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PERSPECTIVE | FES

A National or Religious Conflict? The Dispute over the / Al- Al- in

MOSHE MA’OZ April 2015 n There is a danger that and , the children of , are becoming in- creasingly engaged in a religious conflict. The major focus of this conflict is the Tem- ple Mount/Al-Haram Al-Sharif and /Al-Quds Al-Sharif. Amalgamated with nationalist and political components of the Arab-Israeli dispute, this conflict also derives from two opposed processes: growing Islamic Judeophobia in the Arab and , on the one hand; and accelerated Jewish in Israel and the diaspora, on the other. n Top Israeli and Palestinian leaders, eager to score political gains, have not put an end to these dangerous phenomena. Mahmud Abbas, President of the Palestinian Authority, is not in a position to curb his people’s anger and frustration regarding alleged Jewish intentions to destroy the Al-Aqsa . Israeli Prime Minister Ben- yamin Netanyahu and other right-wing Israeli leaders continue to use the Jewish sanctity of the Temple Mount to garner public support. n Given this situation, the new Israeli government must negotiate with the Palestinian Authority and the , and arrive at an agreed solution. The and the should induce the relevant parties to settle their differ­­en- ces, particularly over the issue of the Temple Mount / Al-Haram Al-Sharif. Otherwise, a bloody Muslim-Jewish conflict may spread globally, especially in European coun- tries. Thus, these countries have a special interest in promoting peaceful dialogues among their Muslim and Jewish citizens. MOSHE MA’OZ | A NATIONAL OR RELIGIOUS CONFLICT?

At A Glance On the Palestinian side, Munib Al-Masri, a prominent businessman from , wrote: »(…) the Israeli gov- Arabs and Jews, the children of Abraham, are becoming ernment, which operates in a cool and calculated man- increasingly engaged in a . The major focus of ner, is taking actions that are likely to bring about Ar- this conflict is the Temple Mount / Al-Haram Al-Sharif and mageddon (…); the expansion of [Jewish] settlements East Jerusalem / Al-Quds Al-Sharif. Amalgamated with in Jerusalem, the shootings in the Haram Al-Sharif [by nationalist and political components of the Arab-Israeli Israeli soldiers], and the ›nationality law‹,3 which can be dispute, this religious war also derives from two opposed understood to mean that East Jerusalem is the ›eternal processes: growing Islamic Judeophobia in the Arab and ‹ of Israel and fundamentally Jewish — all of these Muslim world, on the one hand; and accelerated - actions, whereby sanctifies the policy of power, ish Islamophobia in Israel and the diaspora, on the other. arouse Arab-Islamic reactions. There is a concrete - Some recent manifestations of these destructive trends, that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will turn into a which feed off each other, are on one side: Muslim reli- religious war.« gious leaders calling for (holy war) against Jews and Israel (by and , for example); killing of Jews in Despite these warnings, top Israeli and Palestinian lead- (Har-Nof suburb in Jerusalem, 18 November ers, eager to score political gains, have not stopped these 2014); an attempt on the life of Yehuda Glick, a Jewish dangerous phenomena. Mahmud Abbas, President of Temple Mount activist (24 October 2014); and desecra- the Palestinian Authority, represents an occupied and tion of Jewish cemeteries (in Jerusalem and the Negev, victimized population, and is not in a position to curb his 16 and 29 November 2014). On the other side: occasio­ people’s anger and frustration regarding alleged Jewish nal calls by Jewish religious leaders to kill Arabs () intentions to destroy the Al-Aqsa mosque. Calling it a and destroy the Al-Aqsa mosque on the Temple Mount; »religious war« by Israel, has urged his people to de- periodic burnings of and Qur’ans by Jews in the fend the mosque and Al-Quds — the »Eternal Capital of and Israel; and killings of innocent Arabs (e. g., the Palestinian People«. Abu Khdeir in Jerusalem, 2 July 2014). In ad- dition, the Israel-Hamas war in Gaza (July – August 2014), Benyamin Netanyahu, Israel’s prime minister, has also with its heavy toll and destruction — particularly done very little to change the desire of Jewish citizens among Gaza inhabitants — consequently increased the to rebuild the (approx. 40 per cent), control rate of Palestinian Judeophobia to 93 per cent.1 and pray on the Temple Mount (approx. 65 per cent), and keep a united Jerusalem under eternal Israeli sov- Moderate Israeli and Palestinian personalities — religious ereignty (80 per cent).4 On the contrary, on »Jerusalem and secular — have been warning for years that the Jew- Day«, May 2014, he proclaimed: »Jerusalem was unified ish-Muslim conflict over the Temple Mount could trigger 47 years ago. It will never be redivided; we will never a devastating worldwide religious war. For example, two divide our heart — the heart of the Nation. Jerusalem former Israeli heads of Shabak (general security service), is also Mt. and Mt. (the Temple Mt.), the have both cautioned against Jewish extremism. Yakov — Israel’s eternal.«5 Peri, former cabinet minister of the Party, stated in the documentary Gatekeepers (2012): »If Jew- Netanyahu and other right-wing leaders continue to ish militants sabotaged the [Al-Aqsa] mosque it would use the Jewish sanctity of the Temple Mount to garner mean the end of the world (…) the eruption of a world public support, particularly during the most recent Israe- war between us and the Muslim world.« Similarly, Carmi li election campaign (since December 2014). Earlier, in Gilon, former vice president of Hebrew University, as- September 2014, Uri , a minister from the HaBayit serted in late November 2014: »(…) the continuation of HaYehudi party, defiantly visited the Temple Mount, call- the extreme [Jewish] messianic activity on the Temple ing for Jewish over it, and for the rebuilding Mt. will lead to , a war of the entire Muslim nation against the entire Jewish people.«2 3. (30.12.2014). 4. Haaretz (12.07.2013). , ed., Sovereignty of and 1. Uriel Heilman (2014): ADL Survey, More than a quarter of a million of Man. The Sanctity and Political Centrality of the Temple Mount, (Hebrew), the world is anti-Semitic, in: Jewish Exponent (13.5.2014). The Jerusalem Institute of Israel Studies, 2001, p. 135. 2. Haaretz (1.12.2014). 5. Haaretz (29.5.2014).

