgovernmentandrespondedtopossibility ofpeacetalkswith throughout thecountrythatwouldlastseveralyears. ThePCP-SLdeclaredwar campaign targetingAPRAlawmakers,governorsand localcouncilmembers murdered. HisdeathmarkedthebeginningofaShining Pathassassination mayor ofPascoandanewlyelectedmemberthelower houseofCongress,was May 1985,onlyafewweeks after the APRA violence continuedtoexpandbeyond the Ayacucho countrysidetonewareas.In While therewasanoveralldeclineinthenumberofattacksandsabotage, That sensewas strengthenedbytheMRTA’s announcementofaunilateraltruce. first yearofthegovernmentledAPRAtobelievethatachangewasoccurring. “The ShiningP CVR. InterviewwithAlanGarcía. May7,2003. CVR. Interviewwith CVR. InterviewwithAgustínMantilla. October24,2002. Former PresidentGarcíaremembersthatlawmaker, Alberto Valencia, Despite thosestrategicproblems,thedropinnumberofvictims APRA wasunabletoestablishitsownguidelinesfortheanti-subversive subjugated, silenced,managedortoldwhattodo. encountered anuneasysituation.Psychologically what appearedconvenient withoutplacinganyobstaclesintheway. We weak andhadignoredthempolitically, butwhichhadallowed themtodo government inyearspastandwerecomingoutofathatwas […] therewereaseriesofstumblingblocks.Thearmedforceshadbeenthe 48 ath’s declaration ofwar.” Alberto V e Ayacucho’ alencia. September11,2002. ilitary, policeand Caretas, s peasantsinthewar May13,1985.P. 16. victory, Luis Aguilar Cajahuamán, DINCOTE cansolve it,then 47 , theywere notwillingtobe 45 46 against thePCP-SL. formal roleduringtheuprising attheprisons.Shortlyafterprisonmassacre, participation oftheCatholic Church.InJune,thePeaceCommissionhadapurely the PeaceCommissionwith someoftheoriginalmembers,butwithout of violence,etc.» innocent peopleinprison, proposals forlegalnormsdealingwiththeproblem certain effectsormanifestationsofviolence,suchas detention-disappearance, conditions itencountered«[…]wereexclusivelygeared towarddealingwith commission createdexpectationsthatweredifficult tomeetbecausethe and themembersresignedinDecember. As onecommissioner stated,the worked withoutanyrealsupportfromthegovernment orthepoliticalparties, rights andpacification,thecommission’swas unclear.task Thecommission Giesecke, ascientist.Besidesadvisingthepresident on issuesrelatedtohuman García Sayán,alawyer;CésarRodríguezRabanal,psychoanalyst; andAlberto Castaneyra; BishopAugustoBeuzeville;FernandoCabieses, aphysician;Diego component oftheanti-subversive policy. government createdthePeaceCommissiontointroducepacificationasa was apriorityforthenewgovernment.Shortlyaftertheseevents, events inPucayacuandAccomarca,itwasclearthatdefenseofhumanrights be accountableforhumanrightsabuses.Beyondtheinvestigationsinto highlighted theobligationofthoseresponsibleforanti-subversiveeffortto was amarkedchangefromthepreviousadministration. commanders andtheheadofpolitical-militarycommand.Thequickresponse resignation ofthepresidentJointChiefsStaffandfiredregional zone. Withevidenceofthemassacresinhand,governmentdemanded Second MilitaryRegionandthepolitical-militarycommanderofemergency announced aninvestigationanddemandedreportsfromthecommandersof Accomarca, where69peoplelosttheirlives.Thegovernmentimmediately graves fromArmymassacresinPucayacu,wheresevenpeoplewerekilled,and Early oninthenewgovernment,September1985,camereportsofcommon Alternatives foraddressinghumanrightsabuses ability tofightarmedsubversion. informationsystemsandotheritemsthatalsoimproved thestate’sweapons, undertookanefforttoequiptheforces,buyingvehicles,year, thegovernment records, anumberofhighlyqualifiedofficerswerealsopurged.Thefollowing of manyhigh-rankingandbeatofficers.Besidesofficerswhohadquestionable headed acommissionthatannouncednumberofmeasures,includingpurge the passageofalawrestructuringpolice,InteriorMinisterAbelSalinas paralyzed them. Investigative PoliceofPeru–wereembroiledininternalconflictsthatbasically trafficking, buttheirthreedivisions—theCivilGuard,RepublicanGuardand The presidentattemptedto revivetheeffortinearly1986,reorganizing The PeaceCommissionmembersincludedJudge MarioSuárez Sen. Valle Riestra,presidentoftheHumanRightsCommission, In response,Garcíaannouncedareorganizationofthepoliceforces.With 221

THE C IVILIAN G OVERNMENTS IN THE FIRST DECADE O F THE VIOLENCE 222 PART ONE: THE TRAGEDY AND THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR IT uprising byinmatesaccused ofterrorism.Morethan30inmateswerekilled,but Lurigancho’s «Britishcellblock.»TheRepublican Guardviolentlyputdownthe took office,wasaggravated inthewakeofOctober4,1985,uprising cellblocks. which wereneglectedbythestate,totakecontrolover whatwentoninvarious Lurigancho prison.ThePCP-SLalsotookadvantageof conditionsintheprisons, prison in1984,andparticularlyonetheso-called«British cellblock»inLima’s such asonebyinmatesjailedonordinarycriminal charges inLima’s ElSexto There werealsoprecedentsofprisonriotsthathadended withmultipledeaths, wage thepeople’swar andwheretheplanto«induce APRA togenocide»spread. considered «shiningtrenchesofcombat,»battlefields whereitcouldcontinueto and apasserbywere killed,however. APRA’s organizationalsecretary, who rights.» commander generalattackedthe«pseudoinstitutionsthatdefendhuman Navy Ministrydemandedreinstatementofthedeathpenalty, andtheNavy’s the JointChiefsofStaffandheadNavy, inMay1986. After themurder, the «genocide.» ThePCP-SLkilledRearAdmiralCarlosPonceCanessa,amemberof ambushes ofthearmedforces,tryingtoalsoforcethemrespondwith members andattackpartyofficespublicinstitutions.Italsosteppedupits thought foritsowncadreswhowouldbekilledasaresult. agreement bythePCP-SLleadership«toinduceAPRAtogenocide»withno force ittoshowits«repressiveunderside.»Thatpositiontranslatedintoan government to,asAbimaelGuzmánstated,«removeitsprogressivemask»and assassinations. Aswehavenoted,thePCP-SLconstantlyharassed the emergencyzone,butitwasgainingstrengthinotherareaswithitsselective violence, therewerealsotroublingsigns.TheShiningPathhadbeenhithardin economy wasexpandingandthegovernmentenjoyedahighapprovalrating. social investmentinareasthathadbeenmostaffectedbytheviolence.The of thepoliceforceswas underway, andthestatehadinitiatedaprogram of of thearmedforceshadbeenpunishedforhumanrightsabuses,areorganization significant eventhoughthegroupwasnotasstrongPCP-SL;somemembers had beenhardesthit.Inaddition,theMRTA hadcalledatruce,whichwas By June1986,therehadbeenadecreaseinthenumberofdeathszonesthat The impactoftheprisionmassacre never reactivated. to investigate.ThemembersresignedonJuly11,1986,andthecommissionwas the PeaceCommissionreleasedareportonitsactionsandrequestedauthority 49 La República 49 The situationintheprisons, whichwasalreadycriticalwhenGarcía PCP-SLThe alsobegantogainstrengthinthecountry’s jails,whichit Following itsplan,thePCP-SLlaunchedacampaigntoassassinateAPRA While thosecircumstancesmayhaveraisedhopesforanendtothe Shortlythereafter, thePCP-SL attemptedtokill Alberto Kitasono, , May7,1986;Hoy, May7,1986. escaped unharmed.Three APRA militants 1986, wascorrectinseeingtheriotasa«provocation bythePCP-SL,» case involvingthegovernment. days later. At the acknowledged thatamassacrehadtakenplacebyvisitingLuriganchoseveral 111 inmates,accordingtoofficialstatistics.PresidentGarcíapartially rifles andmanyhomemadeweapons.ThreeNavyofficerswerekilled,as there wasmoreviolentandlastedanotherdaybecausetheinmateshadthree who hadalreadysurrendered.TheNavywasinchargeofElFrontón.situation cellblock wherethePCP-SLmilitantshadrioted,authoritieskilled124inmates order atLurigancho,takingoverfromRepublicanGuard.Aftersecuringthe Three inmateswerekilledintheoperation.TheArmywaschargeofrestoring Staff oftheArmedForces. hostages andimposingauthority»byassigningthetasktoJointChiefsof energetically asthelawallowed,preserving–whenpossiblelivesof decided «[…]thatitwasnecessarytore-establishorderintheprisonsas Institute, judicialauthoritiesandmembersofthePeaceCommission,Cabinet attempt tocontrolthesituationwithmediationbyNationalPenitentiary hosting ameetingoftheSocialistInternationalorganization.Afteraninitial at theLurigancho,ElFrontónandSantaBárbaraprisons.Attime,Peruwas prisons inLimaandCallaobeganonJune18,1986,withprisonerstakinghostages do toso. the APRAgovernmentto«inducegenocide»whilepubliclyaccusingitofplanning in differentjailsaroundthecountry.» new genocidalplanbeingpreparedbythegovernmenttobeappliedinmates Shining PathleaderAntonioDíazMartínezannouncedthattherewas«[…]a in danger. ShortlybeforehisinterrogationtheFifthCorrectionalCourt, 1986 theyfiledseveralcivilrightsprotectionsuits,allegingthattheirliveswere SL inmatesbegandemandingguaranteesfromjudicialauthorities,andinJune the governmentdidnotinvestigateevents.Overfollowingmonths,PCP- 52 51 50 formality, astheme involve themilitary. The P administration deliberatelymisinformedthecountry aboutthedecisionto communiqués issuedduringtheriotsandsubsequent repression,the control oftheprisons«asquicklyaspossible.»In mostofthesixofficial judgment contradictedthedecisiontoputarmedforces inchargeofregaining operations began.Hundreds ofinmateswerekilled. and prisonauthoritieswereblockedfromtaking action beforethemilitary request, madeoveraloudspeaker, Minutes oftheCabinetmeetingon June18,1986. Report ofthe Desco. The Cabinet’s initialassessment oftheeventsduringameetingonJune18, The AirForcequicklyre-establishedorderattheSantaBárbaraprison. While thegovernmentacknowledged thatextrajudicialexecutionswere The uprisingbyShiningPathinmatesthatledtothemassacrein Resumen Semanal, Ames Commission.P. time, theprisonmassacrewas consideredthemostserious mbers were unsurewhethertheinmateshadheardonly June13-20,1986.Year IX,No.371. 51 eace Commission’ 245. that theyreconsidertheiractions.Judicial 50 ThePCP-SL’s s dissuasive rolewas a mere tactic was totryforce 52 butthat 223

THE C IVILIAN G OVERNMENTS IN THE FIRST DECADE O F THE VIOLENCE 224 PART ONE: THE TRAGEDY AND THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR IT Gerónimo Cafferata, formercommander generaloftheNavy.followed Thiswas assassinations. InOctober 1986,aPCP-SLcommandattackedViceAdmiral and waswidelypublicized. Nevertheless, thereportdid havewidesupportamongalloppositionparties commission members,however, because soon ashistermended.Thereportwassigned by onlyaminorityofthe actions againsttheministersinvolved,aswell PresidentGarcíaas committed bythesecurityforcesandcalledonCongress totakeconstitutional inside. Thereportalsostatedthattherewereefforts tocoverupthecrimes Frontón theNavybombedBlueCellblockknowing thattherewereinmates down theriotscarriedoutextrajudicialexecutions in Lurigancho,whileEl Rolando Ames,alsooftheUnitedLeft. the post.Thecommissionbeganoperatingin1987under theleadershipofSen. Left senator, was chosentopresid not operateduringthefirstyear. RetiredGeneralFernández Maldonado,aUnited question theCabinet.Congressnamedaninvestigatorycommission,butitdid presented inSeptember, whenthelower houseofCongressheldhearingsto the anniversaryofmassacrebecame«DayHeroism.» organized turnedthevictimsintomartyrsforcause.OnPCP-SL calendar, plan toforcethegovernmentcommithumanrightsabuses.Thesubversive He madeanimpressiveoffer to appearasadefenderofhumanrights,promisingsanctionthoseresponsible. handed approachtodealingwiththePCP-SL.Atsametime,Garcíaattempted increased amongvarioussectorsofthepopulationthatdemandedaheavy- subversive civilian governmentinmakingdecisionsaboutimplementationoftheanti- actions. Militaryleaders,meanwhile,furtherdistancedthemselvesfromthe regarding itsresponsibilityforanti-subversivepolicyandthearmedforces’ for havingquelledtheprisonriot. meeting onJuly19,theJointChiefsofStaffArmedForceswerecongratulated the governmentbackedactionsofsecurityforces.DuringCabinet take precautionsandevenorderthattheriotingprisonersnotbekilled.Instead, military operation,itdidpossessinformationthatshouldhaveallowedto events. preventing districtattorneysandjudgesfromindependentlyexaminingthe 19 withasupremedecreedeclaringtheprisonsrestrictedmilitaryzoneand however, beinvestigated couldnever becauseofacover-up thatbeganonJune out attheSanJuanBautistadeElFrontónprison.TheeventsFrontón, committed atLurigancho,theCVRhasfoundthatexecutionswerealsocarried After theprisonmassacre, thePCP-SLcontinueditscampaignofselective The commission’s reportstatedthatthe The executive The ShiningPathexploitedthebloodyepisode,whichfitperfectlyintoits Despite theseriousnessof From thatmomenton,thegovernmentadoptedanambiguousposition While thegovernmentcouldnothavepredictedextremesof strategy. branch’s , saying,«EithertheygoorIgo.» explanation of the events attheprisonswasexplanation oftheevents theevents at e over thecommission,butherefusedtoaccept APRA lawmakersrefusedtobackit. the prisons,G forces responsibleforputting arcía’s popularity de Insumos of distributingbasicfoodstuffs andothergoods( Franco, ayoungAPRAmilitant andpresidentofthestate-runcompanyincharge rise totheLibertyMovement( from thebusinesssector, Popular Action andthePopular Christian P nationalization ofthebankingsystem.Thedecision sparkedfierceopposition President Garcíamadeasurpriseannouncement inCongress–decreeing subsidies andstimulationofdemandhadreachedits limits.Atthesametime, situation deterioratedquickly. The Terrorist attacksbeganto multiplyinthesecondquarterof1987aseconomic APRA minister inOctober1987. reform. RetiredArmyGeneralEnriqueLópezAlbújarbecamethefirstdefense seemed thatthegovernmentnolongerhadenergyorconvictionforsucha passed inMarch1987,butithadnorealimpactontheanti-subversivefight.It that itwouldreducetheirinfluence.ThelawcreatingtheDefenseMinistrywas circles aswellinthearmedforces,whichpubliclyrejectedchange,arguing appointed bythepresident.Theproposalmetresistanceinvariouspolitical was thatthearmedforceswouldberepresentedinCabinetbyaminister apology forterrorism. terrorism andillicituseofthemediatopromotesubversionwithalawpenalizing The executivebranchalsoproposedincreasingsentencesforcrimesrelatedto the situationledtoreformsinInteriorMinistry’s GeneralIntelligenceBureau. numerous raidsinLima’s shantytownsinthefollowingmonths.Theurgencyof issues. of CésarLópezSilva, aphysicianwhoserved as APRA’s secretaryofprofessional attacks onprivateandpublicinstallationsendedinlateJanuarywiththemurder earlier,week when APRA’s Jorge bombings causedalarminthecapital.SeveralAPRAofficeshadbeenattackeda of thegovernment’s effortstost human rightsviolations.Thesecondlawwasaimedatincreasingthecredibility soldiers mightcommitinthelineofduty, eliminating«excesses»asanexcusefor special courtstotryterrorismcasesandanotherchangethelistofcrimesthat organizing an«anti-terroristplan.» Sen. ArmandoVillanuevapartysecretaryagainandgivinghimthetaskof shantytowns. ThegovernmentandAPRAreactedtobetheeventsbynaming by themurdersoftwo APRA leadersinLima’s HuaycánandHoracioZevallos 54 53 Desco. Desco. AND THE NATIONWIDE SPREADOF THE CONFLICT Debate overcreationofaDefenseMinistrybeganatthistime.Theidea The securityforcesmovedintopublicuniversitiesandcarriedout The governmentproposedseveralnewlaws,includingonetocreate The debateovernationalizingthebankswasheating upwhenRodrigo Resumen Semanal, Resumen Semanal, , ENCI),was murdered.Franco’s death hardenedthepositionof 54 February27-March5,1987.Year X,No.408.P. 1. January16-22,1987.Year X,No.402.P. 1. Movimiento Libertad Del Castillotookofficeasmayor. em abuses.OnJanuary15,1987,aseriesof economic programbasedonpricecontrols, Empresa NacionaldeComercialización ) ledbyMarioVargas Llosa. 53 Thiswave of arty, giving 225

THE C IVILIAN G OVERNMENTS IN THE FIRST DECADE O F THE VIOLENCE 226 PART ONE: THE TRAGEDY AND THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR IT of subversive organizationsalsobegan,includinganattempttobombtheoffices that theministrywasatserviceofAPRA.Paramilitaryactionstargeting Jo surface. After strategy fortheinternalarmedconflict. forces, however, hadalreadydecidedtoundertaketheirownredefinitionofthe links thathadbeenlostwiththecreationofDefenseMinistry. Thearmed the PCP-SL.Thegovernmentturnedtoarmedforces,seekingrebuild assistant secretaryfornationalaffairs,NelsonPozo,wasalsoassassinatedby subversion neededthesupportofentirepopulation. A monthlater, APRA’s government and APRA andreinforcedthe 55 to givetheterroristsimportance theyarelookingforwewillbecometheir the media«[…]toassume animportantresponsibility, becauseifwe aregoing following theNovember 6,1987,assault onthecity. PresidentGarcíacalledon action. Thepressgavewidecoveragetothesituation inJuanjuíthedays Bureau hadbeenestablishedjustthreemonthsearlier andwasnotyetreadyfor at theendofNovember1987tookpolicebysurprise. TheSpecialOperations and government APRA, theappearanceofMRTA gu While theMRTA hadannouncedin1986thatitwas endingits«truce»withthe The assaultonJuanjuí youth inMay1988,thepresidentsaid: to theparty. At theopeningsessionofSeventh NationalCongressof APRA characteristics ofShiningPathmilitantstojustifytheimportancecommitment In anattempttoencouragetheparty’syouth, Garcíahighlightedsome climate oftensionanddistrustbetweenthegovernmentarmedforces. them carryoutacoup.» perfectly wellwheretheywere,becauseitwasmyjobandInotgoingtolet generals andcommandersofthe Army, Navyand Air Forcewere.knew I government andthetensionswitharmedforces.«[...]Iknewwhereall bombing. InaninterviewwiththeCVR,Barsallorevealedmistrustin El Diario Desco. New criticismofthegovernment’s useoftheInteriorMinistrybeganto willing tofacedeath,giveuphislife,hasmystique. own self-criticism,myfellowdelegates,istorecognize thatanyonewhois They arecalledfanatics.Ibelievethattheyhavemystique, andpartofour personal admirationbecausetheyare,whetherwelikeitornot,militants. give ofoneself[…].Thesearepeoplewhodeserveourrespectandmy Shining P have andthatwedonotasaparty[…]wrongornot,criminalthe committed andwillingtosacrifice.We mustrecognizesomethingthatthey And wemustrecognizehowtheShiningPathhasitsmilitantsactive, The president’s actionsduringapartymeetingfurtherincreasedthe Resumen Semanal . PersonnellinkedtoInteriorMinistrywereblamedforthefailed sé Barsallowas appointed ath militanthaswhatwe don’t have: mystiqueandwillingnessto , July1-7,1988.Year XI,No.475.P. 1. interiorminister, opponentscharged party’s ideathatthewar against errilla columnsinSanMartín 55 jeopardized thesecurityof judgesandprosecutors,proposedreturning a callfornationalunity. Hedenouncedtheunscrupulous useofinformationthat in thefightagainstsubversion (Obando1991:381). results, andtheexecutivebranch seemedtotakeabackseatthearmedforces the DefenseMinistry. The c been dissolvedafterthereformofNationalDefense Systemandcreationof and appearedtobeareplacementfortheNationalDefense Council,whichhad Anti-Subversive CoordinatingCommissionbegan operating onJuly3,1988, would takeoverleadershipofandresponsibilityfor anti-subversive efforts.The announced thathewouldpresideoveranewinter-ministerial commissionthat 1990. Army GeneralJoséValdivia Dueñas,was convoy. definitely beenkilledinCayarashortlyafteraShining Pathambushonamilitary included muchmoresupportingevidence,foundthatunarmedpeasantshad massacre hadoccurredinCayara. another districtattorneywhoagreedwith taken place.Escobarwas removed fromthecaseshortlythereafter, replacedby Escobar presentedhisinitialfindings,concludingthatamassacrehadindeed and severalwitnesseseitherdisappearedorwerekilled.DistrictAttorneyCarlos The districtattorneyandtheSenatecommissionersreceivedconflictingreports, own investigation,inadditiontoonealreadyunderway bythedistrictattorney. Senate andheadedbySen.CarlosEnriqueMelgarvisitedtheareabeganits version ofthemassacre.Onemonthlater, aspecialcommissionset upbythe President Garcíavisitedtheareahimself,andofficialsbegantochangetheir of the Attorney General’s OfficeandmembersofCongressvisitedthezone. the massacrecameforward,acommissionofCabinetministers,representatives denying «anallegedmassacreofpeasants.»Afterpeasantswhohadwitnessed PCP-SL ambushofamilitarypatrol.TheCabinetreleasedanofficialcommuniqué economic andsocialchange. the newfrontinwarandregionalizationprocesstopressfor The peopleofSanMartínwantedtotakeadvantagethesituationcreatedby 17and18toprotestthestateofemergency.department-wide strikeonNovember in thedepartmentandtherewasagreatdealofsocialunrestamongpeasants. was sentintocontrolthezone.Thelegalleft-wingpartieshadastrongpresence was declaredinthedepartmentofSanMartínonNovember10andArmy had usedearlierinthedecadetodismissterroristthreat.Astateofemergency «a showputonbytheMRTA» andrepeatingthecommentshispredecessors long time.»InteriorMinisterJoséBarsalloplayeddowntheattack,sayingitwas principal collaborators.»Headded:«Thewarwillbesevereandlastfora In hisstateofthenationaddress onJuly28,1988,PresidentGarcíamade Meanwhile, Sen.ArmandoVillanuevawasnamed Cabinetchiefand Nevertheless, aminorityreportfromtheMelgarCommission,which In mid-May1988,theArmyenteredcommunityofCayaraaftera The FronttoDefendtheInterestsofPeopleSanMartíncalleda The reportstatedthatthepolitical-militarycommander inthezone, ommission, however, didnotproducemanyconcrete responsible. Thecasewas closedin Sen. Melgar’s opinion thatno 227

THE C IVILIAN G OVERNMENTS IN THE FIRST DECADE O F THE VIOLENCE 228 PART ONE: THE TRAGEDY AND THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR IT report: proposals. Sen.EnriqueBernales,whoheadedthecommission, statedinalater The Senateapprovedthereportbutdidnotacton anyofthecommission’s human rightsombudsman,andreinforcingtheNational IntelligenceService. welfare policies,rejectingconceptsforei different sectors,linkingtheNationalDefensestrategy todevelopmentandsocial citizen participation,anationalpacificationaccord,complementary policiesfor Senate 18recommendationsforacompr inadequate forcombatingsubversioninPeru.Thecommission presentedtothe operations werebasedondoctrinairemanuals thatwereoutdatedand and integratedstrategy.» Inaddition,the had «guidelinesforananti-insurgencypolicy,» ithadnotdeveloped«anintegral worsening economy. a Thecommissionconfirmedthatwhilethegovernment commission wascreatedinApril1988amidincreasingsubversiveviolenceand of theviolenceandformulatealternativesforbringingpeacetonation.The purpose andfosteringimpunity. reports almostalwaysfav that thestatedidrecognizeaproblemexisted,butpanels’majority situation inwhichCongresscontinuedtocreatespecialcommissions,implying undermining theoriginalpurposeofcommissions.Thiscreatedanodd investigations andclosedranks behindtheadministrationandparty, worsened, howeve worsened, during muchoftheAPgovernmentbetween1980and1985.Asconflict logical consequenceofthedemandsthatAPRAhadmaderulingparty in chargeoftryingterrorismcases. the policeinchargeofpre-trialinvestigationsandSpecialCorrectionsCourts 1989, thegovernmentpassedLaw25031,whichmodified24700,putting as aterroristactassociationwith,incitingoradvocatingterrorism.InJune the samesentenceaspersonwhocarriedoutcrime.Thelawagaindefined authors orinstigators,co-authorsaccomplicesofterroristactswouldreceive Law 24953,passedinDecember1988,whichestablishedthattheintellectual would controltheuseofarmsandexplosives.Thetwobillswereincludedin documents oradvocateterrorism.» «[…] illicitassociationforterrorismandpeoplewhodistributefliers,falsify SL leaderOsmánMorote.Garcíaalsoproposedanewlawthatwouldsanction on terrorismcharges.Onesuchcasehadbeentheacquittalofwell-knownPCP- police officerstoavoidlegalerrorsthatcouldultimatelybenefitpeopledetained responsibility forinvestigationofterrorismcasestothepoliceandtraining 56 Desco. An examplewastheSpecialSenateCommissiontoinvestigatecauses The specialcommissionscreatedinCongresswereoriginallyseenasa anti-subv not forceittochangeitsconduct andundertakeacompletereviewofthe Resumen Semanal, The governmentunderstood thattheserecommendationswould ersion policy. Thiswas aseriousmistake bybothsides.TheSenate r, most APRAla July22-August 4, 1988.Year XI,No.478-479.P. 2. ored thegovernment,oftennegatingcommission’s 56 Asecondbillproposedbythepresident ehensive pacificationstrategy, including wmakers lostenthusiasmforthe gn tothenati commission statedthatthemilitary on’s reality , creatinga TABLE 3 Apurímac, Ancash,Huancavelica,Pasco,LaLibertad, PunoandSanMartín. under astateofemergency, the law–becamewidespreadindepartments affected bysubversionor 1987 and1989.Abandonmentofelectedoffice–asituation notcontemplatedin campaign. Anincreasingnumberoflocalauthoritieslefttheirpostsbetween areas ranaseriousriskofbeingtargetedby territory and36percentofits1,770districts,whichmeantthatofficialsinthose departments underastateofemergencyrepresented33percentthenation’s Junín, Pasco, Ay Apurímac (exceptfortheAndahuaylasprovince),Huancavelica,SanMartín, recommendations ofitsownSpecialCommission. and whileCongresswasunabletopassanti-subversivelegislationbasedonthe the administrationwasseekinganalternativetoNationalDefenseCouncil developed anintelligencestrategyforfightingterrorism.Thisoccurredwhile administration orCongress.Meanwhile,thepoliceforcesindependently but granteditaroleinthenewpoliticalconfigurationofcountry. that notonlygavethemilitarycontroloverfightagainstterroristviolence, subversive experienceanddevelopingacomprehensiveanti-subversivepolicy crisis andspiralinginflationerodedthegovernment’s popularsupport. of theanti-subversivepolicyunderthoseconditions.Thedeepeningeconomic needed toexpand.Itwasimpossiblemaintainthesocio-economiccomponent the conflictwasspreadingtootherpartsofcountryandsecurityforces The lackofresourcesfortheanti-subversiveeffortwasobviousatatimewhen in September1988,endingtheplanforeconomicchangeinstitutedbyAPRA. The governmentpresentedapackageofgradualeconomicadjustmentreforms APRA

IN THE FACEIN THE CRISIS OF THE By mid-1989,eightdepartmentswereunderastateofemergency:Lima, The newstrategywasdesignedwithoutthedirectparticipationof The armedforces,meanwhile,weresystematicallystudyingtheiranti- population inanationalcommitmenttopacification(Bernales1990:179). and thegovernmentshouldhaveacceptedthatitwastimetoinvolve should havedemandedcompliancewiththerecommendationsitapproved, acucho, HuánucoandtheConstitutionalProvinceofCallao.The particularly Junín,Lima, Ay the ShiningP acucho, Huánuco, ath’s assassin ation 229

THE C IVILIAN G OVERNMENTS IN THE FIRST DECADE O F THE VIOLENCE 230 PART ONE: THE TRAGEDY AND THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR IT the CivilianSelf-DefensePatrols in supported thepatrolsover theobjectionsof Army andhisparty. Theheadof Valley ofHuamangaand58hamletsaroundthe Apurímac River.» Valencia (Ayacucho), thepatrolsrepresented«[…]42communitiesinSachabamba defeated agroupofShiningPath and theofficerswereleftalonetofaceamuchlargerenemyforce. coordination amongstateagencies,asrequestsforbackupwentunanswered the departmentofUcayali,killing10officers.Theattackrevealedlack On July28,1988,onlyafew The RodrigoFrancoCommand fund tofinancetheanti-subversivefight. an offensiveagainstsupportgroupsoutsidethecountry andcreateaspecial strengthen theintelligenceservice,organizepeasant self-defensepatrols,stage subversives inthecountryandwheretheyoperated. Heannouncedplansto government wouldtaketodealwithsubversion, describing thenumberof Defense MinisterGeneralVelázquez Giacariniexplainedtheactions strikes» inprovincessurroundingLima. days laterinHuancavelica.InthefirstweekofJune,PCP-SLcalled«armed now undermilitarycontrol.Anothersuccessful«armedstrike»wascalledafew to Huancayo inanefforttocalmthefearthat hadgrippedthecity, whichwas for May10inthedepartmentsofJunín,HuánucoandPasco.Thepresidentflew was appointedtoheadthe InteriorMinistry. ThePCP-SL calledan«armedstrike» one of APRA’s old-guardleaders,w was assassinatedonMay6andtheCabinetresigned.Sen.LuisAlbertoSánchez, had beensummarilyexecutedaftersurrenderingorbeingwoundedwasignored. widely publicized inthemedia.ThefactthatsomeofMRTAwere fighters inspecting thebodiesofMRTA fightersandsomelocalresidents.Theimages chapter. Presi Army convoyonApril28outsideMolinos,Jauja,isdescribedinthepreceding orDecember.»November by oversight byagroupofconscientiousofficers,Iwould returnpeaceto Ay the government gavemeno morethan100rifles,FALs, andallowed for Commander the CRFwithAPRA,Interior MinistryandtheNationalPolice. been assassinatedayear earlierbythePCP-SL.Various sourcesbegantolink took creditforthekilling. The groupwasnamedfortheAPRAleaderwhohad Lima. Anewgroup,theRodrigo FrancoCommand( Association andattorney for PCP-SLleaderOsmánMorote,wasmurderedin Day address,ManuelFebres Flores,presidentoftheDemocraticLawyers In themeantime,peasantpatrolsin Apurímac River Valleyhad On March27,1989,thePCP-SLattackedpolicestationinUchiza, On June6,duringthepresentationofnewCabinet beforeCongress, May wasthemostviolentmonthof1989.APRARep.PabloLiOrmeño The armedconfrontationbetween acolumnofMRTA fightersandan Huayhuaco dent Garcíatraveledtothezonealmostimmediatelyandwas seen , madehisfirstpublicappearance,statingthat«[…]if hoursbeforethe cadres. According to as namedCabinetchief the Apurímac River V Riverthe Apurímac president’s Comando RodrigoFranco, APRA Rep. annual Independence and Agustín Mantilla and Agustín alley, Alberto Valencia known as acucho CRF), country’s districts. Also in by theseresignations. members oftheIU.Theprovinces ofLima,HuánucoandJunínwerehardesthit posts. Ofthese,431(75percent) werefromAPRAand80(14percent) local electionsinNovember 1989,576localauthoritieshadabandonedtheir hundreds ofdistrictandprovincialauthoritiestoabandon theirjobs.Beforethe groups, 1989was themostviolentyear. of victimsweredistrictmayorsandappointedlieutenant governors.Forboth communities farremovedfromthenationalpolitical scene.Thelargestgroups and othertraditionalleaderswhoheldleadership positionsinindigenous authorities whowerekilled.Thatdoesnotinclude the communityauthorities members ofAPRA. between 1980and1995wereassassinatedin1989. Of these,45percentwere preliminary data,33percent(53)oftheprovincialanddistrictmayorskilled and 71percentofmunicipalauthoritieswerekilledin1989.Accordingto Of thepoliticianskilledthroughoutdecade,68percentofpoliticalofficials 1989 wastheyearwithmostassassinationsofauthoritiesandelectedofficials. If 1984was oneoftheyears with Elections andthesubversivethreat perpetrators whowere notnecessarilyconnectedwithoneanother. organization. Itispossiblethat make itdifficulttobelievethatthecrimeswerecommittedbyasingle Rodrigo FrancoCommandandthevarietyofareaswhereactionsoccurred agents. presidency, Congressagainrejectedaccusationsofcrimescommittedbystate the IUrepresentatives.Withthisvote,oneoffinalonescastduringGarcía Congress approvedthemajorityreport,butstruckoutaccusationsagainst CRF. Instead,heaccusedthreeIUlawmakers ofassociationwithterrorism. Rep. CésarLimo,statedthattherewasnoevidenceprovingtheexistenceof Minister AgustínMantilla.Themajorityreport,signedbyCommissionPresident existence oftheparamilitarygroupandpointedtopossiblelinksInterior investigating theCRFpresentedtworeports.Theminorityreportaffirmed session underPresidentGarcía’s administra problems inthepartyduetomurdersofactivemembers. to buynewweaponsforthepolice,aradicalAPRAyouthwingandinternal linktheparamilitarygroupto would A group. Thecommissionattemptedtohighlighteventsandcircumstancesthat murdered, Congresshadsetupacommissiontoinvestigatetheparamilitary In thelocalelections,there werenocandidatesin15.37percentofthe The impactofthreats,attemptedmurderandassassinations forced The CVRreceivedreportsofapproximately500municipal andpolitical The CVRbelievesthatthelargenumberofactionsattributedto On May31,1990,duringtheHouseofRepresentatives’lastlegislative After IURep.HeribertoArroyoandAPRAPabloLiOrmeñowere 1989, 17justicesofthepeace were killed,representing thehighestdeathtollsduringinternalwar, the command’s namewas used bydifferent PRA, includingthegovernment’s decision tion, thespecialcommission 231

THE C IVILIAN G OVERNMENTS IN THE FIRST DECADE O F THE VIOLENCE 232 PART ONE: THE TRAGEDY AND THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR IT to peasantpatrolsinthecommunity about thefutureofanti-subversiveeffort,PresidentGarcíapresentedrifles In December1989,amidarapiddeclineinhispopularityandgeneralpessimism The finalphaseof and militarytoincreaseprotectiondidnotconvincevoters. the departmentsofHuánucoandJunín.PledgesbyInteriorMinistry, police departments of Ayacucho andHuancav absenteeism in10years ofdemocracy class, particularlyinLima. assassinations didnotreceive sufficientattentionfromthecountry’s political assassinated withfamiliesandneighbors.Thescopeofthiscampaignselective zones, wherethelackofprotectionwasmostpronounced,andtheywereoften 40 percentofallthosekilledbetween1982and1995.Themajoritylivedinrural smaller thanthoseofother policeunits. Minister Mantilla,waseffective eventhoughitoperatedwithabudgetinfinitely the variousPCP-SLorganizations. TheGEIN,whichwasreinforcedbyInterior group alsocoordinatedthe networkofsafehousesandhadalistcontactsfor in chargeofdistributingPCP-SLpropaganda.Thatwas importantbecausethis archive intheraid.TheGEINalsostruckatParty SupportGroup,whichwas central leadershipandpartyorganizations.Officers seized thePCP-SL’s general Central Committeemeetingsandcoordinatedcommunication betweenthe Department ofOrganizationalSupport,whichorganized partycongressesand staying onlyafewdaysearlier. GEIN raidedasafehousenearArmyheadquarters whereGuzmánhadbeen was giventhebasicresourcesneededtoorganize group.OnJune1,1990,the Lieutenant GeneralReyes group would go created withintheDIRCOTEduringfinalyearofAPRAgovernment.This The PCP-SLstrikefailed. APRA andFREDEMO,aswellcivilsocietygroups,churchorganizations,etc. IU presidentialcandidate,andsupportedbyhisrivalsinotherleft-wingparties, and politicalorganizations.ThedemonstrationwascalledbyHenryPease,the area. Unlikeotherefforts,themarchbroughttogetherawidespectrumofcitizens countered byamarchtensofthousandspeoplethroughthedowntown local elections,thePCP-SLcalledan«armedstrike»inLima.Thestrikewas protest theShiningPath’s 1989,shortlyafterthe «armedstrikes.»InNovember politicians, residentsofthecitiesHuancayoandHuamangaheldmarchesto decision thatwas controversial thenandremainscontrov government haddecidedtoprovidelogisticalsupportthepeasantpatrols,a The 1990generalelectionsweremarkedbythehighestrateof The SpecialIntelligenceGroup( Meanwhile, followingtheleadofcivilsocietyorganizationsandlocal on toarrest years later. Abimael GuzmánReinosotwo Police the APRA government the APRA Roca, thenSuperiorDirectorof ThesafehousealsohousedthePCP-SL’s . Absenteeism exceeded40percentinthe elica, whileitwas Grupo EspecialdeInteligencia, ofRinconadaBaj close to50percentin ersial today. the Technical Police, a, Ayacucho.The GEIN) was limits ofrulelaw. process ofviolencethattheydidnotknowhowtohandleeffectivelywithinthe rights violationsandthesufferinginflictedonthousandsofcitizensduringa CVR’s judgment,areethicallyandpoliticallyresponsiblefornumeroushuman the armedforcesagainstpopulation.PresidentGarcíaandAPRA,in that militarizedtheconflictandpermittedimpunityforcrimescommittedby human rightsabuses,itdidnotmaintainthatpositionandfellbackonmethods which hadbeenmarkedbyabdicationofciviliancontrolandablindeyeto began withtheintentionofchangi government failedinthefightagainstsubversion.Whileadministration emergency (Lynch1999). percent ofthepopulationand29.62territorywereunderastate or underthecontrolofapolitical-militarycommander, whilein1990,45.18 population and7.25percentofPeruvianterritorywereunderastateemergency isbestseenthroughstatistics.In1985,6.04percentofthenation’sgovernment leader VíctorPolaydeniedthattheescapehadworsenedsecurityproblem. country’s securityproblems.InaninterviewwiththeCVR,however, MRTA was abletoregroupasaresultofitsleaders’escape,furtheraggravatingthe several300-meter tunnelthathadbeendugover months.Inaddition,theMRTA prison andthelimitationsofintelligenceservices,whichhadnotdetecteda MRTA escapeexposedtheprecariousnessofcountry’s maximum-security and Rincón,throughatunnelbuiltintotheMiguelCastroprison.The by theJuly9,1990jailbreak47MRTA inmates,includingP Like PresidentFernandoBela The escalationoftheinternalarmedconflictduringAPRA Police effortsunderthe APRA government, however, wereovershadowed ng thePopular Action unde’s administration,the APRA government’s practices, olay, Gálvez 233

THE C IVILIAN G OVERNMENTS IN THE FIRST DECADE O F THE VIOLENCE and interrogationwerethe newpolicetactics. collaborators, ratherthanto protectlocalpeopleandtheirrights.Pursuit,capture subversive patrolstrained todestroytheenemyandstrikefearintoits been trainedmainlyforpreventive andguarddutieswerereplacedwithanti- police presenceinareaswhere thePCP-SLoperated.Policeofficerswhohad engaged inopencombat. prepared tofaceanorganizationthatstagedsurprise attacksandalmostnever the interiorofcountry, whichwere «armed struggle»thePCP-SLtargetedpolicestations insmallcommunities parts ofthe Andes tocreatea«newpower,» fromthebeginningofso-called terrorist tactics.Withthegoalofeliminatingrepresentatives ofthestateinrural Officers ofthevarious policeforceswere thefirsttargetsofShiningPath’s T to thestrategicdefeatofsubversivegroups. civilian populationandeffortstogatherusereliableinformation,whichled was anappropriatestrategyfinallydeveloped,involvingcooperationwiththe Popular ActionandAPRAgovernments.Onlyinthelate1980searly1990s to subversion.Serioushumanrightsviolationswerecommittedunderthe analytical andstrategicmistakesthatconsiderablydelayedaneffectiveresponse rights. Thestatesecurityforces—thepoliceandarmedalsomade them toeffectivelycombatthePCP-SL andtheMRTA whilestillrespectinghuman to designacomprehensiveanti-subversivestrategythatwouldhaveenabled As hasbeenmentionedabove,theconstitutionalgovernmentsof1980sfailed HE POLICEFORCES The staterespondedearly tothisaggressionbychangingthetypeof THE STATE SECURITY FORCES CHAPTER 4 generallypoorlyequippedandill- 235 THE STATE SECURITY FORCES 236 PART ONE: THE TRAGEDY AND THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR IT FROM CONFUSION TO police reportsubmittedtotheCVR. victims intheirhistory:682dead,754woundedand101disabledaccordingtoa During theyearsofviolence,policeforcessufferedgreatestnumber hit bythesubversiveorganizations,whichtheywerepoorlyequippedtoface. numerous violationsofpeople’s basicrights;atthesame time, theywere hard role indismantlingthenationalPCP-SLleadership. the late1980swithcreationofvariousintelligenceunits,whichplayedakey carry outtheirspecializedtasksofinvestigation.Intelligenceworkimprovedin were generallylimitedtoauxiliaryfunctionsandhadinventopportunities military commandswereestablished.Underthesecircumstances,policeofficers — wereplacedunderthecommandofmilitaryinplaceswherepolitical- police forceuntil1988,whentheyweremergedintotheNationalPoliceofPeru the CivilGuard,were mostvisiblefaceofthestate—andnotalways a choice hadacertainsymbolic force,becauseinruralareasthepolice,especially timely, Office, akeylinkinthefight againstsubversion,seriouslyunderminedany combined withtheincreasing corruptionthat between topofficialsorviolencelower-ranking officers.Thisinfighting, police branches,whichsometimesreachedtheextreme ofpublicconfrontations mentioned invarioussectionsofthisbook:therivalries amongthedifferent to corrupt—drugtrafficking. problem thatwastakingonincreasedimportanceand demonstratingitsability In addition,thepolicehadotherfirestofight,mainlycommon crimeandanother from thePCP-SL,whichwas illegalanddiametricallyopposedtotheruleoflaw. its protests,whichfellwithintheexistinglegalframework, andthenewthreat legacy ofsocialunrestmadeitdifficulttodistinguish betweenthelegalleftand a problemthatcoul to understandthesignificanceofPCP-SLandtendedconsidersubversion there was alackofreliableinformation;ontheother, civilianauthoritiesfailed mentioned above,createdabasicdifficultyforthepoliceforces.Ononehand, political systembysurprise. responsibility ofconfrontingthesubversive threatthathadtakenthecountry’s support andhadfewlogisticalfinancialresources,thatwasgiventheinitial PIP). Itwasthisthree-prongedorganization,whichlackedfirmgovernment Republicana three branches:CivilGuard( When theviolenceunleashedbyPCP-SLbegan,policeweredividedinto effective responsetothenew challenge. During thedecadesofinternalarmedconflict,policecommitted During thisprocess,thepoliceforces–therewerethreebranchesof This wastheinstitutionthat thePCP-SLchoseasitsfirsttarget.The Added tothiswasaninstitutionalproblemthat hasalreadybeen The policeforcesalsofacedotherdifficulties.politicaltransition’s The lackofasolid,consistentgovernmentpositiononthesubversion, , GR)andInvestigativePoliceofPeru( A SLOWLEARNINGPROCESS d be solved relatively d besolved relatively Guardia Civil easily. , GC),RepublicanGuard( permeated the Policía deInvestigacionesdelPerú PIP’s Intelligence Guardia , Shining Path’s established thestateofemergencyinareafollowing day. hospital wheretheywererecoveringfromwounds. Thegovernmentre- group ofRepublicanGuards,whokilledthreeaccused subversivesinalocal Guillén andJoséReaConde—inthejailbreakwas followedbyreprisalsa authorities abouttheplan.Thedeathsoftwopoliceofficers —FlorencioAronés took thepolicebysurpriseeventhoughRepublican Guardhadwarned 2, 1982,inHuamanga.Theescapeof254prisonersfrom theHuamangaprison organization. ThePCP-SLplannedjailbreaks,thelargest ofwhichoccurredMarch Ayacucho, andthesituationwas becomingmoredifficultforthesubversive attack ontheTambo policestation. dangling herintheairtoforceconfessallegedparticipation her, andthentookheraloftinahelicopter, tyingaropearoundherfeetand said theyburstintoherhomeonOctober28,1981,forcedacar, raped raped byagroupofsevenhoodedSinchis population’s basicrights.TheCVR heardtestimonyfromonewoman who was addition, thepoliceinterventionswereaccompaniedbyviolationsof areas, however, thelackofpersonnelmademoreeffective controldifficult.In important PCP-SLmembersinHuamanga,whilesufferingnofatalities.Inrural who was mortally plan knownastheVivancoJointOperationsPlan,inhonorofapoliceofficer command, formedbycolonelsfromthethreepolicebranches,implementeda 40 membersofthespecialforcesknownasSinchis.Ahigh-levelpolice Belaunde’s government sent193 first declarationofastateemergencyin Ayacucho. PresidentFernando later, anotherfierceattack,thistimeonthepolicestationinTambo, ledtothe Sulca, diedintheattackonstationQuinuaAugust15.Sevenweeks attacked. Thefirstpoliceofficerkilledintheconflict,SergeantRamiroFlores demonstrated inattacksonpolicestations. revolution witha«bloodquota,»pavingthewayformadnessthatwas PCP-SL leadershiphadapprovedthedirectivetopayfortriumphof construction ofsupportbases.»ItmustberememberedthatinMay1981,the «beat thecountrysidewithguerrillaactions»and«striketoadvancetoward by theShiningPathincampaignsdubbed«conquerorweaponsandresources», committed abusesagainstcitizens. local powerstructure,wheretheyestablishedauthoritarianrelationshipsand friendly face.Onthecontrary, inmanycommunitiesthepolicewere partofthe and Huamanga grewmorechaotic. installations. Thatleftthefield clearforthePCP-SL,andsituationinHuanta stations, untilthedirector general oftheCivilGuardorderedaretreattolarger group continuedtodemonstrate itsfirepowerwithsuccessiveattacksonpolice The raidontheHuamanga prisontoreleaseprisonersdemonstratedthe Meanwhile, theInvestigativePolicehadarrestedother peopleoutside During thisfirst60-dayperiodofjointaction,thepolicearrested In 1981,thepolicestationsinQuinua,LuricochaandTambo were Beginning intheearly1980s,policesufferedfromattacksunleashed ability toorganizeeffective attackson wounded intheattackTa police officerstotheareaenforceit,including

when shewas14yearsold.Thewoman mbo. protected facilities.The 237 THE STATE SECURITY FORCES 238 PART ONE: THE TRAGEDY AND THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR IT into thelocalpopulation.Asaresult,Sinchis challenge posedbytheShiningPathcadres:withoutuniforms,theyblended anti-subversive tactics,theirtrainingwasoflittlehelpindealingwiththe most notableinthecaseofSinchis down moraleamongofficers. and communitypolicestations.Lackofequipmentcoordinationdragged scarce. Therewasalsoalackofcoordinationwithjurisdictionalheadquarters without improvingtheconditionsunderwhichtheyoperated. was nowclearthatthepolicecouldnotcontinuefightingShiningPath March 26,cadresattackedthe Ayzarca 1 Security Officebegancarrying outspecializedanti-subversiveinvestigation. violence inflicteduponthembythesubversives. violations —referredtoas«excesses» being targetedatanyminutebytheShiningPath. Committing humanrights they wereinastateoftensionbecausethehostile environmentandthreatof violations committedbytheanti-subversiveforces. Oneexcuseusedwasthat recalled theeventsasfollows: raped bysevenSinchisinJanuary1981 public outragewastherapeofGeorginaGamboa,who17whenshe only ofadultwomen,butalsoadolescents.Onethefirstcasestospark and arbitrarydetentionwerecommonpracticesoftheSinchis perpetrator ofabuse,tortureandrape–animageborneoutbyfacts.Torture and thecivilianpopulation.AstereotypesoonemergedofSinchi that, addedtotheabusestheycommitted,widenedgapbetweenpolice on March31,theytargetedthemainpoliceheadquartersinVilcashuamán. by headquarters. Police jurisdictionshaveamainheadquarters andnetworkofminorpolicefacilitiesthatarerun Another problemwastherelationshipwithpopulation.This Officers lackedequipment,weaponswereobsoleteandammunition Encouraged bythesemoves,thePCP-SLintensifieditsoffensive.On Besides thepoliceefforts in the Andean area,adivisionofPIP’s State From thebeginning,effortsweremadetojustify thehumanrights Cangallo, too. or ananimalcarcassandtookmetoCangallo.I was aprisonerin next day, whendaylightcame,theythrewmeontoatrucklikecorpse comein.Iwaswould practicallydead.Ididn’t feelnormalanymore.The would gooutandanothercomein;he seven ofthem.Sevensoldiers.Sinchis they hitme.Iwasdevastated.Theyrapedmethatnight.Therewere handkerchief inmymouth,andwhenIscreamedaskedforhelp They rapedmeallnightlong.Iscreamedforhelp.stuffeda They beatme.me,thentheystartedtoabuserape

— wasalsoawayoftakingrevengeforthe . . hacienda, nearP Although theseofficersweretrainedin In aCVRpublichearing,Ms.Gamboa

began tosuspecteveryone,and

came inandrapedme.One arcco andPomatambo; , as wasrape,not

as the 1 It officers whoarrived in Ayacucho, oneagent toldtheCVR thatit was «[…] terrorism suspectwitha dull knife.Describingthesituationfacedbypolice new arrivalswholackedcombat experience.Thebaptismconsistedofkilling a received bytheCVR,one of themostchillingmayhavebeen«baptism» There werealsoritualpractices forgroupbonding;accordingtotestimony without complaint,andrecording thepracticesonfilmandinphotographs. entrails withtheirteeth,aswelllacerateown bodiesandresistthepain the AmericasandotherU.S.bases:havingtraineeskill animalsandripouttheir to thetheaterofoperations. recruit morepersonnelandprovidespecifictraining to thosewhowouldbesent interventions fellmainlytothepolice.Asaresult, the policefeltneedto were interrogatedwithhelpfromthestaffoflocal PIPoffice. were takentomilitarybasessuchasLosCabitos in Huamanga,wherethey more andpeoplewhomtheyassumedwere subversives. Thedetainees underthecommandofan Army officer.always information withthemilitaryandparticipateinjointpatrolssoldiers, preventive functions.Underthenewscheme,policeweretosharereliable in Ayacucho metwithtoppoliceofficialssothattheywouldemphasizetheir military. Exercisinghisauthority, which wouldlastfromDecember29,1982,untilJune19,1986. police. ThusbeganthephasethatCVRcalls«militarizationofconflict,» the certaintythattheywouldquicklyachievesuccesshadeluded establishing political-militarycommands,themilitarytookontaskwith TerryBelaunde gave thearm and thelackofdisciplinetheydisplayedinemergencyzone.WhenPresident accentuated intheearly1980sbecauseoflatter’s failedanti-subversive efforts been oneofbothemulationandcontempt.Militarydisdainforthepolicewas The relationshipbetweenthepoliceforcesandarmedhastraditionally T subversives’ hands. of surprisecombinedwithofficialvacillationandnegligenceplayedintothe valuable timethatultimatelygavetheShiningPathanadvantage.Theelement the PCP-SL. was theonlyunitthatachievedconstant,consistentresultsinfightagainst followed, DICOTE,whichworkedintensivelyunderless-than-idealconditions, — forinvestigationratherthananintelligenceunit.Inthemonthsthat DIPAS), was establishedinMarch1981. briefly calledtheAnti-SubversivePoliceDivision( The Anti-T HE POLICEDURING THE MILITARIZATION OF THE CONFLICT The trainingmimickedthemethodsusedatPanama-based Schoolof Nevertheless, intheearlydaysofpolitical-military command,armed Meanwhile, asthePCP-SL’s The government’s newpoliciesformallysubordinatedthepoliceto the Overall, however, theconfusionofthisearlyperiodresultedinaloss errorism Division( División ContraelTerrorismo ed forcescontrolovertheemergencyzonesby the firstheadofpolitical-militarycommand activity expanded,soldiersbegantocapture It was conceived División dePolicíaAntisubversiva , DICOTE),whichwas as anoperationalunit , 239 THE STATE SECURITY FORCES 240 PART ONE: THE TRAGEDY AND THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR IT base paste)amongpoliceintheemergencyzone. translate intoanincreaseinalcoholismanddrugdependency(especiallycocaine suffered fromtheeffectofshortages,isolationandfear, whichbeganto largely bythepolice’s severe shortageofsupplies.Police officers,meanwhile, the theftofgoods,foodandanimalsfromruralpopulation,robberymotivated events andestablishedthatacrimehadbeencommitted. Officials triedtocoverupthecrime,butajudicialinvestigationconfirmed Balcón Huaycco,wheretheyweremurdered.Inall,32peoplefromSocosdied. ceremony, theyforcedthepeopleoutofhouseandtook themtoaplacecalled taking place.Afterarguingwiththecommunitymembersattending 13, 1983,policeofficersburstintoahousewhereanengagementceremonywas massacre inSocos,acommunitytheprovinceofHuamanga.OnNovember of victims. well asthegovernmentsandjudiciary,as facilitatedtheincreaseinnumber by protectingthieves,rapists,torturersandmurderers,thepolicecommanders, crimes werecoveredupbytheinstitutionsinvolved.TheCVRisconvincedthat disappearance, tortureandrape,ofwhichwomenwerethemainvictims.The rights violationscommittedbysecurityforces:arbitrarykillings,forced get yourbaptism.’Everytimetheycameandbroughtadetainee,youknew[...].» recruits, insidethere[inthemilitarybase]andtheysaid,‘Nowyou’re goingto disastrous, becausepeoplewerearrivingfromMazamari.Theyhadus,thenew Díaz Martínez,whohadbeen atopPCP- office inHuaraz,underthe directionofCol.HéctorJhonCaro,detainedAntonio PCP-SL’sthe centralorganizationin Lima. became amilitarizedorganization andreplacedtheMetropolitanCommitteeas Committee ( of thisthatwithinthePCP-SL,groupknown asthePeople’s Support agent toldtheCVR—anddealtitsomedebilitatingblows. Itwaspartlybecause on thePCP-SL’s MetropolitanCommittee—«theoneswhohadthebombs,»one acted, atleastinMetropolitanLima.DIRCOTE,therefore, focuseditsactivities detectives hadgainedgreaterknowledgeofhowthe ShiningPathoperatedand called Deltagroups,eachofwhichhad10to15members. approximately 150agents.Theunit’s maintasksfelltofive operationalgroups Contra elTerrorismo 1983, changedDICOTE’s rankandnameto leadership changedtheunit’s situation. A in Limawithoutsettingasideinstitutionalconflicts.Theannualturnoverof While themilitarywas moving into The workofDIRCOTE These arrests, however, didnothave a significantimpactonthe PCP-SL, Along withthesecrimes,otherformsofabusealsoproliferated,including One ofthepolicecrimesthathadgreatestrepercussionswas That trainingkeptpacewiththeincreaseinvarioustypesofhuman The PIPalsomadesomeprogress inLima.InDecember1983,thePIP During thatyear, theunit’swork boreitsfirstsignificantfruits.The Socorro Popular , DIRCOTE).Bytheendofyear, theofficehadastaffof ) begantotakeongreaterimportance. SocorroPopular Ayacucho, DICOTEwas pursuingitstasks SL leaderfrom ministerial resolutionissuedonJuly5, the Anti-Terrorism Bureau( the group’ s earlydays. Dirección and Investigative Policeasoperationaloffices. Nevertheless,tensions amongthe Forces, whilemaintaining top-level officesoftheCivilGuard,RepublicanGuard 5). Thelawcreatedasingle directingoffice,theGeneralBureauofPolice legislation was cl regulated andextendedthe reorganization.Oneimportantcomponentofthis crimes, butalsoofhonest, competentmembersoftheforces. and resultedintheremovalnotonlyofcorruptofficers andthoseimplicatedin ranking personnel.Thecriteriaforthispurgewerenot well designed,however, dismissal orretirementofalargenumbercommissioned officersandlower- passage ofLaw24294.Onethemostrelevantprovisions ofthelawwas trafficking ringrunbyReynaldoRodríguezLópez. Eduardo Ipinze,andotherhigh-rankingofficers were protectingthedrug- August 2,1985,forexample,itwas rev drug-trafficking cartels.Corruptionhadreachedembarrassing proportions.On difficulty: deep-rootedcorruptioninthepoliceforces, mainlyassociatedwith with thepolice. and withthatgoalinmind,itestablishedaparticularlysmoothrelationship administration soughttoincreaseciviliancontrolovertheuseofpublicforce, the armedforceshadbeengiveninfightagainstsubversion.TheGarcía other things,totheneedbalanceexcessivedecision-makingpowerthat The new APRA government’s greaterinterestinthepoliceforceswas due,among Support andsearchforcounterbalances rectify thatshortcoming. but notatrueanti-subversive policy, andthenewgovernment alsofailedto coordination, however, didnottranslateintoclearpolicy. Therewas support, as longitwasaccountableafterward.Greaterautonomyandbetter incentives andimproveitsorganization.Itwasgivengreaterfreedomtowork each ofwhichwas assignedcertaindepartments ofthecountry. PIP offices.In1985,thattaskwasturnedovertotheDeltagroupcommanders, nationwide, gatheringandanalyzinginformationsubmittedbydepartmental Beginning in1984,DIRCOTEpreparedaweeklyreportofterroristactivities enabling thebureautocreatemoreoperatinggroupsdivideupwork. zones. agreed toputDIRCOTEonequalfootingwiththepoliceservicesinemergency end oftheBelaundeadministration.Between1985and1986government taking placeinthecentralhighlands.DIRCOTEimproveditslogisticsafter that wasmorecoherentthantheindiscriminatepersecutionofallegedterrorists because ofdeficienciesinthejudicialsystem. because manyofthesubversiveleaderswhoweredetainedquicklyreleased The FoundationLawof the PoliceForces(LegislativeDecree371) Reorganization ofthepoliceforcesbeganonAugust 14,1985withthe Efforts toincreasethepolice’s influenceran intoanincreasinglyserious The newgovernmentenabledDIRCOTEtoofferitspersonnelslight During thoseyears,thenumberofagentsassignedtoDIRCOTEincreased, Nevertheless, DIRCOTEpavedthewayforadifferentofoperating assifying thepoliceasaprof ealed thattheformer essional, notamilitary, force(Article PIP director , General 241 THE STATE SECURITY FORCES 242 PART ONE: THE TRAGEDY AND THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR IT for thecrimes,policereport concludedthat“[…]wecannotdiscountthe that membersofthePolice Detachment ofSocosweredirectlyresponsible the Inv At therequestofPublicMinistry, murder ofMaríaCárdenasPalomino. aggravated murderof32residentsSocosandattempted aggravated under thecommandofLieutenant.AlbertoDávilaReátegui —forthe agents whoweremembersoftheSocospolicedetachment atthetime— Edilberto GuerreroMorante,filedaformalcriminalcomplaint againstthe26 Second MixedProvincialDistrict the mediaandbyPublicMinistry, theprovincialdistrictattorneyof Based onthecomplaintfiledbyrelativesandtestimony gatheredthrough found thebodiesof29people. relatives ofthevictims,wenttoBalcónHuaycco ravine, wherethey officers arrived inSocosfromthecityof Ayacucho. Theofficials,alongwith On November15,thejudge,DistrictAttorneyand Investigative Police deeds, thepolicewereunabletokeepwordofcasefromreachingofficials. Despite statementsfromplaintiffsandwitnesseseffortstocoverupthe happened. returned toSocos,whereshetoldherfamilyandneighborswhathad dawn, whenthepatrolwent away, MaríaCárdenasleftherhidingplaceand Palomino, whofelldownanembankmentandthereforewasnotshot.At shaken loosebytheexplosions.TheonlysurvivorwasMaríaCárdenas detonated grenadessothatthebodieswouldbecoveredbyrocksandearth they wereshotpointblank.Thepolicethenpiledthecorpsestogetherand Later, thepeasantsweretakentoBalcónHuayccowhere,atabout2:30a.m., group andrapedthem. stopped inAllpaMayo,wheretheyseparatedtheyoungwomenfrom a placecalledQuebradadeBalcón,halfanhourfromSocos.Thepolice When theyhadleftthehouse,wereorderedtowalksinglefiletoward of thepeoplepresent,thenorderedallguestsouthouse. intervention. Thepolicefiredintotheair,askedtoseeidentitydocuments present hadbeendrinkingliquorandreactedbyprotestingthepolice only hadpermissiontohaveasocialgatheringuntil8p.m.Mostofthose members burstintothehouseandtoldpeopletogohome,becausethey preparing toleavemeethisfuturewife,apatrolofformerCivilGuard At about9p.m.,whenthefuturebridegroomandsomeofguestswere in atraditionalceremonyknownasyaycupacu. Quispe JanampaaskedforMaximilianaZamora Huamanga, only200metersfromtheCivilGuardpolicestation,Adilberto On November13,1983,inthedistrictofSocos,18kilometersfromcity estigative Police estigative of Ayacucho. Despitestatements fromwitnesses E XTRAJUDICIAL EXECUTIONSINSOCOS Attorney’s a policeinv Office inHuamanga,Óscar estigation was Quispe’s handinmarriage (1983) launched by General BureauofIntelligence( control over internalorder. curfew weredeclaredinMetropolitanLima,andthearmedforcesgiven escalation oftheMRTA’s actionsinLima.Thatyear, astateofemergencyand assassinations bythePCP-SL,includingdeathofAPRAleaders,andan as aresultofthedeteriorationsituation:anincreaseinbombattacksand the violencetakingonanationwidescope. discussed elsewhereinthisbook,markedaturningpointtheconflict,with The prisonmassacresthatoccurredonJune18and19,1986,whichhavebeen T top-ranking policeofficersgreateraccesstodecision-makingspheres. who firstserved asviceministerand continued tobeoperational.ThegreatestsupportcamefromAgustínMantilla, a priority, itneglectedtheneedtostrengthenintelligenceunits.Thepriority police forcescontinued. type ofinformationgenerated,however to DIRCOTEandotheroperationalunitsintheformofintelligencenotes.The ministry officials.Oncethatinformationhadbeenanalyzed,itwasdisseminated DIGIMIN), whichwaschargedwithproducingintelligence the SpecialOperationsBureau( the government preferredtousemilitarizedpoliceforces.To thatend,itcreated government’s pri operational unitslikeDIRCOTE,whichcontinuedtotakeabackseatamongthe zones, mostofthepolicein thoseareaswerenotfromDOESandlackedadequate and increasedthecombat capacityofonepolicegroupsenttotheemergency ( operational bodyandrenamed theNationalBureauofSpecialOperations the changeinpolicestructures in1991,thebureauwasconsideredanational several officersdied.In1990, the unit’s namewas changedtoDIROESPNP. After units, theycarriedoutoperationsinvariouspartsofPeru, includingPuno,where zones, whichnowincludedalargepartofthecountry. Besidesservingasbackup conflict andweresenttoreinforcevariouspolicedetachments intheemergency as quicklypossible. killed andwoundedrose.Itbecamenecessarytoincrease thenumberofagents worsened andthenumberofemergencyzonesincreased, thenumberofpolice Nacional dePolicía officers whohadrecentlygraduatedfromtheNational PoliceSchool( words, itinsistedonpursuingapurelymilitarysolution. Dirección NacionaldeOperaciones Especiales HE CREATIONOF The government createdandequippedtheMinistryofInterior’s The focusofthepolice’swork begantochange,largely anti-subversive While theGarcíaadministrationsawequippingpolicecombatunitsas While DOESservedasthe focalpointforanti-subversiveoperations The DOESmembersbecametheelitepoliceforceduring thisstageofthe The firstDOESgraduatingclassesconsistedmainlyoflower-ranking DOES orities. Insteadofusingpoliceintelligencetocombatsubversion, ) anddonetheirmandatorymilitaryservice.Asthe conflict AND THE MATURINGOF THE AND Dirección General deInteligenciadelMinisterioInterior Dirección deOperacionesEspeciales later ministeroftheinterior,allowedwho , DINOES). DIRCOTE , didnothave

information fortop tactical v , DOES).Inother alue for Escuela , 243 THE STATE SECURITY FORCES 244 PART ONE: THE TRAGEDY AND THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR IT they wereofficiallysuspended. and thatfiveofthosesentencedwerereinstatedbythepolice,eventhough that thepaymentofcivilreparationstovictims’familieswasnotmade responsible forthedeeds,despiteattemptstocoverupcrime,itregrets While theCVRrecognizesthatjudicialauthoritiessentencedthose however, showsclearlythatthepenaltyofsuspensionwasnotenforced. from prison.Areviewoftherecordssomepoliceofficerssentenced, officers couldnotreturntoactivedutyforfiveyearsaftertheirrelease thereafter.years Thesentenceoftotalsuspensionmeantthatthepolice of totalsuspensionduringthetimeprisonsentencesandforfive Chamber oftheSupremeCourt,whichalsoimposedanaccessorysentence The sentencewasupheldonSeptember30,1987,bytheSecondCriminal did nottakepartinthecrime. victims’ legalheirs.Therulingacquitted15membersofthepoliceforcewho defendants werealsorequiredtopaycivilreparationsof120,000intisthe of SocosandtheattemptedaggravatedmurderMaríaCárdenas; 11 ofthedefendants(sixthemSinchis)formurder32residents Tribunal of Ayacucho handeddownitsdecisiononJuly15,1986,sentencing When theoraltrialwasfinished,FirstMixedChamberofCorrectional years inprisonforthepoliceofficersinvolved. Gualberto AltamiranoGuevara,drewuptheformalaccusation,seeking25 the PublicMinistry, theSuperior instruction stagewascompleteandthefinalreportsissuedbyjudge opened acaseformanslaughterandattemptedhomicide.Oncethe On February8,1984,thejudgeofFirstCriminalCourtHuamanga with firearmsweremembersofthePCP-SL.” possibility thattheauthorsofcrimeterrorismandmultiplehomicide Court districtattorney of Ayacucho, broader standpoint, Peru’s strategy which madeallsubversive movementsessentiallypolitical.Viewedfromthis relevant partsofthecourse wasitsemphasisonideologyasabattleground, political warfare attheFuHsingKang naval attachéofthePeruvian EmbassyinBolivia,JuanVega Llona. those yearswasthearrestofsubversivesresponsible forthemurderof Rincón wasdetained.Anotherimportantbreak forDIRCOTEduring Hotel inHuancayo. A fewmonths later, on founder VíctorPolay Campos, Barrionuevo, thePCP-SL’s passports. Oneparticularlyimportantarrestwas thatofOsmánMorote at Lima’s airportastheyweretryingtoleavethecountry with Ecuadorian arrest, MRTA leadersHugo Avellaneda andPeter CárdenasSchultewere detained groups, especiallytheMRTA. InFebruary1988,severalmonthsafterGálvez’s time, itwas alsoreceivingtechnicalcooperationfromtheIsraeliEmbassy. security measuresforU.S.facilitiesanddelegationsvisitingthecountry. At the occasionally, theCentralIntelligence Agency (CIA),basicallytocoordinate personnel, includingthestaffofFederalBureauInvestigation(FBI)and, analysts. Bythattime,DIRCOTEhaddirectcontactwithU.S.diplomatic and analyzeit.DIRCOTErequestedassistancefromtheUnitedStatestotrain the amountofinformationgatheredsoonexceededgroup’s abilitytoprocess was possibletotakeabroaderviewofsubversion inthecountry. The increasein member oftheMRTA. arrest ofAlbertoGálvezOlaechea, efforts quicklyledtosignificantachievements,includingtheAugust17,1987 DIRCOTE agentssoughtresourcestouniteandmotivatetheirpersonnel.The was putoffuntilthenextadministration. was metwithasmuchdoubtandhesitationtheprecedingreorganization, Guard), withalltheirrightsandobligations.The functions ofthepoliceforces(CivilGuard,InvestigativePoliceandRepublican Perú Peru’s ConstitutionandcreatedtheNationalPolice ofPeru ( unfavorable conditionsunderwhichtheywerecombatingsubversion. the treatmenttheyreceivedfromtheircommanders,wereindicatorsof problems. Thepoliceofficers’wagedemands,alongwiththeircomplaintsabout lower-ranking policeofficersbecauseoftheforces’seriouseconomic on thecityofJuanjuí—andserioustensionsbetweengovernment still abusiveandauthoritarian,humanrightsviolationscontinued. treatment ofthecivilianpopulationinemergencyzones.Thepolicewere anti-subversive training.ThecreationofDOESalsofailedtoimprove thepolice’s , PNP).Thereafter, thisinstitutionwouldassumetheorganizationand In 1988,theheadofDIRCOTE, JavierPalacios,attendedacourseon During thoseyears,DIRCOTEdetainedtopleaders ofthesubversive By 1988,DIRCOTEhadnearly1,000members.Withastaffthatsize,it Amid thisscenarioofinstitutionalupheavalandeconomicshortfalls, On December6,1988,alawwaspassedthatmodifiedcertainarticlesof The nextyear, 1987,was markedbyaserioussetback—MRTA’s assault second-in-command. OnFebruary3,1989,MRTA Rolando, Rodrigo, for combating subversionwas School inTaipei, Taiwan. Oneofthemost was arrestedbychanceattheTourist ajournalistworkingfor April 16,1989,MRTA leaderMiguel merger itself,however, which Policía Nacionaldel very limited, Cambio anda 245 THE STATE SECURITY FORCES 246 PART ONE: THE TRAGEDY AND THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR IT battleground emerged. forces begantotaketheplaceofpoliceincoca-growingzones,andanew but failedtoprovideassistancethepolicestation.Afterattack,armed The MinistryoftheInteriorhadtimelyinformationaboutwhatwashappening, Uchiza stationrepeatedlycalledforbackup,buttheirrequestswentunheeded. so-called «people’s trial.»Facedwithamuchlargerenemyforce,officersatthe including threewhowereexecutedbythesubversivesafterbeingsubjectedtoa destruction ofthepolicestationandcapturemurder10officers, small cityinthemiddleofacoca-growingareaSanMartínresulted the crisis:PCP-SL’s attackonthepolicestationinUchiza.Thethis Terror spread,alongwiththesensethatgovernment hadlostcontrol. prisons andthepoliticalclass’lackofanappropriateresponsetoproblem. thetenserelationsbetweenwere thepoliceand deteriorate untilthatlawwasstruckdownin1989.Complicatingthematter cases. Therelationshipbetweenthepoliceforcesandprosecutorscontinuedto Public Ministryresponsibilityforconductingpre-trialinvestigationsinterrorism situation wasaggravatedbytheapprovalin1987ofLaw24700,whichgave presentation ofevidenceduringthepre-trialinvestigation.Analreadytense reprisals fromsubversiveorganizations. evidence. Inmanycases,however, thereleaseswere theresultofbribesorfear released ShiningPath andMRTA militantsaftertheirarrest,alleginglackof was heardbytheCVR. Military Studies( as theDIRCOTEchiefpointedoutinapresentationtoCenterforSuperior forces). Shining Path’s armedactionswas lefttotheotheroperationalgroups(the Delta apparatus todismantling its politicalapparatus.Thetaskofcounteractingthe combating thePCP-SL:a shift fromstrikingatthesubversive group’s military important supporters.The same wouldbetruelaterwithotherDIRCOTEgroups. the newgroup.TheU.S.government,through CIA,wasoneofitsmost In themonthsthatfollowed,arrangementsweremade toobtainresourcesfor DINCOTE, EdgarSucllaFlores,andBenedictoJiménez, theunit’s capableanalyst. formed toresolvediscrepanciesthathadarisen between thenewheadof independently ofthebureau’s day-to-day operations.Infact,thegroupwas Reinoso. would achievewhathadseemedimpossible:thearrest ofAbimaelGuzmán within DIRCOTEduringthefinalmonthsofAPRA administration.Thegroup The SpecialIntelligenceGroup( T HE GEIN’S This cycleclosedwithatragiceventthatalsodemonstratedthedepthof The judicialsystem’swas the mainprobleminrelationtopolicework Police constantlycomplainedaboutthejudicialsystem,whichtoooften The group’s representedaquantumleapintheapproach to objective Although thegroupwasformallypartofDIRCOTE, itbegantowork PROGRESS AND POLITICAL AND MILITARY CONTROL Centro deAltosEstudiosMilitares Grupo EspecialdeInteligencia ) in1989,arecordingofwhich military, problemsinthe , GEIN)wascreated agents. While CommanderMarcoMiyashiro ledthegroup,Major Jiménezwas had nocriminalrecordto justifysuchaction.ByJanuary1991,GEINhad20 warrants forthearrest,on terrorismcharges,ofpeoplewho,exceptinonecase, refusing tocarryoutanorder fromMontesinos,whowantedBREDETtoissue in 1991,whenhewenttoseek economicbackingfromtheU.S.StateDepartment. that grouptheSpecialBrigadeofDetectives( the searchfortopleadersofsubversivegroups. Palacioswouldbaptize to JavierPalaciosthataspecialgroupsimilarGEIN beestablishedtobeefup In thatpost,heprovidedgreatersupporttotheoperational groupsandproposed December 1990,PNPGeneralHéctorJhonCarowasnamed directorofDIRCOTE. gathered bythegroupledtonewoperationsfortracking PCP-SLleaders.In of theentireministrystructure,especiallytopposts. them controlovertheNationalPoliceofPeru.Military officersalsotookcharge of interiorministerwenttoaseriesArmygenerals, whichnaturallygave — anetworkthatwouldalsohavehandinmanagement ofthepolice.Thepost for anextensivecorruptionnetworkthatreachedthehighestlevelsofstate would cometolightmuchlater, as counterbalance. Thismove, paved theway given apositionofsupremacythattheprecedinggovernmenthadtriedto which wouldhaverevealedMontesinos’tieswithdrugtraffickers. investigation intothedrug-traffickingorganizationrunbyRodríguezLópez, Vladimiro Montesinos,Fujimori’s adviser, was interestedinstoppingthe purge ofthePNP. Itisnowknownthatthedecisionhadanothermotive: first measuresadoptedbythegovernmentofAlbertoFujimoriwasanextensive the formerinteriorministerand«RodrigoFrancoCommand,»oneof the APRAgovernment.Asaresult,andamidinvestigationsintotiesbetween was brewingovertheapparentlyincreasingpoliticalnatureofpoliceunder members ofthePCP-SLCentralCommittee. months later—in1991afterarduouswork,theGEINwasabletoidentify SL leaders.Itwaspainstakingworkthatrequiredagreatdealofpatience.Only gathered was usedtodeterminetheidentity, functionsandwhereaboutsofPCP- knowledge agentshadacquiredinthefightagainstsubversion.Theinformation groups, includingpseudonyms,telephonenumbersandaddresses. agents alsofoundalistofcontactinformationformembersthecentralPCP-SL from thecentralleadershiptopartycommitteesandothergroups.Inhouse, the centralapparatusinchargeoforganizingpartyeventsandrelayingorders Organizational SupportDepartment( earlier.days few Thehousewas t Monterrico neighborhoodwhereAbimaelGuzmánhadbeenlivinguntiljusta On June1,itscoreditsfirstvictorywhenagentssearchedahouseinLima’s an addressandatelephonenumber—thathadbeenonfilefornearlyfiveyears. Palacios wasremovedfrom hisDINCOTEpostthatsameyearafter Despite initialdifficulties,GEIN’s Under theFujimoriadministration,armedforceswereoncemore While progresswasbeingmadeonthatfront,aseriouscontroversy While theGEINsufferedfromlogisticallimitations,itsstrengthlayin GEIN beganitsintelligenceoperationsonMarch5,1990,usingdata— he baseofoperationsforthePCP-SL’s Departamento deApoyoOrganizativo Brigada EspecialdeDetectives work continued.Theinformation , BREDET) , DAO), 247 THE STATE SECURITY FORCES 248 PART ONE: THE TRAGEDY AND THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR IT from theNavy, theNationalIntelligenceService( services tookgreaterinterestinGEIN’swork. Inadditiontoinitialcooperation Congress. Committee. ItalsofounddetailedinformationaboutthePCP-SL’s FirstNational important PCP-SLmaterial,includingavideotapethatshowedtheentireCentral in chargeoftheoperationsdepartment.Inaraidshortlythereafter, GEINseized work plan,although withnewnames: DIVICOTE-1andDIVICOTE-2 (Anti- detention. Information obtainedthrough thesearrestswould lead to Abimael Guzmán’s arrests ofPCP-SL memberslinkedtotheCésarVallejo Preparatory Academy. as thesecondarrestofmany MRTA leaders.Ofparticularimportancewere the Committee andtheheadof theShiningPath’s propaganda tool, carried outthatledtothearrestofwhatwas was namedtoheadDINCOTE.Aftertherestructuring, newoperationswere apparently forpoliticalreasons.InDecember, PIP General Antonio KetínVidal head oftheunit,HéctorJhonCaro,was removed fromhispostunexpectedly, commander wasappointmentafterthenamechange. InNovember1991,the to obtainmoreresourcesandimproveitsperformance considerably. Anew Bureau ( unit withinthePNP anditsname the decade. institutional historyandidentitycontinuedtocarry heavyweightthroughout or drugtrafficking.Eachpoliceforcehadastrongidentity, however, andthat with specializedoperationalunitsforcombatingcertaincrimessuchasterrorism offices ofthePNP. Intheirplace,thegovernment createdacentralizedstructure the topofficesofdifferentbranches,whichhadbeenconsideredoperational issuing aneworganizationalchartthat,alongwithotherinnovations,eliminated the policeforcewastocompleteunificationofdifferentbranchesby of humanrightsviolations,crimesandcorruption. rivalry amongpoliceforcesthatweretheoreticallyunited,therenewcases been accompaniedbyother, lacked aclearstatesecuritypolicy. Thedecisiontodismisspoliceofficershad not subversive leaders,especiallyGuzmánReinoso. among theintelligenceservicesoverinformationthatwouldleadtoarrestof sharing theDIRCOTEfacilities.Therewasintensejealousyandfiercecompetition members ofthedeathsquadknownasColinaGroup. later, several oftheanalystsplacedinGEINbyMontesinoswere fingeredas support fortheintelligencework beingdonebyGEINandBREDET. Ayears few been collected.TheSINanalysts(whoweremilitary)wouldsupposedlyprovide DIRCOTE toallowagroupofSINanalystsexaminethedocumentsthathad SIN) providedfunding.Inexchangeforsupporthowever, Montesinosasked After thissignificantblowtothesubversiveorganization,intelligence Under thenew structure,GEINandBREDET continuedwiththeexisting Amid thesechanges,DIRCOTEwasraisedtothestatus ofoperations For severalyears,theonlysignificantchangegovernmentmadein A yearintotheFujimoriadministration,itwasclearthatgovernment From mid-1991on,tensionsgrewbetweenthepoliceandmilitaryofficers Dirección NacionalContraelTerrorismo morecomprehensive was changedtotheNational Anti-Terrorism , DINCOTE).ThisenabledDINCOTE Servicio NacionaldeInteligencia proposals. Besidestheongoing left ofthePeople’s Support El Diario, as well , SIN-led investigations andoperations. Thisversionofeventswas oneofthe the commander oftheJointChiefsStaff, GeneralNicolásHermoza Ríosand PCP-SL’s defeat to the ar «pacification» thatwasnot basedonfact.Therevisedversionattributedthe apparatus andgraduallyassumed avarietyofillegalfunctions. had beenasmall,bureaucratic bodyuntil1990,becamethegovernment’s political Decrees relatedtonationalpacificationreinforcedthe SIN.Theservice,which direction ofVladimiroMontesinos,becamethegovernment’s preferredagency. about toreachadecisiveconclusion. DINCOTE insteadofprovidingitwiththeexpected supportforworkthatwas themselves. TheFujimoriadministrationwenttothe extremeofdismantling decisive blowwithoutpriorconsultationandforhaving announcedthenews their intelligenceservices,whichcouldnotforgive the policeforinflicting At thesametime,however, theycausedill willamongthearmedforcesand other PCP-SL leaders—markedthesubversive organization’s strategicdefeat. surprised topgovernmentofficials,whowereunawareoftheoperation. transferred manypolicefunctionstothe Army. Giventhisshift,Guzmán’s arrest Staff, andtheanti-subversiondecreesissuedattimeof1992coup President FujimorihadgivenabsolutecontroloftheconflicttoJointChiefs and hadoptedforananti-subversivepolicybasedonamilitarysolution. bethearmedforces—or,would power moreprecisely, themilitarytopbrass— be seeninthenextchapter, thegovernment haddecidedthatitsmainbaseof ran countertothepathchosenbygovernmentofAlbertoFujimori.Aswill that werepartoftheunitthroughoutitslonghistory. successive decisionsbytheheadsofvariousoperationalandspecialgroups DIRCOTE policeagents’performance(andlaterthatofDINCOTE)wasthefruit also theresultofdedicatedworkcarriedoutexclusivelybypolice.The on theprogressbeingmade. to betakenweredefinedoncetheinvestigationsunderwayanddepended process ratherthansimplycarryingoutapreviouslydesignedplan.Thesteps (DICOTE, in1981),itsagentshadengagedagradual,cumulativelearning particular, itmustbenotedthatsincethebureau’s establishmentasadivision success layalongprocessofpoliceworkandlearning.InDINCOTE’s casein prisoners tothepoliceunit’s facilities. concluded, DINCOTEdirectorVidalpersonallyescortedGuzmánandtheother PCP-SL CentralCommittee,werearrested.Withtheoperationsuccessfully Revoredo, LauraZambranoPadillaandMaríaPantojaSánchez,leadersofthe neighborhood ofSurquillo,whereAbimaelGuzmánReinoso,ElenaIparraguirre Carlos Verau Asmat, whichendedwiththeraidonahouseinLima Terrorism IntelligenceDivisions),respectively. In addition,theadministration craftedanofficialversionof In thenewauthoritarianclimate,SIN,under realbutunofficial The arrestsinSeptember1992—notonlyofGuzmán, butalsoofmany Based onitsinvestigations,theCVRbelievesthattheseaccomplishments The arrestsmadebyDINCOTE’s various specialintelligencegroupswere The CVRbelievesitiscrucialtohighlightthatbehindthisresounding On September12,DIVICOTE-1beganthefinalphaseofOperationCaptain med forces,particularlydecisions supposedlymadeby 249 THE STATE SECURITY FORCES 250 PART ONE: THE TRAGEDY AND THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR IT prisoners. Torture by and provingacrimebeforedetaining—themistreatment andtortureof detentions —thepracticeofdetainingtoinvestigate insteadofinvestigating linked totraditionalpoliceactivityinPeru:unlawful andindiscriminate important todifferentiatebetweentwotypesofpatternsorbehaviors. place anddateofhumanrightsviolationsperpetratedbythepolice,itisvitally within thepoliceasaninstitution.Inacloseranalysisoftype,frequency, subversion reinforcedtherepressive,authoritarianpracticesthatalreadyexisted percent) andthearmedforces(28.73percent).Ingeneral,fightagainst the yearsofviolence.ThatputstheminthirdplacebehindPCP-SL(53.68 responsible for6.6percentofthedeathsanddisappearancesPeruviansduring to bearrested,indictedandoftenconvicted. exaggerated accusations.Asingleaccusationwasenoughfortheaccusedperson repentance systemturnedmanypeopleintovictimsoffalse,inexactor ensuring thecredibilityofinformationgatheredinexchangeforbenefits, Laxly enforced,withoutprecautionsthatshouldhavebeenindispensablefor deplorable manifestationofthiswastheway«repentancelaw»functioned. action bythepolicewhilesidesteppingrulesorlimits.Oneparticularly the governmentbeginningin1992expandedpossibilitiesfordiscretionary established bythecoupofApril5,1992.Theanti-terrorismdecreesissued committed undertheprotectionofferedbylegalandinstitutionalregime CVR alsobelievesthatitisnecessarytoexaminethehumanrightsviolations While acknowledgingthemeritsofpoliceforce’swork duringthe1990s, H faction ledbyÓscarRamírezDurand, the group—droppedoff.In1996,however banners thatPresidentFujimoriwavedduringhisre-electioncampaignin1995. empirical evidenceshows thattheforceddisappearancesandarbitrary police didnotcommithuman rightsviolationsindependently;nevertheless, in theemergencyzoneechoes thatofthearmedforces.Thatdoesnotmean the lackofofficialcontrolsandsanctions. amid generalizedviolencethatmadethemseempermissible, especiallygiven Without clearstrategiesorplans,thepolicefrequently resortedtothesemethods throughout almosttheentirecountry. Thesamewas trueofunlawfuldetention. execution orforceddisappearance,torturewas practicedbythepolice Unlike other, morefocusedtypesofhumanrightsviolations, suchasextrajudicial the group. GEIN’s efficiencyandunderscoretheerrorthathadbeenmadeindisbanding UMAN RIGHTSVIOLATIONS First, therearecertainviolationsoffundamentalrightsthatclosely According totestimoniesreceivedbytheCVR,policeforceswere Over theyears, interestinDINCOTE—and,consequently, fundingfor Second, itmustbenotedthat thepatternofviolationsbypolicepersonnel the policewas asystematic, Feliciano , awave ofattacksbythePCP-SL , wouldbringbackmemoriesof generalized, extensiv e practice. TABLE 1 responded togeneralpoliciesandstrategiesofthearmedforces. by membersofthearmedforcesagainstpopulationduringconflict attempted todeterminetheextentwhichhumanrightsviolationscommitted justly defenditselfagainstunjustinsurrections.Withthatinmind,theCVRhas to defenditselfwiththeforceofarms,becausealegitimategovernmentcan enemy thathadarisenamongitsownpeople,thedemocraticstateright determination andPeruvians’fundamentalrights.Althoughitfacedaninternal shortly thereafterbytheMRTA, wereattacksagainstpeace,democraticself- opportunity todestroythestate. the returntodemocracy, andthePCP-SL plannedtotakeadvantage ofthe were notdesignedtohelpresolvetheproblem.Thatgapbecameevidentwith of context. the At at thetimeadheredtorigidprinciplesandwereabstract,disconnectedout strategy. T In 1980,therewasnoclearconnectionbetweennationalpolicyandmilitary T state officialsgrantedtotheperpetrators. cover-ups andotherguaranteesofimpunitythatpolicecommanders way ofexercisingpowerandabusingvictims.Thispracticewasaggravatedby to obtaininformationorself-incrimination,andweregenerallyanignominious in policestationsandprisons.Theyweresometimesusedasmethodsoftorture occurred duringpoliceraidsincommunitiestheemergencyzones,aswell sexual violenceagainstwomen,especiallyrape.TheCVRfoundthatthesecrimes such as Ayacucho, Apurímac, were underastateofemergencyandthecontrolpolitical-militarycommand, executions attributedtothepolicewereconcentratedindepartmentsthat HE A RMED The «people’swar» declaredbythePCP-SL,aswell astheonelaunched Finally, it is he ideasaboutsecurityheldbypoliticiansandincipientcivilsociety F ORCES same time,themilitary’s doctrinesandprofessionalabilities also importanttonotepoliceresponsibilityinthecrimeof Huancavelica andJunín. 251 THE STATE SECURITY FORCES 252 PART ONE: THE TRAGEDY AND THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR IT campaign from1983-1985, includinglocaldevelopmentand«civicaction» government’s strategicpriorities, theamountsearmarkedforanti-subversive Ecuador. In back ontheargumentof«supplementary spending»becauseoftheconflictwith keep militaryspendingequivalent to26percentofthenationalbudget,falling two fronts—guidedofficialstatepolicy. Themilitaryministers managedto against EcuadororChile—or, intheworst case,againstbothatonce,awar on its regionalandglobalgeopoliticalimportance.The hypotheticalcaseofawar spent excessivelyonweaponsandmilitaryinstallations inanefforttoincrease subversion. Inthepreviousdecade,undermilitary dictatorship,Peruhad defense budgetrequestedbythelegislatureandfunds earmarkedforfighting forces aboutthetruenatureofproblemwasdisparity betweentheforeign not abidebythatlogic. Argentine MontonerosinLimahadbeenmanaged. ThePCP-SL,however, did subversive violencebrokeout,itwouldbedealtwith thewayproblemsof the ideathatPeru’s Marxistleftwouldbekeptinlinebyelections,andif in June1980,shortlybeforeBelaundetookoffice. secret lawsfortheNationalDefenseSystemissuedbymilitarygovernment government. Theclearestsignsofthispartialtransferpowerwerethedetailed the Belaundeadministrationweresimplycarriedoverfromoutgoing remained inthesamehands.Thustopmilitarycommandersatstartof branches ofthearmedforces.Responsibility—andauthorityforsecurity the militarycommandersunderhisregimesremainedasheadsofdifferent remembered thatMoralesBermúdeznegotiatedwithBelaundetoensure important marginofdecision-makingoverdefensepolicy. Itmustalsobe the transitiontoaciviliangovernment,militarywascarefulmaintainan was doneaccordingtothetextbooksandexperienceof1960s.Aspart formation ofananti-subversiveunitwithineachinfantrydivision,andthis activity thatrespondedtothehypotheticalthreatofsubversionwas understandable giventheideologicalconvictionsoftime.Theonlymilitary in thatdirection. easy todetermineifoneofthem,orwhichone,hadstartedtakingconcretesteps many politicalgroupstalkedaboutthepossibilityofarmedstruggle.Itwasnot campaign was beinglaunchedagainstadomestic knew thattheprocesswouldbemoredifficultifitoccurredwhileamilitary considered thetransferofpowertoaciviliangovernmentmoreimportant,and recognize theseriousnessofthreatposedbyPCP-SL.Inanycase,it Francisco MoralesBermúdez.Itisclearthatthemilitarygovernmentdidnot Revolutionary GovernmentoftheArmedForces,whichwasledbyGeneral countryside tothecity»precededtransferofpowerbyso-called The firsttwo monthsofthePCP-SL’s «prolongedpeople’swar fromthe T HE UNACKNOWLEDGEDINTERNAL ARMED CON Proof oftheignorancebothBelaundegovernment andthearmed The PeruvianArmedForcesreturnedthegovernmenttocivilianswith The circumspectionwithwhichthematterwashandledis comparison withtheseexpenses, whichsimplyratifiedthemilitary FLICT AND INAPPROPRIATESTRATEGYFLICT AND enemy. Besides,inthe1970s System ( with theinternalconflictandnoclearrelationshipexternaldefenseneeds. to theacquisitionofasquadronMiragefighterjets,whichhadnothingdo soon bereconsidered,themassiveincreaseinmilitaryspending1985wasdue projects, wasminute.Whilethisdisparitybetweenspendingandthreatwould reason Iam opposed, aslongitis not strictlynecessary, toinvolvingthe 60 weremembers.[...]Ibelieve thatwouldbetheworstalternative,andfor Shining Pathmembers that theycouldbecertain of success.Theykill60peopleandmaybethereare 3 start killingPCP-SLmembers andnon-members armed forcestookcontrol ofinternalorderin Ayacucho, «theywould have to minister ofwar, GeneralLuisCisnerosVizquerra, whotoldthepressthatif voice speakingoutagainstinvolvementofthearmed forceswasthatofthe of guarantees,butstoppedshortsendinginthe armed forces.Theclearest of emergencyaftertheattackonTambo policestationincludedthesuspension should beconsideredtraitorstothecountry. the country’s richesanddisturbthepeacewithactsofterrorismsabotage president himselfstatedthathebelievedanyone whoattemptedtodestroy and somevoiceswerealreadyproposingtheuse ofthearmedforces.The 1981, however, thegovernment categorizedthePCP-SL’s actionsasterrorism the InvestigativePolicehadmadesomesignificant arrests.Startinginearly He advocatedusingpoliceforces,sincetheCivilGuardand,toagreaterextent, Jara believedthatterrorismcouldbecontrolledwithoutsuspendingguarantees. constitutional guaranteesasawayofdealingwithstrikesbylaborunions.Dela two years,themilitarygovernmenthadrepeatedlyusedsuspensionof plan todeclareastateofemergencyintheaffectedareas.Duringpreceding government. OnDecember23,InteriorMinisterJoséMaríadelaJaraopposeda even then—sparkeddebatewithintherecentlyinaugurateddemocratic serious lackofunderstandinginthegovernmentandCongress. conceptswithimplicationsforov subversive Congress tookonthetask.Whenmilitarybegantodevelopbroaderanti- defense policyalone,andneitherthepoliticiansinministriesnorthose armed forces,becausethemilitarycontinuedtoconsideritselfcapableofdefining subversive policydrawnupjointlybytheexecutivebranch,legislatureand of military’s constitutionalrankblocked directives issuedbythegovernmentandCabinetministers.Thisstrengthening only partofnationalpowerarisesfromdemocraticvoteandflowsthrough «guardian» roletotherankofsupremelawstate.Underthisdoctrine, more modernroleforthearmedforces,1979Constitutionraisedtheir «guarantee» securityandnationaldefense.Insteadoftakingasteptoward Constitution, whichgavethearmedforcesconstitutionalmandateto requiring thatitbejustifiedonlytothepresident.Thiswasreflectedin1979 segmented thestate,givingmilitaryresponsibilityfordefensepolicyand Another legacyofthemilitarygovernmentwasNationalDefense The president’s decisiontoputfive provincesin Ayacucho undera state By late1980,thePCP-SL Sistema deDefensaNacional

