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Home , Beit Hanina, Bethlehem Governorate, E1 (Jerusalem), East Jerusalem, Gilo, Givat HaMatos

A/75/376

Advance Unedited Version Distr.: General 1 October 2020

Original: English

Seventy-fifth session Item 52 of the provisional agenda* Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian People and Other of the Occupied

Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian , including East , and the occupied Syrian Golan

Report of the Secretary-General**

Summary The present report, prepared pursuant to General Assembly resolution 74/88, provides an update on activities in the occupied , including , and the occupied Syrian Golan, from 1 June 2019 to 31 May 2020, highlighting their impact on human rights.

* A/75/150. ** The present report was submitted after the deadline in order to include the most recent information.

A/75/376

I. Introduction

1. The present report, submitted pursuant to General Assembly resolution 74/88, provides an update on the implementation of the resolution from 1 June 2019 to 31 May 2020. It is based on monitoring and other information-gathering activities conducted by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, and on information provided by other United Nations entities in the Occupied Palestinian Territory and by non-governmental organizations. The report should be read in conjunction with recent related reports of the Secretary-General and of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights submitted to the General Assembly and to the Human Rights Council.1 The quarterly reports of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on the implementation of resolution 2334 (2016) concerning the same period2 also provide relevant information. 2. The report presents an update on settlement advancement and its impact on human rights, and examines in particular demolitions and evictions in East Jerusalem and . It also contains an update on Israeli settlements in the occupied Syrian Golan. 3. During the period under review, Israeli settlement activities increased in the occupied West Bank, including East Jerusalem. On 20 April 2020, the parties to the new coalition Government of agreed on terms under which the Prime Minister could put forward a proposal to annex parts of the occupied West Bank.3 Demolitions of Palestinian property and forced evictions increased and settler violence continued at the high levels of the previous reporting period, including during the COVID-19 pandemic, and largely with impunity. These developments exacerbated the coercive environment described in previous reports of the High Commissioner for Human Rights.

II. Legal background

4. International human rights law and international humanitarian law are concurrently applicable in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, namely, Gaza and the West Bank, including East Jerusalem. This includes the de jure applicability of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (Fourth Geneva Convention), which is binding upon Israel as the occupying Power. A detailed analysis of the legal framework applicable in the Occupied Palestinian Territory and the occupied Syrian Golan can be found in previous reports of the Secretary-General.4

III. Activities related to settlements

5. During the reporting period, there was an increase in settlement plan advancements and tenders, particularly in East Jerusalem and surrounding areas. The announcement of the “Peace to Prosperity – A Vision to Improve the Lives of the Palestinian and the Israeli People” by the Government, on 28 January 2020, was followed by calls from members of the Government of Israel to annex parts of the occupied West Bank. The demolition of Palestinian structures in the West Bank, including in East Jerusalem, increased by 19 per cent compared to the previous reporting period and continued at slightly lower levels since the COVID-19 outbreak. Settler violence continued at high levels, resulting in significant property damage, in particular during the outbreak of COVID-19. In the majority of incidents of settler violence which OHCHR monitored, described below, (ISF) failed to protect the Palestinian population, and for most incidents there was no accountability for violence perpetrated in those incidents.

1 A/74/357, A/74/468, A/HRC/43/67, A/HRC/43/21, A/HRC/43/70. 2 See June 2019 oral report (S/PV.8557), September 2019 oral report (S/PV.8557), December 2019 written report(S/2019/938), March 2020 oral report (S/2020/263) See https://unsco.unmissions.org/security-council-briefings-0. 3 https://unsco.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/security_council_briefing_-_23_april_2020.pdf. 4 A/HRC/34/38 and A/HRC/34/39.

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A. Settlement expansion: land designation, planning and tenders

6. Advancement of plans for settlement construction further increased by seven per cent in the reporting period from the already high level of the previous reporting period, with plans for some 11,700 housing units in the West Bank advanced or approved by the Israeli authorities.5 Of these units, 10,400 will be located in , including about 4,400 which had reached the final stages of approval by 31 May 2020. In East Jerusalem, plans for some 1,500 housing units were advanced, about 900 of which had reached the final stage of approval as of 31 May 2020.6 The Government of Israel further announced intentions to advance thousands of units in East Jerusalem, including in and E2, which, if constructed, would sever contiguity of the West Bank, including East Jerusalem (see Section IV). 7. Israeli authorities issued tenders for 1,700 units in Area C settlements, compared with 2,400 during the previous reporting period. In East Jerusalem, tenders were announced for 1,500 housing units.7 8. Official data on settlement construction starts in Area C indicate a decrease from 2,395 units in the previous reporting period to 1,301 units. 9. On 1 December 2019, the Minister of Defence of Israel instructed the Israeli Civil Administration to advance planning procedures for a new settlement in the marketplace in H2 area of .8 10. According to the Israeli NGO , seven new outposts were established during the reporting period,9 compared to 11 in the previous one.10 Previously, between 2007 and 2017, an average 1.7 outposts were established per year.11 All the new outposts are agricultural, which has a greater impact on surrounding Palestinian communities as they take over larger swaths of land and divert water.12 I recall that settlements activities by Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, are violations of international humanitarian law. Although outposts are also considered illegal under Israeli domestic law, Israeli authorities continued to encourage and facilitate the establishment of certain outposts through provision of services and incentives. For example, on 24 February 2020, the Prime Minister of Israel reportedly ordered that 12 outposts be connected to the Israeli electrical grid.13 Israeli authorities demolished structures or prevented construction in at least six outposts, but none was fully dismantled.14

B. Consolidation of settlements

11. Following the announcement of the U.S. “Peace to Prosperity” Vision, the Prime Minister of Israel stated that “Israel will apply its laws to the Valley, to all the Jewish communities in and , and to other areas that the [United States Government’s] plan designates as part of Israel and which the United States has agreed to recognize as part of Israel.”15 He later clarified that such a step would only take place once a joint U.S.-Israeli

5 Compared to 10,900 in the previous reporting period. 6 Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for the Peace Process. 7 In East Jerusalem, the first tender in over two years was issued for 600 units in the previous reporting period. 8 A/HRC/43/67 para. 16 and https://unsco.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/sg_report_on_ the_implementation_of_scr_2334_-_12_december_2019.pdf para 5. 9 Peace Now, on file: Maskiyot South, Nili East, Makhrour outpost, Kedar East ("Mitzpeh Yehuda"), Neriya Ben Pazi's farm, Amichai South, Halamish East. 10 A/74/357, para. 10. 11 A/HRC/43/67, para. 10. 12 A/HRC/40/42, para. 39. 13 https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/elections/.premium-netanyahu-authorizes-west-bank- outposts-connection-to-electrical-grid-1.8569266. 14 https://unsco.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/security_council_briefing_-_30_march_ 2020_2334.pdf and https://unsco.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/sg_report_on_ the_implementation_of_scr_2334_-_12_december_2019.pdf. 15 https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-prime-minister- netanyahu-state-israel-joint-statements/.

