Corruption and Bad Governance – Hindrances for Women’S Political Representation in Europe

Corruption and bad governance – hindrances for women’s political representation in Europe

Aksel Sundström and Lena Wängnerud The Quality of Government Institute University of Gothenburg P.O. Box 711 SE 405 30 Gothenburg SWEDEN

[email protected] [email protected]

Abstract: While much of the recent literature on descriptive representation of women focus on the role played by political parties, we argue for the relevance of studying factors exogenous to parties, especially the importance of corruption and bad governance. We hypothesize that in contexts of low quality of government – understood as the levels of corruption, partiality and ineffectiveness of government services – informal institutions are strong which favor clientilism and the advancement of candidates with access to traditional networks and hence will have a negative impact on the proportion of elected women. We develop and test this argument on a new, previously never used, dataset on the proportion of female locally elected councilors in 167 regions of 18 European countries. Using a novel measure on regional governance we perform a multi-level analysis with regional-level control variables such as gender equality culture, economic and human development, as well as the national-level controls of gender quotas and types of electoral system. The results show that levels of corruption, partiality and ineffectiveness of government substantially affect the proportion of female local councilors. The article contributes by presenting evidence indicating that corruption and bad governance are important determinants for female political presence in contemporary Europe. Thus, getting rid of corruption and bad governance is not only a matter for countries in less affluent parts of the world and hindrances to women’s political representation are not eliminated by the reformation of political parties only.

Keywords: Women’s descriptive representation; sub-national variation; Europe; corruption; quality of government.

Prepared for the 63rd PSA annual international conference, Cardiff, 25-27 March, 2013. 1

INTRODUCTION Parties are becoming the key variable in research on women’s political representation, especially in research focusing Europe. Once described as “the secret garden of politics” (Gallagher & Marsh, 1988) parties’ candidate selection procedures are by now relatively well documented. We know which parties that have introduced gender quotas. There is also research mapping out aspects of centralization and formalization of recruitment.1 Moreover, it has been demonstrated that, for the advancement of women, it is important that the party organization has ties with organizations outside the party because these provide more points of access for women (Kittilson, 2006: 48-49). There is little doubt that parties, how they organize, are decisive for the advancement of women. We see a risk, however, that whilst research on parties is becoming increasingly specialized other explanatory factors are falling into the background. In this paper we pick up the theme of what provides points of access for women but in contrast to much ongoing research we focus on factors exogenous to parties. The core idea is that male- dominated networks that exclude women from political institutions may be upheld by factors such as corruption and bad governance in contexts outside the party organization. Our research draws on insights gained in studies mostly based on countries outside Europe. For example, cross-national comparative research have established that societies that elect few women tend to be more corrupt than societies that elect a large number of women (Dollar et al., 2001; Swamy et. al., 2001). Through a case-study on Thailand Bjarnegård (2009) demonstrates how informal recruitment to political positions serves to protect corrupt interactions between men in power and she argues that women are excluded since they are not trusted with the sensitive nature of exchanges. We believe that much could be gained by taking this research into account in studies on women’s political representation in Europe. Recent studies show that corruption and bad governance is more widespread and varies within countries in Europe to a larger degree than previously recognized (Charron et al., 2011). At the same time, while research holds that the proportion of women still is low in a number of political institutions throughout Europe, few comparative studies have analyzed the variance in women’s representation beyond national-level institutions. This study breaks new ground by focusing on the sub-national level in Europe. We hypothesize that low quality of government – understood as the levels of corruption, partiality and ineffectiveness of government services (Rothstein & Teorell, 2008) – has a negative

1 For recent publications see Dahlerup, 2006; Krook, 2009; Paxton et al., 2010; Tripp & Kang, 2008. 2 The distinction originates from Pitkin (1967). A review of research on politics and gender discussing this 2 impact on the proportion of elected women. With new, never previously used data on women’s local representation, we can empirically test this claim. We have constructed a comprehensive dataset over the proportion of female locally elected councilors in 167 NUTS- regions in 18 European countries in the most recent elections available. Using a novel measure on regional governance, the European Quality of Government Index (Charron et al., 2011), we perform a hierarchical linear modeling (HLM) analysis with regional-level control variables such as gender equality culture, economic and human development, as well as the national-level controls of gender quotas and types of electoral system. Our findings underpin the notion that quality of government is the new “secret garden of politics” that needs to be mapped out in greater detail. The results show that levels of corruption, partiality and ineffectiveness of government substantially affect the proportion of female local councilors and hence are important determinants for women’s political representation in contemporary Europe. The rest of the paper will proceed as follows: First we discuss recent trends in research on women’s political representation and make a distinction between descriptive versus substantive representation of women. Thereafter we pick up findings in current scholarship on gender and corruption and show how this strand of research is relevant for understanding inclusion/exclusion of women in political institutions. In the section on methodology we argue for the advantage of studying the sub-national level in Europe and we present our new dataset over locally elected councilors. The section on result reports the findings from our empirical analysis. In the concluding section we argue that hindrances to women’s political representation are not eliminated by the reformation of political parties only.

DESCRIPTIVE REPRESENTATION OF WOMEN A much-used distinction in scholarship on politics and gender is that between descriptive and substantive representation of women.2 The first strand of research, descriptive representation, focuses on variations in the number of women elected to political institutions, foremost parliaments, across time and across different parts of the world. The second strand of research, substantive representation, focuses on effects of women’s presence in political institutions. While there are reasons for expecting a link between descriptive and substantive representation of women, we believe that it is useful to separate between them and focus in

2 The distinction originates from Pitkin (1967). A review of research on politics and gender discussing this distinction is found in Wängnerud (2009). 3 this article explicitly on the descriptive representation. The research focusing on descriptive representation represents a more mature research field, partly because of the longer history of this tradition (e.g. Duverger 1955) and partly because in research on descriptive representation there is a distinct dependent variable: What is to be explained is the numerical distribution of seats between women and men. The sizeable literature on causes behind the election of large numbers of women reveals a shift, at least in Western democracies, from system-oriented towards strategy- oriented explanatory models (Wängnerud, 2009). Strategy-oriented explanatory models dig into processes endogenous to parties; factors such as party-ideology and organizational structure are brought forward. In contrast, system-oriented explanatory models dig into processes exogenous to parties; factors such as electoral system and gender equality culture are brought forward. Our study is a call for a shift back to system-oriented research but with focus on other aspects than in previous scholarship. While research on parties is important to understand women’s representation it needs to be recognized that there is variation that hardly can be explained by ideology or organizational factors alone. Figures from the dataset used in this article can serve as an illustration. For example, how come that in Greece there are differences from regions with an average of 12 per cent female local councilors to regions with the proportion exceeding 24 per cent? Italy is another country displaying large variation at the subnational level; from regions with an average of 10 per cent female local councilors to regions with an average of 28 per cent. Our suggestion is that much could be gained by taking findings in research on gender and corruption into account when trying to explain variation in women’s descriptive representation. Pippa Norris (1993) has worked out a comprehensive model of parliamentary recruitment in Western democracies emphasizing the political system, the party context, and supply and demand factors in the recruitment process. This model, however, do not include the kind of factors we are interested in. In order to test the credibility of our perspective we will include a number of determinants proposed in previous research such as gender equality culture, electoral system, levels of economic and social development, and gender quota strategies. Our choices of independent variables will be thoroughly discussed in the section on methodology.

RESEARCH ON GENDER AND CORRUPTION Previous research on the relationship between gender and corruption has mainly been focused on individual differences in tolerance to corruption and the relationship between national

4 shares of female politicians and corresponding degrees of corruption. In our focus on the descriptive representation of women we deal foremost with the latter scholarship. In their seminal study Dollar and colleagues (2001), demonstrate that higher rates of female participation in government are associated with lower national levels of corruption. They measure corruption with data from the International Country Risk Guide and claim to have included a range of variables in their analysis to control for various underlying institutional characteristics that could be responsible for a spurious correlation. The association between the presence of women and levels of corruption has since then in many ways been reproduced (e.g. Treisman, 2007). Studying national differences in the Corruption Perception Index, Swamy et al. (2001) also proposes that countries with a greater representation of women have lower levels of corruption. This has in turn produced an underlying assumption among a number of policy-makers that the presence of women can be a quick fix to reduce corruption (e.g. World Bank, 2001). As a contrast Sung (2003) launched a rivalling explanation, the “fairer system” thesis. This argument contends that “liberal democratic institutions and spirit increase female participation in government and restrain systemic corruption, but the latter two factors are not causally related” (Sung, 2003: 708). Data from Freedom House and Fraser Institute is used to back up the theoretical argument in the article. According to Sung (2003: 718) the effect of female participation is lost when controlled for liberal constitutionalism, as gender equality and low corruption both are seen as effects of a fair system. These findings have later been tested and largely supported, also with new indicators used as a proxy for gender inequality (Branisa & Ziegler, 2010). While Vijayalakshmi (2008) find no effect on corruption from having a larger share of female politicians in the local self-government of India, a different result is reported by Beaman et al. (2012). In this experimental study the authors investigate the effect from a scheme of randomized quotas of reserved seats for women to local village-assemblies in India. Accordingly, the villages having had a female leader from this randomized scheme report less instances of bribery. It is noted by Pande and Ford (2012: 20) that, regarding the results from this study, “it is possible that inexperience rather than preferences limits corruption on the part of women”. Continuing this debate on the causality between gender and corruption, Alhassan- Alolo (2007) investigates the issue empirically and points out that women in some ways can be shown to be as corrupt as men. Rather than an inherent trait, women's, in some aspects lack of engagement in corrupt behaviour, is argued to be a matter of possibilities. A similar line of

5 reasoning has been put forward by Goetz (2007) who argues that the opportunities for corruption are shaped by gender. Following from this argument is an assumption that women in power act as corrupt as men if only they are given the chance. Goetz point out that there are a number of myths surrounding women and corruption and concludes: “To expect that women’s gender alone can act as a magic bullet to resolve a corruption problem that is much bigger than they are, that is systemic, is unrealistic to say the least. It reflects not just wishful but almost desperate thinking” (Goetz, 2007:16). Wängnerud and Grimes (2012) however argues that the relationship between corruption and representation of women is probably interlinked in a relationship of feedbacks, where a high share of elected women and low levels of corruption can be believed to be part of a positive spiral. Acknowledging that the relationship between the representation of women and corruption is contested and possibly more complex than simply an effect from one variable in one direction to another variable, our focus in this article is more limited. We are interested in examining to what extent levels of corruption and bad governance can explain the variation in the share of elected women on the local level in Europe. Having this delimitation, we draw on theoretical work from scholars developing why corruption can be believed to affect the processes of recruitment to political positions.