among them[...]andthepolice willcertainlysaythatall ’s manyattacks—mostofthembrutalbombings, , SDN)anditslaws.TheSDNessentially possibilitiesforacomprehensive anti- erall statepolicy , because thatistheonlyway , itencountereda 253 THE STATE SECURITY FORCES 254 PART ONE: THE TRAGEDY AND THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR IT to themilitary’s role.Creating conditionsforimposing thelawandensuring commanded themto«assume controlofinternalorder»weredisproportionate The responsibilitiesassigned tothearmedforcesbypresident,who SL, theorganizationthatwas bentondestroyinganysignsofsuchawareness. to astatethatguaranteedthose rights.To dothis,they hadtoeliminatethePCP- possible toraisetheawareness ofcitizensthattheyhadbasicrightsandbelonged it hadnotpreviouslyexisted.Inotherwords,thearmed forcesweretomakeit more difficult:tocreateconditionsfortheestablishment oftherulelawwhere difficulties inherentinthetask.Themilitary’s realmissionwas farstranger and emergency zonewasmadewithoutclarityoradetailed examinationofthe moving thewartoanewstage. success againstthePCP-SL.Instead,theyfedinto ShiningPath’s planfor to dealwithaseriousupheaval,norexistingmilitary capacityguaranteed in theemergencyzone,providedforConstitution asanappropriateway sectors ofthePeruviangovernment.Neithermilitary controloverinternalorder Belaunde’s governmentcom action intheemergencyzone. their arms.OnDecember31,about2,000membersoftheArmyweresentinto 27, heissuedanultimatumtotheterrorists,demandingthattheylaydown he wassaying.Bythen,Belaundehadalreadymadeuphismind.OnDecember attributing hiswordstoill-willinsteadofconsideringtheseriousnesswhat the nationaltragedy. ManypeopleconfusedCisneros’ direwarnings withthreats, in 1968.Theresultwasgeneralconfusionamongthepublic,whichpartof of the1960sandmilitarycoupthathadoverthrownhisfirstadministration there wasadirectrelationshipbetweenmilitaryinterventionagainstguerrillas The presidentresistedapprovingamilitarycampaignbecause,inhisexperience, appeared difficulttoavoid,andbytheprogresssubversivesweremaking. political implicationsofsendingthearmedforcesintoemergencyzone,which members ofhisadministrationbecameseriouslyconcernedaboutboththe the policeforcesandtogover from Lima.ThejailbreakbytheShiningPathprisonersdealtaheavyblowto did notleavetheLosCabitosmilitarybase,becausetheyhadreceivednoorders police ingunbattles,whileothersoverpoweredtheprisonguards.Armysoldiers Huamanga prison.Someoftheattackersscatteredthroughoutcity, engaging indeed enteredamilitaryphase.Oneexampleofthiswastheraidon people. conv military controlofthezoneandstampingoutallresistancebyforce,justasina problem. Thearmedforces,however,we by theattacks,wasdemandingpromptuseofforcearmstoeliminate stemmed fromveryrealcircumstances.Onesegmentofpublicopinion,outraged armed forcesinthisfight».(González,1983a:50).Thedrastictoneofhiswarning entional war,entional whichw The decisiontoputthearmedforcesinchargeofinternal orderinthe The events of1982showhowthePCP-SL’s terroriststrategytook As thePCP-SL’s attacksbecamemoreviolent,Belaundeandcertain The PCP-SL,meanwhile,createdtheimpressionthatconflicthad ould have resultedinthedeathsofmanyinnocent pletely bysurpriseandexposedthetensionsamong nment’s policyingeneral. re unpreparedforanythingbuttaking term strategicframework. from governmentdirective02SDN/81.The lackedanoverall,long- unprecedented inLatinAmerica.TheArmydeduced thenatureofitsmission that itaccumulatedpoliticalandmilitarypowerthrough astrategythatwas support orguidance,thatitdidnotestablishcamps ormaintaincolumns,and forces northegovernmentrealizedthatPCP-SL did notdependonforeign about thePCP-SL’s organization and itsway of operating.Neitherthearmed In theearlyyearsofconflict,armedforceslacked adequateintelligence 1, whichhadbeenused17yearsearlierinthe1965 anti-guerrilla campaign. support. Operationswereplannedandcarriedoutaccording toManualNE-41- international communistmovementand,therefore, dependentonexternal earlier movements.TheShiningPathwasportrayed aspartofthelarger strategy anditsmilitarypoliticalorganizationasaguerrillaforcesimilarto the NationalDefenseCouncilaplanbasedon in Ayacucho asanimportantstepinitslargelypremeditatedplan. reluctant togetinvolved.OnlytheShini he givetheorder, andeven Belaunde didnotwant togowar. Onlywhenitwas absolutelynecessarydid complex objectiveand battle. involving civilianauthoritiesinleadershipofthepoliticalcomponentthis that subversion shouldbeconfrontedwithapurelymilitarystrategy, without state-related orotherwise.Evenbeforetheactionsbegan,therewasanattitude of publicofficialsand,ingeneral,anyoneinvolveddevelopment,whether development action;andsecond,thePC reasons: first,Belaunde’s newpoliticalteamwas notinclinedtoleadthatsortof strength tospreadthroughouttherestofcountry. Thatdidnotoccurfortwo been abletoreducetheviolenceandisolatePCP-SLbeforeitcouldgain military forceandeffortsatsocialdevelopmentpublicserviceswouldhave functions meantadivisionoflaborwithcivilians.Onlyboldcombination necessary toeffectivelyre-estab of thestate,itwasimplicitthatstatewouldassumenon-militarytasks was understoodbyBelaundeinthenarrowsenseofmilitarilyengagingenemies and regulatorydevelopment. organize comprehensiveaction,includingeconomic,educational,institutional broader taskexclusivelytothearmedforcesassumesthattheymustdirectand by thestate,notjustconquestofterritoryforcearms.Leavingthis operational characterofthepoliceandjudiciaryinvolvescomprehensiveaction 2 a purely police or military problem, rather than a political war” (MinistryofDefense,2000). a purelypoliceormilitaryproblem, ratherthanapoliticalwar” “Some erroneousdecisionswere madeintheearlyyearsbecausesubversionwasconsidered The strategyadoptedbythe armedforcesassumedthatthepopulation At thepresident’s request,thearmedforcesdrewupandpresentedto The resultwasamilitaryanti-subversivecampaignwithanextremely Because puttingthearmedforcesinchar minimal supportfromtherestofstateandsociety. then itwas hedged.Thearmedforceswerealso lish ruleofla P-SL’s strategyincludedtheassassination ng Path sawthe ge ofinternal w. Thislimitation onmilitary an evaluation ofthePCP-SL’s military order in ’s participation 2 Ayacucho 255 THE STATE SECURITY FORCES 256 PART ONE: THE TRAGEDY AND THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR IT including someontheuniversitycampus. workers andteachers.In1989,thePCP-SLcarriedoutfirst«executions,» officials andaccesstoteachingposts,essentiallyliquidatingunionsof university,the «monitoring»the electionofstudentleadersanduniversity confrontations, thePCP-SLheldadministrativeandacademiccontrolover of theuniversity. subversive groups,particularlythePCP-SL,whichvirtuallygainedcontrol security forces.Thefirsthumanrightsviolationswerecommittedbythe battle betw The NationalUniversityoftheCenterPeruwassceneafierce Tumialán Pinto,provincialdistrictattorney the Attorney General’s Officedecidedtoinvestigate, appointingImelda students, professorsandemployees oftheuniversityincityHuancayo, military personnel)aboutdisappearances andextrajudicialexecutionsof 1992 and1993. Military DetachmentoftheNationalUniversityCenter ofPerubetween 9 deDiciembremilitarybase,theCSCarhuamayo baseandthe did notprovideitwithinformationaboutArmypersonnel whoservedatthe into theidentityofthosedirectlyresponsiblebecause Ministry ofDefense implemented them.TheCVRwasunabletodomorein-depth investigation which werepasseddownthemilitarychainofcommandto thosewhoactually have issuedthepoliciesororderstocarryoutsystematic militaryactions, have carriedouttheextrajudicialexecutionsanddisappearances, hemay Although thetoppolitical-militarycommanderofzone maynotpersonally professors andemployeesoftheNationalUniversity the CenterofPeru. Group’s the numberofmilitaryinterventions.ThereareindicationsColina Fujimori, thegovernmentdecidedtoexerciseevenstrictercontrol,increasing reached itsheightin1992. executions andforceddisappearances,whichbegantointensifyin1990 through apolitical-militarycommand,implementedpolicyofdetentions, members ofthesecurityforces,whichhadpoliticalcontroloverarea confrontations between theMRTA andthePCP-SL. on campus.Someofthebloodiestepisodesthiseraweredueto some studentswererecruitedforits«urbanmilitias»orthearmedcolumns schools, suchasEducation, The MRTA During the1980s,firstthroughsilentlaborandlaterdeadly In October1992,becauseofconstantcomplaints(mostly against In June1991,afteravisittotheuniversitybyPresidentAlberto Because oftheincreasesubversive actionattheuniversity, participation inexecutionsanddisappearancesofstudents, een subversive groups—thePCP-SL N ATIONAL had alesserandbrieferpresence,particularlyincertain T U HE DISAPPEARANCEOFSTUDENTSFROMTHE NIVERSITY OF THE Agronomy, C ENTER OF Economics andSocial of theSpecial P ERU and the MRTAthe and —andstate

(1990-1992) District Work, where Attorney’s authority createdbythePCP-SL’s incur were uselessordirected againstthelocalpopulation.Thevacuumof into communitiesandthen beatanimbleretreatsothatthemilitary’s efforts incursions intocommunities orpursueShiningPathcolumns.ThePCP-SLburst subversive actionsatanygiventime. minimum of90,000troops,thatmeansonly3percent participatedinanti- police. Ifthetotalsizeofmilitaryduringthose yearsisestimatedata personnel stationedintheemergencyzonetotaled about 2,000troops,besides timeduringthisperiod.Countingthe given any Army andNavy, combat force of2,000,onlyone-eighthwhomwerestationed intheemergencyzoneat Naval the Ancón were relievedeverytwomonths,andtheytrained andtookrestperiodsat infantry, equivalent to twoco patrols didnotbecomewidespreaduntil1984.About 250membersoftheNavy base. Thistransformationcameaboutastheresultof combatexperience;small and squadronsformcombatpatrols,whichalsotookturnsservingatthe the stateonlyexistediftherewas amilitarybasenearby. presence andmorepatrols.Inplaceswherethesubversivewasgreatest, sudden, scatteredappearancesbythesubversiveswasagreatermilitary police stationsandoccasionallyharassingmilitarypatrols.Theresponsetothese in battle,butlimitedthemselvestoenteringdefenselesscommunities,attacking firepower atcertainpoints,becausethesubversivesdidnotengagemilitary bases. Itsoonbecameclearthatitwasnotamatterofdevelopinggreater hacienda inSanFrancisco.Themaintacticinvolvedpatrolsdispatchedfromthe points fromwhichitwaspossibletocontrolthevalleys,suchasLuisiana Francisco. extended fromHuantatothe Apurímac v notable measurewasdispatchingtwoNavyinfantrycompaniestoanareathat activity, thedecisionwas madetoreinforcethemilitary presence.Themost After thefirstfieldinspectionsandapreliminaryassessmentofsubversive reorganized andexpandedtoincludetheprovinceofAndahuaylas(Apurímac). which includedfiveprovincesof Ayacucho and the commandofGeneralClementeNoelMoral,nationalsecuritysub-zoneE, the governmentorderedarmedforcesintofightagainstsubversion.Under territorial control.ThemilitaryoperationsbeganonDecember30,1982,when and attemptingtodestroyarmedelementsorenemyforces. military responseconsistedoftakingcontrolcommunitiesandruralareas the entirecommunity. Thatexplainsthehighnumberofinnocentvictims.The using itsbaseofsupportinonesegmenttoprovokeamilitaryresponseagainst the Peruvian government.Infact,thePCP-SL dividedupeachruralcommunity, was dividedintocommunitiesthatbackedthesubversivesandthoseloyalto The ArmyandNavypatrols leftthemilitarybasestomakeviolent The Navyinfantrywasforcedtoabandonitsusualsystemofplatoons Anti-subversive baseswereestablishedinallprovincialcapitalsandat The missionoftheanti-subversivecampaignwasdefinedasrecovery Base. Overall, thePeruvian Navy’s infantryatthetimehada mpanies, operatedintheemergencyzone.They sions was notsolvedbythemilitary’s alley, in all ofHuancavelica, was the jungleregionofSan 257 THE STATE SECURITY FORCES 258 PART ONE: THE TRAGEDY AND THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR IT responsible forthosecrimes. Office, thataformalcriminalcomplaintbefiledagainstthoseallegedly CVR recommendedtothePublicMinistry, throughthe Attorney General’s disappearance. Forthatreason,withintheframeworkofitsmandate, implies thecommissionofcrimesmanslaughter,abductionandforced have beenfullyidentified. torture, extrajudicialexecutionordisappearanceofatleast74peoplewho the securityforcescarriedoutapolicyinvolvingarbitrarydetention, 43 peopleinitsattempttocontroltheuniversity. Inresponse,membersof practice. students attheNationalUniversityofCenterPeruwasageneralized Tumialán Pintostatedthattheextrajudicialexecutionanddisappearanceof Investigative Committeethathadbeenestablishedforthecase,Imelda American CommissiononHumanRights(IACHR). those disappearedorexecutedbymilitarypersonnelturnedtotheInter- it was impossibletogetjusticeinthecountry’s courts,somerelatives of open criminalproceedingsagainstmembersofthesecurityforces.Because executions, onlyintwocasesdidtheFirstCourtofInstructionHuancayo acts. against membersofthesecurityforceswhopresumablycommittedthese investigation. Nevertheless,nocriminalcasesareknowntohaveresulted appointed EnriqueMirandaPalmaasspecialprosecutorformorein-depth Junín, asinvestigator. In April 1993, Attorney GeneralBlancaNélidaColán Office oftheHumanRightsOmbudsman’s Under domesticlaw, theconductattributedtomembersof The CVR’s inv Years later, onOctober3,2001,atthe11thsessionofCongressional Despite theconstantforceddisappearancesandextrajudicial estigation concludedthatthePCP-SL murderedatleast Office intheJudicialDistrictof Army the flaginplaza. observations aboutthevillagers’ behavior, suchaswhoattendedtheraisingof «intelligence» blacklisttoidentifyallegedterrorists. surround avillage,forcealltheresidentsoutoftheirhomesandusean out inthesametheaterasmilitaryoperations.Acommonpracticewasto defenseless communities,andinterrogationstoobtainintelligencewerecarried subversives orPCP-SL«fortresses.» In onlyafewexceptionalcasesweretheredirectengagementswitharmed achieved withoutfindingtheenemy, whichwas hiddenamongthelocalpeople. It soonbecameclearthatthegoalofre-establishinginternalordercouldnotbe result, themilitarypatrolsfrequentlyengagedinindiscriminateviolence. actions. Therewasalackofintelligenceworkandbroadmarginforerror;as 5 4 3 forces. Themilitarytroopsalsoshared fingering localShiningPathsympathizersandagreeingtosidewiththearmed provisions theyhad,describingthesubversiveincursionandsometimes case, thecommunitymemberswelcomedpatrolandsharedwithitfew PCP-SL reactedindifferentwayswhenamilitarypatrolarrived.Inthebest state presenceformanyyears.Thecommunitiesthathadbeenvisitedbythe It wasnotunusualforapatroltofinditselfinplacewheretherehadbeenno called bythemilitarypatrolwasconsideredsuspect. the combatants,butalsothose whoshouldhaveprovidedpolitical,economic committed. Thepeopleresponsibleforthoseerrors and excesseswerenotonly effects ofthewarexplain—butdonotexcuse theerrorsandexcesses progress madebythePCP-SLin1983.Physicalexhaustion andthepsychological amid theneutralityofterrifiedmajoritypopulation. Thatexplainsthe in everycommunitythatwasgraduallyabletogainpolitical andmilitarypower SL focusedoncreatingdivisions,ensuringthatthere wasaShiningPathsector entire populationforthePeruvianstateandarepudiation ofterrorism,thePCP- While thearmedforcespursueddifficultgoalof gainingthesupportof brutally accomplisheda«coun Shining Pathmilitants.ButthePCP-SLattackedagain inmanyplacesuntilit when peoplewereabletoovercomethedivisionand fearthatprotectedlocal authorities andregainingmilitarycontrolwiththehelpoflocalpopulation, There wereplaceswherethearmedforcessucceededin«re-establishing»local patrol, holdinga«people’s trial»infrontoftheentirecommunity. abused, mutilatedorexecutedanyonewhohadcollaboratedwiththemilitary harshest treatment.Withhelpfromlocalinformants,thesubversivespublicly followed. Communitiesthathadbeenvisitedbythearmedforcesreceived when thepatrolleft,villagewasleftdefenseless.RetaliationfromPCP-SL first yearoftheconflict,theyusuallydetainedsuspects.Inafternoon, They sometimesalsoidentifiedoneormorepeopleassubversives.Duringthe CVR. InterviewwithretiredGeneral AdriánHuamánCenteno. CVR. InterviewwithretiredGeneral LuisPérezDocumet. CVR. InterviewwithretiredGeneral RobertoNoelMoral,March10,2003. 5 Often,anyonewhodidnotattendcommunityassemblies ter-reestablishment» ofits«people’ ter-reestablishment» 3 Moreoften,weaponswereturnedagainst their foodand, 4 Initialcriteriaincluded especially, s committees.» medicines. 259 THE STATE SECURITY FORCES 260 PART ONE: THE TRAGEDY AND THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR IT died ofexhaustion,whileothers werekilledwhen,inthetorturers’judgment, many ofthepeoplewhowere detainedcouldnotwithstandthetortureand to adetentioncenterorother placesoheorshewouldnotbefound. relatives andthe In thecaseofdisappearances,perpetratorsdenied detentionbefore relationship withthesubversivegroups. Generally, peoplewere freedwhen and theyweretoldthatwouldbefollowedput undersurveillance. First theywerethreatenedsowouldnotreportwhat hadhappened, Some were provide information. their backs,weresubjectedtovarioustypesoftorture toforcethem were blindfolded,oftenforcedtostripand,withtheir handstiedbehind the «PinkHouse»orinLosCabitosmilitarybase. The detainees,who Torture generallyoccurredwhen thedetaineeswere interrogated, eitherin served as and occasionallyatabuildingknownasthe«PinkHouse,»whichmayhave who hadbeenirregularlydetainedwereheldatMilitaryBase51,LosCabitos, detentions. Accordingtosomeofficerswhoservedatthetime,people the PublicMinistryoranyauthorizationthatwouldhavemadetheseordinary The captorsactedwithoutjudicialwarrantsandtheparticipationof detention: searches,neighborhoodsweepsandselectivedetention. and laterdeniedhavingdetainedanyone.Threemethodswereusedfor In thecaseofarbitrarydetentions,agentsdidnotidentifythemselves liberation, extrajudicialexecutionanddisappearance. arbitrary detention,takingthedetaineetoamilitaryfacility, torture,selective of policeandmilitarybehaviorcharacterizedbythefollowingstages: Huamanga between1983and1984.Inallofthesecases,therewasapattern abducted, torturedormurderedbysecurityforcesintheprovinceof control ofthearea.TheCVRhasverified138casespeoplewhowere Complaints ofhumanrightsviolationsincreasedassoontheArmytook their command,wasMilitaryBase51,LosCabitos,inHuamanga. The centerofoperationsforthoseofficers,aswellthebattalionunder General AdriánHuamánCentenoandArmyColonelWilfredoMoriOrzo. Between 1983and1985,thepolitical-militarychiefswereNoelMoral,Army the provincesofHuamanga,Huanta,LaMar,CangalloandVíctorFajardo. ral wasnamedPolitical-Militarychiefoftheemergencyzone,whichincluded in thefightagainstsubversion.ArmyGeneralRobertoClementeNoelMo- on December31,1982,thegovernmentdecidedtoinvolvearmedforces Because oftheincreaseinPCP-SL’s D ISAPPEARANCES, TOR In thecaseofextrajudicial executions, itisimportanttonotethat In somecases,detaineeswereselectivelyfreedwithno explanation. the intelligenceunit’s dropped offinastreet,whileothersw Public Ministry.moved Incertaincases,thedetaineewas TURE AND EXTRAJUDICIAL (1983-1985) center ofoperations. activity inthedepartment investigation found thattheyhadno EXECUTIONS ATTHE ere turnedover tothePIP. L OS C ABITOS MILITARYBASE of Ayacucho, activities thelefttookan ambiguous stanceonthearmedstruggle,giving Congress distanceditselffrom thePCP-SLtoacertainextent,inmanypolitical PCP-SL as a presence intheemergency zone.Opponentsontheleftsawwaragainst defense witheconomic,administrative andpoliticalefforts toincreasethestate’s of politicalunityinthecountry wasthemajorobstacletocomplementinginternal such abuses,theoppositiongavemattergreaterpolitical attention.Thislack violations w the cost,withnosubstantivechangesinitspolitical agenda oreconomicplans. was officiallyclosedandthegovernmentoptedfora rapidvictoryregardlessof of Uchuraccaywhomistookthemfor news blackoutbegan,eightjournalistswerekilledby members ofthecommunity of control,whilePeruvianofficialsdiscreditedthem. Just afewmonthsafterthis of thepublic,bothathomeandabroad,asindicators ofasituationthatwasout interviews. Thefewreportsthatfilteredoutwerelater takenbycertainsectors from enteringthearea,reservingrighttoauthorizenewsreportsor prohibited theRedCross,humanitarianorganizationsandpressingeneral command oftheemergencyzone,aspartitsstrategytoisolate house» inthatcity. included apigfarmneartheLosCabitosArmybaseinHuamangaand«pink where peopleweredisappearedandtortured.Otherinterrogationcenters base inthatprovince,whichtemporarilyhousedaclandestinedetentioncenter One notoriouscasewasthatofthestadiuminHuanta,mainNavyinfantry but alsotoclandestinedetentionsandtorturecentersonsomemilitarybases. about thePCP-SLandcontrollingruralareaslednotonlytoseriousexcesses, enormous imbalanceinthecountryside.Thedifficultyobtainingintelligence on thosewoundedorcapturedsubversivematerialconfiscated,reflectan subversives killed,whichwasinthethousands,aswelllackofstatistics comparison withtheenormousnumberofciviliancasualtiesandalleged proportions consideringtheregion’s population.Thearmedforces’ lossesin violation committedinconfrontingthePCP-SL’s strategyreachedcatastrophic registered asmallernumberoflossesthaninlaterperiods. decreased notablyaround1985.Thearmedforcesandpolice,meanwhile, loss ofmembersandsympathizers,thenumberattacksbyPCP-SL kill themcommunitieshadbeenvictimizedonamassivescale.Becauseofthe affected asCisneroshadpredicted:membersoftheShiningPathdied,butto Because ofthemagnitudemilitarycounteroffensive,PCP-SLwas VIOLATIONS T non-military measures. and institutionalsupporttostabilizetheresultsofmilitarypresencewith HE POLITICAL-MILITARY COMMANDS:SYSTEMATIC, GENERALIZEDPATTERNS OFHUMANRIGHTS While membersofthegoverningpartydeniedthat humanrights Human rightsviolationsincreasedbecausethepolitical-military The numberofextrajudicialexecutionsandvarioushumanrights ere occurringor, insomecases,simplyminimizedcomplaints of Peruvian v ersion of Argentina’swar.»«dirty Although theleftin subversives. Shor tly thereafter , thecase 261 THE STATE SECURITY FORCES 262 PART ONE: THE TRAGEDY AND THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR IT actions thatviolatedhumanrights. the zone,itisclearthattopofficershadcommandandcontrolover Cabitos) inplanningandimplementingthemilitaryoperationscarriedout and theresponsibilityofPolitical-MilitaryCommand(basedatLos the characteristicsofmilitaryorganizationitself(ahierarchicalstructure) Based onthisinformation,andtakingintoaccountcertainaspectssuchas rights. power tomodifytheproceduresthatviolatedpracticesrespectedhuman may nothavebeenpartofacentralizedplan,thetopcommandershad Even takingintoconsiderationthehypothesisthatthesepracticesormethods filed aboutthem. be awareofthelargenumberhumanrightsviolationsandcomplaints tolerated by, thestatemilitaryapparatus.Thecommandershadto may have security forces.Thereforethehumanrightsviolationswehavedescribed procedures —designingthem,correctingthemorreplacingforthe of victims. uniformity oftheprocedures,andgeneralized,becauselargenumber execution respondedtoapracticethatwassystematic,becauseofthe facilities, torture,selectiveliberation,disappearanceandextrajudicial rights violationsrepresentedbyarbitrarydetention,detentioninmilitary Because ofthispatternbehavior,wecanstatethattheconstanthuman were victimsofextrajudicialexecutions. reasons, itcanbeassumedthatthelargemajorityofpeoplewhodisappeared places relatively nearthecity, suchasPuracutiandInfiernillo.Forthese graves, whileotherswereabandonedalongroads,inravinesorother they haddemonstratedtheirguilt.Somebodieswereburiedinclandestine It isclearthatonlyhigh-rankingmilitaryofficerscouldestablish been partofananti-subversive strategycreatedby, oratleast discovered in discovered that yearbythePCP-SL. Duringthatperiod,thefirstmassgraveswere highest oftheentireperiod ofconflict.Soisthenumbercrimesperpetrated and disappearancesbythesecurityforceswhilehe wasincommandisthe took stepsinthatdirection,thenumberofreports of extrajudicialexecutions and economicmeasuresneededtowinthe General Huamánseemedwillingtotakepersonalresponsibility forthepolitical General Adrián HuamánCenteno. A native oftheareaandaQuechuaspeaker, of whathadoccurred. fought bypeoplewhosoughttoenditquicklyandat anycost,leavingnotrace blackout intheconflictzone.Theresultwasanofficially non-existentwarbeing outbreaks, coincidedwiththearmedforces’strategy ofacommunications war, conflict thathadthenatureofasubversive rather thanmerelyterrorist government, whichdidnotofficiallyacknowledgetheexistenceofaninternal the conceptofanti-subversiondidnotincludethem.Thepoliticalposition to militarypower; functions tothearmedforces,wantedensurethatthisdidnotimplyareturn occurred fortworeasons:ontheonehand,government,whileithaddelegated led defenseeffortdidnothaverepercussionsinotherareasofnationallife.This implicit and(clearly)unanimouspoliticaldecisiontoensurethatthemilitary- outgrowth ofdiscontentamountpoorpeasantfarmers. underestimate thedangerandinterpretPCP-SLasunderstandable unity necessaryforconfrontingthePCP-SL,butalsoenabledbroadsectorsto leftist groups,theMRTA andthePCP-SL. Thisnotonlyfrustratedthepolitical about itsrole—keptpeoplefromrecognizingthemarkeddifferencesamong conflict, thiscollective the samepoliticalplayer:internationalcommunism.Inearlyyearsof reinforced thebeliefthatbehind radical branchesofAPRAthathadgivenrisetotheephemeralguerrillas1965, guerrilla force,linkedtointernationalcommunismanddescendedfromthe armed struggle.ThefactthattheMRTA hadthecharacteristicsofaregular Movement ( communism. Theconfusionincreasedwhen Cold War phenomenon,anationalguerrillaforceencouragedbyinternational the governingpartyandoppositionconfusedPCP-SLwithjustanother lack ofunifiedsupportfordefenseeffortsasaweaknessthenewsystem.Both commanders —whoatthetimewerealsopoliticalfiguresinterpreted any case,therewasnoactivenationalstanceagainstthePCP-SL. violent naturethesocialconflictwastakingonperfectlycomprehensible.In impression thatithadnotcompletelyrenouncedtakinguparmsandthe them withappropriate weaponsortraining, ledtoanincreaseinviolence bythe communities toriseupagainst thethreatfromPCP-SLwithoutproviding ambivalent supportforthe peasantself-defenseforces,encouragingentire In early1984,GeneralManuelClementeNoelMoral wasreplacedby The marginalnatureofthewarin1983-1985wasdeterminedby As aresult,politicalpositionsontheissuebecamepolarized.Top military Movimiento RevolucionarioTúpacAmaru Huamanguilla andPucayacu. Itisalso on theother, oppositiongroupswanted tomakecertainthat self-deceit —whichoriginatedintheleft’s ownconfusion the PCP-SL,MRTA andleftistlegislatorslay population’s support. the Tupac , MRTA) announceditsown clearthatHuamán’s Amaru Rev Although he olutionary 263 THE STATE SECURITY FORCES 264 PART ONE: THE TRAGEDY AND THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR IT April 27,1984,withthegoalof«[…]qualitativ Departamental deDesarrollo de Ayacucho of theDepartmentalDevelopment interpreted hisjobasincludingmanagementofthebudgetforpublicspending Huamán, asheadoftheMilitary-PoliticalCommandEmergencyZone, PCP-SL aswellbytheself-defenseorganizations. carrying out legally rigorousinvestigations tobringcriminalterrorists totrial which wastoarrestpeople legallyonthebasisofobjectiveevidence.Instead intelligence-gathering forthe wa el Terrorismo consequences. Despitethe creation ofthe Anti-Terrorism Division( the outbreaksofsubversive activitywhileavoidingsignificantpolitical forces. pressure inthecountrysidewhilepolicearrested leadersofthesubversive party’s nationalsecuritystrategyseemedtorevolve aroundapplyingmilitary peasant farmersandgivingpoliticalauthoritytothe military. Thegoverning strategies were out provided experiencethatwouldbeusefullaterintheconflict. Theseexperimental not helpreducetheindiscriminatenatureofarmed actions,althoughthey the population(«strategicvillages»aroundHuanta) in thisphase,however, did These peasantself-defenseforces(ApurímacValley) andthepolicyofregrouping of theReaganadministration. incompatible withthegovernment undoubtedly sharedbymanytopArmycommanders;nevertheless,itwas reformist anddevelopment-orientedideologicalposition,whichwas before beingremovedfromhispostcontainsrevealingpassagesabout if ithadnotbeenforthe«people’s war.» PCP-SL tomakepeoplebelievethattherewouldneverhavebeensuchspending public investment untilGeneralHuamán’s arriva by thePCP-SLsincetimeofAgrarianReformandhadneverseenany the «people’s war.» Becausethevillagesinemergencyzonehadbeenvisited PCP-SL’s countryside longbeforetheAgrarianReform.Huamánalsounderestimated plan, seemedtorecreatethepaternalisticm against thePCP-SL.Infact,manyoftheseactions,insteadbeingpartareal more concernedaboutthepsycho-socialeffectofthesemeasuresonfight from beingamodelofsustainabledevelopment.Itisalsoclearthathewasmuch the areaofagriculturaldevelopmenthadlittleexpertguidanceandwerefar sufficiency offoodsuppliesintheemergencyzone.»Itisclearthathisactions by actsofterrorism,generatingthegreatestpossibleemploymentandself- agricultural productionactivitiesthatbenefitthepeasantpopulationaffected reorienting 1984publicspendingfortheDepartmentof Ayacucho toward Convinced thathehadtolinkdevelopmentwithmilitaryaction, The governmenturgedmilitaryandpolicecommanders toeliminate In 1984,theNavyinfantryorganizedfirstself-defense committees. The reportabouthisexperiencesthatHuamánsubmittedtosuperiors political abilitytomakesuchsocialspendingappearbeavictoryfor ), thepolice’s inv side theboundsofofficialpolicy, whichopposedmobilizing estigative r. Thisv ’s economicpolicyandtherecommendations ). HeissuedDirective001-SAS/SZSN«E»on Corporation of eered away from capacity wasplacedatthe serviceof odels thathadexisted ely, quan l, itwas notdifficultforthe titatively Ayacucho ( the division’s purpose, and strategically División contra in Ayacucho’s Corporación commanders. murdered Rear Admiral CarlosPonce Canessa,one of theNavy’s top onTaskhad served Force 90in Ayacucho. OnMay4,1986,PCP-SL militants PCP-SL murderedLieutenant CommanderJorgeAlzamoraBustamante,who while waitingforthebusthat wouldtakethemtowork.OnMarch14,1986,the of theNavyandcivilianswereattackedindistrict ofVilla MaríadelTriunfo Navy personnelinLima.OnAugust16,1985,several dozen uniformedmembers the followingmonths,whenShiningPathcarried outaseriesofattackson support andthatproducedresults.Thescenariobecame morecomplicatedin rights violationsduringtheGarcíaadministration thathadthepresident’s Staff, blamingthemforthekillings.Thatwasmajor investigationintohuman dismissed themilitarycommandersandevenpresident oftheJointChiefs have beenmassacred.AlanGarcíabackedtheinvestigation andimmediately commission discoveredthemassgravescontaining thebodiesofpeoplewho coincided withfierceattacksbythePCP-SL.InSeptember, acongressional massacres inPucayacu,Accomarca,Umaroand Bellavista.Theseactions in Congress. issue ratherthanstrikedownthelaw, even thoughhehad anabsolutemajority Alan García,whotookadvantageofhiselectiontodivertattentionfromthe under pressurefromthearmedforcesanditspoliticalallies,wasnotrejectedby Military CodeofJustice.»Thislegacytheoutgoinggovernment,introduced «[…] membersofthearmedforcesorpolice[exclusivelysubject]to or transferofauthorities[...].»Thesamelaw—whichisstillineffectmakes emergency zone,grantingitthe«[…]powertorequestremoval,appointment which regulatedthefunctionsofpolitical-militarycommandinany announced hisprogramsforchange. the start,however, hehadtoassimilatevery harshconditionseven ashe and addresstheeconomicrecessionwithspeechesradicalmeasures.From Alan Garcíaattemptedtoeasetheoppressiveatmosphereofinternalwar As seeninanearlierchapter, inthefirstmonthsofhisadministration President E government’s securityanddefensepolicy. strategies thatwentbeyondthemandategiventhemunderelected Centeno, showsthatfromtheearlyyearsofconflict,armedforcesadopted arming thepopulation.This,alongwithinitiativesofGeneralHuamán opposition, manytopmilitarycommandersandmostpublicopinionopposed completelyoutsidetheboundsof were gradually cametobeseenascomplementthemilitary’s anti-subversionefforts. surveillance, infiltrationofcriminalorganizationsandrecruitingcollaborators in casesbasedonclearproof,theinvestigativepoliceofficerstrainedclandestine FFORTS AT On June5,1985,theoutgoingBelaundeadministrationissuedLaw24150, In August1985,justafterAlanGarcíatookoffice,soldiersperpetrated The military’s initiatives to organize communityself-defensepatrols CIVILIAN CONTROL AND EXPANSION OF After P once’s murder, the Ministerof official strategy. The THE INTERNAL ARMED CONFLICT the Navy, Vice Adm government, the iral Julio 265 THE STATE SECURITY FORCES 266 PART ONE: THE TRAGEDY AND THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR IT Ministry ofDefense;and3.byensuringthem strengthening thenewinstitution;2.bymergingmilitaryministriesintoa ways: 1.byunifyingthepoliceforcesintoNationalPoliceofPeruand in thepoorestpartsofAndes.Civiliancontrolwastobeachievedthree making effortstomediatetheconflictandencourageagriculturaldevelopment consisted ofgainingciviliancontroloverthearmedforcesandpolice,while García administrationbegantoimplementaninternalsecuritypolicy. Thepolicy frame ofmind.Amidthisnotoriouslackclarityinitsfirstfewmonths,the acurfew inthecapital,ameasurethathadstrongimpactonpublic’swas guarantees inthecitythatwasseatofhisowngovernment.Addedtothis Alan GarcíaimposedastateofemergencyinLima,suspendingconstitutional commander generaloftheNavy. victim, AdmiralGerónimoCafferattaMarazzi,whohadrecentlyservedas murders didnotend,however. OnOctober14,thesubversives claimedanew institution andtheentirecountry»had«awakenedlion.»Theselective Pacheco Concha,warnedthatthesubversiveshad«[…]deeplywounded established bythemilitary governmentin1979. enough tochangethepattern ofcivilian-militaryrelationsthathadbeen System lawwas m between theJointChiefsof StaffandtheCabinet.AlthoughNationalDefense The resultwasaMinistryofDefensethatlimited tocoordinatingrelations winning overtopcommandersthroughhispersonal relationshipswiththem. Staff. Hedid,however, allowhimselftobelieveintheshow–orfarce—of head ofstate,nordidhereducethedefactopowerwielded bytheJointChiefsof acknowledge anyreductioninhisdirectauthority overthearmedforcesas such achange.Whencreatingthenewministry, thepresidentrefusedto congressional majoritysaidnothingabouttheconstitutional consequencesof was underwaytocreatetheMinistryofDefense, butGarcíaandhis of theprisonsasquicklypossible,regardless the cost.Meanwhile,work uprising occurred,AlanGarcíaorderedthatarmedforce beusedtoregaincontrol rights inthefightagainstsubversion.Butwhen PCP-SL-organizedprison announced byGarcíaandAbelSalinasincludedrigorousrespectforhuman per se remained asanauxiliaryforceundermilitaryauthority, control ofpolitical-militarycommands.Thismeantthatthepoliceinthoseareas control oversecurityanddefense. García’s firstCabinet,however, therewas aclearattempttoincreasecivilian or nottousethearmedforcesinfightagainstShiningPath.InAlan weas have seen,duringdebatewithinBelaunde’s administrationover whether president andthearmedforces. through apolicyofpromotions,aswellcommunicationbetweenthe lostitsmeaningasconstitutionalguaranteesweresuspended.Thepolicy Under pressurebecauseoftheferocity The initialthrustofGarcía’s administrationlasted eightmonths,coming Alan Garcíamultipliedtheareasofcountrythatwereunder Awareness oftheproblemsrelatedtocivilian-militaryrelations arose, odified togive theCabinet directauthority, thatwas not ofthePCP-SL’s crimesandattacks, ilitary’s loyalty to and thatpolicework the government greater consistencyinguiding thevariouseffortsaimedatensuringinternal chain ofcommand.Increased civilianadministrationwassupposedtolead neither acivilianminister northepresidenthimselfheadedoperational sharing ofoperationalresponsibility withtopmilitaryofficers.Inotherwords, was establishedindirectly, underasystemofadministrative controls, withno responsibility foraunified,consistentmanagement of thewar. Civiliancontrol policy aimedatincreasingciviliancontroloverthearmed forceswithouttaking of throwinguproadblockstoanti-subversiveactions. which wastheonlycontrolmechanism,placedgovernment intheposition jointly bythearmedforces.With aninternalwar underway, thisveto power, plans oroperations,andlimitedhimselftoaccepting or delayingthosepresented minister, however,was notpreparedtodirectorsupervisethepreparationof Cabinet member, withthesamerights Defense System.ThepresidentoftheJointChiefs of Staffwasanautomatic regime andlaterkeptbyBelaunde—responsible for directingtheNational Council, whichhadbeencreatedbyMoralesBermúdezattheendofmilitary relations. García’s decreesmadetheCabinet—ratherthan theNationalDefense an elementtakenfromadvanceddemocraticconceptofcivilian-military of militarypolicy. minister was littlemorethanamediatororfacilitator, ratherthanthedirector without thesupportoftopmilitarycommanders.Infactandbylaw, the minister ofdefense.Underthissystem,thecoulddolittleornothing those plansandoperationssupportedbyboththeJointChiefsofStaff was approximatelyasfollows:thepresidentreceived,forhisapproval,only post onOctober14,1987.Thesystemofcivilian-militaryrelationsthatresulted García’s firstdefenseministerwas the JointChiefsofStaff.Inaddition,insteadbeingacareerpolitician,Alan structure andcompetenciescomparedtothoseofthecommandinggenerals president. Infact,thesedecreesgavetheMinistryofDefenseminimalfunctions, in alawpassedbyCongress,butitsspecificcontentwasestablishedthe In otherwords,thegeneralideaofcreatingaMinistryDefensewasapproved however, were determinedbylegislativedecreesissuedtheexecutive 24654. Itsoperationanditsrelationshipwiththebranchesofmilitary, lead. the resultofhiseffortstonationalizebankingsystemleftGarcíaunable Path’s terrorismin1988andthecountry’s completepoliticalfragmentationas it appearedthathehadtakentheinitiative.Hyperinflation,peakofShining armed forces,evenacceptingarolethatwasunclearandsubordinateaslong the remainingfouryearsofhisadministration,Garcíabackedactions was bornofinertia,andthefirstminister aretiredmilitaryofficer. During Ministry ofDefensewasapprovedin1987,themeasurehadnorealmeaning.It to anabruptendwiththemassacreinprisons.Whenlawcreating García’s administrationattemptedtoimplementasecurity anddefense The illusionofciviliancontrolovermilitarypolicywasroundedoutby The MinistryofDefensewascreatedonMarch31,1987,throughLaw General EnriqueLópez as thedefenseminister. Thenewdefense Albújar, whotookthe branch. 267 THE STATE SECURITY FORCES 268 PART ONE: THE TRAGEDY AND THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR IT significant progresstoward a Internal DefenseofTerritory: Anti-Subversion. Thismeasurerepresented the wayforJointChiefsofStafftoissueDirective01-PE-DI-JUN86JUL90 military relationsthatfavoredthearmedforceafterprisonuprisingpaved bailout thatensuredmorethanUS$1billionforthePeruvian economy. that demandinSeptember1988,managingtopulloffacomplicatedfinancial fight againstsubversion withoutnewexternal the internationalfinancialcommunity, becauseitwas impossibletofinancethe opposition’s demandthatPeru resumepayingtheexternaldebtandreturnto effort tonationalizethebanks.Thearmedforcessoontookupconservative government’s economicpolicyandorganizedoppositiontotheadministration’s country. Theconservative trying toshowPeruviansthatitswasaviablealternativeforgoverningthe armed forces,whileatthesametimedistancingitselffromShiningPathand with thegoalofkeepingrulingpartyfromtakingcontrolpoliceand on theonehandandpossibilityofamilitarycoupother. assumed thatithadtoconfrontadualinternalsecuritychallenge:subversion appears thatGarcía’s government, liketheBelaundeadministrationbeforeit, on civiliancontrol,wereunclearwithregardtothefightagainstterrorism.It Nevertheless, theobjectivesof Alan García’ security basedonmilitary knowledge, whichwasamajor stepforward. Shining P and counterintelligence, althoughtherewasstilllittleknowledgeofthe The directivealsoacknowledged majorpendingtasksintheareasofintelligence the appropriatejudicialauthority afterbeinginterrogatedbythemilitaryunit. that apersondetainedbythearmedforcesmustbe turned overtothepoliceor confronting armedsubversives. Another partofthedirective, however, stated the armedforceswouldlimitthemselvestodissuading, pursuingand house searches,documentchecks,interrogations,detentions andarrests,while to theonethatalreadyexisted.Thepoliceforceswould beinchargeofhouse-to- division oflaborbetweenthepoliceandarmedforces thatwasverysimilar as contradictionsbecamemoreserious. APRA) andeven«progressive»sectorsofthechurch tendtosupportsubversion same directivestatedthatalllegalleft-winggroups, unions(exceptthoseof to subversion.»Thatstillimpliedhighlyscatteredefforts, consideringthatthe neutralizing «anyviolatorofthelawandconstitutionalorderwhocontributes directive, thatgoalwasstillconfusedwiththeofdestroyingand/or would laterbecomeclearthatthiswasIt theabs neutralize theLocalPolitical-AdministrativeOrganization»ofsubversives. actions. Thepurposeofanti-subversiveoperationswas«todestroyand/or certain errorsthathadexistedsincethestartofmilitary’s anti-subversive The expansionoftheShiningPath’s actionsandthechangeincivilian- The left-wingoppositioninCongresscriticized APRA’s securitypolicy As asignofqualitative progress inthe«people’swar,» PCP-SL In theorganizationofnationalinternaldefense,directive calledfora ath’s structureandaction,itemphasizedtheneed toobtainsuch opposition, meanwhile,focusedoncriticizingthe , police,judicial,economicandpoliticalactions. more comprehensive s securitypolicy, whichwas based credit. García’s olute strategicpriority. In the strategy, but government met government also repeated columns was the The documentthatmarkedthebeginningofasubstantivechangeinstrategy T until theendofGarcía’s term. rumors oflarge-scalecorruption,helpedcreateasenseanxietythatpersisted currency becauseofhyperinflation,impoverishmentthemiddleclassand services ingeneral,alongwithuncertainlyaboutthevalueofnational services, suchasurbandrinkingwater, electricity, highway safety andpolice Defense MinisterLópez rumors ofamilitarycoup,whichwerepromptlyfollowedbydenialsthe that itwas aterroristploytounderminethemilitary’s credibility. José Valdivia Dueñas,saidtherehadbeennoinnocentvictimsinCayara and General’s Office.The head ofthepolitical-militarycommandinzone,General combat.» ButstatementsfromlocalresidentssentthecasetoAttorney the areaandreportedthattheyhadfoundno«signsofbombardment,fireor de Lima General López 50 peasants.AteamincludingJusticeMinisterCamiloCarrillo,Defense community ofCayara.Newsspreadthatthemilitaryhadmassacredmorethan was ambushed,resultinginfierceretaliationbytheArmyagainst staged boldandrepeatedattacksonmilitarypatrols.InMay, amilitaryconvoy that followed. The second that population, whichhadbeen reducedandterrorizedbythewar. security forcesandsetting upa to amasspower, murderinganyone whohad collaborateddirectlywiththe villages andturnthepolice andmilitaryinterventionsintoopportunitiesforit was thefundamentalproblemofwar. ThePCP-SLwas preparedtoreturn that supportofthepopulationwasnecessaryforcombating subversion.This appeared inthesectionon«NormsforAnti-Subversion.» Thefirstnormstated laying thegroundworkforsuchaction.Themain ideasofthenewstrategy understanding bylimitingthegoaltokeepingsubversion fromseizingpoweror action. Butthesecondpartofdefinitionmoderated thescopeofthis that subversion was nolongerunderstoodsolely, oreven principally, asmilitary the supportbases,guerrillazonesandrelatedbodies. of militiaandthemasses,typespeople’s committeesandtheirfunctions, for attack,thePCP-SL’s finalobjectives, thegui party andthe«people’s guerrillaarmy,» explained themainideasof«GuidingThought,»revealedstructure very completeandaccuratedescriptionofthe PCP-SL’s characteristics.It was publishedinLimabytheMinistryofDefenseJune1989.Itcontaineda INTO POLITICS HE COMPREHENSIVE ANTI-SUBVERSIVE ), RaúlFerreroandLimaAuxiliaryBishopAugustoBeuzevilletraveledto Army ManualonNon-ConventionalAnti-SubversiveWarfareME41-7, Adding totheoverallsenseofinsecurityin1988werepersistent The way ofwinningpeople’s The changeintheconceptappearsopeninglines, whichindicate Albújar, thedeanof Albújar. The norm statedthatthepopulation’s supportcouldbe STRATEGYTHE AND new «people’s committee» tocontrolthe irregularity orcollapseofessentialpublic cooperation was describedinthe norms Lima Bar Association ( itsformofactionandorganization ding ideasoftheareasincharge A RMED F ORCES’ NEWINCURSION Colegio deAbogados which 269 THE STATE SECURITY FORCES 270 PART ONE: THE TRAGEDY AND THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR IT only preparatory, is reflects theoverallsenseof thisstrategicconcept.Thefirststep,whichisactually inseparable fromtheuseofpsycho-socialandcounterintelligence operations. (Ministry ofDefense1989:77).Themanualmakesclear thatarmedactionsare operations todestroyorbreakthesubversiveforces’ moraleandwilltofight» to thoseofthesubversives»and«carryoutaggressive andefficientpsychological initiative, surprise,trickery, mobilityandcreativity, usingproceduressimilar 74). Indescribingthearmedactioncomponent,document states:«Fightwith «form networksofcollaboratorsandinformants;»etc. (MinistryofDefense1989: infiltration;» «maketrainedinterrogatorsavailable;» «establishadatabase;» and «localforce;»«carryoutcounterintelligence operations;»«optimize members andorganization,itsstrengthsweaknesses, its«supportbases» (Ministry ofDefense1989:73).Itspriorities,therefore, were toidentify theparty’s anti-subversive waris80percentintelligenceand20operations» and howtointerveneina«redzone.»Thefirstclarificationwasthat«[…]the when itdescribedhowtodisrupttheorganizationofarmedsubversivegroups subversive minority. the suspensionofbasicconstitutionalrightsandselectiveelimination rules hadthesamesense;thustheywerecombined,withoutcontradiction,with step isthedecisiveone: second stepistoinstallforces tocontrolterritoryandthepopulation.Thethird of the«People’s Army.» Inthenew of apsycho-socialstrategyexpressedintheformcorporateethicformembers Mao’s case,however, therewas norecognitionofbasicrights;itwas merelypart surprisingly similartothoseimposedbyMaoonhisrev Defense 1989:69-70).Thisobjectiveisfleshedoutinaseriesofrulesthatare «[…] createinthepopulationapositiveimageofforcesorder»(Ministry occurs whileastateofemergencyisstillineffect.Thefirstthingnecessaryto final stepsthatresultfromal establishing normalconditionssuchastheruleoflaworelections.Theseare destroy thesubversives’domination. to mobilizesupportwithoutfirstscoringaconvincingvictorythatwould to takeprecedenceoveractionsinvolvingthepopulation.Itwouldbeimpossible guerrilla unitsandthesubversives’Political-AdministrativeOrganizationhad prevail andwhichwould disappear. Thusmilitaryandpoliceactionagainst subversion, ontheother. Thequestion,then,was whichoftheminoritieswould and theinterestsofafreesociety minorities thatareinconflictthelocalrepresentativesofPeruvianstate immediately. Theneutralmajorityiswhat power (MinistryofDefense1989:60). throughanactive won «Intervention inaredzone» isthedecisiveactionandonethatbest The practicalimplicationsofthenewstrategyappearedinmanual Winning thesupportofpopulationdoesnotdirectlyfollowfromre- The similaritytotheShiningP the destructionorexpulsion ofthearmedsubversives. The minority. ong processofrestoringorder, aprocessthat , ontheonehand,andnucleusofsupportfor This conceptwasbased Peruvian anti-subv the PCP-SL called«themasses.»The ath’s strategy isapparentalmost on atheoryofpolitical ersive olutionary army. In strategy, these implemented: them. Directive017prioritized thezoneswherethesemeasureswouldbe the drugtraffickerswhosupported thesubversivesorreceivedprotectionfrom existed, themissionwastoseparatesubversionfrom drugtraffickingandfight organization builtaroundanti-subversivefronts.Second, wheredrugtrafficking internal defenseinnationalsecurityzonesandsub-zones wasreplacedbyan action throughouttherestofwar. First,the armedforces’ organization for PE-DI). Thisdirectivereflectedtwomajorstrategicdecisions thatshapedmilitary 017forInternal Defense(DVAForces Directive Nº017CCFUERZAS ARMADAS- must bemanaged. only inpassingaspartofthepsycho-socialwaror anexistingconditionthat democratic, constitutionalnatureofthepowerbeing defended,itismentioned essential publicservices.Althoughthismanualdidnotcompletelyerasethe election ofmunicipalauthoritiesandthere-establishmentorimplementation post-war elementsincludetheestablishmentofself-defensecommittees, pacification canbegin,whilecombatshiftstoother«redzones.»Importantlocal Administrative Organization—isreached,theprocessesofconsolidationand understood tobeapoliceoperationratherthancombatoperation. the definitionofoperationstates:«thisisadirectedpoliceoperation.»It Organization» isdefinedasthefinalstepofinterventionina«redzone,»that Manual 41-7, carried outcompletely.» Onenoteworthy detailinthismainpassageof goal inthemosteffective,certainmannersoastoensurethatelimination«is «deactivation,» itisclearthatthisanti-subversiveactionmustaccomplishits «elimination» ofthePolitical-AdministrativeOrganizationisunderstoodas be completeandthereforetheprioridentificationmustaccurate.Evenif explaining whatismeantbythetwoprecedingconditions:eliminationmust 1º JUNÍN-PASCO, becauseofitsgreat strategicimportanceitwas definedas the CenterofGravityAnti-Subversive Operationsnationwide. to beexpectedchange. the LocalPolitical-AdministrativeOrganizationaretoocommittedtosubversion In thisoperation,itmustbekeptinmindthattheheadandmainmembersof Thattheplannedeliminationcanbecarriedoutcompletely. (b) Thatsufficientinformationhasbeenreceivedtoguaranteethesuccessof (a) It iscarriedoutbasedonthefollowingtwoconditions: Administrative Organization. This isadirectedpoliceoperationtoeliminatethemembersofPolitical- Step three:DestructionoftheLocalPolitical-AdministrativeOrganization. The newstrategywasthebasisforJointChiefsof StaffoftheArmed Once thepointofnoreturn—totaldestructionPolitical- The finalphraseemphasizesthatthesepeoplecannotberedeemed,thus the elimination. in which«destructionoftheLocalPolitical-Administrative Army 271 THE STATE SECURITY FORCES 272 PART ONE: THE TRAGEDY AND THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR IT economy operating, therefore,itwasnecessary tocomeanunderstanding agricultural product—it isanagro-industrialproduct.To keepthepeasant no valuewithouttheprocessing andmarketingchain.Cocaisnotmerelyan paste, andsomeclandestine airstripsandlightplanes,becausethecocaleafhas people whoprovidedtheacid andkeroseneneededtomanufacturecocainebase farmers meantacertainacceptance ofmacerationpits,small-timedrugrunners, front. Inpracticalterms,reachinganunderstanding with coca-growingpeasant to amilitaryfacilityin1989wasopenedbyintelligence operationsontheHuallaga captain whohadbeencashieredmanyyearsearlierfor misconduct—returned named GeneralAlbertoArciniegapolitical-militarycommander oftheHuallaga. corruption. Asaresult,monthaftertheattack,onMay 2,PresidentAlanGarcía to repelanattack,becausetheofficerswerevery vulnerable todrug-related with morethan50policeofficersweapons ofwar, butwas alsoill-prepared under militarycontrol.ThePNPbaseinUchizawas disproportionatelylarge, Santa Lucía.TheU.S.agencyisnotallowedtooperate inareasthatareatwaror the U.S.DrugEnforcement Administration’s (DEA)anti-drugbaseinnearby command; thiswasanexceptionalcase,andprobablyduetothelocationof time. Thezonewas underastateofemergency, but not underapolitical-military be explainedinthebroadercontextofpoliticalchangestakingplaceat forces. traffickers andpavedthewayforVladimiroMontesinos’influenceoverarmed task ledtoacertainlevelofcoexistencebetweenthearmedforcesanddrug and politicalsituationinvolved drugtrafficking.Theambiguityofthemilitary’s of Peru. recounted intestimonygatheredbytheTruth andReconciliation Commission 1991 wasdirectlyreflectedinthenumberofmurdersandextrajudicialexecutions fronts. Staff bymakingitspresidentthechiefofoperationsforanti-subversive imperceptible tothepublicattime,increasedpowerofJointChiefs measure was signedby their administrativedependenceonrespectivemilitaryregions.»The the JointChiefsofStaffArmedForcesforoperationalmatters,maintaining appendix specifiedthat«(2)TheAnti-SubversiveFrontswillbedirectlyunder president oftheJointChiefsStaff,modifiedacentralpointdirective.The Nº 017CCFUERZASARMADAS-PE-DI).Thisappendix,signedbythenew assigned. InJanuary1990,anunusualappendixwas addedtoDirective17(DVA 5º Areasintheprocessofformation. 4º LIMA-ICACALLAO. 3º AYACUCHO -HUANCAVELICA - APURÍMAC. 2º SANMARTÍN-HUÁNUCOUCAYALI. The doorthroughwhichVladimiroMontesinos— aformerArmy In 1989,thepolicebaseinUchizawasdestroyed.Thatdisastercanonly The otherdecisive strategic The intensityoftheoperationsinJunín,PascoandHuánuco1989- With theseprioritiesset,thefrontswereestablishedandforces Admiral Alfonso Pa Admiral Alfonso decision regardingthe nizo Zari quey. Thismeasure, country’s military drowning, hangingtheperson fromhooksintheceiling,electricshocks,burning, in whichextremeviolence wasused,includingsuchpracticesasbeating,near- notclear.were Thiscoincides withmanywitnesses’ accountsofinterrogations during interrogationindicatesthatatthetimeitwas written,suchguidelines The factthatthisreportcontainedsuchclarifications about whatwaspermissible (Ministry ofDefense1989:9). must notbesubjectedtotortureorcruel,inhuman ordegradingtreatment» be usedinsteadofillicitcoercion,threatsoranyform ofviolence.Thesepeople must notbemistreatedforany he orsheshouldbefreed.Inaddition,«Theperson capturedand/ordetained determined thatanallegedsubversivewasnotimplicated interroristactivities, them overtothepolice.Itstatedthatwheninterrogation bymilitarypersonnel of holdingpeopleforamaximum24hoursbefore freeingthemorturning In discussinginterrogationanddetainees,thereportemphasized theimportance interrogation. and second,theneedtoavoidcrueltreatmentorlongperiodsofdetentionfor need toprovidemorepersonnelandmaterialresourcesforintelligenceoperations, counterintelligence. Themostnoteworthypointsinthereportwerefirst, against subversion. Joint ChiefsofStaffbysubmittingareportabouthisexperienceinthefight who atthetimewasheadofMantaroFront,respondedtoarequestfrom at eliminatingsympathizersratherthanactivePCP-SLmilitants by thesecurityforces.Themajorityofanti-subversiveoperationswereaimed determine fromtheappearanceofbodieswhethertheyhadbeenexecuted the v they disappearedorwerefounddead,theirbodiesdumpedinvariouspartsof been detainedoncewerefollowedandsometimesagain,afterwhich held fordaysincellsonmilitarybasesorDINCOTE’s facilities.Thosewhohad new phenomenon.Manyofthepeoplewhoweredetainedfreedafterbeing carried outbeginninginthefirsthalfof1990.Thenewstrategygaverisetoa the MantaroV which hadseemedsooverwhelmingbefore,begantocrumble,takingrefugein network ofinformantsthatconstitutedthebeginninghispowerbase. in theareaandhadbecomealawyerfordrugtraffickers,organizedanextensive logistical bases.Atthatpoint,formerCaptainVladimiroMontesinos,wholived the coca-growingareatoidentifypossiblealliesandneutralizeShiningPath’s after drugtraffickersatthesametime.Intensiveintelligenceworkwasdonein unnecessary becausestateforcesthereeffectivelyfoughtthePCP-SL,whilegoing where theNavywasstationed,atacitagreementwithdrugtraffickers indispensable atthetime?OneasternsideofHuallagaandinUcayali, with thedrugtraffickingcartelsthatdidnotsupportShiningPath. Was this 6 PM-PH datedDecember5,1990. Official Communiqué289C.o/07.00. Huancayo, December 21, 1990.Ref:RGNº050856-EMFA/ alley. In December1990,thecommandergeneralof31stInfantryDivision, The armedforcessoonfelttheadvantages ofthenewstrategy. Theenemy, Because oftheregularitywithwhichthisoccurred,itwas possibleto alley, 6 Thisexperiencewasmainlyintheareasofintelligenceand where high-intensityanti-subversive operationswere reason. InINTERROGATIONS, persuasionwill 273 THE STATE SECURITY FORCES 274 PART ONE: THE TRAGEDY AND THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR IT in Huánucoor SanMartínuntil1994.It is importanttonotethatvarious human beginning in1990—decreases inviolenceanddrugtrafficking—werenotseen Highway. Basadre Thetwo positive indicatorsof this NavycampaigninUcayali them toformaseriesofself-defense committeesincommunitiesalongtheFederico action campaignandestablished anorganizationofcollaboratorsthatenabled charge oftheeasternside theHuallaga.TheNavy’s BALICOSlaunchedacivic Humboldt BasetoconcentrateontheareaofTingoMaría, whiletheNavytook The situationinUcayalichanged1990,whentheArmy lefttheAlexandervon rockets athouses. who theywere.IntheattackoncommunityofBellavista, helicopterslaunched were moweddownwithouteitherthegunnersor pilotseverseeingexactly river. Inseconds,dozensofpeoplehidinginvegetation alongtheriverbanks Helicopters equippedwithheavyartilleryopenedfire oncommunitiesalongthe There wereindiscriminateattacksagainstcommunities underPCP-SLcontrol. Portillo province.TheArmytooktheinitiative, Navysharedthetactics. ( the easternsideofHuallaga,whiletwoNavy LightCombatBattalions In 1989,anArmyAnti-SubversiveBattalionwasoperatinginPadreAbad,on armed forcestodeactivate therestofMRTA. one ofitsleaders,SísteroGarcía,defectedandbegancollaboratingwiththe was furthercrushedinconfrontationswiththearmedforces.InJanuary1992, represented theirstrategicdefeat. Already decimatedbythePCP-SL,MRTA This resultedinmanydeathsanddesertionsamongthesubversives On theHuallagaandUcayali fronts,anti-subversive forcesalsofacedtheMRTA. coca-growing areasofHuánuco,SanMartínandUcayali. in aforcedlaborcamp.To thenortheast,operationsreached«redzones» and of AsháninkapeoplewhohadbeenrecruitedbythePCP-SLandwerebeingheld from theMantaroFrontadvanced totheEneRiver, wheretheyfreedhundreds universities, mainlyLaCantutaandSanMarcos.To theeast,inJunín,commandos Central Highway, asinthe theyexpandedtoLima’swest, low-income neighborhoods—mainlyalongthe The scopeofanti-subversive operationsbroadenedin1990and1991.To the the HuallagaandUcayalifrontsbecauseofdrugtrafficking. resulting fromaprolongedwar;andthird,theparticulardifficultiesposedby the Fujimorigovernment;second,psychologicaleffectsandlowmorale economic resourcesattheendofGarcíaadministrationandbeginning the erosionofsecurityforces’professionalethicwerefirst,meagerstate circumstances thatresultedinanintensificationofclandestineoperationsand strategy hadsetinmotionledtoincreasinglyselectiveandsordidpractices.The had littleinfluenceoverthecourseofoperations.Themechanismthatnew Later eventsshowedthatself-criticalreportssuchastheonedescribedabove become proofthattorturehadbeeninflicted. victim’s fam was killedandthecorpsedisappearedormadeunrecognizablesothat disfigured orbecauseheshehadseenthecaptorsinterrogators.Theperson wounds andmutilation,oftenfollowedbydeathbecausethepersonwasalready Batallones LigerosdeCombate ily would not denouncethedeedorsothatbodywould , BALICOS)wereinchargeoftherestCoronel cases ofHuaycánandRaucana—national 9 Evento 1006272. Evento Evento1004165. 9 8 economic aidprovidedtohelp Perufightsubversionwassmall.Assistanceduring Compared toU.S.spending inCentralAmericaduringthe1980s,amountof aid fromtheUnitedStatesandothercountries,such asTaiwan andIsrael. Tothe in combatsubversion, I at least,terrorwassownasmuchbythearmedforces asbythesubversives. however, werenotequalinallplaces.ForalongtimeHuánucoandSanMartín, activity; effortstoprotectthepopulationandincrease trustinthearmedforces, strategy wasundoubtedlyafactorinthesteadyincrease inthelattertypeof intelligence activitiesandplatoonstocarryoutselective elimination.Thenew was todeployanti-subversivebattalionsincertain zonesandorganize serious asinHuánuco.Itisnotable,therefore,thatthemaindecisionofwar those sameyearsdemonstratedanumberofinhumanpracticesthatareas 1990 and1991.TheeventsthatoccurredinthedepartmentofSanMartínduring and directiveweredisseminated,areexamined,thereislittledifferencefrom in 1990and1991arementioned.Iftheeventsof1989,beforenewstrategy elimination meantinpractice.OnlyafewoftheeventsthatoccurredHuánuco These eventsarementionedheretogiveanideaofwhatthestrategyselective been raped,werefoundinthePucayacu River. in JoséCrespoyCastillo.Mutilatedbodies,includingthatofagirlwhohadalso military basedetainedandlaterkilled18residentsofthevillagePrimavera, dragged bythehair, beatenand raped. Anatolio withashottothehead,aswellRumo. Anatolio’s daughter was soldier. Military personnelopenedfireastheyenteredtheTrujillo home,killing ran uparedflag.Whentheflagwasremoved,bombexploded,injuring the doorway ofthehome Anatolio, RumoandShanaTrujillo, wheretheyalso bombs todetonatewhentheArmyarrived.Theyleftoneofburiedin Prado, thePCP-SLcalledanarmedstrike,blockedroadsandsetupbooby-trap thrown fromahelicopteroverthejungle. tortured andspentfourdayswithoutfood.Whenhewasneardeath, members oftheArmyafterhewasaccusedbeingaPCP-SLmilitant.He In early1990inTingoMaría(Huánuco),Juan Ayala Almeida was detainedby the topmilitarycommandersinfollowingyears. northeastern fronthadsecondaryeffectsthatinfluencedthepoliticalthinkingof the PCP-SLwasreallyduetoaplan.Itseems,instead,thatcampaignson was actuallyimplemented,andwhetherthestrategicdefeatofMRTA and work. Thiswasundoubtedlytheintent,butitisnecessarytoassesswhether the population’s supportandonselective actionsmadepossiblebyintelligence comprehensive rights violationswerecommittedduringthecampaignscarriedoutunder 7 NTERNATIONAL Evento 1003908. INFLUENCES IN THE ANTI-S strategy. Thenewstrategywas supposedlyfocusedongaining 1980s thePeruvian government soughtmilitary UBVERSIVE STRATEGY 8 Inearly1991,soldiersfromthe Aucayacu 7 OnJanuary6inAngashyacu,Leoncio 9 275 THE STATE SECURITY FORCES 276 PART ONE: THE TRAGEDY AND THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR IT good reasontodoubtthatthose officers duringthattimehadagreatinfluence.GiventheresultsinPeru,thereis Nevertheless, theideasandskillsthatUnitedStatesconveyedtoPeruvian the 1980swaslimitedalmostexclusivelytoinstructionandtraining. end ofthedecade,wereat adeadend.UndertheCarterAdministration, over guerrillasinthe1970s hadgivenwaytomilitarygovernmentsthat,bythe States hadsubstantialmilitary superiority. In during theColdWar hadanegative politicalimpact,even whentheUnited Vietnam, itwasclearthat warsthathadbeenunleashedinfar-flungplaces policies ofPresidentJimmyCarter(1977-1981).With theU.S.withdrawalfrom capacities relatedtolow-intensitywarfarehaddiminished asaresultofthe understand theseevents.Attheendof1970s, U.S. militaryactivitiesand conflict.» the newanti-subversivedoctrineinspiredbyU.S. conceptof«low-intensity harmful todemocracy, butalocalinterpretationofthepoliticalimplications was nottheamountofeconomicaidtohelpPerucombat subversionthatwas armed forces(ArmyIntelligenceService).Unlikethe caseofCentralAmerica,it of theNationalIntelligenceServiceeventhoughthey werepartofPeruvian operations groupsthatnotonlycommittedexcesses, butbecamethemaintool While thefirstgoalwaspartiallyachieved,costcreationofspecial and withoutrepresentingasetbacktothespreadofdemocracyinworld. expected tobringavictoryoverterrorismwithoutmanyhumanrightsviolations coincided withthenewstrategyoflow-intensityconflict.Thatwas April 5,1992. to puttheirsweepingplanintomotion.Theystagedinstitutionalcoupon that support,Fujimoriandhispresidential-militarycoteriesawtheopportunity legislature weremetsuperficiallydidsignificanteconomicaidmaterialize.With human rightsviolations.OnlywhentheconditionsimposedbyU.S. administration, theU.S.Congressbeganpayingattentiontoreportsofsystematic drug traffickers. A newobstacle soonarose,however. EarlyintheFujimori themselves inthenortheasternpartofcountrybyprovidingprotectionto was raisedagain,particularlybecausethePCP-SL and the MRTAwere financing world financialsystemintheearly1990s,ideaofU.S.economicaidtoPeru economic aidforcombatingsubv because ofthegovernment’s policyonpaymentoftheexternaldebt.Thatblocked from 1986to1988,Peruwasisolatedtheinternationalfinancialcommunity relations withtheSovietUnionsince1970sworsened thesituation.Later, events inArgentina.ThefactthatPeruvianofficialshadmaintainedgood had itseyeonthedictatorshipsinSouthernCone,especiallydisastrous even acompletemobilizationofitsarmedforces.TheUnitedStates,meanwhile, 1985, Peruwasconfidentthatitcouldsolvetheproblemonitsown,without useful indefeatingthesubversives, helpedstrengthendemocracy. A lookattheinternationalsituationmakesitpossible tobetter The mostsignificantaspectofthissetbackfordemocracywasthatit There werereasonsforthelimitedU.S.economicaid.Between1980and ideas aboutstrateg ersion. After thecountry’s reinsertionintothe South America, the«victories» y, whichwereundoubtedly counterinsurgency, special term «low-intensityconflict»wasadoptedtoreferthecombinationof in thefightagainstsubversionwere atanall-timelow. Peruvian statein1980,U.S.militarypreparationandhemisphericcooperation repressive forces.WhenthePCP-SLlauncheditssubversivewaragainst stepping backfromdevelopinganti-subversivestrategiesandtraininglocal democratic transitionsinLatinAmericaanddecreasemilitaryaid.Thatimplied United Statestendedtoincreasethepoliticalcomponentofitssupportfor In 1984,whenGeneral Adrián HuamánCenteno, strategy remainedthesame, however, development-based concepts oftheprecedingdecade.Theanti-subversive was framedbytheinternational politicalsituationand,therefore,the 1980s. Whentheterroristviolencebrokeout,government’s economicpolicy that thePeruvianstatefacedincounteringterrorist subversionintheearly was asignificantpartoftheconceptlow-intensity conflict. eliminated nationaldevelopment plansfromitsanti-subversive policy. This during thoseyearsinmany«ThirdWorld» countries,theReaganadministration costly. Ignoringthevalueofsocialreformsandstrategicinvestment implemented comprehensive non-militaryprogramsweretooexpensive, slowandpolitically development thathadbeenpartofanti-guerrillastrategy inthe1960s.These capacity intheUnitedStatesmarkedashiftaway fromthesocio-economic publichumanrightspolicy.conflict impliesanactive support fortheinsurgencybyenemygovernments.Inbothcases,low-intensity support forcounterinsurgencyeffortsfromfriendlygovernmentsalternateswith number ofpeopleaffectedbyhumanrightsviolations.Inlow-intensityconflicts, enemy organizationasselectivelypossibleandlimit,insofarpossible,the resemble terrortactics.Thecentraltaskoflow-intensitywarfareistoaffectthe would beselectivestrikeswithastrongpsychologicalimpactthatclosely seen asanessentialelementoflow-intensitywarfare. Theresult,paradoxically, decisive psychologicalimpact.Inthisapproach,traininginhumanrightswas human rightsreinforcedtheideaofapplyingviolenceselectivelysoastohavea on respectforhumanrightstoreinforcethethesisofselectivity. Training in used duringspecialselectiveoperations.Recommendationsincludedanemphasis quantitative terms,buthighlevelsofviolenceinconcentrateddoseswouldbe would actinsmallcommandounits.Levelsofviolencebelow protect thecountry. conflict, inwhichtheUnitedStates’fullmilitarymightwouldbeunleashedto minimal involvementofU.S.personnelandresources,unlikehigh-intensity and terrorism.Accordingtothisconcept,low-intensityconflictwoulddemand be usedtoachievepoliticalobjectivesincountriesaffectedbyguerrillawarfare sent theBelaundegovernment animperiousdemandformassivepublic That begantochangeundertheReaganadministration(1981-1989).The This internationalbackdropmakesiteasiertounderstand thesituation Besides thisuseofhumanrights,theresurgence «special»military The mainagentsofthesewarswouldbespecialoperationsforcesthat operations andunconventional because thearmedforceshad notchanged. chief ofopera warfare thatwould tions in Ayacucho, 277 THE STATE SECURITY FORCES 278 PART ONE: THE TRAGEDY AND THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR IT when thePentagon declassifiedseveral manualsonSeptember20, 1996,aswell the anti-subversioncourses attheSchoolofAmericaswasmadepublic is added,anti-subversiveinstruction hadalargeaudience.Thebasiccontentof Americas between1980and 1996.IftheworkofU.S.militaryinstructorsinPeru low-intensity conflict. was determinedtoinfluencetheiroutcomethrough thestrategicprinciplesof Peru arenotcoincidental.TheUnitedStateshadaninterest inbothconflictsand advance oftheguerrillasinElSalvadorandonethat defeatedthePCP-SLin during thesameyears.Thesimilaritiesbetween strategythatstoppedthe The difficultyinapplyingthemwasevidenttheinternal conflictinElSalvador however, was onlypartofthe intense strategyinvolvingspecialoperations. was asharpchangeofdirectionandPeru’s anti-subversion shiftedtoward an social crisisprovoked byGarcía’s policiesandsubversion was atitspeak,there Around 1988,whenasPeruwassinkingundertheweight oftheeconomicand of low-intensityw — neededtoadaptthe Andean nation’s anti-subversive strategytotheconcept with anytypeofassistanceotherthanthemilitaryaid—instructionandtraining For thesereasons,duringthe1980sUnitedStatesrefusedtoprovidePeru and thateconomicdevelopmentwouldputanendtoviolentinternalconflict. development isnottheissue;itdeniesthatpovertymaincauseofsubversion warfare. Thedoctrineoflow-intensityconflictmakesitclearthateconomic sense ofpeaceandprogressamidtheinsecuritydefenselessnessinternal ultimately, isatypeofpsycho-socialoperationaimedatproducing amomentary along withmilitarypreparationforitsspecialoperationsgroups.Civicaction, would receivefromtheUnitedStatesonlyaidnecessaryforcivicaction, administration tomakeitmoreefficientandlessexpensive.Thegovernment of thestateagainstsubversion.Theeasiestreformsinvolvedrestructuringpublic use offorcewhilepoliticallyconfrontingsubversivesandmobilizingallsectors poor countries.Thatgovernmentwouldhavetoadoptstrictcontrolsoverthe leadership todealwiththeseriousproblemsoflegitimacythattendedaffect government thatwouldtakeupthechallengeofsocialjusticeandprovidestrong conflict. TheReaganadministrationwasconvincedthatitcouldonlysupporta of statepolicyandmilitarystrategythatfellundertheconceptlow-intensity there hadbeennopublicinvestmentorsocialreforms. of themajoritypopulationwhileisolatingsubversives,eventhough prepare tolaunchaspecialoperationswaraimedatrespectingthehumanrights forces systematicallyadoptthestrategyrecommendedbyUnitedStatesand García whenhetookoffice.Onlyafterward,in1988,didthePeruvianarmed doomed thedevelopmentprojectsandnationalizationplansenvisionedbyAlan development projectsdidnotchangeinthefollowingyears,afactorthatalso swimming againstthetide.Theabsenceofinternationalsupportforlarge-scale investment andpoliticalsocialreformintheemergencyzone,hewas An estimated898Peruvian officerstookcoursesattheSchoolof The anti-subversivestrategywithintheconceptoflow-intensity conflict, It isnecessarytodescribewithmoreprecisiontheoriginalcombination arfare. ThatU.S.policyfinallyshaped recommendations, whichwere giv Peru’s political process. en alocaltwist. especially those whosegoals,beliefsorideologies arecontraryoropposed tothe targets ofcounterintelligence operationslocalornationalpoliticalgroups, finally subjugatedit.The manualentitled a certaintypeofpolitical-military powerthatconspiredagainstdemocracyand predominance ofspecialoperations duringtheconflictledtodevelopmentof to whomtheyareapplied. counterintelligence operationsfrequentlytramplethe basicrightsofthepeople emergency. Whenthisusurpati which thearmedforcesassumecontrolofinternal orderduringastateof government’s functionswas combinedwiththeconstitutional provisionunder only bepoliciesoftheelectedgovernment.InPeru, thistendencytousurpthe intelligence, militarymissionsincludemeasuresthat, inademocracy, could become aparallelalternativetotheelectedgovernment. Intheeyesofmilitary affected bylow-intensityconflicts.Theanti-subversive armedforcestendto unlimited. Thisimpliesseriousrisksforthefuture of democracyincountries intelligence activitiesbroaden,accordingtothesemanuals, untiltheyarealmost expectations. Withsubversionasthepretext,rangeandscopeofmilitary policies andmechanismsforcontrollingthepopulation’s activitiesand is thatsuchawarnotfoughtprimarilywithbullets,butcomprehensive guidance forthegovernmentfacingsubversivethreat.Implicitinmanuals for controllingandreorganizingcivilianactivities. activities occurisunderastateofem counterintelligence. Itisunderstoodthatbecausetheterritoryinwhichthese personnel becomeasupportingforceforactivitiesdesignedanddirectedby their activities.Inthis«controloverpopulationandresources,»othermilitary targets; itisalsoaimeddirectlyatchangingpeople’s attitudesandcontrolling political power. operations allowedthemtobecomethebasisforanti-democraticmilitaryand basic rightswillbeviolated.InPeru,thelackofdemocraticcontroloverthese support basesforsubversion.Whatisclearinthisstrategythehighriskthat other, soatfirstactions subversives. Operationsarecarriedouttobegindistinguishingonefromthe problem ofnotdistinguishingbetweenlegalopponentsthegovernmentand 1960s thathadbeenpartlyreworked. concepts andexamplesinthemanualswerebasedlargelyonmaterialsfrom the AmericasinPanama1987byU.S.Armyintelligenceofficers.Thecontents, anti-subversion manualsthatweremadepublicdesignedattheSchoolof designed toprovideintelligencetrainingU.S.alliesaroundtheworld.The Intelligence School’s ForeignIntelligence Assistance Program,whichwas largely drawnfrominstructionmaterialfor«ProjectX,»theU.S.Army result ofpressurefromtheU.S.Congressandcivilsociety. Thecontentswere as throughCIAmanualsdeclassifiedin1997.Thesecametolighta The U.S.recommendations focusedonspecialoperations.InPeru,the In thisscenario,militaryintelligencebecomesasourceofpolitical According tothemanual,counterintelligenceisnotlimitedidentifying Counterintelligence activitiesaresurroundedbythemoralandpolitical are aimedagainstallopponents,whetherornotthey on occurs,democraticcontrolsdisappearand ergency, thearmed Counterintelligence forces hav lists aspossible e responsibility 279 THE STATE SECURITY FORCES 280 PART ONE: THE TRAGEDY AND THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR IT EXAMPLES with theruleoflaw. actions anelementofcomplexity andfunctionalspecializationthatcompetes information abouttheenemy’s behavior. at givingthemilitaryforce adecisiveadvantageovertheenemybyobtaining intelligence imposesstrict control over theuseofforce.Rather, controlisaimed Humanitarian Law. That,however, isnotwhyoperational,strategicortactical actions, thecriteriaarerulesofwarfareestablished byInternational actions andcriminalprosecution,thelegalcriterionis theruleoflaw;inmilitary CONT BLACK LISTS counterintelligence: national government.Theconceptisverybroad,asaretheattributesof criterion oflimitingviolenceasanalternative network ofinformants. the threattoone’s operationalcapacitywithoutcausingmajordamageto the counterintelligence istousethesmallestamountofforce necessarytodeactivate the whitelistasimportantgrayandblacklists. Thebasicprincipleof «exploited.» Exploitinginthissensemeansobtaining information,whichmakes counterintelligence operationsthatthe«targets»are nottobeeliminated,but to anti-subversiveefforts.Itisageneralprincipleofintelligenceand while «whitelists»containthenamesofpeoplewhohaveproventheirloyalty The targetson«graylists»includepotentialoroccasionalenemycollaborators, — inotherwords,theymustbethetargetsofcounterintelligenceoperations. include. Theyaredirectenemycollaboratorswhomustbedetainedimmediately DETENTION AIN THEIDENTITIES • • • • The useofmilitaryintelligencetocombatsubversion introducesthe These arethegroupsortypesofpersonswhoma«blacklist»should ( municipal ordepartmentalbranchesoftheenemygovernment These mayincludelocalpoliticalfigures,PoliceChiefsandleadersof Indoctrination activitiesamongtroopsorcivilians. participated inIntelligence,Counterintelligence,Security, Police orPolitical presence intheareaofoperationsrepresentsathreattoNationalSecurity. Enemy CollaboratorsandSympathizers,knownorsuspected,whose Forces orthepoliticalinterestsofNationalGovernment. sabotage, politics,andsubversivepersons. Counterintelligence: ARE OFPRIMORDIAL IMPORT Other personsidentifiedbyG2as[targetedfor]immediatedetention. Enemy CollaboratorsorSympathizersknownsuspectedtohave Political LeadersknownorsuspectedtobehostiletowardtheArmed Known orsuspectedenemyagents,personsinvolvedinespionage, Whiletheruleoflawand internationaljuridicalorder 237). AND LOCATIONS OFPEOPLEWHOSE This utilitarianprinciplegives military ANCE FOR ANCE FOR to thecriterionof THE ARMED legality. ARREST AND FORCES. In police groundwork fortheFujimori regime. Second, alongwithinstruction attheSchoolofAmericas,itlaidideological central elementsoftheanti-subversive strategyusedtodefeatthePCP-SL. This doctrinemeritsclose scrutinyfortworeasons.First,ithelpeddefinethe wasconcept of«politicalwarfare» o subversive returned, theseofficershelpedteachsecuritypersonnel andpreparePeru’s anti- traveling toTaiwan andlivingthereforperiodsofuptoayear. Whenthey Taiwanesewarfa conceptofanti-subversive placebos whentheymightbeuseful. relaxing andrecoveringfromtheshock»E-3),resorting tohypnosis,drugsand minimal, aframeandblanket,nomattress.Theidea istokeepthesubjectfrom extreme heatandcold,deprivingthedetaineeofsleep («Thebedshouldbe being interrogated,subjectingthepersontoextreme physicalexhaustionand take turnsanddivideuprolesinordertoprolongthepressureonperson convincing himorherthatthethreatswillbecarriedout.Interrogatorsshould breaking downthepsychologicaldefensesofpersonbeinginterrogatedand effective thanpainitself.Theuseofforceisnotdiscarded,however,of asaway counterproductive forobtaininginformation,andthatthethreatofpainismore chapters oncoercivetechniques,theynotethattorturetendstobe and sleepschedulesshouldbealtered.AlthoughbothCIAmanualsinclude transported andkeptincommunicadosoheorshelosesallsenseoftime.Food person shouldbegaggedandblindfol because thatisthetimewhenpeoplearemost According to Resource CIA manualsaremuchmorepreciseandexplicitthantheArmymanuals. detention facilitiesdescribedinthemanualsareclearlyclandestineprisons.The psychological defensesandkeeptheinterrogatorfromgettinginformation.The that hisorherimprisonmentwillendsoon,isenoughtoraisetheperson’s reference towhatisgoingonaroundthem.Ifapersonsomehowbecomescertain to subjectthedetaineesstrictestisolation,deprivingthemofanyclear Counterintelligence Interrogation. teachings oftheCIAmanuals1960s,especially1963 of disinformation. American officersinthe1980s—isseriouslydistorted.Itaparadigmaticcase these manualsonanti-subversiveaction—andinU.S.instructionofLatin does not. operating plans,sothatonlytheforcesthemselvesknowrulesandenemy rules ofthegame,counterintelligenceactionsdoleoutviolenceaccordingto authorize theuseofforceaccordingtolegalnorms,sothateveryoneknows It isclearthatintheterm «politicalwarfare,»politicsisconsideredan Officers ofthePeruvianpoliceandarmedforcescarefully studiedthe The instructionsforinterrogationinthemilitarymanualsfollow With thisdifferenceinmind,theconceptofhumanrightsmentioned Exploitation Training Manual strategy. Human ResourceExploitation, The firstcourseinPsychologicalOperationsbased on the AccordingtotheArmymanuals,basicruleis ffered inPeru’s War Collegeasearly1984. (1983)isanupdatedversion of detentionsshouldbedoneatdawn, ded immediately, strippednaked, re beginningintheearly1980s, passive psychologically. The KUBARK KUBARK Human . 281 THE STATE SECURITY FORCES 282 PART ONE: THE TRAGEDY AND THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR IT the mostaggressive operations:recruitment ofcollaboratorswith thepromise strategic criterionoflimited violenceandthejuridicalcriterionisclearinoneof and strippingitofthesupport ofthemasses.Theradicaldifferencebetween with gratuitousbenevolence. Itisonlyameansofisolatingtheenemy’s leadership leaders oftheenemyband, notaconsiderablenumber.» Thisisnottobeconfused in intelligencewarfare,the keyelementistoaffectonly«alimitedgroupof of psychologicalwarfare istheadequatedistributionoffeelingshostility. As ideological changeislaidwithpsychologicaloperations. Oneofthecentralpoints participation inthepoliticalwar. enemy’s promises.Thisisfollowed byneutralityand,only attheend,byactive itself indicatesthatanecessaryfirststepismaking thepublicskepticalof trying tocontrolterritory, buttogainthe support ofthepopulation.Thestrategy Gonzalo thought»toPeruviananti-subversivestrategy in1989,isthatofnot from thePCP-SL’s «prolongedpeople’swar fromthecountrysideto city- Chinese Communists’ «people’swar» to Taiwan’s «politicalwar,»likewise and late 1980s.Perhapsthestrategicideathatmostclearly transferredfromthe decisive influenceonthedevelopment ofPeru’s anti-subversive strategy inthe warfare. central elementofallrationalconceptsjustice,isabsentfromtextsonpolitical progress hadbeenmadeinthepoliticalwar. Theconcept of personalrights,a confrontation thatcouldbedisadvantageousifitoccurredbeforesufficient involved donotresorttoopencombat.Violenceislimitedsoasavoidmilitary discredit, divideanddebilitatetheenemy. Forstrategicreasons,however, those political warfare,thereistherighttokill,aswellmisinform, Exceeding theseboundariesdoesnotmeanabandoningthemindsetofwar. In victory possible. gains strategicadvantagesthatmakeasimultaneouspoliticalandmilitary warfare, whichisalsoandmoredescriptivelycalled«totalideologicalwarfare,» delicate fabricofsociety. Militarymightremainsthe«centerpiece.»Political in politicalwarfarestrategicadvantageiswonnotonthebattlefield,but warfare orhumanrightsingeneral.Rather, theuseofviolenceislimitedbecause whether thesearecitizens’rights,rightsprotectedbyinternationallawregarding not amatteroflimitingdestructive forcesso asnottoviolatepeople’s rights, reasons thatrestricttheuseofviolenceincounterintelligenceoperations.Itis warfare involves. and subjugateoreliminateenemyactivities.Thisispreciselywhatpolitical this formofpoliticsthestateusesallmeansavailabletogainpoliticaldominance fair competition—ratherthanwaramongideologiesororganizations,in of citizens’politicalrights.Unlikeordinarypolitics,inwhichthereisopenand politics istheexercisingofstate’s righttoexistence,ratherthantheexercising the noun«war»todefineaparticulartypeofwarfare.Understoodinthissense, attribute ofwar. Theword The decisive battleisfought Nevertheless, theanalysisofMaoiststrategyinthesemanualshada All actionsrelatedtopoliticalwarfaregobeyondmilitarymaneuvers. As aresult,inthistypeofwartheuseviolenceislimitedforsame «political» has been reduced to an adjective modifying «political» hasbeenreducedtoanadjective on thefieldofideology. Thegroundwork for new scenario, went into motionw new scenario,went Military Plananditsblueprint forgovernance,updatedtocoincidewiththe even theconspiratorshadimagined.Finally, theoperationoutlinedin thePolitical- presidential-military power clique.Inshort,hetooktheconspiracyfurtherthan alive despitethecomplications, updatingitandadaptingtotheinterestsofhis of thegroupthatdrewupPolitical-MilitaryPlan, tookchargeofkeepingit Throughout thisprocess,VladimiroMontesinos,although hehadnotbeenpart over militaryandeconomicaidforcombatingsubversion anddrugtrafficking. This waitingperiodwasfurtherextendedbynegotiations withtheUnitedStates overtures toAPRAandtheleftearlyinhisadministration puttheplansonhold. changes, economicreformandthedefeatofterrorism. ButFujimori’s political by thearmedforces.Thenewregimewouldimmediately ensuretwonecessary military declarationthatwouldcomefromanewcivilian regimeproppedup and APRAwouldblockapeaceful,democraticsolution, pavingthewayfora Political-Military Planassumedthatextremepolarization betweenFREDEMO into action,however, becauseFujimori’s electioncomplicatedmatters.The president toagreegovernjointlywiththearmedforces.Theplanwasnotput overthrow AlanGarcía,detainhim,tryhimfortreasonandpressurethenew Plan wastomakeamilitarydeclarationshortlybeforethechangeofgovernment, to thedocumentasPolitical-MilitaryPlan.Theideaof Montesinos builtaroundFujimori.Forlackofamoreprecisename,wewillrefer Verde,» was lateradoptedbythepolitical-militarypower cliquethatVladimiro neoliberal politicaltoneofthisextensivedocument,whichthepresscalled«Plan 1990, whenanewadministrationwouldnormallytakeoffice.Theauthoritarian, preparing aplantostagecoupandestablish«guideddemocracy»inJuly subversive In 1989,whilethearmedforceswerepreparingandimplementingnewanti- T undercover operationsbymilitarysecretserviceswithnodemocraticcontrol. requires suspendingguaranteesandeliminatingpublicoversightthrough defense policyarethetruedefendersofhumanrights,evenifthis is democratic values national defenseactions.Inthisview, asin«politicalwarfare,» theorderof of therulelawandsecurityisanidealthatwillsomedaybeattainedthrough anti-communist effortsofnationalsalvation.»Inotherwords,thefullenjoyment and thesafeguardingofhumanrightsarefundamentalobjectivesour the establishmentofaconstitutionalregime,consolidationrulelaw freedomandslavery,between betweendemocracyandtotalitarianism.Therefore necessary «[…]tostressthefactthatbattleagainstcommunismisa that theoppositionandinternationalpressuremanagedtomaintain. with therepentancelaw, althoughthiswas limitedbyaspectsoftherulelaw that noonewilllookintotheirpast.AsimilarpolicywasappliedunderFujimori HE M ILITARY- An analysisofthePolitical-Military Planindicatesthewayinwhich Finally, it s P strategy, a OLITICAL hould benotedthataspartof«psychologicalwarfare,» itis P inverted. Thosewhohelpattainthegoalsofstate’sinverted. LAN AND THE RISEOF group ofmilitaryofficersandcivilianswas secretly ith Fujimori’s A LBERTO coup on April 5,1992. F UJIMORI F UJIMORI 283 THE STATE SECURITY FORCES 284 PART ONE: THE TRAGEDY AND THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR IT secret, thenew systemputinplaceshould alsoremainsecret.This perfectedand if theideawasforarmed forces’controlovertheelectedgovernmenttobe unnecessary whenFujimori agreedtowork toward the plan’s goals.Moreover, the armedforces’secret plans.Theintendedmilitarydeclarationbecame for thepresident-elect.While there,VladimiroMontesinosintroducedhimto military socialclub,where he hadbeentakenonthepretextofprovidingsecurity administration tookoffice,Fujimorispentseveralweeks livinginasuite reflected «theabnormalconditionsaffectingthePeruvian state.» to takemoderate,non-confrontationalpositions.»They alsostatedthattheresults tendency duringperiodsofsocial,politicalandeconomic instabilityforCitizens 9, thedayafterelections,eventswereexplainedas follows:«Thereisanatural established intheConstitution.»Butanewintelligence analysisdatedApril and thebeginningofaprocessnationbuildingoutside thedemocraticsystem guiding statepolicycanguaranteetheunityof majority ofthepopulation of generalizedsocialupheaval.Undertheseconditions, onlytheforcesoforder months ofthenewadministrationareunrealisticand could leadtotheunleashing that «plansforanorderlyelectoralprocess,transferofgovernmentandthefirst earlier, intheirintelligenceanalysisofFebruary20,1990,theyhadconcluded and, therefore,theiroperatingplanstothenewscenario.Ascantsevenweeks of whatitmeanttobepartthefreeworld. substantial confusionabouttheUnitedStates,ascoupplottershadlostsight from theverypoliticaldynamicthattheysoughttoneutralize.Therewasalso this meantbeingsubjecttothewillofapopularleaderwhodrewhispower openly againastheyhadinthe1970s,coupplottersdidnotcalculatethat underestimated bothfactors.Althoughtheyknewthatcouldnotgovern subversion anddrugtrafficking.ThePolitical-MilitaryPlanhadcertainly that theUnitedStatesplacedonprovidingeconomicaidforcombating hatched withinthearmedforces:Fujimori’s electoralvictoryandtheconditions committed duringtheconflict. major problems;manyofthemwouldlaterbeaccusedhumanrightsviolations to stagethecoupwere thecountry’s unwillingtoallowdemocracysolve structural reformoftheeconomy. Thetop-rankingofficerswhowere conspiring accomplishments neededatthetime:astrategicvictoryoverterrorismand positions stemmedfromthedesiretotakecreditfortwogreat were participatingindemocraticelections.Third,theseforcedideological human rightsthatwasbythenalreadythecommonheritageofparties placing thearmedforcesinanideologicalpositioncontrarytocultureof «elimination oftheundesirablesurpluspopulation»servessamepurpose, armed forces.Second,itisnoteworthythattheemphasisplacedon inadmissible doctrinethatwaspurelyconspiratorialanddesignedtounitethe using theveryarmsthatnationconferreduponthem,wasanindecent, affirmation oftherightmilitaryofficerstoseizepower unconstitutionally, the armedforceswerebecomingpoliticized.First,itisclearthateventhen Between theJune10run-offelectionandJuly28, whenthenew After the1990elections,plotterswereforcedtoreadjusttheiranalysis Two processesinterferedwith andtransformedthecoupplotbeing coup. received thefirstpledgesofdisbursement,itwassuddenly interruptedbythe U.S. requirements.Thatprocesslastedthroughout1991, andin1992,afterPeru Fujimori tookaseriesofsteps,somerealandmere invention,tomeetthe plan forimprovingrespecthumanrightsinthe fightagainstsubversion. rights violationsthatthePeruviangovernmentwas forcedtoinventanaction Narcotics ControlActof1990(INCA).Thisnormisso explicitregardinghuman that internationalaidforsuchpurposeswasregulated bytheInternational the U.S.Congress. time amongtheU.S.EmbassyinLima,SecretaryofStateJamesBakerand this directionwererevealedthroughdeclassifiedmessagesexchangedatthe from theUnitedStatestocombatdrugtraffickingandsubversion.Stepstakenin Fujimori administrationbeganmakingarrangementstoreceiveeconomicaid cast theirvoteswiththeAPRAlegislators. in theLuriganchoandElFrontónprisonsbecauselawmakersloyaltoFujimori Alan GarcíawassparedaconstitutionalaccusationinCongressforthemassacres subversive effortswithoutabdicatingdemocraticcontrolortheruleoflaw. and theoppositionmajorityinCongress,whichpreferredsteppingupanti- between Fujimori’swar, supporters,whofavored anunlimitedanti-subversive coordinated actionbyallsectorsofthestate.Therewaspoliticalpolarization support, Fujimoriannouncedanewanti-subversivestrategyinvolving massacres, tortureanddisappearancesmultip subversion, usingevenharshermeasures,andaccusationsofillegalexecutions, and irresponsible.Meanwhile,thearmedforcespolicecontinuedtofight opportunity todiscreditthelegislatureandjudiciary, corrupt claimingtheywere it wasunconstitutionalandillegal.Fromthenon,Fujimorimissedno Predictably,subversion. theSenatestruckdowndecreeongroundsthat excesses orhumanrightsviolationscommittedduringthefightagainst JUS, bywhichtheexecutivebranchgrantedamnestytoanyoneindictedfor policy. ThefirsttestofstrengthcameinOctoberwithSupremeDecree017-90- administration —toeliminatealldemocraticcontroloversecurityanddefense April 5,1992coup,butthedesireofarmedforces—encouragedby bethebaseandVladimiroMontesinos theconductor.would and FujimoriduringtheirplottinginJune.TheNationalIntelligenceService mediatized versionofthePolitical-MilitaryPlanwasputintoplaybyMontesinos debate between Congressandtheadministration. Whilethelatter believedthat Congress. held inApril.ThePeruvian governmentsignedtheagreementwithoutconsulting conference on«DrugTrafficking, One Year afterCartagena,»whichhadbeen that agreementhadbeen revisedinlightoftheresultsinternational government signedananti-drugagreementwiththe UnitedStates.Thedraftof In May, in preparationforreceiv In responsetoinitialconsultations,theU.S.government pointedout Following onepriorityofthePolitical-MilitaryPlan,inearly1991 It wasnoteconomicpolicythatstartedFujimoridowntheroadto In theUnitedStates,there wasexpectationtemperedbydoubtsand ing economic lied. With themilitary’sfull aid, thePeruvian 285 THE STATE SECURITY FORCES 286 PART ONE: THE TRAGEDY AND THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR IT Rights arrived inLimathatmonthatthe invitationofthePeruvian government support. Similarly, adelegation international criticism,the CouncilforPeacewasestablishedwithgovernment organizations.» Thedouble standardcontinued.Inanobviousefforttocalm said therewere«terrorists infiltrated inpseudohumanitarianandhumanrights military ceremony, Fujimoricalledhumanrightsdefenders «usefulfools»and Congress. Thelegislatorswerenotmistaken.Thatsame month,inaspeechat requirements forU.S.aid.Thevisithadnoimpact on thepositionofU.S. George Bush,inOctobertoexpresshiswillingness tocomplywiththe in theUnitedStatesinsteadofU.S.instructorsbeing senttoPeru. each area.AfinalrequirementwasthatPeruvianmilitary personnelbetrained and aftereachdisbursementithadtoreporttheU.S. Congressonprogressin accords. Theexecutivebranchwasrequiredtoaccept theseconditionsinwriting, drug operations,and(c)progresswasmadeincompliance withtheCartagena operating, (b)thearmedforcesandpolicewereable tojointlycarryoutanti- would bedisbursedwhen(a)anationalregistry ofdetainedpersonswas in complyingwiththeaccordsofCartagenaSummit.Thethirdinstallment over airportstopreventdrugsfrompassingthroughthem,aswellonprogress The seconddisbursementwoulddependonPerudemonstratingefficientcontrol replacement partsurgentlyneededbytheAirForceforanti-drugairpatrols. free accesstoalldetentionfacilities.Thatfirstpaymentwouldbeearmarkedfor made whenpersonnelfromtheRed for grantingaidgradually, as conditions were met. An initialpaymentwould be result ofapolicyPeru’ in theirjudgment,thehumanrightsviolationscommittedPeruwerenot memorandum draftedbythemilitaryattachésatU.S.Embassystatedthat both fightingdrugtraffickingandrespectinghumanrights.AJuly31 already metbyPeru andexpress to CongressdatedJuly30,inwhichhelisted,pointbypoint,theINCAcriteria independently whetherPerumettheINCAcriteria;thiswasreflectedinaletter 91-20 asastartingpoint,theU.S.secretaryofstatebegantodetermine with Peruwasanequallyfrontalcounterattack.Usingpresidentialresolution agencies wassystematicallyblocked. in Peru,investigationintohumanrightsviolationsbyrelevantinternational the U.S.Congress.Addedtomagnitudeofthoseviolationswasfactthat government intheareaofhumanrights,hadlittleeffectonstancetakenby administration. Thesefactors,whichattenuatedseverecriticismoftheFujimori the responsibilityforcorruptiontoweaknessofjudiciaryandpublic administration’s fightagainstthePCP-SL and the MR reports fromtheU.S.EmbassyinLimacalledattentiontoFujimori of humanrights,convincedthatthesituationwasextremelyserious.New progress incombatingdrugs,Congressplacedemphasisexclusivelyontheissue it waspossibletomakebasicprogressinrespectforhumanrightsandsignificant Peru’s overtures included avisitbyFujimoritohisU.S.counterpart, The U.S.Congressrespondedbyestablishingaseriesofpreciseconditions The U.S.administration’s reactiontothisfrontalattackonitsnegotiations s topmilitarycommanders. from theInter-American CommissiononHuman ed hisconfidenceinFujimori’s Cross andthe Attorney General’s Officehad TA andattributedpartof commitment to other branches of government. W other branches ofgovernment. to accumulatepowerfor himself aloneratherthantrulysharingitwiththe them andweakened to anextremeinthenameoffightingsubversion,soas authority place himselfabovemilitary implied fordemocracyand theruleoflaw. included militaryandnon-militaryareas,despite the risksthatsuchaplan ( MD/SDN) onthepacificationpolicydrawnupbyNational DefenseSecretariat regime’s doubledealingwas action, buttoFujimori’s personalneedtoaccumulatepoliticalcapital.Thenew armed actiontoasecondaryrolerespondednot the intrinsicneedforsuch the democraticprocess.Theinsistenceonreducingethical andlegalcontrolover subversion, understoodasatransformationofsociety andstatethattranscended the Political-MilitaryPlan. forces insteadofthedecorativerolethathadbeenoutlined forthepresidentin Fujimori sought,andgraduallyachieved,personalleadershipoverthearmed adhere tobasiccriteriaofethicsandjustice.Thatneedwascreatedbecause which openedadoorforthosewhoinsistedthatthearmedforces’actionsshould administration’s needtomaintain The intelligenceinterrogationsnolongerhadfatalconsequences. Shining Pathleaderswhoweredetainednotdisappeared,torturedorkilled. conditions attachedbytheU.S.CongresstoeconomicaidforPeru.Asaresult, Peruvian districtattorneys.Thislistwasestablishedtocomplywithoneofthe that wasupdateddailyandoverseenbytheInternationalRedCross of humanrightsviolationsas1990.Onepowerfulfactorwasthelistprisoners the strategyadoptedin1989wasnotonlyfactordecreasenumber unreliability. 1992 coupbrutallyconfirmedthewarnings oftheU.S.CongressaboutFujimori’s to Japan,wherehereceivedaidcommitmentstotaling$127million.Thusthe was notdecisivetohisplans.InMarch1992,Fujimorihadmadeanofficialvisit taken bytheOAS.Fujimoriwasnotimpressed,becauseamountofaidinvolved Bernard Aronson,metwithFujimoriandexpressedsupportfortheposition of thatyear, theU.S.assistantsecretaryofstateforWestern hemisphericaffairs, trafficking andsubversionwasinterruptedbythecouponApril5,1992.InMay anti-subversive Armybattalions. indication thattheaidwouldnotincludeUS$10.05millionfortrainingthree Peruvian officials,withanemphasisontheregistryofdetainedpersonsand reduce theflowofdrugstothatcountry the conditionsimposedbyU.S.Congress,aslongnoeffortwassparedto to gatherinformationaboutcasesthathadbeendenouncedbeforeit. Secretaría deDefensaNacional Fujimori kepttheruleoflaw andparliamentarypolicyaliveinorderto The sourceofFujimori’swas thefightagainst politicalinitiative Another influentialfactorinthisturnofeventswastheFujimori From theseevents,itcanbeconcludedthatthemoreselectivenatureof The economicaidandmilitaryassistanceforthefightagainstdrug On January17,1992,theU.S.StateDepartment«reluctantly»accepted reflected inaMinistry ). Thedirectivecontainedabroadpoliticalplanthat hile thatpower structurewas contradictory, certain democraticpoliticalappearances, . At thesametime,however, hereduced . Theconditionswere communicatedto of Defensedirective(003-91- 287 THE STATE SECURITY FORCES 288 PART ONE: THE TRAGEDY AND THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR IT impasse. from takingeffectatamomentwhenCongresscould notmeettoresolvethe series ofreservationsregardingtheGeneralBudget Law for1992,preventingit had respondedtothecongressionalactionsonlast signed Law25399,whichcontainedthenormsstriking downthedecrees.Fujimori measures strikingdownthedecrees.OnFebruary7, congressionalleadership tool forfightingsubversion.Inresponse,thepresident refusedtosignthe most outrageintheexecutivebranch,becauseitwas adirectattackonthemain Decree 746,theNationalIntelligenceSystemLaw, however, that provoked the be misusedtothreatendemocraticfreedoms.Itwas thevotetostrikedown System. Becausethelanguagewasimprecise,Congress arguedthattheycould or disseminatinginformationobtainedprocessed bytheNationalDefense which penalizedmoneylaundering,coveringupdrugtraffickingandrevealing the criminalprocedurescodewouldtakeeffect;andDecrees736,747762, six decrees.TheseincludedDecrees731and764,whichpostponedthedatethat before theendofordinarylegislativesessiononDecember15,itstruckdown sought inordertojustifyviolationofconstitutionalorder. with theexecutivebranch,eventhoughthatwasexactlywhatcoupplotters prepared byFujimoriandMontesinos.Thelegislaturechoseacollisioncourse however, didnotyieldinthefaceofchallengeposedbylegislativedecrees to riskitslittleremainingsecuritydefendethicalandlegalprinciples.Congress, on theanti-subversiveoperations.Themajorityofpopulationwasunwilling multiplied andweredisseminatedbyinternationalorganizations,withnoeffect organized inspecialoperationssquads.Thereportsofhumanrightsviolations murders werecommittednotbyparamilitaries,butactive-dutyofficers were alsoreportsofmurdersbyparamilitaries.Itwaslaterlearnedthatthe of Staffissuedastatementdenyinganylinkwithdocument.Atthetime,there document thatreferredtothestrategyofselectiveelimination.TheJointChiefs be verydifficultforthelawmakerstowinpopularsupport. the politicalregimeandconfrontingpresidentinadebatewhichitwould foundations andforceCongresstochoosebetweenallowingsuchaguttingof to pacification,thatwouldignorethenation’s constitutionalanddemocratic of 126legislative months thatfollowed,VladimiroMontesinoswouldorchestratethepreparation inappropriate forademocracy. WhatCongressdidnotforeseewas thatinthe he obtainedfromCongress,passlegislativedecreesthatwereillegalor produce aseriesofexecutive decreesand legislature withanti-subversioninitiativesnodemocraticcontrolswasto it wasrealandworkedforFujimoriatthetime.Histechniqueflooding This isnottheplacefora detailed descriptionoftheApril5,1992,coup,but it F 1992-2000: UJIMORI ADMINISTRATION Congress had30daystoreviewthedecrees.Infewthatremained July, In journalistCeciliaValenzuela presentedontelevisionamilitary THE ROLEOF THE decrees, includingmany, especiallyamongthe35thatreferred A RMED F ORCES FR later, with OM THE 1992 extraordinary pow day oftheyear, issuinga COUP UNTIL THE ENDOF THE ers that National Defense Systemthatled,among otherthings,toMontesinos’ SIN. forces duringtheFujimori regimeandthelawsregardingagenciesof while itwasstillinpower — wascompatiblewiththeroleplayedbyarmed the 1979Constitution—which, aswehaveseen,wereproposedbythemilitary and defenseweresufficient. Italsomeansthatthecontentofthosechapters or callaconstituentassembly, becausethe1979constitutionalnorms forsecurity terrorist subversionitwasnotnecessarytobreakwith theconstitutionalorder and defenseinthe1979Constitution.Thatindicates thattosuccessfullyfight committee ofdignitariesthatrecommendedpeople for positions. appoint andfirecivilianauthorities.Thepolitical-military chiefappointeda military commands,whoeffectivelybecamelocalgovernors, withthepowerto subversion effortswasthebroadeningofrole theheadsofpolitical- 1994. Morefavorable toFujimori’s politicaldominancethantotheanti- self-defense committeeswith232,668memberswere formedbetween1992and committees undermilitaryauthority. According totheJoint ChiefsofStaff,4,628 subversion wastheonethatrecognizedandorganized peasantself-defense had proposedin1991,whichCongressnotratified. 1993 Constitution.ThusFujimoriachievedallthelegislativechangesthathe approving thatlegislationandadjustingittotheConstitution,resultingin of thelegislativebranchgovernment.TheCCDlatertookontask Democrático the coupuntilDemocraticConstituentCongress( campaign ofinformationanddisinformation. doctrine of«politicalwarfare.»Themassesarecontrolledthroughapropaganda explainedintheTaiwanesebasic techniqueforsuchcontroliswell school’s undercover andpsycho-socialoperationstocontrolthepoliticalprocess.The forces supportedinstitutionallyforeightyears,wastheinsidioususeof element ofthemilitaryoperationandregimebornit,whicharmed goals. Theprotest,therefore,wasbriefandsymbolic.Butthemostcharacteristic that wasdeterminedtousearmsandviolateallbasiclibertiesachieveits in thedaysaftercouphadnorealobjective,becausetheywerefacingaforce but wecannotdiscountthepossibilitythattheremighthavebeenothers. their supportforthecoup.TheCVRhaslearnedofonlyonehonorableexception, general commandersbytelephone.Theregionalchiefscalledthatnighttoexpress the televisedpresidentialmessagetobebroadcastthatnightandlatercalltheir of operationalunitsreceivedtelephonecallstellingthemthattheyshouldwatch fronts limitedthemselvestoprovidingbackup.Thatafternoon,allcommanders Lima carriedouttheoperations,therefore,whilethoseinregionsandon political powerinPeruiscentralized(whilemilitarynot).Theforces scope astheoperationoutlinedinPolitical-MilitaryPlan. should benotedthatitwasabroadmilitaryoperationofthesamenatureand The 1993Constitutionrepeated,pointbypoint,thechapter onsecurity Besides «repentance,»theprovisionthatmostaffectedfightagainst As willbeseeningreaterdetailthenextchapter, fromthe timeof The civildisobedienceledbymanylegislatorsandsocietyleaders On Sunday, April 5,1992,the , CCD)was seated,Fujimori coup operationsfocusedonLima,because legislated profusely, Congreso Constituyente usurping thefunction 289 THE STATE SECURITY FORCES 290 PART ONE: THE TRAGEDY AND THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR IT and counterintelligence operations. military control.Asaresult, policeinvestigationsweresidelinedbyintelligence skilled ingatheringinformation fromnon-publicsourceswereplacedunder commands intheemergency zoneswasroundedoutwhentheagentsmost 1990. Thesubordination ofthePNPtoheadspolitical-military was thenamingofmilitary personneltodirecttheNationalPoliceofPeruin described intheTruth andReconciliationCommission’s also criminal,involvingtopofficialsoftheregime.These havebeenextensively classified assecret.Thisledtoaseriesofactionsthat were notonlyirregular, but own budgetandmakesitsoperatingplans,keeping allthatinformation with noministerial,judicialorcongressionaloversight. TheSINwouldsetits National IntelligenceServiceandplaceditunderthe president’s directauthority de InteligenciaNacional ratify wasDecree746,whichdealtwiththeNationalIntelligence System( state asaresultofthe types ofdamageinflictedonthearmedforcesand,byextension,Peruvian out fortheirindependentjudgmentandmilitaryleadership,wasoneofthe the regime. them fromusingtheirauthorityoveryoungerofficerstoencouragecriticismof in theUkraineorCuba.Therepressionwasalsoaimedatretiredofficers,tokeep diplomatic postswheretheircareersstalled,suchasthepostofmilitaryattaché whose personalmeritsweremostoutstanding,givenbureaucraticor immediate familyemigratedtoArgentina.Others,includingmanyofthose and hefoundnosupportwithinhisbranchofthemilitary, Arciniega andhis leaving insultingmessagesthreateninghim.Whenthethreatswererepeated personnel tohishomewhenheandfamilywerenotthere,vandalizingit front frommid-1989untilJanuary1990.Montesinossentspecialoperations Alberto Arciniega,whoheadedthePolitical-MilitaryCommandofHuallaga that theregimeestablishedforarmedforces.OneoffirstwasGeneral forcing outofthecountryanyofficerswhodidnotmoldthemselvestorole charge ofpressuring,blackmailing,suing,bribingwhenpossibleandespecially they couldbecarriedout,andalltheofficersinvolvedwerequicklydetained. left thepresidentialpalace,butcoupplotters’planswererevealedbefore Salinas Sedó,JoséPastorVivesandErnestoObandootherofficers.Fujimori military coupattemptagainstFujimoriwasorganizedbyretiredGeneralsJaime operations withnooversight. Staff forsevenyears,andonegrantingtheSINpowertocarryoutundercover indefinitely, resultinginHermozaRíosremainingasheadoftheJointChiefs one thatenabledthepresidenttokeeptopmilitarycommandersintheirposts of thislackdefinition.Themodificationswithseriousconsequencesincluded As drasticandimmediateastheeconomicshock,but lessperceptible, One oftheNovember1991legislativedecreesthat Congressdidnot The sideliningordistancingofthebest-preparedofficers,whoalsostood Throughout Fujimori’syears inoffice,VladimiroMontesinostook 10 On November13,1992,justninedaysbeforetheelectionofCCD,a The legislativechangesthatfollowedrevealedtheseriousconsequences , SINA).Thatnormgrantedbroadresponsibilitiesto the military’s supportfor the April 5coup. Final Report . Sistema and lackedresources becauseoftheemphasis onoperationsplanned anddirected undercover operationbyanti-drug policeorganizedwithcoverfromtheDEA. Paredes alsousedArmyhelicopters totransportdrugs.Thiswasproveninan Colombia, inexchangefor about$1million.ThedrugtraffickerManuelLópez flights totheprocessingcenter inPalmapampa, Ayacucho, andfromthereto meeting inLimawithVladimiroMontesinos,who authorizedthehelicopter shipment usingArmyhelicopters.Throughofficers, Benítezarrangeda firms operatinginCampanillaputhimchargeof arranginga20-tondrug According totestimonyfromaformerDEAinformant, ÓscarBenítezLinares, known as detained orwhosedrugshadbeenseized,evenacase inwhichaPCP-SLleader their drugsstolen,dealsstruckwithrelativesofdrug traffickerswhohadbeen have aneffect.Therewerecasesinwhich«narcoterrorists» wereassaultedand airstrips orderedbyLimaandintelligenceobtained byDEAagentsbeganto dangerous inearly1993,whenAirForceinterdiction flights,thedestructionof trafficking. Ways ofgettingholddrugmoneybecamemoredaring and at thepoliceairbaseinSantaLucía—launchedoperationstocombatdrug U.S. DrugEnforcementAdministration(DEA)—whichneverstoppedoperating quantities, whentheJointChiefsofStaffandSIN,incooperationwith payments improvedthefoodandotheraspectsoflifeonbase. charges alongwithmostoftheofficerswhoservedthere,headmittedthat the chiefofHuallagafrontattime.Whenhewastriedondrugtrafficking traffickers tomakeaprofit,investandexpand.ArmyGeneralRíosAraicowas the militarypresenceinzone.Thusconditionswerecreatedfordrug it, inexchangeformodestamountsofmoneythatmadeitpossibletoincrease to provideservicesandfacilitatethetraffickers’businessinsteadofcombating responsible forfightingdrugtrafficking,allowedthemilitarybasesthemselves aside forfood,fuelandinfrastructureimprovements. larger amountstoofficersandsmallerenlistedsoldiers.Partwasset money. Onthemilitarybase,moneywas distributedproportionately, with players whohadthecapacitytoaffectdrugtraffickingreceivedregularhush as didthePCP-SLandpolicebaseinSantaLucía.Inotherwords,alllocal local mayor, governorandcocagrowers’ organizationalsoreceived payments, $2,000 foreveryflightthattookofffromtheairstripcontrolledbybase.The subversive baseshadresumed.Theheadofeachanti-subversivebasereceived and thesoldiersdeployedthere. Valley, Hermoza Ríosweremonopolizingthestate’s presenceintheUpperHuallaga necessary to«reducetheflowofdrugsUnitedStates,»Montesinosand Department wasinsistingtotheU.S.CongressthatmilitaryaidPeru intense negotiationswiththeUnitedStatesovermilitaryaidandU.S.State fostering thecompletecorruptionof By late1993,theanti-subversive militarybaseshadsunkintoinaction Drug moneybegantoflowupthechainofcommand,andingreater In short,in1992thearmedforcesandSIN,onlystateagents By January1992atthelatest,paymentofprotectionmoneytoanti- This createdaparadoxicalsituationin1991.WhileFujimoriwas Chatín, who was chief oflogisticsintheT Peru’s top ocache area,was freed. militarycommanders 291 THE STATE SECURITY FORCES 292 PART ONE: THE TRAGEDY AND THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR IT the terrain.Hermoza Ríospersonally directed thepreparation, and President represented ahugeadvantage fortheenemy, whichmadeuseofknowledge ones, wasthatthere no waytoexploretheterrainbeforegoingin.This the difficultiesofthisoperation, andonethatsetitapartfromallprevious population, engagingincombat andhand-to-handfightingforterritory. Oneof in populatedareaswhere theenemywascamouflagedamidcivilian 300 men,werespecialoperationscommandos.The goal wastodestroytargets 2,000 men,includingsupportpersonnel.Ofthese,at leasttwocompanies,some operated inpatrols.Testimony fromparticipantsindicatesthattherewere about of rivers,theonlyroutesoutareas. flee wasshotbyarmedPCP-SLmilitantsstationedat piersandnearthemouths threatened themandheldunderideologicalcontrol. Anyonewhotriedto been reducedtoservitudebymembersofthePCP-SL, whokeptthemisolated, area weredroppedfromhelicopters,butwithnoresult. Thelocalpeoplehad not effectiveintheseplaces.Thousandsofflyerswarning peopletoabandonthe particularly «repentance,»thathadbeenusedearlier withsomesuccesswere between April andJuly1994. as «Cuchara»and«Primavera»intheprovinceofLeoncioPrado,Huánuco, subversive «pockets»[groupsofnineto12PCP-SL «people’s committees»]known respect forhumanrights. subversion, suchasrepentance,civicactionand—wascommonafter1991 anti-subversive strategyandthelanguageusedbySchoolofAmericas. levels cannotcarryout.Thereisanevidentreturntotheprinciplesoftraditional implying thattheupperechelonsimplementoperationsofatypelower operational methodsarereservedtoupperechelonsoftheintelligencesystem, of generalities.Thesectiononintelligenceintroducestheideathatcertain dismantling thePolitical-AdministrativeOrganizationconsistsofonly30lines is practicallynoanalysisof Operation Ariesandotheroperationsduringthefinalstageofconflict.There 1996. Itisnotdifficulttoseethatthismanualreflectsthestrategyappliedin and whichwefoundinaneditionofacommandtrainingmanualdatedJanuary subversivos enelPerú,ME41-7-B) in Peru(Contrasubversión-DoctrinayprocedimientosAplicacióncontralosmovimientos Anti-Subversion —DoctrineandproceduresApplicationagainstSubversiveMovements theaters ofoperations. he haddirectcontrol,whichwasunconnectedwithothereventsinthefronts’ intelligence workbyusingaparallelstructureofspecialoperationsoverwhich of Staffand,ultimately, theSIN.Montesinoshaddiscouragedanddisrupted commando groupsthatcarriedoutdirectordersfromtheSIE,DINTE,JointChiefs drug-trafficking firms,concentratedactionandfundsinthehandsofairborne whether tostrikeatdrugtraffickersalliedwiththePCP-SLorfavorcertain by LimaortheDEA-supportedpolicebaseinSantaLucía.Specialoperations, To combatthis,the Army preparedanti-subversivecompanies that Operation Arieswasthearmedforces’frontaloffensiveagainst The manualemphasizesthepsycho-socialaspectsoffightagainst The changeinmilitarystrategyisreflectedtheArmymanualentitled , whichwasapprovedbyNicolásHermozaRíos, revolutionary ideology,revolutionary and the Not surprisingl y, thepsycho-socialtactics, section on Ecuadorian campaign. IttooktheArmy nearlytwoweekstomobilize tothe conditions underwhichthe Peruviansfoughtcontrastedwiththewell-prepared with armedconfrontations continuinguntilMarchofthatyear. Thedifficult unfortunate conflictbetween Peru andEcuador, whicheruptedinJanuary1995, the armedforcesforpolitical gain.Examplesincludetheeventssurrounding providing supportdayafterday. exactly amilitarygovernment,butwhichcommitted thearmedforcesto enabled himtotoleratethefrustrationofsupporting atyrannythatwasnot future bounties—andestablishingacertaindegree ofmilitaryleadershipthat something, sharinginMontesinos’economicbooty — andpriorityforacutof Czar BarryMcCaffreyoverthenextfewyears.Hermoza Ríosalsoobtained traffickers. Inthatrole,hewaspubliclyrecognized andpraisedbyU.S.Drug until fouryearsearlier:exclusivepursuerandselective godfatherofdrug and establishedhimselfintherolethatGeneralNoriega hadplayedinPanama Pérez deCuéllar. reorganization oftheoppositionaroundpresidential candidacyofJavier had beenthreatenedbyrevelationsabouttheColinaGroupand laid fortotalpacificationofthecountry. Thatincreasedhispopularity, which the PCP-SL’s lastbastionsintheHuallagaandthatgroundwork hadbeen the riverbanksandthathelicoptershadtobringinfuelburnthem. previous operation.Witnessestestifiedthatbodiesappearedbythedozensalong the armedforcesas«repentants.»Theresultwasahigherdeathtollthaninany helicopters thattoldlocalresidentstoleavetheareaandturnthemselvesin of theentireconflict.Themilitaryissuedanultimatum,droppingfliersfrom helping toreorganizeresistance.Theoperationwasthemostviolentandbloody operation consistedofeliminatingallgroupsresidentswhoweresuspected organization insomeofthevillagesatentrytoarea,butmain detained «repentant»militantsmade they werefacingaforcecouldnotresist.Theinformationprovidedbythe increase intheviolenceandmilitarypresencetomakePCP-SLmembersfeel location ofkeyenemypositions. detained. Duringtheweeksthatfollowed,theyprovidedinformationabout prepared awayintoPrimavera.SomeShiningPathmilitantshadalsobeen achieved theirgoal,althoughtheyhadtightenedanoosearoundCucharaand operation hadbeensuspendedandtheforceswithdrawnwithouthaving new ones,whichsoonfoundthemselvesinthesamesituation.Bymid-May, the but withcasualtiesmounting,thepatrolsthathadgoneintobereplacedby claiming victimswithouteverengaginginopencombat.Findingnoonetofight, that harriedthecommandoshourafterhour, firingfromthedensejungleand guard posts.ThePCP-SLmembersrespondedbyambushinginsmallgroups Commandos thensurroundedthezoneandadvanced,capturingShiningPath Fujimori wasalsopresent. The nextchapterdescribes otherwaysinwhichPresidentFujimoriused The resultwasthatFujimoriabletoannouncehehaddestroyed The secondphase,frommid-Junetomid-July,was characterizedbyan The firstphase,inAprilandMay1994,beganwithAirForceattacks. Montesinos gainedcontroloverthecoca-growing activities itpossibletodeactivate thePCP-SL’s 293 THE STATE SECURITY FORCES 294 PART ONE: THE TRAGEDY AND THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR IT Peru’s anti-drugpolicy, mentioningtheSIN in particularasoneofitsguiding cooperation withtheregime. InAugust1999,theUnitedStatespubliclypraised drugs andrenewedaidfor thatpurpose.Therewerenoobstaclestocontinued however,Peru theUnited Statesrepeatedlygave highmarksinthefightagainst the government steppedupitseffortstoremainin power. At thesametime, activities. arms purchasesand,intheprocess,embezzleanddivert publicfundsintoillicit clique headedbyFujimori,MontesinosandHermoza Ríosachancetomakenew it createdconfusion.TheconflictwithEcuadorgave thepresidential-military armed forces.Theamnestythrewjusticeoutthewindow. Besidesbeingoffensive, 13, 1992,andmorerecentcasesofseriousoffenses against thenationand the convictionsforattemptedmilitarycoupagainst FujimorionNovember committed duringthefightagainstterrorism.At sametime,itstruckdown a generalamnestylawthateliminatedconvictionsand indictmentsforcrimes and thepeacefuloutcomeofCenepaconflict.InJune 1995,Congressapproved military courtsfoundonlylower-ranking officersguilty. many areasbeforethatparticularcasecametolight.Itcausedascandal,butthe campaign. Suchmilitaryproselytismforthegoverningpartyhadbeenseenin and troopsinasortofcivicmilitaryoperationsupportFujimori’s electoral Fujimori’s printedelectoralpropaganda.Hewas accompaniedbymanyofficers General HowardRodríguez,headoftheFirstMilitaryRegion,distributing of theregime’ will, encouraginginthemandhispoliticalsupportersafalselypatriotichatred aware ofthetruesituation,Fujimoricontinuedtobendarmedforceshis By linkingthemilitary’s honor that theywouldrisktheirlivesagainagainstanyonewhobelievedtheopposite. their lives intheconflict,Fujimori’s lieturnedintoafirmconviction,sosolid attention fromwhathadreallyhappenedinTiwinza.Forthosewhorisked in March,whichfavoredpeace,andthepresidentialelectionsAprildiverted disadvantageous positionsandtheirsupplylineshadbeencut.Diplomaticefforts When thecease-fireordercame,Peruvianadvanceforceswerein February 14.Infact,TiwinzahadnotbeenunderPeruvianmilitarycontrol. victory hehaddecidedtodeclareaunilateralcease-fireasofnoonT Peruvian forceshadroutedtheEcuadoriansthere,andthatbecauseof target and,inthemiddleofcombat,madesurpriseannouncementthat support thewareffort.HesingledoutTiwinzapostasadecisivemilitary forces sufferedgreatlybecauseofthelackfood,waterandmedicalattention. pilots toturnaroundwithinthecombatzoneeverytimetheyenteredit.Ground order hadbeengivennottoenterEcuadorianairspace,whichforcedPeruvian comparison tothenewanti-aircraftsystemitfaced,butmainlybecause suffered manycasualties,partlybecauseofitstechnologicallimitationsin point atwhichitcouldattackEcuadorianpositions.ThePeruvianAirForce International politicalquestioning oftheFujimoriregimeintensifiedas Fujimori tookadvantageoftheupsurgeinpopularity from hisre-election Months beforetheconflict,inSeptember1994,journalistshadcaught Fujimori visitedthetheaterofoperationsmoreforpoliticalgainthanto s democraticcritics. with afalsehoodthatwas unacceptabletoanyone uesday, publicized escape throughawindowtoavoid thepress.FromMiami, wheresheis was investigatedbyCongress, wherehisappearancewasmarkedbyhighly head ofthatgroup, Army MajorSantiagoMartinRivas, whohadreceivedamnesty, Carles Talledo, aformer SINinformant,disclosedtheColinaGroup’s activities.The operations usingmilitarypersonnel underthedirectcommandofSIN.Mesmer showed thatitwas capableofattackingthe first ofhisrighttofreedomexpressionandthen hiscitizenship,theregime businesspeople andeventheconservativemediafeelinsecure. BystrippingIvcher dangerous itsauthoritarianandanti-democratic mindsetwasandmade most dailynewspapersandradiotelevisionstations. own televisionstationsinPeru.Therewasanimmediate outragedresponsefrom would alsolosecontroloftheTVstation,becauseforeigners arenotpermittedto National Securityandtheinterestsofstate.»IfIvcher losthisnationality, he the nationalitygrantedtoforeigncitizensis — orlosePeruvian nationality. Law,Nationality whichoutlinesthe requi May 28theMinistryofInteriorpublishedenablingregulationsfor personal behaviorwithnocriminalchargesortrial.To round outthethreat,on Ivcher becamethefirstPeruviantomeritamilitarycommuniquéabouthis the generalsmeantwhentheyspokeofa«biasedcampaignwithevilintentions,» through asupplycompanyhealsoowned.Althoughnooneknewexactlywhat etc.). Ivcheralsohadtiestothearmedforcesbecauseofaseriescontracts accusations againstit(suchasMontesinos’income,theLeonorLaRosacase, station inwhichIvcherwasamajorityshareholderbeganbroadcastingserious After havingfaithfullysupportedtheadministrationforyears,television Staff issuedacommuniquéagainstBaruchIvcher, anaturalizedPeruvian citizen. bitter anddestructivewassetinmotion.OnMay23,1997,theJointChiefsof that itwas hisbirthday. Lima withthepresidentofJointChiefsStaff,HermozaRíos,onpretext heads ofthesixmilitaryregions,wholefttheirbasessimultaneouslyandmetin in hispost.Thearmedforces’responsewasanunprecedentedmeetingofthe whether theHermozaRíos,presidentofJointChiefsStaff,shouldremain operation. InDecember, Fujimori Montesinos, HermozaRíosagainclaimedcreditforhavingmastermindedthe in October1997attheUniversityofPacific,aneventattendedbyVladimiro the oldproblemofmilitary’s subjugationtoFujimori. At abookpresentation Ríos overwhoshouldgetthecredit,resultinginafallingoutthatexacerbated years thatfollowedtherewasabitterdisputebetweenFujimoriandHermoza contributed tothegovernment’s residence sinceDecember17,1996,wasthelastmilitaryoperationthat freed thehostageswhohadbeenheldbyMRTA intheJapaneseambassador’s forces. In 1998,therewasaseries ofaccusationsandinvestigationsintospecial Instead ofboostingthegov At thesametimeasthatfallingout,anotherprocesswasevenmore The successfulOperationChavíndeHuántaronApril22,1997,which Under Article 12,onejustificationforrescinding prestige, aswilllaterbeseen,althoughinthe ernment’s image,the let the press know that he was weighing let thepressknowthathewas most basicprinciplesofmodernsociety. rements forforeigncitizenstoobtain «commission ofactsthatcouldaffect Ivcher caserev ealed how 295 THE STATE SECURITY FORCES 296 PART ONE: THE TRAGEDY AND THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR IT March 12,1999,the General CésarSaucedo.AsasignthatHermozaRíoshadfallenintodisgrace,on pillars oftheregimesincecouponApril5,1992.HewasreplacedbyArmy considering thathehadwieldedalargepartofthestate’s powerandbeenoneofthe commander generalofthe however, thePNPgotwhatitwanted. population, thelegislaturehadnevergrantedrequest.Withdecreelaws, public order. Becausethiscouldhavebeenusedtoharassandblackmailthe power todetainsuspectsforup48hourspoliceinvestigationormaintain had repeatedlyrequestedthattheorganiclawgoverningtheirworkgivethem National PoliceofPerutosimplifythetasksarrestandinvestigation.Thepolice measures —anotherofMontesinos’successescoincidedwithademandfromthe the development ofthedemocraticrulelaw detailed reportshowingmostofthosenormstobeunconstitutionalandcontrary sweeping packageofdecreelaws.TheHumanRightsOmbudsmanpresenteda special powerstoissuelegislationinthisarea,andthepresidentrespondedwitha that hadbeeninventedtocombatterrorism.Congressgrantedtheexecutivebranch and criminaloperationsapplytoothercrimesthesamesummaryprocedures sense ofinsecuritybecausecommoncrimetobroadentheSIN’s power in police the fightagainstcrime.Theideawas totakeadvantage ofthepopulation’s general announced thattheSINandarmedforcesintelligenceserviceswouldalsolead to continueexpandingthepowersofpresidentandSIN.PresidentFujimori and blackmailingelectoralinstitutions,oppositioncandidatesthepress. in hiding,formerArmyintelligenceagentLuisaZanattaaccusedtheSINofpressuring the cohesionthathadresulted fromthecoup. been dismissed,theyapparently believedthatsupportforthecurrentregimelacked Since HermozaRíos,whohad led line arosefromthedeepinsecurity feltbyMontesinosandthenewcommanders. officers signanagreementtocondemnandpunishanyone whorefusedtotoethe forces. sign theagreementandstampitwithsealoftheir branchesofthesecurity national policewhowereinthecountry, aswell as SINpersonnel,sothatallcould 19, therewasameetingofthetopactive-dutyofficers ofthearmedforcesand included acondemnationofBaruchIvcher’s armed forces’imageorcastdoubtonthevictoryover terrorism.Theagreement 5, 1992,coupandtheamnestylawsrejectinganymoves thatwouldtarnishthe Montesinos. Thepurposeofthemeetingwastosignan agreement backingtheApril attended bytoppoliceofficialsandSINrepresentatives, includingVladimiro harm tothecountry, violationoffreedom attorney’s officein On August20,1998,NicolásHermozaRíoswasrelievedofhisdutiesas Unlike HermozaRíos,Montesinosrespondedtothestormwithaboldplan These werethearmedforces thatpresentedAlbertoFujimoriwiththe That event was symptomaticofregime’s fatigue.Theneedtomakeallthe The nextday, onMarch13,theJointChiefsofStaffheldaspecialsessionalso Lima toinvestigateHermozaRíosforthecrimesofrebellion, Attorney General’s Officeorderedthe46thprovisionaldistrict Army. Thedismissalwas surprisinglydiscreetandspeedy, the military’s support for expression andabuseofauthority. activities. A . Unfortunately, it few dayslater, on March the April 5coup,had had littleeffect.The a last-ditchefforttoinflateFu Montesinos asheandFujimoridescribedtheresultsofOperationSiberia.Itwas appeared ontelevisionin August oftheregime’s Elecciones June 7,2000,fivedaysbeforetheNationalElectionsBoard( insignia ofsupremecommanderandhailedhimaspresidenttherepublicon Fujimori’s congressionalbloc. Montesinos bribingCongressmanAlbertoKouritoswitchloyaltiesandjoin catastrophe forhispowerstructurethenightopponentsairedavideoshowing over hisownmedia,revealedbytheoutcomeofOperationSiberia,turnedintoa other informationthatwasbiasedorblatantlyfalse.Montesinos’lossofcontrol Peru andColombia,whichMontesinoshadappropriatedinbadfaith,adding Colombia, becauseitconsistedonlyofinformationthathadbeensharedbetween Siberia waspromptlyunmaskedasafarcebythecountriesimplicated,especially to defeatthecountry’s enemiesthroughspecialintelligenceoperations.Operation and thetopmilitarycommanders,byflauntingasupposedextraordinaryability ) declaredthathehadwonathirdterm.Thenewcommandersalso jimori’s popularity, final year, flankingVladimiro in alliancewithMontesinos Jurado Nacionalde 297 THE STATE SECURITY FORCES

