Palacký University in Olomouc 2004; and V
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
Palacký University Olomouc Philosophical Faculty Department of Philosophy Mgr. Vlastimil Vohánka Modality, Logical Probability, and the Trinity: A Defence of Weak Skepticism MODALITA, LOGICKÁ PRAVDĚPODOBNOST A TROJICE: OBHAJOBA UMÍRNĚNÉHO SKEPTICISMU Dissertation thesis Study program: Philosophy Supervisor: Prof. PhDr. et RNDr. Jan Štěpán, CSc. Olomouc 2011 1 Statement I declare that I wrote this dissertation on my own and that I cited all used sources. Olomouc, ............................... Vlastimil Vohánka ............................... 2 Abstract (EN) The author defends the thesis that, apart from religious experience, it cannot be evident – in a defined sense of psychological impossibility – that the Trinity doctrine is logically possible. The Trinity doctrine is understood broadly, as the proposition that there is just one God but three persons each of which is God. It is concluded that, apart from religious experience, none of the following claims can be evident: the Trinity doctrine is true; Christianity is true; the Trinity doctrine is logically possible; Christianity is logically possible; the Trinity doctrine has some but not minimal (zero) logical probability with respect to all that is evident; Christianity has some but not minimal logical probability with respect to all that is evident. Christianity is understood as a particular compound proposition including the Trinity doctrine. Replies are provided to objections against the employed principles of logical probability. The author leaves as undecided whether the Trinity doctrine, Christianity, or their logical possibility are: epistemically justified; well-argued; plausibly logically probable with respect to all that is evident (though not evidently logically probable on such information apart from religious experience); or probable in other than the logical sense. Keywords Evident truth · Logical probability · Logical possibility · Analycity · Trinity · Christianity · Apologetics · Psychological possibility · Religious experience · Non-deductive methods in mathematics · Epistemic justification · Good argument · Interpretations of probability · Richard Swinburne · Timothy J. McGrew · Peter van Inwagen · John Maynard Keynes · James Franklin · Scholasticism · Baroque scholasticism. Abstrakt (CZ) Autor hájí tezi, že, dáme-li stranou náboženskou zkušenost, je vyloučeno (ve specifickém smyslu tzv. psychologické nemožnosti), aby bylo evidentní, že učení o Trojici je logicky možné. Učení o Trojici se tu chápe široce; jako propozice, že existuje právě jeden Bůh, ale přitom tři osoby, z nichž je každá Bohem. Je učiněn závěr, že, dáme-li stranou náboženskou zkušenost, je vyloučeno, aby bylo evidentní, že: učení o Trojici je pravdivé; křesťanství je pravdivé; učení o Trojici je logicky možné; křesťanství je logicky možné; učení o Trojici má neminimální (nenulovou) logickou pravděpodobnost vzhledem ke všemu, co je evidentní; křesťanství má neminimální (nenulovou) logickou pravděpodobnost vzhledem k všemu, co je evidentní. Křesťanství se zde chápe jako určitá složená propozice zahrnující učení o Trojici. Jsou poskytnuty odpovědi na námitky proti užitým principům logické pravděpodobnosti. Autor neřeší otázku, zda jsou učení o Trojici, křesťanství či jejich logická možnost: epistemicky justifikované; dobře zdůvodněné; plausibilně logicky pravděpodobné vzhledem ke všemu, co je evidentní (byť nikoli evidentně logicky pravděpodobné vzhledem k takovým informacím, dáme-li stranou náboženskou zkušenost); nebo pravděpodobné v jiném než logickém smyslu. Klíčová slova Evidentní pravdivost · Logická pravděpodobnost · Logická možnost · Analytičnost · Trojice · Křesťanství · Apologetika · Psychologická možnost · Náboženská zkušenost · Nededuktivní metody v matematice · Epistemická justifikace · Dobrý argument · Interpretace pravděpodobnosti · Richard Swinburne · Timothy J. McGrew · Peter van Inwagen · John Maynard Keynes · James Franklin · Scholastika · Barokní scholastika. Reproduction of the engraving on the title page: Albrecht Dürer (1471 – 1528), Melencolia I (1514). Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Melencolia_I_(Durero).jpg (accessed December 6, 2011). 3 To Pavla, Kilián, Klára, and Benedikt. ―All things are wearisome; man is not able to tell it. The eye is not satisfied with seeing, nor is the ear filled with hearing.‖ Ecclesiastes 1: 8. 4 Contents I. Introduction ................................................................................................................................................................ 6 I.1. Worth inquiring .................................................................................................................................................. 6 I.2. Outline .............................................................................................................................................................. 13 II. Concepts .................................................................................................................................................................. 17 II.1. Evident truth .................................................................................................................................................... 17 II.2. Logical probability .......................................................................................................................................... 28 II.3. Propositions ..................................................................................................................................................... 32 II.4. Logical possibility ........................................................................................................................................... 33 II.5. Analycity ......................................................................................................................................................... 36 II.6. The Trinity doctrine ........................................................................................................................................ 43 II.7. Christianity ...................................................................................................................................................... 47 II.8. ―Public‖ evidentness ....................................................................................................................................... 50 II.9. Psychological impossibility ............................................................................................................................. 56 III. Two Arguments ..................................................................................................................................................... 73 III.1. The brevity of philosophical arguments ......................................................................................................... 73 III.2. Argument I ..................................................................................................................................................... 78 III.3. Argument II .................................................................................................................................................... 93 III.4. Arguments I and II in a symbolic shape ......................................................................................................... 99 III.4A. Argument I ........................................................................................................................................... 100 III.4B. Argument II .......................................................................................................................................... 108 IV. A Defence of WMST and WMST* ..................................................................................................................... 112 IV.1. A partition .................................................................................................................................................... 114 IV.1A. Possibility of the doctrine p-evident from its truth? ............................................................................. 117 IV.1B. Possibility of the doctrine p-evident not from its truth? ....................................................................... 151 IV.2. Interlacing notes .......................................................................................................................................... 197 IV.3. The modal step ............................................................................................................................................. 205 V. On Further Objections .......................................................................................................................................... 214 V.1. Keynes‘s wavering ........................................................................................................................................ 214 V.2. Franklin‘s triangle argument ......................................................................................................................... 215 V.2A. Bernoullian induction ............................................................................................................................ 217 V.2B. A Bernoullian triangle argument ........................................................................................................... 220 V.2C. Additional note .....................................................................................................................................