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of the third Jewish . He and other senior officials, East Jerusalem to ; and in , political activists, and , simultaneously launched a the (Israeli Parliament) passed a law to this ef- public campaign to change the status quo of the Mount, fect. However, Israel also granted control of the Temple to permit Jewish there. Mount to the Jordanian , a religious trust. Since then, many Israeli governments have rejected requests by Muslim leaders, largely , for sovereignty The Role of the Temple Mount / Al-Haram Al-Sharif over East Jerusalem and the Temple Mount, declaring in the Deterioration of Muslim-Jewish Relations them to be »disputed« places.

On 5 June for the last 47 years, many Jews in Israel and Furiously reacting to the Israeli occupation of the Haram, abroad have celebrated the military victory known as the East Jerusalem, and other Arab , many Muslim Six-Day War (1967) and the »liberation« of East Jeru- political and religious leaders called for Jihad to »liberate« and the Temple Mount. For Jews, this euphoric these sites. Periodically, Muslims used violence against Is- event meant the return to the Temple Mount (Hebrew: raeli and Jewish targets, causing severe bloodshed and Har HaBayit) after more than 1,900 years of exile. destruction. These leaders employed not only anti-Zi- onist, but also anti-Semitic language in their campaign In contrast, millions of Muslims around the world, and against Israel. especially in , mourn this event as a historical trauma and an immense Naksa (defeat). For them, the At the same time, a growing number of Jews, particu- Jewish conquest of East Jerusalem (Al-Quds Al-Sharif) larly in Israel, have developed Islamophobic attitudes, and the Haram Al-Sharif occurred after more than 1,400 partly in reaction to Muslim Judeophobia and partly in years of Muslim rule (except for the Crusaders’ occupa- rejection of the Muslim claim to the Temple Mount. This tion during 1099 –1187 and 1229 –1244). hostility has persisted with the backing of Jewish rab- bis and little interference by Israeli authorities. All of this Indeed, for both Jews and Muslims, the Temple Mount transpired despite the gradual development of pragmat- and the Old of Jerusalem are hugely important reli- ic conciliatory approaches by Arab and Muslim leaders gious, cultural, political, and national sites. For centuries, since the late 1970s (except for revolutionary Iran and Jews in the diaspora prayed towards Jerusalem, vowed militant Muslim groups). never to forget it (»If I forget thee O Jerusalem, may my right arm wither«), and blessed one another with »Next year in Jerusalem«. Although predominantly secular, Changes in Muslim-Jewish Relations the Zionist-Jewish movement has considered Jerusalem and the Issue of Jerusalem (Zion) the political and cultural center of the Jewish peo- ple since the 1880s. For centuries, with a few exceptions, Jews in Muslim lands did not experience anti-Semitism. As Bernard By comparison, the Palestinian-Arab national movement Lewis, the noted scholar of , wrote in 1984: »One established its national political-cultural center in East important point should be made right away. There is lit- Jerusalem in the 1920s, while Al-Haram Al-Sharif — par- tle sign of any deep-rooted emotional hostility directed ticularly the Al-Aqsa mosque — has continued to be a against Jews (…) [in Muslim lands …] such as the an- foremost religious for Muslims. They called it Awla ti-Semitism of the Christian world. There were, however, Al-Qiblatayn (the first direction before ), unambiguously negative attitudes. These were in part Thani Al-Masjidayn (the second mosque after Mecca), the ›normal‹ feelings of a dominant group towards a and Isra’ and Mi’raj (the place from where Prophet Mu- subject group, with parallels in virtually any society.«6 hammad ascended to heaven). Indeed, Jews in Muslim countries occasionally praised Failing to acknowledge the particular sanctity of this Muslim rulers for their benevolent treatment, while as- shrine for Islam and overwhelmed by its spectacular mil- piring to the destruction of »evil« . Yet, one itary victory and the historic magnitude of this event, 6. Lewis, Bernard (1984): The Jews of Islam, Princeton, Princeton Univer- the Israeli government decided in to annex sity Press, p. 32.