the basisfortheirlegitimacy despitemanyclearillegalities. the armed forcescreditforthe victoryover which theyclaimedforthemselves, theNationalIntelligenceServiceand presidential adviserVladimiro Montesinosengagedinpropagandatactics abuses andhumanrights violationsmentionedearlier. Thegovernmentand main reasonswhythegovernmentenjoyedhighpublic acceptancedespitethe translated intoacollectivesenseofsecurityandorder afterchaos,wasoneofthe structure werethemostnotablepartsofthatdefeat.The victoryoversubversion, their topleadersandthedestructionoforganization andleadership which thesubversiveorganizationssufferedastrategic defeat.Thearrestof country’s history. presided overaregimeinwhichcorruptionreached levelsrarelyseeninthe third term.Hisgovernmentcollapsedafterscandals revealedthathehad plagued byfraud,irregularitiesandabuses,Fujimori wasunabletocompletea administration’s contrary totheprovisionsof1993Constitutionthathadbeenhisown accentuated evenfurtherwhenheinsistedonrunningforathirdtermin2000, government was the 1979Constitution.Althoughhewasre-electedin1995,duringthattimehis judicial branchesofgovernmentandassumedpowersnotgrantedtohimunder the supportofarmedforces,hestagedacoupagainstlegislativeand elections, FujimoribecamethedefactoheadofstateonApril5,1992,when,with Alberto FujimorigovernedPerufrom1990to2000.Choseninfree As hasbeenexplained inthetwo precedingchapters, however, theCVR Nevertheless, Fujimori’s administrationcoincidedwiththe years in ALBERTO authoritarian andviolatedtheruleoflaw. Thosetraitswere brainchild. Alt FUJIMORI’S ADMINISTRATIONS CHAPTER 5 hough hewonthoseelections,whichwere PCP-SL and the MRTA, usingthisas 299 ALBERTO FUJIMORI’S ADMINISTRATIONS 300 PART ONE: THE TRAGEDY AND THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR IT T solve theproblemhadbeenlost. had beencarelessinanti-subversiveeffortsandtheopportunitytodecisively president andhiscohortsofaharshcrackdownonterrorism,theadministration emphasizing strictlypoliticalobjectives,anddespiteannouncementsbythe of thedecadeandFujimori’s secondadministrationdemonstratedthatby state apparatus,wereresponsibleforserioushumanrightsviolations.Theend close collaborationwithVladimiroMontesinosandtightcontroloverthe strategy.military TheCVR has government that weredecisiveinthestrategicdefeatofterrorismdidnotcomefrom significant successes,astheCVR’s from the«officialtruth»thatwasconstructedin1990s.Althoughtherewere found thattherealstoryofdefeatsubversiveorganizationsisdifferent president, thatmilitaryregi not besusceptibletopolitical wear andtear. As thepower behind theelected secret militaryregimewith realpoweror«strategicdominance»thatwould 1990. Thisplan,whichbecame knownas«PlanVerde,» involved establishinga and civiliansplannedacoup aimedatestablishinga«directeddemocracy»in premeditated. Allofthisalsodemandedareadjustment ofstateinstitutions. of humanrightsviolationsthat, operations and,aboveall,intelligencework,andalso includedtheperpetration than thedemocraticregimeitself.Thenewstrategy emphasizedpsycho-social based ontheneedsofwar:«theanti-subversiveeffort» wasahigherobjective subversion. Thisredesignmeantthatthearmedforces weredefiningstatepolicy the armedforcesbeganredefiningtheirownfocus forthefightagainst however, thenewpresidentputotherpoliciesintopractice. his opiniontheywerethe«breedingground»ofsubversion.Onceinoffice, his strategywould focusm subversion —atruenationalpriorityatthetimeFujimorimaintainedthat and distancedhimselffromeconomicliberalism.Ontheissueoffighting to establishingaliberaleconomicregime,Fujimoridefendedgradualadjustment While Vargas Llosaproposeda 90 Front ( facing offinarunoffelection:MarioVargas Llosa,candidateoftheDemocratic for García’s successorwas highlycontentious provinces andonedistrictunderastateofemergency. Theelectoralcampaign with annualinflationin1989runninghigherthan2,775percentand65 The Garcíaadministrationleftthecountryinadeepeconomicandsocialcrisis, HE ). Theirplatformsweresharplyantagonistic,reflectingthefeelingsofvoters. A RMED Frente Democrático,FREDEMO The planincludedadjustment policiestostophyperinflationandmake As mentionedintheprecedingchapter As hasbeenindicated,duringthelastyearsofGarcía administration, F ORCES AND THE NEWGOVERNMENT per se , andsometimesrancountertothegovernment’smainly ainly onattacking«hungerandmisery,» becausein me would effectivelygovern also foundthattheFujimoriadministrations,in severe macroeconomicadjustmentasaprelude Final Report ), andAlbertoFujimoriofChange90( while fewer innumber,would bemore and thisbookpointout,theactions , in1989agroupofmilitaryofficers and endedwithtwo candidates thecountry. Cambio Those changes occurred,butwithoutconsensus amongthearmed forcesand cleared forchangingthe security forcesandmodifyingpowerrelationships. threat ofacoupneutralized andthetopcommanderschanged,waywas the topcommandersof Navyand Air Force,butnotthe Army. With the the newgovernment. As of thepolitical-militaryplan wasmarkedbytensionsandrumorsofplotsagainst The negotiationbetweenmilitaryleadersandthepresident-elect overadoption T the topleadersofsubversiveorganizations. Group ( they begandoingspecializedintelligenceworkthrough theSpecialIntelligence they weresubordinatetothepolitical-militarycommands. Attheysametime, responsible forhumanrightsviolations. to maneuver, whichmeant,amongotherthings,impunity formilitarypersonnel strategy thatwasbeingdirectedbythearmedforcesandgavethembroadroom Constitution. First,Fujimoriacceptedthecontinuationofanti-subversive was laidforincreasingmilitarypowerwithoutthecontrolsmandatedby political-military planwasalsoareactiontothatsituation. beanintensificationoftheShiningPath’swhich would terroristactions.The on hisorganizationtheideaof«strategicequilibrium,»mostvisibleeffect extremes. In1989,asdetailedinearlierchapters,AbimaelGuzmánhadimposed Montesinos. somewhat throughtheintervention—andself-interestofVladimiro implementation of«PlanVerde,» althoughitskeypointshadbeentouchedup macroeconomic «shock»thathehadpromisedtoavoid.Thusbeganthe quickly agreedtoputthepointsofplanintopractice,beginningwith residence atamilitaryfacilityonthepretextthathislifewasindanger. He that plan.Beforehetookoffice,thearmedforcesconvincedFujimoritotakeup was avacuumthatcouldbefilledbythepolitical-militaryplan. lack ofapoliticalparty, theabsenceofarealplanforgoverning thecountry. It circumstances surroundingthepresident-elect:lackofpoliticaldefinition, have appearedtobeacoupagainstthepeople. percentage oftheelectoratevotingagainstamacroeconomicadjustment—would that amilitaryuprisingunderthosecircumstances—withanappreciable that ofFREDEMOforcedtheconspiratorstosuspendtheirplans.Theythought legal conditionsfavorabletomilitaryandintelligenceoperations. be sustainedwithoutnewloans.Italsoincludedreformstocreatepoliticaland the countrycredit-worthyagain,becausefightagainstsubversioncouldnot HE FIRSTDECISIONS Grupo EspecialdeInteligencia Under thismodel,thepolicefollowedtwopaths.In emergencyzones, Once Fujimoriacceptedcertaincentralideasoftheplan,groundwork By thetimenewgovernmenttookoffice,violencehadreached With VladimiroMontesinos’help,thepresident-electwasaskedtoadopt Soon, however, thecoupplotterssawnewopportunitiesin The riseofFujimoriandhiselectoralvictoryonaplatformcontraryto a result,thegovernment’s firstdecisionwas toreplace , GEIN),aunitinDIRCOTE,focusingonarresting 301 ALBERTO FUJIMORI’S ADMINISTRATIONS 302 PART ONE: THE TRAGEDY AND THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR IT never investigatedthecasesandnoonewaseverheld responsible. University oftheCenterPeru,inHuancayo, 1990 and1991.Authorities including theforceddisappearanceofseveraldozen studentsattheNational that hadexistedunderPresidentsBelaundeandGarcía. Thereweremanycases, Peru’s reinsertionintofinancialcircuits. the newrequirementssetbyU.S.government,whose supportwasvitalfor respecting andprotectinghumanrights.To agreatextent,thiswas aresponseto Absalón Vásquez. such asSantiagoFujimori(the with Montesinosplayingaleadingrole,alongothergovernment«advisers,» sectors ofthearmedforces.Thecliquethatwas formedheldthe«realpower,» supported bypoliticalfiguresoperatingintheshadowsandalliancewith which togovern.Thatraisedthepossibilityofrulingwithahiddenregime Beyond that,thegovernmenthadnointentionofbuildingapoliticalpartywith related totheeconomicprogramandwithAPRAonthoseofpoliticalinterest. to establishpragmaticalliancesonveryspecificissues:withFREDEMOissues in thelowerhouseand14(18percent)Senate.Thatforcedgovernment have amajorityinCongress.Hisparty, Change90,won only32seats(28percent) office. the electionandwhichhehadevendemonstratedinhisfirstfewmonths distancing himselffromtheimageofconsensus-builderwithwhichhehadwon more intunewiththestepshehadtaken.Inpoliticalarena,thatmeant initial collaborators—professionalswithtiestotheleftandformingateam part ofthegovernment’s attentionin1990and1991. and tradestructure,therecoveryofinternationalcredittookupasignificant country’s economicstabilization,theshifttoward aliberalmodelinthefinancial which wasimplementedwithoutsettingupemergencysocialprograms.The Minister JuanCarlosHurtadoMillerinAugust.Itwasasevereadjustment, an economicadjustment«shock»plan,whichwasannouncedbyFinance meanwhile, wereputundermilitarycontrol. favored thenewgovernment’s relationshipwiththe Army. Thepolice, police, becausefromtheoutsettherewasinterferenceMontesinos,who universities, mainlyLaCantuta andSanMarcos.Theyalsoexpandedtoward income neighborhoodseast ofLima,suchasHuaycánandRaucana,national chapter explained,in1990 theanti-subversiveactionswereexpandedtolow- and July31,1992,would be the«recoveryofcriticalareas.»Asprevious - 1990-1995.» In early1990s,thearmed forces drewupthe«Anti-subversionCampaignPlan I MPLEMENTATION OF In fact,however, therewas stilla tendencytoperpetuatetheimpunity In thoseearlymonths,thegovernmenttookapublicstanceinfavorof governments,earlier Unlike Alberto Fujimori’s administrationdidnot While thiswastakingplace,PresidentFujimorigettingridofhis While thesechangeswerebeingintroduced,thegovernmentlaunched According totheplan’s tim THE AN TI-SUBVERSIVE STRATEGY president’s brot eline, thetaskbetween August 1,1990, AND IMPUNITY AND her), Augusto Antonio li and forced officerswhosupported theinstitutionalstructureintoretirementor and intelligenceaffairs,made decisivechangesintheArmybyApril5,1991.He figurehead. Montesinos,who hadbecomethepresident’s onlyadviseronmilitary Julio SalazarMonroe,a military officerwillingtoaccepthisconditions, a forces. Montesinossoonbecame therealheadofSIN,wherehemadeGeneral Nacional build hisownpowerbaseintheNationalIntelligenceService ( proposal forcombatingsubversion. core ofthegovernment—cliqueadvisers was preparingarigidlegal continued tohammeroutconsensusonastrategyfor pacification,thehidden shift frompragmaticcooperationtoconfrontation.And whilethepoliticalforces up histacticofunderminingthepublicimageCongress. Whatfollowedwasa lost thepresidencyofbothhouseslegislature.In July1991,Fujimoristepped and theoppositioninCongress,however, andtheseintensifiedwhenChange90 strategy.»subversive Tensions were Political Accordwassignedfor«thedesignofacomprehensive,democraticanti- be formedtoconsolidatethemainagreementsonpacification.InJuly, aNational it wasannouncedthatacommissionoffourpoliticalpartyrepresentativeswould investment andjobcreationforaperiodof150days. the powertolegislateonpacification,reorganizationofstate,private proposal asaguarantee,inearlyJuneCongressgrantedtheexecutivebranch stated theproposalpresentedtocountry’s politicalparties.With that subversive groupsdoesnotjustifythecommissionofabusesbystateagents,» and humanrights.«Themassivemercilessviolationofrightsby pacification thatstressedtheimportanceofstrictrespectforconstitutionalnorms consensus amongpoliticalforces.InMay1991,itannouncedaproposalfor government announceditscommitmenttorespecthumanrightsandseek As partofthestrategytogainfinancialsupportfromUnitedStates, T connected withthemassacreinAndeancommunityofCayara. prison massacre,andBrigadierGeneralJoséRolando of ArmyBrigadierGeneralJorgeRabanalPortilla,whowaslinkedtothe1986 courts. Oneindicationofthistrendwas military andpoliceactionsintheemergencyzoneswouldbehandledby was alreadydeveloping.OnDecember23,1990,thegovernmentdecreedthat oversight bydemocraticinstitutions. A systemofimpunity, althoughincipient, forces —withthegovernment’s encouragement—thereforesoughttoeliminate violations thatweredenouncedbyvariouscivilianorganizations.Thearmed San MartínandUcayali. freed fromthePCP-SL,andnortheastwardtococa-growingzonesofHuánuco, the easternpartofJunín,toEneRiver, wherehundredsof Asháninkas were OWARD From thetimeFujimoritookoffice,VladimiroMontesinos hadsoughtto After thethirdmeetingofcountry’s politicalforcesattheendofJune, The expansionincludedselectivekillingsandotherhumanrights , SIN).Thisenabledhimto extendhisinfluenceandpowertothearmed T HE C OUP: THE LEGISLATIVE DECREESOFNOVEMBER already appearingbetw the Senate’s approval of Valdivia Dueñas,whowas 1991 Servicio deInteligencia een thegovernment the promotions 303 ALBERTO FUJIMORI’S ADMINISTRATIONS 304 PART ONE: THE TRAGEDY AND THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR IT Operational CommandoftheInternalFront( president fortheperiodoftimehedeemedappropriate.Italsocreated generals andheadoftheJointChiefsStafftobeappointeddirectlyby structure. Amongthemostimportantchanges,itcalledforcommanding Decree 743—theNationalDefenseSystemLawcreatedanewdefense pacification andmadesweepingchangesinsecurity-relatedagencies.Legislative been granted,thegovernmentissued120decrees,35ofwhichinvolved —commandergeneralofthe year Army. who backedMontesinos’intentions,includingthecoupplannedforfollowing the decisiveblowbyhavingFujimorinameGeneralNicolásHermozaRíos— antagonism betweentheexecutiveandlegislativebranches,Montesinosstruck budget ofthemilitaryandpoliceintelligence intelligence communitysothatitcouldcentralizeandcontroltheactivities included inthepolitical-militaryplan,was toraisetheSIN’s rankwithinthe reach intothemostremoteplaces.Partofhisproposal,whichwasnotexplicitly efficient anti-subversivestrategyrequiredanintelligenceapparatusthatwould interests oftherealheadSIN.MontesinosconvincedFujimorithatan and expandingtheirresponsibilitiesinthefight against drugtrafficking. military commands,furtherdetailingthepolitical-military commands’scope local governments.ItalsoreiteratedthatthePNPwas subordinate tothepolitical- personnel providedbypoliticalofficialsofpublic agencies andregional would haveeconomicandfinancialresources,goods andservices,aswell of theirpowertododevelopmentworkintheareas undertheirjurisdiction, commands intheemergencyzones.Itestablishedthat thosecommands,aspart secret. LegislativeDecree749broadenedtheprerogatives ofthepolitical-military respond directlyandexclusivelytotheSIN,itmade theintelligencebudget also createdintelligencebodiesinministriesandpublic agenciesthatwould any informationitrequested,withcriminalpenalties fornon-compliance.It SIN broadpowersandrequiredpublicprivateagenciestoprovideitwith Legislative Decree746—theNationalIntelligenceSystemLawgranted leaders ofthearmedforcesandpolice,withnopoliticaloversight(Article26). COFI), whichreportedtothepresidentofJointChiefsStaffandconsisted requirements ofthearmedforces’ on pacificationthatwould beissuedinNovember. Theserespondedtocertain in thejudiciaryandPublicMinistryor Attorney General’s Office. network inthe Army, whichhadadissuasive effectasheextendedhisinfluence considered moremalleable.Atthesametime,heorganizedhisownespionage dispatched themtobureaucraticpostsandreplacedwithotherswhomhe the military. Thepurpose culmination ofalongprocess ofabdicationdemocraticauthorityinfavor anti-subversive strategythat hadbeenestablishedin1989andmarkedthe drug trafficking. According tothedecree,this wouldguaranteetheeliminationofterrorismand With onlyafewdaysleftunderthespeciallegislativepowersithad In June1991,Montesinostookchargeofpreparingthelegislativedecrees These andotherdecreescreated thelegalframeworkforandratified of themaneuver was toensurethat Congressdidnot anti-subversive Comando OperativodelFrenteInterno services. InDecember, amidopen strategy, but especially tothe 1 , 1 an emptyformalitythatitusedtobuytimeuntilits secretplansmatured. turned againtomulti-partyconsensus-buildingschemes, buttheyweremerely automatically tookeffectwhenthe30-dayreviewperiod expired. by thelegislatureexceptthatone.Thedecreesnot reviewedbyCongress legislative decrees.Fujimorifinallysignedallthedecrees thathadbeenmodified expressed hissupportforthepacificationstrategy setoutinthepresident’s Chief ofStafftheArmedForces,NicolásdeBariHermozaRíospublicly the government.Inresponse,afewdaysafterbeingappointedtoheadJoint to modify743,theNationalDefenseSystemLaw, whichwas very importantto pacification —andmodifyoroverturnthem.Nevertheless,Congressmanaged remaining decrees—therewere120inall,notjustthoseassociatedwith bills thepresidenthadvetoed.Evenso,timewastooshorttoreview legislative sessionbetweenJanuary20andFebruary3,1992,toexaminethe to resolvetheproblem.Givencrisis,Congresscalledanextraordinary Law for1992,whichblockeditfrombecominglawasCongresscouldnotmeet last dayoftheyear, Fujimori overturning thedecreesandrefusedtosignthemintolaw. Inaddition,onthe institutions. problem wasthatthenormremovedSINfromalloversightbydemocratic At 10:30p.m.onApril5,1992,theconstitutionalpresident oftherepublic,Alberto T andwould subversion exasperated theexecutivebranch,becausethiswascentraltoolforcombating Legislative themselves tobeingmisusedunderminecivilliberties.Therejectionof System. Becauseofthelackprecisionintheirterms,thosedecreeslent dissemination ofinformationobtainedorprocessedbytheNationalDefense money laundering,coveringupdrugtraffickingandtherevelationor that thecriminalcodewouldtakeeffect,and736,747762,whichpenalized struck downsixdecrees.Theseincluded731and764,whichpostponedthedate remaining beforetheendofordinarylegislativesessiononDecember15, Representatives organizedmulti-partycommissions,andinthefewdays decrees draftedbyFujimoriandMontesinos.TheSenateHouseof mid-December whenthe30-dayreviewperiodexpired. have timetoanalyzeallthedecrees,whichwouldautomaticallytakeeffectin HE APRIL Military Commandwithregardto thefightagainstterrorismanddrugtrafficking.” respective jurisdiction,whowill carryouttheinstructionsandordersissuedbyPolitical- command themembersofNational PoliceofPeruwhoprovideservicesinthezonesits Section a).LegislativeDecree749 statedthatitsresponsibilitiesincluded“havingunder of thearmedforcesandpolice initsjurisdictionand/orthoseassignedtoit”(Article5, Law 24150ofJune1985gavethepolitical-military commandresponsibilityfor“assuming The government’s intentionhadthusbeenblocked. Theadministration In response,thepresidentofficiallyobjectedtolegislature’s decisions Congress didnotshrinkfromthechallengeposedbylegislative 5 COUP:MEASURES AND IMPLICATIONS Decree 746,theNationalIntelligenceSystemLaw, was whatmost unilaterally increasetheexecutive made anumberofobjectionstotheGeneralBudget branch’s power. The 305 ALBERTO FUJIMORI’S ADMINISTRATIONS 306 PART ONE: THE TRAGEDY AND THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR IT according toitsownrules,bydecreeandwithnochecksorbalances. regime hadnearlyninemonths—fromApril1992toDecembergovern and itsmemberswereelectedonNovember22.Withnorealopposition,the the DemocraticConstituentCongress( Congress. ThoseelectionswerecalledonJune1.Theresultingbodywas OAS ministersduringwhichFujimoriannouncedelectionsforanewConstituent democratic, andonly21percentbelievedthatthepresidentshouldbeimpeached. percent ofthepopulationbelievedthatregimebeganonApril5was percent inagreementwiththerestructuringofjudiciary. Meanwhile, 51 with 71percentofthepopulationapprovingdissolvingCongressand89 community, however, thedefactoregimesettledin.Ithadstrongpublicsupport, incapacity. Despitetheseeffortsandinitialcondemnationfromtheinternational including anattempttoimpeachthepresidentongroundsofmoral Constitution. Reconstruction, whichcalled,amongotherthings,forthedraftingofanew first decreelaw, ofNational theFoundationalLawofEmergencyGovernment Raygada was sw Alfonso delosHeros.OnApril6,anewCabinetheadedbyÓscarlaPuente complete supportforthecoup.ThemoveledtoresignationofCabinetchief Chiefs ofStaffandtheNationalPoliceissuedastatementexpressingtheir Constitucionales who had surrendered. Decree Law 25564 (June 20,1992)loweredtheageof who hadsurrendered.Decree Law25564(June Legislative Decree748,which establishedtherepentancelawforsubversives anonymous or«faceless» judges. DecreeLaw25499(May16,1992)modified terrorism andexpandedsanctions inothercases,whileinstitutingtheuseof Law 25475(May6,1992) establishedthedeathpenaltyincertaincasesof for detentionandtrial—thatignoredthebasicguarantees ofdueprocess.Decree universities andsweepsthroughurbanareas,intensified civilactions. for peasantself-defensecommittees,permitted militaryinterventionin laws werealsosignedthatexpandedpolicecontrolin prisons,expandedsupport National IntelligenceSystemLawgrantingbroadpowers totheSIN.Decree into effect.InJuly, DecreeLaw25365reinstated,withsome modifications,the that hadbeenmodifiedorstruckdownbyCongress at theendof1991alsowent violating thesuspended1979Constitution.Legislative decreesonpacification laws thatsubstantiallymodifiedtheanti-terrorism legislation,insomecases On April5,1992,theFujimoriadministrationbeganenactingseriesofdecree G Magistratura the judiciary, theNational CouncilofMagistrates( Fujimori Fujimori,announcedthathewasdissolvingCongressandreorganizing OVERNING BYDECREE A fundamental factorintheregime’s stabilizationwas theassemblyof There werevariousreactionsfromthecongressionalopposition, Changes weremadetoanti-terrorismlegislation—the legalframework ), theConstitutionalGuaranteesTribunal ( ) andthePublicMinistry. Minuteslater, theheadsofJoint orn in.Thatsameday, DelaPuenteannouncedtheregime’s Congreso ConstituyenteDemocrático Consejo Nacionaldela Tribunal deGarantías , CCD) Under those circumstances, adefacto government thatpromised afirmhand created thesenseamongLima’s middleclassthatthePCP-SL mighttriumph. terrorism, includingthe car bombingonTarata StreetinMiraflores, which position thattheUnitedStates shouldtakeifthePCP-SL cametopower. to seizepower. Thatsameyear, theU.S. lack ofinternationalaidforthePeruviangovernment couldenablethePCP-SL U.S. assistantsecretaryofstateforWestern hemisphericaffairs, statedthatthe of thePeruvian international communitybecauseitappearedthatthe PCP-SLcouldgetthebest raids onsafehousesthatwouldleadto Abimael Guzmán’s arrest. and makesignificantarrests.Since1990,thepolice hadbeenfindingcluesin was producingimportantresults,enablingthegroups toamassinformation in self-defensecommittees.Atthesametime,policework bytheGEINandBREDET implementing since1989,supportedbytheruralpopulation thathadorganized areas, whichhadbeencausedbythestrategythat the armedforceshadbeen campaign, however,w ratcheted upitsviolencewithbrutalassassinationsinthecapital.Theurban followed. rather thandeterminingwhetherbasicnormsofdueprocesswerebeing military aid.Thosesteps,however, were aimedatprotectingthedetainees’ lives improved itscompliancewithrequirementsfornegotiatingU.S.economicand a recordofdetentionsandallowingtheRedCrossintodetentioncenters,Peru process began.Bydecreasingthenumberofdeathsanddisappearances,keeping decreased considerablyafter1993,anewstagemarkedbyviolationsofdue types ofhumanrightsviolations,suchasexecutionsanddisappearances, cost ofbasiccivicguaranteesasoccurredwiththedecreelaws.Whilecertain system wereneededtorespondthecrisis,suchastepcouldnotcomeat terrorism. Decree Law25728madeitpossibletoconvictdefendants under theMilitaryCodeofJusticeintrialstheateroperations.Finally, for judgingcrimesoftreasonandpermittedtheusesummaryprocedures president oftheJointChiefsStaff.DecreeLaw25708establishedprocedures Internal Front( norms andprocedurestothedirectivesofOperationalCommand agencies involvedincombatingsubversionanddrugtraffickingtoadapttheir emergency zonesandanti-subversive activity. DecreeLaw25626requiredall decrees ratifiedtopmilitaryprerogatives andexpandedthemilitary’s powerin limiting theaccusedperson’s abilitytomountadefense.Thissamegroupof judge civiliansaccusedofterrorism.Inaddition,itreducedthetrialtimeframe, terrorism. Inaclearlyunconstitutionalmove,italsoallowedmilitarycourtsto (August 13,1992)definedastreasoncertaincrimesthathadbeenconsidered criminal responsibilityfrom18to15forcrimesofterrorism.DecreeLaw25659 Such externalandinternal alarmwasbasedonlarge-scaleactsof Despite allthis,therewasgreatconcernnotonlyinPeru butalsointhe While thepoliticalprocessfollowedthatcourse,ShiningPath The CVRbelievesthatwhilespecificmeasuresandamodificationofthe Comando OperativodelFrenteInterno, government. InMarch1992inWashington,government. Bernard Aronson, as actuallytheflipsideofPCP-SL’s defeatinrural Congressheldpublichearings onthe COFI), whichwasrunbythe in absentia forcrimesof 307 ALBERTO FUJIMORI’S ADMINISTRATIONS 308 PART ONE: THE TRAGEDY AND THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR IT National IntelligenceService.Fujimori Asmat,» wasnotcoordinatedwiththepresident,interiorministeror not aware oftheeffort.Theoperation,code-named«PNP CaptainCarlosVerau as thefruitofitsallegednewstrategy. conceal itsemphasisonamilitarystrategy, information. Thatdidnotstopthegovernment,whichhadneverattemptedto work exclusivelybythepolice,basedontheiraccumulatedexperienceand detention ofotherimportantsubversiveleadersweretheresultdedicated Contrary tothegovernment’s claimsatthetime,Guzmán’s arrestandthe earlier especially theGEINandDIRCOTE,whichbythenwasknownasDINCOTE. members oftheCentralCommittee.Itwasgreatestachievementpolice, occurred: thedetentionofAbimaelGuzmánReinosoalongwiththreetop On September12,1992,theeventthatpressdubbed«thearrestofcentury» G received publicsupport. 3 2 against enemysecretagents —inotherwords,counterintelligenceoperations clearly excludeitfromcarrying outitsownundercoversecurityoperations and operatingplanskeepthemclassified.The SIN’s newpowers didnot congressional oversight.ItalsogavetheSINpower to establishitsownbudget placed itdirectlyunderthepresident,withno ministerial,judicialor and madetheSINitsdirectingbody. Thelawgave theSINbroadpowersand created theNationalIntelligenceSystem( centralize intelligenceinordertocombatsubversion. Thatdecreeformally 1992, grantedfullpowerstotheSINongrounds thatitwasnecessaryto series of«nationalpacification»decrees.DecreeLaw 25635,publishedJuly23, fight againstsubversion. ThishadbeendonebeforeGuzmán’s arrestwitha time ofGuzmán’s arrest. particular, itdidaw already publicizedthepolice’s s the nationandpresentedfirstimagesofGuzmán.DINCOTE,however, had made nostatementtothepressuntil11:30p.m.,whenhebroadcastamessage 1993, thegovernmentdismantled various membersofDINCOTEweretransferredtootherunitsandtasks.In sparked thegovernment’s rancortoward thepoliceunitsinvolved. Monthslater, authorization orsupport. UZMÁN’S ARREST The magazine CVR. InterviewwithaPNPofficer andformerGEINmember,February26,2003. (Desco. in Iquitoscarryingoutplannedsocial assistanceactivitiesinnativecommunitiestheAmazon In fact,Guzman’s arrestsurprisedtopgovernment officials,whowere The government,meanwhile,insistedongivingthe SINpowerinthe The factthatGuzmánwasarrestedwithoutpoliticalcoordination Resumen Semanal They [themilitary]willneverforgivethefactthatthiswasdonebypolice Sí reported thathewasfishingnear Colombia.Othermediareportedthathewas ay withtheGEIN(DIVICOTE-1),whichhad80agentsat , September9-15, 1992,No.686). uccess without several ofDINCOTE’s specialgroups.In 3 returnedtoLimaonSeptember13and Sistema NacionaldeInteligencia from presentingtheaccomplishment waiting for government , SINA) 2 an officialstatementonMay 12,theMinistryofInteriorannouncedthat35 operation lastedfourdays andendedwithahighdeathtollamonginmates.In Mónica prisoninChorrillos.Becauseofresistance fromtheprisoners, Canto Grande,withthegoaloftransferringmorethan 100womentotheSanta cellblocks holdingShiningPathmembersintheMiguel Castroprisonin some ofthetopShiningPathleadersimprisonedthere. government saidwas anefforttorestoreauthorityinthepenitentiary, eliminated government control,apoliceraidontheCastro Castro prison,whichthe institutions suchasthe Attorney General’s Officeandthejudiciaryunder functions. Amonthafterthecoup,withnoCongress andwithoversight management ofthecountry’s prisonsandrelatedestablishments,limitingINPE’s through thePNP—inchargeofinternalandexternalsecurityaswell Penitenciario government announcedthattheNationalPenitentiaryInstitute( population, especiallytheinmatesaccusedofterrorism.OnApril8, and SanPedro,beganimplementingreformstoreorganizetheprison Police tookchargeofthecountry’s two largestprisons,MiguelCastro discretionary powersinprisons.OnApril7,1992,ArmytroopsandtheNational had beengoingonforyears,requiredanimmediatesolution. schools. Bytheearly1990s,th subversion. Thiswastrueinthecaseofprisons,whichoperatedassubversive the military, prisons operations toareaswheretherehadpreviouslybeenrestrictions.According With its«comprehensi H disseminating anofficialversion of theCIA.With itsnewpower, theSINalsotookchargeofdevelopingand his leadingrolewasthecloserelationshipheestablishedwithrepresentatives were centralizedintheSIN.AnotherfactorthatenabledMontesinostoshoreup DINCOTE’s bestpoliceagentstoensurethat resources. Onepracticalconsequenceofthiswasthedecisiontoreplacesome Fujimori andconvincehimoftheneedtoexpandservice’s and power gave MontesinosanidealopportunitytodemonstratetheSIN’s effectivenessto Salinas SedóonNovember13,ninedaysbeforetheCCDelections.Theevent established afterthefailedmilitarycoupagainstFujimoriledbyretiredGeneral services. — alongwithitstasksofcoordinatingandmonitoringthemilitaryintelligence 4 UMAN RIGHTSVIOLATIONS AFTER THE COUP police begin. he tookchargeoftheJointChiefs ofStaffinlate1991didthetransfernewstrategyto Some policeofficershavesaidthat GeneralNicolásHermozaRíosmaintainedthatonlywhen On May6,thepoliceoperationcalled«Transfer One»beganinthe Legislative Decree734,issuedinNovember1991,gavethemilitary The powerofMontesinos—and,therefore,theSIN—becamefirmly , INPE)wasbeingreorganizedandputtheMinistryofInterior— and publicuniv ve strategy,» is was morethanclear,is andtheproblem,which 4 of«pacification.» the government expandedanti-subversive ersities were two the tasks,informationandpower of themainbastions Instituto Nacional 309 ALBERTO FUJIMORI’S ADMINISTRATIONS 310 PART ONE: THE TRAGEDY AND THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR IT victims, prisoners accusedofterrorismhaddied. Altogether, however, therewere 41 5 selective eliminationaspartofth been carriedoutearlierattheNationalUniversityofCenterPeru,where nine studentsandaprofessor. Theoperationwas differentfromthosethathad better knownasLaCantuta,endingwiththeabductionanddisappearanceof on July18,1992,inastudentdormitoryatEnriqueGuzmányValle University, powers inuniversities.Itwasthiscontextthatamilitaryincursionoccurred modified, butwhichFujimorienactedwithitsoriginallanguageafterthecoup. or apolitical-militarycommand.ThatwasoneofthedecreesthatCongresshad more thanauthorizationfromtheMinistryofDefense,Interior the armedforcesandNationalPolicetogointoalocaluniversitywithnothing of suchacrime.»LegislativeDecree726,issuedinNovember1991,authorized requirements incases«[...]offlagrantcrimeorimminentdangerperpetration campuses bycourtorderandattherequestofrector, buteliminatedthose Fujimori administrationallowedtheNationalPolicetogoontouniversity Trujillo, ElviaNilaSanabriaPach Politburo, andothermembersoftheCentralCo and secretlyburiedbyamilitary deathsquadoperatingwiththeapprovaland stating thatthe10people who haddisappearedbeenabducted,murdered (the «SleepingLion»)sent oppositionCongressmanHenryPeaseadocument what hadhappenedatLaCantuta.OnApril3,agroup callingitself« expressions. Inearly1993,informationbegantofilter fromtheArmyabout evident withthecoupattemptonNovember13,1992, soonfoundotherpublic Discontent withtheregimeinonesectorofarmed forces,whichbecame the knowledgeandapprovalofPresidentFujimori VladimiroMontesinos. decision-making structure,thosecrimescouldnothave beencommittedwithout Pedro Yauri inHuaura, Lima,inJune1992. district ofElSanta,Ancash,inMay1992,andthedisappearance ofjournalist committed bythisgroupincludedthemurdersofnine peasantfarmersinthe committed amassacreinBarriosAltos,downtown Lima.Othercrimes perpetrators, thesquadknownasColinaGroup,whichbeforecouphad areas. Itsoonbecameknownthatthesehadbeencarriedoutbythesame disappearances —hadoccurredpreviouslyinmetropolitanLimaandnearby apparently unconnectedhumanrightsviolations—executionsand That wasnotthefirsttimethisoccurred,norwoulditbelast.Aseriesof agents whowerenotassignedtotheareaanddirectedbySIN. dozens ofstudents. the directionofpolitical-militarycommand,hadledtodisappearance CVR. Event10151401. The governmentissuedanewdecreelawexpandingthearmedforces’ The CVR believes thatbecauseof The CVRbelieves In contrast,theoperationatLaCantutawascarriedoutbyagroupofSIE 5 The universitylawthathadbeenineffectsincethebeginningof includingHugoDeodatoJuárezCruzatt,amemberofthePCP-SL’s e armedforces’ comprehensive eco andTitoValleTravesaño. the defactoregime’s mmittee, suchasYovanka Pardavé strategy, command and León Dormido under » 6 simply unknowntothelocalmilitarychiefs.This parallel structureenabled under directcontroloftheSINorJointChiefsStaff —wereoftenunclearor Joint ChiefsofStaff.Theobjectivesandpersonnelfor thespecialoperations— jurisdictions; thoseoperationswereorganizedanddirected bytheSINand military chiefswereconvincedtoallowspecialoperations totakeplaceintheir Nevertheless, thatispreciselywhatMontesinos did throughtheSIN.The or theheadofmilitaryregionanti-subversivefrontwheretheyoccurred. and couldnotbeplannedorcarriedoutbehindthebackofoperationschief Cantuta. case ofthedisappearanceandmurdersstudentsprofessoratLa ask questions,andtoallowthegroupoperate.Thatiswhathappenedin the operation—inotherwords,basicallytellinghimnottostickhisnoseor only themilitarychiefoffrontorzonesohewouldprovideguaranteesfor Inteligencia delEjército special missions,usingpersonnelfromtheArmyIntelligenceService( beginning inearly1990.Withthatbacking,theSINdeployeditsownforcesfor command anddirectlycommandedoperationsontheanti-subversivefronts Internal Front( approved bytheJointChiefsofStaff,whichasOperationalCommand orders ofthepresidential-militaryclique.TheseundercoverSINoperationswere operations nolongerfellwithinanti-subversiveefforts,butrespondedtothe personnel andgivingordersoutsidetheofficialchainofcommand,sothat Army GeneralRodolfoRoblespubliclyclaimedthattheSINwasusingmilitary T once acasehadbeenopenedinthemilitarycourts. rights violationsfromappearingbeforecongressionalinvestigativecommissions majority approvedamotionthatpreventedofficersimplicatedinallegedhuman tanks intothestreetinanactofintimidation.Finally, inMay, thecongressional denied thereport,orfrompresidentofJointChiefsStaff,whosent Reactions werenotlongincoming,eitherfromChange90lawmakers,who credibility wasquestioned«becauseithasnosealorsignature.» Congress appointedaninv support ofthetop Army commandersand HE truck orknowingwhereitwas headed. group, andlefthourslaterwithout thechiefofmilitarybaseexaminingwhatwasin access totheuniversityatnight. MartínRivas’truckenteredthecampus,carryingspecial of StaffandtheSIN.Heassigned thelieutenantandarrangedforspecialgrouptohave understanding thatitwasaspecial operationunderthedirectresponsibilityofJointChiefs subversive criminalswhowere beingsought.Thechiefofoperationsagreed,onthe recently beenstationedatthemilitary basethatcontrolledtheuniversityandcouldidentify asked whyithadtobethatlieutenantandnotanother,Rivasanswered thatthelieutenanthad residence hall,andthatheneededacertainlieutenantforthe operation. Whenthegeneral special operationwasgoingtobecarriedoutdetain““subversive criminals””attheuniversity Major MartinRivasappearedbeforeGeneralLuisPérezDocumet andinformedhimthata SIN ’S SPECIAL OPERATIONS Special intelligenceoperationswerepartofregularmilitary 6 Comando OperativodelFrenteInterno , SIE),andsentthemtothetheatersofoperations,notifying estigative commission, even thoughthedocument’s the SIN.Basedon , COFI)waspartofthechain Pease’ s charges, Servicio de 311 ALBERTO FUJIMORI’S ADMINISTRATIONS 312 PART ONE: THE TRAGEDY AND THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR IT operations was toterrorize prerogatives andfacultiesthathadbeengrantedtotheSIN.Thegoalofthese itself wasdeactivated,specialintelligenceoperationscontinuedbecauseofthe of democraticcontroloveranti-subversiveefforts.EvenaftertheColinaGroup its supportersandforcingthemtodefendpositionsthatimpliedacompletelack human rightsinapremeditated,systematicwaywiththegoalofradicalizing presidential-military powercliqueengagedinaseriesofactivitiesthatviolated the SIN. President Fujimori,whobylawwastheonlypersonresponsibleforsupervising with theapprovalofHermozaRíos,asheadallmilitarypersonnel,and the combatunitsastheirsuperiors.TheirorderscamedirectlyfromMontesinos, commandos ofthe«ColinaGroup»didnotacknowledgemilitaryheads all branchesatanytimeandforreason.MartínRivastheother As aresult,GeneralHermozaRíoshadathisdisposalallmilitarypersonnelof president oftheJointChiefsStafffunctionoperationschiefCOFI. this capacitywasfacilitatedbyadirectiveissuedinJanuary1990thatgavethe providing authorizationandoversight. BesideshavingtheSINA lawinits favor, same office—or, rather, thesame and jointspecialoperationssquadsunderitsdirectcontrol.Inotherwords,the were atitsdisposal.Ithadintelligenceagents,entirenetworksofinformants of theoperationalcapacityvariousbranchesasthoughtheirpersonnel services, theSINplannedandcarriedoutoperationsonitsown,takingadvantage supervising operatingplansandtheresultsofcountry’s various intelligence in BarriosAltos.Insteadoflimitingitselftoanalyzing,authorizingand psycho-social operationsaimedatchangingpublicbehavior, suchasthemassacre and terroristactsagainstdissidentofficialsorpoliticalopponents,forspecial such asthemurdersinElSanta,Ancash,wellthreats,blackmail,bribery for dirtyjobs,suchassettlingscoreswithdrugtraffickers,orspecificretaliation, Montesinos touseintelligenceagentsandspecialoperationsmilitarypersonnel the military’s favor withLaw26291,knownastheCantuta Law. The measure own investigation.Thisled toajurisdictionaldisputethatCongressresolvedin the outskirtsofLima.Thearmed forcesannouncedthattheywouldlaunchtheir discovery offourgravescontaining burnedhumanremainsinCieneguilla,on broader repercussionsthe nextmonth,however, whenapressreportledtothe on thegroundsthatmilitarycourtswereinvestigating thecase.Thecasehad majority approvedareportthatabstainedfromassigning criminalresponsibility Hermoza Ríoshimselfcriminallyresponsiblefor the LaCantutacase.The commission thatfoundtheofficersinchargeof militarybaseandGeneral In June1993,thecongressionalmajorityrejectedareport fromtheinvestigative T I MPUNITY HE « C ANTUTA After theBarrios Altos massacre,ifnotbefore,thegovernment’s L AW» the regime’ person —carriedout s opponents. operations as well as operations aswell (Youngers 2003:286-288).Intwo comm commission eventhough soldiers escortedthemembersthroughouttheirvisit investigative commission wasformed.About50peopletestifiedbeforethe Derechos Humanos the NationalHumanRights CoordinatingCommittee( provided bylocalchurch groups orthelocalpress.Afteratripbymembersof first reportsofhumanrightsviolationsresulting fromtheoperationwere to thesituationinregiongeneralandOperation Aries in particular. The human rightsorganizationsbegancallingnational and internationalattention Although theremotelocationmadeitdifficulttodocument casescompletely, especially initssecondphase,ledtothehighestdeath tolloftheentireconflict. companies forthisoperationwithhelpfromIsraeli experts.Thenewstrategy, of therivers,onlyroutesoutareas.TheArmy preparedanti-subversive attempted tofleewasshotbyarmedPCP-SLmilitants atpiersorthemouths kept themisolated,threatenedandunderideological control.Anyonewho results. Localpeoplewerereducedtoservitudebymembers ofthePCP-SL,which tactics usedinearlierstrategies,especially«repentance,»hadnotproduced Prado, Huánuco,betweenAprilandJuly1994.Inthatarea,thepsycho-social committees»] knownas«Cuchara»and«Primavera»intheprovinceofLeoncio Aries» againstsubversive«pockets»[clustersofnineto12PCP-SL «people’s bombardment fromhelicoptersequippedwithartillery. destruction ofsubversivebasesincoca-growingcommunitiesandeven on limiteduseofforce.Thenew offensive thatabandonedtheanti-subversivestrategyof1989,whichwasbased were leftuntouchedandconsolidated.ThatpavedthewayforanewArmy again, asextensivecoca-producingareascontrolledbythePCP-SLinHuánuco Chiefs ofStaffand,ultimat that wereflowninforthejobandanswereddirectlytoSIE,DINTE,Joint firms concentratedactivitiesandresourcesinthehandsofcommandogroups drug traffickersalliedwiththePCP-SLorinfavorofcertaindrug-trafficking languishing becauseofinactionandalackresources.Specialoperationsagainst During thoseyears,theanti-subversivemilitarybasesinHuallagawere O whom weresentencedto20yearsinprison. Among themwereSantiagoMartinRivasandCarlosEliseoPichilingüe,bothof court issuedaverdictsentencingsomeoftheofficersimplicatedincase. dispatched theLaCantutacasetomilitarycourt.Dayslater, themilitary approved 1993Constitution.TheSupremeCourtjudgesloyaltoFujimori and approved byFuji number ofrequiredvotes.ThiswasonethefirstlawsdrawnupbySIN appropriate chamberoftheSupremeCourtbysimplemajority, reducingthe jurisdiction incasesotherthandrugtraffickingwouldberesolvedthe established thatdisputesoverwhethercivilianormilitarycourtsshouldhave PERATION The armedforceslaunchedthefrontalassaultknownas«Operation A RIES , CNDDHH)andagroup ofjournalists,acongressional mori’s majorityinCongressthatviolatedtherecently ely, theSIN.Thisstalledanti-subversive effort campaign involvedmassive firepower, the unities thatthe Coordinadora Nacionalde Army allowed the 313 ALBERTO FUJIMORI’S ADMINISTRATIONS 314 PART ONE: THE TRAGEDY AND THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR IT Chávez, GilbertoSiuraandRafaelRey—adisgrace. by congressionalrepresentativesincludingFranciscoTudela, JulioChuMeris,Martha second lawinJuly. judiciary hadnopower toreviewthe amnestylaw. PresidentFujimorisignedthe guilty of«prevarication.»Congressapprovedasecond lawthatstatedthe closed thecaseandwarnedthatifJudgeSaquicuraytried toreopenit,shewouldbe the Barrios Altos case,spokeoutagainstthelaw. Inresponse,theattorneygeneral honortheamnestylaw.would A Judge afterward, SupremeCourtPresidentMoisésPantojaannouncedthatthejudiciary conflict withEcuador. PresidentFujimorisignedthe disloyalty andoffensesagainstthenationarmedforcesduringrecent coup attemptonNovember13,1992,andthosewhoallegedlycommittedactsof terrorism. Inanefforttoappeaseopponents,italsoincludedthoseinvolvedinthe benefited anyonesentencedforhumanrightsviolationsduringthefightagainst morning hoursofJune14byavote47-11.TheGeneralAmnestyLaw the congressionalmajorityonnightofJune13andapprovedinearly Court inLima. called totestifyby Antonia Saquicuray, thechiefmagistrate ofthe11thExamining SIN chiefGeneralJulioSalazarMonroeandadviserVladimiroMontesinoswere Altos case.Becauseofthecase,presidentJointChiefsStaff,titular SIN andfourothermilitaryofficersforthemurdersof15peopleinBarrios prosecutor AnaCeciliaMagallanesbroughtcourtcasesagainsttheheadof law inJune1995.Thewaspassedjustoveramonthafterprovincialcriminal Support forimpunityreacheditsheightwiththeapprovalofabroadamnesty T The congressionalHumanRightsCommissioneventuallycloseditsinvestigation. Prado— ofthe«armedforces’actionsinlastbastionsShiningPath.» having released«negativeversions»—complaintsfromresidentsofLeoncio majority ofCCDmembersapprovedamotioncondemningtheCNDDHHfor pressuring Congresstotakeactionagainstit.Asaresult,onApril28,1994,the human rightsgroupsofblockingthefinaloffensiveagainstsubversionand Human RightsCoordinatingCommission.Throughthemedia,officialsaccused government launchedacampaignagainstitscritics,especiallytheNational commission toenter, Moyunaandde Anda, bodieswere found. aggravating the situationforseveralyears. Amongthemostalarming indicators 1980s was The judicialsystem’s inefficiencyorinabilitytohelpsnuffoutterrorism inthe A C HE AMNESTY LAWHE AMNESTY NTI-TERRORISM LEGISLATION AND INNOCENT PEOPLEINPRISON ONSEQUENCES OF THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK THAT FOLLOWED THE COUP The CVRconsiderstheamnestylaw—whichwasdefended andsupported The draftamnestylawwaspresentedwithoutwarningbymembersof In thefaceofevidence,insteadbeginninganinvestigation, a majorproblem.Theproblems wereleftunchecked,however, ntonia Saquicuray, law thesameday. Shortly who was investigating (26479) ANTI-SUBVERSION WITHOUTSUBVERSION visitors allowedwereoftensubjectedtoinhumanand degradingtreatment. minutes aday. Unprecedentedrestrictions isolation oftheinmateduringfirstyearandlater access toapatioforonly30 The specialnormsissuedafter1992wereappliedinall areas,includingabsolute Picsi inChiclayo)wereremodeledandturnedintoenormous «punishmentcells.» Gradually, benefits, itmadenosensetoinvestinanything otherthanpunishment. Considering thatthisgroupofprisonershadbeen excludedfromallprison were designedsothattheinmateshadnocommon areasorworkareas. opportunities, wereignored.TheY most extremeisolation.Allotherelements,suchaseducationorwork after crimesagainstpropertyanddrugtrafficking. regimens. Intermsofthenumberinmates,crimeterrorismrankedthird the country’s totalprisonpopulation. Theseinmatesalsohadspecialprison inmates servingsentencesonterrorismcharges,whorepresented15percentof were solvedbybuildingnewprisonsorremodelingexistingonestohousethe of somanypeopleposedvarious problemsforgovernment prisonpolicy. They 1996, whentheAdHocCommissionbeganreviewingcases.Theimprisonment sentenced forcrimesofterrorismortreason,afairlysmallnumbercomparedto In 1999,about2,700peoplewerebeingheldinprisonsafterindictedor T 1,087 innocentpeoplewhohadbeenunjustlyimprisonedwerereleased. insufficient evidence,orcoercion.BetweenAugust1996andDecember1999, pardons incaseswhichtheconvictionhadbeenbasedonfabricatedor review individualcasesandmakerecommendationstothepresidentforgranting Committee launchedacampaign,anAdHocCommissionwasestablishedto prison was oneresult.Muchlater, aftertheNationalHumanRightsCoordinating certain humanrightsviolations.Thelarge-scaleproblemofinnocentpeoplein either guaranteesoroversightmechanisms. the governmentchoseautilitarianpaththatdidnottakeintoconsideration created bytheinternalwar. Believingthattheendjustifiedmeans,however, benefits. Specificmeasureswereurgentlyneededgiventheemergencysituation number ofpeoplewhoweresentencedreleasedquicklybecauseprison tried, andofthese,betweenthosetriedsentenced.Inaddition,alarge were thehugedisparitybetweennumberofpeopledetainedand support and, ultimately, prolongitsstay inpower. another inasetoftoolsthat thegovernmentusedtodissuadecritics,gaincitizen chose tousetheissueof terrorism asatool.Anti-subversivepolicywasjust rapid deactivation ofthesubversive threat, Alberto Fujimori’s administration was As explained inthechapteronPCP-SL,afterGuzmán’s arrestandthe HE SPECIAL PRISONREGIMENF The newprisonswerebuiltusingnocriteriaotherthansecurityandthe The legalprovisionsadoptedafterthecoupledtoexacerbationof existing prisons(MiguelCastroandChorrillos inLima,and OR CASESOF TERRORISM AND TREASON anamayo andChallapalcaprisons,forexample, were placedonvisits,and the few 315 ALBERTO FUJIMORI’S ADMINISTRATIONS 316 PART ONE: THE TRAGEDY AND THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR IT emphasized inofficialpropaganda, archive t hours eachday»onahistoryofthePCP-SLandgave themaccesstotheparty watch thenewsontelevision.Healsoallowedthem to«worktogetherafew magazines whenhewenttoseetheShiningPathleaders andallowedthemto the otherprisonsforholdingmeetings.»Montesinos tooknewspapersand prison conditionsforPCP-SLinmatesandtheywere given«certainleewayin a resultofthenegotiationsduringthosemonths,certain changesweremadein that wasbasedintheprisons.GuzmánandIparraguirre alsoindicatedthatas organized byMontesinos.Ineffect,Guzmánsalvaged anorganizationalstructure political positionanddirectivesthankstothemeetingsoftopleaders concern, andsecond,reconstructingthe«Party»disseminatingitsnew objectives: first,ensuringthatGuzmánwasnotkilled,whichthegreatest agreement withthegovernment,PCP-SLdidachievetwoimportant prisons, butdidnotwipeouttheorganization.Althoughitsignapeace leadership paidpoliticaldividendsforFujimoriandloweredtensionsinthe armed groups.ThepeaceaccordproposedbyGuzmánandtheShiningPath extreme conditionsinmaximum-securityprisonsandisolatingtheremaining consisted ofincarceratingthelargestpossiblenumbersubversivesunder as seriouslythegovernmentclaimed.Strictlyspeaking,pacificationpolicy government interestsandtrailedoffaround1995. «academic interlocutor.» were dominated bycircumstantial Theseconversations and dealingwithGuzmán,IparraguirretheotherShiningPathleadersas more thanthirteenyears. We acceptthispetitionasourownandreiterateit.» whose applicationwouldendthewarthatcountryhaslivedthroughfor of GuzmánandIparraguirretoseekconversations«toreachaPeaceAccord, Martha Huatay, Rosa Angélica SalasandMaríaPantoja supportingtheinitiative before thereferendum,governmentrevealedalettersignedbyOsmánMorote, meetings, whichbeganOctober8,weresuccessful.On28,threedays persuade themtoadoptthenewpoliticalpositionthathewasproposing. Central CommitteeintheNavalBaseCallao.ThegoalwasforGuzmánto various prisonsaroundthecountryforameetingof17membersPCP-SL Constitution, thegovernmentarrangedtotransferShiningPathleadersfrom tool forpoliticalgain. Fujimori fortalkstoreachapeaceaccordwereusedmainlyaspropaganda 8 7 arrest ofafew leaders whohadnosupportbase. Ríos, statedthat95percentofterrorism hadbeeneliminatedandthatallremainedwasthe for theUPP, thepresidentofJoint In August1994,forexample,when PérezdeCuellarbeganhiselectoralcampaignascandidate and 8,afewdaysbeforethereferendum. Fujimori publiclydisplayedtwo letters fromGuzmánproposingapeaceaccord,onOctober1 Despite theapparentdecreaseinsubversiveactions, whichwas The possibilityofendingtheproblemsubversionwasnotaddressed Vladimiro Montesinoswasresponsibleforconductingtheconversations It shouldbenotedthatontheeveofreferendumtoapprove1993 In October1993,forexample,letterswrittenbyAbimaelGuzmánasking hat DINCOTE had confiscated, as well asbooksfromGuzmán’shat DINCOTEhadconfiscated,aswell Chiefs ofStaffthe 8 theadministrationdidnotreduce Armed Forces,NicolásHermoza library. 7 The Ministry ( leaving thepostandonpretextofcreatingJudicial CoordinatingCouncil to Montesinos,asAttorneyGeneralafterthecoup. In1996,tokeepherfrom political weaponforcontrollinganyoneopposedto its interests. — avoidingjudicialandpoliticaloversightbutalso usedthejudiciaryasa had sunk.Withthat,theregimenotonlyguaranteed impunityforitsmembers filmed evidencewouldshowthedepthsofcorruptiontowhichmanymagistrates judiciary. With thatinmind,it majority, thegovernment wanted toensurethatithadstrictcontrolover the preparing toremaininpowerafter2000.Besidesasubmissivecongressional Fujimori wonwith67percentofthevote. an occurrenceacknowledgedbytheSpecialElectionsBoardinthatdepartment— facts —suchasthedisappearanceof37,000electoralrecordsincityHúanuco, Although doubtsaboutthetransparencyofelectionspersistedinlightnew criticism andallowedthepresidenttocapitalizeonhisimageasleaderofmilitary. Another adv whose pretextwasthesubversivethreat,forhisre-electioncampaignin1995. population. military officersfrequentlyservedasintermediariesfortheircontactwiththe officials responsibleforeconomicandsocialprogramstobeginoperatingagain informed ofwhowascirculatinginthearea.Whenitpossibleforpublic authorization wasneededforpubliceventsandmeetings,themilitary been attheheightofwar. With thestateofemergency ineffect,military subsided, militaryauthorityremained,althoughitwasnotasstricthad civilian apparatushadretreatedinthefaceofviolence.Assubversiveactions for manyyearsthemilitaryrepresentedand«embodied»state,because military commands.Inseveraloftheruralareashardesthitbyinternalwar, prolongation ofmilitarydominanceovercivilianauthoritythroughthepolitical- local residentsfearfulofnewincursionsbytheShiningPath—meant the statesofemergency—whichoftenbecameaguaranteetranquilityfor districts ofthecountrywerestillunderastateemergency. Theextensionof without subversion.Bymid-1995,approximately68provincesandthree number ofemergencyzones.Instead,itmaintainedananti-subversivemodel 9 and theSIN. out ofsubmissionto,ignorance ofand/orcomplicitywiththeexecutivebranch Public Ministrytobesubordinatedwereapprovedby thecongressionalmajority than theattorneygeneral,whobecameamerefigurehead. Consejo deCoordinaciónJudicial Law 26623ofJune15,1996. One keystepwastheappointmentofBlancaNélida Colán, whodeferred Shortly afterthestartofhissecondterm,administrationbegan Meanwhile, PresidentFujimoritookadvantageofthemilitarydeployment, With thereinsofkey stateinstitutionsfirmlyinhand,the It isimportanttonotethatthenormsallowed judiciaryandthe 9 withColánaspresident.Thecommissionwasgiven morerealpower antage was the armed conflictwithEcuador, whichmutedhisopponents’ ), anExecutiveCommissionwascreatedinthePublic created anExecutiveCommission.Yearslater, 317 ALBERTO FUJIMORI’S ADMINISTRATIONS 318 PART ONE: THE TRAGEDY AND THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR IT continued. political dividendsthatitreapedwiththeoperation.First,accusations accusations thatweremountingagainstVladimiroMontesinos. popularity. Morei before beingfreedbyamilitaryoperationknownasChavíndeHuántar. was quicklyreducedto72hostages,whowouldspendfourmonthsincaptivity by anMRTA commandintheresidenceofJapaneseambassador. Thenumber chapters, occurred:theabductionofmorethan600peoplewhowereheldhostage new Constitution. third time—whichwouldbeonlythefirstre-electionsinceapprovalof elected onceunderthenewConstitutionandwasthereforeeligibletoruna only onere-election,thatdidnotapplytoFujimoribecausehehadbeen Interpretation. Thelegislationstatedthatalthoughthe1993Constitutionallowed Legislators loyaltohimapprovedameasureknownastheLawofAuthentic In August 1996,Fujimori’s intentionofremain Operation ChavíndeHuántar to thoseinpower. organization orpersonwhoappearedtoopposerepresentpoliticalcompetition work focusednotonsubversion,whichbynowwasbarelyvisible,butany operation oftheSINasabodythatcarriedoutespionageandthreats,whose part ofthePolitical-MilitaryPlandescribedabove.Theschemeincluded second term.Theideaofagovernmentthatlastedmorethandecadewasalso administration displayed itsdesiretoremain 9 members. Beginningin1998, withgreatercontroloverthemedia,afrequent when referringtoactivities carriedoutbytheoppositionorevensomeitsown accusations ofterrorismorusetheword the media,inwhichitexploitedissueof«terrorism.» Itstacticsincluded operations directedbytheSINandcarriedoutthanks toincreasingcontrolover In theyearsthatfollowed,governmentcontinued tostagepropaganda The politicaluseofterrorism a «clarification»oftheirdecision. Congress, theformalchargewasthattheyhadexceeded theirfunctionsbyissuing that theLawofAuthenticInterpretationwasunconstitutional. Accordingto majority firedthreejudgesfromtheConstitutional Tribunal forhavingruled violations. OneofthemostseriousoccurredinMay1997,whencongressional a resultoftheoperation’s successtoshoreupitsimagewhileitcommittedvarious carried outbytheintelligenceservices. For example,inJuneContrapunto (aTVnewsprogram)revealed197casesofphonetapping For several reasons,however, t The operation’s successcausedanotableupsurgeinthegovernment’s It wasinthiscontextthatasurprisingevent,detailedprevious 10 Thegovernmenttookadvantageofthepopularitythatitgainedas mportantly, itsidelined the seriousandincreasinglyinsistent he government couldnotmaintainthe terrorists inofficebeyond thepresident’s ing inpower becameclear. bygovernmentofficials opinion, usingthethreatofterrorismasadissuasive argumenttothesameend. spying onandharassingopponentsoftheregime andmanipulatingpublic previous years.TheSINfocuseditsattentionand resources onpersecuting, only passengers. group ofpoliceandmilitaryofficersaboutthestrange presenceofthevehicle’s byanoff-dutypoliceofficernamedJuan driven Alfonso Salazar, whoalerteda government’s version. place undercircumstancesverydifferentfromthosedescribedinthe light oftheapproachingpresidentialelections.Apartfromthat,arresttook internal front,theuseof occurred explainstheimportanceofarrestweakened more dangerousthanitreallywasatthetime.Thecontextinwhichtheseevents the easternpartofcentralhighlands.ThereportsmadePCP-SLseem information begantoappearaboutactionscarriedoutby between 1993and1998thatterrorisminPeruhadbeendefeated,bymid-1999 the peaceaccordin1993. Committee andleaderofthe«RedPath»( Durand, information aboutthefightagainstsubversionwasarrestofÓscarRamírez serious irregularitiesincertainpartsofthecountry. however, severalorganizations itself asthemainvoice fortheadministration’s campaignnationwide.Thistime, supported bythemilitaryinemergencyzones—hadclearlyestablished the pretextofcombatingsubversion.Thestateapparatus—stilllargely were ongoingirregularities,suchastheuseofmilitarypersonneldeployedon for expression. demonstrations ofpoliticaloppositiontoaregimethatallowednootheroutlets administration, as«terrorist»acts,ratherthanwhattheyreallywere, demonstrations werepresentedontelevision,bystationscloselyalliedwiththe circulating rumorsthatthemarcheswereinfiltratedbyShiningPath.The practice wastodissuadecitizensfromparticipatinginprotestmarchesby The finalmonthsoftheFujimoriadministrationfollowed thetoneof While Fujimoriandhiscohortshadrepeatedlyassuredthecountry One oftheclearestexamplesgovernment’s manipulationof During Alberto Fujimori’s 2000electioncampaignforathirdterm,there Feliciano , whowasafounderofthePCP-SL,memberitsCentral Feliciano Feliciano of electionobservers confirmedanddocumented was detainedonaninter-provincial busbeing ’s arrestaspropagandawas onlytooclear, in Sendero Rojo ) afterGuzmáncalledfor Feliciano’s Feliciano followersin . Onthe 319 ALBERTO FUJIMORI’S ADMINISTRATIONS