Clientelism – the mechanism excluding women in corrupt contexts The argument put forward by Bjarnegård (2009) contends that certain aspects of clientelism affect the political representation of women. Criticizing assumptions in earlier research that has viewed women on elected seats as an antidote for corruption, she argues that the association that has been identified in previous writings in fact is misguiding and that these studies “tap into something larger than corruption, namely clientelism and change over time” (Bjarnegård, 2009: 68). Clientelism is a label for exchanges of personal favors for political support. Corruption, here understood as monetary-based exchanges, can be part of the interactions going on but the concept of clientelism is more multifaceted. For the advancement of this study, most important to note is that in clientelist systems the protection of one group often leads to the exclusion of another. Moreover, Bjarnegård (2009: 27) notes that clientelism as a political practice highlights the interplay between formal and informal political institutions. When formal institutions are weak certain types of informal institutions may grow strong. The gender dimension ticks in since “in clientelist systems, opportunities for electoral corruption are gendered in that only those with access to networks, those with connections within the local or national elite, those with resources to finance corrupt behavior,

6 and those who are already influential in society are in positions to be considered assets in clientelist networks and are the only ones who will be trusted with the sensitive nature of the exchange” (Bjarnegård, 2009: 38). Stockemer (2011) studies women’s descriptive representation in national legislative assemblies in the African countries and find that levels of corruption have some explanatory power. He develops the theoretical underpinnings of the argument proposed by Bjarnegård and presents a mechanism of four components to why candidate recruitment processes might tend to “weed out” female candidates in high corrupt environments (Stockemer, 2011: 697); 1. Under-institutionalized parties in corrupt settings are organized on the basis of personal connections and lack transparent rules of candidate selection. 2. In such situations political seats can be bought and public officials are elected based on traditional – and often male- dominated – clientelistic networks. 3. When promotion to higher office is contingent upon personal connections rather than merit, women must become either patrons or clients in the male-dominated patronage networks. 4. Women are often excluded from these corrupt networks based on tradition and culture and also often lack the resources to buy themselves into these networks. Taken together, this reasoning lead Stockemer (2011:697) to hypothesize that corruption “reinforces traditional networks and prevents women from gaining human and financial resources” and will thus have a negative impact on the proportion of female representatives. In addition to the argument proposed by Bjarnegård (2009) and Stockemer (2011) we draw on the work by Kittilson (2006), whom we believe capture something important when she finds that a decisive factor for the political representation of women is that the party organization has ties with organizations outside the party. Our suggestion is that the underlying factor is about transparency. Closely-knit networks, protecting more or less illegal activities, may have a hard time to survive in settings where parties are involved with a broad spectrum of organizations. Based on the discussion above we have reason to believe that party recruitment processes will be less transparent and clouded within clientilistic relationships in contexts where partiality and corruption is widespread. This will lead to less ties with organizations outside the party and, indirectly, hinder women in their advancement to elected seats. We have argued that what we are looking for are factors exogenous to parties. What is described above is a situation where parties can be the hub for corrupt activities. Our line of reasoning is grounded in the distinction between formal and informal political institutions. Bjarnegård (2009:70) notes that informal political institutions often go hand in hand with

7 weak formal political institutions such as bureaucracies and rule-of-law. Parties may be permeated by corrupt activities but it is reasonable to regard clientelism and related illegitimate behaviour as a system-factor anchored in a societal context characterized by low quality of government. For this reason we find it plausible to believe that when corruption, partiality and ineffectiveness is prevalent in government then will these processes be more present in party recruitment processes. We have been inspired by Bjarnegårds study on Thailand. However, we disagree with her assumption (2009: 97) that low quality of government is most likely to be found in semi-democracies. In accordance with Sung (2003) Bjarnegård puts great hope in political liberalization processes; it is anticipated that liberal democracy/high levels of democracy is the denominator for good governance as well as for gender equality. In contrast, we argue that male-dominated closely-knit networks with informal patterns of recruitment can be a hindrance for the advancement of women also in political institutions in European countries. Following this reasoning, our intention is to test this claim empirically. We therefore hypothesize that low quality of government – understood as high levels of corruption, partiality and ineffectiveness of government services – will have a negative impact on the proportion of female local councilors in the European regions.

DESIGN AND DATA In this study we break new ground by focusing on the gender composition of elected officials on the sub-national level and by studying regions rather than nations. The kick-off for our study is recent publications showing that corruption and bad governance is more widespread and varies to a larger extent within countries in Europe than previously recognized (Charron, et al., 2011). While the proportion of women still is low in a number of political institutions throughout Europe, few comparative studies have analyzed the variance in descriptive representation beyond national-level institutions. This insight informed us to collect data on the proportion of female local councilors in the European regions (see Sundström, 2013). Even though European countries are heterogeneous, they are, from a global perspective, quite similar in terms of culture, modernization and liberal democratic institutions. Much research in the field of gender and corruption is focused on regions like Asia, Africa and Latin America. Yet, we argue that it is urgent to recognize that “the misuse of public power for private good” – the standard definition of corruption – has a negative effect on social and economic development also in established democracies. This leads us to a research design with several opportunities. Most important, our focus on regions allows us to move beyond

8 the ecological fallacies sometimes present in cross-country studies where researchers ignore variances within countries and make inferences regarding nations based on observations not valid for the entire country (Rydgren 2007).

Explaining female local councilors in the European regions The dependent variable of our study is the proportion of female locally elected councilors aggregated to a mean of each region. Since the construction of this variable required a comprehensive collection of new data by the authors, the following sections will briefly describe the procedure in which this was done. It should be noted that previous scholarly comparisons of subnational representation of elected women have provided little insights in the variation across and within countries.3 At best, some reports have provided an overview of the national averages of locally elected women (see CEMR, 2008). Yet, no relatively recent source of data exists to date that describe the variance within countries in this matter. The dataset utilized in this article therefore contribute by providing a unique picture of the proportion of women in the locally elected assemblies in the European regions. The authors performed the collection of data in the 18 countries included in this study with the purpose of finding the most recent figures (as of March 2013) on the gender composition of locally elected councils. The first priority was to obtain the official sources of data from statistical offices and electoral institutions. In some instances – when statistics from official channels were not sufficiently comprehensive – experts, such as scholars specialized on elections or statistical consultants, provided the figures (for a comprehensive description of sources, see Appendix 2). What constitute a local councilor is difficult to assess across these diverse institutional settings. In 15 out of the 18 countries studied in this report we have found figures on categories that we believe are highly comparable: They broadly correspond to municipal councils – that is, a local deliberative assembly constituted by councilors elected by direct universal suffrage. Three countries (France, Slovakia and Romania) provided some challenges in meeting these requirements. For both France and Romania data on municipal councilors is not available for researchers. Instead we use figures on their intermediary-level councils. In Slovakia national authorities have not collected data on the gender composition of local councilors. Instead of excluding the country from this comparison we include figures on the

3 There exist exceptions; Rigon and Tanzi (2012) study the variation of the share of female municipal councilors in Italy. Wängnerud and Sundell (2010) and Svaleryd (2009) provide an insight to the variance of elected women at the subnational level of Sweden. 9 sex ratio of mayors of the municipalities in the country (for more information of the local assemblies in each of these countries see Table 1 and Sundström 2013).4 The regions in this study are based on the system of NUTS (the Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics) and their levels differ in the countries we analyze. In Belgium, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Netherlands, Sweden and U.K., we study NUTS 1 regions. In Austria, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, and Spain, we study regions at the level of NUTS 2. Figures on local councilors in each municipality or local division are aggregated to an average value for each NUTS region in this study. This is a common procedure of reporting statistics in many of these countries and most often the authors have not been forced to make this calculation, but instead relied on official aggregates. In all, we believe that our dependent variable is operationalized in a way that we measure the concept that we are interested in. The percentage of elected women is a standard operationalization in the literature on descriptive representation. It should be acknowledged that it constitutes some challenge to compare local councilors across these institutionally diverse contexts as the mandates and responsibilities of these councilors possibly differ across countries. However, we are not aiming to explain the effects from having a certain share of locally elected women but are instead interested in explaining the reasons to why this variance exists. Assuming that the processes of clientilism and recruitment to the position of councilor are relatively similar although these councils might have different responsibilities, we believe that the specific differences between the countries are less relevant. Since the electoral cycles in the countries we study are not synchronized, the year when the most recent elections were held varies across our sample from 2009 to 2012 (see Table 1 for details). In three countries, Portugal, Netherlands and Denmark (and also in a few Austrian regions), elections were held in 2009. Since the data on regional quality of government was collected during 2009 and we would like the dependent variable to be measured after our main independent one, this is not perfect. However, we argue that this does not constitute a problem. Quality of government is known to be a “sticky” concept and it is unlikely that this measure would fluctuate rapidly over time.

4 In the analysis that follows in this paper we will discuss how we perform the same models for the dependent variable but with these cases excluded and how this does not seem to alter our main findings in a significant manner. 10

Table 1 Comparing local councilors across 18 countries

Number of local Year from which Country Name of local councils authorities the data is collected France Department councils (conseil general) 101 2011 Germany Local council (gemeinderat) appr. 14000 2011 Italy Local council (consiglio comunale) 8094 2011 Spain Local council (concejal) 8117 2011 UK Local authority councils 466 2010 Hungary Municipal body of representatives (képviselõ-testület) 3175 2010 Czech Republic Municipal council (zastupitelstvo obce) 6250 2010 Slovakia Local council (obecné zastupiteľstvo in municipalities and mestské zastupiteľstvo in cities). Figures refer to elected mayors (starosta in 2792 municipalities and primátor in cities). (2909 mayors) 2010 Portugal Parish assembly (assembleia de freguesia) 4259 2009 Romania County council (consiliul judeţean) 41 2012 Sweden Municipal assembly (kommunfullmäktige) 290 2010 Denmark Municipal council 2009 (kommunalbestyrelse) 98 Belgium Municipal council (conseil communal/ gemeenteraad ) 589 2012 Austria Municipal council (Gemeinderat) 2357 2009-2012 Netherlands Local council (gemeenteraad) 418 2009 Poland Municipal council (rada gminy) 2479 2010 Bulgaria Municipal council (obchtinski savet) 264 2010 Greece Municipal council (dimotiko simvoulio) 325 2010

Studying the distribution of our dependent variable we can conclude that there exist a large variance in the share of locally elected women between countries, but more importantly, also within the nations of this study. The difference between the regions with the lowest and the highest share of women exceed ten per cent in a majority of the countries in our sample. In Denmark for example the region of Syddanmark has an average of 28.5 per cent women in their local assemblies, compared to 38.6 per cent in Hovedstaden. In Greece, the 12.3 per cent female share of the councilors in the region of Kentriki Ellada stands in contrast to the region of Attica and its mean proportion of 24.3 per cent. Also in Italy is this difference clearly visible. While Emilia-Romagna has 28.2 per cent women as an average in its councils, the region of Campania has only 10 per cent. The variance in the share of female locally elected

11 councilors is graphically illustrated in Figure 1 and listed in Appendix 1 (the darker the shading in Figure 1, the higher the average number of women elected).

