’s Continued Quest for Space Dominance

Rick Fisher, International Assessment and Strategy Center Updated, December 21, 2015 Early 2016: Official Announcement of PLA “Space Force” ?

For over a decade the PLA has been considering the formation of a “Space Force.” Chinese sources have said that the PLA Air Force and the Second Artillery were vying for its leadership. But in late 2015 some unofficial Chinese sources indicated the winner was instead the General Armaments Department (GAD). The Space Force will be a separate sub-service of the new Strategic Support Forces (SSF). The SSF will also include Rocket Forces that will control nuclear and non-nuclear missiles forces. There may also be an Electronic Information Forces, controlling cyber warfare, electronic and signals intelligence.

The Space Force may control civil , China’s manned space program, ground-launched space warfare assets, space-based space warfare assets and perhaps strategic missile defense systems.

Unofficial sources also note the first Space Force commander may be Major General Li Shangfu, former Deputy Director of GAD and Deputy Commander of the Manned Space Program. General Li may have also been the commander of the Xichang Launch Center when it was hosting early anti-satellite interceptor testing. ASATs Programs

Ground Based Anti-Satellite Program: Likely started in early 1990s in conjunction with revived Ballistic Missile Defense program. Successful test of SC-19 ASAT in January 2007 likely preceded by about 3 previous tests. SC-19 believed derived from KT-1 SLV, in turn derived from DF-21 medium range ballistic missile. In May 2013 there was a test of a new DN-02 ASAT. One possibility is that DN-2 is based on the China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation (CASIC) mobile solid-fuel space . Chinese academic engineering articles also explore the possibility of air-launched ASATs. The Shenyang Aircraft Corporation may be modifying a J-11 fighter for this mission. CASC’s LM-6 and LM-11: Operationally Responsive Space (ORS) Program

Like the U.S., China has a program to insure access to space and to rapidly repopulate satellite constellations in the event of an attack. Such a system could also be used as ASAT launchers The China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation’s (CASC) small liquid fueled LM-6 may also be another effort to meet China’s ORS requirements. First launched on 20 September 2015, it can loft 1,080kg to a 700km SSO. LM- 11 is based on the DF-31 ICBM, but with an added liquid-fuel stage that extends beyond the cold-launch tube. It was first launched on 25 September 2015 can loft a 350kg payload to 700km SSO. Both systems are “moveable,” and can be pre-loaded and cave-stored for rapid roll- out and launch. But they are not as mobile as PLA ICBMs. CASIC’s Kuaizhou: ORS, ASAT, ABM and Prompt Global Strike (PGS) ?

With the Kuaizhou family, CASIC has started a second source for the PLA of ICBM-range missiles. Kuaizhou-1 is based on the KT-1, likely uses a larger version of the same 1.4m solid motor. Its ICBM-like 12-wheel TEL was first seen in 2012. It performed launch missions in 2013 and 2014. In October 2015 it was revealed that CASIC was building the larger Kuaizhou-2 with a new 2.2m solid motor. This missile is closer to the size of the US Peacekeeper, which is now the basis of the III/IV, which were also considered for the US Prompt Global Strike mission. Chinese academic articles show great interest in the PGS mission, and Kuaizhou-2 may enable the development of a Chinese PGS capability. ASAT too, or new line of ICBMs. Also enabling PGS: Jilin satellite constellation

By 2030 China intends to loft 138 surveillance satellites as part of the Jilin LEO global surveillance network. Jilin is touted as a “commercial” initiative, but it will likely be used by the PLA as well. Early Jilin satellites have a .72 meter resolution and its associated Lingqiao video satellite has a 1.4 meter resolution. This can be expected to improve in the future. When fully lofted, Jilin will provide a 10-minute revisit capability. Enough to give multiple targeting updates to a Kuaizhou based PGS missile while in flight. China is also developing a novel optical/laser data relay satellite constellation that could greatly increase space data transmission rates, possibly allowing the PLA to monitor multiple PSG operations. Project 921-2 Tiangong and Program Reportedly started in 1999, the Tiangong was designed as an 8-ton development platform for a future Space Station. This was intended to supersede the need to dock two capsules to test initial docking systems. Tiangong-1 was launched by a modified LM-2F in November 2011 and its first crew of three was launched on Shenzhou -9 in June 2012. A second crew of three was lofted to Tiangong-1 by Shenzhou-10 in June 2013. Both Tiangong crews included one female member. Tiangong-1 also includes conspicuous cameras in the fairing section between the crew and mission sections but these are not described by official Chinese sources. A Tiangong-2 is expected to be launched in 2015. Tiangong will also form the basis for a cargo transport system to the future Space Station.