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significant but rare exception to this Jewish Islamophil- during the 1920s and 1930s, as as the head of ic attitude was articulated by the great Jewish the Palestinian National Movement. He used the Tem- and scholar (d. 1204), who labeled the ple Mount / Al-Haram Al-Sharif issue as a vehicle for his Kingdom of »the most hateful nation towards pan-Islamic and pan-Arab campaign against Jews and Jews«7. Apparently, he referred to the Al-Mohads rul- Zionists. Fermenting anti-Jewish riots, he demanded ers who harshly persecuted Jews in the mid- that the British Mandatory authorities prohibit Jewish and possibly forced Maimonides to temporarily convert prayers at the Western Wall (Al-), which Muslims to Islam. considered part of the Al-Aqsa Mosque. He and oth- er Muslim leaders also alleged that Jews were conspir- Jews were highly grateful to the Ottoman Muslim state ing to destroy the Temple Mount mosques and rebuild (1453–1918) for absorbing hundreds of thousands of their ancient temple. These allegations and other Mus- Jewish fleeing from the Spanish-Christian in- lim actions, together with Jewish reactions, led to the quisition in the late 15th century, as well as for permit- bloody 1929 riots, which started at the Western Wall ting them to settle in Palestine, notably in Jerusalem. and spread throughout Palestine. The Ottoman authorities allowed Jews to pray at the Western Wall, but not on the Temple Mount. During The was also imbued with Nazi anti-Semitism and the 19th century, the Ottoman authorities protected expressed his adoration of Hitler. During World War II, Jews against a newly emerging form of anti-Jewish he cooperated with the Nazis and found refuge in Berlin sentiment by local , namely anti-Semitism during the period 1941– 45. He coordinated campaigns »imported« from . This new phenomenon was with Hitler and other Nazi leaders against the British manifested by a series of »blood libels« against Jews in »oppressors« in Palestine, as well as against the Jews. the region, particularly in in 1840. Muslims Upon his request, Nazi leaders »promised to destroy the in the region were influenced by this new trend, and Jewish national home in Palestine and engage in the from time to time used the »« as a weapon battle against world Jewry«.8 against Jews. The Mufti endeavored to spread his anti-Semitic views among Palestinian Arabs, particularly the youth (the The Impact of the Arab-Zionist Conflict »Nazi Scouts«). Nonetheless, a sizable Palestinian op- position, led mainly by the notable Nashashibi family, A turning point occurred with the advent of the Zion- did not share the Mufti’s views. Many of them opted to ist-Jewish movement and its enterprise in Palestine, coexist and to cooperate with the Jewish Zionist move- which began in the late 19th century and included pur- ment, particularly in Jerusalem. chasing Arab lands and, indirectly, evicting Arab peas- ants. Gradually, more and more Christians and Muslims Indeed, the mainstream of the Zionist (secular) move- developed not only an anti-Zionist attitude, but also ment also sought coexistence and cooperation with the anti-Semitic sentiments (although some did distin- Arabs. It did not aspire to dominate the Temple Mount guish between Zionists and Jews). Some Christian Ar- and rebuild the Jewish Temple, but only to control the abs expressed these hostile positions in order to forge Western Wall as a historical national symbol. Significant- a common Arab nationalist stance with Muslim Arabs. ly, in 1937 and 1947 the Zionist movement accepted (al- Jerusalem constituted a major venue for such cooper- beit reluctantly) two plans for the partition of Palestine, ation, with Muslims and Christians in Jerusalem even whereby Jerusalem would not be under its control at all. signing an anti-Semitic petition. With the appearance The first was the British Report (1937), of the Palestinian-Arab national movement, Muslims suggesting that Jerusalem should be under British con- assumed a major role in the anti-Zionist, anti-Semit- trol; the second was the Partition Resolution of the Unit- ic current. Indeed, the of Jerusalem, ed Nations (Resolution 181 (II), 1947), which assigned Amin Al-Husayni, was the major leader of this current »a special international regime for the city of Jerusalem (including the holy places)«. 7. Maimonides (1952): Igeret Teyman (Yemenite Letter), Halkin Edition, , pp. 98 – 99; Stillman, Norman (1979): The Jews of the Arab 8. Philip Mattar (1998): The Mufti of Jerusalem, New York, Columbia Lands, , p. 241. University Press, pp. 99 f.

