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The European Launchers between

Commerce and Geopolitics

Report 56 March 2016

Marco Aliberti Matteo Tugnoli

Short title: ESPI Report 56 ISSN: 2218-0931 (print), 2076-6688 (online) Published in March 2016

Editor and publisher: European Space Policy Institute, ESPI Schwarzenbergplatz 6 • 1030 Vienna • Austria http://www.espi.or.at Tel. +43 1 7181118-0; Fax -99

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ESPI Report 56 2 March 2016 The European Launchers between Commerce and Geopolitics

Table of Contents

Executive Summary 5

1. Introduction 10 1.1 Access to Space at the Nexus of Commerce and Geopolitics 10 1.2 Objectives of the Report 12 1.3 Methodology and Structure 12

2. Access to Space in 14 2.1 European Launchers: from Political Autonomy to Market Dominance 14 2.1.1 The Quest for European Independent Access to Space 14 2.1.3 European Launchers: the Current Family 16 2.1.3 The Working System: Launcher Strategy, Development and Exploitation 19 2.2 Preparing for the Future: the 2014 ESA Ministerial Council 22 2.2.1 The Path to the Ministerial 22 2.2.2 A Look at Europe’s Future Launchers and Infrastructure 26 2.2.3 A Revolution in Governance 30

3. World Outlook in 2015: Analysis of Launcher Policies, Programmes and Developments 33 3.1 33 3.2 38 3.3 40 3.4 42 3.5 India 44 3.6 Other Nations 45 3.6.1 Argentina 45 3.6.2 Brazil 45 3.6.3 46 3.6.4 Israel 47 3.6.5 47 3.6.6 48 3.6.7 48 3.7 Policies and Politics of Access to Space: an Overview 49 3.7.1 Autonomy, Commercialisation and Privatisation of Access to Space 49 3.7.2 Ongoing Developments 51

4. Current Dynamics and Future Trends 53 4.1 Launch Activity Outlook 53 4.2 The Structure and Dynamics of the Market 58 4.2.1 Geo-economics of Launchers 58 4.2.2 The Evolutions of the Launch Service Market 61 4.3 Unfolding Trends in Demand and Supply 64 4.3.1 All-Electric 65 4.3.2 (Mega) Constellations 66 4.3.3 Reusability 67 4.3.4 Additive Manufacturing 69 4.3.5 Non-vertical Launch and Small Satellites 69 4.4 The Future Landscape 71

ESPI Report 56 3 March 2016

5. What Prospects for European Launchers? 75 5.1 Europe’s Strategy on Access to Space: an Assessment 75 5.2 Europe’s Way Forward: Some Reflections 78 5.2.1 Enhancing the Commercial Competitiveness of European Launchers 78 5.2.2 Promoting Disruptive Technological Innovation in Europe 80 5.2.3 Boosting the Strategic Value of Launchers 82 5.2.4 Pursuing Autonomy and/or Cooperation in Human ? 83 5.2.5 Securing Europe’s Gateways to Space 85 5.2.6 Propositions Overview 85

6. Conclusions and Recommendations 87

Annex 89 A.1 Worldwide Expendable Orbital Launch Vehicles as at 2015 89 A.2 Launch Vehicles under Development 93 A.3 Overview of Major Orbital Launch Sites 96 A.4 Technical Compatibility Between Launchers And Satellite Bus 99

List of Acronyms 100

Acknowledgements 104

About the Authors 104

ESPI Report 56 4 March 2016 The European Launchers between Commerce and Geopolitics

