ISBN: 978-4-86482-088-2 NIDS CHINA SECURITY REPORT NIDS China Security Report 2021 China’s Military Strategy in the New Era National Institute for Defense Studies, Japan National Institute for Defense Studies, Japan NIDS China Security Report 2021 China’s Military Strategy in the New Era Published by The National Institute for Defense Studies 5-1 Honmura-cho, Ichigaya, Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo 162-8808 Japan Website: http://www.nids.mod.go.jp Translated by INTERBOOKS Copyright © 2020 by the National Institute for Defense Studies, Japan All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form without written, prior permission from the publisher. The China Security Report 2021 comprises NIDS researchers’ analyses and descriptions based on information compiled from open sources in Japan and overseas. The statements contained herein do not necessarily represent the official position of the Government of Japan or the Ministry of Defense. This publication is a translation of the Japanese version originally published in November 2020. ISBN978-4-86482-088-2 Printed in Japan NIDS China Security Report 2021 Contents Preface iii Summary v Acronyms and Abbreviations viii Introduction 2 Chapter 1: China’s Preparations for Informatized Warfare 1. Changes in China’s Military Strategy 6 (1) The Era of Mao Zedong (1927–1976): The Curse of the Final War and Active Defense 6 (2) The Era of Deng Xiaoping (1976–1989): A Break from the Final War and a Shift to Local War 7 (3) The Era of Jiang Zemin (1989–2004): Local Wars under High-Tech Conditions 9 (4) The Era of Hu Jintao (2004–2012): Informatized Local Wars 10 2. The Era of Xi Jinping (2012–Present): Shift to Informatized Warfare and Intelligentized Warfare 11 (1) Informatized Warfare 11 (2) Intelligentized Warfare 15 Column Unrestricted Warfare’s High Compatibility with Informatized Warfare and Intelligentized Warfare 20 Chapter 2: China’s Cyber Strategy 1. China’s Quest to Improve Cyber Capabilities 26 (1) The PLA’s Pursuit of “Informatization” 26 (2) The Missions and Structure of the Strategic Support Force 27 2. The PLA’s Recognition of Cyber Warfare 32 (1) Cyber Operations in Informatized Warfare 32 (2) Aspects of the PLA’s Cyber Warfare 33 (3) The Challenges and Future Direction of China’s Cyber Capabilities 35 i 3. China’s External Activities related to Cybersecurity and the International Reaction 38 (1) China’s Efforts on Cyber Governance 38 (2) China-U.S. Relations concerning Cyberspace 40 Chapter 3: China’s Military Use of Space 1. Relationship between Space Policy and National Defense Policy 44 (1) Long-term Goals of Space Activities and the Military 44 (2) Space in the Context of the National Defense Policy and PLA Unit Operations 45 2. Situation of Space Activities and Their Military Implications 48 (1) Operations of Space Systems 48 (2) Development of Counterspace Capabilities 53 (3) Military-Civil Fusion in Space Activities 55 3. International Relations over the Space Domain 57 (1) Relations with the United States 57 (2) Relations with Other Countries 58 Chapter 4: China’s Military-Civil Fusion Strategy 1. Historical Development of Military-Civil Relations in China 62 (1) Military-Civil Relations Prior to the Era of Reform and Opening Up 62 (2) Military-Civil Relations in the Era of Reform and Opening Up 64 2. Military-Civil Fusion Strategy in the Xi Jinping Administration 66 (1) Background 66 (2) Military-Civil Fusion Policy System 68 (3) Military-Civil Fusion Management System 72 (4) Military-Civil Fusion Operational System 74 (5) Challenges Faced by Military-Civil Fusion 77 3. The International Community’s Reaction to the Military-Civil Fusion Strategy 78 (1) Concerns regarding Technology Transfer due to Military-Civil Fusion 78 (2) Strengthening of Investment Regulations in the West 80 Conclusions 84 Notes 89 ii Preface Preface The NIDS China Security Report published by the National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS) was first released in March 2011. It is not difficult to find differences between this report—the 11th in this series—and the inaugural issue. Unlike the East Asian Strategic Review which takes Summary an annual, fixed-point observation style, the NIDS China Security Report sets a particular theme each time and provides a detailed analysis related to China’s military affairs and security from a mid- to long-term perspective. Initially, the report was written by several researchers studying China and Taiwan, and analyses focused on China’s diplomacy, maritime policy, and the moderniza- tion of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Beginning with the seventh issue, the report gradually Introduction broadened the scope of analysis, and has dealt with relations between China and countries/regions such as Taiwan, the United States, Southeast Asia, South Asia, Pacific Island countries, Russia, and Central Asia. Accordingly, the writing team was expanded to include not only members of the China Division but also experts on other regions as well as researchers of specific issues. Thus, the NIDS Chapter 1 China Security Report has