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mapping committee agreed on specific areas of the West Bank over which Israel would apply its .16 The committee’s work was ongoing at the end of the reporting period. The Government of Israel announced that it would advance large-scale plans in the areas which appear to be allocated to Israel according to the map included in the Vision (see Section IV below). Other notable advancements in January and February 2020 included the announced plan to declare seven new nature reserves in Area C and to expand 12 existing reserves, for the first time since the 1990s17 and the early advancement of a new large industrial park south of .18 12. On 20 April 2020, the new coalition Government of Israel agreed on terms under which the Prime Minister could put forward a proposal to annex parts of the occupied West Bank for Government or approval.19 On 22 April 2020, the President of the State of stated that he would regard agreements with Israel and the United States "completely cancelled" if Israel moved forward with such steps.20 On 19 May, he announced that the and the Palestinian Liberation Organization were absolved “of all the agreements and understandings with the American and Israeli governments and of all the obligations based on these understandings and agreements, including the security ones.”21 The following day, Palestinian officials formally notified Israeli counterparts of the termination of security coordination. 13. If implemented, of any part of the West Bank would constitute a most serious violation of , including the UN Charter.22 It would also severely impede the exercise by the Palestinian people of its right to self-determination, and be a major obstacle to the achievement of the two-State solution and a just, lasting and comprehensive peace.23 Such a step would entrench the establishment of settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, which has no legal validity and constitutes a flagrant violation under international law.24

Hebron 14. On 23 December 2019, the Court confirmed after appeal the eviction of the Israeli settlers who have occupied the Palestinian-owned ‘Al Bakri’ house in Tel Rumeida, Hebron, since 2001. After 14 years of legal proceedings, the Jerusalem Magistrate Court had ruled on 12 March 2019 that the Bakri family owned the property and that the settlers had acted in bad faith by using forged documents to claim ownership, and ordered them to evacuate the property within 45 days.25 Israeli authorities had previously ordered the settlers to evacuate in 2006, 2008 and 2012, without result. The latest court decision had not been implemented by the end of the reporting period. 15. On 12 May 2020, the Ministry of Defence of Israel assumed municipal planning authority over the Ibrahimi Mosque/Tomb of the Patriarchs in Hebron from the Palestinian Hebron Municipality, on the stated grounds that the site should be made accessible to persons with disabilities with the construction of an elevator.26 The order allowed 60 days for objections.

16 https://unsco.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/security_council_briefing_- _24_february_2020_0.pdf 17 https://unsco.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/security_council_briefing_-_21_january_2020.pdf. 18 https://peacenow.org.il/en/1739-settlement-units-promoted-eli-settlement-housing-legalized-new- industrial-park. 19 https://unsco.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/security_council_briefing_-_23_april_2020.pdf. 20 https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/04/pompeo-annexation-occupied-west-bank-ultimately- israel-200422163510199.html. 21 S/2020/555, para. 40. 22 S/2020/596, annex I. 23 S/RES/2334. 24 S/RES/2334. 25 CS 12278-02-14, available in Hebrew at http://peacenow.org.il/wp- content/uploads/2019/03/Bakri_eviction_verdict_120319.pdf. 26 https://unsco.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/security_council_briefing_-_20_may_2020_0.pdf.

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Regularization of outposts 16. According to the Israeli NGO Peace Now, four outposts were regularized under Israeli law through the approval of plans that retroactively included the outposts27 as neighbourhoods of existing settlements.28 Plans to similarly regularize the outposts of Mevo'ot Yericho, Governorate, and Haroeh Ha'ivri, near the Palestinian community of Khan al-Ahmar-Abu al-Helu, east of Jerusalem, were deposited in February and March 2020 respectively.

C. Impact of settlements on human rights

Settlement-related violence 17. According to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), incidents of settler violence continued at a high level, with 337 incidents recorded during the reporting period,29 compared to 357 in the previous one. Killings of and injuries to and the severity of attacks decreased slightly. No Palestinians were killed by settlers, while a 17-year-old Israeli girl was killed by Palestinians at the Ein Bubin in the West Bank in an attack in which her father and brother were severely injured30. The number of Palestinians injured31 by settlers decreased from 133 in the previous reporting period to 116, with no injuries from live ammunition reported. Twenty-one were injured by Palestinians compared to 37 in the previous reporting period. Incidents of property damage by settlers slightly increased to 266, with 8,591 trees vandalized.32 Attempts by settlers to enter and attack Palestinian communities continued to cause friction between ISF and Palestinians. ISF killed one Palestinian and injured 230 in such contexts.33 18. Governorate continued to account for the largest part (27 per cent) of settler violence incidents, while 50 per cent of the injuries due to settler violence were recorded in .34 The High Commissioner for Human Rights has reported on how repeated and apparently organized settler violence, coupled with other coercive factors, has forced several Palestinian families to leave their homes in those areas.35 19. A series of settler attacks were recorded in H2 in Hebron during a Jewish religious celebration, on 22-23 November 2019. In all incidents, ISF were present but did not take action to protect Palestinians. On 22 November 2019, in Wadi al Hussein neighbourhood, a group of around 50 settlers beat (including with batons) and pepper sprayed members of an extended Palestinian family outside a shop. Six men and one woman were injured, one of them seriously. On 23 November 2019, three settler attacks took place in the restricted area of Tel Rumeida. In one incident, a large group of settlers threw stones and bottles at the house of a local human rights defender. One stone entered through a window and struck a one-year old boy in the head, causing injury. ISF denied entry of an ambulance to Tel Rumeida. After soldiers outside the house had failed to contain the settlers for 20 minutes, six Palestinian men and women carried the boy to a checkpoint, and were pepper sprayed by settlers on the way. The boy was treated in hospital. The same day, in the same area, another group of settlers entered a building where two Palestinian women (one of whom was pregnant) and their five children - aged between two days and eight years old - were present. In agitated state, the settlers threw empty bottles on the doors and stairway, causing damage to the property. Due to a sudden movement, one of the women who had recently given birth started bleeding after her surgical stitches opened. ISF prevented the ambulance from entering Tel