Executive Summary

tially designed to increase the production Background rates so as to generate economies of scale that would ensure competitive pricing for The overarching objective of this report is to 6 and -C without the need for provide an in-depth reflection on the me- public support payments during exploitation. dium-term prospects for Europe’s access to space (i.e. over the next 10-15 year time- This strategy raises a number of questions in frame). Starting with the resolution endorsed terms of effectiveness and, more broadly, at the 2014 Ministerial Council of the Euro- with regard to the overall prospects for pean Space Agency (ESA), the project as- Europe’s access to space in the next decade. sesses the scope, implications, opportunities and constraints of the European strategy in The International Landscape: Current Dynamics the launcher sector with respect to the and Future Trends broader and rapidly evolving international context. Indeed, the 2014 decisions were not In order to assess how the 2014 decisions only driven by endogenous factors (such as will position European future launchers at the the deficit of commonalities between Ariane nexus commerce and geopolitics, a detailed 5, and Vega, and the dependence of a reference analysis of worldwide launcher pro- significant part of European institutional grammes and an in-depth assessment of launches on Soyuz) but in particular by ex- current and future trends in the sector are ogenous ones, including the increasing com- provided in the report. These show that a petition in the worldwide commercial market number of concurrent trends are unfolding. and the great changes expected in the up- All major spacefaring nations are in the proc- coming years with respect to both the supply ess of upgrading their flagship families of and demand conditions of the satellite launch launchers and launch infrastructure, primarily industry. driven by the need to reduce cost and in- In order to cope with these challenges, the crease commercial competitiveness, while Ministerial Council resolution called for the strengthening national autonomy and ex- “availability as soon as possible of new Euro- panding existing capabilities and infrastruc- pean launch services which are not only com- tures to accommodate more ambitious goals. petitive without requiring public support dur- The era of international joint ventures seems ing exploitation, but also flexible and modular to have reached an end at this stage. enough for responding to a wide range of Upgraded or brand new launch vehicles from needs, from institutional to commercial re- all major space-faring nations will enter ser- quirements, as well as to the uncertainties on vice over the course of the next ten years, the evolution of the commercial” market. while current launch systems will be progres- To achieve this objective, European ministers sively phased out. The main Geosynchronous agreed to kick-start the development of Ari- Transfer (GTO) launchers of the 2020s, ane 6 and Vega-C, and to introduce funda- other than , will consist of Vulcan mental changes in the overall governance of (U.S.) /Heavy (U.S.), H-III (Japan), the European launcher sector, particularly “in 5/7 (China), GSLV Mk-III (India) the relations between industry and govern- and A5 (Russia). As a higher number ments in developing and operating launch of players will be interested in capturing a vehicles”. The result was a multi-pronged share of the market demand, there will likely strategy aimed at increasing flexibility and be an increased degree of competition. At the reducing the cost of Europe’s future access to same time, however, this expansion of supply space by activating a number of levers, in- will take place in a market where demand is cluding the utilisation of heritage hardware, a expected to remain stable over the medium far-reaching streamlining of industrial organi- term, bar a substantial decrease in launch sation, the maximisation of common expend- prices. elements, and the creation of synergies The Non- (NGTO) envi- between different market segments. All these ronment will probably continue to be domi- levers – together with the guarantee of five nated by captive institutional demand, al- institutional launches per year – were essen-

ESPI Report 56 5 March 2016

though the growing number of commercial tive manufacturing, a now in its applications and related constellations – as infancy but with the potential to shake up the well as the exponential increase of small sat- very foundations of the entire manufacturing ellites – points to the possibility of more industry, could have a substantial impact on commercial competition for contracts for reducing the production cost of launch vehi- small launchers. Moreover, there will be cles, potentially dramatically reducing the strong competition to deliver to Low cost of access to space. Moreover, reusable Earth Orbit (LEO) and non-vertical launch system such as the Sky- (MEO) between Vega-C, (Ja- lon could well be the way of ac- pan), /7 (China), cessing space in what will perhaps be a post- (U.S.), III (U.S.), Falcon 9 (U.S.), rocket era. PSLV (India), Soyuz 2.1v (Russia) and An- gara 1.2 (Russia). Prospects for the new European Launchers: an Furthermore, the trend of using launch capa- Assessment bilities as a geopolitical tool for foreign policy Building on the above, an overall assessment objectives is growing. While in the past it was on the medium-terms prospects for European the launcher technology itself that was to be launchers was performed. This revealed a leveraged by means of technology transfers, number of issues of potential concern, which today several countries are offering complete are summarised as follows: packages (which include launch of a domes- tic-built rocket, satellite and ground support) • The new European strategy on access to to countries of geopolitical interest. This un- space as defined by the 2014 ESA Minis- folding policy reality might have potentially terial Council represents a politically disruptive effects on the future global launch well-agreed compromise that follows a industry. period of intense disagreement between ESA Member States, notably Ger- Finally, after decades of complete reliance on many and . However, the past dis- government funding to develop launch vehi- agreement might continue to have a det- cles, a new paradigm is gradually emerging in rimental effect on the development the launch industry of several countries: schedule, which is tight. Hence all efforts while access to space still remains firmly un- should be made to put the past behind der the control of national governments, the and focus on the earliest possible entry role of private actors (and private invest- into service of Ariane 6. ment) is clearly increasing, with commercial companies such as SpaceX, - • From an overall perspective, the pro- Launchers (ASL), Mitsubishi Heavy Industries jected way forward appears to a large (MHI), , and posi- extent conservative rather than trend tioned to become even bigger stakeholders in setting. The Resolution sanctions a revo- both development and exploitation of launch lution in terms of processes (efficiency- vehicles. driven industrial reorganization and gov- ernance), but a mere evolution in terms In fact, the determination and focus of new of product – as the new launchers, Ari- entrepreneurial efforts to establish and com- ane 6 in particular, will be built upon mercialise game-changing launch technolo- consolidated . gies was met by success at the end of 2015, when for the first time the landing-and-reuse • The new European launchers will realize of a suborbital vehicle and the landing of the cost savings principally by virtue of first stage of an orbital-capable rocket were modularity, common design synergies as achieved. With the technological feasibility well as industrial reorganization and now proven, questions remain about the eco- streamlining. A core objective – not to nomic impact of first-stage reusability, which say the main objective – is to eliminate will require a few more years to be answered. the need for public support payments Nevertheless, the competitive edge currently during exploitation while maintaining a gained by those actors will position them at competitive pricing policy. However, the of reaping the expected bene- European stakeholders have not fully fits, possibly allowing them to continue to set clarified what the overarching goals of the tempo and direction of the global space Ariane 6 and Vega-C are in terms of the transportation sector. market shares that need to be achieved, or how to instrumentalise the launchers The introduction of disruptive innovation in order to provide support to the foreign technologies does not stop at rocket reusabil- policy goals of Europe. ity, where Europe is perhaps lagging behind, but extends to other segments. This may • The success of this new launcher strat- give Europe leap-frogging possibilities. Addi- egy will rely de facto on the guarantee of

