The European Launchers between Commerce and Geopolitics Report 56 March 2016 Marco Aliberti Matteo Tugnoli Short title: ESPI Report 56 ISSN: 2218-0931 (print), 2076-6688 (online) Published in March 2016 Editor and publisher: European Space Policy Institute, ESPI Schwarzenbergplatz 6 • 1030 Vienna • Austria http://www.espi.or.at Tel. +43 1 7181118-0; Fax -99 Rights reserved – No part of this report may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or for any purpose with- out permission from ESPI. Citations and extracts to be published by other means are subject to mentioning “Source: ESPI Report 56; March 2016. All rights reserved” and sample transmission to ESPI before publishing. ESPI is not responsible for any losses, injury or damage caused to any person or property (including under contract, by negligence, product liability or otherwise) whether they may be direct or indirect, special, inciden- tal or consequential, resulting from the information contained in this publication. Design: Panthera.cc ESPI Report 56 2 March 2016 The European Launchers between Commerce and Geopolitics Table of Contents Executive Summary 5 1. Introduction 10 1.1 Access to Space at the Nexus of Commerce and Geopolitics 10 1.2 Objectives of the Report 12 1.3 Methodology and Structure 12 2. Access to Space in Europe 14 2.1 European Launchers: from Political Autonomy to Market Dominance 14 2.1.1 The Quest for European Independent Access to Space 14 2.1.3 European Launchers: the Current Family 16 2.1.3 The Working System: Launcher Strategy, Development and Exploitation 19 2.2 Preparing for the Future: the 2014 ESA Ministerial Council 22 2.2.1 The Path to the Ministerial 22 2.2.2 A Look at Europe’s Future Launchers and Infrastructure 26 2.2.3 A Revolution in Governance 30 3. World Outlook in 2015: Analysis of Launcher Policies, Programmes and Developments 33 3.1 United States 33 3.2 Russia 38 3.3 China 40 3.4 Japan 42 3.5 India 44 3.6 Other Nations 45 3.6.1 Argentina 45 3.6.2 Brazil 45 3.6.3 Iran 46 3.6.4 Israel 47 3.6.5 North Korea 47 3.6.6 South Korea 48 3.6.7 Ukraine 48 3.7 Policies and Politics of Access to Space: an Overview 49 3.7.1 Autonomy, Commercialisation and Privatisation of Access to Space 49 3.7.2 Ongoing Developments 51 4. Current Dynamics and Future Trends 53 4.1 Launch Activity Outlook 53 4.2 The Structure and Dynamics of the Space Launch Market 58 4.2.1 Geo-economics of Launchers 58 4.2.2 The Evolutions of the Launch Service Market 61 4.3 Unfolding Trends in Demand and Supply 64 4.3.1 All-Electric Satellites 65 4.3.2 Satellite (Mega) Constellations 66 4.3.3 Rocket Reusability 67 4.3.4 Additive Manufacturing 69 4.3.5 Non-vertical Launch and Small Satellites 69 4.4 The Future Landscape 71 ESPI Report 56 3 March 2016 5. What Prospects for European Launchers? 75 5.1 Europe’s Strategy on Access to Space: an Assessment 75 5.2 Europe’s Way Forward: Some Reflections 78 5.2.1 Enhancing the Commercial Competitiveness of European Launchers 78 5.2.2 Promoting Disruptive Technological Innovation in Europe 80 5.2.3 Boosting the Strategic Value of Launchers 82 5.2.4 Pursuing Autonomy and/or Cooperation in Human Spaceflight? 83 5.2.5 Securing Europe’s Gateways to Space 85 5.2.6 Propositions Overview 85 6. Conclusions and Recommendations 87 Annex 89 A.1 Worldwide Expendable Orbital Launch Vehicles as at 2015 89 A.2 Launch Vehicles under Development 93 A.3 Overview of Major Orbital Launch Sites 96 A.4 Technical Compatibility Between Launchers And Satellite Bus 99 List of Acronyms 100 Acknowledgements 104 About the Authors 104 ESPI Report 56 4 March 2016 The European Launchers between Commerce and Geopolitics Executive Summary tially designed to increase the production Background rates so as to generate economies of scale that would ensure competitive pricing for The overarching objective of this report is to Ariane 6 and Vega-C without the need for provide an in-depth reflection on the me- public support payments during exploitation. dium-term prospects for Europe’s access to space (i.e. over the next 10-15 year time- This strategy raises a number of questions in frame). Starting with the resolution endorsed terms of effectiveness and, more broadly, at the 2014 Ministerial Council of the Euro- with regard to the overall prospects for pean Space Agency (ESA), the project as- Europe’s access to space in the next decade. sesses the scope, implications, opportunities and constraints of the European strategy in The International Landscape: Current Dynamics the launcher sector with respect to the and Future Trends broader and rapidly evolving international context. Indeed, the 2014 decisions were not In order to assess how the 2014 decisions only driven by endogenous factors (such as will position European future launchers at the the deficit of commonalities between Ariane nexus commerce and geopolitics, a detailed 