27 Brosh, Givat Salit, Ibei Hanahal and Haresha. 28 Peace Now, on file. 29 Only incidents resulting in injuries or property damage are included. 30 Compared to four Palestinians and five Israelis killed in the previous reporting period. 31 Injured; people physically hurt and treated at a medical facility or on site by paramedic personnel, https://www.ochaopt.org/page/settler-related-violence. 32 Compared to 246 incidents and over 8,300 trees vandalized in the previous reporting period. 33 During the previous reporting period, ISF killed four Palestinians and injured 295 in such circumstances. 34 OCHA, https://www.ochaopt.org/page/settler-related-violence. 35 A/HRC/43/67, paras. 46-59.

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Rumeida, forcing two paramedics to cross the checkpoint by foot to treat the woman. Around two hours later, a group of four to five settlers entered a shop nearby. One of them pepper sprayed five young Palestinian males, including a 16-year old boy in a wheel-chair.36 Two soldiers stationed nearby stopped and spoke to the settlers after the attack, but let them leave without taking any action. 20. On 15 December 2019, a group of six settlers threw stones at three Palestinian women and a four-year old girl who were sitting in the yard of their house in Madama village, adjacent to settlement, . As they fled into the house, two of the women were hit with stones and one of them - at the time five months pregnant - fell twice. She reported that she was later treated in the hospital for an injury to her shoulder and for medical examination of possible complications related to the pregnancy. Another 20 settlers gathered and smashed three windows with iron pipes and threw one stone into the house, before a group of Palestinians approached the house, prompting the settlers to leave. Fearing further attacks, the family relocated for over two months. 21. The cases illustrate that Palestinian women are particularly targeted by settler violence in their homes during the day, when men are usually absent. Furthermore, pregnant women and women who have recently given birth may suffer additional injury or other consequences from such attacks. 22. Settlers also attacked Palestinians and their property following ISF law enforcement measures against settlers, leaving messages suggesting these attacks were acts of retribution. A series of incidents resulting in damage to Palestinian property marked with graffiti conveying threats or hate speech37 occurred following demolitions in the outpost of Kumi Ori, near Yitzhar settlement, in Nablus Governorate, on 15 January 2020.38 On 24 January 2020, a mosque in Sharafat neighbourhood, East Jerusalem, was partially burned by three masked men who left the following graffiti on the mosque: “You demolish for , Kumi Ori demolishes for the enemies”. On 28 January 2020, unknown assailants set fire to a classroom of the Eynabous school, Nablus Governorate. Graffiti at the site read “You are demolishing homes? That is only for enemies! Regards from Kumi Ori.” At least eight attacks of this type took place between 24 October and 19 December 2019 in Nablus, Qalqiliya and Governorates, with over 70 vehicles and other property of Palestinians damaged and marked with similar messages, following the imposition of a closed military area in Kumi Ori, in October 2019, which barred settlers from entering this area. 23. As in previous years, settler violence peaked during olive harvest and spring months. In 2019, in conjunction with severe restrictions imposed by Israeli authorities on access to land for Palestinians seeking to harvest, OCHA recorded 60 incidents of settler violence against farmers across the West Bank, with 45 per cent of them in Nablus Governorate.39 The attacks resulted in 10 Palestinians injured, damage to over 2,700 trees, and theft of approximately 160 tons of produce.40 Despite significant movement restrictions imposed by both the Israeli and Palestinian authorities during the COVID-19 pandemic, settler violence increased in the spring of 2020, in particular in terms of damage to Palestinian property. 24. The monthly rate of settler violence from March to May 2020 was over 20 per cent higher than during the same period in 2019.41 This significant increase is particularly alarming, as it happened despite the almost total lockdown in the West Bank during March and April in the context of the COVID-19 outbreak. Amidst almost daily attacks in some areas at the beginning of the outbreak, according to media, ISF did not appear to enforce the movement restrictions vis-à-vis settlers and reportedly accompanied them on several

36 Two were treated on the spot and three were briefly treated in the hospital for burns. 37 Such incidents are often referred to as “price tag attacks” by authorities and in media. See A/HRC/40/42, para. 30. 38 The ISF have also reported several instances of settlers attacking ISF in and around the outpost, see for example https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-israeli-soldier-wounded-by-west-bank- settlers-throwing-stones-military-says-1.8010112 and https://www.haaretz.com/israel- news/.premium-firebombs-hurled-at-border-police-vehicle-in-yitzhar-settlement-1.8715546 39 https://www.ochaopt.org/content/record-yield-reported-2019-olive-harvest. 40 Ibid. 41 OCHA, https://www.ochaopt.org/page/settler-related-violence.

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occasions.42 On 9 April, ISF reportedly placed 20 settlers from the so called “hilltop youth” - a group from outposts and settlements around Nablus - in an improvised quarantine site near Jericho, after they had been in contact with a confirmed COVID-19 patient. Two of them were reportedly arrested five days later, suspected of having thrown stones and tear gas canisters at three Palestinians and of setting fire to two cars near the quarantine site.43 Human rights organizations also reported cases of settlers spitting on Palestinians during attacks, causing fear of exposure to COVID-19 and prompting victims to go into quarantine or self- isolation.44 In several incidents, settlers appeared to attempt to take over Palestinian land, taking advantage of the restricted movement of Palestinians due to the state of emergency.45 For example, on 6 April, 10 settlers attempted to install a fence on Palestinian lands in Ash Shuyukh village, Hebron Governorate. When the owners arrived, settlers threw stones, used electric tasers and pepper spray, and unleashed dogs. One Palestinian sustained a dog bite to the leg and others bore bruises. When ISF arrived, they ordered the Palestinians to leave their land, firing tear gas and stun grenades. The Palestinians filed a complaint to the Israeli police. 25. As the occupying Power, Israel has the obligation to take all the measures in its power to restore and ensure, as far as possible, public order and life in the Occupied Palestinian Territory and to protect the Palestinian population against all acts or threats of violence in all circumstances.46 All incidents of settler violence must be promptly, fully and impartially investigated. Israel also has the obligation to respect, protect and fulfil the human rights of the Palestinian population, including their rights to life and security of person; as well as the right to health, including during the COVID-19 pandemic.47