ESPI Report 56 6 March 2016 The European Launchers between Commerce and Geopolitics

an institutional launch business base, to more aggressive stances on the com- which might however be difficult to en- mercial market by national actors, with sure absent a formal commitment by all governments subsiding their launchers European stakeholders. even more than today. Should this sce- nario play out it might be difficult for Ari- • The integration of into ASL ane 6 to remain competitive, unless would entail a significant market verti- some form of financial backing from ESA calisation since one of its shareholders Member States is reintroduced. In the (Airbus Defence & Space) is also a lead- meantime, the extent of support for the ing satellite manufacturer. Hence it is exploitation of for the period important that effective measures be put 2016-2023 also remains unsettled. in place to ensure continued market equilibrium, as otherwise, unintendedly, • The roadmap for Vega (namely Vega-C market share may be lost. and Vega-E) appears to be more robust. However, the forecast evolution of the • The new launcher strategy seems to pro- lightweight Vega into what will de facto ject the current policy reality over a 15- be a medium-lift launcher (the perform- year period, to some extent assuming ance envisioned for Vega-E would be up that the current strong market situation to 3,000 Kg in GTO) will enable meeting and beneficial financial scenario (with demand in the small segment of the GTO near-zero interest rates and favourable market, but leaves open the question of exchange rates) will last. This may be how to best capture the ever-growing overly optimistic. The introduction of demand for small/micro satellites in the game-changing technologies currently future. Unless both Vega-C and Vega-E pursued by several launch providers, will be made simultaneously available, most notably first-stage reusability con- there could be some hurdles in terms of cepts as well as non-vertical launch sys- the pairing of satellites and the schedul- tems, could dramatically affect Ariane 6’s ing of launches. future prospects and blunt its forecast competitive edge by the time it enters • Europe is following the worldwide trend into service or soon thereafter. Measures of strengthening sovereign autonomy in are necessary to ensure that Ariane 6 access to space, by realizing an all- can evolve with the market – without European family of and thereby endangering the high priority to be given overcoming the current dependence of to early market entry. European institutional launches on the availability and pricing of the Russian- • While flexible enough to respond to a made Soyuz. However, the decision to wide range of needs, Ariane 6 has a replace Soyuz-ST with Ariane 62 and strong commercial focus, and it is in a Vega-C, while understandable from an certain sense almost exclusively tailored industrial policy perspective, by implica- to satisfying the demand from commer- tion down-prioritises the fact that the cial satellites operator. Such commercial presence of Russian-made Soyuz-ST at focus might make it difficult to fulfil all the Guyana Space Centre (GSC) repre- the varied needs of the Agency’s mis- sents much more than a mere technical sions. Furthermore, Ariane 6 is not de- and economic cooperation. The eventual signed to be human-rated. Consequently, phase-out leaves open the issue of find- Europe will not be able to conduct ing an analogue and valuable mechanism autonomous missions for European-Russian cooperation in in the foreseeable future. space. • In terms of production costs, Ariane 6 • Unlike other major spacefaring nations, will be less demanding than the current which are putting a strong emphasis on generation by 40%. However, there are the upgrading of their launch infrastruc- limited margins of profit for Ariane 6. The ture through the construction of new expected launch cost of Ariane 64 is € , Europe will continue to rely 90/100 million while the prearranged on the GSC. While located in a very ad- launch price is € 115 million. This surplus vantageous location, particularly for GTO however will be largely needed to cover launches, the GSC will remain the only the mismatch between the expected for Ariane and Vega in the launch costs (roughly € 80 million) and foreseeable future, with inherent risks. launch price (roughly € 70 million) of Ariane 62. Crucially, the modest margins allow little room for manoeuvre in case of price war. Indeed, potential oversupply or distorted market conditions can lead