5, Soyuz and Vega, and the dependence of a reference analysis of worldwide launcher pro- significant part of European institutional grammes and an in-depth assessment of launches on Soyuz) but in particular by ex- current and future trends in the sector are ogenous ones, including the increasing com- provided in the report. These show that a petition in the worldwide commercial market number of concurrent trends are unfolding. and the great changes expected in the up- All major spacefaring nations are in the proc- coming years with respect to both the supply ess of upgrading their flagship families of and demand conditions of the satellite launch launchers and launch infrastructure, primarily industry. driven by the need to reduce cost and in- In order to cope with these challenges, the crease commercial competitiveness, while Ministerial Council resolution called for the strengthening national autonomy and ex- “availability as soon as possible of new Euro- panding existing capabilities and infrastruc- pean launch services which are not only com- tures to accommodate more ambitious goals. petitive without requiring public support dur- The era of international joint ventures seems ing exploitation, but also flexible and modular to have reached an end at this stage. enough for responding to a wide range of Upgraded or brand new launch vehicles from needs, from institutional to commercial re- all major space-faring nations will enter ser- quirements, as well as to the uncertainties on vice over the course of the next ten years, the evolution of the commercial” market. while current launch systems will be progres- To achieve this objective, European ministers sively phased out. The main Geosynchronous agreed to kick-start the development of Ari- Transfer Orbit (GTO) launchers of the 2020s, ane 6 and Vega-C, and to introduce funda- other than Ariane 6, will consist of Vulcan mental changes in the overall governance of (U.S.) Falcon 9/Heavy (U.S.), H-III (Japan), the European launcher sector, particularly “in Long March 5/7 (China), GSLV Mk-III (India) the relations between industry and govern- and Angara A5 (Russia). As a higher number ments in developing and operating launch of players will be interested in capturing a vehicles”. The result was a multi-pronged share of the market demand, there will likely strategy aimed at increasing flexibility and be an increased degree of competition. At the reducing the cost of Europe’s future access to same time, however, this expansion of supply space by activating a number of levers, in- will take place in a market where demand is cluding the utilisation of heritage hardware, a expected to remain stable over the medium far-reaching streamlining of industrial organi- term, bar a substantial decrease in launch sation, the maximisation of common expend- prices. able elements, and the creation of synergies The Non-Geostationary Orbit (NGTO) envi- between different market segments. All these ronment will probably continue to be domi- levers – together with the guarantee of five nated by captive institutional demand, al- institutional launches per year – were essen- ESPI Report 56 5 March 2016 though the growing number of commercial tive manufacturing, a technology now in its applications and related constellations – as infancy but with the potential to shake up the well as the exponential increase of small sat- very foundations of the entire manufacturing ellites – points to the possibility of more industry, could have a substantial impact on commercial competition for contracts for reducing the production cost of launch vehi- small launchers. Moreover, there will be cles, potentially dramatically reducing the strong competition to deliver payloads to Low cost of access to space. Moreover, reusable Earth Orbit (LEO) and Medium Earth Orbit non-vertical launch system such as the Sky- (MEO) orbits between Vega-C, Epsilon (Ja- lon Spaceplane could well be the way of ac- pan), Long March 6/7 (China), Antares cessing space in what will perhaps be a post- (U.S.), Athena III (U.S.), Falcon 9 (U.S.), rocket era. PSLV (India), Soyuz 2.1v (Russia) and An- gara 1.2 (Russia). Prospects for the new European Launchers: an Furthermore, the trend of using launch capa- Assessment bilities as a geopolitical tool for foreign policy Building on the above, an overall assessment objectives is growing. While in the past it was on the medium-terms prospects for European the launcher technology itself that was to be launchers was performed. This revealed a leveraged by means of technology transfers, number of issues of potential concern, which today several countries are offering complete are summarised as follows: packages (which include launch of a domes- tic-built rocket, satellite and ground support) • The new European strategy on access to to countries of geopolitical interest.