Figure 1 Female locally elected councilors in the European regions (percent)

Comments: For the details of each country, see appendix.

Regional measure of Quality of Government While there is no dearth of indicators for levels of corruption or the quality of government of countries (e.g. the International Country Risk Guide rating, the Corruptions Perception Index and the World Bank Good Governance Indicator), there is a clear lack of reliable data on the sub-national level. We utilize the most comprehensive regional governance indicator that exists to date, EQI, the European Quality of Government Index. This index was assembled in 2009 by scholars at the Quality of Government Institute, at the University of Gothenburg, with funding from the European Commission (see Charron et al. 2011). The investigators focused on 18 countries and surveyed approximately 34 000 citizens on three different types of government services (law enforcement, health care and education). Participants were asked how they would evaluate these services numerically according to three aspects, their quality,

12 impartiality and corruption. In total, the survey consisted of 16 independent questions related to the three pillars of good governance, which were then combined to a regional index. Moreover, the researchers combined the regional scores with external measures on quality of government in order to complement the regional scores from the survey with a country- context. To do so, the researchers introduced a component controlling for these regions’ deviation from the national average of the established World Bank’s World Government Indicator (WGI).5 The final index is standardized so that the mean is 0 with a standard deviation of 1. In all, the EQI gauge the quality, impartiality and corruption of government in these regions. Higher numbers correspond to little corruption, partiality and ineffectiveness and lower numbers equals less quality of government (see also Charron & Lapuente, 2013). We include all regions from the 18 countries that have been covered by the EQI, with the exception of Bolzano in Italy as this region did not have an official figure for its share of female local councilors.6

National-level control variables Our model includes a rigorous test for alternative explanations for the variance of our dependent variable. We use both national-level and regional-level variables for this purpose. The three national-level controls are type of elections system, legislative gender quota on the subnational level and voluntary party gender quotas. The first control variable has a long history in research on women’s representation. The seminal contribution by Duverger (1955) stressed the importance of election systems in determining the share of elected women. Also Norris’ (1993) model of parliamentary recruitment in Western democracies emphasizes the importance of the political system. Numerous studies find that women’s presence is favored by electoral systems with party lists, proportional representation (PR), and large district magnitudes. In a single-member system, a woman has to be the number-one choice for her party in order to take part in the race. In a PR system with large district magnitudes, a woman can be placed further down on the party list and still be elected. This argument also contends that since PR systems tend to produce a larger number of parties and an increased possibility of new parties entering politics the idea of gender equality is more likely to be spread amongst parties due to the diffusion of ideas coupled with strategic considerations of not losing the

5 For a more detailed description on the survey and the creation of the index, see Charron et al. 2012. For extensive sensitivity tests between national WGI scores and the regional measure of quality of government, see Charron (2010). 6 In our multivariate analysis we also ”loose” four french territories as missing cases, as no data on HDI and educational attainment was available for these regions. 13 female vote (Kittilson, 2006; Lovenduski & Norris, 1993; Wängnerud, 2009: 52). To account for this aspect we control for election system and create four dummy variables (Mixed- Member Proportional system, Two-Round System, Party-List proportional system and First Past the Post system).7 Not surprisingly the effect from gender quotas has been shown to play an important role for determining female representation. The two last decades of research on women’s representation have shown that the number of elected women has often not increased steadily but rather grown in “punctuated and sometimes dramatic increases” (Kittilson, 2006: 10). It is widely known that an increased feature, especially in more recent democracies, has been the design of quota provisions for women through legislation (Dahlerup, 2006). To gauge this effect we have created dummy variables for countries having legislative quotas on the subnational level.8 Besides the importance of legislative acts some studies also point to acts by parties, such as the implementation of gender quotas or other voluntary gender-specific measures within parties, as important determinants of the number of women elected (Freidenvall, 2006; Studlar & McAllister, 2002). It should be noted that the number of women elected has also increased in parties that have never adopted quotas. Thus, one can expect a “contagion effect” in party systems where one party has adopted voluntary quotas (such as a zipper system for party lists); that is a positive impact on the share of female candidates also in other parties (Kittilson, 2006). To measure this effect we introduce dummy variables for countries having political parties that have adopted voluntary gender quotas.9

Regional-level control variables We also include four regional-level controls in our model, gender equality culture (measured as the female share of labor paticipation), regional GDP per capita, human development and educational attainment. Related to the control for political culture it has been stated that “societies that elect large numbers of women tend to be more gender equal also in other respects than societies that elect few women” (Wängnerud, 2009: 51). The concept of gender equality culture – where women have opportunities for upward mobility – has been widely acknowledge to correlate with the number of women in elected seats (Inglehart & Norris, 2003: 138). Although a “culture of equality” is a concept that is quite difficult to gauge

7 Data is taken from the Electoral System Design database at http://www.idea.int/esd/ 8 The information is retrieved from The Quota Project at http://www.quotaproject.org/uid/countryview 9 The information is retrieved from The Quota Project at http://www.quotaproject.org/uid/countryview 14 empirically, a reasonable alternative is to use a measure on women’s participation in the labor force (see Iversen & Rosenbluth, 2008; Stockemer, 2011). This measure has shown to be significant in previous analyses of women’s participation in local politics, comparing national averages, in Europe thus it makes sense to include this factor as a control (Wide, 2006: 144). The indicator included in our analysis measure the ration of women to men active in the labor market.10 Numerous studies have found that modernization in a broad sense often tend to correlate with high gender equality and a high presence of elected women (Berg, 2007; Inglehart et al., 2002; Ingelhart & Norris, 2003). It has been found that countries with higher economic development and a highly educated population tend to elect a larger share of women. To account for these effects, regional measures of GDP per capita, level of education and a human development index are included as indicators of modernization.11 The measure for GDP per capita has been averaged for the years 2007-2009 and, as this is the standard procedure when dealing with skewed variables, logarithmically transformed. The indicator for education is a measure of the percentage of the population having completed a tertiary education. The Human Development index is a composite measure that also takes into account life expectancy.

Potential endogeneity Before we report the findings from our empirical test, a discussion on the possible challenge of endogeneity between the share of locally elected women and regional quality of government is warranted. With the debate on the causal relationship between gender and corruption in mind one could believe that the proportion of women in local parliaments would affect the governance in these regions. In order to address this potential problem in our analysis we would, ideally, need time series data on both women’s representation and regional governance. As this data does not exist we have tried our best to measure our dependent variable after the data on governance and corruption. We are therefore humble with our claims and do not attempt to end any debate on causality between gender and corruption. However, we still believe that providing a robust result of correlation in this cross-regional sample is a substantial contribution in itself.

10 The information is retrieved from Eurostat regional statistics at http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/region_cities/regional_statistics 11 The data was generously available from the data used by Charron et al. (2012) and originated from the official figures reported to the Eurostat database. 15

METHOD To gauge the effect of corruption and quality of government on our dependent variable we firstly analyze the bivariate relationship between the proportion of elected women and regional quality of government. Secondly, we proceed to build a multi-level model. We have four regional level covariates (Female labor force participation, GDP per capita, Human Development Index, and educational attainment) and three national level factors (the electoral system type, legislative gender quotas on the subnational level and voluntary party quotas). Having data structured across two different geographical stages we deem hierarchical linear modeling (HLM) to be the appropriate method. In our analysis we cluster regions within countries. Our multi-level model covers 167 European regions in 18 countries. For summary statistics of the variables included in the model, see Table 2 in the appendix. It should be noted that the dependent variable we analyze below is the one where we included 18 countries, and thus also the three countries (Slovakia, Romania and France) that admittedly are a bit differently measured. Our rationale for this is based on thorough analysis and several tests to ensure that these three countries do not alter our results in any significant aspects. We have run the same model using a slightly altered dependent variable (having only one of these countries, two of them or none of them) and basically find the same results as in the results reported below. The relationship that is presented in the results section is thus also evident when we analyze the regions in the other 15 European countries. This further strengthens our belief to assume that the same process of corruption and partiality as affecting the recruitment of women is present in country councils as in municipal councils. In the literature on women’s representation the “Scandinavian exception” is used to signal that the Nordic countries are difficult to compare with other settings (see Rosenbluth et al. 2006). We see no problem of including the regions of Denmark and Sweden in this analysis. They represent roughly five per cent of our sample and do not drive our results in any significant aspect.

RESULTS From the scatterplot reported in Figure 2 it is evident that we have a strong bivariate relationship between regional quality of government and the average proportion of locally elected women in these entities. This relationship is positive and based on this first analysis it is apparent that the regions with less partiality, corruption and ineffectiveness tend to be the

16 ones with a higher share of female councilors. However, in order to complement this picture with even more robust results we proceed to report findings from the multivariate model.

Figure 2. Bivariate relationship: female councilors and quality of government

Our multivariate HLM analysis basically confirms the findings that regional quality of government has a substantially strong effect on women’s representation in the European regions. As evident in model 2 of Table 2, when only the effect from EQI is reported, this relationship is positive and significant on the 99.9 per cent level. When our regional-level and national-level control variables are introduced this effect is slightly decreased, but still strong. In our full analysis, model 4 of Table 2, we still observe positive coefficients from EQI on our dependent variable, when all our independent variables are taken into acount. More specifically, the size of the coefficient can be interpreted as that a one-point increase in regional governance would predict an increase of approximately 2.7 higher percent of female councilors as an average. Taking our country-level variations in to account we can also see that our model explain a large share of variances within countries. The statistics reported in Table 2 indicate that our model indeed has a good fit and explain a substantial part of the variance in the proportion of locally elected women in the European regions. The control variables show surprisingly little significant effects but most of

17 them have the anticipated sign of direction. GDP per capita seem to have a strong and significant effect. Test for multicollinearity indicate that regional HDI and GDP per capita are highly correlated, and VIF values from the variable HDI indicate that this might influence our model. However, this does not seem to significantly alter the general trend of our results.