Accountability for settler violence 26. The Secretary-General and the High Commissioner have on many occasions reported on the prevailing climate of impunity that exists for settlers and those taking over private Palestinian land.48 In August 2019, the Ministry of Justice of Israel released a report listing 118 investigations into allegations of ideologically motivated crimes perpetrated by settlers against Palestinians and ISF between January 2017 and June 2019. The report indicates that investigations resulted in 11 indictments filed, two trials and no convictions.49 Forty-six cases were still under investigation or prosecution stages. During that period, 559 incidents of settler attacks against Palestinians were reported.50 27. During this reporting period, OHCHR followed up on accountability for 11 cases of settler violence that occurred between 11 July 2018 and 19 October 2019, including the killing of three Palestinians, which were reported on in the previous reports of the Secretary- General and the High Commissioner for Human Rights.51 28. Concerning the killings, the OHCHR review revealed that one suspect was arrested and indicted in one case, while no perpetrator has been held accountable in the other two

42 https://www.wattan.net/ar/news/304131.html; https://www.wattan.net/ar/news/304306.html; https://www.wattan.net/ar/news/304336.html; https://www.alwatanvoice.com/arabic/news/2020 /03/16/1322491.html. 43 https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-settler-youths-flee-military-run-coronavirus- quarantine-steal-army-tents-1.8770302 and https://www.btselem.org/press_releases /20200423_violent_attacks_by_settlers_spike_in_april. 44 https://www.btselem.org/press_releases/20200423_violent_attacks_by_settlers_spike_in_april. 45 On 5 March 2020, the Palestinian President proclaimed by presidential decree a state of emergency in the State of Palestine valid for one month due to the outbreak of COVID-19. The state of emergency was later prolonged and valid as of the end of the reporting period. Severe restrictions on movement and assembly have been implemented during the vast part of the state of emergency. 46 Hague Regulations, articles 43 and 46; Fourth Geneva Convention, article 27. 47 A/HRC/34/38, paras. 13, 36 and 37. 48 See A/74/357, para. 27; A/70/351 para. 23; A/HRC/25/38, paras. 42-47; A/HRC/43/67, paras. 26-29; A/HRC/31/43, para. 37; and A/HRC/34/39, para. 18. 49 A/HRC/43/67, para. 27, available in English at https://s3-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/files.yesh- din.org/Law+enforcement+settlers+official+reports/Moj+report+om+Law+Enforcement+in+the+Wes t+Bank++-+28.8.19.pdf. 50 OCHA, see A/HRC/43/67, para. 27. 51 A/74/357, para. 22, 45, 46, 49, 56, 59 and 61, and A/HRC/43/67, para. 20, 22, 24 and 58.

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cases. Thus, one settler was indicted for the manslaughter of a Palestinian woman on 12 October 2018, near Nablus.52 In May 2019, he was however released to house arrest, and on 2 May 2020, he was permitted to return to the settlement in the West Bank where he used to live despite objections by the state prosecutor that he presented a danger to the public.53 The trial has not advanced since the indictment.54 Concerning the killing of a man by settlers in Al Mugghayyer, Governorate, on 26 January 2019,55 witnesses were interviewed and the police collected evidence, including video footage, in February 2019. The family of the victim has since not received any updates on the investigation and no arrests were reported. In another case, on 3 April 2019, two settlers shot and killed a 23-year-old Palestinian man south of Nablus, after he had thrown stones at Israeli vehicles, and injured another.56 The man’s family reported that they did not file a complaint because ISF had publicly stated that the man had attacked the settlers. The man who was injured in the same incident filed a complaint, but had not received any information on the investigation as of the end of the reporting period. In May 2020, in response to a request by a Member of the Knesset, the Israeli State Attorney reportedly stated that the killing was lawful based on the findings of the police.57 29. In the other eight cases which OHCHR reviewed where violence resulted in injuries or property damage, no perpetrators were held accountable. In four of the cases, the victims did not submit any complaint or withdrew it, reporting that they had received threats or feared reprisals from settlers, that numerous complaints they had previously filed about settler violence had not led to any investigation, or that they lacked trust in, and knowledge of, the Israeli legal system. In one case where a complaint was submitted, the settler (an off-duty soldier) was suspended from ISF and arrested on 4 June 2019 on suspicion of setting fire to Palestinian property on 16 May 2019, which had been captured on video footage.58 Yet, no indictment was reported according to available information. In the other four cases where complaints were submitted, no steps to investigate had been reported to the victims as of the end of this reporting period, even though the incidents took place up to two years ago. The Palestinian Red Crescent Society reported it had not received any information about investigations following their complaints to the Israeli police about four59 settler attacks against their ambulances in Hebron between July and November 2018.60 The non- governmental organization Youth Against Settlements, which filed a complaint about an incident of settler violence during which Palestinians were injured on 24 December 2018,61 had received no information. They reported two new incidents of settler violence in April and May 2020. 30. For incidents of settler violence which occurred during this reporting period, some victims reported they had not filed complaints to the Israeli police for similar reasons as noted above. For example, on 22 November 2019, four adult settlers kicked, slapped and pepper sprayed a 10-year old boy in the street in Wadi Al Hussein neighbourhood in H2 of Hebron. A soldier stationed at a nearby checkpoint took no action. The boy was treated in hospital for burns from the pepper spray and bruises and was discharged the same day. The family reported they had not submitted a complaint for fear of reprisals from the settlers and due to failure by the police to investigate their previous numerous complaints about settler violence. 31. The Israeli human rights organization Yesh Din reported that 75 per cent of victims did not file a complaint in 28 settler violence incidents62 it monitored during the olive harvest

52 A/74/357, para. 45. 53 A/74/357, para. 45 and https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-suspected-killer-of- palestinian-woman-can-go-back-to-settlement-home-court-rules-1.8815179. 54 In January 2020, the Ministry of Defense of Israel denied the woman’s husband compensation for an ‘act of hostility’ because she did not have Israeli citizenship or residence permit. 55 A/74/357, para. 22. 56 A/74/357, para. 46. 57 https://www.inn.co.il/News/News.aspx/436210. 58 A/74/357, para 49. 59 The four incidents are counted as one case for the purpose of this review. 60 A/74/357, para. 61 and A/HRC/40/42, para. 43. 61 A/74/357, para 59. 62 Including violence resulting in property damage.