T HE LEGACY OF THE CONFLICT OF THE LEGACY WAYHE AND THE TOPEACE P ART TWO 321 THE FACTORS THAT MADE THE VIOLENCE POSSIBLE 322 PART TWO: T HE LEGACY OF THE CONFLICT AND THE WAY TO PEACE enlightened vanguard abletointerpret thelawsofhistory. Needlesstosay, the countries mustorganize in partiesofselect,secretcadreswhowillbethe through alongprocessof revolution, andtosucceedtheproletariatindifferent supposedly morejustsociety(communism).That canonlybeattained ontological privilegetotheproletariatasclass thatwillestablishanew, mainly embodiedinthePCP-SL,whichdrewfromdifferent politicaltraditions. state power—isawillthatorganizesitandunleashes it.InPeru,thiswillwas Behind allviolencethathasapoliticalpurpose—specifically theconquestof T Peru.» institutions thatcontributedtothetragicsituationofviolenceexperiencedby social andculturalconditions,aswellthebehaviorsofsocietystate wasIt theTruth andRecon 1 cause oftheinternalarmedconflict which remainedhighafterdemocracywasrestored in1980. organizations, largelypeacefuldemonstrationsand participationinelections, our societyinotherdirections,mainlythroughtheproliferationofcommunity who inthelate1970swerechannelingtheirdreamsfortransformationof a «people’swar» againstthestate,goingwillofmillionsPeruvians HE Supreme Decree, Article2,Sectiona. PCP-SL 1 Asaresultofthisanalysis,theCVRfoundthatimmediate,decisive One elementwastheMarxist-Leninisttradition, whichgrants THE FACTORSTHE THATPOSSIBLE VIOLENCE MADE THE ’S DECISION TO BEGIN THE CONFLICT ciliation Commission’s taskto«analyzethepolitical, CAPÍTULO 6 in Peruwas the PCP-SL’s decisiontolaunch 323 THE FACTORS THAT MADE THE VIOLENCE POSSIBLE 324 PART TWO: T HE LEGACY OF THE CONFLICT AND THE WAY TO PEACE Shining Path’s plans,the in itsquestforrealdemocracy(economicequality).Inthedevelopmentof consensus. Itsetdirectdemocracy(assemblies)againstrepresentative representative democracyandpoliticsasameansfordialogue,negotiation dictatorship over Proletarian CulturalRevolution(1966-1976),anditscallforan«all-encompassing the directheirofMaoism’s mostradicalexpression,theso-calledGreat as the«leadershipclass.»AccordingtoAbimaelGuzmán,ShiningPathwas the formofa«prolongedpeople’swar.» Theproletariat,meanwhile,keptitsrole peasants weregiventheroleof«principalforce»inarevolutionthatwouldtake Leninist tradition,thePCP-SLsubscribedtoMaoistwayofthinking,inwhich PCP-SL considereditselfthepartyofPeruvianproletariat.WithinMarxist- 3 2 environment. Although A figurelikethatofGuzmánandaplanthe PCP-SLaroseoutofthis having risenupthroughschools,tradeunions,cities and/ormarkets. overwhelmed bytheemergingpopularclasses,they werelosing«respect»after they werelookeddownonbytheelitesincapital. Atthesametime, While «notable»intraditionalsociety, theseintellectualsneverthelessfeltthat Andean urbancentersandformedpartofthetraditional localpowerstructure. misti provincial citieswhosharedthecharacteristicsof socialstratumknownas origins ofitsprincipalleaders.Severalwere PCP-SL. what Marxisttraditioncalls«personalitycult,»aswasseeninthesectionon over theroleofpersonalityinhistorywastakentounimaginedextremes weight: authoritarian traditionthatwas older, morewidespreadandcarriedevengreater incarnation oftheevolution«15billionyearsmatterinmovement.» Guzmán became«PresidentGonzalo,»thefourthswordofMarxism, Mariátegui’s imagegraduallyfadedaway untilitdisappearedaltogether, while place withintheuniverse oftheMaoistleftwas moreorlessdefined,however, that wasinsurrectionist,enlightenedandsectarian, «how tochangesouls.» Revolution was thegreate take upMariátegui’s causeagainandreconstitute hisparty.» main socialistrepresentativeoftheradicaltradition,andproclaimed:«Letus left, thePCP-SLroseuptoreclaimlegitimacyofJoséCarlosMariátegui, to Maoism.Itonlygainedimportancewhen,amiddisputeswithinthePeruvian See thedocumentbysamename, dated1975. single partyaspoliticalregime. will save P That sectarianismincludeseverything fromthesloganof APRA’s earlydecades,“Only APRA ,

a Quechuawordforthemestizos—patronsornotables— wholivedin The ShiningPath’s extremeauthoritarianismisalsorootedinthesocial Along withtheradicaltradition,therewas anotheraspect ofPeru’s In thePCP-SL,MaoismwasintertwinedwitharadicalPeruviantradition caudillismo eru,“ totheMarxistleft’s mostrecentthesis , orthetraditionofpoliticalbosses.DebateinMarxistcircles the bourgeoisie.» it presenteditselfasradically radical Peruvian trad st milestoneinhumanhistory, becauseitdiscovered According toGuzmán, mestizo about theproletariatasvanguard orthe ition was always subordinated intellectualsfrommid-sized new, inpracticetheShining 2 andwhichdenied 3 OncethePCP-SL’s China’s Cultural communism: who sharedit.Theculmination ofthisgreat,all-encompassingstorywasautopia, simple moraluniverseinblackandwhitethatgavemeaning tothelivesofthose consistent understandingnotonlyofthecountry, butof theentireuniverse, a «all-powerful becauseitistrue»(PCP-SL1988a:II),this providedanapparently an all-encompassing«greatstory.» Presentedasascientificideologythatwas The PCP-SLoffered,aboveall,adiscoursethatclaimed tobecompletelycoherent, members themselvesdefinedasa«warmachine.» the PCP-SLdecidedtobuildasmallbutwell-regimented organizationthatthe Eighty thousandinacountryof150millioninhabitants!» (Guzmán1988).Thus «How manyBolsheviksweretherewhentheOctober Revolutiontriumphed? tended toformverystrongwills.Guzmánhimselfrecalled thecaseofUSSR: 1970s? First,partiesofcadreshighlysteepedintheideology ofLeninisttradition How didthesesmallgroupsmanagetoforgesuchastrongwillthroughoutthe only onecapableofinterpretingthelawshistory. between theleadersandmilitants,withleader(AbimaelGuzmán)as model andalsoreproducetheoldverticalhierarchies the PCP-SLwasabletoimplementitstraditional,authoritarianpedagogical the establishedorder, butimmersedinanauthoritariantradition.Inthatway, small groupsofyoungpeoplewhowerereceptivetotalkaradicalbreakwith Shining Path’s plans.Theintellectualsdescribedabove establishedlinkswith knows andthestudentlearnsobeys,createdanenvironmentripefor the persistenceofaverticaltransmissionknowledge,inwhichteacher between thepartyandpeasantry. Thestate’s neglectofpubliceducationand institutes —firstasaplaceforrecruitment,andlater«transmissionbelt» educational institutions—universities,pedagogicalinstitutes,post-secondary At somepointduringthe1960s,theseintellectualsdiscoveredpotentialof proverb, «sparetherodandspoilchild.» communities themselvesandeveninschoolsthatwerestillgovernedbythe physical punishmentonestatesorinpolicestations,aswellthepeasant bodies. ThePCP-SL,therefore,waspartofalong-standingtraditionthatincluded negotiated throughtheuseofphysicalviolenceandleftitsmarksonpeople’s was anauthoritarianrelationshipwiththepopulation,inwhichpower What remainedconstantbetweentheold laws ofhistoryandthereforeguidetheentirecountrytoabetterfuture. exclusive representative.Thatknowledgemadeitpossibletounderstandthe monopoly ofa«scientific»knowledgewhichthePCP-SLconsidereditself way ofthinkingtheparty’s superiorityover the«masses»was justifiedbythe racist attitudethatsawtheinferiorityofIndianas«natural,»inPCP-SL’s hierarchy wasbasedonamonopolyofeconomicandpoliticalpower down asaresultofmodernization.Ifintraditionallandholdingsocietythe Path representedtherestorationofastrictlyverticalorderthatwasbreaking new societywithout substitute,withoutthe exploitedortheexploiters,without know ofeternalmatter,isnecessarily andinexorablyheaded.…Asingle society towardwhich15billion yearsofmatterinmovement,fromwhatwe The societyof«greatharmony» […]theradicalanddefinitenew mistis andthenewrevolutionaries within the partyitself, 325 THE FACTORS THAT MADE THE VIOLENCE POSSIBLE 326 PART TWO: T HE LEGACY OF THE CONFLICT AND THE WAY TO PEACE communists wouldcomeoutalive. people’swarwould beanextended Armageddon, fromwhichonlythe They wouldbethehandwritingonwallinmiddleofbanquet; battles thatwereunderstoodaspersonalandcollectivepurificationrebirth. changed thetoneofhisdiscoursesandpartywentthroughaperiodinternal reason, whenGuzmándecidedtocasthispartyintothe«armedstruggle,»he armed strugglemarkedtheseparationofoldtimesfromnew. Forthat necessary toprovokearuptureofapocalypticproportions.Thebeginningthe 4 face deathincreasedwith the lettersofsubmissionto«PresidentGonzalo»that which wouldbenecessary forthetriumphofrevolution.Thiswillingnessto willing to«livetheirlivesonfingertips»and «cross theriverofblood,» beginning in1980andthetypesofmilitantswhowould makeupthePCP-SL: and 1980foreshadowedthetypeofviolencethat wouldstrikethecountry before thearmedstrugglebegan.Theferocityofhis haranguesbetween1978 mentality. It At thesametime,fanaticismbecameoneofkey aspectsofShiningPath bosses» werecapturedin1992. was veryimportantforitscohesion,butthisbecame its Achilles’heelwhen«the of thesewasitsextreme Other traits,however, madetheShiningPath avery specialphenomenon.One that thepeople’swar was thestrategybywhichsocialism wouldtriumph. leftist vanguardgroupsinPeruandotherpartsoftheworld,whichbelieved To thatextent,thePCP-SL couldbeconsideredanexaggeratedversion ofother market.» «through theparty»atatimewhenitwasdifficulttoachievethis their freetime,aplaceforadventureandthepossibilityofsocialadvancement especially youth managing universityhousingandcafeterias.Theactivepartymembers, ensure thatitsmembersbecamedirectorsofstudentwelfare,incharge which thePCP-SLpracticedprofuselyinuniversities,whereittookpainsto the group’s moreprosaicaspects.The otherfaceof of politicalwillthatthePCP-SLrepresented,itisalsoimportanttokeepinmind While itisnecessarytohighlighttheseelementsunderstandtheconcentration daily life,providingitsactive memberswithatotalidentity. party beacompleteinstitutionthatorganizedandcontrolledeveryaspectof only «ahandfulofcommunists,»asGuzmánhimselfadmitted,requiredthatthe which was militarizedtowage the«prolongedpeople’swar.» To beginthiswith Initiators.” the armedstruggle.See:“TheNew Flag,”“OnThree The symbolismofpurification,rebirth andsalvation aboundsinGuzman’s The PCP-SL alsoofferedanorgan To attainthissocietywithoutmovement, literally«theendofhistory,» parties, withoutdemocracy, withoutarmies, the oppressedoroppressors,withoutclasses,astate, started withtheexacerbationofviolenceinGuzmán’s discourse s, foundinthePCP-SL notonlyorder, buttheorganizationof caudillismo. Building thepartyaroundagod-likefigure izational plan:th Chapters inOurHistory”and caudillismo wars (PCP-SL 1986a:20). is politicalpatronage, e Communist discourses before “We arethe itwas Party, 4 gaps: and power aredistributedunequallythroughout ourterritory, resultinginother asthepossibilityofmakingoneselfheardandsilencingothers.Wealthwell its followers a who isheardandignored.Thisimportant,becausethePCP-SLoffered and symbolicpower, includinghavingavoice: who«hastherighttospeak,» just amatterofunequaldistributionwealth, however, butalsoofpolitical surviving, is as important a factor as poverty, if abysmal differencebetweenthosewhohavethemostandaremerely The mostvisibleanddramaticgapisbetweenrichpoor.I backdrop againstwhichthedramawasplayedout. conflict. Rather, asthe itisoneofthefactorsthathelpedsparkit,andserved indicate, however, poverty alonedoesnotexplaintheoutbreakofarmed poorest inhabitantsofthepartscountry. As thesetestimonies According totestimoniesgatheredbytheCVR,violencemainlyafflicted L Path, therefore,mustbeexamined. geographical places.ThehistoricalcausesthatfosteredtheexplosionofShining a certainmindset,andwasabletotakerootinparticularsocialsectors and structuralfaults,tookupcertaindemandsseriousfrustrations,expressed advantage ofcertainsetscircumstances,fedonoldinstitutionalweaknesses long «decadeofviolence,»itisnecessarytonotehowthatpoliticalwilltook butthatalonedoesnotexplainwhyitendured.Tosubversion, understandthe Political willisadecisivefactorinexplainingthebeginningofanyarmed that theywerewillingtodieasthepartymembersdidinprisons. were encouragedtopay«thequota»ofbloodand«inducegenocide,»proving caudillo party militantssignedwhentheyjoinedthePCP-SL.Theglorificationof ONG-TERM ORHISTORICALFACTORS IN THE CONFLICT BetweenLimaandtheprovinces • AmongCreoles, mestizos,cholosandIndians • Amongthecoast,highlandsandjungle • continued toweigh onthecountry. Instead, theywererecreated, andethnic-culturalracialdiscrimination becoming blurredandmore porous.Theydidnotdisappear, however. old socialclassdifferences were breakingdownandtheirboundaries crashing downalmostassoontheyweredesigned. became thefrontierwherestate’s modernizationprojectscame the crisisoftraditional Andean society. At thesametime, Amazon became accentuatedasthe20thcenturyprogressed, untilitresultedin gravitation towardLimaandthecoast,todetriment oftheAndes, the restofcountryjustwhentheyseemedmost interconnected. preceding theconflict,exacerbatingdistancebetween thecapitaland contrastedwiththelossofindividualidentitybypartymilitants,who The country’s manygapsareimportantinunderstandingtheconflict. The mixtureof theseinequalitiesandforms ofdiscriminationproduced discourse thatcreatedtheillusionofembracingallreality, as . Centralizationincreasedinthedecades . Economic,demographicandsymbolic . Throughoutthe20thcentury, the not moreimportant.Itis nequality, the 327 THE FACTORS THAT MADE THE VIOLENCE POSSIBLE 328 PART TWO: T HE LEGACY OF THE CONFLICT AND THE WAY TO PEACE generations, especiallyinruralareas. Widespread accesstoschoolsanduniversitiesdeepened differencesbetween The gapsthatgrewmorevisibleincludedthegeneration andgendergaps. led totheemergenceofimportantregionalmovementsbeginningin1960s. was the mostexplosive thegapbetweenLimaandrestofcountry, which modernization deepenedcertaingapsandmadeothersvisible. Among theformer, communication channels,especiallyhighwaysandradio. down withmigrationtothecities,massiveschoolenrollmentandexpansionof mobility andafairlyrigidhierarchicalorderseemnormalbearable,broke it difficultforasenseofcitizenshiptodevelop. society oflordsandservants,especiallyinthepoorestareasAndes,making the marketandterminalcrisisofhaciendasystemthathadproduceda expectancy andurbangrowth;ii)economicchanges,especiallytheexpansionof foundations crumbledbecauseof:i)demographicchanges,suchasincreasedlife region, ethnic-culturalbackgroundandraceas«normal.»Thestructural arguments oftraditionaldomination,whichsawdiscriminationbasedonclass, and thecity. The mostsignificantofthesewere: modernization inthecountryaccelerated,oftenonlytobecutoffmidstream. became morepainfulbeginninginthemiddleoflastcentury, asprocessesof or Indiansfromtheprovinces,highlandsandruralareas.Thatperception a growingperceptionofmistreatmentamongthepoor,werewho seenas 5 consisting ofscattered,intermittenteffortsthatwere oftentruncated,either onto thepublicstageingeneral. participate andbecomeleadingplayersinthenewsocial organizations,bursting and urbanareas.Somewhatlater, womenalsobegantogainaccesseducation, extent, alsotheleadersofvariousprocessessocial organizationinrural played theleadingroleinmassivewavesofmigration andwere,toagreat to limitfreesecondary education. in HuamangaandHuantaaftera supremedecreeissuedbythemilitarygovernmentthreatened influenced bypeoplewhowould later formPCP-SL.Later,in1969,thereweremassiveprotests defenseoftheUniversityover ofHuamanga’s budget, demands. ThefirstPeople’s DefenseFront(Frente de DefensadelPueblo)arosein Ayacucho outbreak ofthearmedconflict arosenotoutofdisputesoverland,butfromeducational It shouldbenotedthatin Ayacucho, themainsocialmovements inthedecadespreceding Increased numberandexpansionofsocialnetworksinthecountryside • Organizationalprocesses. • Expansionofthemedia. • schoolenrollment. Widespread • Large-scalemigration. • The breakdownofthetraditionalorderandacceleration The supportingarguments,whichmadeasocietywithlittlesocial These processesgnawedawayatthestructuralunderpinningsand All ofthisindicatesaprocessmodernization that wasunequal, 5 Itisimportanttorecallthatyoungpeople and duringitsearlyy ears, itw as strongly cholos reinforcing its roleasa«guardian»institution. sense ofcitizenshipandled themilitarytotakeanactiveroleinpoliticallife, democratic systemandhad plansforthecountrycontributedtothisfeeble considered natural. vertical, exclusive orderimposedthroughviolence,whennecessary, was fragility reflectedwaysofthinkingaboutandengaging inpoliticswhicha armed conflict,thecountryhadonly14yearsofdemocratic government.That of military could onlytriumphthroughviolence. state builtthrougharevolutionthat,formostofthe leftistpartiesofthetime, real democracy, which couldonlybeattainedinapopularorsocialistdemocratic that wereconsideredbourgeois.Insteadofformal democracy, theyproposed devoid ofcontent,whichplacedlittlevalueonindividual rightsandliberties revolutionary paradigmsthatconsideredrepresentative democracya«form» 1970s, law, juridica This societywas accompaniedbya state thathadlittlelegitimacy. Untilthe I w occur, there the countryatdifferentlevels:economic,social,symbolic.Becausethatdidnot significantly expandedthedomesticmarketandprovidedgreaterintegrationof have atleastachievedsustainedeconomicdevelopmentthatwould the inadequacyofnationalplans.Iftheseplanshadbeensuccessful,theycould intellectual eliteswholedthecountry, orbecauseofpoliticalstagnationand/or because ofalacklong-termvisionsharedbythepolitical,businessand NSTITUTIONAL FACTORS Geographical areas where thisradicalbreak couldoccur. • Socialsectorsreceptive toproposals foraradicalbreak withtheestablishedorder. • they, atl between twoworlds:thetraditionalAndeanworldoftheirparents,which scattered throughoutthecountryfeltthattheywere inano-man’s-land provinces, mestizos,withahigherthanaverageeducation.Somesectors too muchuncertainty. consistency freedthemfromapresentthatofferedlittlesatisfactionand minority ofthesepeoplewasattractedbyamodelwhoseabsolute rejected thembecausetheyweremestizosor These were especially, conflict. somewhat bearableforsolong.Theseweretheareashardesthitby that hadbeenremovedfromthetraditionalordermadethem and expectations,morethananything,thebackwardnesspoverty in asortoflimbobetweenmodernitythatexistedpoliticaldiscourse The absenceofconservative andliberalpartiesthatwereloyaltothe The ruleoflawwasalsoquestionedbytherightthrough alongtradition takeovers ere: east inpart,nolongershared;andtheurban-Creolew l orderandtherepub . Inthefivedecadesprecedingoutbreakofinternal but notexclusively,young peoplefromthe lican stateitselfwere questioned by cholos Especially areaslocated fromtheprovinces.A orld, which 329 THE FACTORS THAT MADE THE VIOLENCE POSSIBLE 330 PART TWO: T HE LEGACY OF THE CONFLICT AND THE WAY TO PEACE armed internalconflict,ledtotwodifferentmodels: and reformofthestatethat,intwodecadesthatpreceded theoutbreakof were followedbyaweak,intermittentprocessofmodernization, democratization discriminatory anditspersonnelabusive. back on them. Worse still,when itdidact,thejudicialsystemtendedtobe departmental ornationalcapitalinsearchofjustice,onlytohavejusticeturnits in whichtheprotagoniststravelfromdistantruralcommunitiesto hearings andinthetestimoniesgatheredbyCVR,therearecountlessstories impartial, universalsystemofjusticewasalmostnon-existent.Bothinpublic order anditsownstyleof«justice.» not seemintolerable,particularlyifthat«newpower»initiallyimposedacertain above andwhichcreatedsubjects(orevenservants)insteadofcitizens—did establishment oftheShiningPath’s «new Because thislackofdemocraticpractice,incertainpartsthecountry and resources,establishagreaterpresenceofthestateatlocallevel. have madeitpossibletobroadenthepracticeofcitizenship,conferresponsibilities Belaunde. Ifthisprocesshadnotbeeninterruptedbythe1968coup,itwould were actuallyonlyheldin1963and1966,underthefirstgovernmentofFernando suffrage wasnotguaranteeduntilthe1979Constitution.Municipalelections ofhavingandexercisingrightsdevelopedunequally.awareness Universal minimum standardsfordemocracy. Colombia weretheonlycountriesinLatinAmericawithgovernmentsthatmet democratization fellbythewayside. Inthe1970s,CostaRica,Venezuela and and repressiveregimes.Legitimatehopesfortransformation movements shookLatinAmerica.Theresponsewasaseriesofmilitarycoups States. InthewakeofCubanRevolution(1959),awavearmedsubversive of nationalsecuritythatwasenergeticallypromotedintheregionbyUnited militaristic traditionsinanewcontextandframingthemwithindoctrine flanks atthetimeincluded: areas beyondthosedirectly relatedtothechangeofpoliticalregime.Theweak overwhelmed bythedemocratic transitionthatbeganin1977,whichincluded The outbreakoftheinternal armedconflictcameatatimewhenthestatewas CIRCUMSTANTIAL FACTORS Thereformist authoritarianmodelunderthegovernmentofGeneralJuan • Theliberal democraticmodel,whichbeganin1956andevolvedmore • Velasco (1968-1975). (1963-1968). clearly duringthefirstadministrationofPresident FernandoBelaunde The greatstructuralchangesthattransformedthecountry, therefore, If thedevelopmentofasensecitizenshipwasweak,traditionan Modernity broughtanembryonicsenseofcitizenship.InPeru,the The «ColdWar» redoubledthisquestioning,placingthecontinent’s old power» —whichwas imposedfrom The ShiningPath was anunexpectedenemy. THE DURATION OF THE CONFLICT United Leftandwhichhad astronginfluenceinorganizationssuchastheGeneral such asPCP-Unity(PCP- Constituent Assembly of1978,afterHaya delaTorre, aswellMarxistparties as HugoBlanco,whoreceived thesecond-highestnumberofvotesfor to theMRTA —butnotthePCP-SL. place atthetimeinCentralAmericaorSouthern Cone—somethingsimilar administration couldhaveanticipatedanarmeduprising similartothosetaking elect aciviliangovernment. Theprevious day, thePCP-SL beganitsarmedactions. age 18.Thus,onMay18,1980,after17years,thecountry wenttothepolls leftist Marxistpartiesandgranteduniversalsuffrage toilliteratepeopleover was politicallyinclusiveandtendedtomakethingsmore democratic.Itlegalized movements duringthoseyearscontinued.TheConstitution approvedin1979 • The economicsituation The • Powervacuumsinextensiveruralareas,especiallytheAndes. • Weaknessofpoliticalparties. • to itscitizens. as aninstitutionhadevengreaterdifficultymeetingitsbasicobligations public enterprises,thestate’s percentageofGDP)hadgrown,butthestate Mobilization ( government deactivatedtheNationalSupportSystemforSocial process ofdismantlingtheagrarianreform,MoralesBermúdez’s illicit economy, growingcocabecauseofalackeconomicalternatives. settlers whohadarrivedduringtheprecedingdecadestotakepartin situation insignificantpartsofthehighjungle,pushinglargegroups began in1977withthesupportofUnitedStates,aggravated have beentheir beneficiaries.TheGreenSea(« under attackfromwithinandthemarginsbythosewhoshould islands (oftenweakenedfromwithinbyineptorcorruptadministration) created bythecollectivistagrarianreformwere leftastiny, demoralized traditional powersinthecountryside.Thecooperatives—SAIS,CAP the stateapparatusthatinsomewayshadfilledvacuumleftbylocal by thepreferentialvote. rather thanorganizationsorplatforms.Thattendencywasencouraged the 1980swastenuousandincreasinglyrevolvedaroundindividuals rural Perumeantthattherepresentationarosefromelectionsin The absenceofpartyorganizationsortheirretreatfromlargeareas propaganda thatattackedpoliticalpartiesandrepresentative democracy. leaders wereinexileandthepoliticalgroupsdiscreditedbyofficial cipal elections,thepartieshadlosttheirstrength.Someofmain The governmentandthearmed forcesdistrustedleft-wingleaderssuch Despite thesedifficulties,thetransitionsparkedbygrassroots Sistema NacionaldeApoyoalaMovilizaciónSocial Unidad . By1980,thesizeofstateapparatus(bureaucracy, ), theUDPorUNIR,which wouldsoonformthe Because ofthesuspensionnationalandmuni- Fernando Bel Verde Mar ») operations,which aunde’s second As partofthe , SINAMOS), 331 THE FACTORS THAT MADE THE VIOLENCE POSSIBLE 332 PART TWO: T HE LEGACY OF THE CONFLICT AND THE WAY TO PEACE violent actionstoprotestthenewleadershipinChina country. ThePCP-SL itselftookpainstodiscreditthishypothesislaunching government triedtofindlinksbetweenthesubversivesandsomesocialist mobilizations inthelate1970s. legitimacy ofusingweapons totakepower. years. Itisimportanttorememberthatthesepartiescontinueddefendthe and theteachers’union(SUTEP),allofwhichweregainingstrengthinthose CGTP), thePeasantConfederationofPeru( Confederation ofWorkers ofPeru ( 8 7 6 teachers toruralschools.Theseteachers,inturn,recruited secondaryschool universities, butkeptthemwithintheeducational system,sendingthemas The PCP-SLestablishedadifferentcircuit.Itrecruited cadresincertain of thesegroupswasmeasuredbytheirabilitytocontrol andmobilizepeople. party. Thiswas primarily donebysettinguppeasantunions.Theeffectiveness countryside, involvingthematvariouslevelsinacircuit designedtoexpandthe to drawtheirbestyoungcadresfromtheuniversities andsendthemintothe they? especially peasants.Howdiditreachthem,andwhat kindofpeasantswere SL hadnotwon theacceptanceorneutralityofsignificantsectorssociety, socialist countries. SL’s survival wasitsradicallyauta call onthearmedforces,asexplainedabove. to beatahastyretreat,whiletheBelaundegovernmentappearedreluctant down itsguard.Thusthesmallpoli where thestate,whosepresenceinruralareaswastenuous,hadespeciallylet few organizationsandpeasantmovementsintheyearspreceding1980, encountered seriousresistance.Theconflictbeganin Ayacucho, anarea that had the rise,suchasCuscoorCajamarca.Oncontrary, inthoseareasit Path didnotbeginitsactionsinaregionwherepeasantorganizationswereon related actions. groups thatshareditsviolentrhetoric,butwereundertakingpoliticalandlabor- for hismilitaryplan.ThemembersoftheShiningPathgotlostamongother insignificance onthepoliticalsceneandinlabormovementwasanadvantage arrested andquicklyreleasedshortlybeforelaunchinghis«people’swar.» His of unionstoelectoral success. In the1980s,yardstickforeffectiveness shiftedrapidlyfromthestrengtheningandmobilization said: “DengXiaoping,sonofabitch.” The famousdogshangingfromposts thatappearedinsomeLimastreets1980withsigns they were beingguided opposed thesemobilizations,including thenationalstrikesin1977and1978,becauseitbelieved Except forthestrikebySUTEPin 1978andbysecondaryschoolstudentsin1979,PCP-SLhad During the1970s,mostofpartiesthatwouldlater formtheIUtended The PCP-SLhadremainedonthemarginsofnearlyallgrassroots Nevertheless, allthesefactorswouldhavebeeninsufficientifthePCP- Besides thegeneralsurprise,anotherfactorthatcontributedtoPCP- In addition,eventhoughitannounceda«peasantwar,» theShining by PCP-Unity’ 6 ThishelpsexplainwhyGuzmánhadbeen s “revisionism.” ce stationsinnorthern Ayacucho were forced Confederación GeneraldeTrabajadores delPerú, rkic nature.During Confederación CampesinadelPerú 7 andtheembassiesof the earlyyears, the , CCP) 8 Lima. Thisalsoshowed that pov only aregionalphenomenon,butextendedthroughoutchainofcities,including intellectuals andeducatedyouthswhoconstituted«sensitivelinks»werenot and «executions.» justice thatputanendtoantisocialbehaviorbyresortingphysicalpunishment vehicle forestablishingorderandadministeringadraconian,verticalstyleof In addition,thePCP-SLappearedearlyonasanoptionfora«newstate,» and wheretherewasdiscontentbecauseofinequitableaccesstoscarceresources. had seriousinternalorexternalconflicts,whereauthoritieslittlelegitimacy, the distributionoflivestockandharvestsfoundacceptanceincommunitiesthat down equality, expeditious urban Peru,butinthedynamic,organizedsectorsofruralPeru.Itsplantop- contributed tothedevelopment ofaverystrongidentityontheperiphery and violence.Thiswas notanobstacle, however, anditmight even have San Martín Interests ofthePeopleSanMartín( Federation ( the unionsoverwhichgrouphadinfluence: SelvaMaestraAgrarian In thecaseofMRTA, thisidentificationwas determinedtoacertainextentby Ayacucho —thatincluded notonlythecountryside,butalsourbanperiphery. with thesubversive groups—theMRTA inSanMartín,thePCP-SL innorthern consistent manner. of the1970sfromarmedstruggletoparticipationinelections, ofteninalessthan that brokeawayfromleftistpartieshadchanged theirdiscourseattheend lesser extenttheMRTA becamemagnetsthatattractedsmall,discontentedgroups is necessarytokeepinmindtwoadditionalfactors.First,thePCP-SLandafar than anywhereelse,withabuseandcorruption. into theilliciteconomyandwherepolicejudiciarywereidentified,more SAIS, orthecoca-growingvalleys,whereentirepopulationshadbeenpushed conflictive ruralareas,suchasthosewheretheagrarianreformhadformed characteristic of Ayacucho. Thephenom of powerassociatedwiththeusephysicalviolencewerenotexclusively membership andsupportin of thepeople’s war.» Throughtheselinkages,thePCP-SLwove anetofparty the growthof«people’s guerrillaarmy,»was «attheservice sinceeverything The criterionforeffectivenesswasthegrowthofpartyitselfandespecially organizations,» communities. Theepicenterforpartyexpansionweretheso-called«generating students throughwhomthePCP-SLestablishedbeachheadsinmany 10 9 individual basis. At The PCP-SLdemandedthatthe groupdisbandandthatitsmembersbeabsorbedonan On thedefinitionof“generating organizations,”seethechapteronPCP-SL. various leftistgroups thatoptedforviolence. The PCP-SL’sThe expansiontootherpartsofthecountryshowed thatthe This enabledthePCP-SLto«conquerbases»onmargins,notonlyin To explainthedurationandexpansion ). InthecaseofPCP-SL,identificationwasbased ontheparty Federación AgrariaSelvaMaestra 9 whichfedcadresintothepartythrough«people’s schools.» 10 the otherextreme,MRTAwas Second,incertain justice, destructionofproductive infrastructureand the northernprovinces erty, lack ofruralorganizationandtheexercising Frente deDefensalosInteresesdelPueblo places therewas regionalidentification enon broughttolightotherhighly , FASMA) ortheFronttoDefend ofthesubv the productofsuccessive mergersof of Ayacucho. ersive phenomenon,it ersive 333 THE FACTORS THAT MADE THE VIOLENCE POSSIBLE 334 PART TWO: T HE LEGACY OF THE CONFLICT AND THE WAY TO PEACE little totheGDP. Inruralareas, sectors labeledhereas«unrepresented» wereinsignificant:theycontributed embracing, toagreaterorlesserextent,theentirecountry. sense ofnationalidentityandcitizenshipwas feltbeyondthe rural periphery, have beengroundedinhavingandexercisingcivil rights. Thefragilityofthis was alsorelatedtothefragilityofasensenational community, whichshould and thearmedforces.Therelativelylongdurationof theinternalarmedconflict transcended, theresponsibilityofgovernmentadministrations, politicalparties of deepcracksintheconfigurationnation, which included,butalso crisis and,later, therampant socialbreakdownattheendof1980s. from thereintootherareas,takingadv gained apresenceintheunrepresentedmarginsof oursocietyandadvanced and nationalterritoryonthesidelinesofpoliticalrepresentation.ThePCP-SL regime hadbeenrebuiltin1980,leavingsignificantsectorsofthepopulation symptom, revealedthedeep«geologicalfaultlines»onwhichdemocratic of thevariouspartiestoconflict.Theabdication,whichwasmerelya sectors ofsocietythatwere affectedbythestate’s response. the eyesofhispartymembersandevenappeartobe«lesserevil»forcertain way, triumphsforGuzmán,becausetheyenabledhimtovalidate histhesisin (1986) paramilitarygroups(1987)anddeathsquads(1989)wereall,insome a victory. Thewidespreadrepressionin Ayacucho (1983-1984),prisonmassacre Leviathan thatGuzmándescribedinhisnightmares,ithandedthesubversives investigations showthateverytimethestatecameclosetoresembling the mindofitsownmilitants,andlaterincountryasawhole.TheCVR’s expansion wastheneedtocreateanenemyinitsownimageandlikeness,first until itculminatedinthecoupofApril1992. of «abdicationdemocraticauthority»thatprogressed,withupsanddowns, understandable confusionthatexistedatfirst.Thoseerrorsconstitutedaprocess the errorscommittedbystateandpoliticalparties,aswell the conflictifpoliticaleliteshadbeenuptochallenge.ThePCP-SLfedon exclusion. fluctuate between indifferenceandthedemand forarapidsolution totheconflict they wereeasypreyforpolitical patronage.Publicopinion,therefore,could notdecisive inelections;urban were groups inLimaandpeasantsectorsthatwere fed who «foundthemselvesbetweentwoworlds,»aswellforsmallneighborhood «structure offeelings»forpoorstudentswhosufferedfromdiscriminationand having beenharmedbyinequalityanddiscrimination.ThePCP-SLprovideda similarities thatcombinedskincolor, languageandcustomswithasenseof established withveryrigid,exclusiveboundariesbasedonethnicandregional PCP-SL, whichfedintoits«generatingorganizations.»Asenseof«us»was Viewed fromthecenterofpolitical,economicandsymbolic power,Viewed the The mereexistenceofareasthatlackedpoliticalrepresentation wasasign It wasnot,therefore,simplyamatteroftheerrors,excessesorlimitations An indispensableelementintheShiningP None ofthesefactorswouldhavebeenenoughtoexplaintheduration becauseoftheir antage ofthestate’s errors, theeconomic areas, becauseoftheir scant demographicw upwith ath’s plan poverty, s forsurvival and extreme pov eight, they abuse and erty, demonstrations produced twodeaths.Afterthat,thecountrysufferedno beginning oftheend dictatorshipheadedbyManuelA.Odría.Those feared ministerofgovernment andpolice,EsparzaZañartu,whichmarkedthe widespread politicaldemonstrations inArequipaledtotheresignationof upheavals inpreviousdecadesresultedlowlevels ofviolence.In1955, PCP-SL years wasminimal. for 1978.Onceagain,thenumberoffatalitiesindemonstrations duringthose democracy, because days 1977 andMay1978.Theformerhadanindirectinfluence onthereturnto teachers andregionalgroups,whichinturnledto the nationalstrikesofJuly social upheavalthattranslatedintodemonstrations andstrikesbyworkers, following decade. cost inhumanliveswasextremelylowcomparedtothenumberofdeaths Agrarian Confederation( height afterthereorganizationofCCPandcreationNational widespread asinthepreviousdecade,butpeasantorganizationreachedits agrarian reformwasbeingimplemented.Themobilizationnotas fewer thaninthefirst10daysofAugust1991. large landowners.Inthoseyears, however, only166peopledied(Guzmán1981), taking overhundredsofthousandshectareslandthatwereinthehands organizedanddemonstratedthroughoutthecountry,peasants andfarmworkers movement ofthetimeinLatinAmericaarosePeru.Hundredsthousands by peacefulmeans.Between1958and1964,themostsignificantpeasant highlight theserioussocialandpoliticalconflictsthatarosewereresolved nation thatwereimplementedinthosedecades,butitisalsonecessaryto We indicatedthelimitsofplansforbuildingandmodernizing have C favor thesubversivegroups,especiallyPCP-SL. violations wasaddedtothemix,apictureemergedin1990thatappeared international community’s relativetoleranceforthestate’s humanrights administration alsocontributedtotheadvanceofsubversivegroups.If thus playedtheirpartinprolongingtheconflict. those whoweredifferent—migrantsinthatcase.Centralizationandracism was markedbysweepsconductedthesecurityforcesandstigmatizingof especially emotionally. The «others»: poor, rural,Indians. without caringmuchaboutthesocialcost.Afterall,victimsweremainly RUELTY IN THE CONFLICT Finally, the ex Critics mayobjecttothisdiscussionofsocialorganizations, becausethe Meanwhile, beginningin1976thecitiesexperienced anunprecedented In the1970s,asecondwaveoflandtakeoversshookcountryas and theMRTAwere politicalorganizations.Nevertheless, political even treme economiccrisisofthelastyears ofGarcía’s Confederación NacionalAgraria later themilitaryregimecalledaConstituent Assembly distance includedLima’s «cones,»wheretheconflict They werefaraway, notonlygeographically, but , CNA)in1974.Again,the 335 THE FACTORS THAT MADE THE VIOLENCE POSSIBLE 336 PART TWO: T HE LEGACY OF THE CONFLICT AND THE WAY TO PEACE decades inthe«cat additional widespreadpoliticalpersecution. 11 required ahighcostinhuman livesbecausedespitethepowervacuums, superiority overindigenous peoples. especially inindigenousareas,becausethePCP-SLperpetuated oldconceptsof lives» orwhenhecalledhisfollowersto«induce genocide,» wasunleashed when Guzmánannouncedthat«thetriumphoftherevolution willcostamillion burying thevictimstocarbombsincities.Thegenocidal potential,explicit actions rangingfrom«executions»markedbycruelty andaprohibitionagainst terrorist andgenocidalpotential.Thepotential wasunleashedwith taste fordeaththatbecameasymbolofidentityand gavetheShiningPatha order tomaintaintheparty’s cohesion,theleadersinstilledinitsmembersa for thepersonandrighttolife,includingthatof itsownpartymembers.In PCP-SL «seesclasses,notindividuals.»Thisleadsto anabsolutelackofrespect subversive action,especiallythatofthePCP-SL,there isadefiniteblindspot:the convincing thestateandsocietythatdeathwas,sotospeak,awayoflife. had tofocustheirenergyoninstillingthiswillinpartymilitantsandthen peasants, othersectorsofsocietyorthemainpoliticalparties.ThePCP-SLleaders the willtokill,muchlessmassively extent andbrutalitycontinuetoamazeus. that thestartofarmedconflictwasunexpected.Norisitsurprisingits consolidation ofamodern,democraticnationalstate.Itisnotsurprising,then, military gov transformations ofthepreviousdecadesandpoliticalearthquake only Quechua, Aymara or Amazonian indigenouslanguages. the lattercategorybasicallyconsistedofPeruvianmenandwomenwhospoke and womenoverage18therighttovote,eveniftheywereilliterate.Attime, and finallyenshrinedfullrecognitionforuniversalsuffrage,grantingallmen construction ofanationalstate.TheConstitutionexcludednopoliticalparties a symbolicandlegalendtothegreatpoliticalexclusionthathadblocked reforms. despite itsauthoritarianstyleandtheradicalcontroversialnatureof Southern Cone,themilitaryregime(1968-1980)wasnotparticularlyrepressive, Cuban RevolutionwasmutedinPeru.Incomparisontoitscounterpartsthe to otherLatinAmericancountries,thewaveofguerrillaactioninspiredby No bloodwasshedinthemilitarycoupsof1962,1968and1975.Incomparison Progressive SocialParty( parties, suchasPopularAction( jungle in1962. The exceptionwastheimprisonment ofleftistleadersintheSepapenalcolonycentral Meanwhile, «beatingthe countryside» andbuildingthe«newpower» In thephilosophical,politicalandevenpsychologicalfoundationsof What wasmissinginthedecadesbeforeoutbreakofviolence After thedeepdemographic,economic,politicalandsocio-cultural From thisstandpoint,theConstitutionapprovedin1979seemedtoput ernment’s reforms, thecountryseemedtobeonway tothe acombs,» APRA was was acombs,» APRA Partido SocialProgresista Acción Popular or systematically, on allowed tooperate ), theChristianDemocratsand 11 ) becamemorefirmlyestablished. In1956,aftermorethantwo the partofstate, legally, andnew sometimes behaved likeanoccupyingarmy. the armedforces.Inearlyyearsoftheirintervention,forces racism-tinged contemptforpeasantsthatpermeatedstateinstitutions,including began toshow:notonlythelackofanationalcommunitycitizens,but block, atleasttemporarily. Beginningin1983,thedeepcracksmentionedabove had actuallytraveledalonganddifficultpaththatthePCP-SLmanagedto intensity» ofdeathsfromsocialconflictsandpoliticalconfrontations,thecountry a responseshowsthatinthepreviousdecades,whichweremarkedby«low the state’s response.ThefactthatthePCP-SL’s deadlyprovocation encountered state. Thispolicyalsocontributedtothehighdeathtoll. places wheremilitarybaseswerebeingsetup toll. FromLima,Guzmán Path’s tacticof«counter-reestablishments» furtherincreasedtheciviliandeath burying them.Afterthearmedforcesmovedintocombatsubversion,Shining family membersdie«likeanimals,»oftenexacerbatedbytheprohibitionagainst provided totheCVRreflectednotonlypain,butalsoindignationathavingseen terror. Itsmurderswere «exemplarypunishments.»Manyofthetestimonies acceptance, thePCP-SLincreasinglyhadtoresortimposingitselfthrough which was thePCP-SL’s inspiration.Forthatreason,afterthe firststageof organizations andwasmoreinterconnectedthanthatofChinainthe1930s, Peruvian countrysidestillhadafarlargerpopulationofactors,institutionsand within andbetweencommunities.Inareasaffectedby drugtrafficking,thePCP- involved inandoftenendedupescalatingmilitarizing oldsocialconflicts turned everythingupsidedown.Inthepoorestrural areas,thePCP-SLbecame the PCP-SL’s incorporated intonationallegislation. violations begantobesanctionedunderinternational treatiesthatwerebeing rights doctrinesthathadrecentlybecomelegalinstruments, ashumanrights to theregionbyUnitedStates,combinedwith shallowrootsofthehuman the crueltyofanti-subversiveforces. of thestubborn,cruelandtreacherous«Indian»reappearedinforce.Fearfanned able toresisttortureandimpassiveinthefaceofdeath.Theoldracistconcepts entire mythologybeganto(re)formaroundthemthatturnedintobeings between thosewhoweremembersofthePCP-SLandnot.An incomprehensible, begantobeseenasdangerous,withnodistinctiondrawn the generalpopulation,alsosowedfear. Thedisdained«others,»whowere often 13 12 animals.” “gringos” orpishtacos.Theycould notconceivethattheircountrymencouldkillthem“like community; whentheytelltheirstories, theyrefertothosewhowerekillingthemas“foreigners,”, Rather, itwasthepeasantswho somehowseemtohavehadagreaterawarenessofnational On the“counter-reestablishments,” seethechapteronPCP-SL. The otherdecisivefactorinthecrueltyofinternalarmedconflictwas If thepreviousphasewasoneofmoderationon partofallinvolved, Added tothiswastheinfluenceofnationalsecurity doctrineexported But theviolenceunleashedbyPCP-SL,whosemilitantsblendedinto sudden appearanceonthesceneopeneda«Pandora’s box»that proposed establishing«people’s committees» nearthe 13 12 tosparkareactionfromthe 337 THE FACTORS THAT MADE THE VIOLENCE POSSIBLE 338 PART TWO: T HE LEGACY OF THE CONFLICT AND THE WAY TO PEACE and neighborhoodgroups, andorganizationsofworkers,peasantsteachers. war.» abroad asaromanticguerrilla force,andtheanti-subversivestrategiesas«dirty were tryingtogainnationallyandinternationally by presentingthemselves evangelical churches.Theychallengedthelegitimacy thatthesubversivegroups rights organizationsandsignificantsectorsofthe CatholicChurchand rights violationscommittedbyboththestateand subversivegroups:human actions andcreateaclimateofoppositiontothesubversive groups. the violence,wasanotherfactorthathelpedstem brutalityofanti-subversive the PCP-SLwasstrategicallydefeated. of thereasonsforbreakdowndemocracy, the April 1992coupcamewhen these authoritiespaidwiththeirlives.Whilethesubversives’advancewasone districts andprovincesthatwerethreatenedbysubversion.Inmanycases, provinces, itismoreimportanttonotethecontinuityofelectedauthoritiesin recruiting members.ThisespeciallyaffectedtheMRTA. existence ofalegalleftfurtherreducedthesubversivegroups’possibilitiesfor an alternativewayofchannelingconflictsandbuildingrepresentation.The moments, thepartysystemandelectionsactedasashockabsorber, providing limitations, reducedtheopportunityforviolencetotakeroot.Evenatworst Amazon. in Peru,despitethepersistenceofsmallarmedgroupscertainparts That maybethecase,forexample,inColombia.Thesamethinghasnotoccurred victory donotexist,onepossibilityisthatitwillbecomea«chronicinsurgency.» When averyviolent,motivatedgrouptakesuparms,buttheconditionsfor T areas ofsupportforthePCP-SL. aggressive armiesthatviolently«swept»areasconsideredenemyterritoryor committees oftenwentbeyondtheirspecificmandate,turningintosmall, conflicts betweenfamiliesandgenerationsoverland.Self-defense community, especiallypoorones,welled upinamixturethatalsoincluded neighborhoods. punishment metedoutinpeasantcommunitiesorlow-incomeurban to extremesatraditionthatrangedfromabusebylandholdersorpolice with cruelty. Everywhere, thePCP-SL on theperiphery, adynamicinwhichtheforcesoforderalsobecameinvolved SL aggravatedasituationthatwasalreadyviolentinsociety 14 HE DEFEAT OF THE SUBVERSIVEGROUPS This referstothe so-called“remnants”ofPCP-SL intheEneandApurímacvalleys. Rebellions againstthePCP-SLwerealsobrutal.Theviolencelatentinany With fewexceptions,thesubversives alsofailedtowinovergrassroots There werealsooversightbodiesthatquestionedthe crimesandhuman The existenceofanindependentpress,eveninareas directly affectedby While therewerenoelectionsin1989and1990asmallpercentageof First, subversionbeganinademocraticcontextthat,despiteits 14 Why? exacerbatedphysicalpunishment,taking to live thatexistsinanyhumancommunity PCP-SL couldonlyofferthem: elimination ofauthoritiesanddestructionproductiveinfrastructure—the PCP-SL endedupcausing«thechorustorevolt.» resounding notethatwould transformtheworld.Inmanyplaces,however, the accompany thepartyanditsleaders,whowerefocusedonstriking force» oftherevolution,faithfulallies,secondvoice,chorusthatwould groups’ defeatwas theruralpeasantry. sphere ofinfluence.Thesectorwhoserejectionmostcontributedtothesubversive demobilized, destroyedand/orpreyedontheorganizationsthatfellnearits Instead, thePCP-SLbecamea«socialanti-movement»(Wieviorka1991)that expected it. handed thePCP-SLitsfirst strategicdefeatintheplacewheregroupleast strategy, ill willamongpeasants,which, combinedwiththearmedforces’changein require morefoodsupplies forthepartyandmoreyoungrecruits.Thisincreased balance thatitstillmaintained inmanyruralareas.TheShiningPathbeganto PCP-SL gatheredspeedtoreach«strategicequilibrium,» itbrokethefragile and plannedforthechildren’s growth andeducation.Inthatcontext,whenthe reproductive mindset,whichorganizedactivitiesaround thecycleoffamilylife PCP-SL’sthe surprise,the«prolongedwar» cameupagainstthepeasantfamily’s economy, thePCP-SL’s approachconflictedwi family relationships.Thesewerereplacedbytheterm «companion»( basic elementsasburyingthedeadoruseofforms ofaddressthatdenoted — notonlythecelebrationoffestivalsorelection of authorities,butalsosuch children?» bebettertokilltheentirefamily,would because«who’s goingtosupportthe but nottokill.»IftheShiningPathwasgoingkillfathers,womensaid,it CVR indifferentpartsofthecountry, thoseaffectedaskedthepartyto«punish, and smallchildren.Forthatreason,accordingtotestimonygatheredbythe with thelivesoftheirmembers,mostwhomwereyoungmenfamilies in pooreconomieswherecommunitiesdidnothavetheluxuryofdispensing Theestablishmentofanegalitarianutopiathatquicklyshowedits • Asubsistence-basedeconomicplanthatwasarchaicevenforthepoorest • to besad. vertical organizationthatreachedextremeswhenthepartyforbadepeople every facetofdailylife,goingbeyondnecessaryordertoanexcess easily tothe«deathpenalty»andatotalitarianorganizationthatregulated authoritarian side,especiallyintheapplicationofjusticethatresorted peasants. The murderscommittedbythePCP-SLnotonlyranupagainstwill That happenedbecauseafterthedestructionof«oldorder»— Above all,however, withpeasantsincreasingly involvedinamarket The totalitarianapproachimpliedintolerancetoward thelocalculture led towidespreadestablishment oftheself-defensecommitteesthat This sectorwas tohave beenthe«main , theywere also th thedynamicofruralsociety. To counterproductive compañero ). 339 THE FACTORS THAT MADE THE VIOLENCE POSSIBLE 340 PART TWO: T HE LEGACY OF THE CONFLICT AND THE WAY TO PEACE toll, especiallydeathsofQuechua speakersandruralresidents,attributedto and asubversivegroupthat repeateditserrorsexplainswhytheoveralldeath rejection bythepopulation. Thedifferencebetweenarmedforcesthatlearned repetition ofthePCP-SL’s cycleofconqueringbases/counter-reestablishment/ different partsofthecountryattimesthroughout the1980sweseea the mostindiscriminateandc This, however, blindedittoreality. Whilethe to avoid theconsequencesofcentrifugalforceandholditssmallbodytogether. guerrilla army,» thePCP-SL inability tolearn. Absorbed bystrengtheningthepartyand«people’s itself the«beaconofworldwiderevolution.» radically autarkic,thisisolationwasstillsignificant for apartythatconsidered one towhomtheycouldpresenttheircredentials.While thePCP-SLwasalways even repudiated.Bytheendof1980s,its«ambassadorsterror»foundno In Third World solidaritygroups,thePCP-SLwas increasinglyisolated and was madeupof18smallgroupswithlittleinfluenceintheirrespectivecountries. Internationalist Movement( Revolution aneccentricity. The Mao China’s turntoward capitalismmadethefollowers oftheCultural the MRTA’s inspirationandsometimesitstrainingground.ForthePCP-SL, post- countries, incorporatingintopoliticallifeguerrillamovementsthathadbeen it contributedtopeacenegotiationsandaccordsinvariousLatinAmerican groups. Theendofthe«ColdWar» directlyaffectedtheMRTA, especially because Salvador, orstillexistinColombia. groups fromforminginruralareaslikethosethatexistedGuatemalaandEl water.» areas, thearmedforceswereoneswhoendedupoperating«likeafishin organize self-defensecommitteeswheretherewasresistance.Inmanyrural establish allianceswithself-defensegroups,orpressuredruralresidentsto repression moreselective,andsoughttowinovertheruralpopulation that, ashasbeenmentioned,gavegreaterweighttointelligencework,made sought togainthepeople’s trust.Theywere theheraldsofachangeinstrategy forces learnedtobetterjudgetheenemy. Fromthestart,therewere officerswho for anecessaryinterconnectionwithstatethatreallydidexist. peace, mayorsandoftenpeoplewithuniversitydegreeswereviewedasresources the peasantry. To thepeasants,however, communityauthorities,justicesofthe people wereoutsidethecommunities,partofan«oldstate»thatwasnot erroneous assessmentoftherolelocalauthorities.ForShiningPath,these 15 To acertainextent,the drug-traffickingareaswere an exception. The mostimportantfactorinthePCP-SL The internationalclimatealsobecamemoreadverseforthesubversive The absenceoflargerurallandholdersalsohelpedkeepparamilitary Based ontheirownexperiencesandhistoricalpeculiarities,thearmed In addition,astheconflictprogr Movimiento RevolucionarioInternacionalista endedupconstructingav ounterproductive aspectsoftheir strategy, in PCP-SLwas 15 essed, thePCP-SL’s strategyrevealed its state andthearmedforcescorrected linked toa ’s defeatwas thegroup’s ery powerful exoskeleton Revolutionary , MRI)which «flight forward.»Inpracticalterms,itmeant: Guzmán’s decisionto«reachstrategicequilibrium»showeditselfbeasortof whose nameitwassupposedlyactingcontinuedorevenincreased.Abimael state agentsdecreasednotably, whilethePCP-SL’s aggressionagainstthosein the midstofterror. willingness towakeupeachmorning,takeadeepbreathandgoonwithlifein daily lifeingeneralcontinued.AllPeruviansshouldpayhomagetothis hardest hitbytheviolence,whereauthorities,schools,churches,workersand in generaltokeepgoing,especiallythosewholivedandsurvivedtheareas public rejectionofthesubversivegroups:stubbornwillingnessPeruvians Theoverexposure ofthePCP-SL’s apparatusandthefallofitsnational • Themassacreofruralpopulations, especiallytheAsháninka. • Aspilloverofterrorintothecities,througharmedstrikesandcarbombs. • leadership in1992. Finally, the CVRwo uld liketohighlightanotherfactor, bey ond general 341 THE FACTORS THAT MADE THE VIOLENCE POSSIBLE