Table 3. Results from the multivariate HLM analysis 1 2 3 4 DV: Share of female councilors EQI 3.090*** 2.792*** 2.675*** (0.734) (0.838) (0.841) Fem lab. participation 4.974 19.791 (32.017) (47.457) HDI -0.073 -0.0297 (0.105) (0.111) log GDP/c 4.963* 4.594* (2.121) (2.142) Tertiary education 0.096 0.0528 (0.121) (0.127) List PR elect 0.921 (8.169) TRS elect -17.121 (12.541) MMP elect 1.639 (9.024) Subnat legislative quota 2.747 (6.128) P arty quota -3.747 (5.733) F ixed intercept 26.273 *** 26.259 *** -24.532 -31.960 (1.942) (1.734) (30.237) (43.125) Random effect: Country 8.053 7.166 7.687 7.398 (1.451) (1.296) (1.500) (1.769)

Log restricted-likelihood -508.08503 -499.09244 -489.3808 -472.48312 AIC 1022.17 1006.185 994.7616 970.9662 BIC 1031.524 1018.657 1019.706 1011.5 Observations 167 167 167 167 Number of groups 18 18 18 18

Comments : The three dummy variables for election system have the fourth dummy, for countries with a First Past The Post election system, as a reference category. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. *** = p<0.001, ** = p<0.01, * = p<0.05

CONCLUSION The empirical analysis performed in this article substantiates the suggestion that corruption, partiality and ineffectiveness of government services is an important factor when investigating the variance in the representation of women. In this study we have analyzed a novel dataset on the proportion female locally elected councilors in Europe. Regional figures on governance quality exert a substantial influence on women’s representation at the local level. We contribute in two aspects to the theoretical discussion on gender and politics. Firstly we argue that, as factors exogenous to parties (such as bad governance) affect the proportion of elected women, hindrances to women’s political representation are not eliminated by the reformation of political parties only. This should hopefully inform the future discussion on gender and representation. Secondly we specifically contribute to the debate on gender and corruption. Sung (2003: 718) observes that “gender equality and government accountability are both great achievements of modern liberal democracy” and thus downplay the possible effect from corruption on women’s representation. In the previous literature of country comparisons such reasoning is difficult to question. However, studying female descriptive representation on the regional level we can move beyond the prior focus on national level institutions. If Sung was right then we should not observe such a wide variance of elected women within the regions in the (democratic) countries we study. Controlling for regional-level and national-level factors that can be seen as possible determinants of women’s representation our models still indicate a significant and substantially important impact from our regional measure of quality of government. The results of our model show that quality of government is an important determinant for women’s political representation in Europe. Thus, modernization and democratization, as most commonly understood, cannot be the only driving forces behind the advancement of women. Our empirical analysis rests on a cross-sectional dataset. Though we do not claim to propose a ”final” answer to the debate of causality between the representation of women and levels of corruption, our findings clearly has advanced this field of research. For future empirical research it would be worthwhile to study how this relationship holds in a time-series analysis. This would of course require a continuous effort as regional data on governance currently is not available. The test performed in this article constitutes for now a significant contribution.

REFERENCES Alatas, V.; L. Cameron; A. Chaudhuri; N. Erkal; L. Gangadharan (2009), “Gender and Corruption: Insights from an Experimental Analysis”, Southern Economic Journal 75(3), 663–680. Alhassan-Alolo, N. (2007), "Gender and corruption: testing the new consensus Public Administration and Development, 27, 227-237. Beaman L., E. Duflo, R. Pande and P. Topalova (2011), “Political Reservation and Substantive representation: Evidence from Indian Village Councils”. In “India Policy Forum 2010-11” (eds) S. Bery, B. Bosworth, A. Panagariya, Vol 7, Sage Publications. Beaman L., E. Duflo, R. Pande and P. Topalova (2012), “Female leadership raises aspirations and educational attainment for girls: a policy experiment in India”. Science feb 3. Berg, J. (2007) “Gender attitudes and modernization processes”, International Journal of Public Opinion Research 19(1): 5-23. Bjarnegård, E. (2009), “Men in Politics: Revisiting Patterns of Gendered Parliamentary Representation in Thailand and Beyond”, PhD Thesis at the Department for Political Science, University of Uppsala. Branisa, B. and M. Ziegler (2010), “Reexamining the link between gender and corruption: The role of social institutions”, Discussion Paper No. 24, Courant Research Centre. Charron, N. (2010), “Assessing The Quality of the Quality of Government Data: A Sensitivity Test of the World Bank Government Indicators.” QoG Working Paper. Charron, N. and V. Lapuente (2013) “Why do Some Regions in Europe have Higher Quality of Government?” Journal of Politics. Charron, N. L. Dijkstra and V. Lapuente (2012) “Regional Governance Matters: Quality of Government within European Union Member State” Forthcoming in Regional Studies. Charron, N., V. Lapuente and B. Rothstein (2011) “Measuring Quality of Government and Sub- national Variation” Report for the EU Commission of Regional Development. European Commission Directorate-General Regional Policy Directorate Policy Development. Dahlerup D,.(ed.) (2006), Women, Quotas and Politics, London: Routledge Dollar, D.; R. Fisman; and R. Gatti (2001), “Are women really the fairer sex? Corruption and women in government”, Journal of Economic Behaviour & Organization, Vol. 46, 423-429. Duverger M. (1955), The Political Role of Women. Paris: UN Econ. Soc. Counc. Gallager, M. and M. March (eds.) (1988), Candidate selection in a comparative perspective: The secret garden of politics. London: Sage. Goetz, A. M. (2007), “Political Cleaners: Women as the New Anti-Corruption Force?”, Development and Change, 38 (1): 87-105. Inglehart, R, Norris, P & Welzel, C (2002), “Gender Equality and Democracy”, Comparative Sociology 1 (3-4): 321-346.

Inglehart, R. and Norris P. (2003) Rising Tide. Gender Equality and Cultural Change Around the World. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press Iversen, T, Rosenbluth F. (2008), “Work and power. The connection between female labor force participation and female political representation”. Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci. 11:479–95. Krook, M. L. (2009) Quotas for Women in Politics. Gender and Candidate Selection Reform Worldwide. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Lovenduski, J. and Norris, P. ed. (1993) Gender and Party Politics. London: Sage. Michailova, J. and I. Melnykovska (2009), “Gender, corruption and sustainable growth in transition countries”, Journal of Applied Economic Sciences, Vol. 4, 3(9): 387-407. Paxton, P.; M. Hughes & M. Painter (2010), “Growth in Women’s Political Representation: A Longitudinal Exploration of Democracy, Electoral Systems and Gender Quotas”, European Journal of Political Research 49 (1): 25-52. Pitkin, H. (1967) The Concept of Representation. Berkeley: University of California Press. Rivas, M. F. (2008), ”An experiment on corruption and gender”, Department of Economic Theory and Economic History, University of Granada, Working Paper 08:10. Pande, R. and D. Ford (2012), “Gender Quotas and Female Leadership: A Review”. Washington DC: World Bank. Rigon, M. and G.M. Tanzi (2012), “Does gender matter for public spending? Empirical evidence from Italian municipalities”, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area, Temi di discussion no 862. Rosenbluth F.; R. Salmond; M.F. Thies (2006), ”Welfare works: explaining female legislative representation” Politic & Gender 2(2): 165–92. Rydgren, J. (2007), "The Sociology of the Radical Right" Annual Review of Sociology 33: 241-262. Stockemer, D. (2011), "Women's parliamentary representation in Africa - The impact of democracy and corruption on the number of female deputies in national parliaments", Political Studies, 59(3), 693-712. Sung, H-E. (2003), “Fairer Sex or Fairer System? Gender and Corruption Revisited”, Social Forces, 82(2), 703-723. Svaleryd, H. (2009), “Women’s representation and public spending”, European Journal of Political Economy 25(2), 186-198. Swamy, A.; S. Knack; Y. Lee; and O. Azfar (2001), “Gender and Corruption”, Journal of Development Economics, 64, 25-55. Transparency International (2007), “Gender and Corruption: Understanding and Undoing the Linkages”, Working paper 2007:3, Berlin. Tremblay, M. ed. (2008) Women and Legislative Representation. Electoral Systems, Political Parties, and Sex Quotas. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Tripp, A. M. and A. Kang (2008), “The Global Impact of Quotas.” Comparative Political Studies 41 (3): 338-61. Vijayalakshmi, V. (2008), “Rent-Seeking and Gender in Local Governance” The Journal of Development Studies, 44(9): 1262-1288. Wide, J. (2006), “Kvinnors politiska representation i ett jämförande perspektiv - nationell och lokal nivå” PhD Thesis at the Department for Political Science, University of Umeå. World Bank (2001), “Engendering Development: Through gender equality in rights, resources and voice”, A World Bank Policy Research Report, Oxford University Press. Wängnerud, L. (2009), “Women in Parliaments: Descriptive and Substantive Representation” Annual Review of Political Science 12: 51–69. Wängnerud, L. (2010), “Variation in Corruption between Mexican States: Elaborating the gender perspective”, QoG Working Paper Series 2010:18. Wängnerud, L. and A. Sundell (2012), "Do politics matter? Women in Swedish local elected assemblies 1970-2010 and gender equality in outcomes”, European Political Science Review (4): 97-120.