ESPI Report 56 7 March 2016

Recommendations broader framework of a “European Vision for Space”. This report sets out a variety of possible measures to overcome the issues identified 4. The creation of a “pan-European Export as of concern: Credit Agency” should be considered. In this respect, the European Investment • Enhance the commercial competitiveness Bank could be entrusted with new, dedi- of European launchers; cated functions of support to the export • Promote disruptive technological innova- of European satellites and launch ser- tion in Europe; vices, with the ultimate goal of providing • Boost and geopolitically leverage the a larger launch business base both for strategic value of the launchers; current and future European launch sys- • Reinforce Europe’s role in human space- tems. flight; • Secure Europe’s gateways to space. 5. ESA and its Member States should assess the possibility of better leveraging the ex- While not all the proposed measures within isting small spaceports such as Andoya these five specific – yet strongly interlinked – and Kiruna or the upcoming launch facil- areas can be easily implemented, it is impor- ity in the UK, by examining the possibility tant to discuss the concrete steps that could of accommodating lightweight orbital be taken to ensure the long-term availability launch vehicles. Such possible decisions and competitiveness of an autonomous ac- would ideally have to be accompanied by cess to space for Europe. Relevant recom- consideration of the introduction of an mendations and possible concrete policy even smaller configuration of the Vega measures are as follows: rocket or even by opening these space- 1. It is recommended that the debate on the ports to purely commercial launch service follow-ups to Ariane 6 and Vega-C should providers. be pursued in the very near future. Deci- 6. The possibility of building a second sions on a possible Ariane 66 configura- launch site for Europe’s upcoming tion and on Vega-E should be ideally launchers – and in particular Ariane 6 – taken as early as the ESA Ministerial should be considered in order to ensure Council of 2016, and those on Ariane 7 redundancy and cope with the potential well before the Ariane 6 qualification need for increased launch frequency. At flight in 2020. It is also recommended the same time, the huge financial and po- that these decisions become part of a litical efforts required suggest identifying unified “European Roadmap for Access to other policy options. In view of the con- Space” that would pave the way for verging dynamics and similarities be- smoother decision-making in the future, tween European and Japanese launcher and ultimately make Europe a more pro- programmes, extending the Europe- active and trend-setting actor vis-à-vis Japan launch backup agreement to cover the rapidly evolving worldwide landscape institutional missions would provide a of access to space. greater margin for assuring Europe’s ac- 2. A dedicated European-wide R&D seed- cess to space in case of the unavailability funding programme targeting disruptive of . technological innovation should be estab- 7. The development of full spectrum capa- lished, particularly for launcher technol- bilities for accessing space, and in par- ogy. An actor like the European Commis- ticular the development of a human-rated sion (EC), which has a relatively more and re-entry system, risk-tolerant mandate, could provide the should not be put on the backburner, but funding and it might be possible to do so more substantially discussed among all in a more stable manner than today due European constituencies within a broader to the absence of geo-return constraints vision for in the post- in Commission programmes. The overall ISS period by inter alia considering the objective would be for Europe to gain or potential benefits offered by the involve- maintain its role as a trendsetter, without ment of both European institutions and being forced to play a “catch-up game” in European private companies in future the space transportation sector in the space exploration and human spaceflight medium-to-long term. activities. 3. In light of the future phase-out of Soyuz 8. Finally, the potential benefits of more from the GSC, an alternative and sym- active involvement of other EU institu- bolic instrument for European-Russian tions, particularly the European External space cooperation should be identified Action Service (EEAS), should be consid- and more firmly enshrined into the ered in terms of a more efficient exploita-

ESPI Report 56 8 March 2016 The European Launchers between Commerce and Geopolitics

tion of launcher-related technology or European launchers, and increasing services for S&T-based diplomacy. Europe’s influence on the international Among the possible options, but a con- stage. The possibility of assisting the troversial one, the provision to develop- building of geopolitical alliances through ing countries of “launch package agree- the transfer of ‘previous generation’ ments” through Official Development As- technology to countries intent on devel- sistance (ODA) could be a highly effective oping their own launch capabilities should geopolitical move for providing indirect also be kept in mind, particularly at this support to European space industries, time of generational change-over in expanding a launch business base for launchers in Europe.