evolved into a platform for analyzing China by many NIDS researchers, and has become one of the flagship publications of NIDS that attracts significant interest from research institutes and the media in various countries and regions. This latest China Security Report 2021 selected Yatsuzuka Masaaki as the lead author. The report focuses on the PLA’s efforts to use science and technology for military purposes. The primary Chapter 2 areas of analysis are: the new cyber and space domains that are garnering attention; and China’s mili- tary-civil fusion strategy aimed at making military use of science and technology. It further seeks to put in context and analyze China’s concepts of informatized warfare and intelligentized warfare, taking into account changes in China’s military strategy from Mao Zedong’s era through the Xi Chapter 3 Jinping administration. In writing this report, the authors have endeavored to present an objective analysis while taking note of suggestions gained by exchanging views with researchers, experts, and research institutes in Japan and abroad. While their names cannot be listed here, we would like to take this opportunity to express our deepest gratitude to everyone who supported us. The China Security Report 2021 has been written by Yatsuzuka Masaaki (the lead author Chapter 4 and author of Introduction, Chapters 2 and 4, and Conclusions), Fukushima Yasuhito (Chapter 3), Iwamoto Hiroshi (Chapter 4), and Momma Rira (Chapter 1). The report has been written solely from the viewpoints of the individual researchers and does not represent an official view of the Japanese Government, the Ministry of Defense, or NIDS. The editorial team is led by Momma Conclusions Rira (editor-in-chief), and includes Iida Masafumi (deputy editor-in-chief), Ohnishi Ken (editor of the Japanese edition), Jingushi Akira (editor of the English edition), Iwamoto Hiroshi (editor of the Chinese edition), Arie Koichi, Nakagawa Misa, Tanaka Ryosuke, Yatsuzuka Masaaki, and Fukushima Yasuhito. iii The authors of the China Security Report 2021 hope that it will contribute to a deepening of policy discussions concerning China at home and abroad, alongside dialogue, exchange, and coop- eration among countries and regions regarding security. November 2020 Momma Rira Director, Regional Studies Department The National Institute for Defense Studies iv Summary Preface Chapter 1 China’s Preparations for Informatized Warfare In China, to date, the “active defense” military strategy has been adopted consistently. Gradually, it began to emphasize preemptive attacks as Mao Zedong and other leaders of the Chinese Communist Summary Party of each period provided guidance to the army. Active defense in Mao Zedong’s era was premised on “striking only after the enemy has struck [houfa zhiren, 后发制人].” In Deng Xiaoping’s era, local war using conventional weapons was elevated to strategic level, and the active defense strategy came to encapsulate the concept of preemptive attack conceived in local wars. In Jiang Zemin’s era, the goal was to win “local wars under high-tech conditions.” As Hu Jintao’s era neared, Introduction however, China recognized the importance of information in warfare, and the goal became winning “local wars under the conditions of informationization.” Emphasis was now given to the growing importance of preemptive attacks. After Xi Jinping came to power, China’s aim shifted to winning informatized warfare that Chapter 1 makes effective use of new domains, including space, cyber, and electromagnetic. In such warfare, armed forces, which are placed under unified command by eliminating barriers between military services and branches, strike physical targets based on human judgment. Furthermore, when China enters the phase of intelligentized warfare [zhinenghua zhanzheng, 智能化战争], it will have created a command system that integrates humans and machinery, in which artificial intelligence and game Chapter 2 theory will be utilized to accurately analyze and determine the opponent’s intentions. This infor- mation will then be relayed to commanders to make command and strategic decisions. The targets of attack in the intelligentized warfare will include not only physical objects but also nontangible targets in cyber and cognitive spaces. Chapter 3 Chapter 2 China’s Cyber Strategy The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has proceeded with its own informatization and evolved its cyber strategy, recognizing that “information dominance” is crucial for seizing core initiative in Chapter 4 modern warfare. In this process, the Strategic Support Force (SSF) was established in late 2015. It appears that the SSF is responsible for achieving information dominance as well as providing information support for joint operations, including the space, cyber, and electromagnetic domains, and converting advanced technologies into military capabilities. To achieve information dominance, Conclusions the PLA also attaches importance to information warfare and cyber operations for information theft in peacetime, as well as cyber attacks that preempt the enemy in the early stages of war.