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On the other hand, Jewish radical leaders — religious and Vis-à-vis this militant Jewish-Muslim symmetry, the po- secular alike — not only wished to dominate the Western litical and religious leaders of both sides have mostly Wall, but also to rebuild the ancient temple. Public pho- adopted asymmetric and / or ambivalent positions re- tos were displayed of Jews holding Zionist flags with the garding these critical issues — partly to advance poli­ Star of next to the of the Rock Mosque. Mil- tical and national objectives, and partly to please their itant Jews also demonstrated in Jerusalem and , militant groups. Simultaneously, attempts have been chanting anti-Arab and anti-Muslim slogans, calling for made by the relevant governments, as well as by var- the return of the Western Wall to Jewish hands. Further- ious global organizations, to settle this dispute, but to more, radical right-wing secular Jews even plotted to no avail. »liberate« the Wall by military force and to blow up the mosques. Among them was the Revisionist movement Beitar (and later in 1947, the Stern Gang). Ambivalent and Changing Attitudes in Israel: Manifestations of Islamophobia During the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, the Temple Mount did not play a major role in the Palestinian-Zionist conflict. The ambivalent positions in Israel regarding the Temple Only King Abdallah of made great efforts to pro- Mount in East Jerusalem emerged immediately after the tect the Al-Haram Al-Sharif and the of Jerusa- 1967 war. However, by order of , Israel’s lem against potential Israeli attacks. Israel’s Prime Minis- then Defense Minister, no Israeli flags were hoisted on ter David Ben-Gurion did not initiate any military moves the Temple Mount, and the Jordanian Waqf authorities to conquer East Jerusalem and the Temple Mount, and were allowed to administer the site. Jews were permitted Jerusalem was not mentioned at all in Israel’s Indepen­ to visit this site, but not to pray there. Israel’s chief Rab- dence Declaration in . In 1949, West Jerusa- binate had prohibited Jews to visit the Temple Mount, lem was proclaimed as Israel’s capital and until the 1967 owing to theological Halachic (Jewish law) injunctions. war, Israel avoided any steps to occupy East Jerusalem Other notable rabbis stated that such visits and prayers and the Temple Mount. by Jews could cause a religious war, and a Muslim Jihad that would result in the bloodshed and death of many Jews. 1967: The Turning Point Other rabbis and a growing number of militant Jews — As indicated above, the Muslim-Jewish conflict over the religious and secular alike — have pressured Israeli gov- Temple Mount / Al-Haram Al-Sharif was revived in the af- ernments to permit prayers on the Mount, while several termath of the Six-Day War, greatly enhancing the mani- of them, including members of the Knesset and a gov- festation of Muslim Judeophobia and Jewish Islamopho- ernment minister, ignored the prohibitions imposed by bia in the region. Thus, the critical historical change in the government and the Chief Rabbinate. Furthermore, the status of the Temple Mount, East Jerusalem, and oth- growing groups of fanatical Jews, such as »the Faithful er occupied territories ignited among Muslims feelings of the Temple Mount«, and more than a dozen Temple of despair, revenge, and religious solidarity. In particular, Mount organizations have preached on destroying the conservative and zealous Muslims deepened their ideo- mosques and rebuilding the Temple. For this very pur- logical religious attachment to Al-Haram Al-Sharif, ele- pose, they prepared designs of the Temple and its vating its importance and vowing to liberate it by Jihad as well as garments for the . against their Jewish enemies. Similarly, many Jews in Isra- el and abroad were deeply moved by the redemption of These zealous groups have been inspired by senior Or- the Western Wall, the symbol of their historical national thodox rabbis, including the Western Wall rabbi. Prob- ethos. But among zealous Jews, the Messianic longing to ably under the influence of these messianic groups, 30 rebuild the Temple was empowered by the intention to per cent of and 45 per cent of national re- blow up the mosques — the symbols of Islam — that had ligious Jews in Israel currently support the rebuilding of »desecrated« the Temple Mount. These mutually hos- the Third Temple, while the great majority of Israeli Jews tile attitudes have been accompanied by denial of each wish to maintain Israeli control over the Temple Mount. side’s attachment to their respective holy . Furthermore, various youth groups have periodically