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in 2019. In most cases, the reason given was loss of trust in the law enforcement system.63 Yesh Din reported that in the 308 investigation files it monitored between 2014 and 2019, the rate of indictment decreased to four per cent between 2017 and 2019, compared to an overall rate of nine per cent between 2014 and 2019.64 32. In a significant development, on 18 May 2020, a settler was convicted for murder, attempted murder and additional charges for the arson attack that killed a Palestinian family (two adults and a toddler) in 2015. No sentence has yet been handed down, including regarding another settler convicted in the case in October 2019 for “conspiracy to commit a crime motivated by a racist motive”, following a plea deal.65 33. Deficiencies in the justice system to hold settlers accountable for violence against Palestinians, include the application of different legal systems to settlers and Palestinians,66 the persistent and prevailing lack of thorough and impartial investigations,67 the very low rate of indictments and convictions reported between 2017 and 2019, frequently delayed processes, and lenient charges. Fewer complaints are submitted by Palestinians due to distrust in the Israeli legal system and fear of reprisals. While efforts have been made by the Israeli authorities in recent years to prevent, investigate and prosecute particular incidents of settler violence, overall these deficiencies sustain a climate of impunity for settler violence, encouraging attacks to continue.

Demolitions, forced evictions and displacement 34. Demolitions and forced evictions referred to below entail numerous human rights violations, exacerbate the coercive environment and raise concerns about the risk of forcible transfer. They also continue to raise concern about compliance with the relevant provisions of international humanitarian law that are binding on the occupying Power, including the prohibition of destruction of property and institutions dedicated to education.68 35. During the reporting period, Israeli authorities demolished 606 structures in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, displacing 778 people (194 women, 182 men, 177 girls and 225 boys).69 In the previous reporting period, 511 structures were demolished, displacing 641 people. The majority of the demolitions took place in Area C (427 demolished structures, displacing 465 people), and the most affected areas were East Jerusalem (122), Hebron Governorate (126), (110) and Bethlehem (110). Demolitions more than tripled during Ramadan in 2020 compared to 2019.70 36. Demolitions and confiscations continued during the COVID-19 pandemic at only a slightly lower monthly rate than in the previous period,71 leaving Palestinians without adequate housing, medical facilities and access to water, thereby seriously increasing the risk of COVID-19 infection in the West Bank. On 26 March 2020, in Ibziq village, Jordan Valley, the Israeli Civil Administration demolished one residential structure (displacing two persons), and dismantled and confiscated eight tents and equipment (including a water tank, a generator and spraying devices) for lack of a building permit. Some tents were assigned as clinical facilities. 37. Military Order No. 1797 came into effect in July 2019, authorizing the Israeli Civil Administration to remove new structures built without a permit72 in Area C within 96 hours.73

63 https://www.yesh-din.org/en/reaping-with-sorrow-a-summary-of-the-2019-olive-harvest/. 64 https://s3-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/files.yesh- .Law+Enforcement+Data+Sheet+12.2019+ENG.pdf/ דצמבר+ +2019דף+נתונים+חוק/אנגלית/din.org 65 A/HRC/43/67, para. 27. 66 A/HRC/43/67, para. 29 and A/68/513 para. 12. 67 A/HRC/40/42, para. 55; A/71/355, para. 50; A/HRC/34/38, para. 38; and A/HRC/37/43, para. 23. 68 Fourth Geneva Convention, article 53; Hague Regulations, articles 46 and 56 (as noted in A/HRC/34/38, paras. 21 and 33). 69 OCHA. 70 OCHA. 71 A monthly average of 43 demolitions during COVID-19 compared to 51 for the entire reporting period. 72 https://www.ochaopt.org/poc/17-30-march-2020. 73 A/74/357, para. 37.

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The order can be applied to residential structures only if these were inhabited for less than 30 days.74 It was used to demolish 47 structures since it came into effect.75 The order has further limited opportunities for legal recourse,76 and only one appeal against demolition based on the order has been successful. 38. Israeli authorities demolished three school-related structures77 during the reporting period, which affected 181 students and teachers, while 51 schools (43 in Area C and eight in East Jerusalem) were under “stop work” or demolition orders as of 31 May 2020.78 On 16 January 2020, in Hebron, in Birin herding community, ISF demolished the foundation for new school premises intended to serve 60 students.79 The demolition order was based on Military Order No. 1797 and delivered to the school representatives 96 hours before demolition.

Impact of settlements on Palestinian communities at risk of forcible transfer 39. The publicly stated intention of the Government of Israel to relocate thousands of Palestinians residing in Area C remains a key concern and contributes to a coercive environment.80 Some 18 communities in and around East Jerusalem are at particular risk of forced eviction, including the Bedouin community of Khan al-Ahmar-Abu al-Helu.81 The Israeli Government’s stated intention to move ahead with annexation of parts of the occupied West Bank increases this risk.

IV. Settlement expansion, demolitions and evictions in East Jerusalem and Bethlehem

40. In the weeks leading up to the March 2020 Israeli election, and following the publication of the U.S. “Peace to Prosperity” Vision , the Government of Israel advanced or announced its intention to advance thousands of settlement housing units in and around East Jerusalem. If constructed, these plans would further consolidate the ring of settlements around East Jerusalem, severing it from the rest of the West Bank. This would further restrict the freedom of movement of Palestinians living in East Jerusalem, negatively impact other rights, increase the risk of forcible transfer for nearby Palestinian communities, and seriously impede the exercise by the Palestinian people of the right to self-determination and undermine the possibility of a contiguous Palestinian state.