CHAPTER 7

THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE CONFLICT

The two decades of violence summarized in this text have caused great, lasting harm to tens of thousands of people and their communities. The actions of subversive organizations and state security forces caused serious physical harm to many Peruvians while weakening and even destroying significant resources and forms of organization that were necessary for communal life. The CVR has found three main types of individual and collective consequences in the aftermath of the violence. There was psychological harm that affected people’s identity and family and communal life. There were socio- political consequences, reflected in the weakening of communities and, on a national scale, the breakdown of the democratic order that finally gave way to the return of authoritarianism in Peru. Finally, there were economic consequences, reflected in the great loss of infrastructure and opportunities throughout the country, as well as in the destruction of productive capacity and resources, especially in rural communities in areas where the internal armed conflict was most intense.

PSYCHO-SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES This report has described the behavior of the various armed groups that left tens of thousands of people killed or physically injured. The effects of the violence do not end there, however. Rather, they persist in the survivors and witnesses of these events in the form of deep suffering. In its investigation, the CVR heard many accounts of traumatic experiences aggravated by decades of forced silence that kept the victims from dealing appropriately with the pain through which they had lived. 344 PART TWO: T HE LEGACY OF THE CONFLICT AND THE WAY TO PEACE for self-fulfillment. sense ofselfandtheabilitytolivealifeself-determinationwithpossibility violence todestroythemostintimateaspectsofhumanexistence,suchas suffered. Thatlaconic,resoundingphrasespeakseloquentlyofthepotential people toldtheCVRwhendescribingtheirlivesaftertragediestheyhad thousands ofPeruvians the harmtopersonalidentityasaresultofabuseandhumiliationwhich to preventthesedeathsorhonorthedeadaccordingtheirreligiousbeliefs. relatives, whomtheysawdieunderterriblecircumstances.Theywerepowerless the psychologicalscarsofviolencecommittedagainstthemandtheirclose not theonlyonesaffected,however;thosewhowereadultsattimestillcarry children whentheviolencestrucktheirfamiliesandcommunities.Theywere and protection.Thislosshasbeenespeciallyperniciousforthosewhowere of familybreakdownandabdicationthefamily’s roleinprovidingeducation obstacle torecoveryintheaffectedcommunities.Therewasalsoasevereprocess of thearmedgroupstowardadefenselesspopulation.Thatfearremainsan dense climateoffearanddistrustcreatedbytheabusivecriminalbehavior violence hasmanymanifestations.Themostwidespreadandobviousisthe 2 1 assassinations toteachalesson.Peoplerememberitwithterror: seen todayamongthedirectandindirectvictimsofviolence. was adeliberatetactic.Thattactic For thePCP-SL,aswellstatesecurityforces,instillingfearinpopulation F EAR AND 1994, ontheRepentance Law. CVR. BDI-I-P281.In-depthinterview. May 1983. CVR. BDI-SM-P295.Testimony 2002799, Ay voluntarily tomakeastatement. so outoffear,insteadriskingtortureordisappearance, peoplepreferredtogo security forcestogoafterhimandtorturehim.Manypeople weredisappeared, glass ofwater. Ifa terrorist supposedlywenttotheirhouse,havegiven them aplateoffoodor enough forapersontohave seenasubv The persecutionandrepressionbytheArmywasterrible atthattime.Itwas The armedforces,meanwhile,usedthreatsandforced disappearances: blood ranout.Ifyou sawthat, w killed himlikethat.Theycoveredwithhisponchoand theylefthim,andallthe tied hishandsbehindhimwithacord,they’d tiedhisfeetwithacord,andthey They hadcuthisthroathere.Everything inside,they’d cutitwithaknife.Theyhad Besides fearandthebreakdownoffamily, anothercrucialelementis The PCP-SL’sThe mostpow The psychologicalharm—toindividualsandsocietycausedbythe D ISTRUST peasant hadprovidedthat,itwas were victims.«We arenotthe same,»someofthese erful w Aucayacu, ouldn’t you 2 acucho, Nov successful, eapon offearwas itsuseofpublic Huánuco, May2001.Male,authority in1993- ersive go by, go ersive orifsomerepentant die? Iusedtotremblewithfear. ember 18,2002.Femalewitnessin Tiquihua, as itsrepercussionscanstillbe enough ofamotive forthe 1 harm. Smallchildrenwere deprived ofthepersonwhohadrepresentedauthority subversives orsoldiers. authority andprotection beingsubjugated,abusedandhumiliatedby for minorstowatch thefather’s death,seeingthepersonwhohadrepresented of impotencethatsometimesbecameasenseguilt.It wasespeciallydevastating the cruelmurderoftheirlovedones.Addedtopain ofthelosswasafeeling that thefirstblowsufferedbychildrenandspouses washavingwitnessed fulfill itsroleofeducatingandprotectingminor children.Itmustbenoted adult —fatherormotherbecamepoorerandpartially ortotallyunableto local communityorganizations. such asthefamilyandcommunity, as well asculturalpointsofreferenceand who were suddenl Besides fear, theviolencedidseriousharmtopersonalidentityofindividuals L eager toprotectthecitizenswhowereaffected. relationship betweenthepopulationandstateinstitutionsthatseldomappeared reconstituting communitylife.Atamoregenerallevel,distrustalsoaffectsthe loyal. Thatdistrustisalsoanobstacletothepossibilityofrebuildingand accused —justifiablyorarbitrarilybypeoplewhowereconsideredcloseand members, afeelingthatoftenstemsfromthepriorexperienceofhavingbeing the mostvisibleformsisdistrustamongneighborsandevenfamily While generalizedfearisaneffectoftheviolence,italsodoesotherharm.One peaceful. Itwas atfirst,but districts, althoughthathasn’t happenedhere yet. That are nearby. As Itoldyou, we hear fear thereturnofsubversives: «Idon’t thinkit’s reallypeaceful;theenemies 1990s, membersofAsháninkacommunitiesstillfeelabandonedbythestateand subjugated bythePCP-SLbetweenendof1980sandbeginning groups, especiallythe Asháninka communitiesintheEneRiverV state securityforces. the violencewillmakethemfirsttargetsofarrestorotherinterventionby torture orunjustdetention.Thelatterstillfearthatahypotheticalresurgenceof over, iscommonamongpeoplewholostfamilymembersorwere victimsof that disrupteddailylife. over time,turnedintoanxietyandasenseofanindefinitebutimminentrisk what thebehaviorofarmedpartiesmadepeoplebelieve.Thatfear, prolonged the areasaffectedbyviolence,anyonecouldbeavictim,oratleastthatis 3 OSS OFFAMILY PROTECTION CVR. BDI-I.In-depthstudies.Interview withan Asháninka leader. The fearinstilledinthismannercreatedadeepsenseofvulnerability. In For children,beingsuddenly orphanedconstitutedprofoundmoral First was thebreakdownoffam The fearthattheviolencewillreturnisalsocommonamongcertain The persistenceoffear, even aftertheworst phaseoftheviolencewas y deprived of structuresthatprovidedsafetyandstability, it’s goingtocomeback.» about peopleturningupdeadinnearby ily, whichbecauseofthelossan 3 ’s whyIsayit isn’t really alley. Cruelly 345 THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE CONFLICT 346 PART TWO: T HE LEGACY OF THE CONFLICT AND THE WAY TO PEACE were disturbingreminders oftheunfortunateeventsthattheyhadtoface. responded totraumaticevents withsilence.Theiryoung children’s questions irritability anddepression thataffectedsomeoftheirmembers.Adultsoften children. had survived,whowasunabletodedicatefulltime accompanyinghisorher Children wholostoneparentanxiouslydemandedthe presenceoftheonewho laments aboutnothavingbeenabletogiveorreceive parentalprotection. supporting theirfamilies.Theaccountsgatheredby theCVRarefilledwith protecting theirchildren,mothershadtodedicate mostoftheireffortsto distance fromtheirparents.Justwhenfamilyunity wasmostnecessaryfor had lost. treatment andinstabilitywereaggravatedbytheir longing fortheworldthey Adaptation wasalwaysdifficultintheplaceswhere theysettled,becauseill person wouldhavebeenlikeifheorshehadnotdied. who wouldremainidealizedintheirmemoryandfantasiesofwhatthat unprotected oldage.Forsiblings,itmeantthelossofacompanionandprotector parents, itmeanttheendofhopeandbeginninganewfear, thatofan them. Thatresponsibility, oftenpremature,ledto the fields,tendinganimals,caringforyoungersiblingsorworkingtosupport In mostcases,olderbrothersorsistershadtotakeontheparentalrole:working for themtodevelop andaffirmtheiridentity. the victims’childrenwaschangedbyabsenceofrolemodelsnecessary affection, stimulationandencouragement.Thustheemotionaldevelopmentof provided notonlyfood,clothingandschoolsupplies,butalsoadvice,guidance, the CVRoflossrepresentedbydeathafatherwho,ifalive,wouldhave and orderwhohadprovidedprotectionguidance.Somewitnessestold 4 prepared, evenastheysometimesfacedrejectionintheircommunities. were forcedtotakeonnewtasksforwhichtheynot,orfelt had tofightalonefortheirfamilies’ meant losingrightsandstatusinthecommunity. With thepainstillfresh,widows adolescents whowere forcedtogrowuptooquickly. CVR. BDI-SM-P11. Testimony 203238. For familiesthatwerenot scattered,lifebecamedifficultbecauseofthe For adolescents,thephysicaldistancefromtheirhomes becameanemotional The violencecausedmanyfamiliestoscatterastheyfledhurriedlysurvive. A child’s death was painful after theirhusbands.Theyhateme.[...]. well. [...]Ourneighborshateme.Theysayallkindsofthings.thinkIam They talkaboutme.Thathurts.Isufferfromallthosethings,andI’m notdoing into awoman. That’s whatIdo,and can’t dowhatamandoes,andIcryday I suffer. Ican’t doitalone.HowcouldI? I can’t findalaborer Besides orphans,therewasthedramaofwidowhood.Beingawidow . [...]Ihavethe do to andupsettingforbothparentssiblings.For survival andtheirchildren’sThey future. somehow Igetthroughlife.People hateme. and night.Isuffer. I’m asinglemotherandIhave nothing.I work myself,turningintoaman, 4 overadapted I sufferfrom children or everything. slaughtered withouttheirconsent: upon seeingtheircropsburned,homesdestroyed, theiranimalsstolenor [...] theymightkillyououtof morning intheplaza.MyneighborsandIsaid,‘No, if youtrytotakeitcourt fear ofreprisalsifanyonesoughtjustice.«Somanypeople turnedupdeadinthe Abandoned corpsesormutilatedbodiescouldappearatanytime,accentuating longer communitygatheringplaces,butbecamethesitesofdreadfuldiscoveries. and soughtwaysofsurvivingontheirown. result, manycommunitymembersstoppedparticipatingincommunalactivities seen asdangerousbecausetheaggressorsusedthoseoccasionstoattack.Asa individual andfamilylife. and thecommunitylostitsstrengthasastructurethatbroughtorderto only availableoptionwasdisplacement.Ineithercase,dailylifedisrupted cases, thecommunitieschosetobewatchful; inothers,perhapsthemajority, the people lived together, andunderminedcommunalvalues andpractices.Insome bonds, madecommunityorganizationfragile,alteredtheconditionsunderwhich acts ofviolencecommittedbythecommunitiesthemselves,weakenedcommunal the family. areas thatwereaffectedbytheviolencewasasdamagingbreakdownof For theemotionalwelfareofresidents,breakdowncommunitylifeinrural L 5 5 OSS OFCOMMUNALPOINTSREFERENCE CVR. BDI-SM-P294.Testimony 202735. CVR. Testimony so much. quail takeflightandscatter. We scatteredlikequail,hereandthere.We suffered farmer foralongtime.[...] I’d worked withthe banksince1955.[...]The Army [...] Iusedtogetloansfrom thebank.[…]I’veworkedforyears;beena years, andIhadadryingfloorforcacaocoffee harvestedalotofcorn. raised coffee,bananasandcacao.I’vebeenamemberof thecooperative[...]for enormous harm.Ihad140boards.[...]wasbringingwood tobuildmyhouse.I [...] Theyburnedmyentirehouse,theyateallanimals andtheydidme Many communitymembersmentionedhowupset anddesolatetheyfelt The violencealsochangedstreetsandotherpublicplaces,whichwereno don’t know left outoffear. [...]Thereweremanyofusthatday. [...]Thosewhowerethere,I there hadbeenauthorities…butwithallthatfear,wherewerethey?Theyalso slept wherewe That time,becausewe were Opportunities forsharedexperience,suchasassemblies,begantobe The harassmentandmassacringofentirecommunities,aswellthe 5 where theywent. To 201066. Ay shouldn’t acucho. have slept,andmychildrencriedliketherain.[...]If vengeance.’ SoIdroppedit,outoffear.» afraid, we hadtogointothehillsandsleepthere.We Lima, toIca.…Theyscattered,likewhenmother 6 347 THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE CONFLICT 348 PART TWO: T HE LEGACY OF THE CONFLICT AND THE WAY TO PEACE community hassufferedfrom beingstigmatized.Theclearestandmostcommon avoid takingresponsibility. risen topositionsofauthorityfromwhichtheydeny theirpastactionsand community lifewithoutpayingforwhattheydid,and someovertheyearshave accomplices toorperpetratorsofthoseviolations. Somehavere-entered lives ofthosewholostfamilymembersorproperty andthosewhowere perpetrators duringthoseyears.Feelingsofsadness andresentmentcolorthe among neighborswho,forvariousreasons,had facedoffasvictimsand establish communitylifeencounteredamajorobstacle: therancorthatremained collaboration was oftenpunishedwithdeathbytheopposingparty. the securityforcesbyprovidingthemwithfoodorshelter. Thisforced the self-defensepatrolorsoldierscameandsamethinghappened.» people ofbeingsnitches.Theymurderedincoldblood.Thentheyleftand protection, aggravated people’s the crossfire,»withnopossibilityofturningtoanyarmedpartiesfor both subversiveorganizationsandstatesecurityforces.Findingthemselves«in interest intheircommunities’traditions. to theCVR,youngpeoplenolongerwantparticipateinfestivalsandhavelost ravaged bythearmedgroups.Insomeplaces,accordingtotestimonyprovided other cases,thePCP-SLprohibitedthem. sacrilege, ledpeopleinsomepartsofthecountrytogiveupthosecustoms.In attacks. Thefearofsufferingnewattacks,whichweresometimestingedwith community ritualsandfestivals,occasionsthattheaggressorsoftenchosefor 9 8 7 CVR Testimony 100490. CVR. Testimony 100704. CVR BDI-SM-P101.Testimony 430194. now andIhavenowaytobuildmyhouse. Besides conflictsamongmembersofcommunities,in manycasesanentire When theworstyearsofviolenceinruralAndes ended,effortstore- unspeakable thingseven forces, anditbecameaviciouscircle.Theywentin,theykilled,peoplesuffered and dothesamething.Theywouldkillpeoplebecausethey’d helpedthesecurity give themwhattheyaskedfor. A littlewhilelater, thesubv demand things.Theypracticallyforcedpeople,andpeoplehadnochoicebutto the subversiveswerecoming?»Later,theywouldgotodifferentplacesand had beenkilled,theystartedkillinglocalresidents, None ofthepeopleinthatarealivedpeaceagain,becausejustassoldiers To save theirownlives, peoplewere regularlyforcedtohelpthePCP-SL and It isstrikingtonotethataggressionagainstcommunitieswasintensefrom Over theyears,therehasbeenaculturallossincertainareasthatwere Other things,inthiscasesymbolic,affectedbytheclimateoffearwere burned ev erything Ihad.Nowdon’t though theyweren’ daily anxiety. «ThePCP-SL came and have aleafor 7 t guilty. saying, «Whydidn’t youus tell a rooftile.[…]I’ 9 ersives w ersives m anoldman ould come accused 8 Grieving, therefore,becomes chargedwithuncertainty, combiningtheneedto person’s relatives have no access toevidenceabouthisorhercurrentcondition. the state.Ineverycaseinwhich thedetainee’s whereaboutsisstillunknown, the subsequent disappearance ofpeoplewasastrategyfrequentlyusedbyagents whether thepersonisdead. Inthe1980sand1990sinPeru,detention grief.» particular circumstancesunderwhichthelossoccurred. Itis,therefore,«special conflict arestillgrieving.Thisisnot«pathologicalgrief,» butresultsfromthe appropriately. Heorsheremai overwhelmed, thepersonremainstrappedby loss,unabletorespond pain withtheirmentalandemotionalresources. Iftheseresourcesare that impliesacertaintemporarylackofbalanceand in whichpeoplerespondto and preparetogetonwiththeirlives.Griefisavery intenseemotionalprocess forms ofgrieving,theritualsandcustomsbywhich peopleprocesstheirlosses the lossofafather, the perpetratorsthatleftdeepestmarkonaffectedpopulation.Besides The lackofpityandbasicrespectforthedeadwasonecharacteristics Changes inwaysofgrieving Peruvian citizens. beatings, insultsarestillpresentinthememoryandidentityofthousands That brutalityhasgiventheviolationsaperversepersistence:murders,rapes, honor theirdeadandattemptingtostripthevictimsofhumancondition. or agentsofstatesecurityforces,reachedtheextremeforbiddingsurvivorsto unprecedented cruelty, whethertheyweremembersofsubversive organizations permeated theidentityofvictimsandthoseclosetothem.Theperpetrators’ harm thatresultedfromthepersonalexperienceofsufferingandwayit damage, however, merelycomplementedother, deeper, moreintimatetypesof affected thesocialenvironmentinwhichpeoplesoughtself-fulfillment.That The breakdownofthefamilyanddeteriorationcommunitylifeseverely Personal scarsofsuffering local people’s effortsatreconstruction. community memberswhodiedinthefollowingyearsandnorecognitionof the deathsofeightjournaliststherein1983,withnomentiondozens case was thatofthecommunityUchuraccay, whichbecameknownsolelyfor because ofnewsreportssomeepisodeviolence.Oneespeciallysignificant even moredifficultfordisplacedpeopleintheirnewhomes. Ayacuchosu have was automaticallyassociatedwithterrorismandviolence.Manypeoplefrom case isthatofthedepartment Ayacucho, anamethatinthe1980sand1990s The samethingoccurredinmanyplacesthatgainednationalnotoriety One factorinthesechangeswaysofgrievingisthe uncertaintyabout Many ofthepeoplewholostfamilymembersduring theinternalarmed ffered becauseofthisabusive association,whichmadelife mother, childorsib ns aprisonerofpain. ling, thesurvivor underwent changesin 349 THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE CONFLICT 350 PART TWO: T HE LEGACY OF THE CONFLICT AND THE WAY TO PEACE 13 12 11 10 identified byclothingorotherbelongingsfoundwith them: already eatenpartofhisface.» killed himtherewherethelandslidewasandadogeatinghim.Ithad or outsidetowns,thecorpsesrevealedferocityandabusesuffered.«They from animalsthatthreatenedtodevourthem.Dumpedinstreets,onriverbanks state ofdecay, hackedtopiecesorburned.Sometimestheyhadberescued remains, sometimesforseveraldaysorweeks.Thebodieswereoftenfoundina brutality ofthedeathinflictedonafather, mother, childorsibling. farewell tothelostrelative.Anotherisknowingtoomuch,havingwitnessed remained insuspense. a ghost.Thussignificantpartofthelives ofthevictim’s familymembers which deniedrealityandopposedthetruth,turneddisappearedpersoninto said theysawsomeonewholookedlikemydadinaprison.»Theofficialposition, «perhaps helosthismindandiswanderinginsomedistanttown...,»«someone members stillharboraglimmerofhope:«maybehewasabletoescape...,» years havepassedandallindicationsarethatthepersonwasexecuted,family death. TheCVRhasfoundmanyversionsofthisprocess.Although15or20 reality. The su anguished hopefornewsoftheperson’s whereabouts. know whetherthelovedoneisdeadoralivewithanunendingsearchand eyes, andatnightit’seyes, allIcansee.» When Ifoundhimtieduplikethat,nearly that theywillneverbeabletoerasefromtheirmemories.«Hewastiedup. CVR. Testimony 500620. CVR. Testimony 203731. CVR. Testimony 201804. Aucayacu, inthedepartmentofHuánuco, onApril8,1990. CVR. Testimony 435036. W Fifteen or20years later, witnesses Many peopletookonthepainfultaskofsearchingfortheirlovedones’ Not knowing, The uncertaintyopensthedoorforimagining,fantasizinganddenying coming.» Theylookatsomeoneandsaythat. when theyseeaheavy-setpersongopast,say, «Ithinkthat’s mydad alive. Iwanttoknowbecausemychildrenarealsosuffering.Sometimes [Weeping] Iwouldliketoaskyou, please,totellusthetruth.Ifhe’s deador bury it. was noskin.Hishairofftooneside,allrotten,andI had togatheritup nose, noeyes.Hishairandclotheswererotting,hisflesh wasallwhite.There being eatenbydogs.Hehadnoblood,notevenatongue. [...]Notongue,no When Ifoundmyhusband,hadtotakehimandburyhim. Hewasalready rvivor escaped stillimaginesthatthevictimmaysomehowhave 13 however, isnottheonlyobstacletobiddinganappropriate oman, wifeofadisappearedman whowas 11 12 Sometimestheunrecognizablebodieswere described totheCVR detailsofscenes went crazy. That 10 ’s always beforemy detained bysoldiersin remains. incomplete processesthathaveleftalegacyofsadness anduneasinessthatstill clothes orholdingawake. Thes burials withoutindispensableritua the road,dead.» with asign.Theysaidnooneshouldpickthemup.And theyallremainedalong community. «’Thisishowinformersdie.’ whodiedalongtheroad Everyone posthumous dishonorwasalesson—ofsubmissionandsilenceforthe as partoftheterrorstrategy. deceased restsinpeace,whichisalsoasourceofrelieftothesurvivors. scrupulously followtraditioninhonoringthedead,thusensuringthat must becarriedoutaccordingtocertainproceduresandtimeframes.People community members.Allsocietieshavemeaningfulfuneralceremoniesthat loss. Theyarealsoatimewhenthesurvivorsfeelsolidarityofother process. Theyallowforatimelyexpressionofpainandhelppeopleaccepttheir threat ofdrasticpunishment,tohonortheirmurderedrelativeswithafuneral. increasing thesufferingofsurvivors,whomperpetratorsforbade,under naked —raisespainfulimagesoftheindignitiesandabusesvictimssuffered: burned him.Myfath cut hisheadwithaknifeasifheweresheep.Theyhimupinpiecesand their fathershadbeentreatedlikeanimals.«Theykilledmyfatherthere.They were dumpedoftenfoundtheirpainexacerbatedbyasharpsenseofhumiliation: 17 16 15 14 CVR. Testimony 200670. CVR. Testimony 487551. CVR. Testimony 100557. CVR. Testimony 203858. several hoursbecausethey didn’t killhimoutright. and whenapersonbleedstodeath,Ithinktheysufferlot.Myfatherlivedfor tilling thesoil,becausetheyhithimoverhead,brutallycuthisjugular, blow andhehadn’t suffered.»Butunfortunately, him. SometimesIsay:«Ifthey’d killedhim, remember yearslaterreadingtheautopsyreport,criminalwaytheykilled says, andthensheburstsinto tears. «I shouldatleasthave buriedthemsomy heartwould resteasy,» mymother remember them,we cry. Mymom We didn’t seetheirbodies,we Sometimes survivors defiedthethreatsandcarriedouthasty, desperate In manyplacesduringtheyearsofviolence,buryingdeadwasprohibited It mustberememberedthatburialceremoniesarecrucialtothegrieving In manycases,thebrutalitiessufferedinlifewereprolongedafterdeath, happened tothem,howtheydied,whodidit. Sometimes thefirstthingthatcomestoyourmindisparents—what The conditioninwhichbodieswerefound—tortured,hackedtopieces, Those whorecoveredtheirlovedones’bodiesfromaplacewherecorpses 16 er’s bodyw The lifelessbodieshadtobe e were uneasy as nothingbutash.» couldn’t burythem. To ls suchaswashi remembers herchildrenanditmakessad. 17 if they’d killedhimwithonewell-aimed , inadequateburials, It’straumatic. very they killedhimasifwere 15 ng thebody, changingthe 14 left inplain this day, whenever we Too much.I bad burials, view. That 351 THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE CONFLICT 352 PART TWO: T HE LEGACY OF THE CONFLICT AND THE WAY TO PEACE river. disappeared peoplebeingheldinsomeprisonoron an islandinthemiddleofa lies andmistreatment.Insomecases,thehopewas nurturedbystoriesabout Veryyears. fewfound to knockatthedoor. That’salwaysthink.» I what person willreturn.«Whenevermydogbarks,Ithink thatmydaughterisgoing disappeared. Deprivedofthecertaintydeath, relativesstillhopethatthe on withtheirlivesisespeciallydifficultinthecase ofvictimswhowere impotence athavingbeenunabletoavoid aloved one’s deathordisappearance. members feelpartlyresponsiblefortheeventsorreproachthemselvestheir memories anddreams. violence thatcausedthedeatharemorealivethaneverinrelatives’thoughts, strongly markedbythemissingfamilyme respect. who hasdied,secureintheknowledgethatpersonbeentreatedwith to getonwiththeirlives. To dothis,itisvitaltohave dulyhonoredtheloved one forgotten, thepersonisgivenaspecialplaceinmemorythatenablessurvivors survivors imprisonedbytheirloss.Althoughadeceasedfamilymemberisnever were leftalonewiththeirgrief. Intimidated, thecommunitydemandedrapid,discreetburials.Thesurvivors solidarity. Itwas impossibletoexperiencelossandsorrowcollectively. clothes, andthatkeptthemfromreceivingsignsofcommunitycompassion themselves forbiddentoshowoutwardsignsofgrief,suchaswearingmourning 21 20 19 18 these nightshe’llcomeback.»Ithinkthat.Buthenever comes.» I cryandthink,«Maybehe’llcomeback,maybe comeback.Maybeoneof CVR. Testimony 500627. CVR. Testimony 200337. CVR. Testimony 203903. CVR. Testimony 500634. Often addedtothehopeofapossiblereturnissearch thatlastedseveral Giving thelostfamilymemberaplaceinmemorysothatsurvivorscanget If onlymysonhadn’t One particularlydisturbingelementisthesenseofguilt.Manyfamily that. «Please helpme,me.»Idreamofmyfather,andsufferalotbecause Just likemyyoungersister, Istill In somecases,theseprocessesarestillpending.Thelivesofthesurvivors As explainedabove,inmanycasesthechangesgrievingprocessesleft This incompletegrievinghadotherconsequences.Thesurvivorsfelt studying over there. have tocomehelpmeplowthefieldonSaturdaysandSundays.» 18 answers in [...] Hewas come. ...Becausewe their searches;mostonlyencounteredsilence, studying thereandmyhusbandtoldhim,«You dream thatthey’re killinghim.Hesaystome, mber’s presence.Thescenesofthe were livinginVinchos; mysonwas 20 «Ifeelsadbecauseheisgone. 21 19 who weresurethattheirrelatives hadbeenfoundwererelieved,butthatwas can theyberecognized?Whoislefttorecognized amongthoseremains? bone fragments,bodypartsmixedwithscrapsofcloth decayedbytime,how from ourmemoriesoftheirphysicalappearance.But whenwefindremains, relative’s bodylooklike?Would theybeable torecognizeit?We recognizepeople expectation, chargedwithpain.Whatwouldbe found? Whatwouldtheir been disturbedbyanimalsandtheelements. site, however, thework becameparticularlydifficult,because thegraveshad hoped tohavetheopportunityperformnecessary rituals.Atthesecond exhumed. Inonecase,familymemberswhohadcarried outthehastyburial that werefound,raisedtheexpectationsofrelatives, who expectedtheresttobe site, Chuschi,endingwiththeidentificationandsubsequentburialofbodies as ahumanitarianact. of theseinvestigationstofamilymembersandtheirgreatvalueforjustice from somesuchsites.Thesefewcasesprovideanideaoftheextremeimportance burial sites.TheCVRandthePublicMinistryjointlyexhumedhumanremains — wheresurvivorsbelievetheycanfindtheirlovedones’remains. clandestine burialplaces—massgraves,intheterminologyusedpastdecades their fateistiedtoanotherterriblelegacyoftheviolence:thousands know thatwehadburiedhimandwouldrememberhim.» onewhosedeathisconfirmed. «We’dhonor oftheloved becontenttoatleast information cantheygetonwiththeirlives. information abouttheirlovedones’fateorwhereabouts.Onlywiththat 24 23 22 CVR. Testimony 201205. CVR. Testimony 201256. CVR. Testimony 400039. If Iseehimburied,I’llforgetforever. son’s bonesback.Iwant toseehimburied,andI’llforgetaboutmysonforever. That’s whywe’v Along withthisdemand,naturally, comesthedesiretoholdfuneralritesin hope forhisreturn.That’ him ordisappearhim;Iwanttoknowthetruthsocanbeatpeace,nolonger I want them togivemeananswer. The mostfrequentdemandofrelativesthedisappearedisreliable keep thinkingabouthim.«He’llcomeback,he’ll has died.He’sno say. Sothat’s whatIwant. Those whowereabletorecognize amurderedfamilymemberandthose The mostnotablereactionfromfamilymembers was theiranxious The easewithwhichthistaskwascarriedoutatthefirstexhumation One oftheCVR’s taskswas togatherreliableinformationaboutthese The tragedyofthedisappearedanddemandfortruthabout e cometotheTruth Commission. P longer withus.»Thatway Icantellmychildren,sotheywon’t s whatIwant. [...]I 22 Maybe he’s alive, ormaybetheyreallydidkill 24 want totellmychildren,«Y come back,he’s erhaps Icanatleastgetmy alive,» 23 my children our father 353 THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE CONFLICT 354 PART TWO: T HE LEGACY OF THE CONFLICT AND THE WAY TO PEACE that, toseeusnaked.Theylaughed.Itwas humiliating.» out inthemiddleofnight,naked.[...]Andpolice laughedtoseeuslike to beingstrippedofone’s defenses,ofprotection.«Imaginesomeonehaulingyou defenseless, exposedtoridiculeorsexualintrusion.Forced nudityistheprelude forced tostriporwereviolentlystrippedoftheirclothes. Theyfeltashamed, their testimonyindignantlydescribedhowhumiliatedtheyfeltwhenwere vulnerability andlossaffecttheperson’s entireidentity. Thepeoplewhooffered independently andwork. Whenabodyisdamagedinthisway, feelingsof self-esteem, especiallybecausetheharmusuallyaffectstheirabilitytolive people’s conceptsoftheirownbodies,leadingthemtodoubtorlowering their paralyzed, resultingindis waves ofabomborsophisticatedmethodstorture;limbsmutilated bodies thevisiblesignsofhorror:facesdisfiguredbygunshots,shock esteem, besidescausingotherpeopletofailacknowledgeorvaluethem. or otheraspectsoftheselfledpeopletoquestiontheirownidentityandself- could leadtostigmatization.Inthelong detained. As hasbeenindicated,thename were confusedwithothersbecauseoftheirnamesandpunishedorunjustly of theriskbeingassociatedwithorconfuseda«suspect.»Somepeople dangerous toidentifythemselves,makethemselvesknown,especiallybecause all ofwhichareimportantaspectspersonalidentity. For manypeople,itwas they alsoconcealedtheirfamilyties,placesoforigin,rolesandlivedexperience, or thoseoftheirrelativestosavethemselvesandlovedones.Bydoingso, and theconditionsitimposedforcedmanypeopletochangeordenytheirnames enable ustorecognizeandberecognizedbyothers.Theviolenceoftheconflict Names areasignofouridentity;theyidentifyusandsingleout. H now andleave againsoquickly.» this encounter, saying:«Youwent re-encounter thedeceasedrelative.Onegrievingwomanfeltfleetingnessof recognizing theirlovedones.Forsome,openingagravewasanopportunityto not thecaseforthosewhodidfindout,orcouldrecognizeresisted 26 25 this typeofabuse,butnot theonlyones.Maledetaineeswerealsosubjectedto means ofsubjugatingordominating people.Women were themainvictims of victim’s Sexual violence,especially rape,isatraumainitself,becauseitexceedsthe S to doitrightthere.Ifeltcompletelyhumiliated.» wanted I togosomewherechange,andtheytoldmeIcouldn’t move, thatIhad how todescribethefeeling.AllIcansayisthatthey handed memyclothesand EXUAL VIOLENCE ARM TOTHE CVR. BDI-SM-P20. Testimony 100188. Lima,20-year CVR. BDI-P23.Testimony 100444. Those whostillsufferthephysicaleffectsofviolentactsbearontheir capacity forresponse.During theyears ofviolence,rapewas usedasa NAME AND THE BODY ability, amongother away forsuchalongtime,onlytocomeback run, concealingordenyingone’s name of acommunity, atownorfamily -old w 26 oman detainedby thepolice. things. Thesemarkschange 25 «Idon’t evenknow public actswitnessedbythedetainee’s children. facilities, althoughinsomecasestheabusebeganat the timeofdetention,with sense ofself. way.destructive Theintentionalityoftorture isassociatedwiththelossofa in whichthepersoncommittingabuseexercises poweroveranotherina experience andanattackontheperson and physicalabuseisalsopsychological,because it isalwaysahumiliating the bodyasmuchpossible.Thisismostbrutal faceofviolence.Alltorture a person’sbody Torture andphysicalpsychologicalabuseareanotherway ofdoingharmto T tears andextremetension. their bodylanguagerevealedthetraumathroughtrembling,sweating,profuse or reportthecrime.Inmorethanonecase,uponrecountingtheirexperience, they felt;manyhadbeenunabletospeakofitbefore,sharetheirhumiliation When theyrecountedtheevents,victimsshoweddeeppainandshame events remainintheshadowofanexperiencethattheysimplywishtoforget. indignation, painandademandforjustice.Forsomevictims,however, these they suffered«rape.» victims remainsilentorrefertoitas«sexualviolence,»withoutadmittingthat the enormousdefensiveneedtodenyandrefuseacknowledgedeeds, Because ofthehumiliationandshamethataccompanythesewounds,because convinced, however, thatthenumberof enter intoanintimaterelationshipareseriouslyharmed. that rapeproducesisdifficulttoovercome; theperson’ fear anddistrustofnewbonds.Theassociationbetweensexualitytorture a rape,thecapacityforemotionalsharingisusuallychanged,andtheregreat thinking «thisisn’t happeningto feeling thebody»or«seeingitfromadistance,»«becomingdisconnected» person’s psychologicalunity. People frequentlyexperienceasenseof«nolonger who israped.Someaffectthecohesionofsense«self,»fragmenting phenomena comeintoplayinthedefenseofemotionalintegrityaperson to relateothersandtheworld,whichtheyseeasathreat.Manypsychological and damagestheirself-esteem.Itaffectspeopl violence andrape.Rapeleavesvictimswithpainfulscarsontheirself-image 27 ORTURE CVR. BDI-SM-P23. Testimony 100444. the policehadcome.They searched thehouse. why?» Isaid,«Butwhy, please?»Therewas nodistrict attorneythere;only in frontofmychildrenand my wife,withnoexplanation.Ievensaid,«But They didn’t say, Most torturevictimsweredetainedinprisons,military basesorpolice Over theyears, fear, intenserageanddeep humiliationturnedinto The CVRhasgatheredthetestimonyofcountlessvictimsrape;weare and identity. Thegoalisto «Good evening, sir.» At thatmoment,theybegantobeatme me,» or«thisisjust ’s dignity. Itis victims isfargreaterthanweknow. diminish t e’s sexualityaswell astheirability a baddream.» 27 also apower relationship he personbyweakening s sexlifeandabilityto After suffering 355 THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE CONFLICT 356 PART TWO: T HE LEGACY OF THE CONFLICT AND THE WAY TO PEACE person turnedupwithnoeyes,tongue,fingernails.» shot myfriend.Theydousedhimwithgasolineandsetonfire.Another Afterwards theytoldmenevertospeakoutagainstthepartyagain.» fear. «They threatenedtokillme.Theyhitmeandkickedlikeananimal. feelings thatthevictimsusedtogatherstrengthresistbeatings. associated withtorturearestrategiesandmethodsforcontrollingthoughts the victimsrefertoas«trauma»andgeneral«psychologicalproblems.»Also loss ofmotorfunctionsandalterationsinsensoryperception,aswellwhat hopelessness andresignation,asenseofhumiliation,guiltdeathwish,the the experienceoftortureisfrequentlyaccompaniedbyfeelingsintensefear, experienced whensubjectedtobrutalmistreatment.Theresultsindicatethat intense feelingsoflackprotection,vulnerabilityandhumiliationthey 31 30 29 28 the utmostcontempt. they werehumanbeingswascompletelyignoredand theyweretreatedwith experiences spokeofhavingbeentreated«worsethan animals.»Thefactthat abuse even moredestructive topersonalidentity. Thepeopledescribingtheir life inhishands.Thisaffronttotheperson’s dignitymakesthebeatingorphysical does andacceptsnocriticism.Hedemandsonlysubmission.hasthevictim’s power andabilities.Heclaimstoknowmoreaboutthevictimthan CVR. BDI-SM-P322.Testimony 411276. CVR. Testimony 10317,Lima,policeofficer. CVR. BDI-SM-P238.Testimony 301074. CVR BDI-P124. The PCP-SLalsousedphysicalandemotionalabusetopunishinstill me underw Then hebroughtabasinfullofwaterandstuckmyheadinitlikethis.Heheld An analysisofthetestimonypeoplewhoweretorturedreveals circumstances, whenthey’re beatingyou, they insultyou and sayanything. passed outtwicefromthebeatingandlater…you «We shouldkillhimandmakedisappearfromthefaceofearth.»I good-for-nothing parts, myback,spine.Theybeatmeandsaid,«We’ve gottomakethis was about.Theybeatmeoverthehead,onears. hitmeonvital They mademelistentoaradiothathadcassette,andI couldn’t tellwhatit To thepersonwhoistortured,torturerappearstohave unlimited mind. everything. Ieven rememberedmymother What amIgoingtodonow, whyaretheydoingthistome?Ithoughtabout until dawn.Myarmshurt.Ihadsleptbecausewastired.thinking, I wasafraidhegoingtohitme.[...]Heleftmelyingthere,handcuffed time, sayingthat.Sometimeshehitme.[...]Igotnervouswhencamein. over and[...]«Haveyouthoughtaboutit?»Hecameinfromtimeto was going to say. Itoldhimhad tell,» Isaid.«OK!Sitdownandtalk!»heHewantedtowritewhat 28 Testimony 200175. ater foralongtime,soIcouldn’t ev completely useless.»Theysaid,«He’s adamned terrorist,» come alone.Thatwentonforalongtime, . Everything goesthroughyour en talk.«Yes, I’lltell;yes, I’ll 30 know, under those 29 «They 31 armed forcestreatedwithcontempt thosewhomitshouldhaveprotected.There had absolutepowertoharmoreliminateanyoneit chose. Themembersofthe dominance thatothershadovertheirlives.TheShining Pathmadeclearthatit They tookeverythingIhadinthehouse. went over grabbed mybabyandwe she letgoofthelittleboy[...]myboy’s headbroke,smashedlikeanegg.I are goingtokillus,ruin[so]weescapedquickly, Igrabbedmylittlegirland because theysaidtheSinchishadsettledinarea[...]cuttingand to thehills.We lived inthehillslikedogs.Dayandnightwekeptrunningaway […] Inthoseyears, Ihadanotherchild, littleboy, in1991,andwe escaped injured people’s dignityandmadethemfeellikeanimals. community live in caves. Thereforethisexperience,althoughonlytemporary, a stateofextremepovertyandrootlessness,becauseonlypeoplewhohaveno destroyed their ownhumanity. All ofthisreveals theways inwhichtheseactsofviolence alienating humiliation,thepeoplewhoaremistreatedevensaythattheydoubted they weretreated«likeanimals»or«worsethananimals.»Inextremecasesof The perpetratorstriedtostriptheirvictimsofhumanity. Manypeoplesaid S 35 34 33 32 TRIPPED OFTHEHUMANCONDITION CVR. BDI-SM-P232. Testimony 510257. CVR. BDI-SM-P221.Testimony 301060. CVR. BDI-SM-P23.Testimony 100444. CVR. BDI-SM-P376.Testimony 100862. People’s senseofdignitywas alsoaffectedbythefierce,arbitrary now, chaotic, terrifyinglife.Even Ican’t findpeace. that forthreeorfouryears.Sodidmymotherandchildren. Itwasacompletely We hadtolookforcaves. Itookmyblanketsthereevery like night.Ilived We didn’t even sleepinourhouseatnight. We lived like deer or like foxes. Fleeing infearandtakingrefugehillscavesmeant«regressing»to garbage. Believe me,fromthetimeweentered[...]prison,theytreateduslike dead. Dumphim[...]. me. [...]Dumphimwiththepickuptruck,becausethisdogisalready came to,theysaid,«Thisdoghasn’t a waterheaterorhotthattheyhadboiled.Irememberwhen [...] BecauseIdidn’t I hadtokeepliving.rememberfeelingalittlehot want todie.Ihadmytwochildren,whowereverysmall,andrealizedthat back tothesamebase.ThenextdayIw outright tokillme,stoptorturingme.FinallyIpassedout.Theytookme dying, andIremember, asthoughitw questions theyaskedme,soallIcoulddowas screamandcry. I felt like I was the victims’ 33 dignity. know anythingandIwas innocent,Icouldn’t 32 thehilltolive. That’ 34 died,» becausetheyhad ere yesterday, that as stillaliv water, Idon’t s wherewe all lived. [...] 35 e, becauseI once Iaskedthem wanted tobury know ifitwas didn’t really answer the answer 357 THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE CONFLICT 358 PART TWO: T HE LEGACY OF THE CONFLICT AND THE WAY TO PEACE with nothing.» Here’syou allofit.’ themoneyIhave. I’llgive Theytookeverything; theyleftme anything. I’llgiveyoumycows,calves,butlethusbandlive.Ibegyou. and moneyinexchangeforlives. «Thosepeoplewere robbingme.Isaid,‘Take themselves fromdetention,whichtheyalsoknewwouldbefatal. which theysometimessawastheonlywaytoescapeacertaindeathorfree or appealtoreason,hadresortbegging.Thiswasadesperateresponse, mercy oftheirpersecutorsandunabletodefendthemselves,establishdialogue a lovedone.Thereareaccountsfrompeoplewho,findingthemselvesatthe Another affront,ofcourse,washavingtobegremainaliveorsavethelife P nothing isthegreatestaffronttodignityandself-worth. dead. Wew resident ofonecommunitysaid:«[...]Wewere oppressed.We were alive, but masters ofotherpeople’s lives. are manyaccountsofthewaysinwhichthosewhoborearmsactedas 35 34 33 336 humiliation. abusers hadabsolutepower, andtheyrespondedwithnewabuse LEAS, DESPERATION AND SUBMISSION CVR. Testimony 203816. CVR. Testimony 201920. CVR. Testimony 202397. CVR. Testimony 415155. «Take your kidsandgetoutofhere.» could happentoyour family, The testimoniesrevealhow, intheirdesperation,peopleofferedanimals don’t do aiming atmeandIwentdownonmykneestheresaidtothem,«Please And whenIbeggedthemformychildren,gotupfromwheretheywere For thosemostaffected,theclimateofterrorhadfacedeath.A a river. Sothecommanderaccusedusofbeingthiev I beggedthecommander. I cried andbegged Then danceinthedirt,»hetoldme. There was a them nottokillme.«Ihav When Iwasescaping,theysurroundedmeandcaptured me,andIbegged The pleasoftenfellondeafears.Thatcontributedtothesensethat garbage orsendherhomeand lethercrythere.» So hesentasoldier, saying,«Take thisw of here.Gotothehillsorriver andcrythere.» That’s whathetoldme.[...]. send youtoprison,»hetoldme.WhenIcried,didn’t comfortme.«Getout woman? You’ you andsendtoprison.Whatdothinkofthat, youoldterrorist ere worthle 37 this. You are tall one,aman,whowanted themtokillme.«Youwant tolive? re aterrorist,too,becauseyou’re ss.» Thedestructive also childrenofGod.»Isaid e nothing;don’t too.» And 38 36 message thataperson’ one finallytookpityonmeandsaid, oman anywhere.Throwherinthe kill me.»That’s whatItoldthem. him. Icriedliketherainor her sister. Now 39 to them,«Some es. «I’m going toaccuse s lifeisw I’m goingto day, this orth people whoarecloser, includinglovedones. with aggressiveness,whichsometimesslipoutofcontrol,arealsodirectedat not aimedonlyatthosewhoinflictedtheharm.Feelingsofimpotenceassociated fostered bytheauthorities. feelings ofpainandrage,exacerbatedinsomecasesbythespectacleimpunity As aresultoftheviolencetheysuffered,manypeopleaffectedstillharbor P interests, placing«theoverallinterestofthepeople»aboveallelse. and apolicybasedontherepressionofemotionsindividualneeds suffering asanindividualdefensemechanismforrestoringaprecariousbalance, is aresultoftwothings:complexpsychologicalprocessestorepresspainand their senseofself,hasgoneunspoken.Thatsilence,whichisreflectedintestimony, seen ontheprisoners’bodies,butemotionalexperience,impactithad by prisonguards.Thebrutalviolencethatwasunleashedintheprisonsisclearly and protectioninthefaceofabusetorturetowhichtheyweresubjected innocent peoplelaterjoinedthesubversivegroups,havingfoundinthemrefuge to whichprisonersweresubjectedhadtheoppositeofdesiredeffect:many who wereallegedlysubversivesorterrorists. state intimidated,forciblyextractedinformationfromandannihilatedthose the stateandsubversives,violenceinprisonsalsoshowshow Besides revealingthedynamicthatwasestablishedbetweenrepresentativesof L 40 a desiretohitothers,punishtheirchildrensev aggression rangefromirritabilityandintoleranceto violent behavior, including them onthosewhomtheyperceiveasbeingweakest.Themanifestationsof the violence,somepeopleletloosetheirowndestructivetendencies,turning to distancethemselvesfromtheenormoussenseofimpotenceandrageleftby IFE INPRISON ERPETUATION OF VIOLENCE CVR. BDI-SM-P149.Testimony 400093,residentofUchiza1980-1990. A: Idon’ Q: Andwhydoyouhityourchildren? about sixyearsold. Maybe it’s They haveaffectedmealot,andmychildren. [weeping] it’s affectedmealot,Iam remember, don’tI know. SometimesIfeelafraid. Those feelingsofhatredandrage,aswellthedesireforrevenge,are Besides harmingthem,inmanycasesthecruelandintimidatingregimen t know. because I’ve seensomuchviolencesinc and maybethat’s whyIpunish mychildren.Sometimes… Maybe I’ve becomeaggressiv 40 They becomepartof weak wherethesethingsareconcerned. I mean,don’t feelright.SometimesI e becauseofeverythingI’ve seen. erely, etc. e I wasI e justalittlegirl, daily life. Perhaps 359 THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE CONFLICT 360 PART TWO: T HE LEGACY OF THE CONFLICT AND THE WAY TO PEACE kill, inanindeterminateway, asweseeinthetestimonyoftwo desperateyouths: 43 42 41 ideas orforcingothersinto submissionseemstohavebecomecommonbehavior other areasofsociety. Instillingfearandterroras ways ofprotesting, imposing Some askforhelp. they areconcernedandfrightenedbecausedo not knowhowtohandleit. aggressiveness inthemselvesandtheirrelationships withothersandsay the personfeelspowerless.Somepeopleare aware oftheincreased aggressiveness towardchildrenorpartners,especially insituationswhich CVR. BDI-SM-P86. Testimony 417023. CVR. BDI-SM-P336.Testimony 100959. CVR. BDI-SM-P122.Testimony 302728. A: We’re butofthesevenseven, I stayed alone in [HJUASAW Q: A: Ihaven’t somuch... Q: Whatabouttheeffects?Whosufferedmoreharmincaseofyourfather, know howtosolvealittleproblem.Ithinkneedpsychologicalhelp. And Ifeelviolent!Somuchsothatdesperate.getdesperate;don’t that happens,Ihitthem.Likesaid,livedinaviolentneighborhood.Violent! I’ve seensomuchviolence.Ifeelviolentathomesometimes.Anything In somecases,aggressivenessismanifestedinfantasiesanddesiresto Besides thefamily, The violencehasleftitsscarsinintensehatredthat sometimes leadsto may dothesamethingtothem. I don’t know. Theday Irunintooneofthepeoplewhodidthattomyfather, I been hardonallmybrothersandsisters,becauseIhave anawfulpersonality. anybody. Ijustwent home-Icried. when Isawtheminthestreet….[weeping]. Iwent home[…]butIdidn’t same thingtothem?»WhenIsawthepeoplewhohadthreatenedmyfather, always complaining.Iwould say, «Whydon’t Ihaveaweapon soIcandothe like doinganything.WhenIwasinschool,mymindthat. Everything on that happenedisengraved forget everything.» Butwhat’s worse, nota The awfulthingis,Iusedtosay:«Afterafewyears,yearortwo,you’ll the onlythingistokill,kill. but killing.IfIfightwithsomeone,mygoalisn’t tohitthemandgoaway. No, head andwrappeditupinarag.What’s inmymind,simply, iskilling.Nothing off hishead.Iscoopedbrainsupthegroundandputthembackin I’m sick,butI’ve beentraumatized,becauseIsawmyfatherwhentheyblew out whenIwas the self-defensepatroluntilIwas22.wentintoArmywhengot who died?Whohassufferedmostfromallthis? How manybrothersandsistersdoyouhave? 24. ButIwent onpatrolsunt there hasbeenanincreaseinviolentbehavior 41 43 But mylifew day goesbythatIdon’t remember. il Iwas 22,andIthink,it’s notthat my mind.SometimesI asn’t peaceful. IknowI’ve ASI], w orking with don’t feel 42 tell PCP-SL, everyoneleft.Huantawaspracticallydesolate.» a placeofsilence,andthehouseslandfinallybelonged tonoone.«Withthe however, theflightwas anuncertainroadwithnoreturn. time. Insomecases,familiesreturnedwhenthethreat subsided.Inothers, various communityinstitutionsthathadbeenbuilt upoveralongperiodof animals. Wewent away to save ourlives.» our housesandlived inthehills.We didn’t takeanything withus,noteven our there,ifwe hadn’tstayed escapedtothehills,theywould have killedus.We left said: «Whenwe didn’t listentothem,they threatenedtokillus,andifwe had witnesses ofviolationstherightsindividualsandcommunities.Onewitness each memberofthecommunity, whichturnedthemintoeithervictimsor intense, indiscriminateviolenceofthevariouspartieswasadirectattackon «desolate,» «empty,» «uninhabited,»«silent,»«no-man’s land,»«solitary.» The words usedinthetestimoniestodescribecommunitiesafterdisplacement: destruction ofcommunities.Itsimpactoncommunitylifeisreflectedinthe to threats,forcedrecruitment,themurderofrelatives,massacresor phenomenon appearsclearlyasaresponse—oftendesperateandunplanned were deserted.InthethousandsofaccountsgatheredbyCVR, especially inthecountryside.Smallcommunitiesaffectedbyarmedconflict search oflesshostileareas.Thisphenomenonwasmassiveandwidespread, Families andevenentirecommunitieslefttheplaceswheretheywerelivingin Scattering andfragmentation:displacement D S permeatedthefabricofsociety.suspicion have daily life.Threatsbecamecommon.Control,watchfulness,distrustandextreme there waslittlecondemnation,theviolentterroriststylereproducedin transmitted theideathatthosemethods«couldbeusedbyeveryone.»Because political violenceallthepartiesinvolvedresortedtosamemethods school, intheneighborhoodandcommunity. Thefactthatduringthe dealing withconflictandcompensatingforfeelingsofimpotenceathome, for manyPeruvians.Violence,invaryingdegrees,hasbecomeahandywayof 45 44 adolescents andyouths, who fromthestartwereprimetargetsforforced community building,schoolorchapel,becamedangerous. upset tosuchanextentthattraditionallysafeplaces, suchasthehome, OCIO-POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES ESTRUCTION AND WEAKENINGOF CVR. Testimony 200711. CVR. Testimony 301060. The effectofdisplacementwasdisintegration.Communal spacebecame The flightfromhomeinsearchofprotectionandsafety brokedownthe The breakdownofthecommunity beganwiththedepartureof COMMUNITY ORGANIZATION 44 45 Thesocialorderwas 361 THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE CONFLICT 362 PART TWO: T HE LEGACY OF THE CONFLICT AND THE WAY TO PEACE Just afewofushavestayed.» remained alsolefteventually. They’ve beendisplacedtoLimaandHuamanga. completely destroyed.Therewerenoauthorities,men.Thosewhohad and insecurityledtomoredisplacement:«Afterthat,thecommunitywas people, itsauthorities,teachers.Theresultingsenseofdisorganization population shrink,butthecommunityalsodisintegrated:itlostitsyoung included authoritiesandwealthierresidents.Asaresult,notonlydidthe children totheirfate. people didn’t want tostudy[her of fear, leavingbehindtheirfieldsandanimals.» expropriated byoneofthepartiestoconflict.«TheywentIcaorLimaout in manycaseswerelostforever, takenbyothercommunitymembersor For thesereasons,therearefrequentreferencestohomes,landsandanimalsthat because ofthedesperateandsecretnaturetheirflightfromcommunity. displaced —whichstillconstitutesalossinmostcasesthatwasimpossible peasants own.Whilepeopleweresometimesabletosellpropertybeforebeing and, alongwiththehome,ismostimportant,ifnotonly, propertythat in aneconomicandculturalcontextwhichlandisthemainsourceofsurvival which mightbelesssignificantunderothercircumstances,mustunderstood losses, amongwhichmaterialgoodstakeonparticularimportance.These people,mainlyboys,abandoned young subversives, andtheytookthe persecution: «Iftheyfoundus,wouldbeatboththemilitaryand stopped operatingbecausetheteachersweretargetsofthreatsand studies normallyincommunitieswhereschoolswereconsidereddangerousor also relatedtothedifficultythatyoungpeopleencounteredincontinuingtheir recruitment ordetention.Thedisplacementofthissectorthepopulationwas 48 47 46 I’mwhere living. Mychildrenhaven’t nostalgia andadesiretoreturn: «IcameheretoHuancayo,downinChilca.That’s of thosewhowereleftbehind,thedisplacedpeopleexperienced intensefeelingsof large cities,deprivedoftheirusualfood,farfromland andwithoutthecompany to satisfytheirhungerwerethefirstproblemsbesolved. Facedwiththechaosof over againunderespeciallydifficultconditions.Findinga placetosleepandsomething have nothingtogobackto.» lands andanimalsdiscouragedthosewhomighthave wantedtoreturn:«[…]I to citiesbecamethepoorestofpoor. Inaddition,having losttheirhomes, difficult tounderstand,then,thatthebulkofdisplaced populationthatwent destinations withoutresourcesandhadtostartover fromscratch.Itisnot CVR. Testimony 201642. CVR. Testimony 200499. CVR. Testimony 201347. Testimonies alsoshowthatothergroupsdisplacedintheearlyyears The decisiontoleaveinsearchofprotectionandsafetyimpliescountless As soonastheyreachedaplaceofrefuge,thedisplaced peoplehadtostart Because oftheirabruptdeparture,mostpeople arrivedattheir young peopleaway withthem. That’s 47 e] anymore;theywenttothecity.» gotten usedtoit.They’re sufferingthere.They the community, 48 leaving thew why young 46 omen and Thusthe displaced personwasfromoneoftheareashardest hit bytheviolence. could talkto.Whatwewentthroughwasreallysad.» We didn’t knowhowtospeakSpanish.Wewere lost.We didn’t know who we else, we «You arrive inthecityf speak Spanish,whichseverelyaffectedtheiressentialabilitytocommunicate. survive, andstreetvendingwasanaccessiblesourceofincome. accustomed toworkingthelandforaliving,wereforcedobtainmoney accustomed tothepaceofcitylife,whohadhardesttimeadjustingrurallife. less intense,experiences.Inthosecases,itwasoftenthechildrenandyouth, [...] Theydidn’twant tobehere.[...]Theycouldn’t getusedtoit.» There’s oneneighbortherewhoisgood,althoughshe’ used torunaway. Theyranaway toHuamalí;butIdon’t have familyoranything. 52 51 50 49 by peoplewhosharedtheirroots. CVR. Testimony 205380. CVR. Testimony 100704. CVR. Testimony 453378. CVR. Testimony 304023. Because oftheirlackresources,thedisplacedpeople,whowere Families whoreturnedtotheircommunitiesoforiginhadsimilar, although The displacedpeoplewerealsovictimsofethnicdiscrimination,even I beatthemall.wasthebeststudentinmyschool. school. Theycalledme« city, andIcamebackaftereightmonths. scared. WhenItoldher Even forchildren,theriskofbeingmistreatedincreased whenthe «Don’t pay matter howmuchtheytreatedmelikethat.Mybrotherhelpedalot. and neighborswhocalledme« It was thefirsttimeI’dcity the to gone Many ofthepeoplewhosettledonperipherycitiesdidnot but itw harv produce. Inthecityyouneedmoneyforeverything,butinyourfieldcan things wegotfromthefieldusedtohelp.Imissed The costoflivingwashigh,andIonlyearnedenoughforfood,becausethe I devotedmyselftosellingstaplegoods,whichatthetimewaseverything. one day. about theShiningPath.«Areyou,haveyoubeenaterrorist?» sheaskedme me, «Hey, littleterrorist.»Therewas a y everything andit’ everything didn’t know howtospeak.Inthehi est. You’re asn’t stablework.Itwas only They calledus«terrorist,»evenatschool.Theteacherswould sayto «Oh yes,» Itoldher. any attentiontothem—we’re allequal.» […] Itwas better off with your field, because in the city you have to buy to have better offwithyour field,becauseinthecityyou rom thecountrysideand s expensive. You have to to s expensive.have You , likeI’m you telling serrano From thenon,shewas afraidofme.Shewas ,» butIdidn’t payanyattentionandIstudied. serrano ghlands, everythingw . Itwas big.Ifeltstrange.hadfriends occasional. Iw ,» butitdidn’t give meacomplexno oung teacher, 50 it’s deadly. On today, buy everythingbuy there.Igotajob, s poor. how theykilled,shestarted 51 52 as sorryI’d They wouldgothere. she was afraidtotalk 49 top of as inQuechua. everything the sameat gone tothe 363 THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE CONFLICT 364 PART TWO: T HE LEGACY OF THE CONFLICT AND THE WAY TO PEACE possessed theweapons. and theirroleswereultimately shapedbytherequirementsofthosewho that thelegitimateauthorities didnotknowtowhomtheywererelating, The existenceoftheseplaces createdsomuchconfusionamonglocalpeople a placetoestablishanorganizationthathadtotalitarian ideologicalgoals. eliminated anyformoflegitimately decisions madebyPCP-SLmembers,thereforehad adualmeaning:they for obtainingfoodandmedicines.Thesezones,which weretheproductof «new democracy,» placesoccupiedbythe«supportbases,»aswell the «liberated»zonesfulfilledmultiplefunctions: they wererehearsalsfora the destructionofcommunity’s of culturallydefinedspacesand,intheend,aninvasion ofcommunityspaceand security. Ineither establishment ofanewsocialorderorinexchange for thepromiseofnational demanded variousservices,eitherinexchangefor«freedom»basedonthe increased. Bothpartiessoughtthepopulation’s immediatesubmissionand circumstances, abusesbyboththesubversivegroupsandsecurityforces or militarybaseswereestablishedinthemiddleoftowns.Underthese These weredeclared«liberatedzones;»theplacestemporarilyexpropriated and thetemporaryexpropriationoffacilitiesthatwereconsideredcommunal. direction. been arelativelyorderlysocialstructureintochaoticenvironmentwithno distrust. Thatwasaddedtotheresidents’senseofimpotence,turningwhathad the samecommunitysuspiciousofoneanotherandcreatedageneralclimate own areas,oftenwithnocomprehensiblemotive.Theseeventsmadepeoplein in violentactsperpetratedbyunknownpeopleor, later, bypeoplefromtheir community life,whichinmanycasestranslatedintoanomy. law andcustoms.Alloftheseinvasiveactsexacerbatedthedisorder the community’s consent,andva for coexistence:publicspaceswere forciblytakenov addition, thepresenceofpeoplefromoutsidecommunityupsetnorms the normsthatgovernedexistingorganizations’internaldynamics.In The armedincursionsdisruptedeverydaylifeincommunitiesanddestroyed Disorder andgeneralizedviolence 53 Ibid. Because onegoalofthesubversivegroupswasterritorial expansion, The destructionofcommunalspacebeganwiththetakeovervillages When theyleastexpectedit,communitiesfoundthemselvescaughtup Ayacucho, and Ay to cry. After that,shebecamemyfriend.…Iwas theonlypersonfrom it wasn’t he mightkillus»...ButItalkedtothem.triedmakethemunderstandthat distance. Theyweren’t very friendly. They thought anyonefromtherewasaterrorist,andmyclassmateskepttheir like theythought,thatIhadn’t case, whathappenedinpracticewas theforcedappropriation acucho was rious actionstookplaceoutsidetheboundsof relative tranquility. considered thelandofShiningPath. They established authority, andtheyprovided been amemberoftheShiningPath. said, «If we dosomethingtohim, er, expropriatedwithout 53 then, theydon’t believeus.» more respectfulandthatthethingsaregoing onnowdidn’t happen They don’t respecttheirelders,either. tellthemthat we When we usedtobe they’re drunk,theyfight,insulteach Many youthsneitheracknowledgednorrespected authority:«[...]When form ofviolence. broke downinmanycases,orweresimplyunabletoresistsuchanunexpected no parallel.Theculturalmechanismsthathadbeenshapedovermanyyears that hadbeenstampedontheirenvironment.Theincreaseinyouthviolencehas a and foralongtime.Violencehadtakenoverthestreetshighways,becoming robbery andgangs,whichaffectedmerchantsresidentstoacertaindegree local authorities. efforts atgradualdemocratizationthroughsuchinitiativesastheelectionof and distrustexacerbatedrelationshipsofsubjugationorsubmission,despite could appeartobemilitarypatrols.Thismimicryheightenedthesenseoffear visitors werearmed.Soldierscouldlookliketerroristsandsubversivegroups discriminated againstoreliminatedbecausetheywere consideredtheenemy. of groupsandpeoplethatstigmatizedcertainsocialgroups,whichwereexcluded, Shining Pathcamouflagedassoldiers.» confusion. Nooneknewforsurewhotheywere,ifweresoldiersorthe the notionofauthority. «Theycameinandsaid,I’m theauthority. [...]Therewas returning toamorenormallife. themselves andgetridofthesubversivegroups,recoveringtheircustoms lives. Itmustbenoted,however, thatinothercasespeoplemanagedtoorganize these attemptswerenotalwayssuccessfulandthecostwaslossofhuman either asubversivegrouporthemilitaryledpeopletotryrebel,although confusion anddiscontentamonglocalpeoplegroups.Attimes,abuseby under protection. arms, andastimepassedtheybecameaccustomedtolivinginsubjugationor bases lostacertaindegreeoffreedom.Theywereatthemercythosewhobore 55 54 modus operandi CVR. BDI-I-P648.In-depthinterview, CVR. BDI-I-P56.Interviewwith a resident,age50, Woman, age70,wholed other people’s Before, whentherewereterroristsaround,theymade outallrighttaking [...] Somestartedcommittingrobberies.Theyw The emergencyzoneswerequicklyplaguedwithassaults,systematic For localresidents,therewasnoclearimageofvisitors,especiallywhen The armedgroups’strategiesultimatelyconfusedpeopleandreduced People wholived inthePCP-SL’s «liberated»zonesornearmilitary and themilitarydo,because theyslaughteredtheiranimalsandtookthe work. Ithinktheirheadsarefullofthethingsthey’veseen boththeterrorists That’s the way inthingslikethatanddon’t itis.Theygetinvolved want to bywhichyoungpeopleperpetuatedthebehavioralpatterns Although itwas temporary, thissituationleftdeepscarsof things, sowe’regoing the women’s revolt 55 Oronqoy, 54 against oneoftheCarrillos. Thatconfusionledtothestereotyping La Mar(A to dothesame.That’s whattheysay. other. They’ve lostallrespect.[...] teacher, yacucho), Nov Accomarca (Ay eren’t afraidofanybody. ember acucho), June2002. -December 2002. 365 THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE CONFLICT 366 PART TWO: T HE LEGACY OF THE CONFLICT AND THE WAY TO PEACE 57 56 and orderlyinthosedays. off. Therewerenolongerany with moneywere sw they witnessedspecificgesturesofdisciplineandmorality. «Damn!Thepeople important townspeople. denounce authoritiesforthemisuseofpublicfundsortomakeaccusationsagainst and justiceinthecommunity. This«neworder»providedtheopportunityto community members,becausetheirpresencecoincidedwithadesirefororder the start,therefore,theyfoundacertaindegreeofacceptanceamongsome order» basedonrigiddisciplineaccompaniedbyspecificmoralgestures.From subversive groupsestablishedcontactsandnamedleaders,settingupa«new each otherwhennecessary. Uponarrivingincommunitiesandvillages,the sprang fromvarioussourcesenabledthemtoturncommunitymembersagainst over landoraccesstonaturalresources,familyfeudsandpersonalenmitiesthat people’s discontentandcontradictions thataroseinthecommunity. Conflicts difficult torestorelocalorder. and resentments,encouragingrevengeaddingotherelementsthatmadeit used theconflictsfortheirimmediatestrategicpurposes,fuelinginternalhatreds them destructivelyandleadingtocommunitydisintegration.Thearmedgroups The armedconflictexacerbatedmanylong-standinglocalconflicts,escalating Exacerbation ofinternalconflicts expected tobecometheowners oftheland,sometimeswithconsentlocal and land,whichwere thenusedbythosewhoremainedinthecommunity, who who wereincommand. were poorerandremainedbehindhadnochoicebut to followtheordersofthose and uncertaintysomepeopledecidedtoleavetheir communities.Peoplewho within thecommunity. Theconflictswere notalways explicit,andamidthefear punished. Somepeople’s prosperityalsoledtoenmities,doubtsandsuspicions failed topunishsomememberofafamilywhomothers hadthoughtwouldbe uncertainty, especially, forexample,whenthePCP-SL,noapparentreason, greater tensionamongresidents. members agreedwiththenewway ofdoingthings,however, whichledtoeven the apparenteliminationofgapsbetween richand poor. Notallcommunity powerful was Huancasancos, Ayacucho. CVR. BDI-I-P335.Interviewwith formerauthoritybetweenMarchandMay2002inSancos, (Ayacucho) inJanuary2003. CVR. BDI-II-P505.Interviewwith ay The talkofa«neworder»resonatedwithmanypeople,especiallywhen To exercisepower, thesubversive groupstriedtotakeadvantage of That’s the way it was meat. Theotherscameinanddidthesamething.Theytookouranimals. The abruptdeparturefromcommunitiesforcedpeople toabandongoods The envyandresentmentsamongresidentscreatedgreater distrustand a signofjusticeandtheestablishmentnew, egalitarian order, eeping thestreets,ev 57 oneresidentofSancossaid.Punishmentthe before, andthatnegative habithasbeenreinforced. waqras oung w , theywerepunished.Everythingwasclean oman, aformercommunity erything was orderly, authority, no oneslacked in Huamanga 56 B of supporting,orinsomecasesreplacing,thoseforcesvariousconflictzones. pressure fromthearmedforcesandpolicetoformciviliangroupscapable self-defense committeesontheirown,mostofthetestimonyreflectsacertain forces. Althoughthereweresomeinitiativesamongthecommunitiestoform safeguarding thecommunities,aswellsignsofanalliancewitharmed indigenous andpeasantself-defensecommittees religious practicesthatinsomeplacesbecamestrategiesforsurvival.The themselves withvariousmeans,organizingself-defensecommitteesoradopting impact andaretheonesthatcommunitymembersremembermost.» most important,becausetheywere carriedoutpublicly. Theyhadthe greatest the onlymurderscommittedbyPeople’s Committees,buttheywerethe the entirecommunity. The«people’s trialsthatendedwithexecutionswerenot submit werewarned,physicalpunishedorexecutedafterasummarytrialbefore dictated bythesubversivegroupswasunquestionable.Peoplewhodidnot sometimes evenaccusingtheformerownersofbeingterrorists. and othermaneuverstokeepthepropertythattheyhadacquiredillicitly, other people,someofwhomhadevenacquiredtitle.Thenewownersusedthreats to theirplacesoforiginonlyfindthatpropertyhadbeentakenoverby authorities. Sometimelater, manycommunitymembersorlandownersreturned 59 58 before thosewhowerechildren oradolescentsatthetimewereoldenoughto left theircommunitiesfor the reasonsmentionedabove.Itwouldbesometime and socialrepresentation.Thiswasaggravatedbythe factthatyoungmenhad had beentheirethicalguides. were usurped.Oneconsequencewasthatthecommunities lostthepeoplewho legitimate possessors,andbasicfunctionssuchasthe administrationofjustice their customs,traditionandhistory.was takenfromits Theuseofpower the knowledgeneededtoguideagroupofhuman beings inaccordancewith been murderedorforcedtoflee,therewasaninterruption inthetransmissionof REAKDOWN OF THE SYSTEM June 2002. Report, Huancasancos. CVR. BDI-I-P68.Fieldnotesfrom informal Finding themselvesunderviolentattack,thecommunitiessoughttodefend Because ofthisvacuum,peoplewereslowtolearnnew formsofpolitical With traditionalleadersgonefromthecommunities becausetheyhad With theestablishmentof«neworder,» submissiontothenorms dispute. They’re Accomarca. [...]ThosepeoplearestillbehavingliketheShiningPathleaders. Now theywanttogetbackthelandthathasbeentakenoverbyresidentsof problems over thelandtheyabandonedwhentheirlives were indanger. They’ve returnedtothecommunityofAccomarcaandarealwayscausing 58 terrorizing people,especiallythosewithwhomtheyhave some OF REPRESENTATI interview withfarmer ON AND THE ON AND