ESPI Report 56 9 March 2016

1. Introduction

Earth is the cradle of humanity, From an economic point of view, although the » but one cannot live in a cradle forever satellite launch industry is rather small in ― K. Tsiolkovsky terms of size and revenues when compared to other space activity sectors in both the downstream and upstream segment, it none- theless generates a variety of direct, indirect 1.1 Access to Space at the and induced benefits to society. As several Nexus of Commerce and analysts have pointed out, such benefits in- clude immediate economic effects in terms of Geopolitics gross value added to the national economy; medium and long-term catalytic effects of More than one hundred years have passed enabled revenues from satellite launches since put in place the (which include the downstream sector reve- theoretical foundation for spaceflight, and the nues of both space and non-space industries most basic equation that applies to space and services); as well as non-quantifiable yet activities has remained unchanged: no significant impacts in a number of key areas. launcher, no space programme. From Thus, investments in space launch capabili- to , through Apollo and the modules ties have indeed proved to play a crucial role of the International Space Station, space in supporting overall industry, technology and programmes worldwide have invariably relied research capabilities, in promoting innovation on the availability of launch vehicles to reach and improving competitiveness and in gener- and exploit outer space. ating knowledge, employment and entrepre- 2 All spacefaring nations consider launchers as neurial capacities. Hence, without autono- a strategic good – or more precisely a strate- mous access to space, many of these direct, gic enabler: not a goal in itself, but a conditio indirect and induced benefits could not be sine qua non for the conduct of their military, fully reaped. civil or commercial space efforts, and thus From a political and security perspective, the the foundation for any comprehensive space lack of autonomous access to space could be policy and for the full utilisation of space as- even more harmful, as it would cause de- sets. Understandably, the establishment of pendency on foreign countries for space indigenous launch systems has been gener- transportation needs, and thus restrict a ally regarded as a crucial priority that initially country’s political sovereignty vis-à-vis its responded to security needs as well as to capability to decide when and under what considerations of political autonomy and na- conditions to launch. In this respect, a major tional pride, but which was ultimately instru- inherent risk is that a foreign launch provider mental in providing a wide range of socio- could impose unacceptable conditions for economic benefits through the exploitation of launching institutional satellites – particularly space assets. Thus, for any nation with a military ones – or even refuse to launch on minimum of strategic ambitions in space – the basis of political considerations. and thus on Earth – the lack of an autono- mous access to space will bear high economic While the equation no launcher, no space and political costs.1 programme provides a rather straightforward rationale for the establishment of national launch capacities, attaining such a goal is no

1 easy undertaking. Quite to the contrary, the This report refers to the concept of autonomy, independ- development and maintenance of an indige- ence and non-dependence as outlined by Jan Wouters and Rik Hansen in the book European Autonomy in Space. nous and related infra- Autonomy is a political concept by nature and can be structure is a capital-intensive process requir- defined as ’possessing the power to determine one’s own laws’. Strategic independence is more operational and refers to ’the capacity to take the required decisions and to Access to Space: Factors of Autonomy”. In: Al-Ekabi, execute them so as to safeguard a number of vital inter- Cenan (ed.). European Autonomy in Space. Springer, ests’. Autonomy could thus be understood as a formal 2015. criterion (the goal to achieve), while strategic independ- 2 See Del Monte, Luca and Luigi Scatteia. “A socio- ence is the necessary condition for effective autonomy (the economic impact assessment of the European launcher means to reach the goal). Cit. Al-Ekabi, Cenan. “European sector”. IAC-15. Jerusalem. 2015.

ESPI Report 56 10 March 2016 The European Launchers between Commerce and Geopolitics