A. Settlements plans around East Jerusalem

41. On 9 February 2020, a plan to create a new large settlement of 9,000 units in the area of old Qalandiya/ airport, north of Jerusalem, was advanced in early stages of approval.82 The construction would disrupt the contiguity of territory between East Jerusalem and the Ramallah area. 42. On 24 February 2020, tenders were announced for 1,077 housing units in a new settlement in Givat Hamatos, in the southern part of East Jerusalem.83 Publication of the tenders, initially scheduled for 3 May, has been delayed to an unknown date as of the end of

74 Ibid. 75 OCHA. 76 A/74/357, para. 37. 77 OCHA. 78 Data from the education cluster of the United Nations country team. 79 OCHA. 80 A/HRC/34/39, para. 44; A/72/564, paras. 36–57. 81 A/73/410, para. 22; A/74/357, para. 36; A/HRC/37/43, para. 25; A/HRC/43/67 para. 33. 82 https://peacenow.org.il/en/plan-advanced-for-a-new-settlement-in-atarot-in-the-heart-of-palestinian- east-jerusalem. 83 https://unsco.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/security_council_briefing_-_30_march_2020_ 2334.pdf According to Ir Amim, the tenders had not been published for bidding as at the end of the reporting period.

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the reporting period. The Prime Minister of Israel also announced his intention to advance the expansion of the nearby settlement, with 2,200 housing units.84 Such construction would further consolidate the ring of settlements along the southern perimeter of Jerusalem, separating the Palestinian areas of the city from Bethlehem and the southern West Bank. 43. On 25 February 2020, the Prime Minister of Israel further announced that the Government would advance plans for the construction of over 3,400 housing units in the area of 12 square kilometres known as E1, adjacent to Ma’aleh Adumim settlement, between East Jerusalem and Jericho.85 Two plans for E1 settlement were deposited for objections in early March 2020.86 Construction in the E1 area would effectively cut the West Bank into two parts. On 9 March 2020, the Minister of Defence of Israel advanced a plan for a so-called “sovereignty road” between the southern and northern West Bank for Palestinians. The road would bypass the Ma'ale Adumim settlement and areas around it, effectively preventing Palestinians from entering E1. The Minister stated that its construction would enable settlement construction in E1. 44. On 6 May 2020, the Minister of Defence of Israel announced his intention to advance some 7,000 housing units south of Bethlehem, in the area known as E2, as part of the settlement.87 Israel declared the area as State land in 2004 and allocated it for settlement development in December 2018.88 If constructed, it threatens to carve up the West Bank89 and fragment its southern part.

B. Demolitions and evictions paving the way for settlement expansion

45. In East Jerusalem, demolitions and seizure decreased, but continued at the high levels seen since 2016, with 122 demolitions that displaced 249 people.90 These included 52 self- demolitions,91 which have increased since 2018, likely due to more severe fines and charges imposed by Israeli municipal authorities92 and the amendment to the Planning and Building Law enabling expedited demolitions.93 46. In ,94 demolitions and seizure reached the highest levels since OCHA started systematically recording demolitions in 2009, with 110 structures demolished and 130 people displaced in the reporting period, compared to the yearly average of 26 demolitions for 2010-2018.95 47. The recent demolitions took place near areas of Bethlehem and East Jerusalem where the expansion of the settlements ring around East Jerusalem was announced or advanced.96

84 According to Ir Amim, the master plan and a detailed outline plan for Har Homa were discussed in March 2020, but not yet approved by the Jerusalem planning and building committee. 85 https://unsco.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/security_council_briefing_-_30_march_2020_2334 .pdf and https://peacenow.org.il/en/netanyahu-promotes-the-construction-in-e1#inbox/_blank. 86 Ir Amim, on file, and https://peacenow.org.il/en/road-allow-e1-construction-is-being-promoted. 87 https://peacenow.org.il/en/bennett-announces-intention-to-build-new-settlement-in-e2. 88 A/74/357, para. 8. 89 A/70/351, para. 19. 90 This only includes areas of East Jerusalem located in Jerusalem Governorate and excludes areas located in Bethlehem Governorate. During the previous reporting period, 197 demolitions occurred, displacing 253 people. Between 2009 and 2016, an average of 76 demolitions were conducted annually and the trend subsequently increased. 91 Compared to 52 in the previous reporting period, see A/74/357, para. 31. 92 A/74/357, para. 31. 93 OCHA, https://www.ochaopt.org/content/new-legislation-impedes-challenges-demolitions-and- seizures-west-bank and Humanitarian Bulletin: occupied Palestinian territory, September 2019, p. 5. 94 Including areas in East Jerusalem located in Bethlehem Governorate. 95 OCHA, https://www.ochaopt.org/data/demolition. 96 The most affected communities and neighbourhoods were Jabal Al Mukkaber (45 demolitions), Za’atara (20), (19), (16), Al Walajah (16), Al Khadr (12), (12), (12), Al Issawiya (12), (12) - all located near areas where such expansion is taking place.

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Self-demolition in East Jerusalem 48. Multiple Palestinians in East Jerusalem were forced to carry out self-demolitions, as it is almost impossible for them to obtain building permits due to the discriminatory Israeli zoning and planning regime97 and the imposition of large fines and charges. The amendment to the Planning and Building Law enacted in 2017, which started to apply to all structures as of October 2019, limits the possibility to freeze demolition orders to one year, and only in exceptional circumstances, making the retroactive legalization of construction more difficult. The amendment further limits legal recourses against demolitions, reinforcing the discriminatory zoning and planning regime.98 49. On 9 June 2019, a woman demolished her house in Sur Baher, East Jerusalem,99 to avoid paying hefty fines and charges. A demolition order was issued in 2012 and frozen until April 2019, when it was confirmed in court, giving the woman 45 days to demolish her house for lack of a building permit. The demolition led to the displacement of the woman and her six children (including five minors), exacerbating their economic difficulties as the family depends on widow allowances. The demolition also placed them at higher risk of prevalent discriminatory social practices against women and female-headed households. 50. On 1 February 2020, a family (four adults and three children) in Jabal Al Mukkaber neighbourhood was forced to demolish its house, built on their private land. Following the family’s appeal of a demolition order issued seven years before, the Jerusalem Municipal Court confirmed the demolition in February 2019, issuing a fine of 35,000 ILS (approximately 10,000 USD) and ordering the family to obtain a building permit before 27 December 2019, which they were denied. The family reported being informed that the Municipality would charge 100,000 ILS (approximately 29,000 USD) for the demolition, mainly paying for protection by ISF. The house lay directly above the planned route of an underground tunnel, which is part of the Eastern ring road that would connect several settlements in East Jerusalem and its periphery.