were awayofprotectingand HIERARCHICAL ORDER , age48, Accomarca (Ayacucho), 59 [...] 367 THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE CONFLICT 368 PART TWO: T HE LEGACY OF THE CONFLICT AND THE WAY TO PEACE community toseekrefugeelsewhere. to participateinactionsagainsttheirwill.Inothercases,theysimplyleftthe under thecommandofeitherasubversivegrouporstatesecurityforces,and some caseslocalresidentsfeltobligatedtoacceptpostsoutoffear, toholdthem another formofviolenceagainstthecommunities.Witnessestestifiedthatin that discrediteddemocraticallyelectedauthoritiesandimposednewoneswas targets forinvasionbythePCP-SL.Theimpositionofnewformsorganization and organizations.Disorganized,thesecommunitiesgroupsbecameeasy disappeared. Therewasaconcertedefforttoremovetheheadsofcommunities in thecountryside:approximately2,267authoritiesandleaderswerekilledor leaders whodidnotfleeweremurdered. and secondtoreplacethemwithleadersloyal totheparty. Authorities and authorities was oneofthePCP-SL’s main objectives, firsttogaincontrolofvillages, organizations andlocalgovernments.Theeliminationofcommunity especially attheleaderswhohadclosesttiestotheircommunities, According tothedatagatheredbyCVR,subversiveactionswereaimed Elimination ofleadersandthepowervacuum organizations. the communitycausedaseriousdistortionofnormsandguidelinesfor circumstances. Finally, besidesdestruction,interferencebypeoplefromoutside order underwhichtheircommunitieshadoperatedforyearsandthenew armed conflict.Thenewleaderswerecaughtbetweenthedestructionof new formsofleadershipandadapttothesituationcreatedbyinternal consequence: withnoclearguidelinesfororganization,residentshadtoinvent hold leadershippositionsintheircommunities.Thatbroughtanother 60 and createdimbalanceinthe existingorganizationalmodel,butalsoproduced order. — oftenaccusingresidents indiscriminately—andtore-establishorimpose occurred whenmilitarypatrolsarrivedinthecommunity insearchofsuspects that ignoredordiscreditedformsalreadyexisted inthecommunity. Italso assemblies ortakepartinforcedlabor, orimposedanewmodel oforganization Shining Pathcolumnsarrivedinacommunityand requiredpeopletoattend aimed atthevillage’s generalpopulation.Thisoccurred,forexample,when CVR. Testimony 203701. The figuresgatheredbytheCVRprovideaclearideaofwhathappened The impositionofanauthority inacommunitynotonlydisrupted The establishmentofpowerbyforcetooktwodifferent forms.Onewas He didn’t want totakeoffice,andhedidn’t lastamonth—barelyweek. accept. [...]Andoutoffear,beatinghim,theyforcedhim andappointedhim. to, becausewe didn’t have anyauthorities. Theybeatpeopletomakethem office]. Ididn’t want The peoplevoted.Becauseitwasadangeroustime,noonewanted[tohold my husbandtotakeanoffice,butthemilitaryforcedhim 60 in otheractivities. to themilitary. Otherwise theyhadtoforcethepopulationdowork orengage authorities wererequiredtomakepaymentsthesubversives andsometimes benefited thegroupgivingorders.Depending ontheplace,leadersor norms forsocialandpoliticalbehaviorweresystematically destroyed. to participateincertaincommunityactivities.Inthat way, internalorderand Out offearbeingkilled,authoritiesandcommunity leadersresignedorrefused the militarycameandappointedpeople—governor, assistant prefect,etc.» «There werenoauthorities.Theterroriststheoneswhogoverned,until by otherswhowere under t disagreed oropposedthemcouldbeeliminatedwithoutasecondthought. simultaneously establishedexecutive,legislativeandjudicialroles.Anyonewho tobecarriedoutwithouthesitation.Inthatway,were thesubversive groups They declaredthattheP community representativesinaclearactof Once thearmedgroupshadtakenoverpublicspaces,theyeliminatedlegitimate Abuse ofpowerandusurpingfunctions enemies. rooted inthecommunities,wherepeopleconsideredtheirneighborssuspectsor with theirownlife,ingroupsorindividually.» Distrusthadbecomedeeply individual orfamilysurvivalinstinctbecameparamount.«Everyoneescaped population hadnopossibilityofresponding.Giventhelackprotection, and executelocalauthorities.Manytestimoniestellofattacksinwhichthe took advantageofthefactthatpeoplewereholdingameetingtocapture,accuse and assemblies,becamedangerous.Onmorethanafewoccasions,theaggressors Opportunities fordialogueanddecision-making,suchascommunitymeetings were noauthoritieswhorepresentedthegovernment.» leaders oftheP «In thosedays,therewerenoauthoritieshere.Thethe in thecommunity, accompaniedbyadecreasedsenseofsafetyandidentity. anarchy resultedbecausethedisappearanceofauthoritiesledtolackcontrol by othersinachangethatdidnotreflectthewillofpeople.Confusionand real representativeswerephysicallyorsymbolicallyeliminatedandreplaced confusion andanarchy. Thedisruptionandimbalanceoccurredbecausethe 62 61 CVR. BDI-I-P321.Interviewwith ashepherdess,age Prado, Huánuco),May2002. CVR. BDI-I-P284.Interviewwith authority fromthecommunityofPrimavera(provinceLeoncio have tosupportme.»They forcedhimtosupportthem.Afterthat,he the field,«hikers»recruitedhim.Theytookhimprisoner foraday. «You My husbandwas anauthority. He w Leaders weresubjugatedandforcedtoperformaseries ofservicesthat In manycommunitiesorvillages,authoritieswerenominallyreplaced arty. [...].Theyw arty’s word he commandofthearmedgroupsor Army. was nottobequestionedandthatitscommands ere theoneswhogave theorders,butthere abuse ofpowerandusurpingfunctions. as president.Onedaywhenhewent to 70, Sancos(Ayacucho), March 2002. 61 62 369 THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE CONFLICT 370 PART TWO: T HE LEGACY OF THE CONFLICT AND THE WAY TO PEACE executions. members ofsubversivegroupsprobablyledthemilitarytocarryoutextrajudicial social organizationwas guarantee continuity, powerwas usedtodismantletherelationshipsonwhich liberated zones.Inbothcases,insteadofbuildinganinstitutionthatwould The «re-establishmentoforder»wasnodifferentfromtheconquest attack onthepeople’s cultural patterns,reducingthemtoapositionofinferiority. form ofarbitrarydetentionandtorturelocalresidents.Theaggressionwasan legitimate powerstructures.Abusebymembersofthesecurityforcestook style, astheythoughtbest.That’s whytheykilledwithoutmercy.» The PCP-SLhadtakenovereveryformofjustice.Theymetedoutjusticeintheir It reachedsuchapointthat«inthoseyears,therewerenolongeranyauthorities. community’s representatives, butalsoinstilledfearandterrorinthepopulation. disappeared, givingwaytoapoliticalguillotinethatnotonlyeliminatedthe guarantee publicsupportforthesubversivegroup. and fearthem,thesupposedmetingoutofjusticedidnotnecessarily they frightenedandhumiliatedcommunityrepresentativesledpeopletoreject win thepeople’s trust,theresultswere nevertotheirbenefit.Themerefactthat while theysometimestookpoliceofficersoutintoaplazatofrightenthemand suspicion. MRTA membersapparentlydidnotengagein«people’s justice,»and pre-judged andsentenced,theirfriendswereacceptedwithsomedegreeof some cases,simplytheirownauthoritarian,ideologicaldecision.Enemieswere executed peoplebasedonnothingmorethanthe to resolveolddisputeswithopponentsorlocalenemies.Thesubversivegroups 65 64 63 unpreparedtoresistorrespondcollectively.were Community.” CVR. BDI-I-P512.Thematicpublic hearingon“PoliticalViolenceandtheEducational CVR. BDI-I-P415.Genderw CVR. Testimony hills withmychildren.We The violentarrivalofthemilitaryalsohadanimpactoncommunities’ With «people’s trials,»manylong-standingsystemsandprocedures The newauthoritiestookjusticeintotheirownhandsandusedrevenge supported them.Sowhenhew The violenceweakenedcommunityandgrassrootsorganizations, which there forgoodreason. are inprisonnowaren’t guilty, butthere’s alsoafaircontingentthatmaybe state. Given 14 days,Iwasfreedandsufferedfromextremelyviolent repressionbythe they hungmebythefeettomakeconfessthings I’dnever done. again, accusingmeofterrorism.Iwastherefor14days. Thefirsttwodays, In 1989,theycapturedmeinSanMartínPlazaandtook metoDINCOTE Lima, October28,2002. 202479. Ay those circumstances,it’s possible thatmanyofthepeoplewho acucho. orkshop withmeninHuamanga (A based. Tacit agreementto«punishtherelatives» of 65 sleptthere,terrified. Testimony No.2. as accused,we didn’t leave. We stayedthe in community’s consent or, in 63 yacucho), October23,2002. 64 After right andresponsibilityascitizens. candidates; andthreatsagainstpeoplewhoattempted toexercisetheirprimordial destruction ofidentitydocuments,ballotsandvoting records;themurderof political rightsthathadbeensidelinedforyears.Other attacksincludedthe regional ornationalelections.The«electionboycott» wasanattackonciviland continuity ofpoliticalinstitutionsthatweretryingtogainstrengththroughlocal, type oforganizationandtherewerenoauthoritiesfrom1987to1990.» offices closed.Therewasnothing.Thecommunityhadnoleaders. had noauthorities,notevenamay it ultimatelyscatteredlocalresidentsfor The eliminationoforganizationalleadershipnotonlydecapitatedthecommunity, public institutionsandrecordeverydayeventssuchasbirths,deathsmarriages. these placesbecamea«no-man’s land»whereitwasimpossibleeven tomaintain surveillance, wheretheonlywaytosurvivewasdistrusteveryone. freedom. Overnight,dailylifeturnedintoaclosedspherethatwasunderconstant where everyonefelttheywerebeingwatched,whichdisturbedtheirsenseof community lifeandturnedsocietyintoasortofprisonwithlookouttower, wielded power. had beenhijackedbywhicheversubversivegrouptookcontroloftheareaand problems. people whomthenewpowerbrokersthoughtwerecausingormightcause order» or«re-establishingbecameawayofsubjugatingeliminating communal norms.Farfrombenefitingthecommunities,impositionofa«new with violentactionanddoingawayproceduresbasedontraditional words, thesubversivegroupsputthemselvesabovealllaws,replacingthem respect order, theylear Young peoplewere senttoaschoolwhereinsteadoflearningdefendand young people,itindoctrinatedthemwiththeideathatpowerlayinweapons. weakening ofthenormativesystemorganization.WhenPCP-SLrecruited One oftheconsequencesabusepowerandusurpingfunctionswas Breakdown ofthesystemcitizenparticipation 66 CVR. BDI-I-P403.In-depthinterview withalocalgov (San Martín),August25,2002. group, becausepanicandfear wereeverywhere.Thepeoplewhoin people didn’t want anythingtodo withelectionsorpartiesanykindof were heldinthosedays,20or30peoplevotedandthey takingarisk.But or judge,tosaytheywere fromsuch-and-suchaparty. Whenelections for mayor. Notanymore.Every There couldnolongerbeauthorities. becandidates The beginningofthearmedconflictitselfwasaneventthatbroke Because oftheabsenceauthorityduetoelimination,flightorreplacement, Authorities couldbarelydotheirjobs.Thenormsgoverningorganization The phraseabout«athousandeyes andears»underminedpublic ned toviolateancestralpatternsofauthority. In other or, from1987to one was a longtime.«Itwas ano-man’s land.We ernment officialandwriter afraid to serve as a mayor, gov afraid toserveasamayor, 1990. Thelocalgovernment . Uchiza, 66 Tocache ernor 371 THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE CONFLICT 372 PART TWO: T HE LEGACY OF THE CONFLICT AND THE WAY TO PEACE follow it,even iftheydid imposed bythesubversiveorganizationwassocialistandpeoplewereforcedto systematically destroyedbythosewhousurpedthatfunction.The«new»order 66 66 67 element tobenotedisthedestructionofhumancapital bysuchactsasmurderand in variousareas,includingtheeconomic,whichisaddressed inthissection.Afirst The violencehashadaverydramaticimpactonhuman capital,withrepercussions C S of fearanddistrust,thosewhoshouldhavetakenon leadershiproles. that waspartoftheprocesstransferleadership anddissuaded,because disappearance andforceddisplacementinterruptedthetransmissionoflearning leadership was difficulttostartupagain.The loss ofleadersbecausemurder, has beendifficulttore-establish,evennow. Themuch-desiredrotation of bad experiencestheyhadduringtheconflict. population. Manypeoplelookedaskanceatthe Army’s actionsbecauseofthe was beingpromotedlednotonlytoconfusion,butalsodistrustamongthe community. Themilitary baseisattheserviceofeveryone.» reason theyneededthecollaborationandcomplianceofallmembers the militarybase.Theysaidourmissionwastofightterrorists,andforthat that waslimited,controlledandadeadend.«Anyonewhotraveledhadtoinform was impossibletocontinuewithbartersystemsandmarkets,creatingalife Not onlywerefreedomofmovementandotheraspectsdailylifesuspended,it Villagers hadto«askpermission»ofthedefactoauthoritiesinordertravel. OCIOECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES ONSEQUENCES OF THE ARMED CONFLICTFOR Minutes from1988. CVR. BDI-I-P43.T Prado, Huánuco),May2002. CVR. BDI-I-P302.Groupinterview withwomen,communityof7deOctubre(provinceLeoncio May 2002. CVR. BDI-I-P256.Interviewwith aColombianDominicanreligious Daily lifewas alt authorities againinthepasttwoorthreeyears. SL killedthem.Fromthenon,therewere noauthorities.We’ve onlyhad entire townwenttorepent,andmanypeoplediedbecauseofit.ThePCP- were orwhereyoufrom.Theyjustcameandgrabbedyou.The When therepentancelawcameout, Army The traditionalsystemofrotatingleadershipwithincommunitieswas I don’t knowifthey foundsomeotherway of charge ofIERatthetimeandthosewhowantedtocontinuewiththeirparties, The lawandorderthatwashijackedbytheviolenceofarmedconflict Meanwhile, the Army’s presenceinplaces wheretherepentancelaw ranscript oftheminutesCommunity not understandit,outoffearbeingbrandedatraitor. ered bythefightforhegemoni HUMAN AND SOCIAL CAPITALSOCIAL HUMAN AND doingso.Idon’t know. Assemblies of didn’t investigate whoyou 68 c controloverterritory. sister, Ayacucho(Ayacucho), 69 Accomarca (Ayacucho). 67 or disappeared),73percent hadperformedaprofitableeconomicactivityto According totestimonygathered bytheCVR,ofatotal22,507victims(dead This impliedacomplete restructuringandreorganizationofthefamily. the lossofmainsourceincomeandoftenfamily’s onlymeans ofsupport. maintenance. agricultural activities,whilethewomanperformsactivities relatedtohousehold this familystructure,theman(adultoryouth)is responsibleforthemain each oftheothermembersplaysaspecific,complementary economicrole.In mother whoprovidesthefamilywithsecurity, protectionandstability, and rural economyoftheareasaffectedbyarmed conflict, itisthefatheror to thefamily’s survival, aswelladecreaseinthequality offamilylife.Inthe members’ abilitytoworkresultedinareductionofthe incomethatwascrucial of thislossforfamiliesistakenintoaccount. nonexistent.» labor atthetime.We didn’t have manypeople. Sothelaborforcewas smallor really destroyed uswas regions. Intheopinionofonewitness,duringyearsarmedconflict«what effects, decreasingtheproductivecapacityoffamiliesinthoseareasandentire with fightingthemledtothelossofmanyhumanlivesandhadotherharmful The violentactionsofthesubversivegroupsandsecurityforcescharged Decrease infamlies’productivecapacity affected population’ underemployment. Allofthesecircumstanceshavehadaseriousimpactonthe caused changesinlaborconditions,increasingunemploymentand thelarge-scaledisplacementof was contributed tothenotabledecreaseinhumancapitalaffectedcommunities psychological conditioninwhichtheviolenceleftpeople.Anotherelementthat forced disappearance,aswellitsdeteriorationbecauseofthepoorphysicaland 70 sections. countless effectsonthelivesoffamilies.Thesearebrieflysummarizedinfollowing economically activepopulationinthecommunitiesaffectedbyviolencehad (CUANTO 1980-1993;1993census).Thedeathordisappearanceofpartthe Martín, HuánucoorPasco,wheretheeconomicallyactivepopulationincreased zones thatwereequallyaffectedbythearmedconflict,suchasApurímac,Junín,San 107,000 to104,000inHuancavelicabetweencensuses.Thatwasnotthecaseother active population,whichdroppedfrom154,000to131,000in Ayacucho andfrom deterioration oftheeconomy. Themainreasonwas thedecreaseineconomically areas mostaffectedbytheviolence,whichwasaccompaniedaserious Male councilmember,age50,who wasastudentduringthetimeofviolence. CVR. BDI-I-P343.In-depthinterview Under thesecircumstances,theabsenceofamale(adult oryouth)meant In mostcases,thelossofphysicalconditionsandcertainfamily As hasbeenseeninothersections, Ay 70

The scopeoftheproblemisevengreaterifvalueormeaning s qualityoflife. the [loss of] humanresources,even forcommunity the [lossof] , Lucanamarca,Huancasancos(Ayacucho), March2002. population. Finally, the acucho andHuancav armed conflictalso elica were the 373 THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE CONFLICT 374 PART TWO: T HE LEGACY OF THE CONFLICT AND THE WAY TO PEACE the departmentof married orlivingwithapartner. Most wereQuechua-speakingpeasantslivingin education (illiterate,withaprimaryorsomesecondaryeducation), victims (deadordisappeared)weremalesbetweenages18and34,withlittle and consumption.AccordingtoinformationgatheredbytheCVR,majorityof young menofworkingagecreatedagapinthechainsproduction,distribution disadvantageous conditions. the restofmembershadtofindwayssurviveunderhighly scattering andfragmentationofthefamily, whichmeantthatintheshortrun, The absenceofthesepeople,whohadbeeneconomicallyactive,resultedinthe figures indicatetheheavyimpactofarmedconflictonfamilyeconomy. support theirfamilies,andmostwereconsideredheadsofhouseholds.These 71 the resultofanarbitraryand unjustaccusation.Theyweretakentoprisonsfar peasants fromtheemergency zoneswhohadbeendetainedandimprisonedas capacity, forced displacementalsohadnegative consequences themselves. Thetemporaryabsenceofoneparentbecause ofimprisonmentor they werecastadrift,dependingexclusivelyontheir abilitytolookoutfor abandoned. Insomecases,closerelatives tookthemintemporarily, butinothers who werevictimsoftheviolence. consequences security andsocialemotionalstability reduced possibilitiesforproduction;theywerealso reflectedinproblemsof 500,000. suffered frompost-traumaticstress,whosenumberisestimatedatmorethan number oforphans(boysandgirls)40,000,notcountingchildrenwhohave of womenwidowedbythearmedconflictcouldbeashigh20,000,and widowers andorphanedchildren.AccordingtoRevollar(2000),thenumber said: women werewidowedandchildrenorphaned.Aboutthis,onewitness October 23,2002. CVR. BDI-I-P416. W many orphanedyouths.ThatisthehistoryofcommunityHuaychao. widowed. Theterroristskilledtheirhusbandsduringthoseyears.Thereare to study.In many orphans,widowsandpoorpeoplewhohavebeenunable […] Theviolenceweexperiencedhadaseriesofconsequences.Therewere The «definite»absence—becauseofdeathordisappearance—fathers Prison inmatesunjustlyaccusedofbeingterrorists wereusually Because ofthepermanentabsenceparents,minor childrenwere For w It hasbeenimpossibletodeterminetheexactnumberofwidows, The mostimmediateconsequenceofthisforcedabsencewasthat quality oflife,andsocialemotionalstability.

provides adetaileddescriptionoftheseeffectsonthelives ofwomen omen, theconsequencesofman’s absencewere notlimitedto Ayacucho. our community, in orkshop withself-defensecommittee members,Huamanga(Ayacucho), particular, there are many women who were who particular, therearemanywomen . Thesectiononpsycho-social for thefamily’ s productive 71 e Informática the NationalInstituteofStatisticsandInformation( 2003). affected bytheinternalarmedconflictisestimatedatmorethan600,000(Diez rural communitiesandregions.Thenumberofpeopledisplacedfromtheareas other areas,especiallycitiesorurbanperipheries,ledtoanotherdebacleinthe families, butalsoforcommunities.Thedisplacementoftheruralworkforceto the mainelementsofproductionchaincausedseriousproblemsnotonlyfor Temporary orpermanentabsencebecauseoftheforceddisplacementone Displacement ofthelaborforce family members. deterioration ofthequalitylifeandphysicalpsychologicalcondition long seriesofnegativeeconomicconsequencesforfamilymembers,causinga disintegration ofthefamilyasaneconomicunit. husbands. Thisnotonlyseveredthechainofproduction,italsoledto about thewhereaboutsandconditionoftheirimprisonedordisappeared stolen. Leftalone,womenhadtospendmuchoftheirtimeseekinginformation therefore, thefamily’swerefields abandonedandthelivestock poorlytendedor family supportsitselfwithitscropsandlivestock.Whenamanwasgone, community memberbecausemostlandsarenotcommunallyowned.Each heads ofhouseholds,althoughyouthsandwomenwerealsoimprisoned. family members’lives.Thevictimsofunjustimprisonmentweremainlymale facilities meantaforcedabsencethathadanimmediate,seriousimpactonthe from theirhomes.Forthefamily, theperson’s imprisonmentinoneofthese 72 were theonesleftbehind, becausetheyhadnoalternative. following testimonyindicates.Accordingtothisaccount, thepoorestpeople interpreted thatabsenceasasignofthe«backwardness» ofvillagelife,asthe force createddramaticlocalimbalances. the paceofeconomiclifewasdifferentatnational level,theabsenceofalabor possibilities ofeconomicdevelopmentforthosewhoremained behind.Although The depopulationleftcommunitieswithoutalabor force,greatlyreducing displacement oftheworkforce,andmanycommunities becameghosttowns. returned totheirplacesoforiginasaresultpacification. Therewaswidespread interviewed hadchangedresidencebecauseofthe armedconflictandhad Huancavelica, Junín,HuánucoandAncash,morethan50percentofthepeople people inthecountryisprobably between600,000and1million. of theUnitedNationsSecretariat UnitonInternalDisplacement(1996),thenumberofdisplaced According toadocumentondisplaced peopleinPerupreparedbyFrancisDeng,representative 72 According tothe1997 The forcedabsenceofaparentasresultthearmedconflicttriggered In mostpeasantcommunities,amancannotbereplacedbyanother In placeswherethelocallaborforcewasdisplaced, localresidents , INEI),in437districtsof Survey ofCharacteristicstheReturnedPopulation the departmentsof Instituto NacionaldeEstadística Ayacucho, Apurímac, by 375 THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE CONFLICT 376 PART TWO: T HE LEGACY OF THE CONFLICT AND THE WAY TO PEACE displaced population. communities. Thereturnees,however, probablyrepresentedonlyabout halfofthe situation stabilized,somedisplacedfamiliesbegantoreturntheirhome people themselves. After the 74 73 production andinitself.Thedecreasethe ruralworkforceaffected members oftheproductionchain,whichresultedin changesinrelationshipsof means ofproductionweredestroyed,butalsobecause theabsenceofprincipal decreased workopportunitiesforfamiliesandcommunities, notonlybecausethe The continuousattacksbythePCP-SLandactions bythesecurityforces Changes inlaborconditions:unemploymentandunderemployment reflecting thisprolongedabandonmentofthecountryside. people returnedtotheirhomesafteralongabsence (between sixand15years), economic success.TheINEIsurvey(1997)foundthatmore than60percentofdisplaced land weredoingsounderextremelydisadvantageousconditionsandwithoutmuch for longperiods,itcanbeconcludedthatpeoplewhowereactuallyworkingthe communities wasgreatbecausemuchoftheagriculturallandhadbeenabandoned lands (Matos2002). livestock. Fifteenpercentofthefamiliesworked asdaylaborersonotherpeople’s the mainactivityof90percentfamilies,while32saidtheyraised survey intheareashardesthitbyarmedconflictfoundthatagriculturewas (13.4 percent),crafts(6.4percent)andotheractivities(9.3percent).Another livestock, whiletherestwereinvolvedincommerce(14.6percent),construction of thereturneesworked(attimesurveywasdone)inagricultureor mainly toruralagriculture.Thiscanbeseeninthefollowingfigures:52.2percent age. and actuallyemployed,while37.9percentwereunemployedpeopleofworking according toINEI(1997).Atotalof62.1percentthereturneeswereworkingage remained intheircommunitiesoforiginwereunemployedpeopleworkingage, the areaswheretheyhadoriginallytakenrefuge.Manyofreturneeswho made itimpossibleforthemtoremain,andtheyweredisplacedagain,returning encountered intheirhomevillagesandthescantaidtheyreceivedfromstate MENADES-CONDECOREP estimatedthenumber ofreturnees Support Program(Programade The numberofreturneesisestimated atabout320,000,accordingtothestate-runRepopulation the confrontationinLosMolinos. CVR. BDI-I-P176.T Considering thattheimpactofarmedconflictonfarminginaffected According tothesameINEIsurvey, more thanhalfthereturneesreturned Displacement impoverished notonlythecommunity, butalsothedisplaced professional andotherjobopportunities.Theresultwasbackwardness. Those whowerelessfortunatehadtostaybehind,andtherewasalossof successful merchants,whocouldleavebecauseoftheireconomicsituation. The best-educatedpeoplehadtoleave.Therewasaflightofprofessionalsand estimony taken in Huertas, Huancayo ( estimony takeninHuertas,Huancayo 74 Thesocio-economicconditionsthatmanyofthesepeople armed conflictsubsidedand Apoyo al Repoblamiento, PAR); Junín), inMay2002. at 200,000(P the samePAR reportnotesthat the country’s AR 2001). AR Authorities tellof economic 73 75 because oftheeconomicburdensupporting displaced relativeseven gradual deteriorationoftherelationshipwithfamily thathadreceivedthem For displacedpeople,theemploymentdramawaseven moreacute.Therewasa Because I’m notaman,wherecouldI in poverty. As Added totheseproblemswasthejobdiscrimination thataffectedwomenliving their landandanimals. insecurity anduncertaintythattheyhadneverexperienced whentheyhad even asubsistenceincome.Forthesefamilies,informalemploymentcreated the informalsectororacceptlow-wagejobsthatdidnotprovidethemwith family members.Thelackofworkforceddisplacedpeopletotakeupactivitiesin maintain friendshipsandcooperationamongcommunities,neighborsoreven to astandstill.Thelackoftrusthaddamagedrelationships,makingitdifficult temporary andinsecure.Communitydevelopmentthroughcollectivelaborcame The villagers’fearisolatedthemandforcedtoadoptlifestylesthatwere even walkaround.» stopped working.We communities andmadeitimpossibletocarryonwitheconomiclifeasusual:«Sowe the problempersiststoday. Theviolence disruptedproductiondynamicsinthe harvest. they wereafraidoflosingtheircropsbecausecouldnotseethemthroughtothe they couldnotplantbecauselackedseeds,tendtheirfieldsor unemployment andthedifficultyinfindingemploymentalsohadindirecteffects: members. to-day survival.Thatisreflectedinthetestimonyofmanydisplacedcommunity women andevenchildrenhadtoredoubletheireffortsensurefamilies’day- because oftheabsence,displacementorunemploymentmalelaborforce, reflected informsofunemploymentandunderemployment. the situationaffectednotonlyemploymentpatterns,butveryrighttowork, those whotestified,therewasadualproblemrelatedtoruralemployment,because family, localandregionalproductionsystemstodifferentdegrees.Intheopinionof 78 77 76 stayedand we insideoutoffear.» have anythingforourchildrentoeat,becausenoonecamethestore.Itwasclosed, afraid. We didn’t gooutinthestreetanymore,andtherewas no business.We didn’t indicates: «[...]sowewerewalking[...]andreturnedhomebecause 8. Alleged violation:torture,sexualviolenceandmurder. CVR. BDI-I-P704.Publichearing in Abancay(Apurímac).Secondsession,August27,2002,case CVR. BDI-I-P518.Publichearing in Lima.Firstsession,June21,2002,case2. October22,2002. (Junín), CVR. BDI-I-P762.Interviewwith malesettler,age49,withfifth-gradeeducation.Cushiviani P482. In-depthinterviewwitha peasant victimofPCP-SL [...] Mywifewore herselfouttosupportme,and See, forexample,thefollowingtestimony:“[…]Ourlife Bellavista (SanMartín),August20, 2002. Employment decreasedintheaffectedcommunitiesforthesereasons,and First, withthebreakdowninsocialandproductivesupportnetworks 75 Atthesametime,forpeopleaffectedbyviolence,problemof one woman 76 Italsoaffectedcommercialactivities,asthefollowingtestimony couldn’t work put it,«BecauseI’m 77 any more.People wereafraid.You couldn’t go eventododaylabor?Nowhere.» I couldn’t changed alotbecauseI not aman,Ican’twork. [...] who waswho injuredby help withthework.” CVR.BDI-I- a bomb.Ledoy, couldn’t 78 work. 377 THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE CONFLICT 378 PART TWO: T HE LEGACY OF THE CONFLICT AND THE WAY TO PEACE economies ofthesecommunities. briefly describesthematerialdamagecausedbyviolenceanditseffectson families andcommunities.Thisledtoevengreaterimpoverishment.section as wellthelooting,theftanddestructionofgoods,withseriousconsequencesfor The internalarmedconflictresultedinthedestructionofpublicandprivate property, D they finishtheirstudies,enduponthestreetwithoutjobs.» were unabletocompletetheeducational-laborprocess:«Andevenwhen no jobs?» that they’re professionals,what’s theuseofbeingprofessionalsifthereare studies normally. [...]Nowthatthey’ve finishedhowever theycould,now effects: «[…]Ifthishadn’t happened,my themselves upwithagreatdealofeffortorfamilyinvestmentstillfeltthe desperation thatmanypeoplefelt.Eventhosewhomanagedtopull they sometimesgottiredofit.» starts lookingaskanceatyou. We usually in Lima.Neithercouldmywife.Underthosecircumstances,eventhefamily temporarily: «Thedramacontinued,becausedespitemyage,Icouldn’t findwork 81 80 79 shows theeconomiccostofviolencebysectorasindicated inthatstudy. percent ofthatyear’s totalexternal debt by thesubversivegroupswasapproximatelyUS$8,184,584,648,equivalentto66 «Violence andPacification»concludedthattheeconomiccostofdamagesperpetrated 1980 and2000.In1988,aSpecialSenateCommissionresponsibleforstudyof Nevertheless, therearesomefiguresthatindicatethecostofviolencebetween internal armedconflictorthecostofharminflictedoncivilianpopulation. It isimpossibletodeterminetheexactcostofdamagestatepropertyduring Destruction ofsocialandcommunityinfrastructure ESTRUCTION OFPROPERTY, LOSS OF AGRICULTURAL CAPITAL AND IMPOVERISHMENT 8. Relatives of a a 8. Relatives of CVR. BDI-I-P704.Publichearing in Abancay(Apurímac).Secondsession,August27,2002,case relative ofonethevictims. CVR. BDI-I-P450.Publichearing in Huamanga(Ay CVR. BDI-I-P438.Publichearingin Huamanga(Ay Relative ofthe Unemployment andpovertyaggravatedtheuncertainty 80 Thesituationalsocreatedasenseoffrustrationbecausepeople victim; thewitnessisateacher. victim oftorture,sexualviolence andmurder. 79 and 45percentofGDP. Thefollowingtable gotalongwell,butwe could tell that acucho). Thirdsession, children wouldhavefinishedtheir acucho), April 9,2002,case17.T April 11,2002,case12. 81 estimony of organization ConstitutionandSociety( billion. power linesbysubversivesbetween1980and1991causedlossesofUS$2 TABLE 1 82 Interest FarmingCooperatives( March 1988andJanuary1989againsttheHeroínasToledo andCahuidaPublic in production.Inthecentralhighlands,actsofviolencewerelaunchedbetween billion (Puicán2003:12). estimated thecountry’s economiclosses between 1980and1992atUS$21 to 22in1984and331985. In1986,therewere83attacksand32victims. were aimedatcooperatives.ShiningPathincursions increasedfrom15in1983 the departmentofPuno.AccordingtoastudybyRénique (1991),themainattacks Castilla, whichhadresourcesforsecurityanddefense. that didnotaffectotherSAIS,suchasTúpacAmaru, PachacútecandRamón that wasthelackofpolicesupportandslowresponse fromthepolice,factors of securitysystemsthatwouldhaveenabledittoavoid destruction.Addedto attacks. Becauseofeconomicdifficulties,thecompany couldnotaffordthecost to destroyit(Puicán2003:19).ItfinallyclosedinJanuary 1989afteraseriesof bring peasantcommunitiestogetherinthemarketsystem. Thatledtothedecision the PCP-SL’s the regionunderagrarianreform.AccordingtoPuicán,oneofreasonsfor was consideredthemostimportantofagriculturalbusinessesestablishedin destroyed 1989). Theformerstoppedoperatingafteritsbuildingsandpropertywere according toestimatesbyELECTRO-PERU. owned bysubsidiaryELECTRO-NORTE, whichwouldincreasethetotalbyUS$600million, According toELECTRO-PERU,335 towersweredestroyedin1989.Thatfigureincludes 82 According tootherstudies(Desco),thedestructionofhigh-tension The PCP-SL’s violencewas also In thesouthernhighlands,PCP-SLattacksoccurred particularlyin Anotherstudyof«EconomicsandViolence,»preparedbythe in March1988.TheCahuideSAIS,locatedtheupperMantaroV constant attacks on this cooperative was that theSAISwas ableto constant attacksonthiscooperative Sociedades AgrícolasdeInterésSocial directed againstorganizationsinvolved Constitución ySociedad , SAIS)(Sánchez ) in1993, alley, 379 THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE CONFLICT 380 PART TWO: T HE LEGACY OF THE CONFLICT AND THE WAY TO PEACE which seriouslycompromisedtheirabilitytosupportthemselves. in Table 2.Thesefamilieshadtodealwiththetotalorpartiallossoftheirassets, destroyed eitherbythePCP-SLormembersofforcesorderareshown the authoritiesandchildren.» burned downourhousesandschool[...]thePCP-SLcametotakeaway peasant self-defensegrouptestified:«[…]Theydestroyed ourcommunity. They Incarajay, our expressed asenseofemptinessandimpotenceinthefacethoseevents:«In of propertydestroyedasaresulttheviolence,manypeoplewhotestified of thecommunitybuildings. communities insixprovincesof Ayacuch communities. Anotherstudyfoundthat28percentofthehomesin99 that itwouldhavecostthestatemorethan1.3millionsolestorebuildaffected number increasedto77in1988and971989. destroyed atCututuni.Duringthatyear, however, therewere35attacks.The 1987, thenumberofviolentactionsdecreasedafteraPCP-SLcolumnwas 86 85 84 83 TABLE 2 my house.Everyoneincommunityhassufferedalot.» soldiers beatthemen.[...]Thosewretchesleft 2002. CVR. BDI-I-P411.W CVR. BDI-I-P414.Genderw communities, 33districtsandsix provinces inthenorthernpartofdepartment Ayacucho. displacement donebyCEPRODEP in1997,basedon167familysurveyswithpeoplefrom99 “Diagnóstico dedesplazamiento en Ayacucho 1993-1997.Héroessinnombre,”astudy of provinces ofV Evaluations byCEPRODEP in10communitiesthe Estimates oflossessufferedbyfamilieswhosehousesandcropswere Although itisimpossibletodeterminethenumberofhousesoramount The damagetookitstolloncommunities. A studyin Ay houses were burneddown.The ilcashuamán andLaMar, respectively orkshop with self-defense committee members, Satipo (Junín), November 4, orkshop withself-defensecommittee members,Satipo(Junín), orkshop, Ay 84 86 acucho (Huamanga),October23, 2002.Femalevillager. o were destroyed,alongwith35percent me inpov , inthedepartment districts ofV Shining Path membersandthe erty. They ischongo andT 85 acucho of Ayacucho. Amemberofa burned down 83 ambo, inthe indicated the incomeofpeasantfamilies. amount oflandundercultivationwasdrasticallyreduced, seriouslyaffecting TABLE 3 shown inTable 3. pasture land,3.9percenthadwoodlandand20.2livestock,as percent ofthereturneessaidtheyhadagriculturalland,13.4 and/or livestock,andonly28.6hadnoproperty. Inthesamesurvey, 94.1 had somesortofpropertyintheirhomecommunities,includinghouses,land property. According totheINEIsurvey(1997),71.4percentofpeoplepolled their villagesandabandonhomes,farmland,livestockother The internalarmedconflictforcedaffectedfamiliesandcommunitiestoleave Abandonment oflandandlosscapital Cangallo, Huancapi,Hualla,Canaria,Sarhuaandotherprovinces. also keepingpeoplefromexchangingtheirproductswithvalleyregionssuchas traffic intheseareas,notonlyprohibitingpeoplefromtravelingtothecoast,but coastal provincessuchasNazca,IcaandLima.ThePCP-SLrestrictedcommercial For example,Huancasancos(Ayacucho) hadbeenlinkedcommerciallywith restricted theflowoftradeamonglocalandregionalmarkets(DelPino2001). 87 possible becauseofthePCP-SL’s presenceinthoseareas. 2001). Somecontinuedto sow theirfields,buttheyspentaslittletimethere cultivation beforetheviolencewasplantinglessthan halfahectare(DelPino north (provinceofHuanta). Umaro andPomatambo (provinceofVilcashuam These w Most ofthepeopleinaffectedcommunitieswere smallfarmers.The Some studiesmentionthedestructionofroadsbyPCP-SL,which ere familiesinsixcommunitiesof returneesinthedepartmentof Ay 87 Afamilythathadabout1hectareoflandunder án) andLaupay, Cunya and Uchuraccayinthe acucho: Bellavista, 381 THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE CONFLICT 382 PART TWO: T HE LEGACY OF THE CONFLICT AND THE WAY TO PEACE The numberofagriculturalunitsaffected,however, was ashigh10,575. TABLE 4 hectares hadbeenabandonedinJu Ayacucho. According tothe1997INEIsurvey, bytheendof1996about3,000 were alsofactors(seeTable 4).Theareasmostaffectedwere Junínand the censusnotedthatlackofarurallaborforceandchangesinemployment of croplandwerenolongercultivatedbecauseterrorism.Besidesterrorism, According totheThirdNationalAgricultureCensusof1994,30,655hectares Families soughttominimize theircroplosses,plantingsmallerareastoreduce violence wasanotherfactor indecisionsrelatedtoeconomicsandproduction. income andmeettheirfamilies’ basicsubsistenceneeds.Forlocalresidents,the people fromdoingtemporary workoutsidethecommunitytosupplementtheir not onlyhamperedproduction inthehighlands(Coronel1994),butalsokept for agricultureandincreasedimpoverishmentoffamilies. reduction intheruralpopulationduetothesefactors resultedinalossofcapital especially thoseofworking age,aswell asforced displacement.Logically, the imprisonment, andphysicalpsychologicaldeterioration oftheirmembers, labor forceinthecommunitiesaffectedby death,disappearance, important torememberthattheviolenceresultedin adrasticreductionofthe Peasant families’productionstrategiesbrokedownbecause thePCP-SL With regardtothe«lackoflabor»figureinpreceding table,itis nín andabout9,000 hectares in Ayacucho. run bycommunitymembers,asonevictimrecounted atlength: property ofthewealthiermerchantsaswellsmall shops orprivatebusinesses and allanimalsonwhichtheydependedforsurvival: capital (DelPinoetal2001). saw asharpdecreaseinthelivestocktheyowned,whichledtolossof value toobtainmoneyemigrate.Asaresult,34percentofthesefamilies the military, andin notably, insomecasesbecausetheywere stolenorkilledbythePCP-SL or of cattleandsheep,whichareaformsavingsforthesefamilies,decreased that occurredinvariousplaceswhereconfrontationstookplace.Thenumber When theviolencearrived, means, inbothcasesthetheftanddestructionofpropertyhadanegativeimpact. direct attacksonpeople’s rightsandproperty. Alt Both thesubversivegroupsandmembersofsecurityforcesperpetrated The impactoftheftanddestructionpropertyimpoverishment not onlytoguaranteeproduction,butalsoensuretheirsurvival. the riskoflosingtheirinvestmentifPCP-SLattackedagain.Theirgoalwas 89 88 seamstress, age 43, fromParqo. CVR. BDI-I-P59.InterviewinSan JuandeLurigancho(Lima),June2002.Theintervieweeisa CVR. BDI-I-P415.Genderw … theyevendestroyedthechurchesandschools. [...] Iwas w and tooksacksofrice,sugar, everything.Wherecouldyougotocomplain? They lootedtheshops.[...] kickedinthedoorofshopandopenedit, The subversivegroupsburstintothecommunities andtookoverthe they’d done.Therehadbeenpigs. in themorningtheywereParcco,andnextdayyou couldseeeverything escaped withthat.Theyatnight.Idon’t knowwheretheyslept,but loaded theburrowithmeatfromanimalsthey’d killedatthehouse.They the turkey, theytookthe the plantinghadgonetofeedpig[...].Therewas alsoaturkey. Theyate they wanted.Mymotherhadapig.TheykilledtheWhatcomefrom [...] Theyburnedeverything,thehouse.tookwhatever In general,peoplesufferedthetheftanddestructionoftheirlivestock That accountdescribesthetheft,looting,destructionandpillaging revenge. You they wouldkillyouorburnaliveinyourhousewithkidsoutof else theyfound.Theytookeverything, andif burning theirhomes,takinglivestock,blankets,pots,toolsandanything had beenlandslides,toescapeandsavetheirlives.[Theattackers]were [...] menandwomensleptinotherplaces,thehillsorplaceswherethere orking intheshop.Theshop was couldn’t others becausepeoplesoldthematlessthantheirmarket orkshop formen,Huamanga(A escape andyou’dbe hens. [...].Mybrotherhadgottenaway,they but They’d cuteverything up[...]. burned toacrisp.Children,mothers yacucho), October23,2002. you didn’t w hough theyuseddifferent empty. Iw 88 as discouraged.I ant tohelpthem, 89 383 THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE CONFLICT 384 PART TWO: T HE LEGACY OF THE CONFLICT AND THE WAY TO PEACE school wasrobbedofeverything—tools,pots.[...]» came in1989andourvillagewasdestroyed,houseswereburnedthe 92 91 90 witness describedindetailwhathappenedtothecommunity-runbusiness: forest.» me withnoclothes.We escapedwiththeclothesonourbacks.We fledintothe my house.Theyburnedsewingmachine,typewriter, myradio.Theyleft I’ve beenlivinghereinAnapateforthreeyears.TheyburnedeverythingIhad belongings tosavetheirlives:«MyneighborsstayedinthecommunityofKimbiri. emotional shock.Manypeopletestifiedthattheyhadtoabandontheir or findingnothingintheirhouseswhentheyreturnedwasapsychologicaland their ownerswas morethanmonetary. Seeingtheirbelongingsgoupinflames community of Agu common practiceofthePCP-SL.Onewitnesssaid:«[...]I’m fromthenative CVR. BDI-I-P412.W CVR. BDI-I-P410.Genderw age 58,whowitnessedthemassacre inLucanamarca. CVR. BDI-I-P333.InterviewinSacsamarca, Huancasancos(Ayacucho), March 2002,withavillager, 92 The w 200 animals.Thecorralsranwithblood.Itlookedlikeariver. We were shocked. Early thenextday, we reachedthecabinandfoundthattheyhad slaughtered Businesses andcooperativesalsosufferedtheeffectsofviolence.One The lootingandtheburningofhomescommunitybuildingswasa there. Theybroughtmeatfromnearby. whatever wasthere.Theyatethat;theyevencats.preparedit as Itoldyou,theyalsowentintoallthehousesandtookcorn,favabeans, didn’t work anymore.[...]Onlyrecentlyaretheshopsopeningagain.Before, more. or 12setsofclothes,theyattackedthem.They[merchants]don’t comeany said, We’re and tookalltheclothes.ForParty!Doyouwanttostayaliveornot?They clothes fromthemerchantswhocameHuamanga.Theyassaultedthem animals allaroundthem.Alltheirfood,meatwasfree.Theytook [they said],fortheP alive. Today andtomorrow, men cameandreadiedtheirmachineguns.Whoeversurvives thiswillstay want tokillourbusiness, killusall.Two should justkillusall.Sinceyou orthree everybody elsesaid,Whyaretheygoingtokillourbrothers andsisters?They goingtotaketheplaceofalpacas,theysaid. the killing.Nowyou’re And Andes, inthehills.[...]Theysingledoutwomenandmen whohadopposed our ownincome,sincetheauthoritiesignoreus.It’s justbecausewe live inthe the fruitofourhardworkandeffort,becauseweliveinpoverty andwanttohave this way? What have we pregnant females.Aftertheyslaughteredtheanimals, madeuslineup. who werearmed?Theykilledthe480alpacas,including theyoungonesand somewhat, butunfortunatelywewereunarmed.Whatcould wedoagainstpeople omen said,Whatisthis?It’s theend 90 fighting forthepoor!Themerchantswhobroughtclothes,eight orkshop with displaced people in Satipo (Junín), Nov orkshop withdisplacedpeoplein Satipo(Junín), aytía. We have alsosuffered orkshop for men, Satipo (Junín), Nov orkshop formen,Satipo(Junín), arty! Theyneededprovisionsevery done?Thisw for justafewhours,you’ll stayalive. So we asn’t agiftfromthegovernment; thiswas They slaughteredit.[...]FortheP of theworld. Howcouldtheypunishus from theviolence.ThePCP-SL 91 Thevalueofthesegoodsto ember 4,2002. day. [...]Therewere ember 4,2002. resisted arty, 95 94 93 the peasants’goods:«Whensoldiersarrived,theytook alltheanimals.Sometimes military remainedincertaincommunities,theydidnot missanopportunitytotake had togivethemacalf.Eachneighborhoodgaveoneeach month.» gave thempotatoes,andcorn.Therewerefourneighborhoods, andeachmonthwe what mighthappentothemiftheydidnot:«We cooperated.Whentheyasked,we but lateryousaidsomethingtothemandtheywereafraid.» abuses.The quietly,fields Army [...]wentwere the into tookthecrops,hens, discrimination. AlthoughthePeruvianArmy«behavedwellatfirst,laterthere conflicts withthecooperatives’workers: distributing theirproperty(livestock)amongthepeasants,whooftenhad destroyed theeconomyofbusinesses,suchasIllarySAIS,byforcibly 98 97 96 asked formoneyandgrain.» they startedtolootgoodsandgrain.Theysaid,‘It’s thepig’s birthday,’ andthey They took50sheep,tools,clothing,ataperecorder, atypewriter.» and madethepeoplesubmittothem.[...][Whentheyleft]tookallourthings. military basescommittedmanyabuses:«Theyatetheanimals,rapedwomen 54, whowas an CVR. BDI-I-P33.Interviewin CVR. BDI-I-P30.Focusgroupof men andw member whosebrotherwas CVR. BDI-I-P26. Acc province ofLeoncioPrado,Huánuco. May2002. CVR. BDI-I-P299.Interviewwith afemalememberofthe7deOctubrecommunityin Campesinos dePuno). leaders oftheDepartmentalFederationPeasantsPuno(Federación Departamentalde CVR. BDI-I-P247.Focusgroup,Puno(Puno),May14,2002.Participants werenewandformer 11. W CVR. BDI-I-P708.PublichearinginAbancay(Apurímac).Second session, August27,2002,case oman andman,residentsofthecommunityCotahuarcay. those peoplehadsavedthemselves. They’d won alittlesomething. they foundpeoplewhohadnothing,still was aterrorist.You’re a The securityforces’actionswerealsomarkedbyviolence,abuseand repression, the Army, thepolice.Theysaidthatany 50, sometookmore,didn’t takeanything.Thenextdaycamethe livestock. Peopleweretoldtotakeit.Somepeopletookoneortwo,some animals, butwithnoplanning.Therew Illary SAIS.ItwascompletelyburnedbythePCP-SL.Theydistributed end, theywerepoorpeasants.[...]TheCharquismofarmbelongedtothe the time,communitymembers,peasantswereinconflict,but written down.Sevenpeoplewerekilled,peasantsandworkers.Ofcourse,at [...] Huacautawasburneddownandpeoplewerekilledthere.Ithinkhaveit That accountandthefollowingoneshowhowsubversives ate them.We didn’t gatherupthelittleones.We leftthemthereforthecondors. Every mangottwoorthreealpacas.Thegutswerediscardedandthecondors authority inthatcommunity. omarca (Ayacucho), August 2002, killed bythe Accomarca (Ay 97 Villagerstendedtogiveinthesoldiersoutoffear member oftheShiningPath, aterrorist.Butwhen Army. acucho), June2002.Theinterviewee isafarmer, age omen. Lloqllapampa( Ay asn’t aplanned merchant, age38,allegedformer PCP-SL didn’t say anythingclear,but 95 one whohadliv acucho), June2002. Soldiersfromcertain distribution ofthe 96 «In Accomarca, «In 98 Aslongasthe 94 estock 93 385 THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE CONFLICT 386 PART TWO: T HE LEGACY OF THE CONFLICT AND THE WAY TO PEACE they hadabarbecuewithit.» Mother’s didn’tw doitwe describe: «We hadtotakefirewood tothecamp.Theyforcedus,becauseifwe flee w subjugating thevillagersandleavingthemdefenseless.Peoplewhodidnot when theyfledtheviolenceintheircommunities: tried toprotecty from bothsides:«Whatcanyoudoiffourofthemcomewithguns?Even us alot.» they tookthemaway inahelicopter. Theyleftuswithnothing,evennow. Ithashurt 104 103 102 101 100 99 people losteverythingwhentheirhomesandmeansof subsistencewereburned: shows, thelossanddestructionofgoodspropertyreachedhighlevels.Many principal sourcesofwealth andmeansofsurvival. Moreover, asthetestimony In general,stealinganimalsandfooddestroyedthepeasants’villagers’ collaboration theywanted.» for themtoeat,however manypeoplewereatthebase. That’s thekindof collaboration. Eachneighborhoodcollaboratedbyprovidingcalvesandsheep «They askedforourcollaboration.Theystole,andbesidesthatthey respect women. Theydidn’t respectanybody.» former memberofPCP-SL CVR. BDI-I-P53.Fieldnotesfrom aninformalinterviewwitha60-year-oldfarmerandalleged women. CVR. BDI-I-P48.Focusgroupof women in Accomarca (Ayacucho), June2002. CVR. BDI-I-P39.Fieldnotesfrom an informalinterviewwithafemalefarmer,age48.Accomarca Apurímac. Male communitymemberrecountsthemurderofvillagersinToraya, provinceof Aymaraes, CVR. BDI-I-P701.PublichearinginAbancay(Apurímac).Firstsession, August27,2002,case6. authority inthatcommunity. CVR. BDI-I-P33.Interviewin CVR. BDI-I-P48.Focusgroupofw participated. ere forcedtoserve thePCP-SL orthemilitary, asthefollowingaccounts The destructionofpropertywasaimed,amongotherthings,at police andthe Army tookadvantage ofthat.We abandoned ourhomesandanimals.We abandonedourfields.The the factthatmanyofushadfled,leavingourbelongingsbehind.We animals weresafe.Thesoldiers,thesecurityforces,tookadvantageof [...] Somepeoplewereabusedandmistreated.Neitherthenor The securityforcesalsoappropriatedthegoodsthatpeopleleftbehind People hadnowaytoprotectthemselvesfromtheabusesthatcame everything. Therewere15vendorsthere.TheArmy burned everything. So aroundtwointheafternoon,moreorless,wesawthat theyhadburned because we didn’t know whohaddoneit. 99 Day with the womenthe with intown.[...]ItwasDay stolenthenightbeforeand ourself, theywould hityou with ould bepunished.Itwas thesamewithmilitary.» in Accomarca (Ayin Accomarca Accomarca (Ay 103 104 omen in Accomarca (Ayacucho),w June2002.Five «CaptainGarcíaatemyburrotocelebrate acucho) inJune2002.Farmer, age54,whowasan acucho), June2002. 100 101 (Ayacucho), June2002,heldwithfive the riflebutt.Theydidn’t even couldn’t file acomplaint omen 102 that impoverishmentinthethousandsofaccountsrecorded bytheCVR: violence havebeenaffectedthatway. Itisnotdifficult,therefore, tofindevidenceof or another, allthecommunitiesandfamiliesthatlived through,orstilllive amid, that havebeendestroyedandthefamilieslost everything.Butinoneway and communitiesevenmorethantheyhadbeenbeforetheconflictbegan: affected livingconditionsinthecountryside,impoverishingareas 106 105 was acommunityauthority. CVR. BDI-I-P768.Interviewwith a leaderofthe CVR. BDI-I-P298.V up. TheguineapigswereburnedIcried.Itwasashame. candles. Eventhetinroofhadmelted.Thehensweraisedwereburned a lot.Itwassad.Iwenttomyhouseandfoundnothing.Bottlesmeltedlike The politicalviolencemadeuspoorer. In tho The magnitudeoftheeconomicconsequencesisgreater for thecommunities they? say, Whatdo Icare?That’s tell ustogohell.We lookedforsomeway tosolve it.But now people that before.Ifwe hadaproblem,we went andtalkedaboutit.Theydidn’t something, butIcan’t becauseI’ growing upnow, at howIgrewupandlookmynephewslittlebrotherare And Iworryaboutit,becausegrewupwithadifferentkindoflife.look themselves winandlive; thosewho trust eachother. Now it’ economy andalsoinourway someone, there’s notrust.That’s what community, wehave minds. It’sa then everybody was anenemy. such-and-such aperson.Nowwecallpeopleuncleorcousin,butback everything thathashappened.Andtheyknowtheproblemswehadwith changed. They’re community would have The subv safe, givinguptheirfewfreedaystoworktogethersotheycouldsurvive. in thefieldsanymore.Theyspenttheirtimetryingtokeepcommunity The politicalviolencebroughtmore It isimportanttonotethatallthesituationsmentionedheredramatically the terrorists.Y houses, theirbusinesses,ifwe’re notmembersoftheShiningPath? You’re Despite myage,Istillwenttocomplain.Howcouldyouburndowntheir rose andwe didn’t Only nowarewerecovering. Inthosetimesofviolence,thepriceseeds seed toplant.Ourcropsdecreased.Nothingwasthe wayitusedtobe. 106 ersion broughtalotofpov enenillo (provinceofLeoncioPrado, Huánuco),May2002.Theinterviewee terrible complication.There’s atotal ou’ve resentful, theycomplain,they’re tiredoflifebecause with resentment,thatdistrust,andIwant tosay have enoughmoneytobuy also killedpeopleanddumpedthem.We w almost no trust. No matter how close you are to almost notrust.Nomatterhowcloseyouare progressed. Y s every manforhimself.Thosewholookout your problem.Thingsarecomplicated, aren’t of being.We usedtobeunited,we usedto m afraid,andwe’re worried. Itwasn’t like That’s beeningrained community of Cushiviani (Junín), October2002. community ofCushiviani(Junín), don’t, don’t. Everything brokedown. poverty, ou’ve erty. Ifithadn’ it broughtusinagriculture,the seen howitis.Thekidshave se days, we didn’ se days,we because peopledidn’t work them. We lack oftrust.Inthe t beenforthat,the in thechildren’s couldn’t 105 t even have t even ent through produce 387 THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE CONFLICT 388 PART TWO: T HE LEGACY OF THE CONFLICT AND THE WAY TO PEACE for thedamagedonetothem,withspecialattentionwidowsandorphans: testified expressedtotheCVRtheirwishforgovernmentmakereparation problems havenotbeenresolved.Forthatreason,manyofthepeoplewho have beenunabletoimprovetheirsituationsignificantlybecausemanyofthe situation ofthefamilieshardesthitbyviolenceremainsaconcern.They the violence—conditionsthatstillhavenotimproved. difficulties becauseoftheterribleconditionsinwhichtheirvillageswereleftby Those whoreturnedtotheircommunities,however, nowfaceseriouseconomic not establishanadequatesocio-economiclevelintheirnewplacesofrefuge. survival. Nevertheless,thenewsituationwasalsoadverse,becausetheycould communities andmoveelsewhereinsearchofrefugebetterconditionsfor and theresultingimpoverishmentforcedmanypeopletoabandontheir 109 108 107 to obtainwhattheyneed. Fromthisstandpoint,thewaysinwhichgroups group. Othersincludetheirexpectationsandway ofteachingthemselves life, andreciprocityisoneofthetoolsforsustaining andstrengtheninga implicit agreementsamongcommunitymembersto preserveastablewayof development institutions.Inthissense,theterm«institutions» referstothe The internalarmedconflicthasalsohadanimpact onlocalcommunity D ETERIORATION OFECONOMICINSTITUTIONS CVR. BDI-I-P409.Genderw 2002. CVR. BDI-I-P421.Genderworkshop withmen,Pichari,LaConvención(Cusco),October25, October 23,2002. CVR. BDI-I-P416.W all Icansay. started tosufferfromanemia.Howmanychildrendied ofanemia.That’s had foodtoeat.Butwhenwe went with like itusedtobe,whenIlived withmyhusband.We hadeverything. We eat. beenorphaned,too.They’rehave malnourished.Theyhave nothingto suffered. Theyshouldalsoreceivereparations.Iseehowmychildren people whohavesuffered.OurAsháninkabrothersandsisters these orphanswhohavebeenleftbehind.Notonlythem;therearemany Truth Commissiontoinsistthatthegovernmentpayreparationsall one takesresponsibility. the childrenareleft.Iamawidow. Ihave several smallchildrenandno the politicalviolence.»ThePCP-SLtookusandkilledmyhusband.Now She’s inCorilla,butshe’s fromSanaveni. Shesays,«Ihave sufferedfrom The testimoniesgatheredbytheCVRshowthatcurrenteconomic As indicated,thetotalorpartiallossoftheirbasicmeanssubsistence didn’t takeourcropstomarketanymore. the wayweusedto.Thepricesgotforourproductsdroppedand same strength.What’s more,nowwe fields areabandoned.We don’t work theway weuseddo.There’s notthe And Ifeelallalone,havingseenhowtheykilledmyhusband.It’s not orkshop withpeasantself-defense committeesinHuamanga(Ayacucho), 109 orkshop withw They have noclothestowear. So I would likethe omen in Satipo (Junín), Nov omen inSatipo(Junín), all workin the PCP-SL,we didn’t eatandwe 107 Production hasdecreased.The our ownfields. ember 4,2002. 108 long years ofrelationships years long part ofcommunalcustoms. Both the armedgroupsdistorted thesepractices,usingtheminwaysthatwerenot communal labor( supporting thefamilyand thecommunity. Economicorganizationbased on affects thisorganization, of familyandcommunityrelationships.Thepermanent absenceofamember affected theirmembersandinstitutionsdifferently andtovaryingdegrees. cooperation andcollaborationweakenedwere alteredinwaysthat and individualsrelatedtooneanother. Oldmodelsof personalandcollective life wasreflectedinchangesthatdirectlyaffected thewayinwhichgroups there wasadisruptionofunprecedentedmagnitudein localproductionsystems. compromised theeconomicsystem.Inlivesoffamilies, villagesandregions, fled. Thetemporaryorpermanentabsenceof thesepeopleseriously who hadbeenthesolesupportersoftheirgroupsdied,disappearedorsuddenly community organizationinvariousways. changed, andtherewasgreaterdistrustinrelationships,whichaffected and imbalancetocommunitylife.People’s perceptionsofoneanotheralso groups’ suddenarrivalchangedthismodelofproduction,bringingchaos the fieldandensuredsurvival offamiliesandthecommunity. Thearmed development. Thissystemallowedforanexchangeoflaborproductionin of laborandresourcestosupporttheirmembersachieveeconomic Local productionorganizationsconstantlyresortedtothereciprocalprovision Changes incollectiveformsoforganizinglabor resolution ofinter-communityconflicts. lack ofattentiontoimprovingproductiontechniques,propermanagementand development. Thedisorganizationoftheproductionsystemwasaccompaniedbya problems intheexchangeofgoodsandaffectedexpectationsforpersonallocal changed theproductiveorganizationoffamiliesandcommunities,createdmajor the population,andthesepracticessoondisappeared. stipulated byancestralpractices.Thiscreatedconfusionanddistrustamong and oftenprohibitedsucheventsorusedthemforpurposesotherthanthose but thiscustomwaschangedbythearmedgroups,whosoughtcompletecontrol events hadbeenopportunitiesfortheexchangeofagriculturalgoodsorlivestock, and harvesting,incommunityfestivals,wasdirectlyorindirectlyaffected.These community development.Production,whichwasoftenritualizedinplanting organizing productionanddistribution,aswelltheirsenseoffamily because oftheeffectsviolence. and communitiesorganizethemselveshavebeensignificantlytransformed Peasant lifeisfundamentallycommunalandstrengthened bybonds The turmoilthatthearmedconflictcreatedinfamily andcommunity In familiesandcommunitiesthathadnoroleinthearmedconflict,people This sectionprovidesanoverviewofthewayinwhicharmedviolence The actionsbythearmedgroupsaffectedcommunities’waysof minka ) orreciprocallabor( becausetheperson’s based onknowingoneanother, rootedinthe assurance ayni and minka ayni areformsofexchangethat imply ) wasseriouslyaffectedbecause activities were important for 389 THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE CONFLICT 390 PART TWO: T HE LEGACY OF THE CONFLICT AND THE WAY TO PEACE community ofAccomarca. toparticipateincommunitylabor,»want saidoneleaderofthepeasant the energytostartoverwiththeireconomicactivities.Residents«nolonger collective benefit,strengtheningthegroup. Communal laborisnolongeraninstitutionthatbringsindividualstogetherfor rise toothersbasedonindividualism.«Thereusedbe therefore, formsthebasisofcontinuityforsocialandeconomicrelationships. that theservicesprovidedwillberepaidinkindsometimefuture.Trust, 113 112 111 110 and failuretofulfilldesignatedroles. ancestral customs,promptedbyfearanddistrust,led todiscouragement,neglect As aresult,eachmemberfoundhisorherownmeans ofsurvival.Thischangein This fragmentedtheorganizationalmodelandkept productive infrastructure. mutual aidforsurvival,torebuildpropertythathad been destroyedortorepair most affectedbythearmedconflictcouldoccasionally turntocooperationor emerged atdifficultmoments.Eveninthehardesttimes, thepeoplewhowere subjected, however, reciprocity didnotdisappearaltogether;rather, itre- liquor,» the goodofcommunity. Nowpeoplewon’t participateunless you offerthem is aresident,age 65,whow CVR. BDI-I-P350.InterviewinSancos, Huancasancos(Ayacucho), March2002.Theinterviewee Accomarca (Ay CVR. BDI-I-P33.Interviewwith a farmer,age54,whowasanauthorityinthecommunityof residents participated. CVR. BDI-I-P412.W CVR. BDI-I-P3.Focusgroup,Vilcashuamán (A In somecases,entirecommunitieshavebecomediscouragedandlack They’re co In manycases,however, relationshipsoftrustwere destroyed, giving Communities andfamiliesalsosufferedastheirmembers werescattered. Despite theconstant,intenseattackstowhichcommunitieswere eat? [...]It’s to disappear. P Willingness toengageincivicactionispracticallydisappearing.[...]It’s going completely abandoned. did theyhave tokill theleaders enthusiasm forworking forthecommunity. That’s howthingsarenow. Why village issad,andtheparkallovergrown.Peopleseemtohavelosttheir the village.Nowpeoplearen’t united.[...]Thingshave changedalot.The aren’t good.Inthose they say, Imayasw that now. They wanttoreceivefoodhandouts.expectthat.Eventhemenarelike it’s worse. Nownobodyw 110 onepersonsaidwithacombinationofnostalgiaandconcern. acucho), June2002. 113 ming back,onebyone. As orkshop fordisplacedpeopleinSatipo ( a situationthat’s eople arewillingtowork foroneday, butnomore.Howwillwe orks atthecommunity healthcenter. 112 ell goback.Theywork intheirfields,butrelationships years, we w years, we 111 ants towork.the Even hard toexplain,andnow, withgovernment aid, of thecommunity?W ere unitedandwe worked forthegoodof yacucho), June2002.Fourmaleparticipants. they seethatthevillageiscalmnow, Junín), November 4,2002.Displaced it fromrecovering quickly. mothers havebecomelazier. minkas e’ve beenabandoned, here [...]workfor ended upwithoutmoneyorproducts,eitherbecause oftheftandlootingbythe system ofdistributionandexchangeproducts.Many familiesandcommunities subversive groupsorsecurityforcesinthecommunities directlyaffectedthe and, therefore,areductioninwhatwasavailablefor bartering.Thepresenceof The changesineconomicsystemswereaccompanied by adecreaseinproduction Suspension oftradingnetworksandopportunities the followingtestimony: often suffereddiscriminationandwerefrequentlystigmatizedasdescribedin violence, nolongerhadmaterialandsocialsupport.Theybecamedestitute, affected, suchaswidowsandorphans,wholostfamilymembersbecauseofthe have becomev but thatcustomisdisappearing,accordingtothepeoplewe’vetalkedto.People in four leader, acomm the fragmentation,ancestraltypesofrelationshipsfaded.Inopinionone was nolongerawayofsustainingandsupportingcommunitylife.Because 116 115 114 CVR. BDI-I-P416.W Huancasancos (Ay CVR. BDI-I-P320.Fieldnotesfrom aninformalinterviewwithacommunityauthorityinSancos, interviewee isacommunityauthority. CVR. BDI-I-P298.InterviewinV October 23,2002.Theparticipants aremembersofthecommittees. ayllus protect everyoneelse,sonothingwouldhappentous. those widowslosttheirhusbandsinactionagainsttheShining Path,tryingto help you. People aren’t goodanymore. Theychargeyoueverythingfor whenthey because theyhavenomoneytopaylaborershelpthemworktheland. Community authoritieslookdownonpoorchildren,orphansandwidows, Solidarity andcooperationwerealsoundermined.Manyofthepeople For manyauthoritiesandcommunityleaders,communalorganization don’t cometocommunallabor The mostseriousproblem,asI’vesaid,isthatpeoplearenegligent.They build theirhouses,can’t but theylookdownonthembecausethey’re poor. Orphanedchildrencan’t they don’t have moneyto pay thelaborers.Theauthoritiesdon’t sayanything, example, whenwidowswanttoworktheland,noonehelpsthembecause ayni cleaning up. the villageandfixuphealthcenter. Butthemainworkweneedto dois field toandgettingpeopletogetherforcommunallabor[...]cleanup lot ofindifference.I’vetalkedwiththecaptainatbaseaboutgoingfrom works inhisownfieldandeverybody mindstheirownbusiness.[...]There’s a don’t any more.Itstillexistsinsomecommunities,butnotothers.For [clans] thatperform come tomeetings.[...]Ithinktheydon’t lovetheirvillage.Eachone ery lazy. unity suchasHuancasancos«isapeasantcommunityorganized They’ve acucho) inMarch2002. orkshop onpeasantself-defensecommittees heldinHuamanga(Ay 114 The communityusesthatlandnowasameetingplace.» gotten usedtochargingforevery jobtheydo.There’s no enenillo (provinceofLeoncioPrado, Huánuco),May2002.The repair them. And noone minkas , theydon’t fulf and ayni . Before,theyplantedcollectively, ill theirresponsibilities,they says anything. Even says anything.Even 116 though acucho), 115 391 THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE CONFLICT 392 PART TWO: T HE LEGACY OF THE CONFLICT AND THE WAY TO PEACE my moneyandIwentbroke.» who isdoingwellatthatkindofwork.ButthemembersPCP-SLstole Then Iwould buycattleandtakethemto slaughter. I have a relative, D.Q., to goupfromPomabambaandtradewithamerchantHuancavelica. movement inmanyplacesandledtothefailureofsmallbusinesses:«Iused increased thesenseoffearanddistrust. opposing forcescouldidentifyresidentsthereandlaterdisappearthem.That had productsformarket.Theseplacesalsobecamedangerous,becausethe system ofcommerce.Marketsandplazaswereemptybecausepeasantsnolonger restricted orcontrolled,whileinothersitwasprohibited,alteringthelocal communities andvillagestotradetheirproducts.Insomecases,suchwas fields withoutharvestingorsellingthecrops. armed groupsorsecurityforces,becausetheywereforcedtoabandontheir 118 117 of effortandsacrificevanishinaninstant. establishments couldnotbeartoseewhattheyhad earned throughlongyears goods thatmodernityhadtooffer. Inmanycases,theownersofcommercial owners, butalsoaproblemforthecommunity, whichlostaccesstothefew little chanceofstartingover. to continuetheirlocaleconomicactivitieswereseverelyaffectedandhad victims ofdisappearedpeoplefrom theprovinceofVíctorFajardo. CVR. BDI-I-P450.Publichearing inHuamanga CVR. BDI-I-P371.Interviewwith arancher, age50,Lucanamarca(Ayacucho), March2002. that support. one willhirethem?IjustaskthattheTruth Commissionsupportus.Iaskfor up, nowthatthey’re professionals,whatgoodisthatiftherearenojobs, studies normally, theyw their studies.Ifithadn’t beenforthat,mychildrenw children haveheartproblemsandheadaches,too.They’vefallenbehindin the abilitytospeak.I’m beenaffected.They’rehave ill,traumatizedorparalyzed.Oneofthemlost be ashes.Sowe They leftanoteinthehousetellingmetoturnmyselformywould and theintelligenceservicekeptfollowingus.Theymadelifeimpossible. to takecareofmydog.Theykilledhimthere.Ifoundhousedestroyed While Iwas inLima,theysearchedmyhouse inSanJosé:I’d askedaneighbor Constant robberiesandassaultsalsodecreasedcommercial The armedactionalsodestroyednetworksandotheropportunitiesfor But hedidn’t have … They said,You nowwhat,Jorge,keepworking withus;we’re goingtohelpyou. important companies—National,Panasonic,Philips,Singer, Honda,andothers. that hadmadehimaleader, even worse every day. Myfatherwasn’t thesame. The closingofsmallbusinesseswasnotonlydisadvantageous forthe In 1987,therewas anotherattack 118 abandoned ev the sameability, thesamedrive.[...] Businessgotworse ould have nervous, too.Ihave a 117 Peoplewholosttheirgoodsandhadnoway erything outoffear. gotten jobs.Buttheway thingshave ended though he’d w (Ayacucho), against myfather. [...]Businessgot He didn’t have thebusinesssavvy bad heart,Igetheadaches.My April 9, 2002, case 17. Relatives of April 9,2002,case17.Relatives orked forandrepresented As aresult,mychildren ould have finished their communities, butalsoamongindividuals,because impoverishmentand and thatthishaspersistedinvariousways.Theparalysis isseennotonlyin above, theCVRisconvincedthatdevelopmentincommunities wasparalyzed, Because oftheeffectsarmedconflictoncountryside, whicharedescribed Paralysis ofcommunitydevelopment bankruptcy. Thesefailureshave continued,withoutmuchhopeofrecovery. many communityproductionorganizationschosetogiveup,declaring merchants disorientedanddiscouraged.Undertheseunfavorableconditions, brought thethreatofculturaldeath. the zonesaffectedbyarmedconflict,inabilitytoofferittheirchildren families toeducatetheirchildren.Giventhevalueofeducationforin lives andthoseoftheirfamilies.Oneresultwasthelimitedpossibilitiesthese In manycases,theyalsofounditimpossibletoplanandreorganizetheirown make aliving,whichcreatedgreatinstabilityandinsecurityfortheirfamilies. 121 120 119 2002. Peasant W CVR. BDI-I-P246.Focusgroupof femalepeasantleadersfromtheDepartmentalAssociationof CVR. BDI-I-P414.Genderw victim’s relatives. CVR. BDI-I-P443.Publichearing in Huamanga much possibilityforrecovery. or goodadministration.Thingswere goingwell before,butwe don’t see livestock management.You practically bankruptedus.[...] [Community members]don’t want tohave The destructionoftheirmeansproductionleftpropertyownersand Now therearemoreorphanedchildrenwhodon’t The peoplewholosttheirgoodsandshopshadtofindnewways Ayacucho andfoundhisstorerobbed.Itwas anot got worse everyday. afraid, andIthoughtthatwasstrange.Hewantedtokeeplivinghere.Business every day. We were afraid,butnotJorge. was done.Theynever foundoutwhodid time arobbery. ... My fell apart.[...]Myfatherbrokedown. couldn’t. know. to want […] we He even wanttoknowwhoitwas,becausewewereafraidtheywouldkillus.Butnow discouraged. We crybecausewe’re sadthat ourchildrencan’t getaneducation. how we’llbeabletoaffordeducateourchildren.Sowegetevenmore help themeither, becausewe arewidowsandwe and suffergreatlywondering howthosechildrenwillgetaneducation.We can’t dress wellarethosewhohavemothersandfathers.Asmothers,weseethat omen ofPuno(AsociaciónDepartamental deMujeresCampesinasPuno),June4, The debtwore himout.Timegotthebetterofhim,andlittlebyhe orkshop withw father filedapolicereportandthenecessaryinvestigation [...] A kept w few daysbeforethewedding, hearrived herein don’t orking, tryingtogetthestoregoingagain,buthe 121 Today nocommunityhasmuchsupportin omen. Huamanga(Ay (Ayacucho), see thefruitofagriculturalmanagement 119 it. At thetime,we No, Jorgewasn’ anything moretodowithit.It’s April 2002,case15. don’t have money. We w her attackonmyfather, eat w acucho), October23,2002. t afraid.[...]Hewasn’t ell. Thechildrenwho were afraid.Wedidn’t Testimony ofthe onder this 120 393 THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE CONFLICT 394 PART TWO: T HE LEGACY OF THE CONFLICT AND THE WAY TO PEACE solutions totheirproductionandmarketingproblems. communities notonlyimpoverishedlandowners,italsokeptpeoplefromfinding uncultivated forseveralyears.Inshort,theabsenceofinvestmentin only stoppedharvestingtheircrops,theyalsoabandonedfieldsandleftthem that theyhadbuiltupovermanyyearswithgreateffortandsacrifice.Theynot through agricultureorlivestocksuddenlyhadtoabandonthelandandfarms for development. abandonment oftheaffectedareashashadanobviousimpactontheirpossibilities 125 124 123 122 it.» not muchgrainhere,forexample.Whenit’s clearatnight,thefrostburns in theirhouses,storerooms.Theirlivestock. Nothingmore.There’s Everything waspracticallyabandoned.[...]Theylived onthelittletheyhad any more—notintheirfields,wheretheyusedtowork, notintheirpastures. of insecurityandlackprotection.«[...]Nobodythought aboutgettingahead desperation becauseofthelosstheirproperty, whichincreased theirsense one personsaidintestimonytotheCVR. impossible inthevillageofPomatambo,becausetherearemorewidowsthanmen,» also decreasedpossibilitiesforadequatedevelopment. «That’s whydevelopmentis aspirations. Ontopofthis,thedisappearanceorabsencecertainfamilymembers communities’ development,aswellanend,inmanycases,totheirdreamsand countryside orthecitybecauseofarmedactionmeant«asetback»intheir 2002. CVR. BDI-I-P350.Interviewwith avillager, age Victim oftorturebythearmedforces. CVR. BDI-I-P431.Publichearing in Huamanga(Ayacuch leave. defense group.Monobamba( CVR. BDI-I-P184.Interviewwith twobrothers,oneofwhomisamemberpeasantself- CVR. BDI-I-P415.Genderw 125 Fortheseandotherreasons,thefamiliesaffectedby thearmedgroups’ People affectedbytheviolencealsofeltasense ofimpotenceand In theend,weallhadtowork…doitourselves. road, hesaidcouldn’t do who wasinvestinghadalreadyrecoveredthecapitalheputinto subversives came,andthepeoplewhowereinvestingleft.Sinceman They camethenextnight,andeverything went tohelluntilnow. The Many peoplewhohadcontributedtolocalandregionaldevelopment repaired. development. Nowthethingstheydestroyedordamagedhavetobe road toreachacertaincommunity. To could seethattheirmotive was churches, localgovernment buildingsandotherthings—savagely, so you Why? BecausetheShining [...] Therewasdeath,andthatcausedsetbacksincommunitydevelopment. For manyofthepeoplewhotestified,abruptendproductionin 122 orkshop withmen.Huamanga(A Junín), June6,2002.Theyarevillagers whoforcedthePCP-SL to any more,andev Path, especially, destroyed bridges,canals, to destroy. For 65. Sancos,Huancasancos(Ayacucho), March me,that’s asetback incommunity o). Secondsession, erything was yacucho), October23,2002. example, theydidn’t want a April 8,2002,case6. left justasitwas. 123 124 which werenotappropriate. were forcedtodoworkandtakeonrolesforwhichtheynotprepared both studentsandteachersfled. were lecturedaboutthedoctrineofsubversionorevenkilled.Asaresult, made themdangerousplacesforthecommunity. Intheclassrooms,villagers PCP-SL’sThe growth. actionsnotonlycorruptedtheschools’ function,italso factors thataffectedschools,whichwereimportantforsocialmobilityand to recover. had been«murdered.»Theviolenceleftpeopledefenselessandoftenunable actions believedthatfamilyandcommunitydevelopmentinthecountryside 128 127 126 case 8.T CVR. BDI-II-P48.Publichearing in Huancavelica(Huancavelica).Secondsession,May25,2002, 17, 2002. October CVR. BDI-I-P776.Interviewwith femalepre-schoolteacher, age24,Cushiviani(Junín), CVR. BDI-I-P182.Interviewwith villagerandformermay because myy to study. Fromthatmomenton,we eight ornine. And sincethen,we’ve hadnoeducation.We haven’t beenable we wereorphaned.Thesamethinghappenedtomany other children,with father’s first-born sonandIhave younger brothers.Thereare10ofus,and children. Morethan120childrenwereorphaned,allofthemminors.Iwasmy the handsofthosemurderers,damnedterroristswhohadall That’s howwe In placeswheretherehadbeenviolentconfrontations,youngpeople the membersofcommunitydefensepatrolandmilitary. [...] Ididn’t The senseofcommunitydevelopmentwasalsochangedbyexternal Tambo orHuasahuasianymore;theguerrillaswere strongthere. areas. …T those movements,noonebuildsthings.…Andwerepromisingrural rural development.ThatwasoneofthefirsteffectsIcouldsee,becausein Tarma, In accordingtooneofthepeopleinterviewed, thesubversion killed stopped atprimaryschool.Well, somein percent or95oftheorphanshaven’t finishedtheirstudies. They their youngerbrothersandsistershelpingthemgrow up.Ithinkthat90 brothers have.Somanyreallyhavebeenlike fathers,supporting [...] Sincethen,I’vehadtotakecareofmybrotherstheway manyotherolder That’s us, they’d eatus.Thatwas agreatsetbacktotheeconomyandeducation. to school.We were afraidtogothefields.Theywere liketigers—iftheyfound take usaway andkillus.Ourparentsw fell behindoutoffear. We didn’t want tostudyanymore.Iftheyfoundus,they’d estimony ofRubénChupayo the way itis arma isfullofpeoplenowbecausenoone finish mystudiesbecauseofthesubversion, becauseofthreatsfrom ounger brothersw passed themostdifficultandcriticalmomentat… even now. [...] even Ramos. ere justlittle.Theydidn’t knowhowtow 128 really didn’t have ouldn’t even secondary, or inLaMerced find out. Weout. find were afraid togo but theyhav wants toliveinPalca or anything tohangonto, (Junín), June2002. (Junín), [...] Y en’t finished. oung people 126 ork. 127 395 THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE CONFLICT 396 PART TWO: T HE LEGACY OF THE CONFLICT AND THE WAY TO PEACE to leavepovertybehind. their childrenaneducationbecameaseriousobstacleforfamiliesseekingways young peopleadriftandincreasingilliteracyrates.Theimpossibilityofoffering or training,soastoavoidbecominginvolvedintheviolence. many youngpeopletostopparticipatingininstitutionsthatprovidededucation to teach,butalsobecauseofthebreakdowncollectivesocialpatterns.Thatled mutilated, notonlybecauseeldersnolongerhadthefreedomandopportunity 130 129 an enormousnumberofpeople. Oursocietyandstateoweadebtofreparation. property,we canconcludethattheviolencelefteconomicdesolationaffected sections abouthumancapitalandthelootingdestruction ofthecommunities’ communities. Ifweaddtheserepercussionstotheones analyzedinthepreceding organization, educationalinstitutionsandlifeplansof thepeopleinaffected rural worldandleftaseriousimpactontheproductive structure,community CVR. BDI-I-P233.Focusgroups, Huaycán, Ate(Lima),June24,2002.Maleresidents. CVR. BDI-I-P444.Publichearingin Huamanga(Ay Testimony ofthevictim’s relatives. In otherplaces,schoolsdisappearedbecauseoftheviolence,leaving There was The transmissionofancestralknowledgewasalsotransformedor The internalarmedconflict,therefore,paralyzedthe development ofthe fields everydayasifwew maybe I,w a greatpainnow. Ifithadn’t and sisters,we’ finished, buttherearemanyfamiliesthatwereleftlikethat. Allmybrothers studying. Idroppedoutinthefourthyearofsecondaryschool.wasalmost of youwithoutanyreason,andthatwasterrifying.Becausethat,Istopped streets androundeduppeople.Theycouldpickyoubeattheshitout school inHuanta,whereIstudied,themilitarypatrolsoftenwentoutinto walls the ofourschools,andthat’s on finishedmystudies,but have to professional. Butwiththeviolence,mylifechanged.HowIwouldhaveliked [...] Iwasjustakidof14or15atthetime,butmygoaltobecome who couldleavedidso. they arrived, thekidsknew. The Army! The Army! The masks, itwas theMRT came withhoodsandsacks,itwasthePCP-SL.Iftheyblackski Army. Ev happen andwe’d say happened duringthosey concentrating moreonescapingthantheirstudies.Nothingmuch we didn’t learnanythingduringthoseyears,»becausepeoplewere univ ersity. Othersstay erybody was a highdropoutrate.Very high.Manypeopledroppedoutofthe ould have re backward because we become aprofessional.We sacrifice , I wonder whoitis:thePCP-SL,MRTA orthe ed, butwhenItalktothemnow, frightened, w A. And the Army, we alreadyknew…even 129 ears, andtherewas ere nobody.ere We’re notworth anything. been fortheviolence,oneofmybrothers,or I wasn’t ableto. As ondering whowould acucho). Thirdsession, why Iwasn’t able droppedoutofschool.Ifeelthatas constant terror. I toldy Army! to finish. At thenight ou, graffitiappeared they tellme,«Miss, d that.We’rethe in April 11,2002,case16. show up.Ifthey And everyone Things w 130 before ould educating invalues. must beaimedatbuilding citizenship,fosteringademocraticcultureand their rightsandfull and equitableparticipationinciviclife.Andfifth,it responsibility. collective reconstruction bypeoplewhoacknowledgeandrecognizetheir population. Third,itmust givearoletohistoricalmemory, understoodasa and religiousdiversity. multidenominational, justlytakingintoaccountPeru’s ethnic,linguistic,cultural First, itmustbemultiethnic,pluricultural, multilingualand respond adequately, andthereforejustly, tothecountry’s particularsituation. against thoseresponsibleforcrimesandhumanrights violations. reparation ofdamagesforthevictims,andapplication ofcriminalsanctions latter impliesaprofoundreformofinstitutions,compliance withaplanfor implementation ofstatepoliciesthataddressthedemands ofcivilsociety. The reconciliation heldbydifferentpoliticaland socialsectors,andthe issues: finalresolutionoftheconflict,criticaldiscussionconcepts a socialandpoliticalpact. institutions thatwereinconfrontation.Suchreconstruction,therefore,requires and 3)aninterpersonaldimension,involvingthemembersofcommunitiesor society entitieswithasawhole,especiallymarginalizedethnicgroups; 2) asocialdimension,involvingthereconciliationofpublicinstitutionsandcivil dimension, involvingreconciliationamongthestate,societyandpoliticalparties; the conflictofpastdecades.Reconciliationhasthreedimensions:1)apolitical fundamental bondsamongPeruvians,thatweredestroyedorerodedby The CVRunderstands Reconciliation inPerumusthavecertainbasiccharacteristics that For reconciliationtobefeasible,thecountrymustaddressthreevital THE CVR’SPROPOSALS: TOWARD RECONCILIATION Fourth, itmustemphasize the reconciliation Second, itmustleadtothestate’s integration oftherural CHAPTER 8 asaprocessofre-establishingandrefounding value ofwo men byrecognizing 397 THE CVR’S PROPOSALS: TOWARD RECONCILIATION 398 PART TWO: T HE LEGACY OF THE CONFLICT AND THE WAY TO PEACE system. recommendations tostrengthenthejudicialsystemand reformthepenitentiary groups orstateagents.Forallthesereasons, theCVRalsomakes defend therightsofvictimscrimesandviolations committedbysubversive investigations showthatthejudicialsystemdidnot adequatelyusethelawto challenge ofsubversion arevisibleisintheadministrationofjustice.TheCVR’s coordination withpoliticalauthoritiesandcommunity leaders. the maintenanceofinternalorder, basedon respectforhumanrightsandin establish political,democraticandcivilianleadershipofnationaldefense armed forces,theNationalPoliceandintelligenceservicesinaneffortto response. TheCVRthereforemakescertainrecommendationsforreformingthe A secondsetofreasonsfortheviolenceisrelatedtostate’s inadequate and fosteringcitizenparticipation. community andgrassrootsorganizations,localidentities solidifying andexpandingthestate’s presence, fabric. where therewasagreaterstatepresenceandmoresolidpoliticalsocial The CVR’s investigations showthatsubversion was unabletotakerootinplaces political andsocialorganizationsthatcouldserveasrepresentativesofthepeople. levels ofsocialconflict,alsocapitalizingontheabsencestateagenciesand of areasthatweremarkedbybackwardness,stalleddevelopmentandhigh accompanied thereturntoademocraticregime.Indoingso,theytookadvantage sectors thatwereexcludedfromthesocialandpoliticaldemocratization misunderstandings inPeruviansocietyandbroughttogetherdisenfranchised reasons. First,thesubversivegroupsexploitedfragmentationand used terrorandviolencetoimposetheirviews.Thiswaspossiblefortwosetsof minority subversivegroupswithafundamentalist,totalitarianideologythat between 1980and2000foundthattheimmediatecauselayinactionof led toandexacerbatedtheinternalconflict.TheCVR’s analysisoftheviolence The proposalforinstitutionalreformsisaimedatmodifyingtheconditionsthat I out inthefollowingsections. first bythestate,andsecondcivilsociety. Theseactionsorinitiatives areset structures or regulations thatwillhavean impactonaparticularsphere, activity two decadesandrepresent changesormodificationstoguidelines,institutional reforms arerelatedtothe tragic eventsexperiencedbythecountryinpast in thecountry’s poorestandmostundeveloped regions. also makesrecommendations forreformsofbasicandhighereducation,especially include elementsrelatedtopubliceducation,aswe havementioned,theCVR NSTITUTIONAL REFORMS Bringing thisconceptofreconciliationtofruitiondemandsspecificactions, Finally, Another areainwhichthelimitationsofstate’s responsetothe Within thatcontext,wepresentaseriesofrecommendationsaimedat In accordancewiththeCVR’s mandate,itsproposalsforinstitutional because thecircumstancesthatgave risetosubversionalso involving andrespecting and culturaldiv ersity, political andcommunity organizationssotheycanserveasintermediaries opportunities fordevelopment. To thisend,we propose: be clearintheruralareasthatwerehardesthitbyviolence,offering internal orderandensuringaccesstojustice.Thestate’s presence, however, must R and depth. legislation orothergovernmentnormspolicies,dependingontheirdegree institutions orasguidelinesforpublicpolicythroughconstitutionalreforms, or sectorofstateaction.Theyareexpressedaschangesintheorganization ECOMMENDATIONS Creatingastateagencyorbodyto plan andimplementpolicyrelatedto • Recognizingand integratingtherightsofindigenouspeoplesandtheir • Providingincentivestogovernmentpersonnelworkinginremoterural • Recommendingtoregionalgovernments ofpredominantlyrural • Establishingintheseareasinstitutionalpoliciesthatensurethe • Establishingshort-termgoalsrelatedtostate policiesapprovedinthe • aHumanRightsdefensesystembycreatingspecializedagen- Establish • Improveaccesstojustice,increasingthenumberofpublicdefendersand • Strengthen thepositionofJusticePeaceandgiveitsufficient • Strengthentheinstitutionalstructureofpeasantself-defense patrolsand • policiesandnormsforcollaborationamongtheNationalPolice, Develop • indigenous andethnicissues. communities intothe areas thatwereaffectedbytheviolence. population densities. comprehensively addresstheneedsofresidents of areaswithlow developed inconsensuswithlocalgovernments, soasto departments theimplementationofplansforland zoning andtitling, plans andbudgets. needs ofgroupsthatdonothaveavoiceareincluded in localgovernment by theviolence. National Accord,givingprioritytotheirimplementationinareasaffected where theviolencehadgreatestimpact. cies inthepolice,judiciaryandPublicMinistry, especiallyintheareas Community LegalDefenseOffices( the numberofjudiciaryofficesandallocatingmoreresourcesfor authority toresolveeverydayconflicts. possibility ofcreatingaruralpoliceforce. committees, withappropriateregulation.Studythemedium-range local governmentsandcitizens,whichisindispensable. Besides thesepoints,we present recommendationsforstrengthening The recommendationsmadesofarrefertothetasksofmaintaining FOR STRENGTHENING THE PRESENCE country’s legal framework. Consultorios JurídicosPopulares OF DEMOCRA TIC AUTHORITY ). 399 THE CVR’S PROPOSALS: TOWARD RECONCILIATION 400 PART TWO: T HE LEGACY OF THE CONFLICT AND THE WAY TO PEACE and society. recommendations forimprovingtherelationshipbetweenforcesoforder between democraticauthorityandthearmedforces;theyarefollowedby The followingrecommendationsseektoconsolidateabalancedrelationship R between thestateandsocietythroughoutcountry: ECOMMENDATIONS FORCONSOLI Ensuredemocratic civiliancontrolovermilitaryintelligenceservices. • RegulatestatesofemergencyandimmediatelyrepealLaw24150, • Train civilianexpertsinsecurityanddefenseissues. • Developanationalsecuritypolicythatincludesstrategy for • Definethescopeofconceptnationaldefenseandmeaning • Encouragetheparticipationofyoungpeopleinallareaslife(schools, • StrengthentheConsensusRoundtable toFightagainstPovertyandfor • Developalawforpoliticalpartiesandmodifythesystemof • Establishingaprofessionalcareertrackfor intelligenceagentstoensure o Strengtheningtheintelligencesystem oftheNationalPoliceand o Regulatingandstrengthening theroleofNationalIntelligence o Alawregulatingintelligenceactivities,eventhosethataresecret. The o This includes: subordination ofpoliticalauthorities. of emergencydonotimplysuspensiontheConstitutionor responsibility forcontrollinginternalorder. Itmustbeclearthatstates modified byLegislativeDecree749,whichgivesthearmedforces presence throughoutthecountry. pacification thatisaimedatreconciliationandconsolidatingthestate’s Ministry ofDefense. and thatdependsonmilitarypersonnelagenciesfallsunderthe corresponding policy, sothateverything thatisconsideredpartofdefense formation. neighborhoods, highereducation,theworkplace),stimulatingleadership llo Development ( representation. a corpsofqualified,university-educated professionals. Ministry oftheInterior. Council asthehighest-level body. operations carriedoutbybodiesthatobtainandprocess intelligence. counterintelligence, aswellforbeingawareofand evaluatingall obtaining intelligencefromnon-publicsources andfor gencia president oftheNationalIntelligenceCouncil( ). ) musthaveresponsibilityforapprovingoperating plansfor Mesas deConcertaciónLuchacontralaPobrezayporelDesarro- DATING DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS Consejo NacionaldeInteli- IntheConstitution(and,basedonthat,inlower-levelregulations), • Anewcodeofethicsthatgivesaprominentplacetotheprinciples • Changesinmilitaryeducationandthecurriculumtoinstill • Reinforce,withexplicit mentionintheConstitution,functionof • ConstitutionallyandlegallydefinetheNational Policeasanon- • • Modernize continuingeducationandformationinethicshuman Modernize • aMilitaryOmbudsman’s Create Officeresponsibleforhandling • Creatinganationalofficetooverseetheprofessionalintegrityandethics o Officerswillswear to o Reportingasuperiorforhavingcommitted crimesdoesnotconstitute o Soldiersandofficerswillbe taught thattheyarealsocitizensandthat, o Soldiersandofficerswillbetaughtthatthearmedforcesbelongto o Soldiersandofficerswill betaughtthattheycannotcarryout o Soldiersandofficerswillcommitthemselvestorespectinghuman o participate inaffairsrelatedto This shouldleadtoapolicyunderwhichthearmedforcesdonot distinguish NationalDefensefromInternalOrderandCitizenSecurity. democracy. Thisnew integrity oftheindividual,andloyalty todemocraticauthority. officers strongdemocraticvalues,respectforlifeandthephysical law toguaranteepublicorder, crime prevention andlawenforcement. responsible fororganizinganddirectingpolicyinaccordancewiththe Ministry oftheInterioraspoliticalandadministrativeauthority institution. accordance withthedefinitionofNationalPoliceasacivilian militarized civilianinstitution.Modernizethepolicecareertrackin Branch withinastateofemergency. under seriouscircumstancesexpresslyestablishedbytheExecutive rights forthepoliceasmembers ofacivilianagency. branches ofthemilitary. complaints anddrawinguprecommendationsforrelationships within classified documents. of publicofficials,includingcentralizedmanagementaccessto insubordination. as such,theyhaverightsandobligations. nation, nottothegovernment. unconstitutional orillegalorders. rights. Constitution. principles onwhichthenationisbased,areenshrinedin code ofethicsmustincludethefollowing: defend notonlythecountry, butalsothe ternal orderand citizen s ecurity , except 401 THE CVR’S PROPOSALS: TOWARD RECONCILIATION 402 PART TWO: T HE LEGACY OF THE CONFLICT AND THE WAY TO PEACE rights, andchangesinthepenitentiarysystem. independence andautonomy, compliancewithdueprocessandrespectforhuman three These recommendationsinvolve R ECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE Permanent ov • inthePublicMinistryan areaspecializingininvestigationof Establish • Beginan ongoingprogramoftrainingforjudges,districtattorneys and • Incorporate intonationallegislationadvancesininternationalnorms • Establishacomprehensivesystemforaddressingtheissueofpeoplewho • leasteightspecializeddistrictattorney’s At offices,ofwhichthreeshould • Establishatemporary, specializedsystemtohandlecasesofhumanrights • anautonomousbodyresponsiblefortheVictimandWitness Create • andlegallyincorporatethemilitarycourtsysteminto Constitutionally • Establishajudiciarymadeupofpermanentlyappointedmagistrates, • Strengthentheindependenceofjudicialsystem.Thisincludesa • o At leastthreespecializedcriminalcourts, headedbymagistrateswho At o A SuperiorCourtDistrict A o AchamberoftheSuperiorCourtJusticeLimawithnational o problems relatedtohuman rights. lawyers inhumanrights, humanitarian lawanddemocraticculture. related tohumanrights. establish intheConstitutionconstitutionalhierarchy oftreaties related totheadministrationofjusticeanddue process. Expressly the InternationalRedCross,churchesandcivilsociety organizations. with theparticipationofPub and superviseaNationalPlanforForensicAnthropological Investigation, people whodisappearedduringthoseyears,which wouldcoordinate We proposethecreationofanautonomousNationalCommissionfor disappeared duringtheinternalarmedconflictbetween 1980and2000. Huánuco, HuancayoandAbancay). be inLimaandfiveprovinces violations andcrimes.Thissystemshouldinclude: Protection Program. the judiciaryunderSupremeCourtofJustice. not temporaryorsubstitutejudges. judiciary andPublicMinistry. magistrates andthere-establishmentofcivilservicecareersin system fortheindependentappointment,evaluationandsanctioningof international humanitarianlaw. have sufficientknowledgeofandexperienceinhumanrights authority. ersight byjudgesduringstates ofemergency. REFORM OF THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM ttorney’s office areas: strengtheningthejudicialsystem’s lic Ministry, theOmbudsman’s Office, (two in Ayacucho andoneeachin as coordinator. R those deprived ofliberty. the actionsofpenitentiaryofficialsinareasrelatedtodefenserights human rightsorganizations,etc.)haveapublictoolthatpermitsoversightof for action.Itmustalsoensurethatpeopleusingthesystem(inmates,relatives, and providetheoperatorsofpenitentiarysystemwithclear, preciseguidelines development ofenablingregulationsthatpreciselyestablishitsscopeandcontent, system: ECOMMENDATIONS FOREDUCATIONAL REFORM TO FOSTERDEMOCRATIC VALUES EstablishaStudyPlanthatstimulates learningandguidesknowledge • Emphasize educationpoliciesaimedattransformingtheschoolintoa • Improve conditionsfortheprisonpopulationintermsofaccesstobasic • Specifictreatmentforinmatesconvicted of terrorismandtreason, • End theindiscriminatetransferofinmates,enablingthemtoremainnear • ReaffirmintheConstitutionthatpurposeofpenitentiarysystem • Establishtheproceduresandinstitutionalframeworknecessaryfor • ImplementtheenablingregulationsofCriminalSentencingCodeDS • ModernizetheCriminalSentencingCode,adaptingittorealityof • aninstitutionspecializinginpenitentiaryissues. Define • violence. toward well-being,holistic educationandreducingthepropensityfor contributes tothestudent’s holisticdevelopment. place wherethestudent’s humandignityisrespectedandwhich services (nutritionandhealth). of commutedsentences). alternative measures(restorationofprisonbenefits andthepossibility of theRepentanceLawandthosewhoclaimtobeinnocent); encourage inmates, thosewhohaverenouncedtheirties,tookadvantage differentiating amongsituationsandbehavior(PCP-SL and MRTA greater security. their concentrationinafewinstallationstoensurebettertreatmentand their relativesand,inthecaseofthosesentencedforterrorism,facilitating society (thisisnotedinthe1979and1993Constitutions). is theinmate’s re-education,rehabilitationandreincorporationinto for terrorismwhoclaiminnocence. studying andrespondingtorequestsforpardonsfrompeoplesentenced 023-2001-JUS. penitentiary system. A generalnorm,suchastheCriminalSentencingCode,requires The followingrecommendationsarerelatedtoreformofthepenitentiary 403 THE CVR’S PROPOSALS: TOWARD RECONCILIATION 404 PART TWO: T HE LEGACY OF THE CONFLICT AND THE WAY TO PEACE C includes: a particularlycriticalarea.Aspecialprogramshouldbeimplementedthat that havebeendocumented, theconflictaffectedawideruniverse:relativesof Comprehensive PlanforReparations. Besidesthedirectvictimsofviolations benefit, symbolicand/or material,individualand/orcollective,underthe human rightslaw. 2000, havesufferedfromactions oromissionsthatviolatenormsofinternational armed conflictexperienced bythecountrybetweenMay1980andNovember that and thecumulativeeffectofmanycontributions efforts.TheCVRbelieves violence. Itsimplementationwilldependontheclear politicalwilltocarryitout The OMPREHENSIVE PLANFORREPARATIONS FinalReport Restorethedignityandimprovequalityofruralschools.Thisimplies • Redefinethecontent,methodologyandcoverageofeducation,taking • Stimulatealiteracyplan,givingprioritytoadolescentandadultwomen • • Urgent assistanceforthemostvulnerablepopulation,beginningwith Urgent • Disciplinebasedonpunishmentandthreatsdoesnotcontributetothe • Reinforceopportunitiesforparticipationinanddemocratizationofthe • Fosteraneducationthat respectsethnicandculturaldifferences.Adapt • victims schools. encourage stateeducationandhealthagenciestoactively supportrural schools, sothattheseschoolsattractbetterorthe bestteachers;and decorum; adequatelyandcreativelymotivateeducators toworkinrural ensuring thattheybecomeplaceswherestudentscanstudywith the students’real-lifesituation;restoredignityofruralschools, changing andadaptinglessonplanstoencouragelearningthatrelates the ruralpopulation. into considerationskillsforentrythelabormarketandemphasizing in ruralareas. school andoutofschool,asappropriate. strategies forcomprehensiveassistance(healthandnutrition)bothin country’s ethno-linguisticandcultural school educationforchildrenunderage5,takingintoaccountthe the youngestchildreninpoorestareas.Particularlyencouragepre- humiliating orviolentpracticesusedasformsofdiscipline. prohibiting andsanctioningallformsofphysicalpunishment development ofaculturepeace;rather, itcreatesviolence.We propose school. geographic diversity. all aspectsofschoolingtothecountry’s ethno-linguistic,culturaland The ruralschool,especiallyintheareasmostaffectedbyviolence,is include allpeopleorgroupsofwho,because oftheinternal includesaComprehensivePlanforReparationsvictims ofthe Beneficiaries are allvictimswhowillreceive sometypeof diversity, and developing and actionsthatleadtowardreconciliation. solidarity withthevictimsamongPeruviansocietyasawhole. state, inanefforttofosternationalreconciliationandstrengthenasenseof on thembytheactionofsubversivegroupsandoromission violence. Thisisdonethroughpublicacknowledgementofthedamageinflicted between thestateandpeopleamongthatwerebrokenby occurred between1980and2000arenotrepeated. and societytoensurethatviolencehumanrightsviolationsofthetype aimed atre-establishingthesocialpactanddemonstratingwillofstate The CVRproposescertainsymbolicactionsintheformofaseriescivicrituals S consists ofsixprograms. and collectivereparation,aslongthesamebenefitisnotduplicated.Theplan spheres arenotmutuallyexclusive.Beneficiariescanbesubjecttobothindividual the collectivesphererecognizesharmdonetocommonsocialfabric.These sphere includesharmdonedirectlytothepersonorhisherclosestrelatives; collective rights.Thebeneficiariesmaybeindividualsorgroups.individual violations intheircommunities,sufferedjointharmandtheviolationof victims andgroupsofpeoplewho,becausetheconcentrationmassive omissions ofthestateduring theinternalarmedconflicttoregainfulland The overallobjectiveofthe programistoenablepeopleaffectedbyactionsor R scholarship program,andadulteducation. are: exemptionfromenrollmentandtuitionfeesforbeneficiaries, acomprehensive adequate educationorfinishtheirstudies. people who,becauseoftheinternalarmedconflict,lost thechancetoreceivean facilitate andprovideneworbetteropportunities for accesstoeducation The overallobjectiveofthereparationsprogramin theareaofeducationisto R armed conflict. rebuild theirindividualandcollectivelifeplans,which weretruncatedbythe All ofthiswillhelpthevictimsdevelopself-determinationnecessaryto networks andstrengthencapacitiesforpersonalcommunitydevelopment. conflict recovertheirmentalandphysicalhealth,re-establishsocialsupport The purposeofthisprogramistohelpthepeopleaffectedbyinternalarmed R YMBOLIC REPARATIONS ESTORATION OFCITIZENS’ RIGHTS EPARATIONS INEDUCATION EPARATIONS INHEALTH This programconsistsof:publicgestures,actsofrecognition,memorials The purposeofsymbolicreparationsistohelprestoresocialbonds The componentsofaccesstoandrestorationtheright toaneducation 405 THE CVR’S PROPOSALS: TOWARD RECONCILIATION 406 PART TWO: T HE LEGACY OF THE CONFLICT AND THE WAY TO PEACE establish anewlifeandfacethefuturewithdignitywell-being. as aresultoftheinternalarmedconflict,tohelpvictimsandtheirfamilies compensation formoralandmaterialharmcausedtovictimstheirrelatives the reductionofexclusion. respect forandguaranteedenforcementofhumanrightstherulelaw, and Granting economicreparationsalsocontributestoanewsocialpactbasedon re-establish justiceandprovidereparationsforharmsufferedbycitizens. armed conflict.Thesereparationssymbolizetheeffortandpublicwillingnessto inflicted on,lossessufferedbyandmoralharmdonetothevictimsofinternal Economic reparationsarepartofthestate’s acknowledgementofdamages P of peoplewholackidentitypapers;providinglegaladvice;exemptionfromfees. warrants; expungingpolice,legalandcriminalrecords;normalizingthesituation normalizing thelegalsituationofpeopleforwhomthereareoutstandingarrest treatment, ensuringthatitisonequalfootingwithallothercitizens. This involvesprovidingasectorofsocietywithpreferentialaccessorpriority effective civilandpoliticalrights,throughthelegalrestorationofthoserights. consists ofthefollowingcomponents,explainedindetail intheCVR’s The programofeconomicreparationstheComprehensive PlanforReparations C ROGRAM OFECONOMICREPARATIONS OMPONENTS Childrenconceivedasaresultofrape. • ofrape. Victims • Innocentpeoplewhohavebeenimprisoned. • Peoplewhosufferedpartialortotalpermanentdisabilityastheresult of • ofvictimswhowerekilledordisappeared. Relatives • Economicreparationintheformofpensionsand/orindemnity, consisting • reparations intheformofservices. The beneficiarieswillalsobeconsideredfornon-monetary economic during theperiodofinternalarmedconflict. rape, torture,woundsorinjuriesclassifiedbytheCVRthatoccurred victims ofrape;5.Forchildren conceivedasaresultofrape. physical disability;3.For people whowereunjustlyimprisoned;4.For 2. Forpeoplewhosuffered permanentpartialortotalmentaland/or of fivemeasures:1.Forrelativesthosewhowerekilled ordisappeared; Beneficiaries oftheprogrameconomicreparationsare: The objectiveoftheprogrameconomicreparationsis The programincludes:normalizingthelegalsituationofdisappeared; Final Report : As acomplement, theCVRbelievesthat theReparationsFundcould bepartly therefore recommendsallocating fundsforreparationsinthenationalbudget. implementing reparations ispri the onlywaytoensuremedium-range financialviabilityanddemonstratethat committee. Thefundwould bedrawnmainlyfrompublicresources,asthatis creating aNationalReparations Fundadministeredbythenationalsteering beneficiaries. granting benefitstoavoidanysocialstigmaor discriminationagainst Ministry ofJusticeandwithsupportfromtheOmbudsman’s Office. the ExecutiveBranch,throughnetworkoffreelegal clinicsoperatedbythe programs toprovideinformationandtraining,incoordination withagenciesof access tothebenefitswhichtheyareentitled,aswell astheimplementationof beneficiaries ofthecomprehensiveplanforreparations toensurethattheyhave qualification andaccreditationofbeneficiaries. qualification ofvictims,basedonthesamecriteriausedbyCVR,andfor comprehensive reparationsplan.Thisbodymustreceivelegaladviceforthe national steeringcommitteetocoordinateandoverseeimplementationofthe To makethereparationsplanfeasible,CVR N the placeswheretheyhavesettled. communities whodidnotreturntotheirhomesandwillreceivebenefitsin armed conflict,aswellorganizedgroupsofdisplacedpeoplefromaffected communities, nativecommunitiesandotherpopulationcentersaffectedbythe reconstruction. at theirdisposalthetechnicalresourcesandcapitalnecessaryforcomprehensive and compensatefortheerosionofcapitalsufferedbyentirepopulations,placing lost allorpartoftheirsocialandphysicalinfrastructurebecausetheviolence, institutions incommunities,neighborhoodsandotherpopulationcentersthat The objectiveistocontributethereconstructionandconsolidationofcollective P ROGRAM OFCOLLECTIVEREPARATIONS ATIONAL COORDINATING AND SUPERVISORY BODY Employmentandincomegeneration. • Restorationandexpansionofbasicservices. • Restorationandreconstructionofproductiveinfrastructure. • ofinstitutions. Consolidation • Economicreparationintheformofservices,consistingcomplementary • programs. services grantingpreferentialaccesstostatehousingandemployment To Planfor financetheComprehensive The comprehensiveplanforreparationsmustensure confidentialityin The CVRrecommendsthatguidancebeprovided topotential The componentsoftheprogramare: Beneficiaries oftheprogramcollectivereparationsincludepeasant marily thestate Reparations, t recommends thecreationofa ’s responsibility. TheCVR he CVR recommends 407 THE CVR’S PROPOSALS: TOWARD RECONCILIATION 408 PART TWO: T HE LEGACY OF THE CONFLICT AND THE WAY TO PEACE graphic andphotographic information, andageographicdatabase thatrequires designed forthispurpose, whichincludesgeneraldescriptionsofeachsite, implemented includethefollowingjurisdictions: CVR hadrecorded4,644burialsitesnationwideand hadverified2,200ofthem. information obtainedduringitsinvestigations.Bythe endofitsmandate,the community isalsoimportant. the collaborationofhumanitarianorganizations andtheinternational time, placeandperpetrators). the eventsandcircumstancessurroundingvictims’disappearance(including that includethefindingsaspartofaccumulatedevidence,inordertoestablish by theobjectiveofobtainingjustice.Appropriatejudicialprocessesareneeded problems createdbythedisappearanceoffamilymembers. helps thefamiliesobtainlegaldocumentsnecessarytoresolveinheritance identifying humanremainsandreturningthemtothevictims’relatives.This basic rights.Thehumanitariantaskisprimordialandinvolveslocating for bothhumanitarianandlegalpurposes,ofvictimsseriousviolations investigation fromvariousanglesadaptedtothesocio-culturalsituation. number ofvictims,demandstoolsforapproachingforensicanthropological problem offorceddisappearancesandextrajudicialexecutions,aswellthe The complexityoftheinternalarmedconflict,especiallywithregardto N of theexternaldebtforprojectsdirectlyrelatedtoreparationspolicy. various ways,oneofwhichcouldbethecreationamechanismforconversion believes complementary fundingfortheComprehensivePlanReparations.TheCVR solidarity withthevictimsofviolencebyparticipatingactivelyin Ilícitamente Illicitly ObtainedMoney( resources arecurrentlyavailablethroughtheSpecialFundforManagementof corruption-related moneythatisrepatriatedbeearmarkedforthefund.These financed byextraordinaryfunds.Itthereforerecommendsthatsomeofthe ATIONAL PLANFORFORENSIC ANTHROP Southern Andean(Apurímac,Cusco,Puno,MadredeDios). • South-Central(Ay • (Cerro de Pasco,Junín,Huancavelica). Central • Northeastern(SanMartín,Huánuco,Ucayali). • The informationgathered hasbeenprocessedinadatabasespecially The areaswheretheNationalRegistryofBurial Siteshasbeen The CVRhascreatedaNationalRegistryofBurial Sitesbasedon Public institutionshaveparticularresponsibilityin thisprocess,but At thesametime,itisvitalthatthishumanitariangoalbeaccompanied One ofthemostimportantissuesisexhumationandidentification, Finally, the CVR that internationalcooperationcancontributetotheplan’s financingin , FEDADOI). acucho, Apurím calls ontheinternationalcommunitytostandin Fondo EspecialdeAdministracióndelDineroObtenido OLOGICAL ac, Huancavelica). INVESTIGATION Anthropological Investigationshouldinclude: The legalnormsfortheimplementationofNational PlanforForensic Regulatory andlegalaspects D investigation are: construction ofthecases.Thestagestobefollowedinforensicanthropological successive stagesthatensureanoptimalapproachtoandappropriate The forensicanthropologicalinvestigationmustbecarriedoutinaseriesof Stages ofinvestigation well asvariousfieldsofcriminalscience. from theforensicfieldsofmedicine,anthropology, archeologyanddentistry, as anthropological investigationisofvitalimportance.Theexpertsmustbedrawn The participationofforensicexpertsinthevariousphases Participation offorensicexperts coordinate andoverseetheforensicanthropologicalinvestigations. (Public Ministry, Om Formation ofapermanentmulti-disciplinary, inter-institutional taskforce Coordination andsupervision GENERAL GUIDELINES of 1,884formscollectedbytheCVRduringitsmandate. has alsobeendeveloped,whichincludesinformationfrom1,504formsofatotal additional analysisinordertoobtainspecificresults.APre-MortemDatabase EVELOPMENT OFREGULATO Creationofan Office ofDisappearedPersonstohandlecases ofpeople • CreationofaNational CommissiononDisappearedPersonstohandle • andidentificationofvictims. Analysis • Inspection andexhumation. • Preliminaryinvestigationandnationalregistryinspectionofsites. • Exhumation andRecoveryof HumanRemainsandEvidence;Post-Mortem Investigation ofDisappeared Persons;UnitforEvaluation,Analysis, consist ofthefollowingoperational units:SpecializedUnitforPreliminary who disappearedduringthe internalarmedconflict.Theofficeshould occurred between1980and2000. cases ofpeoplewhodisappearedduringtheinternal armedconflictthat budsman’s Office RY, LEGAL AND TECHNICAL ASPECTS and representativesofcivilsociety)to 409 THE CVR’S PROPOSALS: TOWARD RECONCILIATION 410 PART TWO: T HE LEGACY OF THE CONFLICT AND THE WAY TO PEACE broad knowledgeoftheirscopeandlimitations. professional commitmenttotheinvestigationstheycarryoutand,therefore, violations arereported.Thesedistrictattorneysmusthaveadeepethicaland covers thevariousgeographicjurisdictionswherecasesofhumanrights regard tothelatter, the office, aswellitsinfrastructureandmaterialhumanresources.With Legal investigation post-mortem analysisand geneticinformation,mustbeprotected. of BurialSitesandwitnesses’ accounts,includingthepre-mortemformsand Alldocumentaryinformation andtestimonygeneratedbytheNationalRegistry Protection ofinformation them. temporary burialofhumanremainswhenithasnot beenpossibletoidentify A technicalandlegalmechanismmustbeestablished toallowforthe Final dispositionoftheremainsandlegalstatus disappeared bodies toprovidethenecessarysupportforinvestigative report. the victim’s clothingandpersonaleffects,documents associatedwiththe It willinclude,asanappendix,dentalandballistics analyses,adescriptionof legal medicalandforensicanthropologicalissuesresultingfromthejointwork. The investigativereportprovidedtothespecializeddistrictattorneywillinclude Investigative report humanitarian law. person musthavetrainingininternationalhumanrightslawand and theobservationoflesionscausesdeathinskeletalremains).The age, sex,stature,laterality, forensic area,mapping,geographyandgraphicrecords,aswellestimating archeology andanthropology(archeologicalexplorationexcavationinthe The investigatornamedforthecasesmustbeskilledinfieldofforensic Accreditation ofinvestigators It isvitaltoreinforcethetechnicalandlegalaspectsofdistrictattorney’s • The databaseshouldbecomeatoolforcontinuingprocessesthatbegan The • scientific managementandmakingthemakeyissueofnationalinterest. carried outbyotherinstitutions,ensuringtheirimpartialoverall during theCVR’s mandate.Itshouldinclude, insofaraspossible,processes Processing andTechnical SupportUnit. Analysis Unit;UnitforIdentificationofVictims;LegalandData Special District Attorney’s pathologies andotherdistinguishingcharacteristics, Office musthave ateamthat therefore recommendsthefollowing: diversity and complexity theyrequireanord Various typesofrecommendationshavebeenmade,andbecausetheir M under way, atleastone is crucialthatinvestigationsnotbeleftunfinished, andthatoncetheplanis infrastructure isavailable,takingintoaccounttherequirements ofsuchcases.It investigations canbeundertakenonlywhenthe necessaryoperational may requiremoretimeandresources.Itisimportant toclarifythattwoormore to doseveral«small»investigationsinashorttime,whileother the complexityofcases,aswelllogisticalpossibilities.Itmaybepossible The numberofinvestigationsperformedmonthlyorannuallywilldependon Number ofinvestigationsperyear Regional InvestigationPlans. can beadopted,implementedandincorporatedintocasestoincludedin available forinvestigation.Duringthisphase,specificstrategiesinvestigation As aresultofthefirstphase,therewillbesignificantnumbersitesandcases Operational phase subsequent processesofexhumationandanalysis. investigation willmakeitpossibletoestablishstrategiesforbeginning solid justificationbasedonpreliminaryinvestigation.Thisphaseofthe at riskofdisappearingorbeingseriouslyaltered,andcasesthathavethemost Evaluation ofthecasesunderinvestigation,inwhichhumanremainsare Evaluation phase I It willbenecessarytoconsider: Technical aspects MPLEMENTATION ECHANISMS FORFOLLOWINGUP THE TheformationofanInter-Institutional Task Forcesimilartotheonethat • Thatareasonableperiodbeallowed forcompletingtheCVR’s technical • Thepreparationofgrantproposalstoobtainfunding. • Thedevelopmentandadaptationoflogisticalinfrastructure. • Theadoptionofprotocolsandformsfordocumentingpreparing • short time. gave risetotheCVR,which candrawupproposalsforlegislationina and administrativework. reports. OF THE N ATIONAL investigation amonthbecarriedout. P LAN FOR CVR’S F RECOMMENDATIONS ORENSIC erly, consistentprocess.TheCVR A NTHROPOLOGICAL I NVESTIGATION 411 THE CVR’S PROPOSALS: TOWARD RECONCILIATION 412 PART TWO: T HE LEGACY OF THE CONFLICT AND THE WAY TO PEACE Office becauseofitsrolein recommends thatthemajorityofthosegoodsbetransferredtoOmbudsman’s chief inordertodeterminewhereandhowtheycanlegallybeused.TheCVR Other goodsmustbetransferredinanorderlymannertotheofficeofCabinet agreements signedaspartofUnitedNationsDevelopmentProgramprojects. scrupulous accountabilityforthefundsreceivedthroughvariouscooperation also importanttoprepareadministrative,accountingandfinancialreports,with must bedelivered directlytotheOmbudsman’s Officeinanorderlymanner. Itis or convertedintoanelectronicformatforstorage,andsomeisconfidential Office forsafekeepingandmanagement.Muchofthisinformationmustbecopied an extensivesetofdocumentsthatwillbetransferredtotheOmbudsman’s The CVR’sworkallowed itto T minimal professionalteamundertheresponsibilityof theOmbudsman’s Office. independent figureappointedbytheExecutiveBranch andshouldhavea society, especiallyhumanrightsorganizations.Itshouldbeheadedbyan National EvangelicalCouncilandPeruvianConference ofBishops)andcivil Defense, etc.),theOmbudsman’s Officeandrepresentativesofchurches(the of Women’s Executive Branchthatareincludedinsomeoftherecommendations (ministries described intheprecedingsection.Itcouldbecomposedofsectors immediately, period ofnomorethanfivemonthstofulfillitstasks.Itcouldbeestablished could becreatedthroughanadministrativeprocedureandgivena transfer specificproposalstotheappropriatepublicagencies.ThisTask Force Force toorganizeitsrecommendations,helpdisseminatethe CVR suggeststhattheExecutive Branchalsoform created throughSupremeResolution304-2000-JUSdatedDecember9,2000.The The CVRwasestablishedonthebasisofaproposaldevelopedbytaskforce T HE TRANSITION: HE INTER-INSTITUTIONAL TASK FORCE ThatCongressconsideradoptingalawprovidingforthecreationof • ProposalsforlegislationthattheExecutive Branchcouldsubmitto • PlanforimplementingtherecommendationsinvolvingExecutive • public entitytocentralizelong-termdecision-making. initiatives. aspects recommendedbythe CVRinits Congress foritsconsideration; thesewouldberelatedtothevarious implementation andanoversight mechanism. Branch, includingeach At theendofitsterm,thisTask Forcecould presentthefollowingresults: Issue andSocialDevelopment,Justice,EconomyFinance, Interior, without jeopardizing the technical and administrative work without jeopardizingthetechnicalandadministrative TECHNICAL AND following upt ADMINISTRATIVE CLOSURE gather abundantinformationthatisnowpartof sector’s responsibilities, he CVR’s recommendations. Final Report an Inter-InstitutionalTask that requirelegislative Final Report a timelinefor and NomemberoftheCVR maybepartofthisTask Forceoranyother • planfordisseminationofthe National • foradministrativedecisionsthatfallunderthejurisdictionof Proposals • decision ofthecommissioners. mechanism forfollowinguptherecommendations.Thisisaunanimous recommendations. the judiciaryorotherconstitutionallyautonomousinstitutions. Final Report, its conclusionsand 413 THE CVR’S PROPOSALS: TOWARD RECONCILIATION 414 PART TWO: T HE LEGACY OF THE CONFLICT AND THE WAY TO PEACE Article 2: Article 1: 6857). Sereproduceacontinuacióndichaversiónoriginal: que actualmenteestánenlaagendadelCongresodeRepública(proyectos7045y y sociedadcivil,fueinclusoadoptadoparcialmenteendosiniciativaslegislativas fue materiadediversasconsultasconorganismosdelPoderEjecutivo,congresistas permitiera unimpulsosustancialalaejecucióndesusrecomendaciones.Elproyecto En enerode2003,laCVRiniciólosestudiosparaelaborarunproyectoleyque 2.2. TheCouncilhasnationalauthority andisheadquarteredinthecityofLima. 1.1. TheNationalCouncilforReconciliation(hereafterreferred toastheCouncil)is TheconclusionsandrecommendationsoftheCVR,whichareincludedasan 1.3. Therecommendations oftheTruth andReconciliationCommission(Comi- 1.2. 1.1. Creation, objectivesandcomposition Chapter I ON THENA TITLE II Single Chapter PURPOSE OFTHISLAW TITLE I LAW ESTABLISHING THENA making regardingtheimplementation oftheCVR’s recommendations. economic andfinancialautonomy forthepurposeofcentralizingdecision- the Cabinet,withduepubliclegal identityandwithtechnical,administrative, created asadecentralizedpublicagencyundertheofficeof presidentof public documentsforthepurposewhichtheyhavebeenprepared. appendix tothisLaw, as well asthereportonwhichtheyarebased,constitute Laws, inaccordancewithcriteriaofprogressiveness andequity. 065-2001-PCM, areimplementedinconformitywiththeprovisionsofthis sión delaVerdad yReconciliación,hereaftertheCVR),createdthroughD.S. power totheExecutiveBranchlegislateinthisarea. recommendations oftheTruth and public bodyresponsibleforoverseeingtheimplementationof This LawcreatesandregulatestheNationalCouncilforReconciliationas CreationoftheNationalCouncilforReconciliation PurposeofthisLaw TIONAL T HE N ATIONAL COUNCIL FOR RECONCILIA C TIONAL OUNCIL FOR Reconciliation Commission.Italsodelegates COUNCIL FOR RECONCILIA R ECONCILIATION TION TION Economy andFinance,Wom the presidentofCabinetand madeupoftheministersDefense,Interior,Justice, An Inter-MinisterialCommittee ofSupportfortheCounciliscreated,tobeheadedby Reconciliation Article 6: criteria forensuringequitablerepresentation. Republic ontherecommendationoforganizationsvictims,taking intoconsideration requests foradvicesubmittedtoit. of theCouncil’s objectiv May 1980andNovember2000.TheAdvisoryCommitteecontributes tothefulfillment representatives ofvictimscrimesand/orhumanrightsviolations committedbetween The AdvisoryCommitteeofVictimstheViolenceis madeupofseven Article 5: Advisory CommitteeofVictimstheViolence Chapter II The Councilconsistsofthefollowingmember: Article 4: The objectivesoftheCouncilareasfollows: Article 3: )TheExecutiveSecretaryoftheNationalHumanRightsCoordinatingCommittee TheOmbudsman. d) c) Two representatives oftheExecutive Branch,inrepresentationoftheCouncil’s b) Oneindependentfigureofacknowledgedprestigeandmoralstandingwho a) To proposeinstitutionalreformsbasedontheCVR’s recommendations, d) To coordinateandimplementthecomprehensive policyforreparations,subject c) To formulateandimplementspecificpoliciesdesignedtostrengthenthe b) To implementandcarryouttherecommendationsofCVR throughactions, a) The membersoftheAdvisoryCommitteeareappointedby Presidentofthe (Coordinadora NacionaldeDerechosHumanos). the rankofviceminister. Inter-Ministerial SupportCommittee.Theserepresentativesmusthaveatleast will presideoverthecouncil,appointedbyPresidentofRepublic. will besubmittedtotheCouncilofMinistersforitsconsideration. including theformulationofcorrespondinglegislativeinitiatives,which to theprovisionsofthisLawandaccordingfinancialresourcesavailable. process ofnationalreconciliation. institutions. regulations andpoliciesthatbringtogetherproposalsfrompublicprivate CompositionoftheNationalCouncilforReconciliation ObjectivesoftheNationalCouncilforReconciliation AdvisoryCommitteeofVictimstheViolence Inter-MinisterialSupportCommitteefortheNationalCouncil for es, receives the information en’s IssuesandSocialDevelopment. TheInter-Mi- it requestsandrespondstoall 415 THE CVR’S PROPOSALS: TOWARD RECONCILIATION 416 PART TWO: T HE LEGACY OF THE CONFLICT AND THE WAY TO PEACE The Councilhasthefollowingfunctionsandattributes: Article 7: support oftheExecutiveBranch. Council. ItspurposeistomaketheCouncil’s decisionsviableandtocoordinatethe nisterial Committeechoosesfromamongitsmemberstworepresentativestothe The Council’s resources include: Article 10: The Councilhasthefollowingprograms: Article 9: director isamemberoftheCouncilwithvoicebutnovote. manages thebudgetandimplementsannualplansapprovedbyfullCouncil.The The DirectoroftheCouncilrepresentsbodyandguidesitsactivities.director Article 8: )To appoint,ov g) To publiclydisseminateanannualreportoftheresults andprogressofits f) To presentsemi-annualreportstothePermanent CommissionofCongresson e) To guidetheCounc d) To approve the c) To draftproposalsforlegislationimplementingtheCouncil’s programs,as b) To issuenormsandadministrativ a) )Propertythatw a) InstitutionalReformProgram(ProgramadeReformasInstitucionales,PRI) JusticeProgram(ProgramadeJusticia,PJ) d) HistoricalMemoryProgram (ProgramadeMemoriaHistórica,PMH) c) b) Comprehensive ProgramofReparations(ProgramaIntegraldeReparaciones, a) work. the correspondingsectortoexplainanysuchfailurecomply. as necessary. ThePermanent CommissionofCongresswillcallonthehead indicating, whereappropriate,whichpublicinstitutionshavenotcontributed the progressofC implementation ofitsrecommendations. initiative preparedbytheCouncilforthirdparties. appropriate sector. well asothertypesofnormsthatwillreceivepriorityconsiderationfromthe recommendations. international cooperationagencies ortheExecutiveBranch.Thetransferof PIR) Council. FunctionsandattributesoftheNationalCouncilforReconciliation ProgramsoftheNationalCouncilforReconciliation DirectoroftheNationalCouncilforReconciliation FundingandpropertyoftheNationalCouncilforReconciliation ersee and,ifnecessary, dismisstheExecutive as acquiredbytheTruth Commissionorallocatedforitsuseby annual planofactivitiesandbudget,aswell asanyother ouncil’s il’s overall policy, incl activities, detailingobstaclesencounteredand e directives for uding programscreatedfor implementing theCVR’s Directorofthe necessary forimplementationof thislawandtherespectiveLegislativeDecrees. a periodof90daysfromthedatethislawtakeseffect,infollowingareas: The ExecutiveBranchisgrantedthepowertolegislatebyLegislativeDecree,within SECOND: Council willhavefouryearstocarryoutitsobjectives.Thistermcannotbeextended. It willhaveaperiodofthreemonthsforinternalorganization.Afterthatperiod,the appointed within30daysafterthislawtakeseffect. The PresidentoftheCouncilandrepresentativesExecutiveBranchwillbe FIRST: FINAL ANDTEMPORARYPROVISIONS no. required foritsoperation.Thesenormsarepublishedintheofficialgazette, The CouncilapprovesitsInternalRegulationsandallotheradministrativenorms Article 11: )Creationandimplementationofaspecializedjudicialsystemthatpermitsthe c) Implementation oftheHistoricalMemoryProgram,includinglegislative b) ComponentsoftheComprehensive ProgramforReparations,includingthe a) Donationsandtransfersfromprivateindividualsorinstitutions. Resourcesobtainedfrominternationalcooperationagencies. e) d) Resourcestransferredbypublicinstitutionsunderspecificagreementsoras c) ResourcesallocatedintheGeneralBudgetofRepublic,withinbudget b) Within 120days,theExecutiveBranch willissuetheremainingregulatorynorms The Councilwillbeginoperationimmediatelyupontheappointmentofitsmembers. Term oftheCouncil violations determinedbytheCVR. investigation, prosecutionandsanctioningofseriouscrimes humanrights presented bytheCVR. implementation oftheNationalPlanforForensicAnthropological Investigation status ofpeoplewhodisappearedasaresulttheviolenceand toensurethe modifications tocurrentnormsthatmakeitpossiblenormalize thelegal mental healthandeducation. symbolic andlegalreparations,aswellreparationsrelatedto physicaland and thosetobequalifiedbytheCouncil.Thisprogramwill alsoinclude amounts tobepaidindividualsandgroupsofvictimsqualified bytheCVR extraordinary existingresources. be consideredaDecentralizedPublicBody. of theofficepresidentCabinet;forthispurpose,Councilwill Cabinet. property willbeincludedinthebudgetofofficepresident InternalRegulationsoftheCouncil Delegation oflegislativepowersandcomplementarynorms El Perua- 417 THE CVR’S PROPOSALS: TOWARD RECONCILIATION 418 PART TWO: T HE LEGACY OF THE CONFLICT AND THE WAY TO PEACE 1 This lawwilltakeeffectonthedayafteritspublication. FOURTH: that areinoppositiontothisLawherebyrepealed. Law No.25237,LegislativeDecree652andalllegaloradministrativeprovisions THIRD: assumed bytheNationalCouncilforReconciliation. Paz) The repealoftheindicatedlawswilleliminateCouncilforPeace . Ananalysisoftheindicatednormsrevealsnorelevantfunctionsthatshouldbe Repealingofothernorms Effective dateofthisLaw 1 (Consejo porla T the followingconclusions Reconciliation Commission[ was experiencedinPeru betweentheyears 1980and2000,theTruth and As aresultofitsinvestigationintotheprocessviolencepoliticaloriginthat HE DIMENSIONSOFTHECONFLICT 4. TheCVRaffirms thattheconflictcoveredalargershareofnational 3. 2. 1. victims takentogetherwith thosedocumentedbytheCVRin to theCVR areconcentratedinthe Andean departmentof Ayacucho. These violence. Morethan40percent ofthedeathsanddisappearancesreported poverty andsocialexclusion andtheprobabilityofbecomingavictim The CVRhasestablishedthat therewasasignificantrelationshipbetween whole. population’s productivecapacity, andc through thedestructionofinfrastructureanddeterioration ofthe territory thananyotherconflict,causedenormous economiclosses wars thathaveoccurredinits182yearsofindependence number ofhumanlossessufferedbyPeruinall the foreignandcivil the violenceis69,280individuals.Thesefiguresare greaterthanthe The CVRestimatesthatthemostprobablefigurefor victimswhodiedin misunderstandings inPer also aconflictthatrevealeddeepandpainfuldivides prolonged episodeofviolenceintheentirehistoryRepublic.Itwas Peru between1980and2000constitutedthemostintense,extensive The CVRhasestablishedthattheinternalarmedconflictexperiencedby . GENERAL CONCLUSIONS Comisión delaVerdad yReconciliación uvian society . ame to involve thesocietyasa , CVR]hascometo . 419

GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 420 HATUN WILLAKUY 1 11. 10. 9. 5. 8. 7. 6. Ayacucho, Apurímac andHuánuco arefourofthefive poorestdepartmentsinthecountry. they accountforonly9percentof theincomeofallPeruvianfamilies.Moreover,Huancavelica, It mustbenotedthatthepeople who liveinthosedepartmentstodayaresopoorthattogether precarious, andbreachedinthosemomentsofcrisis The CVRhasalsofoundtheconstitutionalorderand theruleoflawtobe action the fundamentalrightsofitscitizenswithinaframework ofdemocratic the Stateinitscapacitytoguaranteepublicorderand security, aswell The CVRhasfoundthattheconflictdemonstratedserious limitationsof society almosttwocenturiesafteritsbirthasaRepublic judgment, theveiledracismandscornfulattitudesthat persistinPeruvian as itsownbytherestofcountry. Thisdemonstrates,intheCVR’s the peasant,poorandpoorlyeducatedPeru,wasneither feltnortakenon rural Peru,theAndeanandjungleregions,QuechuaAsháninka The CVRhasestablishedthatthetragedysufferedbypopulationsof in thecityofLima deaths anddisappearances.Ofthatamount,340,000wouldhaveoccurred were similarcountrywide,theviolencewouldhavecaused1,200,000 tín, addupto85percentofthevictimsregisteredbyCVR departments ofJunín,Huánuco,Huancavelica,ApurímacandSanMar- economically active populationworkedinthefarming/livestock sector 29 percentofthepopulationlivedinruralareasand28 These figurescontrastwiththoseofthe1993census,accordingtowhich rural areasand56percentwereengagedinfarmingorlivestockactivities. victim oftheviolence.Oftotalvictimsreported,79percentlivedin The CVRhasestablishedthatthepeasantpopulationwasprincipal of victimstopopulationreported geographical areasandondifferentsocialstratainthecountry. Iftheratio The CVRconcludesthattheviolencefellunequallyondifferent 68 percentofthevictimswerebelowthislevel. had failedtoattainsecondaryschooleducation,theCVRhasfoundthat census of1993indicatesthatonly40percentthenationalpopulation educational levelsfarinferiortothenationalaverage.While The CVRhasshownthat,inrelativeterms,thedeadanddisappearedhad shares thatcharacteristic 1993 census,onanationallevelonly16percentofthePeruvianpopulation tongue. Thisfigurecontraststellinglywiththefactthat,accordingto armed conflictspokeQuechuaorothernativelanguagesastheirmother testimonies received,75percentofthevictimswhodiedininternal inequalities thatstillprevail inthecountry. According toanalysisofthe with socioeconomicgaps,highlightedtheseriousnessofethno-cultural The CVRhasbeenabletodiscernthattheprocessofviolence,combined . . . the CVRwith . respect to . . 1 Ayacucho . S T R HINING HE ESPONSIBILITIES FORTHECONFLICT 13. 19. 18. 17. 16. 15. 14. 12. P ARTIDO analyze of themostnotableuniquefeaturesprocessthatCVRhashadto an exceptionalcaseamongsubversivegroupsinLatinAmerica,andone to theCVR.ThishighdegreeofresponsibilityonpartPCP-SLis human rights.Itwasresponsiblefor54percentofvictimdeathsreported the PCP-SLwasprincipalperpetratorofcrimesandviolations In theCVR’sview, basedonthe lack ofrespectforthehuman personandfortherighttolife,including is atragicblindness:itsees classes,notindividuals.Thisledtoitsabsolute totalitarian organizationto theirextremes.Initssubversiveactionthere The CVRbelievesthatthe PCP-SLcarriedfundamentalistideologyand was fighting the profoundsufferingthiscausedtopopulation forwhichitsaid disproportionate responsesbytheStatewithouttaking intoconsideration SL adoptedastrategythatconsciouslyandconstantly soughttoprovoke The CVR hasdeterminedthat,inaccordancewithitsideology, thePCP- intellectual orderinthehistoryofhumanity organization, whowasconsidered«theincarnation ofthehighest personality ofAbimaelGuzmanReinoso,founder andleaderofthe through theso-called«GonzaloThought,»which reflected thecultof The CVRhasestablishedthatthePCP-SLachieved its internalcohesion disdained thevalueoflifeanddeniedhumanrights strategic and,thus,atoddswithallhumanitarian values. ThePCP-SL unfolding ofhistory, confinedinavisionof fundamentalistincharacter,was centeredonarigidpreconceptionofthe The CVRbelievesthatthePCP-SLresteditsprojectonanideology of Peruvians characteristics thatfailedtogainthelastingsupportofimportantsectors expressed itselfasamilitaristandtotalitarianprojectwithterrorist tendencies ofthecountry. Puttinginpracticeanironpolitical will,it The CVRhasfoundthatthePCP-SLwentagainstgreathistorical trol setting intimidatingexampleswithinthepopulationtheysoughttocon- unusual cruelty, including The CVRhasproventhatthePCP-SLdeployedextremeviolenceand a timeinwhichdemocracywasbeingrestoredthroughfreeelections will oftheoverwhelmingmajorityPeruvians,menandwomen,at start thearmedstruggleagainstPeruvianState,inoppositionto unleashing oftheinternalarmedconflictwas thePCP-SL’s decisionto The CVRbelievesthattheimmediateandfundamentalcauseof P ATH, . C PCP-SL OMUNISTA DEL . . . ] P ERU- S ENDERO torture andbrutalityasformsofpunishingor number ofpersonskilledanddisappeared, L UMINOSO [ C political action that was solely politicalactionthatwas OMMUNIST ». . P ARTY OF P ERU- . 421

GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 422 HATUN WILLAKUY 27. 26. 25. 24. 23. 22. 21. of thepeace—andnational authorities—governmentministers, local authorities—mayors, governors,lieutenantandjustices destruction oftheoldState atitsfoundations.Thisledthemtoassassinate The CVRnotesthattheideologicalconceptof PCP-SL impliedthe in theformofcarbombs sabotage, selectivekillings,armedstoppagesandterrorist acts,especially Lima andothercitieswerealsocomplementarysettings andsuffered SL inruralcommunitiestheAndesalsoextendedinto theurbancenters. The CVRhasestablishedthattheextremeviolencepracticed bythePCP- State became,inmanycases,confrontationsbetween peasants institutions, andorderedtheirdestruction.Itspeasant waragainstthe connected tothemarketeconomyorregional national networksor The PCP-SLlabeledasclassenemiessectorsthatwere relativelymore militarized oldconflicts,bothinter-community andintra-community. the counter-subversiveresponsebyStatebroughtbacktolifeand The CVRhasestablishedthatthepresenceofPCP-SLinAndesand massacres andrazingofentirecommunities. murders andselectiveassassinations,collectivedissidenceledto to thewillofparty. Individualdissidencewithinthemass resultedin specificities andinstead,turnedthepeasantsintoamassthatmustsubmit peasant population,orthat not takeintoconsiderationtheneedsandeconomicaspirationsof rural areasintotheprincipalsettingforconflict.Nevertheless,itdid The CVRhasfoundthatthePCP-SLadoptedMaoistthesesandconverted efforts towardsocialmobilityandaspirationsforadvancement elites torespondtheeducationaldemandsofyouthfrustratedintheir fleeting acceptance,becauseoftheincapacityStateandcountry’s The CVR hasestablishedthatthePCP-SL’s proselytizingcouldhavea to thecontrolofAbimaelGuzmanReinoso oppressive organizationthroughlettersthatdeclaredtheirsubmission totalizing identity, itessentially While itmayhaveofferedyoungpeopleautopiathatprovidedthem groups ofyoungpeoplebothsexesindifferentpartsthecountry. institutions itwasabletoexpanditsproselytizinganddrawinsmall in theeducationalsystemasitsprincipalbeachhead.Throughthose The CVRhasfoundthatthePCP-SLtookadvantageofsomeinstitutions superiority overindigenouspeoples deaths» (1988).Thisiscombinedwithconceptionsofracismand and thatannounce,«thetriumphoftherevolutionwillcostamillion SL thatcallfor«payingthebloodtoll»(1982),«inducinggenocide»(1985) The CVRalsofindsapotentialforgenocideinproclamationsofthePCP- militants] thatbecametheiridentifyingfeature that ofitsmilitants.ThePCP-SLencouragedafanaticalvein[in . population’s ownorganizationsorcultural enclosedtheminafundamentalistand . . . . . 3 2 31. 28. 29/30. 29/30. Geneva Conventions. This referstonormsofInternational HumanitarianLawfoundinArticle3Commontothe the CVR estimatesthattherealfigureismuch higher. The CVRhasreceivedreportsof 930 localauthoritiesassassinatedbythePCP-SL;nevertheless, • • • • • incongruence wasexpressed patentlywhen,afterhiscapture,Abimael and privations,throughoutpracticallytheentire conflict.This Abimael GuzmánReinoso,remainedinLima,exempt fromphysicalrisks most cruelandbloodymanner, whiletheirtopleadership, especially PCP-SL towarditsownmilitants,whowereinduced tokillanddieinthe The CVRpointsouttheprofoundirresponsibilityand contemptofthe were obligatoryforalltheparticipantsinhostilities. likewise constitutegraveviolationsoftheGenevaConventions,which general strategyorspecificplans.InthejudgmentofCVR,theseactions against thecivilianpopulation,carriedoutonagrandscaleoraspartof commission ofcrimesagainsthumanityintheformarmedattacks directors anditsdesignatedleadership,havedirectresponsibilityforthe CVR pointsoutthatmembersofthePCP-SL,andespeciallyitsnational Because ofthegeneralizedandsystematicnaturethesepractices, organizations and leadersofpeasant,union,neighborhood,educators’ leaders (bothmenandwomen),communityleaders,traditionalmayors, Additionally, thePCP-SL engaged the PCP-SL,governmentauthoritiesaccountedfor12percent. Out ofallthereportsreceivedbyCVRonvictimfatalitiescaused parliamentarians andotherrepresentativesofthepowersState. based onthefollowingelements: hold thegravest responsibilityfortheconflict thatbledPeruvian society, the communitiesinwhoseterritorieshostilitiestookplace. civilian population,increasingtoanextraordinaryextentthesufferingof sought toprovokebrutalreactionsfromthesecurityforcesagainst recourse toterroristactions,constitutedacalculatedmechanismthat themselves, andattackingtraitors,amongothersimilarmethods,suchas as ashield,avoidingtheuseofuniformsorothermarkstoidentify with whichthePCP-SLactedonground,usingcivilianpopulation The CVRfindsthatthemembersofleadershipsystemPCP-SL stressed theterroristcharacteroftheiractions for theirdecisiontoproclaimtheso-calledstrategic equilibriumthat for theirgenocidalpolicythatinvolvedactstoprovoke theState suffering; and peasantcommunities,withahighcostinlives andhuman for theviolentpracticesofoccupationandcontrol ruralterritories bloody strategy for havingformulatedtheirfightagainstPeruviandemocracywitha overwhelming majorityofthepopulation for havinginitiatedtheviolenceinoppositiontowishesof . ; in massiveassassinationsofsocial ; . andwomen’s 3 Theperfidy ; 2 423

GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 424 HATUN WILLAKUY 4 35. 34. 33. 32. The veryactoftaking uparmsagainstalegitimately electedregimeisacriminal act. Fujimori’s government the authoritarian,militarized counter-subversivepolicyofAlberto Ambassador’s residenceinDecember 1996, frustrated stormingofCongress andtheoccupationofJapanese of ShiningPath.Andinthe1990s,especiallybeginning withtheir legitimate politicalrecourse,ultimatelyfosteringtheactions andexpansion to creatingaclimateinwhichtheuseofviolencesought toappearbea On balance,duringthe1980s,MRTA’s discourse andactionscontributed MRTA alsoassassinateddissidentswithin itsownranks law thattheMRTA claimedtorespect.Itisimportant tohighlightthat that violatenotonlypersonallibertybuttheinternational humanitarian the takingofhostagesandsystematicpracticekidnapping, allcrimes to assassinations,suchasinthe negotiations. Nevertheless, MRTA alsoengagedincriminalacts; population andatsomepointsshowedsignsofbeing opentopeace from thecivilianpopulation,itabstainedattackingunarmed members useduniformsorotheridentifierstodifferentiatethemselves maintained ties,theMRTA claimedresponsibilityforitsactions, its Path, andlikeotherarmedLatinAmericanorganizationswithwhichit percent ofthevictimdeathsthatwerereportedtoCVR.UnlikeShining its ownarmedstruggleagainsttheState.MRTA isresponsiblefor1.5 In 1984,theMovimient undermined thedemocraticpoliticalregimeinstalledin1980 the democraticsystem,andthroughtheirarmedactions,actually history. ThePCP-SL the pressandmostinclusivepoliticalsysteminourcontemporary while ademocraticregimewas inpower, withfreeelections,freedomof in thesameperiod,from1980to1992internalarmedconflictdeveloped The Commissionestablishesthat,unlikeothercountriesinLatinAmerica totalitarian projectsneveragainfindanyechoamongtheyoung set inmotiontheinstitutionalreformsnecessarysothatterroristand Many ofthemdieduselesslyandcrue contempt forlife,punisheddifferences,anddemandedfullsubmission. completely verticalandtotalitarianorganizationthatinculcated implantation ofatotalitarianregime.Thus,theywerelockedinto of rebellionpursuedbythePCP-SLimpliedexerciseterrorand by thedesiretotransformthatunjustreality, didnotrealizethatthetype and proclaimedthat,«rebellionisjustified.»Manyofthoseyouth,driven seduced byaproposalthatsetouttheprofoundproblemsofcountry The CVRexpressesitssorrowforthethousandsofyouthwhowere government ofAlbertoFujimoriandVladimiroMontesinos together withanexplicitrecognitionofandgreatpraiseforthedictatorial equilibrium andrequestedapeaceagreementfromthegovernment Guzmán Reinosoalmostimmediatelyabandonedthethesisofstrategic andtheMRTAthemselvesexcluded from unilaterally . o Revolucionario Túpac Amaru case ofGeneralEn lly. TheCVR callsonthecountryto the MRTA tended to legitimate rique López Albújar, (MRTA) initiated . . . 4 itresorted . T T HE RESPONSIBILITY OF HE CONDUCTOFTHEPOLICEFORCES 38. 37. 36. 39. 41. 40. 42. own democraticframework confront thearmedsubversionandterrorismeffectivelywithinits psychosocial, andintelligence,aswellmobilizationofthepopulace-to comprehensive both FernandoBelaundeandAlanGarcíaerredbyfailingtoapplya governed consistent withtheruleoflaw. However, thegovernmentsof country andinmakingtherelationshipbetweenrulers was aninterestinimplementingthe1979Constitution,developing on thearmedconflictasformulatedbyPCP-SL that periodlackedthenecessaryunderstandingofandadequatehandle Nevertheless, theCVRestablishesthatthosewhogovernedStatein None ofthoseelectionswasquestioned municipal electionstookplace,andregionalwereheldin1989. Three presidentialandparliamentaryelectionswereheld,fournational democracy respectedtheseparationofpowersandfreedomexpression. the MRTA, anddespitebeingnotablydeficientinmanyaspects,Peruvian The CVRpointsoutthatdespitethearmedsubversionofPCP-SLand in power consolidatingacorruptautocracy. April 5,1992,Fujimoribecameanauthoritarianrulerwhosoughttoremain to Fujimorialsodidsoin1990.However, beginningwiththecoupd’etat of attained thepresidencyinfreeanddirectelectionsbycitizens.Alber- The CVR confirmsthatFernandoBelaundeTerry and Alan GarcíaPérez who losttheirlives orweredisabledinthelineofduty homage tothemorethanonethousandbravemembers ofthearmedforces the yearsofviolence.Furthermore,CVRpays themostprofound recognizes theeffortsandsacrificesundertakenbytheirmembersduring subversive groupsthatharmedthefundamentalrightsofcitizensand The CVRnotesthatthepoliceforceshaddutytoconfront the responsibilitytoconduct the adequate trainingorsufficient rotationoftheiragents.Whentheyreceived SL, andlaterMRTA, underprecariouslogistic conditions,without The CVRnotesthatthepolicehadtorespondaggression ofthePCP- population anddifferedfromthoseothersubversive groups difficulty inconfrontingadementedenemythatblended intothecivilian other LatinAmericancountries.Thiswastheprincipal reasonforthe armed groupssimilartothosewho,duringyears, wereactivein movements organizedaccordingtoaCastroistmodel,or, inthebestcase, point bythesecurityforceshad,aspointsofreference, theguerrilla The CVRconsidersthatthecounter-subversivetraining receivedatthat hindered their abilitytoadequatelyunderstand whatwasoccurring. This, The CVRconsidersthatthe limitationsofthepoliceintelligenceservices they didnothavesufficient supportfromthegovernment S TATE strategy –involvingsocial,p E NTITIES . counter-subversive . olitical, economic,military, and theMRTA. There fight in . . . Ayacucho, 425

GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 426 HATUN WILLAKUY 5 47. 46. 45. 44. 43. Counterinsurgency unitoftheoldCivilGuard. Operations (DOES),contributed toabettercoordinationofactioninthe and fusionofthedistinct operational unitsintotheDirectionofSpecial unification ofthepoliceforces, oversightfromtheMinistryofInterior, The CVR establishesthat,startinginthe second halfofthe1980’s, covered upsuchactswithmechanismsofimpunity those, intheirroleashierarchicalsuperiors,whoinstigated, permittedor these actsdishonortheperpetratorswhowereinvolved directlyandalso condemns theextensivepracticeofsexualviolenceagainst women.Allof torture, andcruel,inhumanordegradingtreatment.The CVRparticularly agents were:extrajudicialexecutions,forceddisappearance ofpersons, has establishedthatthemostserioushumanrightsviolations bymilitary character duringthecounter-subv been frequentinaddressingcommondelinquency, acquiredamassive police. Torture duringinterrogationsandunduedetentions, whichhad existing authoritarianandrepressivepracticesamong membersofthe The CVRconcludesthatthefightagainstsubversionreinforcedpre- in gravehumanrightsviolations from allthreepoliceinstitutionsactingintheemergencyareastookpart authorities. Inthiscontext,andasthemilitaryoffensiveadvanced,agents commanders, overandabovetheirowncommandscivilian subordinated tothearmedforces,subjectordersgivenbymilitary (CPM) inareaswithadeclaredstateofemergency, thepolicewere Ayacucho andthelaterintroductionofpolitical-militarycommands The CVRhasconfirmedthatwiththeentranceofarmedforcesinto the countrysidethroughout1982 penitentiary bytheShiningPath,andwithdrawalofpolicepostsin exceeded theabilitiesofPoliceForces:attackonHuamanga cities, twoeventsoccurredthatdemonstratedthesubversionhad obtained during1982withthecaptureofsubversives,particularlyin was stillweak.Asaresult,notwithstandingtherelativeachievements impeded betterpoliceactionduringtheyearsinwhichsubversion and instrategicunits,werefactorsextraneoustotheactualconflictthat three policeinstitutions,aswellcorruptionatthelevelofhighofficials The CVRnotesthatcoordinationproblemsinjoiningtheeffortsof population. rights violations,generatedresentmentanddistancedthepolicefrom police detachment,knownastheSinchis Ayacucho, inOctoberof1981, The CVRhasestablishedthatoncetheStateofEmergencywasdeclaredin sending inappropriateagentstodistantregionsasaformofpunishment institution, thepoliceorganizationsmaintainedcommonpracticeof instead ofsendingthemostpreparedandefficientagentsfromeach to underestimatethemagnitudeofdevelopingphenomenon.Thus, along withthelackofknowledgenaturePCP-SL,causedthem intervention by . . ersive action. Add 5 , ledtoanincreaseinhuman the counter . itionally, theCVR -insurgency . T HE CONDUCT OF THE 52. 51. 50. 49. 48. 55. 54. 53. that hadacquiredexperiencefromitsconcentratedworkinLima sufficiently strengthenDIRCOTE[the Anti-Terrorism Directorate],theunit struggle againstsubversives. However, order oftheRepublicandthreatenedfundamental rightsofcitizens bound toconfrontthesubversivegroupsthatchallenged theconstitutional government inanexecutivedecreeissuedDecember 29th, 1982,wereduty The CVRnotesthatthearmedforces,bydecision of theconstitutional Vladimiro Montesinos at thetop,itwas involved in significant reductioninthePNP’s powers, distortionofitsfunctionsand, Intelligence Serviceandsubordinatedtothemilitary. Therewas a Peruvian NationalPoliceweresubjecttotheplansof The CVR establishesthatfollowingthecoupd’etat of April 5,1992,the defeat ofsubversionandterrorism year. Thesecapturesmadeafundamentalcontributiontothestrategic 9, 1992andAbimaelGuzmanReinosoonSeptember12thofthesame the principalsubversiveleaders,especiallyVictorPolayCamposonJune DIRCOTE) intelligenceoperation,whichachievedtheflawlesscapturesof the subversivegroups,leadingtoworkofDINCOTE(previously more accurateunderstandingoftheorganizationandstylesaction The CVRestablishesthatbeginningin1985thepoliceforcesattaineda to drugtrafficking in thecaseofcocaregions,animagepoliceascorruptandlinked This facthelpedanegative imageofthepoliceasperpetratortakeroot,or, populations tendedtoincreaseastheinternalarmedconflictevolved. The CVRcanconfirmthatthedistancebetweenpoliceand who werenotnecessarilyinterconnected centralized organizationoradenominationemployedbyvariousactors been possibletodeterminewhetherthatCommandGroupwasa force tothemisnamed«RodrigoFrancoCommandGroup.»Ithasnot The CVRhasfoundindicationslinkingindividualmembersofthepolice dual excessesbyofficersor soldiers,butalsoentailedgeneralizedand/or behavior ofmembersthe armedforcesnotonlyinvolvedsomeindivi- The CVRaffirmsthatatsome placesandmomentsintheconflict, numerous humanrightsviolations tobecommitted. became moreselective,although itcontinuedtomakepossiblefor population suspectedof belonging tothePCP-SL.Later, thisstrategy an initialperiod,wasoneofindiscriminaterepression againstthe The CVRhasfoundthatthearmedforcesapplieda strategy that,during lost theirlives orwere disabled inthelineofduty. homage tothemorethanonethousandbraveagents ofthemilitarywho armed forcesduringtheyearsofviolence,andoffers themostsincere The CVRrecognizestheeffortsandsacrificesmade bymembersofthe A RMED . F ORCES . the regime’sweb . the sectordidnotattendto,nor . of corruption,ov erseen by . . 427

GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 428 HATUN WILLAKUY 6 58. 57. 56. 59. 60. because theywerekilledinconfrontations. these wereyoungpeoplewho were forciblyrecruitedandwhoneverreturned,possibly the 2,000peoplewhodisappeared atthehandsofPCP-SL.Itisreasonabletobelievethat it isnotcertain,theCVRbelieves thatsomeofthedeathsPCP-SLmilitantscouldbeamong army andtheso-called“masses” that supportedthembetweenmid-1983andmid-1985.Although PCP-SL documentsacknowledgeabout1,700deaths terror contained sectorsdominatedbythePCP-SLthroughcoercionandeven without notingthatthelatterwerenothomogeneousandgenerally loyal tothePeruvianStateandsubversiveorredzonecommunities, torial control,assumingthatthepopulationwasdividedintocommunities taking intoaccountthecostinhumanlives.Theysetouttorecoverterri- civilian authority organization, militaryprofileandstrategyofthePCP-SL.Bydecision intervention (1983-85),theylackedadequateintelligenceonthe conventional conflict(externalconflict).Duringthefirstyearsoftheir subversion, thearmedforceswerepreparedandequippedtoengagein The CVRnotesthatatthetimeoftheirinterventioninfightagainst instigated, permittedorcovered themupwithmechanismsofimpunity them directlyandforthosewho,intheirpositionofhierarchicalsuperiors, women. Alltheseactsconstituteadishonorforthosewhoperpetrated particularly condemnstheextensivepracticeofsexualviolenceagainst of persons,torture,cruel,inhumanordegradingtreatment.TheCVR by militaryagentswere:extrajudicialexecutions,forceddisappearance The CVRhasestablishedthatthemostserioushumanrightsviolations the crimes. cover-ups orforhavingneglectedthefundamentaldutytoputastop commanders, whetherforordering,inciting,facilitatingorengagingin must establishtheexactdegreeofcriminalresponsibilityCPM zones, maybeartheprimaryresponsibilityforthesecrimes.Thejudiciary commands (CPM),designatedthehigheststateauthorityinemergency The CVRconcludesthat,inthisframework,thepolitical-military Humanitarian Law against humanityaswelltransgressionsofthenormsInternational systematic practicesofhumanrightsviolationsthatconstitutecrimes 1983-84 intothemostlethalofconflict, massive humanrightsviolationsandturnedthetwo-year periodfrom and theoperationalcapacityofPCP-SLhard, In theCVR’s view, althoughthemilitaryinterv armed actiontootherareasofthecountry and thepoorersectorsofpeasantry, andfailedtostoptheexpansionof repression intheruralareaspostponedrupture between thePCP-SL still, thestrategyturnedouttobecounterproductive, astheindiscriminate organization ofasystematic The CVRnotesthatinAugustof1989,thearmed forces approvedthe . , their objective was , theirobjective . counter-subversiv to rapidlyendtheconflictwithout of partymilitants,the . mostly in Ay ention hittheorganization 6 italsoleftinitswake e strategy.e Thenew acucho. Worse people’s guerrilla . 7 64. 63. 62. 61. revealed intheCenepaconflict 1995. The erosionofthearmedforces’ efficiencyinitsfundamentaltaskofnationaldefensewas Administrative O objective; rather within thetheatersofoperations.Territorial controlwas notitsmain strategy distinguishedamongfriendly, neutralandenemypopulations of thePCP-SL intelligence operationsand thesupportofcitizens,explainsdefeat along withtheproliferation oftheSelf-DefenseCommittees,police Asháninka peoplesandalsoagainsttheurbanpopulace. Theselessons, unleashed atorrentofviolentterrorismagainst theQuechuaand most intenseinternalarmedconflict(1989-93),and whilethePCP-SL the decreaseinvictimsofactionsbyStateagentsprecisely intheyearsof violations ofhumanrights.Thislearningprocessisostensibly reflectedin to thepointthatitbecamemoreefficientandless pronetomassive during theprocessofviolence,whichallowedthemto refinetheirstrategy The CVRhasfoundthatthearmedforceswerecapable oflearninglessons Montesinos espionage internaltothearmedforcesunderdirection ofVladimiro well astheorganizationofasystemcorruption,blackmail andpolitical activities oftheColinaGroup,persecutiondissentingofficers,as government. Thisprocessofdecompositionwascharacterizedbythe seriously compromisedbyleaderswhotiedtheirfatetoadictatorial and thepeasantry committees, whichchangedtherelationshipbetweenarmedforces peasantry’s reactionagainstShiningPath andthespreadofself-defense The strategyproduceddecisiveresults,includingencouragingthe to winover thepopulation,andtoisolatePCP-SL’s militaryforces. and eventhewell-beingefficiencyofarmedforces dismantling ofthePCP-SL and MRTA failedto The CVRconcludesthatthecaptureofAbimaelGuzmánand Vladimiro Montesinos,thistrucebecameanalliance peasantry. Insomecases,andespeciallyfollowingthepromotionof as theprincipalenemythatneededtobeisolatedfromcoca-growing d’etat in1992and,b)atrucewithdrug traffickersbydefiningthePCP-SL subversive policyandtheimageofavictoriousarmytojustifycoup forces totwogreatinstitutionaldisorders:a)theuseofamodelcounter- in thecoupof1992.Theseantidemocraticprojectsexposedarmed process. Partofthoseauthoritarianplanswouldlaterbetakenupagain then designedplansforapossiblemilitaryinterruptionofthepolitical The CVRnotesthatthenewstrategywasusedbyagroupofofficerswho disappearance ofpersonsinthoseyears appeared whoseactionsmadePerutheworldleaderinforced deliberate orplannedthaninthepreviousstage.Moreover, death squads At thisstagethehumanrightsviolationswerelessnumerous,butmore . . , thestrategysoughteliminationofPolitical- rganizations (OPA) orShining . . prevent theethics,prestige Path popularcommittees, . 7 frombeing 429

GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 430 HATUN WILLAKUY THE CONDUCTOFSELF-DEFENSECOMMITTEES T HE POLITICAL 69. 68. 67. 66. 65. the factthatwhengovernments didoptforsuchdeclarations,they time toconfrontsituations ofseriousrisk.TheCVRdeplores,nonetheless, emergency, whichwere with theuseofitsarmed forces andwouldresorttodeclaringstatesof PCP-SL’s The CVRconsidersthatgiventhedevelopmentofevents, markedbythe of powertoperpetrateviolations the PresidentofRepublicandgroupswhooperate underthecover centralization ofpowerforges,inprinciple,amore directlinkbetween highest authoritieswithrespecttoviolationsofhuman rightssincethe change ofregimehasadirecteffectontheresponsibilities oftheState’s mandate (1992–2000),followingthecoup-d’etat of April 5,1992.This civilian, democratically-electedregimes,fromthe finalperiodofour The CVRdistinguishestheyearsbetween1980and 1992,aperiodof number offamilymembers compensation aftertheenactmentoflaw, andhasbenefitedasmall enacted attheendof1991,anditssubsequentregulations,onlyallowfor and thecountrycontinuestobeintheirdebt.LegislativeDecree741, immense majorityoftheCADmembershaverejoinedtheircommunities experience totheserviceofotheractorsimplicatedinillicitactivities.The become hiredassassinsfordrugtraffickers,nordidtheylendtheirmilitary also emphasizesthat,oncethearmedconflictended,CADsdidnot those whofellinthedefenseoftheircommunitiesandcountry. TheCVR factor intheoutcomeofinternalarmedconflictandpayshomageto The CVRrecognizes,nonetheless,thattheCADswereaveryimportant that mustbepunished the CADswentbeyondself-defensedutiesandwereresponsibleforcrimes and/or otherCADs.AccordingtothefindingsofCVR,onsomeoccasions occurred asaresultofthepressureandintimidationbyarmedforces a significantnumberofcases,theformationself-defensecommittees context createdbytheShiningPath aggression.Itfinds,however, thatin The CVRrecognizesthepeasants’righttoselfdefenseinexceptional strategic defeatintheruralareas. committees (CAD),whichlatermultiplied,givingthePCP-SLitsfirst the farmersofApurímacRivervalleyformedfirstself-defense some casesspontaneously, inothersontheinitiative ofthearmedforces, others intheHuantahighlandsareamongbetter-knownexamples.In being imposedonthembyforce.CommunitiessuchasUchuraccayand cipal allies,roseupagainstaprojecttheydidnotshareandwhichwas according tothecalculationsofPCP-SLoughthavebeentheirprin- The CVR believes thatfromearlyon,poorersectorsofthepeasantry, who PROCESS growing violence,itwas i AND THE . G allowed OVERNMENTS . . under theConstitutionin effectatthe nevitable thattheStatewould respond 8 74. 73. 72. 71. 70. 75. delegate. The lattercouldhavebeenleft tocivilauthoritiesoraministerad-hocpresidential but alsothepoliticalleadershipinfightagainst subversion subordinate toitsown,bytakingovernotonlythe militarycommand civilian authorityinareasdeclaredtobea state ofemergency order, ofthepolitical-militarycommands.Inpractice,commandsmade of democraticresponsibilitybygovernmentwasthe creation,bylegal The CVRfindsthatthefirstinstitutionalturningpoint intheabdication legislation passedbyademocraticallyelectedCongress approved byciviliangovernments,withintheframework ofanti-terrorist forces tookchargeofcombatingthesubversionthrough legalinstruments governments. Inthefirsttwelveyearsofconflict,policeandarmed Parliament, localgovernmentsand,between1989and1991,regional governments ofthoseyears,aswellthepartiesrepresentedin Nevertheless, theCVRmustconfirmverygraveresponsibilityof legislation passedbyademocraticallyelectedCongress approved byciviliangovernments,withintheframeworkofanti-terrorist forces tookchargeofcombatingthesubversionthroughlegalinstruments governments. Inthefirsttwelveyearsofconflict,policeandarmed Parliament, localgovernmentsand,between1989and1991,regional governments ofthoseyears,aswellthepartiesrepresentedin Nevertheless, theCVRmustconfirmverygraveresponsibilityof the searchfordemocracy ultimate sacrifice.Theyshouldbeanexampleforallinthisnewstageof maintained thepresenceofPeruvianState,oftenatcost local authoritiesinthoseareasmostaffectedbytheviolence,who regional ormunicipalresponsibility. Specialm both themilitantsofgoverning asthosewithparliamentary, partiesaswell mistreatment forhonestlycarryingouttheirpublicduties.We referto democratic politicalpartieswhooffereduptheirlivesorsuffered For thisreason,theCVRpayshomagetothoseleadersandmilitantsof country hadjustadoptedintheConstitutionof1979. inability tosubmitthelegalandconstitutionalframeworkthat generated bysignificantsectorsofitsowncitizens,and;iv)agrowing lack ofpreparationforconfrontingthistypeconflict;iii)themistrust State: i)itsinsufficientnationalcoverageandinstitutionaldepth;ii) of thedifferentgovernments’actionswereresultdeepfailings The CVRisawarethatboththeweaknessandimprovisationalnature rights failed totakestepsprevent violationsofthepopulation’s fundamental violations. Similarly, violations. thepermanentnatureofstatesemergency inmore favored theimpunityof Stateagentsresponsibleforhumanrights declared tobeinastateofemergencyundermilitary jurisdiction,which The CVRestablishesthatlaw24150placedsoldiersand policeinprovinces . . ention mustbemadeofthe . . . 8 431

GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 432 HATUN WILLAKUY T INDIFFERENCE andDEMANDFORHARSHMEASURES HE 79. 78. 77. 76. P OPULAR military authority and thecivilianauthoritiesinthoseareasthatpowerresided human rightsviolations,aswellageneralsenseamongthepopulation and moreprovincesweakeneddemocracycreatedaclimateripefor system withnosignificant democratic existence,bycivil-militaryrelations State inheritedfromthemilitary government,bytheweaknessofaparty subversion inasituationmade difficultbythecomplexityofanoversized The CVRrecognizesthat thePopularActionpartyhadtoconfront in thehistoryofRepublic a democraticregime,andinthemiddleofworstinternal armedconflict elections, andfreedomofthepressincontexta difficulttransitionto Belaunde Terry to also emphasizesthespecialeffortmadebygovernment ofFernando remained intheirpositionsdespitetheintensityof violence.TheCVR the Popular Action party, manyofwhom werelocalauthoritieswho The CVRexpressesitsspecialrecognitionofallthe victims belongingto being paidbycitizensoftherural,poorerregions demanded aquicksolution,andstoodpreparedtofacethesocialcost of theconflict.Thissector, inthemain,watched withindifferenceor sector thatbenefitedfromStateservicesandresidedfartheepicenter sector ofPeruvian society, principally military solutionwithoutciviliancontrolsresonatedwithaconsiderable subversion. Onthecontrary, theproclivityofthesegovernmentsfora in bowingtotheindiscriminateuseofforceasameanscombating The CVR hasfound,sadly, thattheciviliangovernments were notalone the regimethatemergedfollowingcoupd’etat of April 1992. judges, amongothers.Thisnewlegalframeworkwasoneofthepillars concepts suchasaggravatedterrorismandtreason,facelesscourts Peru wasasignatory:disproportionateminimumsentences,newlegal guarantees aswelltheConstitutionandinternationaltreatiestowhich legislation includedproceduresandsentencesthatviolateddueprocess their postsevenafterreachingretirementage.Furthermore,thenew law allowedthegeneralcommandersofarmedforcestoremainin Intelligence Servicelaw, andthelawonmilitarysituation. Thislast fields. ThislegislationchangedtheNationalDefenseSystem, only coordinatedandsupervised,butalsodirectedactionsinnon-military Under thatlaw, thecommanders ofthepolitical-militarycommandsnot in thecounter-subversivelegislationpassedaftercoupofApril1992. The CVRbelievesthattheabdicationofdemocraticauthorityculminated A CTION GOVERNMENT . preserve thedemocraticsystem,localandgeneral . in themoderatelyeducatedurban . 9 85. 84. 83. 82. 81. 80. military officersoftheVelasco regimeorthefarrightasperpetratorsofterrorist acts. denouncing theCubangovernment andtheCIA,legalleftgovernment,even The mainpoliticalactorsmade contradictory accusationsamongthemselves,simultaneously government onbehalfoftheState areas ofthe Ayacucho countryside,withnoorganizedresponsebythe diagnoses wasacrucialperiodinwhichthePCP-SLsettledintomany agendas. Itmustbenotedthatthetimelostinmistakenorinterest-driven attributing blameforwhatwashappeningsoastosuittheirownpolitical lar Action(AP)governmentandtheoppositionlostvaluabletime armed subversiveactionsmadetheconflictimpossibletohide,Popu- rights violations,ignoring numerousreportsfromvariousgovernment The CVRconcludesthatthePopularActionpartytolerated thesehuman generalized manner numerous violationsofhumanrightscarriedoutin asystematicand/or protect thefundamentalrightsofpopulation. Thisresultedin without thecivilianauthoritiestakingnecessarypreventive measuresto commands andtheinterventionofarmedforces werecarriedout The CVRhasestablishedthatthecreationof political-military strategies ofthearmedforces a defactosubordinationofthelocalcivilauthoritiesto theanti-subversive contribute tothefightagainstsubversioninnonmilitary arenasproduced political-military commandsandthefailureofpolitical authoritiesto decade andhadgrave consequences forthecountry. Theestablishmentof government initiatedaprocessofmilitarizationthatlastedmorethan The CVRbelievesthatthedecisiontakenbyPopularAction subversive fighttothearmedforcesatendof1982 violent activitybythePCP-SL,optedtohandoverdirectionofcounter- with regardtothegovernment.Thegovernment,facedincreasingly generated rejectionbythepopulation,firsttowardpoliceandthen equipment andwithoutacoherentanti-subversive policy, quickly three institutionswithnocoordinationamongthem,lackingbasic without interruption.Thelimitationsofthepoliceforces,dividedinto with policeforcesandexceptionalmeasuresthatwereextended The CVRestablishesthatthegovernmentoptedtoconfrontPCP-SL country’s politicalforcesbysurprise. months, tobeamarginalproblemthathadtakentheStateandall The CVRfindsthattheinternalarmedconflictwasconsidered,formany response tothesubversivethreatenormouslydifficult. their ownprofiles.Thisdisagreementmadethecreationofaunited ally,his the P number ofpoliciesforabroadunitedfront,whichwereacceptedonlyby The CVRrecallsthatinthiscontext,PresidentBelaundeproposeda cal left marked bydistanceanddistrust,theexistenceofalargeradi- . opular ChristianP . . arty. . 9 The otherpartiesoptedtomaintain Oncetheincreaseinnumberof . 433

GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 434 HATUN WILLAKUY T HE GOVERNMENT 88. 87. 90. 89. 86. the restofcountry, duetotheseriousethnicdivisionsinoursociety entire internalarmedconflict.Thesecasualtieswentalmostunnoticedby left 19,468victimfatalities,or28percentofthetotalestimatedfor and thebloodyofficialresponse,whichaccordingtoCVR’s calculations and 1984.Thesewere causedbythePCP-SL’s assassinationcampaigns highest numberofdeathsintheentireconflictoccurredbetween1983 The figuresoftheCVR reveal that,accordingtoananalysisbyyear, the existent inPeruvian society be aregrettabledemonstrationofhabitsdiscriminationandracism most unprotectedandmarginalizedinthecountry. TheCVR findsthisto by theState,principallyagainstindigenouspopulation,whichis responsibility foritstoleranceofthehumanrightsviolationscommitted 1985, ratifiedthispolicy with noconsiderationforthecostinhumanlives.Law24150,passed the intentionandexpectationofeliminatingsubversioninshortterm, of theseabusesthefundamentalrightscitizenrywasfoundedon by thegoverning party, failedto Similarly, duringthisperiod of terribleviolence,theParliament, controlled Putis, Pucayacu,andCabitos,tonamesomeofthemorenotoriousones. and civilsocietysources.Thiswasthecaseinmassacressuchasthose government the previous been directedagainsttheconduct ofthearmedforcessince new governmentassumed responsibilityforongoingcriticismsthathad development policiesdirected atpeasantsandthepoorestregions.The strategy theninplace.Theexplicitgoalwastodefeat subversionthrough he initiatedaseriesofsocialpoliciestoreorient the anti-subversive The CVR believes thatwhen Dr. Alan GarcíaPéreztookofficeinJuly1985, armed conflictinthehistoryofRepublic. in thecontextofadifficultsituationmiddle of theworstinternal democratic system,localandgeneralelections, freedom ofthepress effort ofthegovernmentPresidentAlanGarcíaPérez topreservethe in officedespitetheintensityofviolence.TheCVR alsoemphasizesthe Alliance] P members ofthePeruvianAPRA[AmericanPopular Revolutionary The CVRexpressesitsspecialrecognitionofallthevictimswhowere The CVR findsthatthePopu following themassacre,majorityathandsofPCP-SL the CVRhasestablishedthat135Quechuapeasantsalsodiedinyear assassination ofeightjournalistsinthecommunityUchuraccay, where The solecommissionwasappointedbytheExecutivetoinvestigate The CVRfindsthatthePopularActiongovernmentbearspolitical OF THE OF arty (PAP), many . P ERUVIAN . A PRISTA . of whomwere localauthoritieswhoremained lar Action gover lar Action P ARTY appoint anyinv nment’s unjustifiedtolerance estigative commissions. . . 91. 96. 95. 94. 93. 92. for unificationofthepoliceforceandcreationaMinistryDefense Additionally, government soughttoexertciviliancontrolovermilitaryactions. leaders responsiblefortheAccomarcamassacre(August1985).Thus, was demonstrated,forexample,inthepenaltiesappliedtomilitary This policyofrespectforhumanrightsandreportingtheirviolation initiate itsownprotestmarches, eveninthecapitalitself. services. ThePCP-SLtook advantage oftheseexpressionsdiscontentto social tensions,whichwere furtheraggravatedbythecollapseofbasic ches andcounterdemonstrations oneconomicpolicydeepenedexisting lost thesupportofcountry’s businessandfinancialgroups.The mar- country. With thefailedattemptto and theonsetofhyperinflationledtoasituationgrave instabilityinthe groups andthemaelstromofviolence.Thefailure economicprogram experienced beginningin1988fosteredthedevelopment ofsubversive The CVRbelievesthattheacuteeconomicandpolitical crisisthatPeru was strengthened in countersubversionwerecreated,andanti-terrorism intelligencework new entitiessuchastheDirectionofSpecialOperations (DOES)unittrained controlling thepolicethroughInteriorMinistry. Inthereorganization later becamethenationalpolice.PAP hadaparticularinterestin complaints aboutthecrisisofcorruptionandinefficiency. Thisledtowhat reorganization ofthethreeexistingpoliceinstitutionsinresponseto The CVR hasestablishedthat thePAP government initiateda collaborating inthecover-upofthatmassacre the killingsinCayara andfindthePAP politicallyresponsiblefor the APRA majorityapprovedthefinding.TheCVR’s investigations confirm on thatcommissionandaprosecutoraffirmedtheopposite.Nonetheless, que Melgarfoundthatthekillingshadnotoccurred,eventhoughaminority investigating commissionheadedbyPAP parliamentarianCarlosEnri- the actionsofarmedforcesinfightagainstsubversives.TheSenate paradigmatic ofthenewattitudegoverningpartywithrespectto The CVRbelievesthecover-upofkillingsatCayarainMay1988tobe judicial forums responsibilities thatmaybedeterminedinothernationalorinternational government inthosecases,withoutprejudicetootherindividual The CVR findsgrave politicalresponsibilityonthepartofPAP branch providingthemwithalegalframeworktodoso. counter-subversive actions,withouteithertheExecutiveorLegislative with thoseevents,thearmedforcesactedgreaterautonomyintheir for humanrightsonthesecurityforces.TheCVRhasfoundthatbeginning PAP government tousecivilianpower toimposeanewregimeofrespect Lurigancho andElFrontón,markedaturningpointintheeffortsof massacre,» whichtookplaceonJune18-19,1986inthepenitentiariesat Nevertheless, theCVRbelievesthatwhathasbeentermed«prison it createdaPeace Commissionandcarriedoutinitiatives . . nationalize thebanks,government . . 435

GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 436 HATUN WILLAKUY 11 10 T HE GOVERNMENTSOF 99. 98. 97. from hisretirementinlate1991until 1998. One pointofinflexibilitywaskeeping NicolásdeBariHermozaRíosasCommanderGeneral elections, forgedmorethan1million signaturestoregisterwiththeNationalElectionsBoard. elections. ThePeruto2000Front (FrentePerúal2000),whichwastosupporthiminthe2000 again. NewMajority(NuevaMayoría) wasonlyamechanismforparticipatinginthe1995 Change 90(Cambio90)wasdeactivated afterthe1990electionsandneveroperatedorganically administration loyalty ofthemilitaryleadership,convertingthem intopillarsofits strengthen theNationalIntelligenceServiceandassured foritselfthe Montesinos. WithMontesinos’participation,thenew regimebeganto upon militaryintelligenceoperatives,thebestknownbeingVladimiro strategy asithadappearedattheend of economicissuesandadoptedthearmedforces’counter-subversive sis andexpandingsubversion–heplacedagroupoftechnocratsincharge order toaddressthelargeproblemsthatheinherited–economiccri- indicated awillingnesstoexchangedemocracyfor security andtolerate the urbanoffensiveofPCP-SL,importantsectors fromallsocialstrata system; amajorityofpublicopinionsupportedthecoup. Inthemidstof the ruleoflawanddemonstratedweakness thepoliticalparty The CVR concludesthatthecoupd’etat of Ap for democracy. Henever builta politicalorganizationtosupporthim. by training,anindependentcandidatewhoquicklyrevealedhiscontempt facilitated thetriumphofanindependent,AlbertoFujimori,engineer political partiesandthelossofconfidenceinorganizations occurred inthemidstofageneralizedcrisis,damagedreputation The CVRhasestablishedthatthepresidentialelectionsof1990,which eventually, were verysuccessful,suchastheSpecialIntelligenceGroup(GEIN),which, subversive policy, that withtheexceptionofsomeareaspolicework emergence ofthecrisis,governmentlostcontrolcounter- leading toanattemptedcoupd’etat. The CVR concludesthatwiththe June 1990.Discontentamongthearmedforceswasconsiderable,even time, threenationalelectionstookplacebetweenNovember1989and the imageofanarchyandchaosincountry. Nevertheless, atthesame militants fromtheCastroprisonin1990,amongothers,fostered abandonment ofmunicipalpositionsin1989,andtheescapeMRTA MRTA, thePCP-SL’s attackonthepolicestationin Uchiza,the confrontation inMolinosbetweenanArmypatrolandacolumnofthe appearance ofthemisnamed«RodrigoFrancoCommandGroup,» used againstpresumedsubversives.Aseriesofevents,suchasthe personnel linkedtodeathsquadactivitiesandparamilitarycommands The CVRhasgatheredtestimoniesthatsuggesttheexistenceofpolice would have the A LBERTO . 11 F UJIMORI greatest successcapturingsubversive leaders of the1980s. ril 5,1992broughtanendto Additionally, he called 10 In . 100. 103. 102. 101. Furthermore, theCVRnotesusemadeofChavíndeHuántar disappearances andmassacresperpetratedbythe«Colina»deathsquad Intelligence Servicearecriminallyresponsiblefortheassassinations,forced his adviserVladimiroMontesinos,andhighlevelofficialsoftheNational The CVRhasreasonablegroundstoaffirmthatPresidentAlbertoFujimori, assassinations, forceddisappearancesandcruelferociousmassacres. to VladimiroMontesinoscalled«Colina»wasresponsiblefor administrative organizationsofsubversivegroups.Adeathsquadlinked subversive strategyemphasizedtheselectiveeliminationofpolitical- The CVRhasestablishedthatbeginningin1992thenewcounter- subversion human rightsviolationsasthenecessarycosttoputanend Fujimori’s operations suchasChavín deHuántar, all carry thestampof Alberto National IntelligenceService itself,aswellthedistortionoflegitimate majority ofthemedia,attacks andcrimes,evenagainstmembersofthe independent journalism,thesubjectionandfinal perversionofthe on thetelephonesofpoliticalopposition, harassment against authoritarianism oftheregimeandtodiscreditopposition. Wiretaps and exaggeratedlyrecreateterrorismasalatent threat tojustifythe were true,butthemajoritymanipulatedbymedia, servedtocreate The CVRaffirmsthatinthefollowingyears,several facts, someofwhich among thedeadbodiesinresidenceshortlyafter itsrecovery shares thepublic’s rejectionoftheimages of Alberto Fujimoriwalking since theyinvolvedindividualswhohadsurrendered. TheCommission extrajudicial executionsthatapparentlyoccurred;these wereunjustified who diedduringtheoperation.Nevertheless, CVR condemnsthe action, aswell astoDr. CarlosGiusti,amember of theSupremeCourt and payshomagetothemembersofArmywhowerecasualtiesthat efficiency ofcommandoswhosuccessfullycarriedouttherescueoperation, State torescuethehostagesheldthereandapplaudsheroism captive formorethanfourmonths.TheCVRrecognizestherightof its repudiationofthatterroristaction,whichkeptdozenspersons the Japanese Ambassador operation, carriedouttorescuethepeopletakenhostagebyMRTA at subversion; rathertheywereusedtoobtainelectoralreturns and theMRTAwere toacceleratethedefeatof notusedbythegovernment The CVRconcludesthatthecaptureoftopleadershipPCP-SL and membersofthePolitburoCentralCommitteePCP-SL. of theMRTA, andthecapture,onSeptember12,1992,of Abimael Guzmán capabilities thatresultedinthecaptureofVictor P intelligence work,demonstratedmoreconstructiveandeffective accumulated sincelateinthepreviousdecadeandemphasisplacedon The CVRholdsthatinthissameperiod,theDINCOTE,thankstoexperience authoritarian gov . ’s residenceinDecember1996.TheCVR expresses ernment. olay, p rincipal leader . . . 437

GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 438 HATUN WILLAKUY T HE LEFTPOLITICAL PARTIES 107. 106. 105. 104. 108. 109. 110. value positively electoralpo at theendof1970’s, someoftheseorganizationschangeddirectionto the contextofextensivesocialmobilizationsanddemocraticopening and astrategythatprivilegedtakingpowerthrougharmedstruggle.In that laterformedpartoftheIUshared,withminordifferences,adiscourse The CVR hasestablishedthatduringthe1970’s, mostoftheorganizations participated inregionalgovernments Parliament, governedatthelocallevel,and,between1989and1992, electoral forcethroughoutmostofthe1980’s; ithadrepresentationin The CVRhasestablishedthattheallianceofUnitedLeftwassecond the advanceofPCP-SL. agenda. Thus,inmanyareasofthecountry, leftmilitantswereabrakeon movements thatuptotimehadnotbeenincludedonthenational channel forpoliticalrepresentationbroadpopularsectorsandsocial intensity oftheviolence.TheCVRalsoemphasizesthatIUwasa many ofwhomwerelocalauthoritieswhoremainedinofficedespitethe to thepartiesthatmadeupallianceIzquierdaUnida[UnitedLeft,IU], The CVRexpressesitsspecialrecognitionofallthevictimswhobelonged Republic ved, andmakeuponeofthemostshamefulmomentsinhistory consequences oftheauthoritarianwayinwhichconflictwasresol- the publicsphere.Allofthesecharacteristicsconstitute,atleastinpart, of thesocialandinstitutionalfabric,aprofoundlackconfidencein economic crisisandintotheabyssof of keepingtheregimeinpower. Thisplungedthecountryintoanew government, theinternalarmedconflictwasmanipulatedwithgoal In lightoftheforegoing,CVRholdsthatinlastyearsFujimori to confronttheviolentconceptsofPCP-SL for bothpartyleadersandthesocialorganizationsinfluenced bytheIU, and even more sowithrespecttoMRTA. Thisambiguitymadeitdifficult the IUinanambiguouspositionwithrespecttoactions ofthePCP-SL, delayed, ideologicaldifferentiationplacedthemajority ofthepartiesin Nevertheless, theCVRpointsoutthatinsufficient, andinmanycases, division oftheleftintopurported reformistsandrevolutionaries of recoursetoviolencetake power. Thiswas whatultimatelyledtothe There weretwogroupsontheleftthatmaintainedto endthepossibility to theviolationscommittedbysubversive groups,especiallytheMRTA. committed bytheState.Nevertheless,itdidnotgive thesametreatment The CVRestablishesthattheleftdenouncedhuman rightsviolations demonstrate thelimitations of«demobourgeois»institutions government asaplatform foragitationandpropaganda,to the leftunderstoodtheirparticipation intheparliamentandmunicipal In theopinionofCVR, althoughnotageneralizedposition,sectorsof . litics andrepres corruption, moraldecay . entative democracy or t he MRT A ideologically , weakening, . . . . T HE 1.113. 112. 111. 115. 114. L EGISLATURE trade organizations from theranksofIU,somewhomwereimportantleadersnational of thePCP-SL,whichassassinatedasignificantnumbersocialleaders progressed, theIUincreasinglydisavowedideologyandmethods «legal front»forthePCP-SL,neitherorganicallynorofficially. As the decade subversives. the securityforces,whichdidnotdistinguishbetweenIUmembersand grassroots provincialmilitantsduringelectoralperiods,werevictimsof (the killingofprisoners,paramilitarygroups,thecausesviolence). investigative commissionsonissuesrelatedtotheinternalarmedconflict Parliament, whohadsignificantrolesinthemostimportantCongressional social organizationsthatitwasinvolvedin,anditsrepresentativesin denunciation ofhumanrightsviolationsthroughitsmemberparties,the Nevertheless, the CVRemphasizestheIU’s positiveroleintheearly advance of subversive that theIUrepresentedamongbroadpopularsectors,allowingfor division wasdisconcertingtoitsfollowers,andbroketheretainingwall government the APRA of greatestelectoralpresence;itkepttheIUfromdifferentiatingitself militants andforthecountry. Thislimitationpersistedeven initsperiod and offeranalternativeofpeacefuldemocratictransformationforits electoral allianceandbecomingaprogrammaticfrontthatmightrepresent that wereinvolved,impededtheIUfromtranscendingitscharacterasan of puttingtheinterestscountryaheadgroupsorpersonalities the partiesandindependentsthatmadeupIU,aswelldifficulty The CVR notesthatpolitically, thesectarianismandineffectiveness of were committingwithimpunity. human rightsviolationsthat boththePCP-SLandsecurityforces the war, Congressdidnotundertakeanyinvestigation ofthemounting in whichthelargestnumber ofPeruviansdiedordisappearedbecause Huancavelica andApurímac asaresultoftheconflict.Duringthisperiod, refusing toexercisecontrol over 1980 –1985failedtoperformitsconstitutionalmandate ofoversightby capacities foroversightandlegislativeinitiative.Thus, theParliamentof Through thesemajorities,thegovernmentsinhibited orweakenedthe majorities fromtherespectivegoverningpartyofeach presidentialterm. The CVR documentsthatthroughoutthe1980’s, Congressfunctionedwith conflict wasquiteadvanced(1991). comprehensive initiativestoaddressthesubversive groupsuntilthe political forcesrepresentedtheredidnottake,nor didtheypropose, armed conflictalsooccurredintheLegislativebranch ofgovernment.The The CVR hasconfirmedthattheState’s problemsconfrontingtheinternal Furthermore, theCVRdocumentsthatmanymembersofIU,especially Additionally, . ’s policy, andendedupdividingtheIUin1989.The groups, andsubsequently, Fujimorism it iscleartotheCVR thattheIUwas nevera what was o ccurring in Ay . acucho, 439

GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 440 HATUN WILLAKUY 121. 120. 119. 118. 117. 116. oversight due toboththeconstitutional cutbackonitspowers and the The CVRbelievesthatafter the1992coup,Congresshadnocapacityfor and crisis. country. At thatpoint,the politicalpartiesshowed clearsignsof exhaustion effort tocontrolthedefacto powersandauthoritariancurrentsinthe of publicopinion,demonstrated thatthiswasabelatedandinsufficient April 1992coup,whichclosedParliamentwiththeconsent ofthemajority of humanrightsviolationsintheinternalarmedconflict. However, the congressional oversight,the1990–92Congressintervened insituations counter-subversive legislationinNovember1991. Withrespectto democratic frameworks.Thisnewattitudewasevident inthedebateon ve participationinthedesignofacounter-subversive policywithin and theincreaseinsubversionspurredgreaterconsensus andmoreacti- appearance. Thelackofaparliamentarymajorityfor thegoverningparty The CVRfindsthatbetween1990and1992,Congress acquiredanother destroyed. as aredoubtofrevisionismandparttheoldState thatneededtobe camp. ThisideacoincidedwiththatofthePCP-SL,whichviewedCongress they hadnoreservationsaboutpresentingCongressaspartoftheenemy subversive policyoverstatedtheinstitution’s ineptitudeandproblems; government andthepromotersofanauthoritarian,militarizedcounter- the politicalpartiesandlegislature’s loss ofprestige, Alberto Fujimori’s majority inCongressforthefirsttime.Taking advantage ofthedecline The CVRnotesthatfollowingthe1990elections,Executivelackeda ses ofviolationsperpetratedbythePCP-SL. no similarefforttoinvestigateanddemandsanctionsfortheterribleca- ses ofhumanrightsviolationsperpetratedbythesecurityforces,itmade Nevertheless, whileCongresstookontheinvestigationofimportantca- currents ofoppositiontohumanrightsviolationswithinpublicopinion. parliamentary debatesandminorityfindingsgeneratedimportant none opinion. Although commissions wereappointedforcaseswithsignificantimpactonpublic Nevertheless, theCVRnotesthatbeginningin1985investigative policy toasphereofmilitaryrepressionandcontrol. weakening ofciviliandemocraticpowerandreducedcounter-subversion authority tothebenefitofmilitary. Thus, legalized whatwasalreadyoccurringdefacto,inhibitingcivilian forces assumedcontrolofinternalorderinallorparttheterritory, established thenormsgoverningstatesofemergencyinwhicharmed The CVRnotesthatCongressionalapprovalofLaw24150,which subversive phenomenon. willingness tocommitfindingaharshandefficientanswerthe took upthatfunctionagain,itdidnothingbutreaffirmitslimited activity wasactivity inthehandsof failed toproposeanyviablealternativeorplan.Theprincipallaw-making The CVRmustnotethatinthefaceofmilitarizationconflict,Congress of them were abletobreakthecycleofimpunity,of themwere the Executive. And when, finally, Congress thisdecisionledtothe T HE 123. 122. 124. 126. 125. J UDICIARY jurisdiction infavor ofmilitaryjurisdiction,whereimpunityheld sway crimes tojustice,systematicallyrulingineverycaseofcontested abstained frombringingmembersofthearmedforcesaccusedserious violations oftherighttolifeandphysicalintegrity;finally, they failed toguaranteetherightsofdetainees,thuscontributinggrave that freedguiltysuspectsandimprisonedinnocents;secondly, itsagents violations. First,thejudiciaryacquiredimageofaninefficient«sieve» an endtotheimpunityofStateagentswhocommittedgravehumanrights subversive groups,protectingtherightsofdetainedpersons,orputting its mission,whetherinconnectionwithlegalpenaltiesfortheactionsof the administrationofjustice.Thejudicialsystemfailedtoadequatelyfulfill The CVRnotesthattheabdicationofdemocraticauthorityextendedto for theproposalsofpalaceandNationalIntelligenceService 15, 1995). Amnesty Law(June process ofaffirmingimpunitywasthepassageLaw26479,General especially noteworthy momentinthe oversight butalsoendorsedandpromotedcover-ups andimpunity. An members ofCongress,notonlyabdicateditsconstitutionalfunction official majorityinCongress,despitethebraveattitudeofopposition The CVRhasalsobeenabletoconfirmthat,inmanycases,thepost-coup committed bystateagents. apparatus thatwouldguaranteeimpunityforhumanrightsviolations harmful tosocietyandthatsought,amongotherthings,establishan the developmentofaprocessmanipulationlegalnormsthatwas parliamentary effortinthecounter-subversionfightwasaggravatedby absolute majoritymaintainedbythegoverningpartyuntil2000.Theweak Court system; thiswasinadditiontotheineffectivenessof theConstitutional the creationofmanagemententitiesoutsidestructure ofthejudicial through massiveterminationsofjudges,provisional appointments,and already mentioned:clearinterferenceinthecapacity ofself-regulation worse made theinstitutionalcontextinwhichjusticewas administeredeven was exacerbatedbythenegligentactionsofsomejudicial officialswho structural problemsthatledtoits Nevertheless, theCVRmustspecifythatjudicialsystemsufferedfrom investigation phase,minimizingtheprosecutor’s roleasguarantor ofthe and theweakeningof PublicMinistry’s in thepreliminary work affected bythebroadand imprecisedefinitionofthecrimeterrorism, was deficient.Between1980 and1992,thissituationwasparticularly The CVRdocumentsthat thelegislationappliedbyjudicialsystem coup d’ The CVR documentsthatPeru’s judicialsituationdeterioratedafterthe . . etat in1992,when,thefollow Ineffect,P inefficiency.However, thiscircumstance ing wereaddedtotheconditions arliament becameanechochamber institution’s participationinthe . . 441

GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 442 HATUN WILLAKUY 12 130. 129. 128. 127. was unconstitutional. Antonia Saquicuray, whoadmittedtheBarrios Proof thatitwaspossibletoreject thisimpunitycanbeseeninthebravestandtakenby treason and theattributionofjurisdictiontomilitarytribunalstrycrimes sentencing; seriouslimitationontheabilityofdetaineestomountadefense; different sentencesforthesameconduct;lackofproportionalityin creating newcrimesthatweretriedindifferentforumsandimposed overcriminalization ofterrorismbymakingtheconceptflexibleand characteristics ofthenewanti-terrorismlegislation,whichincluded: process. Thesituationworsenedafterthe1992coupbecauseof them onthebasisofscant boon forthetruesubversives when,years later, theStatehadtore-try the PeruvianjudicialsystemduringFujimoriregime provedtobea shadow ofdoubtoverthetrialsthattookplace.The discredit sufferedby have toendurelongsentences,butdueprocessviolations castaheavy accuracy intrialsofdetainees.Notonlydidhundreds ofinnocentpersons antiterrorist legislationunderminedtheguarantee ofimpartialityand The CVRhasestablishedthatstrictanduncriticalapplicationofthe1992 line ofdefenseagainstunconstitutionallegislation agreements, judgesrenouncedtheirauthoritytoserveasadecentralized because itbreachedconstitutionalprovisionsandinternational power. With onehonorableexception, provisions andinternationalagreementsratifiedunderPeru’s sovereign majority approvalfortwoamnestylawsthatviolatedconstitutional by managingtohavetheDemocraticConstitutionalCongressprovide attempted tolegalizeimpunityforhumanrightsviolationsbyStateagents The CVRbelievesthatthedictatorshipofAlbertoFujimorispuriously culminating intorture,arbitraryexecutionsandforceddisappearances This situationcontributedinnosmallmeasuretoarbitrarydetentions – inexistenceuntil1991systematicallyavoidedmakingreasonedrulings. corpus petitionsinadmissible.Thetribunalforconstitutionalguarantees to protectcitizens’rightsbythegeneralizedpracticeofdeclaringhabeas The CVRalsohasfoundthatjudicialofficialsfailedintheirresponsibility or resultedinlenientsentences where thecasesweregenerallydismissed,unnecessarilyprolonged, forces theJudiciaryruledoneveryoccasioninfavorofmilitaryforum, through theSupremeCourt,whenaccusedweremembersofarmed The CVRhasestablishedthat,abdicatingitsownjurisdictionandacting massacres in1985,1986and1992. little noticedbyjudgesincriminalsentencing,gave risetoriotsand dignity, terrorism sufferedprisonconditionsthatweredegrading tohuman . and thatinnoway ledtotheir rehabilitation.Theprisonsituation, evidence. Additionally, thosesentencedfor . Altos case,maintainingthatthe amnestylaw 12 inwhichalawwas notapplied . . E T R DUCATIONAL RADE ORGANIZATIONS OLE OFSOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS 135. 134. 133. 132. 131. 136. Public Ministry’swas deferencetotheordersofExecutive total. situation ofchaosandimpunity. UndertheFujimoridictatorship, lethargic, andforensicworkwasverydeficient,whichcontributedtothe hampered negotiations,thusmakingtheproblemsworse the absenceofclearrules,andcomplicatedlegislation,amongotherfactors, was markedlyinept,sinceaninefficientbureaucracypronetocorruption, The CVR hasestablishedthattheState’s roleasarbiteroflaborconflicts character andlegitimacyofthetradeorganizations the armedconflict,givingrisetocriticismsaboutrepresentational the unionsandtradeassociationsledtoamutualdiscreditingthroughout The CVRalsoconcludesthatanti-democraticpracticesorconceptionsin unions foritssubversivegoals sought thedestructionofexistingunions,MRTA soughttousethe The CVRfindsthatwhilethePCP-SLexacerbatedlaborconflictsand assassination ofunionleaders,businessandemployees against variousunionsandbusinesses.Initsreport,theCVRrecords The CVRhasestablishedtheviolentaggressionbysubversivegroups contrary, itfailedinitsdutyto and wasinsensitivetotherequestsofvictims’relatives.On the strictrespectforhumanrightsthatmustbeobservedindetentions, notwithstanding somehonorableexceptions–abdicateditsdutytoenforce The CVRnotesthatthePublicMinistry[prosecutingauthority]– but wasonlyachievablethroughconfrontation and sustainedbya change; onethatcouldnotbeadoptedbythesocial and politicalsystem, the Statewithdrew, newproposalsemergedthatendorsedaradical traditional authoritarianteachingmethods.Inthose areasfromwhich these tendenciesaround.Nordidtheyneutralizethe predominanceof university lawnortheeducationalreformof1972succeeded inturning modernizingprojectsinthe1960’s,were but these failed.Neitherthe The CVRhasfoundthattheStateneglectededucation fordecades.There SYSTEM AND TEACHING PROFESSION TEACHING SYSTEM AND . report crimes,its . investigations were . . 443

GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 444 HATUN WILLAKUY 14 13 139. 138. 137. 140. at post-secondary institutes. during theconflict,3percentwere teachersand2.4percentwereuniversitystudentsor According totestimonygathered bytheCVR,oftotalnumbervictimsstateagents of teachers. Although rarelyapplied,inthe1990s thelawof“apologyforterrorism”legalizedintimidation universities, especiallyintheprovinces; and/or stigmatizingentirecommunitiesofteachersandstudentsinpublic important terrainforideologicalandsymbolicdebate;ii)inintimidating education inthemidstofaconflictthatusededucationalsystemasan The CVRfindsgraveresponsibilityoftheState:i)inneglectpublic the proselytizingalsoofferedanidentityandasenseofbelonging For thosestudents,whohadweak socialnetworksintheirplacesofstudy, and provincialstudents,whowerethegreatestusersofthoseservices. appeal tothefeelingsofdiscriminationandinsultexperiencedbypoor There, aproselytismdevelopedinwhichclientelismwasmixedwithan boards, oratleastfoundsanctuaryinhousingandcafeteriafacilities. university autonomy, thePCP-SL gai proselytize. Taking ad PCP-SL wasabletoplaceinstructorsinschoolswheretheysought factors thatfavoredthePCP-SL.Throughintimidationorcooptation, dogmatism andtheambivalenceofradicalgroupstowardviolencewere advanced institutes,andevenpre-universityacademies.Widespread instrumentalize educationalinstitutions:universities,secondaryschools, The CVRhasfoundthat,inthiscontext,thePCP-SLsoughtto the mostextreme of authoritarianproposalsfromtheextremeleft.ThePCP-SLwassimply the pathofconfrontation.Thatvisionopenedspacesfordevelopment there wasacommonbeliefinfatalistichistoricaldeterminismthrough The CVRhasfoundthatamongmanyuniversityinstructorsandstudents the oldauthoritarianpedagogicalframeworks,whichwentunquestioned universities inthe1970’s. Thesenewcurriculaweretransmittedusing dogmatic andsimplifiedMarxismthatexpandedwidelythroughoutthe «Colina,» in1995.TheCommissionnotesthatbased on itsinvestigations, subsequent amnestyfortheperpetrators,members ofthedeathsquad Valle NationalEducationUniv the massacreofeightstudentsandoneprofessorat EnriqueGuzmány war –includingthedeathsquads.Furthermore,Commission condemns caught intheconfusionofcrossfire,athands various actorsinthe professors andworkersattheUniversidadNacional delCentro(UNCP) especially condemnsthekillingofmorethanone hundredstudents, and workers,whatevertheirpoliticalaffiliation. TheCommission The CVRrepudiatesthecrimescommittedagainst students, professors, because oftheirstatusassuch allowed gravehumanrightsviolationsagainststudentsandprofessors infrastructure forservicesatseveralpublicuniversities;iv)inhaving . vantage of,andfeedingon,amaximalistversion of . ersity, «LaCantuta,»inJuly1992,andthe 14 ned accessinsomecases 13 iii)inthedeteriorationof to university . . T HE ROLEOFTHECHURCHES 141. 144. 143. 142. rights violationsduringtheviolence. contributed totheprotectionofpopulationfromcrimesandhuman undertaken, hasconfirmedthattheCatholicandEvangelicalchurches The CVR,throughthemanytestimoniesgathered,hearingsandstudies ses ontheuniversitycampuses the authoritarianregimeof1990’s, bytheinstallationofmilitaryba- detentions-disappearances anddestructionofinfrastructure,during cos, amongothers,wereaffectedbythecounter-subversivestrategyof Huamanga, HermilioValdizán deHuánuco,Callao,HuachoandSanMar- in additiontothosealreadycited,theuniversitiesofSanCristóbalde community, layindividuals,andCatholicEv The CVRpayshomageto thepriests,menandwomenofreligious in thedefenseofhumanrights. Commission regretsthatsome Evangelicalcommunitieshavenotshared defense committeesthat confronted thesubversion.Nevertheless, that asignificantnumberofEvangelicalpeasants participated inself- of largecitiesandinremoteruralareas.TheCommission alsoconfirms of pastorswhocontributedtothiseffortindefense lifeontheoutskirts national coordinatingbodies.TheCommissionalsorecognizes thecourage valuable roleintheprotectionofhumanrights,principally throughtheir The CVRhasconcludedthattheEvangelicalchurches alsoplayeda toral commitment Ayacucho, and Huancavelica Abancay hav Commission deploresthefactthatsomeecclesiastical authoritiesfrom existence ofhumanrightsviolationscommittedin itsjurisdiction.The the workofChurchorganizationslinkedtoissue,anddenied conflict. Throughoutmuchoftheconflict,thatarchbishoprichindered not steadfastinthearchbishopricof Ayacucho during mostofthearmed Nevertheless, theCVRhasfoundthatdefenseofhumanrightswas the explosionofwhatwas termedthedirtywar and constructingabarrierthatweakenedtheadvanceofPCP-SL lay people,andcatechistscontributedtostrengtheningthesocialfabric Puno, Cajamarca,Ancash,UcayaliorAmazonas,theroleplayedbypriests, regardless oftheologicalorpastoralapproaches.InDepartmentssuchas these organizations,aswellbyindividualclericsandlaypersons, saved andmanyotherabuseswereimpededthankstothesupportof cial Action]andothers.TheCVRhasconcludedthatmanyliveswere misión EpiscopaldeAcciónSocial(CEAS)[EpiscopalCommissionforSo- very earlyintheprocessinitiatedthroughorganizationssuchasCo- activities indefenseofhumanrightsanddenunciationstheviolations human rightsviolationsbytheState.Thesepositionstookshapeof condemned earlyontheviolenceofgroupstakinguparmsaswell . . Institutionally, e notcompliedwiththeirpas- . angelical faithfulwho the CatholicChurch 445

GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 446 HATUN WILLAKUY H 15 UMAN RIGHTSORGANIZATIONS 148. 147. 146. 145. Such astheso-called «DemocraticLawyers»( conflict. paid withtheirlivesfordoingpastoralworkduringtheinternalarmed worst moments,withtenacity andbraverythesewomenkeptalivethe members arepoor, the Abducted,Detained andDisappeared];thevastmajorityofits recidos delPerú (ANFASEP) [Peruvian National Association ofFamilies Asociación NacionaldeFamiliaresSecuestrados, Detenidos yDesapa- In thatcontext,theCVRemphasizesandrecognizes the persistenceof of humanrightsviolationsandcrimes This weaknessworkedtotheadvantageofimpunity fortheperpetrators difficult, andwhohadweaksocialnetworkswith few urbancontacts. with littleconsciousnessoftheirrights,forwhom access tojusticewas is becauseinthemajorityofcasesvictims were poorpeasants, internal armedconflict,victims’organizationswere relatively weak.This The CVRalsohasconfirmedthatunlikeothercountries thatexperienced Peruvian orfromotherpartsoftheworld within theircriticismandmonitoring,whetherthosegroupswere international humanrightsmovementtoincludesubversivegroups subversive groups.Theyalsoactivelyandsuccessfullyadvocatedforthe they refusedtoprovidelegaldefenseformilitantsorleadersofthe themselves apartfromthesubversive groups’ frontorganizations. the mid-1980’s, theorganizationsthatmadeupCNDDHHset above all,beaccountableforthesecurityofitscitizens.Nevertheless,in furthermore, theStateisasignatoryofinternationalagreementsandmust, actions aredefinedwithinalegalsystemthatmustberespected,and, directed theircriticismfundamentallytoward theState,sinceState’s in thefirstyearsofconflict,Peruviandefendershumanrights In keepingwiththetraditionofinternationalhumanrightsmovement, democratic struggleofthePeruvianpeople. conflict andtoobtainingextensiveinternationalsolidarityforthe they contributedtocontrollingsomeofthemostbrutalaspects exercising thedemocraticrightofcriticallymonitoringsecurityforces, owes thesehumanrightsorganizationsadebtofgratitudebecause,by and demandingjustice.TheCommissionisconvincedthatthecountry and aneffectiveresourceinsupportofthevictims’goalobtainingtruth to demonizeit,becameanethicalpointofreferenceonthenationalstage Human RightsCoordinatingBody],andwhich,despiteconstantefforts Coordinadora NacionaldeDerechosHumanos(CNDDHH)[National movement infavorofhumanrightswhichwasorganizedaroundthe associations keptthecapacityforindignationaliveandcreatedaneffective The CVRhasconcludedthatthroughouttheconflict,dozensofcivilsociety Quechua-speaking w Abogados Democráticos . omen from Ayacucho. Eveninthe . ). 15 Later, T HE MEDIA 152. 151. 150. 149. massive corruptionandthe buyingofmedia yellow journalismandw to and ii)theprimacyofacommercial logic,whichintheworstofcasesled resulted inimposingatreatment thatwasnotverysensitivetotheissues, this outcome:i)theuncriticaladoptionoflogic ofviolence,which the pacificationofcountry. TheCVR thattwo believes factorsledto was nottreatedinawaythatwouldentailsignificant contributionto In manymedia,theissueofsubversiveandcounter-subversive violence racism ofthemedia,whichisunderscoredinfinal report reflection andsensitivitytotheissues.Partofthisproblem wastheimplicit that wasinconsideratetothevictimsandofferedlittle toinspirenational has foundthatinmanyinstances,newsmediafellinto crudepresentation With respecttothewayinwhichmediaprovided coverage,theCVR certain importantcasesevenendorsedarbitraryviolence bytheState that thereweremediaentitiesheldanambiguouspositionandin valuable andriskyinvestigationreportingwork,butitalsonotes human rightsviolations.TheCommissionrecognizesthattherewas not takethesamepositionwithrespecttoinvestigatingandreporting objectives ofthesubversiveorganizations.Nevertheless,mediadid each outlet,whichmeantdifferentevaluationsofthesituationor violence, althoughwithnuancesreflectingtothepoliticalinclinationsof that fromthebeginningof1980’s, themediacondemnedsubversive With respecttonewscoverage and edito out theirdutiesselflesslyunderveryadverseconditions working inprovincesdeclaredtobe when of crimesandhumanrightsviolationsonthepartjournalistswho, recognition tothecontributionclarificationoffactsandreporting especially tragiccircumstances. Additionally, theCommissiongivesspecial Uchuraccay martyrs,thefirstjournalistskilledinlineofdutyand while carryingouttheirduties.Particularmentionismadeofthe homage tothejournalistsassassinatedduringinternalarmedconflict unfortunately, on sev crimes. Often,intheseinvestigationsjournalistsriskedtheirlivesand, 1992), indispensabletouncoveringwhowasresponsibleforhorrific courageous, andinsomecases,asthemassacreatLaCantuta( During thoseyears,investigativejournalismeffortswereabundant, played averyimportantrolethroughouttheinternalarmedconflict. The Truth thatthemedia andReconciliationCommissionestablishes be appliedtothoseresponsibleforthedisappearances flame ofhopefortherecoverytheirlovedones,andthatjusticewould eral occasions, those lives were lost.The CVR pays eral occasions,thoselives as complicatedattheend ofthe1990’sby rial policy, the CVR establishes in astateof . emergency, carried . . . July . 447

GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 448 HATUN WILLAKUY T HE CONSEQUENCESOF THE INTERNAL 158. 157. 156. 155. 154. 153. and atomizingsociety. Intheseconditions,theextremesufferinghas distrust tounbearablelevels, whichinturncontributedtofragmenting The CVRisawarethatthe internalarmedconflictintensifiedfearand the conflict;thisgeneration deservespreferentialtreatmentbytheState has haditseducationaldevelopment cutofforimpoverishedasaresultof The CVRhasestablishedthatanentiregenerationof childrenandyouth lack ofsufficientsupporttoreorganizeand theirfamilies. returning, theysometimeshadtodealwithserious landproblemsand discrimination inschools,neighborhoods,andthe workplace.Upon people displacedbytheconflictwereoftenstigmatized andsuffered enormous challengetotheprovisionof varying levelsofsuccessandconsiderablesuffering, whichposedan of socialnetworks,forcingthemtoadaptnew circumstances with human development.Thedisplacedpopulationexperienced thedislocation territory thatwillhavealong-termeffectonthechances forsustainable as wellahistoricregressioninthepatternofoccupationAndean hundreds ofthousandsPeruvians.Thisledtocompulsoryurbanization constituted apainfulprocessofuprootingandimpoverishment In theopinionofCVR,massivedisplacementfromviolentzones expansion ofcitizenship. in thesectorsthatweremostmarginalizedandneedofinclusion of thestructureswherestrengtheningsocialfabricwasmostneeded: produced aprofoundweakening ofcivil the assassinationoftraditionalandstateleadersauthorities.This social lifeandthrewitsorganizationintodisarray, especiallybecauseof It hasbeenpossiblefortheCVRtoestablishthatviolencedestroyedlocal five poorestinthecountry. — Huancavelica, Ay no coincidencethatfouroftheDepartmentsmostaffectedbyconflict the lowestrankingsinpovertyandhumandevelopmentindices.Itis opportunities. TheDepartmentsthatsufferedmostintenselynowoccupy productive infrastructureandthelossofsocialcapitaleconomic The CVRnotesthattheconflictresultedinmassivedestructionof society dedicatedtobuildingpeaceandlaw and communitiesthatresistedworkedtowardtheaffirmationofa emphasize that–despitethehardconditionstherewereindividuals and fosteredacultureoffeardistrust.Nevertheless,itisnecessaryto discrimination andexclusion;weakenedsocialemotionalnetworks worsened povertyanddeepenedinequality;aggravatedformsof accentuated seriousnationalimbalances;destroyedthedemocraticorder; effects atalllevelsofnationallife.Thebreadthandintensitytheconflict the mostseriousinhistoryofRepublic,andhashadprofound The CVRfindsthattheinternalarmedconflictithasinvestigatedis acucho, Apurím ARMED CONFLICT ARMED ac andHuánuco—areamongthe services inthe society, the . political parties,and cities. Additionally, . T HE NEEDFO 162. 161. 6.160. 159. 164. 163. dimensions, thehorrorexperiencedbetween1980and 2000 overcoming thoseconsequencesisthatthecountryrecognize,inallits and equity. TheCommission furtherbelieves thatthefirststeptoward democratic andpluralcountrymovingalongtheroadofdevelopment affects ourbuildinganationalcommunityoffreeandequalcitizensin weigh likealargemortgageonourfuture.Theyplaydecisiverolethat The CVRisconvincedthattheconsequencesofinternalarmedconflict peaceful alternativesandmicroreconciliationprocesses were abletoresisttheviolencethroughself-defenseaswellwith communities andtheCVRwasabletoconfirmthatmany disappearances. Young leadersrecon acknowledge thelossofthousandstheirchildreninmassacresand new responsibilitiesandraisedthemoralchallengetocountry social networksandthemassiveassassinationofleaders,womentookon respond. Onnumerousoccasions,inthefaceofdestructiontraditional all itssev Finally, the conflict-openeddoortoautocracyandimpunity and awillingnesstoexchangedemocracyforsecurityasthecostofending faced thoseyears-withindifference,toleranceforhumanrightsviolations, the wayinwhichpoliticalforcesandlargesectorsofpublicopinion sank duringthelastyearsofdictatorshipAlbertoFujimori.Ineffect, in thepoliticalarenaconsistsofmoraldecayintowhichcountry overcoming thewoundsofpast health, whichweakenstheirabilityforself-developmentand the violencesufferfromoneformoranotherofeffectsontheirmental The CVRhasestablishedthatbroadsectorsofthepopulationaffectedby relationships withjealousyandviolence caused resentmentandhascoloredsocialcoexistenceinterpersonal and restorationofth reparations alreadyconstitute thebeginningofaprocesscompensation The CVRbelievesthatits veryexistenceanditsmandatetopropose harms thathavebeencaused democracy, tomakereparations, indispensable, ifwewishtoliveinacivilizedmanner inpeaceand directed learnoftheshockingdimensionswhathappened, itbecomes to doso.OncetheStateauthoritiesandcitizens whomourreportis drama thatoccurredintheearlyyearsofconflict,it isnolongerpossible it hadeverbeenpossibletoclaimignoranceorincomprehension ofthe With thesubmissionofitsreporttocountry, theCVR believesthatif In theopinionofCVR,oneconsequenceinternalarmedconflict R REPARATIONS the CVR notesthatitmust be recognizedthattheviolence,with the CVR erity, was not abletodestroythecapacityofpopulation e victim s’ dignity . . the extentpossible,forserious structed manyofthemostaffected . . . . . 449

GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 450 HATUN WILLAKUY 169. 168. 167. 166. 165. victims, andhelpingthegrieving processfordisappearedcompatriots. forensic anthropologicalwork forachievingjustice,identifyingpossible the CVR. National PlanforForensicAnthropologicalInterventions proposedby estimates, confirmtheimportanceofinitiatingand implementingthe investigations. Thesefigures,whicharesignificantlygreater thanprevious having carriedoutthreeexhumationsand 2,200 preliminary mandate, theCVRhasregistered4,644burialsites at thenationallevel, based ontheinformationobtainedinitsinvestigations. Attheendofits Furthermore, theCVRhaspreparedaNationalRegistry ofBurialSites general. organizations, aswellbyhumanrightsorganizations andcitizensin arguments supportingthedemandforjusticemade byvictimsandtheir findings ofitsinvestigations,theCVRseekstoexpand substantiallythe of 24,000victimstheinternalarmedconflictandingeneralthrough Through thecasesthatitsubmitstoPublicMinistry, theidentification politically viablecountrycannotbebuiltonthefoundationsofimpunity. and, asaconsequence,anendtoimpunity. An ethicallyhealthyand incurred bythevictims,aswellfairpunishmentofperpetrators an effectiveexerciseofjusticeintermsreparationforthedamages No pathtowardreconciliationwillbepassableifitisnotaccompaniedby The CVRbelievesthatjusticeisanessentialpartofthereparationprocess. income generation). institutional reconstruction,communitydevelopment,basicservicesand iii) individualandcollectiveeconomicreparations(programsfor dignity tothevictims;ii)attentioneducationandmentalhealth; on: i)symbolicreparations,therecoveryofmemoryandreturn the State,butalsobysocietyandinternationaldonors.Itplacesemphasis compensation arecombined.TheProgrammustbefinancedcreativelyby in whichindividualandcollective,symbolicmaterialformsof The CVRpresentsthecountrywithaComprehensivePlanforReparations of violenceareprevented. democratic transitionandgovernanceareconsolidatednewscenarios the damagedrelationshipbetweencitizensandState,sothat evenhandedly, reparationsmustalsogenerate civictrust,reestablishing approaches andhabits,thathavenotbeenfreeofracism.Applied acts ofsolidaritythatcontributetoovercomingdiscriminatory For theCVR,reparationmeansreversingclimateofindifferencewith should receivepreferentialtreatmentfromtheState traditionally discriminatedagainstandexcluded,theyaretheoneswho Since thevast poor, majorityofthevictimswere indigenous, peasants, and isanimportantcomponentoftheprocessnationalreconciliation. For theCVR,reparationhasprofoundethicalandpoliticalimplications Additionally, th e CVR ratifiesthefundamentalimportanceof . P ROCESS OFNATIONAL RECONCILIATION 171. 170. underlying themultiplediscordsinhistoryofourRepublic recognition isthebasisforovercomingdiscriminatorypractices recognized asmultiethnic,pluricultural,andmultilingual.That oriented towardanoverarchinggoal:buildingacountrythatispositively between theStateandsocietyinitsentirety. Thesethreelevelsshouldbe family level,insocialorganizationsandtherecastingofrelationship The CVRunderstandsthatreconciliationmustoccuratthepersonaland State andsociety, and among themembersofsociety interprets reconciliationasanewfoundationalpactbetweenthePeruvian reconciliation andbasedontheinvestigationsithasconducted,CVR citizenship forallPeruvians.Givenitsmandatetofosternational The CVRproposesthatthegreathorizonofnationalreconciliationisfull . . 451

GENERAL CONCLUSIONS

1980 CUÁNTO «Movilidadcampesina:Efectos delaViolencia Política en Ayacucho». En 1999 C 1994 C 1997 CEPRODEP Washington DC: AAAS-CIIDH. 1999 B 1991 1989 A 96« 1996 ALL ORONEL ORAL RCE , Patrick, Paul K B , Isabel (eds.). Lima. Perú ennúmeros ción. Fiona Wilson (ed.). (CEPRODEP) andInstitutodeEstudiosPeruanos. to deTrabajo n.º58.Lima:CentrodePromociónyDesarrolloPoblacional «Desplazamiento porviolenciapolíticaenelPerú,1980-1992». Documen- venio CEPRODEP-PRODEV-PAR-UNION EUROPEA. “Study ofDisplacedPersonsinAyacucho Violencia institucionalenGuatemala,1960a Guerra popularenelPerú.ElPensamientoGonzalo. Guerra popularenelPerú. la derrota de Iván, JoséCoronel,Ponciano delPinoyOrinStarn. ORJA Violencia política y respuesta campesina en Huanta». In Degregori,Carlos Violencia políticayrespuestacampesinaenHuanta». In , José , Luis(comp.) Huancayo: Universidad NacionaldelCentro. SL OBRAK Luminoso. 1980 Violencia y espaciosocial:estudiosobre conflictoyrecupera- yHerbertF. S . Richard Webb and GracielaFernándezBacadeValdéz BIBLIOGRAPHY Lima: IEP. PIRER 1993-1997 1996: , “Héroes sinNombre”. una reflexión cuantitativa. México: s.e. Las rondas campesinasy Con- 453

BIBLIOGRAFIA 454 HATUN WILLACUY G 1990 D 2001 2000 D 2001 1995 1991 1981 G 1988 G «Ay 1983a G 2003 G 2003 D 1989 D «RetornodeComunidadesDesplazadasporlaViolencia». PROMUDEH- 2001 D 1999 1983b ONZÁLES ÁLVEZ ESCO EFENSORÍA UZMÁN UZMÁN ORRITI ÍEZ EL EL P P , Alejandro INO INO Sendero. HistoriadelaguerramilenariaenelPerú. n.º 55.Lima:DefensoríadelPueblo. La desapariciónforzadadepersonasenelPerú hoc creada porley Agosto La labordelacomisiónadhoclosinocentesenprisión.Logros yperspectivas. (eds.). Lima. Perú ennúmeros (eds.). Lima. Perú ennúmeros (eds.). Lima. Perú ennúmeros Cronología delosmovimientoscampesinos, 24 «Entrevista delsiglo.Presidente Gonzalorompeelsilencio». 24. Manuscript. Cajamarca. «Report fortheNationalTruth andReconciliationCommission». La problemáticadelosdesplazados. Violencia políticaenelPerú: PAR. Stern, Steve (ed.). In «Familia, culturay«revolución»:VidacotidianaenSenderoLuminoso». «Alan García:Pensando enel83».Interviewwith Alan García. Quehacer, O , Gustavo , Virginia , Abimael . , Ponciano , Ponciano yotros LAECHEA , Raúl acucho: laesperadelgaucho.InterviewwithLuisCisneros Vizquerra».

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BIBLIOGRAFIA 456 HATUN WILLACUY P 2003 1993b «Asumirycombatirporlanueva grandecisiónydefinición». 1993a 1992 «Queelequilibrio estratégicoremezcamáselpaís». 1991d 1991c 1991b 1991a 1989c 1989b «DocumentosfundamentalesdelComitéCentral».InArceBorja1989 «Balancedela1.ªcampañasobre“Impulsar”». 1989a 1988e 1988d «Línea deconstrucciónlostresinstrumentoslarevolución» 1988c «IIIsesióndelICongresoPCP-SL». 1988b «BasesdediscusiónparalalíneapolíticageneraldelPCP». 1988a 1986c 1986b 1986a 1985b 1985a 1984 «P 1982 «¡A 1981 1980c 01«Experiencia delPAR: lecciones pararedefinirlaEstrategia deInterven- 2001 «Prospección yProgramación.ResumenEjecutivo (Ayacucho, Huancaveli- 1994 P 2002 P 1990 ROGRAMA ROGRAMA OLAY C problemas derivadosdelaguerra»,April. «Giro estratégico.Lucharporunacuerdodepazysolución políticaalos «Agreements oftheCentralCommittee»,August. «Session inpreparationfortheThirdPlenary.», July. campaña». «Sobre lasdoscolinas.DocumentodeestudioparaelbalancelaIII «Construir laconquistadelpoderenmediodeguerrapopular»,August. «Sobre campañaderectificación».DocumentoftheCentralCommittee. anniversary oftheChineseRevolution»,September Abimael Guzmánatameetingofleadersandcadrestomarkthe40th a reflexionaryesforzamosporcumplircomocomunistas.Speechby «Conmemoración del40°aniversariodelaRevoluciónChina.Cuestiones «Agreements ofthefirstsessionFirstCongress». Minutes oftheFirstCongress. «Informe sobreeldesarrollodelaluchaarmadaduranteúltimoaño». «Reunión DirecciónCentral,ComitéMetropolitano»,April-May1986. and cadres,March23toApril9. «¡Rematar elGranSaltoconSellodeOro!».Nationalmeetingofleaders «Desarrollar laguerrapopularsirviendoarevoluciónmundial»,August. «Reuniones delBurópolíticoconlosComitéspartidariossobresusplanes». poder delpueblo!»,February. «¡No votar:sinogeneralizarlaguerradeguerrillasparaconquistarel «Sobre basesdelnuevoplan»,April. August. «Hacia laguerradeguerrillas».DocumentodelComitéCentralAmpliado, ción Estatalen Poblaciones Afectadas porlaViolencia Política». Documen- ca, Apurímac yJunín)».Lima:INADE. MinisteriodelaPresidencia. Sinopsis. Informe sobre eldesarrollo humano,Perú2002:aprovechando laspotencialidades- p. 6,19-20. «MRTA actuaráenfuncióndeloquehagaFujimori». AMPOS ensamiento militardelPartido», December. E DE nuestro heroicopueblocombatiente!»,January. STATAL

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EL D ESARROLLO (PAR) (PNUD) Cambio, July 26,1990, T 1985 S 1924 «LasSAISdeJunínylaalternativa comunal». 1989 R «T 2002 «La 1991 2003 1973 R 2003 P 2002 PROMUDEH/PAR 1991 W 2003 S S 1990 «Los 2000 R R R TALIN UNI ÁNCHEZ UICÁN HEIDON OLDÁN EVOLLAR INCÓN ÉNIQUE AMÍREZ IEVIORKA P , Joseph UNI «Plumas ymontañas».ManuscriptbyaPCP-SLmilitant. March. The FoundationsofLeninism. «Guzmán esunpsicópata.Entrevistaexclusivacon Mariátegui. «Esquemas deestudio».Huamanga:CentroTrabajo Intelectual económico productivo».Lima:CVR-Consequencesarea. «Los costoseconómicosdelaviolenciapolítica:unavisióndesdeelcampo Censo porlaPaz pedro Espino.Lima. to elaboradoporPedroFrancke,AugustoCastro,MarfilFranckeyJuan Terrorismo. Laviolencia política dios Peruanos. tal enayacucho». Programa «Reconciliando elpasado,construyendo elpresente:violenciaysaludmen- CEPES. El mitoGonzalo. rio, n.º10.Lima:CEPES. 10. V R , Julio , JoséLuis D , Kimberly , Rodrigo estimony abouttheoriginsandactionsofMRTA». Manuscript. Lima. ERA INCÓN , Eliana , Michel URAND batalla porPuna:Violencia yDemocraciaenlaSierraSur». desplazados porviolenciapolíticaenelPerú». , Norma , Miguel , Óscar 2001. Lima:PROMUDEH,PAR. Lima. Complete Works, Volume VI. Siembra yDemocracia. en el mundo. Barcelona: Plaza Janés Debate Agrario, Lima: InstitutodeEstu- Feliciano». Caretas, Allpanchis, Debate Agra- n.º 55.Puno. n.º 7.Lima: April 457

BIBLIOGRAFIA 458 HATUN WILLACUY La República La Prensa La Crónica Expreso El Peruano El Diario El Comercio Caretas Y 2003 W N 2003 OUNGERS EWSPAPERS IS e, Carol Universidad delPacífico. Reinventando elEstado:estrategiaeconómicaycambioinstitucionalenPerú. Derechos HumanosenelPerú. Violencia políticaysociedadcivilenelPerú:historiadelaCoordinadoraNacional , Colette

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MAGAZINES

CONSULTED Lima: InstitutodeEstudiosPeruanos. Lima: with manyinstitutions,which withitsignedcooperationagreementsandwhose incorporated, insofaraspossible, inthisreport.TheCVRworkedconjunction during theprocessandmade valuablesuggestionsandproposalsthatwere leaders tocreatetheCVR,submitted valuableinformation,accompaniedvictims conditions thatmadethe process feasible,gainedthecommitmentofpolitical Committee andeachofits memberinstitutions.Thesegroupshelpedcreatethe would liketoespeciallyacknowledgetheNationalHuman RightsCoordinating much moredifficultwithouttheactiv expressions ofencouragementandsupportfromvarious people. carried outwhiletheCVRwasworking,aswellthrough publicandprivate expressed confidenceinourwork.Thiswasrevealed invariousopinionsurveys and sometimesirritatingissues,themajorityof population supportedand fight forabetterfuturethemselves,theirfamilies andthoseclosetothem. those who,fromthedepthsoftheirpain,havebeen able tokeephopealiveand time, thevictims’wordshaverevealedhugepotentialandenergywithin and vividlyperceivetheenormousgapsthatstilldividePeruvians.Atsame with theCVR—andshouldenableentirenationtolearnfromourhistory state andsociety. whoworked Listeningtotheseaccountshasenabled everyone of theirtragedies,allwhichweremovingandmeriturgentattentionfromthe offices infargreaternumbersthanexpectedtosharetheirstoriesandthememory and supportedus. would liketobrieflylistthesecollaboratorsandthankallthosewhoaccompanied invaluable collaborationofmanypeopleandpublicprivate institutions.We During itsmandate,theTruth andReconciliationCommissionbenefitedfromthe The creationoftheCVRandsuccessitswork wouldhavebeen Public supportwasessential.EvenwhentheCVRaddressed controversial Our gratitudegoesfirsttothevictimsofviolence,whocameour ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS e roleplayedbyvarious organizations.We 459 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 460 HATUN WILLAKUY the National Penitentiary Institute,theJudiciary, theSupremeCourtof Military of SupportforRepopulation), theMinistryofEducation,Health, University oftheCenterPeru,aswellotherschools. National UniversityoftheJungle,Altiplanoand University ofSanCristóbaldeHuamanga,theHuancavelica, University ofLima,theNationalSanMarcos, Other collaboratorsincludedthePontificalCatholicUniversityofPeru, through agreementsandjointactivitiesinourregionallocalheadquarters. Sciences, andothers.TheCVRalsoreceivedvaluablecooperationfromlocalNGOs S.A., Transparency, RedinfaandtheNetworkfo Roundtable onDisplacement,theMentalHealth,Terra Networks Edhucasalud, theBartolomédelasCasasInstitute,IDS,TVCultura,National Commission ofJurists,thePeruvianPressCouncil,ConsortiumUniversities, Amazon ResearchandOutreach,theHumanRightsCommission,Andean Commission, theCenterofPopulationDevelopmentandOutreach,for Application, thePeruvianConferenceofCatholicBishops’SocialAction the InstituteofPeruvianStudies,CenterAnthropologyandPractical names appearonourWeb site.We alsothanktheProHumanRights Association, the MinistryofW and theNationalPoliceof Peru, theMinistryofDefenseanditsarmedinstitutes, Management ofIllicitlyObtained Money(FEDADOI),theMinistryofInterior President oftheCabinet, theboardofdirectorsSpecialFundfor Wewould alsoliketoacknowledgetheadministrative teamoftheOffice Dañino, LuisSolariandBeatrizMerinosupportedusunder variouscircumstances. which webelonged,theOfficeofPresident Cabinet.MinistersRoberto institutions. Wewould firstliketomentionthesupport providedbythesectorto communities, werealwayswillingtoprovidecoverage ofouractivities. to themanymediaincountrythat,theircommitment toservingtheir with avividimageoftheirhistory. We are alsopleasedtogivespecialrecognition noteworthy effortandastrongsenseoftheirownmission, providedPeruvians Channel N;theweeklynewsmagazine papers that were indifferent wereintheminority. Wewould liketothankthedaily the CVRandwhatitrepresented.Nevertheless,wecansaywithpridethatthose mission, andtherewere—stillaresomethatnotsympathetictoward had beenasleep.Itistruethatnotallthemediawereequallycommittedtoour could understandthetragedysufferedbyourpeople,thusarousingheartsthat them joinedusintraversingvariouspartsofthecountrysothatentirenation Accompaniment fromthemediaandmanyjournalistswasinvaluable.Manyof Cross delegationchiefswerealwaysenthusiasticintheirsupport. Karl MattlandPhillipeGaillard,whoasInternationalCommitteeoftheRed neededlogisticalsupportandassistancefor we responded toourdifficultandrepeatedquestions,butwasalwaystherewhen received fromtheInternationalCommitteeofRedCross,whichnotonly El Comercio Wewould alsoliketohigh As astateagency, theCVRreceived cooperation fromvarious public omen’s , La República Issues andSocialDevelopment (especiallytheProgram and light thewarm andongoingsupportthatwe Correo Caretas ; TVstationsFrecuenciaLatinaand victims. We , andothermediathat,with r theDevelopmentofSocial are deeplygratefulto history andlessonsthatPeruviansmustnotignore. thanks forhavingallowedustoservethecountryand becomemessengersofa and, now, for theirindulgence. And toallthe readersoftheReport,weexpressour generosity we would beimpossibletolisthereallthepersonsand institutionsfromwhose gratitude. TheCVR’sworkwas, toagreat Program. Program, andMarioSolari,programofficeroftheUnited NationsDevelopment Hermida, assistantresidentrepresentativeoftheUnitedNationsDevelopment representatives oftheUnitedNationsDevelopmentProgram,aswellJoséManuel to KimBolducandMartínSantiagoforthesupporttheyprovidedasresident that weknowdemandedgreateffortanddedication.We expressour specialthanks Program (UNDP)formanaging,effectivelyandwithgreatpatience,acomplexproject special appreciationforandacknowledgementoftheUnitedNationsDevelopment their invaluable supportforvarious CVR activities.Wewould liketoexpressour American CulturalInstitute,IDEA like tothanktheInternationalCenterforTransitional Justice,thePeruvian-North Foundation andtheSwedishforHumanRights.Similarly,would we Commonwealth Offi (ASDI), Germany(GTZandDED)England(DFIDtheForeign Foreign Relations;thegovernmentsofBelgium,Holland,Norway, Denmark,Sweden the CanadianInternationalDevelopmentAgencyandMinistryof European Union,theOfficeofUnitedNationsHighCommissionerforRefugees, often faced.ThankstotheUnitedStatesAgencyforInternationalDevelopment, friendship forwhichwewereevenmoregratefulduringthedifficulttimesthat us carryoutourmission,notonlywithfinancialresources,butalsothe and supportfromfriendlygovernmentsinternationalorganizationsthathelped for havingtemporarilyhijackedsomeofhisvaluableprofessionalstaff. Walter Albán andhisteam,itwas po accompanied usonthedifficultroadthatlayaheadofus.ThankstoOmbudsman which notonlylaidthegroundworkforatruthcommissiontofunction,butalso main activitiesoverstate-runradioandtelevisionstations. Television, whichmadeitpossibletobroadcastthepublichearingsandCVR’s would especiallyliketoacknowledgetheNationalInstituteofRadioand Justice andthePublicMinistry(particularlyInstituteofLegalMedicine).We sparing inthe recognitionofeachandevery oneofourworkers.Listing themin whogave theirtimeandsupportedusdirectly.women Itisalsodifficulttobe briefly theintensityof commitmentofthehundredsPeruvianmenand remembering allthepeople whoworkedwiththeCVR.Itisdifficulttodescribe We apologize foranyomissionsfromthisbriefsummaryofourdebt We cannotconcludetheseacknowledgements withoutespecially Last butnotleast,weexpressourgratitudeforthegenerouscontributions Wewould liketogive special benefited. To ce). We thankstotheOpenSocietyInstitute,Ford owe also them, weexpressourwarmest thanksfortheirsupport -Transparency andthe ssible tocarryoutourwork.We apologize

recognition totheOmbudsman’s Office,

extent, avast collective effort,andit Telefónica Foundationfor 461 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 462 HATUN WILLAKUY been impossibletocarryout suchanenormoustask. victims andourwork teams.Without theirstrengthandintegrity, itwouldhave understanding thenation. an understandingofthevictims’needs,andfor proposinganewwayof area, fordevelopingspecificshort-,medium-andlong-range proposalsbasedon the Reconciliationarea,taskforceonInstitutional Reforms andtheEducation the countrytohearvoicesofthosewhohadnever beenheard. darkest facetsofthematterthatwewerechargedwith investigating. and responsibly, inconjunctionwithinternationalexperts,touncover oneofthe integrity tomanystories,andforapplyingthelawin defenseofhumanrights. night togatheringinformationthatwouldserveasevidence, forlisteningwith to them. responded withefficiency, responsibilityandcommitmenttothetasksdelegated of behaviorthatreceivescantexplanationinisolatedreports,andforhaving to theirwork. armed conflict.Theiracademicexcellencewasmatchedonlybytheirdedication timeline oftheviolence,andstudypoliticalsocialactorsininternal depth studies,thereconstructionofregionalhistories,breakdown public aremainlyduetothem. campaigns andtheway inwhichtheCVR’s who workedinthePublicActionGroup.Thedailyinformation,information presence intheirrespectivegeographicalareasdespitemultiplelimitations. might otherwisehavebeenlostinaseaofurgentmatters. supervisors, whodelugedtheInformationSystemsareawithbasicdatathat The editorsoftheaccountsandtypists,aswellcopy with whichwewerecharged. secretaries fortheirtirelessdedicationandconstantsupportthearduoustask the earlymorninghourstomakelifeeasierforallofus.Thanksalso administrative officesoftheregionalheadquarters.We haveseenthemworkinto solidarity withthosewhosuffer. as theirown,andwhoexpressed,throughpresenceattitude,great who traversedmuchofthecountrylisteningforhourstotragediesthattheyfelt an orderthatdoesnotaffectourappreciationforall,weexpressthanksto: The staffoftheDocumentation Center, fortheirpainstaking, detailedwork, The MentalHealthteam, for itsongoingaccompanimentofboththe The Consequencesarea,theComprehensiveProgram forReparations, The membersofthePublicHearingsarea.Theirtireless dedicationenabled The Forensic-AnthropologicalInvestigationsUnitfor workingseriously The membersoftheSpecialInvestigationsUnitfordedicatingdayand The membersoftheLegalTeam, fortheirin-depthexplorationofpatterns The researchersfromvariousfieldswhoparticipatedwithusinthein- The communicators,journalists,photographersandotherprofessionals The membersoftheregionalandzonaloffices,forfacilitatingCVR’s The administrativestaff,bothintheCentralOfficeand The interviewers,whetherpartoffixed,mobileorshort-termteams, message was communicated tothe many CVRworkinggroups,bothinLimaandourregionalheadquarters. selfless effortswereevidentincountlessactivitiesandofgreathelptothe Those whowerepartoftheVolunteer Program(PROVER).Theirenthusiastic, which madeitpossibletoimposelogicandorderontheseaofdocumentsanalyzed. Truth andReconciliationCommission 463 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Crimes and Human Rights violations

Human rights violations by victim’s sex Forced disappearances Perú 1980-2000 Total cases by year and place Women Men 700 605 100 600 16% 18% 13% 27% 24% 100% 20% 500 80 438 400 60 87% 80% 291 84% 82% 76% 300 292 73% 197 40 200 183 157 141 100 74 47 47 20 1 10 18 13 10 15 1 3 5 0 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 0 Forced Kidnapping Arrest Forced Injuries or Sexual Torture recruitment Disappearanc wounds assault Torture Deaths and Disappearances by year they occurred Total cases by year and place

Cases by group responsible for the violence 700 STATE AND COUNTER-INSURGENCY FORCES 600 579 1200 1,094 500 460 425 1000 389 400 800 328 300 305

600 597 195 200 133 204 121 405 392 99 98 400 356 348 331 100 129 124 54 27 26 28 28 8 221 11 200 123 0 111 188 100 77 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 11 4 36 37 18 17 12 5 0 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Death and extrajudicial executions PCP-SL Total cases by year and place 2000 3000 2,889 1,668 2500 1500 1,171 2000 1,116 1,590 1,710 1,609 1000 1,370 923 878 810 1500 1,360 755 1,017 1,012 560 598 604 1000 770 500 392 335 473 846 176 500 664 300 198 120 121 88 75 57 37 37 71 56 45 29 17 52 43 29 0 0 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 The Truth and Reconciliation Commission was given the mandate to investigate violent acts and human rights violations committed between May 1980 and November 2000. The CVR Timeline of the internal armed con ict (1980-2000) organized this period, which spanned 20 years and six months, into ve stages that were marked by political decision or events of the conict that had a nationwide impact.

1980-1990 Start of the armed violence Militarization of the con ict Spread of violence nationwide Extreme crisis: Subversive oensive and counter-oensive 1980 1981 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 V VII III IX XII I VIII VII VIII VI XI V VII III VII

May 17 March January July July 28 June 18-19 November May March July PCP-SL begins armed actions, PCP-SL assault on Huamanga prison First counter-insurgency operations Four common graves President Alan García Pérez Prison massacres (5) MRTA campaign in Massacre in Cayara (6) Worsening of subversive attacks MRTA militants escape from Castro Castro burning ballot boxes in September by the armed forces; death of discovered in Pucayacu (4) inaugurated northern jungle July and rede nition of principal prison (7) Chuschi. Shining Path’s Edith Lagos killed (2) journalists in Uchuraccay (3) August PCP-SL newspaper publishes actors’ military strategies President Alberto Fujimori inaugurated July 28 December Massacre in Accomarca interview with Abimael Guzmán Start of Fernando Belaunde’s Army put in charge of ght administration (1)

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1991-2000 Decline of subversive activities, rise of authoritarianism and corruption

1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 XI II IV VII VIII VII VII XII IV VII IX XI

November 3 February July July 28 December April July September Massacre in Barrios Murder of María Elena Discovery of common grave Fujimori inaugurated for second term Assault on Japanese ambassador’s Rescue of hostages at Japanese Arrest of Oscar Ramírez First corruption video, “Kouri video,” Altos (8) Moyano (9) with remains of La Cantuta residence by MRTA (12) ambassador’s residence (13) Duran, Feliciano (14) revealed (15) April 5 victims November Coup End of Fujimori’s third government July Attack on Tarata Street (10) September Arrest of Abimael Guzmán and other PCP-SL leaders (11)

8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 PCP-Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path)

HISTORY OF THE PCP-SL

1928 - 1930 PCP (Communist Party of Peru, Socialist Party)

“Red Flag” Communist Party 1964 - 1965 Communist Party “Unity” (Pro-China) (Pro-Soviet)

PCP PCP 1967 “Red Homeland” “Red Flag”

PCP-SL GPCR 1970 (heirs of Mao and (Great Proletariat Internal struggle in Chinese Communist Party. the GPCR) Cultural Revolution) Red Guard/Red Book. Mao personality cult. “All-encompassing dictatorship over the bourgeoisies”

Hua Kou Teng Death Den Xiao Peng of Mao

ORGANIZATION OF REGIONAL COMMITTEES

Northern Regional Committee Principal Regional Committee

Huallaga Regional Committee

Mid-North Zone Committee Iquitos Cell

Central Regional Committee Metropolitan Regional Committee

Southern Regional Committee

Mid-South Zone Committee Revolutionary Movement Túpac Amaru (MRTA) The Marxist – Leninist Socialist Revolutionary Party (PSR – ML) and the Left-wing Revolutionary Movement – The Militant (MIR-EM) were the political parties from which the MRTA originated.

February Capture of Víctor Polay and Lucero Cumpa. April 28 June Military Campaign Los Molinos. MRTA’s objective: VII Party uni cation: Marxist – Leninist Socialist Revolutionary To seize the city of Tarma. Party (PSR – ML) and Left-wing Revolutionary Movement – The Armed confrontation between the MRTA and an Army squad. Militant (MIR-EM) Result: 55 members of the MRTA dead. July 28 MRTA members were buried in a common grave in the Jauja cemetery. Inauguration of President Fernando Belaúnde Terry cemetery.

March 1 Central Committee Agreement: to adopt the name Revolutionary July 28 Movement Túpac Amaru (MRTA). Inauguration of President Alberto Fujimori Fujimori The new organization’s name was not made public until January 1984.

January Year 1995 Attack against a police station in Villa el Salvador. Capture of Miguel Rincón Rincón, who was preparing to take The rst MRTA Central Committee meeting was held in Lima. Congress November 27 Capture of Lori Berenson, American citizen MRTA members were arrested in Cusco by police forces. July 28 December 8 Beginning of Alberto Fujimori Fujimori’s second government The kidnapping of reporter Vicky Peláez and her cameraman, Percy Raborg, both from Channel 2, was the rst MRTA action that showed their intention to use to use mass media as part of their strategy.

April First appearance of their online bulletin: Venceremos (We will prevail) May MRTA members successfully interfered with Channel 5’s television transmission to broadcast their own radio station signal: November 4 July A car bomb exploded at the Ministry of the Interior (Ministry in charge of internal security and police forces). President Alan García Pérez’s government began. August 16 December First MRTA press conference. Víctor Polay Campos, Secretary General of the MRTA was in charge. Truce The MRTA takes the residence of the Japanese ambassador in Peru. for Alan García. November 11 A commando group lead by Néstor Cerpa took El Nacional headquarters, a newspaper of national circulation.

August 7 Second MRTA press conference in Lima. End of the one-year long truce for the government of Alan García Pérez. The Process of the Police Forces Under the 1979 Constitution, the police forces were directly responsible for maintaining public order. The police institutions (Civil Guard, Investigative Police of Peru and Republican Guard) were considered part of the police forces of the Ministry of the Interior (formerly the Ministry of Government and Police), in accordance with the provisions of their respective organic laws, passed in 1969 (Decree Laws 18069, 18070 and 18071. These also established that their mission included functions assigned by the chief of the armed forces for internal defense in case of war.

1979 1979 Constitution: “The Police Forces are directly responsible for maintaining 1987 internal order and preserving public order.” Creation of the Special Operational Creation of the Special Operations Bureau (Dirección de Support Group (Grupo Especial de Apoyo Operativo, GEAO) in the PIP. Operaciones Especiales, DOES). First capture of Abimael Guzmán. V Strike by police forces. First capture of Abimael Guzmán.

17 VIII Capture of Alberto Gálvez Olaechea (“Comrade Rodrigo”), a journalist at Cambio and member of the MRTA. 1980

17 III Declaration of the start of the armed struggle by the PCP-SL. 6 XI Invasion of Juanjuí by an MRTA column.

1988 28 VII Inauguration of President Fernando Belaunde Terry. II The police detain MRTA members Hugo Avellaneda and Peter Cárdenas Schulte. June 13 5 IX Dismissal of Civil Guard General Balaguer, director general of the Civil Guard. He is replaced by Civil Guard General Humberto Catter Arredondo.

13 VI DIRCOTE captures Osmán Morote, PCP-SL second-in-command. 1981 Creation of the Anti-Terrorism Division (División contra el Terrorismo, DICOTE)

7 XII Law 24949 signed, creating the 12 X State of emergency declared National Police of Peru under police command in ve provinces of Ayacucho (Huamanga, Creation of a special analysis group in DIRCOTE, under the cover of the Legal Advisory O ce. Huanta, Cangallo, La Mar and Víctor Fajardo).

1982 Increase in number of armed actions by the PCP-SL throughout the 1989 country. 3 II Capture of Víctor Polay Campos (“Comrade Rolando”).

16 IV Capture of MRTA leader Miguel Rincón Rincón.

1983 1990

5 VII Creation of the Anti-Terrorism Bureau (Dirección III Creation of the Special Intelligence Group (Grupo Especial de Inteligencia) in contra el Terrorismo, DIRCOTE) DIRCOTE.

22 X Attack by the Metropolitan Committee of PCP-SL on the o ces of VII Inauguration of President Alberto Fujimori. Popular Action in Lima. 28

1984 1991 31 I GEIN raids a house in Chacarilla del Estanque where the PCP-SL Central Department operated.

20 VII DIRCOTE detains Laura Zambrano (“Comrade Meche”)-

XI Legislative Decree 744: Change in organizational structure (eective January 1992). 1985 DIRCOTE detains various members of the PCP-SL, including Sybila Arredonda (“Luisa”) and Margie Claro Peralta (“Nancy”). 1992 The Special Brigade of Detectives (Brigada Especial de Detectives, BREDET) captures Peter Cárdenas Schulte and Víctor Polay Campos, the top MRTA leader. 28 VII Inauguration of President Alan García Pérez. 15 VIII Reorganization of the police forces under Law 24294 12 IX GEIN detains Abimael Guzmán, Elena Iparraguirre, Laura Zambrano and María Pantoja, leaders of the PCP-SL Central Committee. 1986 X GEIN captures Martha Huatay. 5 II Basic law regulating the police forces approved. 1993 DINCOTE captures Edmundo Cox Beuzeville of the PCP-SL and Lucero Cumpa of the MRTA

18 VI Massacre of PCP-SL prisoners in the San Pedro prison (Lurigancho); 124 inmates die. DINCOTE Organizational Chart – 1992 Director Inspector’s o ce Division chiefs

Instruction Center Secretariat Duty O ce Legal advisory o ce

Technical- Administrative Content Control Criminal O ce O ce

Instruction Unit Welfare O ce

Executive Director

Assistant Director of Assistant Director of Assistant Director of Anti-terrorism Intelligence Metropolitan Anti-Terrorism Regional Anti-Terrorism Special Investigations Division

DIVICOTE I DICOTEM I JECOTES (later DIVICOTES)

DIVICOTE II DICOTEM II DECOTES

DIVICOTE III DICOTEM III SECTOES DIVICOTE IV DICOTEM IV

Counter-Intelligence Division Anti-subversive O ensives First phase, 1983-1986 Historical-Ideological Carried out in the Moyobamba Zone Historical-Ideological Zone. Corridor Zone The armed forces lacked SAN MARTÍN Expansion and adequate intelligence about Supply Zone PCP-SL’s organization and Final Objective Zone methods of operation. Pucallpa Military Actions This campaign struck a heavy blow to PCP-SL’s organization and operational capacity, but at the Huánuco UCAYALI cost of many serious human rights PASCO violations. LIMA JUNÍN

During the First Campaign, troops were sent from the Huancavelica capital to ght the HUANCAVELICA Ayacucho subversives. Abancay Advance of the armed forces APURÍMAC AYACUCHO

Second phase, 1989-1990 HUÁNUCO Centered on the Corridor Zone. If PCP-SL had controlled this zone, it would have surrounded PASCO UCAYALI Lima. LIMA A comprehensive anti-subversive JUNÍN Economic resources from strategy approved in August 1989 is Lima the Expansion Zone had to implemented and becomes the main pass through the Corridor weapon for defeating PCP-SL. Zone to reach the AYACUCHO Historical-Ideological Zone ICA APURÍMAC and the Final Objective Zone. This resulted in human rights violations that were less extensive but more systematic than those of the rst phase. Suvbersive advance

Third phase, 1990-1991 SAN MARTÍN Upper Centered on the Expansion and Steady increase in the Supply Zone. Huallaga Valley number of military personnel and local The Upper Huallaga Valley in Huánuco and San Martín Ucayali residents involved in the and the Ucayali Valley in Ucayali department were the Valley area where PCP-SL accumulated greater military and ghting. HUÁNUCO economic capacity. UCAYALI On the Huallaga Front, the armed forces fought the most di cult battles of the entire conict. JUNÍN