Table 2. Summary statistics for the variables in the model Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Share 167 24.88629 9.143115 3.8 44.5565 EQI 167 -0.0011182 1.016937 -2.87937 1.74988 Gdp 167 9.853323 0.6516282 7.953688 11.00957 Edu 167 22.39371 8.044362 7.6 42.9 HDI 167 55.4482 21.2476 0 94.9 fem_lab 167 0.7588922 0.0621198 0.634 0.875 Listpr 167 0.6347305 0.4829538 0 1 Trs 167 0.1317365 0.3392213 0 1 Mmp 167 0.1616766 0.3692612 0 1 Fptp 167 0.0718563 0.2590265 0 1 quota_subnat 167 0.5329341 0.5004147 0 1 quota_party 167 0.7784431 0.4165434 0 1

Appendix 1: The share of locally elected women in the European regions

SE3 Norra Sverige 44,56 SE1 Östra Sverige 44,44 ES30 Comunidad de Madrid 42,5 ES21 Pais Vasco 42,4 DE3 Berlin 41,9 ES43 Extremadura 41,9 ES23 La Rioja 41,6 ES42 Castilla-La Mancha 41,5 BE1 Brussels 41,46 ES61 Andalucia 41,2 SE2 Södra Sverige 40,92 ES62 Región de Murcia 40,9 ES53 Illes Balears 40,7 ES52 Comunidad Valenciana 40,5 ES22 Comunidad Foral de Navarra 40,4 ES41 Castilla y León 39,8 DE5 Bremen 38,8 DK01 Hovedstaden 38,6 ES13 Cantabria 38,6 ES12 Principado de Asturias 38,2 ES11 Galicia 37,9 ES24 Aragón 37,9 ES51 Cataluña 37,1 UKI London 36,4 BE2 Vlaams Gewest 36,14 AT13 Wien 35 BE3 Wallonie 34,94 PT17 Lisboa 34,36 UKE Yorkshire-Humber 33,8 DE7 Hessen 33 PT15 Algarve 32,89 PL61 Kujawsko-Pomorskie 32,83 DE6 Hamburg 32,7 PT20 Região Autónoma dos Açores 31,66

UKC Northeast England 31,4 DK04 Midtylland 31,2 UKD Northwest England 30,8 PT30 Região Autónoma da Madeira 30,79 PT18 Alentejo 30,77 UKK South West England 30,7 UKH East of England 30,6 DK02 Sjaelland 30,5 UKJ South East England 30 PL51 Dolnoslaskie 29,73 DEF Schleswig-Holstein 29,5 CZ02 Stredni Cechy 29,4 HU2 Dunántúl 29,19 PL42 Zachodniopomorskie 29,17 DEA North Rhine Westphalia 28,8 HU3 Észak és Alföld 28,78 PL62 Warminsko-Mazurskie 28,66 BG34 Yugoiztochen 28,57 DK03 Syddanmark 28,5 ITD5 Emilia-Romagna 28,22 UKG West Midland England 28,1 PT16 Centro 27,70 PL43 Lubuskie 27,48 CZ05 Severovychod 27,46 CZ08 Moravskoslezsko 27,22 NL1 Noord-Nederland 27,02 CZ07 Stedni Morava 26,64 DEB Rhineland-Palatinate 26,5 AT12 Niederöstrerreich 26,22 AT22 Steiermark 26,2 PL11 Lodzkie 26,18 DK05 Nordjylland 26 DE4 Brandenburg 26 PL12 Mazowieckie 25,87 PL63 Pomorskie 25,83 HU1 Közép-Magyarország 25,79

NL3 West-Nederland 25,74 BG41 Yugozapaden 25,74 BG31 Severozapaden 25,62 UKF East Midland England 25,6 PL52 Opolskie 25,57 BG33 Severoiztochen 25,47 DE2 Bavaria 25,2 PL22 Slaskie 24,95 DE8 Mecklenburg-Vorpommen 24,8 PT11 Norte 24,73 NL2 Oost-Nederland 24,44 GR3 Attica 24,34 BG32 Severen Tsentralen 24,328 UKM Scotland 24,04 CZ04 Severozapad 23,98 ITD2 Trento 23,94 ITC2 Valle d'Acosta 23,89 ITE1 Toscana 23,85 CZ03 Jihozapad 23,65 SK03 Stredné Slovensko 23,58 UKN N. Ireland 23,54 UKL Wales 23,50 DEG Thuringia 23,3 CZ06 Jihovychod 23,24 ITC1 Piemonte 23,04 SK02 Západné Slovensko 22,84 DE9 Lower Saxony 22,60 ITE3 Marche 22,50 ITC4 Lombardia 22,31 CZ01 Praha 22,22 PL41 Wielkopolskie 22,12 BG42 Yuzhen Tsentralen 22,07 ITG2 Sardegna 21,90 FR52 Bretagne 21,9 PL21 Malopolskie 21,83 NL4 Zuid-Nederland 21,74

AT21 Kärnten 21,59 AT32 Salzburg 21,5 ITE2 Umbria 21,402 PL33 Swietokrzyskie 21,21 ITC3 Ligura 21,03 AT34 Voralberg 20,7 SK04 Východné Slovensko 20,53 PL31 Lubelskie 20,44 PL34 Podlaskie 20,32 AT33 Tirol 20,2 FR10 Ile-de-France 20,2 ITD4 Friuli-Venezia Giulia 20,11 DEC Saarland 20 FR23 Haute-Normandie 19,6 DEE Saxony-Anhalt 19,3 AT11 Burgenland 19,26 DED Saxony 19,2 ITD3 Veneto 19,12 SK01 Bratislavský kraj 19,1 AT31 Oberösterreich 18,92 DE1 Baden Wuttemberg 18,7 RO31 Sud-Muntenia 18,46 PL32 Podkarpackie 17,54 FR51 Pays de la Loire 17,2 RO22 Sud-Est 16,83 FR43 Franche-Comte 16,4 ITF1 Abruzzo 16,03 FR21 Champagne-Ardenne 15,8 FR72 Auvergne 15,8 GR4 Nisia Aigaiou-Kriti 15,72 ITF5 Basilicata 15,40 ITF2 Molise 15,39 RO41 Sud-Vest Oltenia 15,18 FR26 Bourgogne 14,9 ITE4 Lazio 14,80 FR62 Midi-Pyrenees 14,7

RO11 Nord-Vest 14,64 FR63 Limousin 14,2 GR1 Voreia Ellada 13,92 FR61 Aquitaine 13,6 ITF6 Calabria 13,10 FR30 Nord - Pas-de-Calais 12,8 FR71 Rhone-Alpes 12,8 FR82 Provence-Alpes-Cote d'Azur 12,7 RO21 Nord-Est 12,62 FR24 Centre 12,6 ITG1 Sicilia 12,38 GR2 Kentriki Ellada 12,27 ITF4 Puglia 12,26 RO42 Vest 12,21 FR25 Basse-Normandie 11,3 RO32 Bucuresti-Ilfov 10,71 RO12 Centru 10,41 ITF3 Campania 10,05 FR81 Languedoc-Roussillon 9,7 FR22 Picardie 8,5 FR53 Poitou-Charentes 8,3 FR42 Alsace 8 FR41 Lorraine 7,6 FR83 Corse 3,8

Appendix 2. Sources from which data was collected

Austria Figures refer to elected member of municipal councils (gemeinderat) for the most recent years available. However the electoral cycles are of differing length in some of these regions. Figures for Vorarlberg refer to the year 2009, where the data on other regions refer to the period between 2010 and 2012. Some of this data was provided by Dr. Robert Gmeiner [[email protected]], Verbindungsstelle der Bundesländer, Vienna. The data for Burgenland can be found online [www.rali.boku.ac.at/fileadmin/_/H85/H854/_TEMP_/Burgenland/Zusammenfassung_Studie_Frauen_im_Burge nland.pdf]. The data for Kärnten can be found online [http://olga.pixelpoint.at/media/PPM_3DAK_frauenreferat/~M3/3026.3dak.pdf]. The data for Oberösterreich can be found online [http://www.frauenreferat-ooe.at/xbcr/SID-06C8B9E0- 52478777/Mentoring_2012.pdf]. The data for Salzburg can be found online [https://service.salzburg.gv.at/WebRoot/LandSalzburgDB/Shops/Landversand/4F57/840E/AE0C/AFF4/0627/0A 01/047B/E426/pdf-Frauenzahlen2012-neu.pdf]. The data for Steiermark can be found online [http://www.verwaltung.steiermark.at/cms/dokumente/11146885_44658183/ec570b75/rffg_frauenmaennerstmk_ web_ds.pdf]. The data for Tirol can be found online [http://www.tirol.gv.at/fileadmin/www.tirol.gv.at/themen/gesellschaft- und-soziales/frauen/downloads/Zahlen-Daten-Fakten-Endfassung_2010.PDF]. The data for Vorarlberg can be found online [http://www.vorarlberg.at/pdf/frauensituationsbericht_2.pdf].

Belgium Figures refer to elected member of the municipal councils (conseil communal/ gemeenteraad) in 2012. The data for Brussels was provided by Mr. Patrik Trouverouy [[email protected]], at the Information Centre of the Brussels Region. The data for Vlaams Gewest was provided by Mr. Tom Doesselaere cel verkiezingen [[email protected]], at the Agentschap voor Binnenlands Bestuur. The data for Wallonie was provided by Mr. Michel L’Hoost [[email protected]], at the Union des Villes et Communes de Wallonie.

Bulgaria Figures refer to elected member of municipal councils (obchtinski savet) in 2010. The data was provided by Ms. Maria Lakova, at the Honorary Consulate of Sweden in Sofia [[email protected]], and is available online from the Central Election Commission of Bulgaria [http://results.cik.bg/tur1/mestni/0103.html].

Czech Republic Figures refer to elected members of the municipal council (zastupitelstvo obce) in 2010. The data was provided by Ms. Eva Jacubkova [[email protected]], at the Information Services Unit of the Headquarters of the

Czech Statistical Office, Prague. The data is available online [http://www.volby.cz/pls/kv2010/kv22?xjazyk=EN&xid=0&xv=7].

Denmark Figures refer to elected member of the municipal councils (kommunbestyrelse) in 2009. The data was extracted from the Danish statistical yearbook 2011 [http://www.dst.dk/en/Statistics/ofs/Publications/Yearbook/2011.aspx], from contact with Mr. Henning Christiansson [[email protected]] at Statistics Denmark.

France Figures refer to elected members of the department councils (conseil général) elected in 2011. The data was provided by the National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies. The information is available online [http://www.insee.fr/fr/themes/theme.asp?theme=5&sous_theme=5&nivgeo=0&type=2].

Germany Figures refer to members of the local councils (gemeinderat) elected in 2011. For Berlin, Bremen and Hamburg the municipality structure is slightly different and the gemeinderat is also a district council. Data for most regions were provided by Mr. Ralf Mueller [[email protected]] at Statistisches Bundesamt, B3- Statistischer Informationsservice. Data on Lower Saxony was provided by Mr. Ralf Martins, [[email protected]] at Landesbetrieb für Statistik und Kommunikationstechnologie Niedersachsen (LSKN).

Greece Figures refer to elected member of municipal councils (dimotiko simvoulio) in 2010. The data was provided by Mr. Vaso Papadopoulou, Head of Directorate of Planning, Development and Employment, General Secretariat for Gender Equality [[email protected]], and from personnel at the Ministry of Interior [[email protected]].