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demonstrated at the site, attacking Muslim passers-by. against Israel. This also includes the recent war between These anti-Muslim and racist anti-Arab manifestations Israel and Hamas in Gaza (July-August 2014). Hamas have constituted a major part of the Islamophobic trend flags carry a picture of Al-Aqsa, and Palestinian children that has increased since 1967. chant »we shall return to Al-Aqsa«. Many Palestinians protested at Al-Aqsa Mosque against Israeli attacks in Influenced also by Muslim, Arab, and Palestinian ter- Gaza. rorism, this trend has been significantly expressed by word and deed. In March 1994, Dr. Baruch Goldstein Although cautious to avoid any further provocation on (an American-Israeli Jewish fanatic) murdered 29 Mus- the Temple Mount, most Israeli governments failed to lim worshippers in the main mosque of . Other achieve a political settlement regarding the problems of Jewish fanatics have occasionally killed Arabs, damaged the Temple Mount and East Jerusalem, as well as other mosques, and burned Qur’ans in the West Bank and . In fact, the opposite: most Israe- Israel. In 1984 a Jewish zealot, Yehuda Etzion, and his li governments since 1967 have endeavored to Judaize comrades attempted to blow up the Mosques on the East Jerusalem, including the Old City. They built new Temple Mount. Jewish neighborhoods, thus extending greater Jerusa- lem into the West Bank, evicting Palestinian residents, To be sure, Israeli political and religious leaders have destroying Arab buildings, and allocating only a small strongly denounced these and other Islamophobic fraction of the city budget to East Jerusalem. Most Is- crimes, while Israeli courts have sentenced several of raeli governments have proclaimed that Jerusalem will these Jewish terrorists to prison. Senior rabbis have ar- remain »united forever«, reflecting the views of most Is- gued that these acts do not represent authentic . raeli Jews (80 per cent) and of the majority of the Knes- Moreover, a large group of Jewish rabbis and Muslim set members. issued a warning in 2012 that the manifestation of »anti-Semitism and Islamophobia is likely to destroy the entire humanity«9. Common and Diverse Muslim Attitudes: The Growth of Muslim Judeophobia Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu has on occasion denounced Jewish atrocities against Muslims. He also As indicated above, millions of Muslims around the prevented Jewish militants from praying on the Temple world reacted furiously to the 1967 Israeli occupation Mount, reneging on his previous promises to them. But of the Al-Haram Al-Sharif, including Al-Aqsa and the in September 1996, he ordered the opening of an an- mosques, as well as East Jerusalem cient adjacent to the Temple Mount, thus pro- and other Palestinian and Arab territories. Political (sec- voking Muslim riots and Israeli retaliations. This event ular) and religious leaders and groups called for Jihad to claimed the lives of many Muslim youth and Israeli sol- liberate these sites. They expressed not only anti-Zionist diers. but also anti-Semitic positions, in the media and text- books as well. Even more critical was the visit by General (ret.) — then leader of the opposition — accom- Radical Muslim and Arab groups launched numerous at- panied by hundreds of policemen at the Temple Mount tacks against Israeli and Jewish targets in various parts on 28 September 2000, with the permission of Ehud of the world (Munich 1972, Buenos Aires 1994, Barak, then PM (Labor-Party). This visit provoked a long 2003, and many other places). Several of these radical series of violent Muslim riots known as the Al-Aqsa In- groups carry names relating to Jerusalem or the Al-Aqsa tifada, which caused the death of hundreds of Palestin- mosque, such as Iran’s Al-Quds (Jerusalem) force, Egyp- ian Arabs and Israeli Jews. Millions of Muslims all over tian Bayt Al-Maqdis (supporters of Jerusalem), Fa- the world protested, calling for the liberation of Al-Aqsa tah’s Shuhada Al-Aqsa (Martyrs of Al-Aqsa). In addition, and the Al-Haram al-Sharif. Several militant Muslim or- Hamas’ TV channel is called Al-Aqsa; and the Islamic ganizations assumed the name Al-Aqsa in their struggle movement in (northern) Israel, led by Shaykh Raad , has used the title Al-Aqsa for most of its anti-Israeli and 9. Haaretz (9.9.2011). anti-Jewish activities and organizations.