There was come mention of a third Tiangong mission but this apparently will not happen. Instead by 2018 or 2019 China may loft the core section of what may eventually become a 100-ton Space Station by the early 2020s. This Space Station is modeled after the Russian concept of replaceable modules for its space station. China did not purchase MIR technology but may have come by it in the late 1990s. The Space Station will include eventual scientific payload modules, one for space and Earth observation. A range of national priority basic research and development will take place aboard the Space Station. But as with the Energia concept, the Chinese Space Station may also perform a range of secondary military missions. At the 2014 65th IAC a Chinese official hinted that a larger second generation space station may be under consideration. Other Weapon and Dual Use Options

2/2006, Journal of the Academy of Equipment Command and Technology, “…Space to Ground Kinetic Weapons.”

12/2013, Chinese Optics, “Development of Space Based Laser Weapons” written by Gao Min-hui, Zhou Yu-quan and Wang Zhi-hong, all from the Changchun Institute of Optics, Fine Mechanics and Physics.

11/13/15: CASIC 2nd Academy web page suggests it is developing Electrothermal Chemical (ETC) “gun shell” technology that could also be used as a space weapon. 2006 CALT Roadmap: First Nearterm RLV Concept At the 2006 Congress of the International Astronautical Federation (IAC), three engineers from the China Academy of Launch Vehicle Technology (CALT) lay out a road map for China’s reusable launch vehicles (RLVs).*

Their paper outlines four levels of space plane research/development: 1) Provides details about test article later revealed to be Shenlong, that will include an air launched glide and hypersonic suborbital test; 2) describes two near term space plane concepts for launching from SLV; 3) a longer term TSTO concept that will use an air breathing hypersonic first stage; and 4) a longer term ambition to develop a SSTO space plane.

The first near-term RLV concept has an estimated 32m length orbiter to be launched atop a Long March 5 SLV (due to be tested in 2014). This orbiter may be heavier than the Shuttle and due to large fuel volume, but only has a 7 ton payload. Shows heritage of Chang Cheng-1.

Different illustrations raise possibility slower re-entry than Shuttle design. Internal fuel carriage raises possibility this may be an early “cross air vehicle,” a popular Chinese advanced aerospace concept. This orbiter conceivably could dip into upper atmosphere to perform “synergetic plane change” maneuvers with control surfaces to then rocket into a new orbit. This vehicle could be manned or unmanned.

At 2006 IAC Yong Yang tells Flight International that initial RLV could be ready by about 2020.

* Yong Yang, Defeng Hu and Menglun Yu (China Academy of Launch Vehicle Technology), “Roadmap of Long March Reusable Launch Vehicle,” 57th International Astronautical Congress, Hyderabad, India, 2006, IAC-06-D2.4.03 Unmanned and Manned Moon Program The Moon has long had intense cultural attraction for Chinese, as it has been the more recent focus for geostrategic attention. Moon program chief advisor has long extolled the resource (Helium-3) and military advantages for China of going to the Moon. On December 3, 2013 the Beijing Times cited a military source noting that the Chang-e 3’s guidance system is related to the HQ-9 SAM, an that the Moon could be developed into a military base for launching missiles. Chang-e 3 was launched on December 1, 2013 and is expected to land on the Sinus Iridium on December 16. It carries a small rover called Jade Rabbit that will transmit imagery to China. The landing base has scientific payloads: Extreme Ultraviolet Camera for monitoring the Earth plasma field; an Optical telescope for timed celestial observation and imaging systems to measure the immediate lunar environment. There will be a Chang-e 5 mission in 2015. Then in 2017 or 2018, Chang-e-6 may perform a Moon sample return mission. A manned Moon mission is expected by 2025 to 2030. There may then be a permanent Moon base by 2050. The Long March-9 heavy-lift SLV is being developed to support Moon and missions. A source at the 65th IAC said the LM9 may soon reach final configuration. However, multiple launches of smaller LM-5 SLVs may also be envisioned, with either Earth or Moon orbit rendezvous options. In August 2011 the Shanghai Academy of Technology outlined a possible Chinese mission to deliver an impact penetrator on Mars for the purpose of analyzing the ejecta. 31 January 2015, on the website of the CCP Central Committee’s journal Quishi (Seeking Truth), Chairman and CCP Party Secretary of the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC), Lei Fanpei, stated that "We will adhere to the path of developing military-civil integration in our coming demonstration of deep , manned moon landing, heavy launch vehicle and other major programs, and are of major significance both to the nation's long-term development and to the task of building the nation into a strong space power." This is CCP vocabulary for their intent to militarize the Moon.