Evictions based on Absentee Property Law and ownership prior to 1948 51. Two of the main laws that have been used as a basis to evict Palestinians from their properties in East Jerusalem in favour of settler organizations are the Absentee Property Law and the Legal and Administrative Matters Law.100 The Absentee Property Law,101 enacted in 1950, allows confiscation of property from Palestinians in areas where “the law of the State of Israel applies”, if the owner of the property fled or otherwise was outside that area after 27 November 1947.102 Since Israel annexed East Jerusalem, property in East Jerusalem owned by Palestinians residing outside the city was determined by Israeli authorities as “absentee property” based on claims initiated by settler organizations, and in some cases transferred or sold to settler organizations.103 Notwithstanding the illegality of annexation under international law, the Israeli Supreme Court accepted such confiscations in a decision on 15 April 2015, while stipulating that the law should be invoked extremely rarely in East Jerusalem, and only with the express permission of the Attorney General in each case.104 The Legal and Administrative Matters Law permits claims for restitution of property in East Jerusalem owned by Jewish persons before 1948, but not for Palestinian claims of ownership in before 1948. It is estimated that hundreds of properties have been taken over by settlers in East Jerusalem since the 1980s based on the two laws, as well as through

97 A/HRC/34/38, para. 26. 98 A/HRC/43/67, para. 32. 99 Most of Sur Baher is located within an area unilaterally annexed by Israel as part of the Israeli Jerusalem municipality. Other parts are located in Areas A, B and C of the West Bank, but the Barrier encloses them to the Jerusalem side of the Barrier. See https://www.ochaopt.org/content/threat- demolitions-east-jerusalem. 100 A/70/351, paras. 30-31. 101 Informal translation to English available at https://www.adalah.org/uploads/oldfiles/Public/files/ Discriminatory-Laws-Database/English/04-Absentees-Property-Law-1950.pdf. 102 A/70/351, paras. 30-31. 103 Ibid. and https://law.acri.org.il//pdf/unsafe-space-en.pdf p. 35. 104 CA 2250/06 Custodian of Absentees’ Property et al. v Daqaq Nuha et al.

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archaeological or tourism projects and transactions involving Palestinian property, including fraudulent purchases.105 52. On 10 July 2019, the Israeli authorities evicted a Palestinian family (one woman and four children) in Wadi Al Hilweh in Silwan, East Jerusalem. Two days before the eviction, the High Court of Justice rejected the family’s request for leave to appeal. Since the early 1990s, the settler organization Elad had attempted to take over the property through four law suits, three of which were dismissed by the Jerusalem District Court as partially based on falsified documents.106 In 2009, the District Court determined that two persons owning one fourth of the property should be considered “absentees” under the Absentee Property Law because they resided outside East Jerusalem. The evicted woman is the daughter of one of the persons considered an “absentee”. The Custodian of Absentees’ Property then sold the so-called absentee property to Elad. During the legal procedures, Elad reportedly bought another 50 per cent of the property from owners living abroad, who likely would have been considered as “absentees” if they had not sold the property, meaning that they would have received no compensation. 53. Nearly 100 families comprising around 700 Palestinians residing near the of East Jerusalem, in Silwan, have been undergoing similar legal processes. On 30 September 2002, the Custodian of Absentee Property released the land where these families live to the Jewish Benvenisti Trust, the administration of which was taken over the same year by the settler organization , based on the assertion that it owned the properties before 1948.107 On 21 November 2018, the Israeli Supreme Court denied a petition by the families against the release of the land to the settler organization. In January and February 2020, the Jerusalem Magistrate Court issued three decisions ordering the eviction of nine of the households (over 45 persons). The decisions have been appealed, while another 22 eviction cases are pending. 54. According to international humanitarian law, private property in occupied territory must be respected and cannot be confiscated by the occupying Power.108 The application of the Absentee Property Law and the Legal and Administrative Matters Law in East Jerusalem is seemingly inconsistent with this obligation. International humanitarian law also requires the occupying Power to respect, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country.109 Furthermore in practice, the measures taken by Israel facilitate the transfer by the occupying Power of its population into parts of the Occupied Palestinian Territory. The transfer of parts of an occupying Power’s civilian population into the territory it occupies is prohibited under international humanitarian law and may amount to a war crime.110 In addition, confiscations according to the Laws are based solely on the nationality or origin of the owner, rendering them inherently discriminatory. 55. Approximately 200 Palestinian households in East Jerusalem, comprising 877 persons, including 391 children, face similar risks of forced eviction due to cases filed in Israeli courts, primarily by Israeli settler organizations.111 Forced evictions frequently violate the rights to adequate housing and to privacy, and other human rights. They are a key factor of a coercive environment that may lead to forcible transfer, which is prohibited by the Fourth Geneva Convention and a grave breach of the Convention.112

105 A/70/351, para. 29-36 and 49-51; A/HRC/34/39, para. 46. 106 Jerusalem District Court cases HC 325/96, TA 1185/96 and TA 1544-09. 107 https://peacenow.org.il/en/the-court-ruled-to-evict-another-8-families-in-batan-al-hawa-silwan. 108 Hague Regulations, article 46. 109 Regulations respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land of 1907 (the Hague Regulations), article 43; and Geneva Convention IV, article 64. 110 Geneva Convention IV, article 49 (6). See also, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Article 8(2)(b)(viii). 111 OCHA, as of January 2019. 112 Geneva Convention IV, Articles 49 and 147; A/74/357, paras. 35 and 77, and A/HRC/34/39, para. 46 with references.