ing not only extremely advanced technical and prevent the transfer of sensitive technol- capabilities and large financial investments, ogy, have profoundly shaped the market but also the highest degree of political will conditions in which launch services are com- and backing. In view of that, it is not surpris- mercialised, to an extent that, arguably, ing that only a dozen countries have been these have no equivalent in any other eco- able to establish a basic launch capacity to nomic sector.4 Security and political consid- reach lower altitude orbits. Multi-destination erations are so deeply engrained in the un- capabilities to reach the geostationary orbit derpinnings of the launch industry that even (GTO), low and medium earth orbits (LEO, for internationally competed launch contracts, MEO) and deep space are even more concen- the commercial launch market cannot be trated, having been mastered by only six aptly described as a “free and fair” trade en- space powers: the United States, Russia, vironment. Europe, Japan, China and India. Even if the rise of private actors is now pro- As a direct derivative of Intercontinental Bal- foundly reshaping many key features of the listic (ICBMs) technology, space car- traditional launch business model, access to rier rockets have historically been developed space ostensibly remains a sector where under the lead of military organisations to market economics is constantly flanked – not satisfy national security purposes. In the to say overwhelmed – by politics. In the light wake of the , both the United States of these considerations, it can be argued that and the former , but also to a dynamics in this field revolve around two large extent China and the pioneering Euro- overarching and closely related dimensions pean space countries, France and the United that the space strategies of the major space- Kingdom, initially conceived their launch ve- faring nations must necessarily confront: hicles as proxies for substantiating their mili- commercial viability and geopolitics. There is tary might.3 While this military dimension – a strong and visible policy nexus between and involvement – remained significant also these two dimensions and any comprehen- in subsequent stages, the development of sive assessment of the sector’s dynamics launchers soon became understood as a tool must thus take this mutually reinforcing rela- for the development of national civil space tionship into proper account. programmes, assets and services, which The term geopolitics needs, however, a clari- would in turn ensure independent decision- fication, as it is understood here to simulta- making based on space data and ultimately neously cover two distinct aspects of the provide a wide range of political and socio- sector. The first is that access to space is an economic benefits. issue-area of strategic interaction among With the expansion of commercial uses for nation-states, and, as such, it can be ana- communication satellites in the early 1980s, lysed through the theoretical lenses provided access to space eventually evolved from a by geopolitics as interpretative paradigms of means to respond to a domestic strategic international relations theory (state-centric demand, to an economic activity also serving analysis, relative-gains-seeker behavioural non-institutional missions. Over the past 25 model, weak institutionalism, power as cen- years, the provision of commercial launch tral variable, etc.), rather than through the services has progressively taken hold, stimu- application of a purely economic analysis.5 lating the emergence of a global market The second is that launchers themselves can characterised by a strong dynamic of com- be understood as both elements and enablers mercial competition and, in recent years, by of political power building. In this sense, the the ever-growing involvement of private un- geopolitics behind access to space has a dou- dertakings. ble facet: on the one hand it is a strategic The market for commercial launch services, however, is not comparable to those for most 4 As noted by Herzfeld, “the nuclear power industry - customer-oriented goods or services, primar- bly comes closest to having parallels to the launch industry ily owing to the predominant influence that [as to face government regulatory actions, to have defense agencies as well as civilian customers, and even to receive non-market forces exercise on it. Key factors subsidies from governments]. However, there is a long such as the central role played by govern- history of successful commercial business in nuclear ments in developing launch capacities irre- energy and many of the trade issues have been resolved. spective of market demand, in supporting Nuclear power also competes with other energy sources their exploitation through a variety of means, and therefore the price for nuclear power is tied to the market price of energy in general. No such pricing baseline including public subsidies, and in devising exists for launch vehicles and services”. Cit. Hertzfeld, regulatory actions to limit foreign competition Henry. Williamson, Ray. Peter, Nicolas. “Launch vehicles: an economic perspective”. Space Policy Institute, The George Washington University. September 2005. 3 Couillard, Philippe. “De à ”. Presenta- 5 See Jackson, Robert, and Georg Sørensen. Introduction tion at “International Conference on the European Space to International Relations. Theories and Approaches. Launchers”. , 3-4 November 2015. Oxford University Press: 2007.

ESPI Report 56 11 March 2016

capability that enhances national power and Yet, in spite of these praiseworthy accom- prestige, in addition to securing the autono- plishments, ensuring the long-term sustain- mous conduct of military, civil and commer- ability of an autonomous access to space and cial space programmes; on the other hand, it its competitiveness on the commercial mar- is a potential instrument to be leveraged ket does not come as a matter of course. The (e.g. by means of technology transfer, crea- satellite launch industry has been changing tion of joint ventures and provision of launch rapidly in recent years, with respect to both package deals) to achieve diplomatic goals supply and demand conditions, and it is ex- and support foreign policy objectives and pected to experience even more profound strategies. changes in the years to come. Only by understanding the complex interac- In response to and in anticipation of these tion between the economic and geopolitical rapid changes, the ESA Council at Ministerial driving factors, can the underpinnings of the level that convened in Luxembourg on 2 De- launcher sector be captured and assessed in cember 2014 took a number of strategic de- the most optimal fashion. cisions vis-à-vis the future of European launchers. The Council’s resolution, which can certainly be regarded as a decisive turning point in the history of ESA, will likely affect 1.2 Objectives of the Report not only the development of Europe’s access to space, but also the broader goals and di- Access to space has by any measure been a rections of the European space programmes true success story for Europe. For more than and of Europe in the international space three decades, Europe has enjoyed the avail- arena for decades to come. Hence, a com- ability of an independent, reliable and effi- prehensive assessment of the consequences cient infrastructure and means for launching of such decisions, in terms of how these will into space. The Ariane launchers have served position Europe at the nexus of commerce a variety of institutional and commercial mis- and geopolitics, is needed. sions and more broadly enabled the construc- tion of a European space programme, becom- The overarching objective of the report is to ing symbols of Europe’s autonomy and provide an in-depth reflection on the me- achievements in space. dium-term prospects for Europe’s access to space (i.e. over the next 10-15 year time The five different rocket generations that frame). Starting with the resolution endorsed have succeeded one another in the Ariane at the ESA C/M 14, this project intends to family have won a considerable share of the assess the scope, implications, opportunities global market, and helped turn the European and constraints of the European strategy in Space Agency (ESA) into one of the most the launcher sector with respect to the important actors in the international space broader and rapidly evolving international arena, while enabling Europe to construct a context. robust satellite launch industry and infra- structure. More than 400 satellites have been To this effect, the report will provide a de- successfully launched from Europe’s space- tailed analysis of worldwide commercial and port in and more than half of political dynamics shaping this domain, inves- the commercial satellites in service today tigate key unfolding trends and their future were launched by the European undertaking, impacts, and in turn assess the ensuing chal- Arianespace, which is indisputably the world’s lenges and opportunities to be faced by Euro- leading .6 Thanks to a pean institutions and industry in safeguarding remarkable launch performance of almost 70 its future competitiveness and optimizing the successful launches in a row, the Ariane 5 political benefits of Europe’s autonomous rocket has now emerged as a global point of access to space. reference for commercial launches and a cornerstone of European institutional launches, having generated over 50 billion 7 1.3 Methodology and Struc- euros of direct economic benefits in Europe. ture