Hungary Figures refer to members of the municipal body of representatives (képviselõ-testület) elected in 2010. The data was provided by Ms. Katalin Szekszardi [[email protected]] at the Election Information Service [Választási Információs Szolgálat, (KIM)], the National Election Office of Hungary.

Italy Figures refer to elected members of the local council (consiglio comunale) elected in 2011. The data is provided by the Ministry of Interior. The data is available online at [http://amministratori.interno.it/AmmIndex5.htm].

Netherlands

Figures refer to elected member of the local council (gemeenteraad) in 2009. The data was provided by Mr. Peter Castenmiller [[email protected]], at the Dutch Institute for Public Administration, Haag (PBLQ Zenk).

Poland Figures refer to elected member of municipal councils (rada gminy) in 2010. The data was provided by Ms. Aleksandra Niżyńska, Researcher, Law and Democratic Institutions Programme, Institute of Public Affairs, Warsaw [[email protected]], available online from the National Electoral commission [http://wybory2010.pkw.gov.pl/Komunikaty_PKW,2/Dane_W_Arkuszach,4/index.html].

Portugal Figures refer to elected member of the parish assembly (assembleia de freguesia) in 2009. The data was provided by Ms. Maria João Santos Rodrigues [[email protected]], at the Directorate of Legal Services and Electoral Studies of the Direcção Geral de Administração Interna (DGAI).

Romania Figures refer to members of the county councils (consiliul judeţean) elected in 2012. In total there exist approximately 1338 councilors. The data was collected through extensive analysis of the counties in each of the eight above shown regions. The Nord-Vest region consists of six counties; Bihor, Bistrița-Năsăud, Cluj, Maramureș, Satu Mare and Sălaj. The figures for Bihor County were retrieved from the following website: http://www.cjbihor.ro/cj.php The figures for Bistrița-Năsăud County were retrieved from the following website: http://www.portalbn.ro/cj/Pagini/Consilieri.aspx The figures for Cluj County were retrieved from the following website: http://www.cjcluj.ro/consilieri/ The figures for Maramureș County were retrieved from the following website: http://www.cjmaramures.ro/Lista.aspx?t=conducereLegislativa The figures for Satu Mare County were retrieved from the following website: http://www.cjsm.ro/consilieri- 2013-satumare-J-cuprins-02.html The figures for Sălaj County were retrieved from the following website: http://www.cjsj.ro/index.php/consiliul- judetean/structura-politica/consilieri-judeteni The region Centru consists of six countries; Alba, Brașov, Covasna, Harghita, Mureș and Sibiu The figures for Alba County were retrieved from the following website: http://adevarul.ro/locale/alba- iulia/rezultate-alegeri-locale-2012-partidul-poporului-obtine-trei-consilieri-judeteni-alba-usl-vrea-renumararea- voturilor-nule-1_50aeee477c42d5a663a1bd95/index.html The figures for Brașov County were retrieved from the following website: http://newsbv.ro/2012/07/02/au-fost- alesi-vicepresedintii-consiliului-judetean-brasov-pascu-chiriac/ The figures for Covasna County were retrieved from the following website: http://www.covasna.info.ro/170_consilieri/ The figures for Harghita County were retrieved from the following website: http://consiliu.judetulharghita.ro/ The figures for Mureș County were retrieved from the following website: http://www.cjmures.ro/consilieri.htm

The figures for Sibiu County were retrieved from the following website: http://www.cjsibiu.ro/portal/Sibiu/CJSibiu/portal.nsf/AllByUNID/DA34F4C3B2D1B53FC2257A24003543B6? OpenDocument The region Nord-Est consists of six counties; Bacău, Botoșani, Neamț, Iași, Suceava and Vaslui. The figures for Bacău County were retrieved from the following website: http://www.csjbacau.ro/consilieri- judeteni-mandat-2012-2016-4.html The figures for Botoșani County were retrieved from the following website: http://www.cjbotosani.ro/portal.html?pid=971 The figures for Neamț County were retrieved from the following website: http://cjneamt.ro/Lists/Consilieri%20judeeni/AllItems.aspx The figures for Iași County were retrieved from the following website: http://flacaraiasului.info/cine-sunt-noii- consilieri-locali-si-judeteni-din-iasi/ The figures for Suceava County were retrieved from the following website: http://www.cjsuceava.ro/index.php/consilieri-judeteni The figures for Vaslui County were retrieved from the following website: http://www.cjvs.ro/modules.php?name=Content&pa=showpage&pid=371 The Sud-Est region consists of six counties; Brăila, Buzău, Constanța, Galați, Tulcea and Vrancea The figures for Brăila County were retrieved from the following website: http://www.portal- braila.ro/Portal/Braila/CJBraila/portal.nsf/AllByUNID/E6D83C343B947CFA42257540002E3852?OpenDocume nt The figures for Buzău County were retrieved from the following website: http://www.cjbuzau.ro/consjud2012- 2016.htm The figures for Constanța County were retrieved from the following website: http://www.cjc.ro/ The figures for Galați County were retrieved from the following website: http://www.cjgalati.ro/index.php/consiliul-judeului/consilieri-judeeni The figures for Tulcea County were retrieved from the following website: https://www.cjtulcea.ro/sites/cjtulcea/Legislativ/Pages/home.aspx The figures for Vrancea County were retrieved from the following website: http://www.cjvrancea.ro/Consilieri- judeteni-10/ The Sud-Muntenia region consists of seven counties; Călărași, Dâmbovița, Argeș, Giurgiu, Ialomița, Prahova and Teleorman. The figures for Călărași County were retrieved from the following website: http://www.calarasi.ro/ro/consiliu/reprezentare-cjc The figures for Dâmbovița County were retrieved from the following website: http://www.cjd.ro/organizare/consilierii_judeteni The figures for Argeș County were retrieved from the following website: http://www.ziartop.ro/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=31702:lista-noilor-consilieri-judeeni- ai-argeului-&catid=3:subiectul-zilei&Itemid=4 The figures for Giurgiu County were retrieved from the following website: http://www.cjgiurgiu.ro/portal/giurgiu/cj/portal.nsf/AllByUNID/000011EA?OpenDocument

The figures for Ialomița County were retrieved from the following website: http://www.cicnet.ro/node/452 The figures for Prahova County were retrieved from the following website: http://www.cjph.ro/index.php?_init=consiliu.conducere_list&type=consilier The figures for Teleorman County were retrieved from the following website: http://www.cjteleorman.ro/ The region Bucuresti-Ilfov has special characteristics. Although Bucharest is the county-capital of Ilfov County, it is administrated separately. However, it does not have its own county council since it is not considered a county itself and belongs to Ilfov. The figures for Ilfov County were retrieved from the following website: http://www.cjilfov.ro/index.php/consiliul-judetean/consilieri The region Sud-Vest Oltenia consists of five counties; Dolj, Gorj, Mehedinți, Vâlcea and Olt. The figures for Dolj County were retrieved from the following website: http://www.cjdolj.ro/structura.html The figures for Gorj County were retrieved from the following website: http://www.cjgorj.ro/Organizare/Consilieri-Judeteni.aspx The figures for Mehedinți County were retrieved from the following website: http://www.sejmh.ro/ The figures for Vâlcea County were retrieved from the following website: http://www.cjvalcea.ro/consvl.htm The figures for Olt County were retrieved from the following website: http://www.cjolt.ro/cjolt/servlet/portal?action=ContentAction&actEvent=showRubric&id=consilieri-judeteni The Vest region consists of four counties; Hunedoara, Caraș-Severin, Timiș and Arad. The figures for Hunedoara County were retrieved from the following website: http://www.cjhunedoara.ro/index.php-meniuId=7&viewCat=24.htm The figures for Caraș-Severin County were retrieved from the following website: http://www.cjcs.ro/declaratii- de-avere-consilieri.php The figures for Timiș County were retrieved from the following website: http://www.cjtimis.ro/index.php?meniuId=3&viewCat=4253 The figures for Arad County were retrieved from the following website: http://www.cjarad.ro/index.php?meniuId=888&viewCat=6878&lg=ro

Slovakia Figures refer to elected mayors mayor (starosta in municipalities and primátor in cities) in 2010. In total Slovakia has 2909 mayors. The data was provided by Ms. Adriana Lukacova [[email protected]], at the International Relations Department, Association of Towns and Communities of Slovakia, Združenie miest a obcí Slovenska (ZMOS). The data is available online [http://www.institutrr.sk/download/b_holubova_5.pdf].

Spain Figures refer to elected members of the local council (concejales) elected in 2011. The data is provided by the Ministry of Interior. The data is available online at [http://www.infoelectoral.mir.es/OtraInformacion/pdf/Impacto_Ley_Igualdad_Locales_2011.pdf]

Sweden

Figures refer to elected member of the municipal councils (kommunfullmäktige) in 2010. The data was provided by Mr. Jonas Olofsson [[email protected]], at the unit for Democracy Statistics of Statistics Sweden (SCB).

United Kingdom Figures refer to members of the local authority councilors elected in 2010. Data for most of the regions was provided by the UK Local Government Association, especially by Mr. Stephen Richards, [[email protected]], and are available at their webpage [http://www.local.gov.uk/web/guest/local- government-intelligence/-/journal_content/56/10171/100325/ARTICLE-TEMPLATE]. Figures for Wales was provided by Mr. Lee Owens [[email protected]], at WLGA, the Welsch Local Government Association. Figures for Scotland was provided by Mr. Tony McNair [[email protected]], at COSLA, the Convention of Scottish Local Authorities. Figures for N. Ireland was provided by Ms. Diana Stewart [[email protected]], at the Local Government Staff Commission in Belfast.