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On the other hand, although condemning the continued three would be without sovereignty and ad- Israeli occupation of Al-Haram Al-Sharif and East Jerusa- ministered by representatives of , Jordan, lem, a growing number of Muslim leaders and govern- Palestine, Israel and the United States. Abbas did not ments have maintained either open or secret relations accept this Israeli offer, and asked for further consider- with Israel. Several of them have also suggested a peace- ations. This offer was far-reaching by Israeli standards, ful settlement to the Jerusalem issue. but apparently not far-reaching enough by Palestinian standards. Significantly, in March 2002 the Arab League (22 Arab states), backed by the Organization of Islamic Cooper- Undoubtedly, this extraordinary suggestion by an Israeli ation (OIC, 57 members including the Arab countries) PM — like of 2000 and the Sau- issued an unprecedented peace plan. For the first time, di- of 2002 — can serve as a basis it offered Israel peace, security, and normal relations, for settling the Arab-Israeli conflict, and prevent a Mus- provided Israel agrees to the creation of a Palestinian lim-Jewish global war. State along the 1967 lines, with East Jerusalem as its capital. This peace initiative, originated by Saudi Ara- On this basis, the new Israeli government must negotiate bia, has been reconfirmed by the Arab League sever- with the Palestinian Authority and the Arab League, and al times since, including in 2014, but with no official arrive at an agreed solution. The US and the EU should response from Israel. was the only Israeli induce the relevant parties to settle their differences, prime minister who de facto accepted this peace initia- particularly over the issue of the Temple Mount/Al-Har- tive. During his negotiations with Palestinian President am Al-Sharif. Otherwise, a bloody Muslim-Jewish con- Mahmud Abbas (2008) he agreed — without his cabi- flict could spread globally, especially in European coun- net’s approval — to the creation of a Palestinian State tries. Thus, these countries in particular have a special more or less along the 1967 lines. East Jerusalem would task to promote peaceful dialogues among their Muslim be the capital of this state, while the holy shrines of the and Jewish citizens.

6 About the author Imprint

Moshe Ma’oz is Professor Emeritus of Islamic and Middle Eas- Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung | Dept. for and tern Studies, Hebrew University. He has published numerous Hiroshimastr. 28 | 10785 Berlin | Germany books and articles on the political and social history of the Middle East. Responsible: Dr Ralf Hexel, Head, Dept. for Middle East and North Africa This is an updated abridgement of an article that was published online in Approaching Religion, vol. 4, No. 2, December 2014. Phone: +49-30-269-35-7420 | Fax: +49-30-269-35-9233 http://www.fes.de/nahost

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