6 With sales that have exceeded the 50% of the global This study has been mainly carried out launch revenues over the last ten years. See Chapter 4. 7 See . “Ministerial Council 2014. through desk research of publicly available Access to Space” ESA. 27 November 2014. Web. documents, conference proceedings and bib- http://www.esa.int/About_Us/Ministerial_Council_2014/Me liographic sources, spanning both sectoral dia_backgrounder_for_ESA_Council_at_Ministerial_Level. and general contributions in the area of ac- Accessed 5 February 2015. Overall, it has been estimated that each euro spent by ESA in the Ariane launcher pro- gramme produces a total of 3.2 euro of value added in the socio-economic impact assessment of the European economy. See Del Monte, Luca and Scatteia Luigi. A launcher sector. IAC-15. Jerusalem. 2015.

ESPI Report 56 12 March 2016 The European Launchers between Commerce and Geopolitics

cess to space. The research has been com- policy and to facilitate the decision-making plemented and strengthened by a number of process in Europe. targeted interviews, generally off the record, The Report is comprised of six chapters. After with various stakeholders and space policy providing an introductory overview in the experts, and by participation in a number of chapter to hand, the next chapter will exam- conferences and symposia, including the ine the decisions endorsed at the 2014 ESA 2015 ESPI Autumn Conference, the "Interna- Ministerial Council by, in particular, highlight- tional Conference on European Space ing the resolution’s rationales and outlining Launchers" organised by L’Academie de l’Air the future evolution of European launch ca- et de l’Espace in Paris, and the “8th Annual pabilities and governance schemes. Conference on European Space Policy”, the findings of which have been incorporated into In order to assess the international back- the report.8 ground surrounding Europe’s policy on access to space, in Chapter 3 the focus will be The research and writing process of the re- shifted to the analysis of the most recent port has in addition immensely benefited developments in the space transportation from the fruitful exchanges with an accompa- sector of the main space-faring nations, as nying group of five experts that was set-up to well as of a number of emerging countries provide competent advice and stimulate dis- which have developed – or are planning to cussions on the scope and overall directions develop – their own launch vehicles. Particu- of the project. The group was composed of lar attention will be paid to assessing the Peter Hulsroj, Ralph W. Jaeger, Arturo de current strategies, and to presenting the Lillis, Nicolas Peter, and Per Tegnér, and con- launch capabilities and forecast evolutions. vened at ESPI twice during the course of the Considerations on the strategic interactions project.9 One of the main benefits of this between space launch powers will also be accompanying group was that it gathered examined within this chapter, as a means of people with different backgrounds and ex- better explaining the underlying forces shap- periences around one table to brainstorm and ing access to space. discuss, in an open fashion, the many issues that around this highly dynamic sec- On the basis of this reference analysis, Chap- tor. ter 4 will put the spotlight on the major fea- tures and currents shaping the global satellite The report provides a variety of quantitative launch industry, with particular emphasis on data and analyses, which – in line with the the complex interaction between market and general criteria proposed by Eisenhardt and non-market forces. Following this, the chap- Yin – were mainly collected to support the ter will be devoted to thoroughly identifying construction of qualitative research. It should and discussing key unfolding trends and me- also be highlighted that while the approach of dium to-long term evolutions that will likely this study is markedly empirical and its scope affect future supply and demand conditions of global, its underlying purpose is normative in access to space. nature deliberately European in perspective: the study concretely intends to describe and Building upon the analysis and findings of the explain the international dynamics in the previous chapters, an overall assessment of launcher sector in order to recommend possi- the current European strategy on access to ble policy actions and strategies to European space and medium-term prospects for Euro- decision-makers. This coincides with ESPI’s pean launchers will be provided in the first mission to provide European stakeholders part of Chapter 5. This will in turn be used as with informed analyses in the field of space a basis to present and discuss a set of poten- tial policy options to better cope with the potential areas of concern identified in the 8 The annual ESPI Autumn Conference took place on 21- assessment. In view of the upcoming review 22 September 2015 and revolved around the theme of of the Ariane 6 launcher programme and ESA “Access to Space and the Evolution of Space Activities”. C/M 2016, Chapter 6 will draw some conclu- The two-day conference in Vienna gathered a large num- sions and general recommendations on the ber of speakers and participants interested in debating additional measures that may be required to new developments in how humans gain access to outer maintain Europe’s competitiveness in the space, and potential new activities arising from an evolved landscape in which launch costs might decrease dramati- commercial market and exploit the strategic cally. value of Europe’s launchers in the best possi- 9 Peter Hulsroj is the Director of ESPI; Ralph W. Jaeger is ble manner. the former Senior VP of Arianespace; Arturo de Lillis is the former Head of ASI Launchers Unit; Nicolas Peter is a Policy Officer for the Space Policy and Research Unit, DG GROW; Per Tegnér is the former Chair of the ESA Council and the former DG of the Swedish National Space Board. They all participated in the Accompanying Group in their personal capacities.