Appendix 2. Political and administrative systems

Austria Gender quotas: No legislated candidate quotas exist for the national or sub-national level. Three parties have adopted voluntary party quotas. The Social Democratic Party of Austria, Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs (SPÖ) has a quota on 40% of women of their party list. The Austrian people’s Party, Österreichische Volkspartei (ÖVP) has a quota on 33.3 % of women of their party list. The Greens-Green Alternative, Die Grünen-Die Grünen Alternativen (GA) has a quota on 50 % of women of their party list. 12 Administrative structure: Austria is a federal state composed of 2 357 municipalities (Gemeinden) and regions. The municipal council (Gemeinderat) is the deliberative body of the municipality. Its members are elected by direct universal suffrage based on the proportional representation system for a five or six-year term depending on the region. Responsibilities include; Water, Sewage, Public order, Urban planning and land development, Social services, Roads and household refuse, Urban transport, Health, Culture and Safety.13

Belgium Gender quotas: No legislated candidate quotas exist. Two parties have voluntary party quotas. The Labour Party, Partij van de Arbeid, (PvdA) has lists where gender but also ethnicity is considered. The congresss of the party has the last say on the composition of lists. The Green Left, GroenLinks (GL) has quotas for women.14 Administrative structure: Belgium is a federal state composed of 589 municipalities (gemeenten), provinces, regions and communities. The municipal council (conseil communal in French and gemeenteraad in Dutch) is elected by direct universal suffrage for a six-year term. It is the municipality’s legislative body and decides on local policy. Each municipality has a public centre for social welfare. Responsibilities for municipalities include; Culture, Environment, Public order, Waste management, Local finance and taxation Registry office, Sports and youth, Spatial and urban planning, Housing, Water and sanitation, Road management and mobility, Social policy, Local economy, , Education, and Employment.15

Bulgaria Gender quotas: No legislated candidate quota or voluntary party quotas exist.16 Administrative structure: Bulgaria is a unitary state composed of 264 municipalities (obshtina), Bulgaria's main administrative and territorial entity. It is an independent legal entity with its own property and budget. The municipal council (obchtinski savet) is the municipality's deliberative body. Its members are elected by direct universal suffrage for a four-year term. The region of Sofia is both a municipality and an administrative entity. Responsibilities include; Household refuse, Sports and leisure, Social services, Environment Water supply and

12 The information is retrieved from The Quota Project [http://www.quotaproject.org/uid/countryview.cfm?ul=en&country=14]. 13 The information is retrieved from The Council of European Municipalities and Regions [http://www.ccre.org/en/membres/Austria.htm]. 14 The information is retrieved from The Quota Project [http://www.quotaproject.org/uid/countryview.cfm?ul=en&country=21]. 15 The information is retrieved from The Council of European Municipalities and Regions [http://www.ccre.org/en/membres/Belgique.htm]. 16 The information is retrieved from The Quota Project [http://www.quotaproject.org/country.cfm]. 34 sewage, Culture, Public Services, Education, Health (medical and social care, sanitation, hygiene, etc.), the Tourism, Road, park and lighting maintenance, Transport, Building and maintenance of public buildings, and Territorial development.17

Czech Republic Gender quotas: No legislated candidate quotas exist. The Social Democrats, Česká strana sociálně demokratická (ČSSD), adopted a voluntary quotas stating that one fourth of the elected must be women. The Social Democratic Women's Organization has the right to nominate extra women if a local party organization has failed to nominate 25 percent women among its top candidates.18 Administrative structure: The Czech Republic is a unitary state composed of 6250 municipalities (obec) and regions. The municipal council is the municipality’s deliberative assembly and is composed of members elected by direct universal suffrage for a four-year term. It appoints the members of the municipal committee. The City of Prague, the capital of the Czech Republic, is divided into metropolitan districts, each made up of its own elected local council. Responsibilities for municipalities include; Local development, Agriculture and forest management, Municipal police, Municipal budget, Water supply and sewage, Household refuse, Public Transport, Primary education, Social services, Spatial planning, Housing, Cooperation with other municipalities and regions.19

Denmark Gender quotas: No legislated candidate quotas exist currently. The voluntary quota of 40 % women in the Socialist People's Party (Socialistisk Folkeparti), was the first party quota introduced (in 1977). This was abandoned in 1996.20 Administrative structure: Denmark is a unitary state composed of 98 municipalities (kommuner) and regions. The municipal council is composed of members elected by direct universal suffrage for four years via a system of proportional representation. It is in charge of the municipal budget, the running of local institutions and the adoption of local policies. Responsibilities for municipalities include; Assistance to the unemployed, Child care, Care for the elderly, Integration of refugees and immigrants, Culture and sports, Environmental protection and waste management, Economic development and Primary education.21

France Gender quotas: Legislated candidate gender quotas exist as the law (n°88-227, Article 9-1) states that he difference between the numbers between men and women of candidates a party present cannot be greater than

17 The information is retrieved from The Council of European Municipalities and Regions [http://www.ccre.org/en/membres/Bulgarie.htm]. 18 The information is retrieved from The Quota Project [http://www.quotaproject.org/uid/countryview.cfm?ul=en&country=60]. 19 The information is retrieved from The Council of European Municipalities and Regions [www.ccre.org/en/membres/Republique tcheque.htm]. 20 The information is retrieved from The Quota Project [http://www.quotaproject.org/uid/countryview.cfm?ul=en&country=63]. 21 The information is retrieved from The Council of European Municipalities and Regions [http://www.ccre.org/en/membres/Danemark.htm]. 35 two % in single member constituencies. Non-compliance with this rule is met by economic sanctions, affecting the financial subsidies to the party. For regional and municipal councils (having more than 3500 inhabitants) there is a requirement of the alternation of the sex of candidates on lists. If a list does not meet these requirements it is invalidated. However no quotas exist for the intermediary level of the general councils. The Socialist Party, Parti Socialiste (PS), have adopted voluntary quotas of 50 % women for candidate lists.22 Administrative structure: France is a unitary state composed of 36 682 municipalities, 101 departments (including five overseas departments) and 22 regions. On the intermediary level the department councils (conseil général) is the department's deliberative body. It is composed of members elected by direct universal suffrage for a six-year term and half of it is renewed every three years. The council elects its president among its members and is composed of specialised committees. Mandatory responsibilities for department councils include; Education, culture and heritage, Economic development, Social and health action, Urban and equipment planning and Environment.23

Germany Gender quotas: No legislated candidate gender quotas exist in Germany. However, four parties have adopted voluntary quotas for candidate lists. The Christian democratic Union, Christlich-Demokratische Union (CDU), state that at least 33 % of candidates on lists should be women. If the lists fail to meet this requirement, the internal election procedure is repeated. The Alliance 90/The Greens, Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, has a 50 % quota for women on party lists. The Left Party, Die Linkspartei, reserve the two first and then every other place on lists for women. The Social Democratic Party of Germany, Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD) stipulates that at least 40 % of candidates on lists and boards must be of each gender.24 Administrative structure: Germany is a federal republic composed of about 14,000 municipalities (Gemeinden), districts and federal states. There are two types of local structures depending on the legal system of the Land: The magistrate system and the council system. The local council (Gemeinderat) is the central body within the municipality. It is elected at the universal direct suffrage for a mandate that can vary between four and six years. This legislative body takes most decisions and has a monitoring function. Mandatory responsibilities for municipalities include; Water management, Social aid and youth, Urban planning, and Building and maintenance of schools. Optional responsibilities for municipalities include; economic development, infrastructures, energy, culture and sport.25

Greece Gender quotas: Legislated Candidate Quotas exist for the national level. At the sub-national level there are also candidate quotas. In Law 3852/2010, Article 18, Paragraph 3, it is stated that the number of candidates in community, municipal and regional elections must be equal at least to one-third (1/3) of the total number of

22 The information is retrieved from The Quota Project [http://www.quotaproject.org/uid/countryview.cfm?ul=en&country=53]. 23 The information is retrieved from The Council of European Municipalities and Regions [http://www.ccre.org/en/membres/France.htm]. 24 The information is retrieved from The Quota Project [http://www.quotaproject.org/uid/countryview.cfm?ul=en&country=61]. 25 The information is retrieved from The Council of European Municipalities and Regions [http://www.ccre.org/en/membres/Germany.htm]. 36 members the council has. Also voluntary party quotas exist. The Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement (Panellenio Sosialistiko Kimena, PASOK) has a quota on a minimum of 40 % women on party lists.26 Administrative structure: Greece is a unitary state composed of 325 municipalities (dimos) and self-governed regions. The municipal council (dimotiko simvoulio) is composed of members elected by direct universal suffrage for a four-year term. This deliberative assembly, headed by the mayor, is the decision-making body of the municipality. Responsibilities include; Social welfare, Agriculture, Building permits and urban planning applications, Issuing of professional licenses, Livestock and fisheries, Infrastructure, Health care, Education and Transport.27

Hungary Gender quotas: No legislated candidate quotas exist. The party Politics Can be Different, Lehet Mas a Politika (LMP), regulates candidacy to the national and European parliament so that a maximum of two repeated candidates of the same sex are allowed to follow on lists. The Hungarian Socialist Party Magyar Szocialista Párt (MSzP) has a quota for women set to 20 %.28 Administrative structure: Hungary is a unitary state composed of 3175 municipalities (települések), cities, cities with county rank, capital city districts and counties. The body of representatives is the municipality's legislative body. It is composed of members elected by direct universal suffrage for four years and is responsible for the management and control of the municipality. Its decisions are presented in the form of resolutions and decrees. A municipality can become a city at the initiative of its body of representatives, depending on its level of development and its impact at the regional level. Responsibilities for municipalities include; Social services, Primary schools, Maintenance of roads, Public areas, cemeteries and sewage, Water resources, Local development, Urban planning, Protection of the environment, Housing, Public transport, Fire services and Culture.29

Italy Gender quotas: Legislated candidate quotas exist as 12 out of 20 regions have adopted gender quotas in their regional laws, while 7 regions have applied Old State Law. The Democratic Party, Partito Democratico (PD), has adopted a “zipper” system for the gender composition on party lists, which also states that 50 % of the candidates on lists should be women.30 Administrative structure: Italy is a unitary state composed of 8 094 municipalities (comuni), provinces and regions. The local council is elected by direct universal suffrage for a period of five years. It is the municipality’s main legislative and decision-making body. The council notably votes the municipal budget. Each municipality

26 The information is retrieved from The Quota Project [http://www.quotaproject.org/uid/countryview.cfm?ul=en&country=89]. 27 The information is retrieved from The Council of European Municipalities and Regions [http://www.ccre.org/en/membres/Grece.htm]. 28 The information is retrieved from The Quota Project [http://www.quotaproject.org/uid/countryview.cfm?ul=en&country=100]. 29 The information is retrieved from The Council of European Municipalities and Regions [http://www.ccre.org/en/membres/Hongrie.htm]. 30 The information is retrieved from The Quota Project [http://www.quotaproject.org/uid/countryview.cfm?ul=en&country=110]. 37 is linked to a province but can directly deal with its region and/or the national government. Responsibilities for municipalities include; Public services, Land development, Environment, Social services, Urban planning, Economic development and Culture.31