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Demolition immediately followed by establishment of outpost 56. An extended family of five adults and two children was subjected to two demolitions in the Makhrour area of Bethlehem near Har settlement. On 26 August 2019, the Israeli Civil Administration demolished the family’s restaurant and residence in their private property in Area C, due to lack of building permit, based on orders from 2005 and 2010. The following day, settlers started establishing an agricultural outpost without any permit a few hundred metres from the demolished structures. The outpost remained there as of the end of the reporting period. Following the demolition, five members of the family lived in a tent supplied by humanitarian organizations, on the site of their property. On 4 March 2020, the Israeli Civil Administration confiscated the tent and razed the grounds where the demolition had taken place. This occurred at the start of the outbreak of COVID-19, putting the family at further risk of contracting the disease, without shelter and access to water.

V. Settlements in the occupied Syrian Golan

57. After the President of the United States announced, in April 2019, that he recognized Israeli sovereignty over the occupied Syrian Golan, plans to further expand Israeli settlements have continued. This included the Government decision, in June 2019, to establish a settlement called “Trump Heights”.113 Several States condemned the U.S. announcement and the consequences of recognizing illegal annexation. The United Nations Secretary-General reaffirmed the validity of Security Council resolution 497 (1981), which decides that the Israeli decision to impose its laws, jurisdiction and administration in the occupied Syrian Golan is null and void and without international legal effect. 58. A human rights organization from the occupied Syrian Golan114 continued to raise serious concerns about the impact on Syrian villages, particularly Majdal Shams and Massada, of a renewable energy project implemented by an Israeli energy company, involving the construction of wind turbines. It stated that the project would involve building 31 wind turbines on land owned by Syrian farmers and would severely affect their human rights, restrict access to their farming lands and ability to expand their already limited built- up areas, and endanger wildlife. In January 2020, the National Israeli Infrastructure Committee approved 25 of these wind turbines. Syrian inhabitants in the area are facing a severe housing crisis, which this project would further exacerbate. Moreover, the areas where they live constitute only five per cent of the overall occupied Syrian Golan, while 95 per cent of the territory is unavailable as it is being used by the Israeli military and over 34 illegal Israeli settlements.

VI. Conclusions and recommendations

59. The establishment and expansion of Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory and the occupied Syrian Golan amount to the transfer by Israel of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies, which is prohibited under international humanitarian law,115 as consistently confirmed by competent United Nations organs, including the International Court of Justice, the Security Council, the General Assembly and the Human Rights Council. 60. The stated intention of the Government of Israel to annex parts of the occupied West Bank, if implemented, would constitute a most serious violation of international law, including the UN Charter, and would have no legal validity. It would be a major obstacle to the achievement of the two-State solution and threaten efforts to advance regional peace and our broader efforts to maintain international peace and security.

113 https://mfa.gov.il/MFA/PressRoom/2019/Pages/Government-approves-establishment-of-new-Golan- Heights-community-Ramat-Trump-16-June-2019.aspx. 114 https://golan-marsad.org/as-syrians-commemorate-yet-another-year-of-occupation-israel-tightens-it- grip-on-the-golan/. 115 Fourth Geneva Convention, article 49(6).

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61. During the reporting period, advancements of new and existing settlements increased, as did the number of tenders announced while the rate of settlement housing construction starts decreased. The plans for settlements in East Jerusalem and surrounding areas, including in E1, are of particular concern as they would isolate East Jerusalem from the rest of the West Bank and threaten to fragment the contiguity of the West Bank. 62. Settlements have significant adverse effects on Palestinians’ rights, including their rights to life, freedom of movement, privacy, family life, an adequate standard of living, work and education and on the exercise of their right to self-determination. 63. Settler violence remained high in the reporting period, continuing an overall upward trend since 2016. Israel largely failed to uphold its obligation as the occupying Power to ensure, as far as possible, public order and life and protect the Palestinian population against all acts or threats of violence. A large number of incidents occurred in the same locations,116 suggesting that much of the violence emanates from specific groups of settlers. While efforts have been made by the Israeli authorities in recent years to prevent, investigate and prosecute particular incidents of settler violence, overall a climate of impunity continued to prevail due to persisting deficiencies in the justice system to hold settlers accountable for violence against Palestinians and damage to their property. 64. Forced evictions resulting from demolitions in the circumstances prevailing in the Occupied Palestinian Territory are a key factor in the creation of a coercive environment. They have a negative impact on a wide range of human rights and increase the risk of forcible transfer.117 The transfer of property pursuant to the application of the Absentee Property Law and the Legal and Administrative Matters Law in East Jerusalem also facilitates the transfer of its population into the occupied territory, in violation of international humanitarian law. 65. The Secretary-General recalls Security Council resolution 497 (1981), which decided that the decision of Israel to impose its laws, jurisdiction and administration in the occupied Syrian is null and void and without international legal effect. 66. On the basis of this report, the Secretary-General recommends that Israel: (a) Immediately and completely cease all settlement activities in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, in compliance with relevant United Nations resolutions, including Security Council resolution 2334 (2016), and halt any planned steps towards annexation of any part of the Occupied Palestinian Territory, in compliance with the principle of inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force. (b) Review the application of planning laws and policies, as well as the Absentee Property Law and the Legal and Administrative Matters Law, to ensure that they are in accordance with the obligations of Israel under international humanitarian law and international human rights law; (c) Immediately halt demolitions and forced evictions and cease any activity that would further contribute to a coercive environment and/or lead to a risk of forcible transfer; (d) Take all measures to ensure the protection of Palestinians and their property from settler violence in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, including through issuance and enforcement of clear orders to the Israeli Security Forces to protect the Palestinian population; (e) Ensure that all incidents of settler and Israeli Security Forces’ violence against Palestinians and damage to their property be systematically investigated, that perpetrators be prosecuted and, if convicted, punished with appropriate sanctions, and that victims be provided with effective remedies, including adequate compensation, in accordance with international standards; (f) Immediately cease and reverse all settlement development and related activities in the occupied Syrian Golan, and end discriminatory land,

116 A/HRC/28/44, para. 49; A/71/355, paras. 18 and 46, A/72/564, paras. 19-22. 117 See A/HRC/34/39, paras. 40–57.

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housing and development policies, in compliance with relevant United Nations resolutions; (g) Immediately remove all mines and minefields in the occupied Syrian Golan, which pose a risk to the local population.

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