Netherlands Gender quotas: No legislated candidate quotas exist. Two parties have voluntary party quotas. The Labour Party, Partij van de Arbeid, (PvdA) has lists where gender but also ethnicity is considered. The congresss of the party has the last say on the composition of lists. The Green Left, GroenLinks (GL) has quotas for women.32 Administrative structure: The Netherlands is a unitary state composed of 418 municipalities (gemeenten) and provinces. The local council (gemeenteraad) is the municipality's deliberative body. Its members are councilors elected for a period of four years via the proportional representation system. The local council is in charge of the college of mayor and aldermen, makes all main municipal decisions and has the power to pass by-laws. Responsibilities include; Health, Childcare, Social services, Urban planning, Tourism, Housing, Transport, Civil engineering, Culture and sports, Employment, Law and order and Primary education.33

Poland Gender quotas: Legislated Candidate Quotas exist for the national level. At the sub-national level there are also candidate quotas. In the Electoral Law it is stated that the number of candidates of either gender on the electoral lists may not be lower than 35% of the overall number of candidates on the list. If a list falls short of meeting this requirement, the committee notifies the authorized person of the necessity to amend the list within 3 days. Should this fail to result in a properly structured list, the committee refuses to register the entire list. No voluntary party quotas exist.34 Administrative structure: Poland is a unitary state composed of 2 479 municipalities (gminy), counties and regions. The municipal council (rada gminy) is composed of councilors elected by direct universal suffrage for a four-year term. In addition to its legislative powers, the council votes the municipal budget and determines local taxes. In Poland, 65 urban municipalities have a special status whereby they are responsible for competences usually exercised by counties. The capital city of Warsaw, which is divided into 18 districts, also has this special status and thus exercises the competences of both a municipality and a county. Responsibilities include; Pre- school and primary education, Housing, Social services, Environment, Culture and Public transport.35

Portugal

31 The information is retrieved from The Council of European Municipalities and Regions [http://www.ccre.org/en/membres/Italie.htm]. 32 The information is retrieved from The Quota Project [http://www.quotaproject.org/uid/countryview.cfm?ul=en&country=164]. 33 The information is retrieved from The Council of European Municipalities and Regions [http://www.ccre.org/en/membres/Pays-Bas.htm]. 34 The information is retrieved from The Quota Project [http://www.quotaproject.org/uid/countryview.cfm?ul=en&country=179]. 35 The information is retrieved from The Council of European Municipalities and Regions [http://www.ccre.org/en/membres/Pologne.htm]. 38

Gender quotas: A legislated candidate quotas exist as it is stated in Decree 72 of the law that lists for candidates (for the elections to the national parliament, European parliament and local governments), shall have at least 33 percent of both men and women. Small municipalities can be exempted. There are also financial sanctions for non-compliance to this rule. The lists in multi-member constituencies cannot have more than two consecutive names of the same sex. No voluntary party quotas exist.36 Administrative structure: Portugal is a unitary state composed of 4259 parishes (freguesias), municipalities and autonomous regions. The parish assembly (assembleia de freguesia) is the deliberative body of the parish and is composed of councilors elected by direct universal suffrage for a four-year term via a system of proportional representation. Responsibilities for parishes include; Environment, Culture, Residence permits and Pet licences, Health, Road and park maintenance, Education, Social facilities for children and the elderly.37

Romania Gender quotas: No legislated candidate quotas exist. Both the Social Democrat party, Partidul Social Democrat (PSD) and the Democratic Party, Partidul Democrat (PD) have adopted a 30 % quota for women of party lists. 38 Administrative structure: Romania is a unitary state composed of municipalities, towns, cities and 41 counties (judete). Responsibilities for counties include; Public health, Social assistance, Water supply, Sewage, Transport and transport infrastructure, Urban planning and landscaping, Regional development, Economic, environmental and social development, Management of public services, Education and Cooperation between local and national authorities.39

Slovakia Gender quotas: A legislated candidate quotas exist as it is stated in Decree 72 of the law that lists for candidates (for the elections to the national parliament, European parliament and local governments), shall have at least 33 percent of both men and women. Small municipalities can be exempted. There are also financial sanctions for non-compliance to this rule. The lists in multi-member constituencies cannot have more than two consecutive names of the same sex. No voluntary party quotas exist.40 Administrative structure: Slovakia is unitary state composed of 2 792 municipalities (obce), cities and self- governing regions. The local council (obecné zastupiteľstvo in municipalities and mestské zastupiteľstvo in cities) is the local authority’s deliberative body and is composed of members elected by direct universal suffrage for a period of four years. The mayor (starosta in municipalities and primátor in cities) is the municipality’s highest executive body and statutory representative. He/she is elected by direct universal suffrage for a four-year mandate and chairs both the local council and the municipal board. Responsibilities for municipalities include;

36 The information is retrieved from The Quota Project [http://www.quotaproject.org/uid/countryview.cfm?ul=en&country=184]. 37 The information is retrieved from The Council of European Municipalities and Regions [http://www.ccre.org/en/membres/Portugal.htm]. 38 The information is retrieved from The Quota Project [http://www.quotaproject.org/uid/countryview.cfm?ul=en&country=189]. 39 The information is retrieved from The Council of European Municipalities and Regions [http://www.ccre.org/en/membres/Roumanie.htm]. 40 The information is retrieved from The Quota Project [http://www.quotaproject.org/uid/countryview.cfm?ul=en&country=184]. 39

Health, Culture and sports, Water supply, Sewage and municipal waste, Local development, Housing, Pre-school and primary school, Public transport, Environment, Social assistance, Road maintenance and Participation in regional planning.41

Spain Gender quotas: Legislated candidate quotas exist as it is stated in the Equality Law (Ley de Igualdad) that a "principle of balanced presence” should come in to affect and that party lists are required to have a maximum of 60 percent of either men or women among candidates to the Lower house. Previously there were not strong sanctions in place to enforce this rule, but this is expected to change. The Ley de Iguldad also addresses regional and local elections, although villages with less than 3,000 inhabitants are not obliged to comply with the law. Several Autonomous Communities has adopted quotas to the regional elections. The Electoral Commission does not approve party lists that do not meet the requirements. Seven parties have adopted a 40 % quota for either men or women on the party lists, including; Canarian Coalition, Coalición Canaria (CC), Nationalist Galician Block, Bloque Nacionalista Galego (BNG), Republican Left of Catalonia, Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC), Initiative for Catalonia-Green, Iniciativa per Catalunya-Verds (ICV), Socialist Party of catalonia, Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya (PSC), United Left, Izquierda Unida (IU), Spanish Socialist Worker Party, Partido Socialista Obrero Espanol (PSOE).42 Administrative structure: Spain is a unitary state composed of 8 117 municipalities (municipios), county councils, Canary Island county councils, Balearic Island county councils, autonomous cities and autonomous communities. The local council is the local authority’s deliberative body and is composed of councilors elected by direct universal suffrage for a four-year term. This assembly approves the local budget, urban planning, by- laws and municipal rules. Responsibilities for local authorities include a number of services depending on the size of the authority. In every local authority responsibilities include; Street lighting, Urban traffic, Food security, Water supply, Road maintenance and Sewage and waste management. In local authorities of over 5 000 inhabitants services also includes; Green areas. Public libraries and Local police. In local authorities of over 20 000 inhabitants services also includes; Social services, Fire prevention and Sporting facilities. In local authorities of over 50 000 inhabitants services also includes; Protection of the environment and Transport.43

Sweden Gender quotas: No legislated candidate quotas exist. The Moderate Party, Nya Moderaterna (M), regulated the party list for the European Parliament election, stating that the top four positions must have an equal gender composition. The Green Party, Miljöpartiet (Mp) has adopted a 50 % quota to their party list, plus minus one person. The Left Party, Vänsterpartiet (V) sets a minimum 50 5 share of women to their lists. The Social

41 The information is retrieved from The Council of European Municipalities and Regions [http://www.ccre.org/en/membres/Slovaquie.htm]. 42 The information is retrieved from The Quota Project [http://www.quotaproject.org/uid/countryview.cfm?ul=en&country=72]. 43 The information is retrieved from The Council of European Municipalities and Regions [http://www.ccre.org/en/membres/Espagne.htm]. 40

Democrat party, Socialdemokraterna (S) adopted a zipper system, where women and men alternates each other on party lists.44 Administrative structure: Sweden is a unitary state composed of 290 municipalities (kommuner), county councils and regions. The municipal assembly (kommunfullmäktige) is composed of members elected by direct universal suffrage for a four-year term. This assembly is the municipality’s decision-making body but can delegate important decision-making powers to the municipal executive committee and to the specialized committees. It also levies taxes and adopts the municipal budget. Responsibilities for municipalities include; (Mandatory) Primary and secondary education, Refuse collection and waste disposal, Social services, Childcare and pre- school, Care for the elderly, Support for the physically and intellectually disabled, Primary healthcare, Spatial planning, Rescue and emergency services, Environmental protection, Water supply and sewerage and Road maintenance. (Optional competences); Housing, Culture, Employment, Energy, Industrial and commercial services.45

United Kingdom Gender quotas: No legislated candidate quotas exist. The Labour Party, regulates candidacy as each candidate has two votes, one for a man and one for a woman. The candidate with the most votes is elected. The Liberal Democrats has adopted a target of having 40 % women as candiates and have previously adopted “zipper” systems for lists to the European Parliament 46 Administrative structure: The United Kingdom is a unitary state with certain characteristics of a federal state, having 446 local authorities. In general, councilors are elected for a four year term, based on either a first-past- the-post voting system or a proportional system. England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland all have a number of local authorities with slightly differing responsibilities and structure. Local competences are not uniform throughout the United Kingdom as they are wholly transferred (devolved) to Scotland, while other arrangements are applied to Wales and Northern Ireland. English local governments remain directly accountable to the UK government and parliament. There are two tiers of local government in parts of England (counties and districts) and a single tier in other parts of England and all of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland (councils). In general, responsibilities for local authorities include, for counties; Social services, Highways and transport, Education, Strategic planning advice, Fire, Waste disposal, Libraries. For districts responsibilities include; Licensing, Building control, Environmental health, Local planning, Waste collection, Housing and Park and leisure services.47

44 The information is retrieved from The Quota Project [http://www.quotaproject.org/uid/countryview.cfm?ul=en&country=197]. 45 The information is retrieved from The Council of European Municipalities and Regions [www.ccre.org/en/membres/Suede.htm]. 46 The information is retrieved from The Quota Project [http://www.quotaproject.org/uid/countryview.cfm?ul=en&country=77]. 47 The information is retrieved from The Council of European Municipalities and Regions [http://www.ccre.org/en/membres/Royaume-Uni.htm]. 41