ESPI Report 56 13 March 2016

2. Access to Space in Europe

This chapter provides an introductory over- launch of the French-German view of the European launch sector. After satellites.11 tracing back the historical evolution of Euro- Within the framework of ELDO, in 1962 major pean vehicles and policies on access to space, European leaders agreed to develop a heavy the chapter describes the current launch ca- rocket, , whose first stage would be pabilities and analyses the institutional set-up Britain’s ballistic ; its sec- behind the development and exploitation of ond stage, Coralie, was to be built in France launch vehicles in Europe. In the second part, and its third stage, Astrid, was to be provided the chapter examines the decisions endorsed by . was to provide the satellite at the 2014 ESA Ministerial Council, explain- and the fairings, while would provide ing their rationales as well as the foreseeable the ground guidance system and the Nether- future evolution of European launch capabili- lands would provide the telemetry links.12 ties and governance schemes. However, as noted by many, these decisions were taken “at the highest political level, as a matter of bargaining and without any sound 2.1 European Launchers: from technical basis”.13 The Europa rocket, in es- Political Autonomy to Mar- sence, was the result of a politically imposed agenda that “was carried over into a man- ket Dominance agement structure in which each partner agreed to share the tasks under the respon- 2.1.1 The Quest for European Independent Ac- sibility of their respective governments, leav- cess to Space ing ELDO itself very few powers in respect of technical and financial management of the 14 In spite of national beginnings, the develop- project”. Not surprisingly, the task of ment of launchers was one of the very first matching three stages and a satellite built in drivers of pan-European cooperative schemes four different countries without a fully- in space. Cooperation in this field predates fledged and centralised technical manage- the establishment of the European Space ment of the project turned out to be an in- Agency (ESA). It originated as early as 1962 surmountable challenge and none of the Eu- with the creation of the first intergovernmen- ropa launches conducted between 1964 and tal entity devoted to space activities in 1971 succeeded in putting a satellite into Europe, the European Launcher Development orbit. Organisation (ELDO), which eventually After the fiasco of the Europa 2 and 3 pro- merged in 1975 with the European Space jects and the parallel demise of ELDO, efforts Research Organisation (ESRO) to form ESA.10 were revitalised by France, which in 1973 Although at that time European countries proposed to ELDO member states to trans- already had significantly different views and form its Diamant-derived Launceur a Trois priorities with regard to space activities, the development of an indigenous European means of accessing space was not a point of 11 With the aim of maintaining its monopoly in the field of contention. And all the pioneering European commercial satellite communications, the U.S. initially space countries agreed that nothing signifi- refused to provide a launcher for the two satellites. It sub- cant could be achieved in this field without sequently agreed to provide the service only on condition sound European cooperation. Such necessity that Symphonie would not be used for commercial pur- poses, but only experimental ones. For a detailed assess- was later made even clearer by the well- ment and historical analysis of the origins of the Ariane known argument with the U.S. over the launcher, see Al-Ekabi, Cenan and Panos Mastorakis. “The Evolution of Europe’s Launcher and Flagship Space Initiatives”. In: Al-Ekabi, Cenan (ed.). European Autonomy in Space. Springer, 2015: pp. 2-14. 12 Ibid. p. 6. 13 Kriege, J. “The History of the European Launchers: an 10 See: European Space Agency. “Launcher strategy”. Overview”. In Proceedings of an International Symposium Web. on “The History of the European Space Agency”. 11-13 http://www.esa.int/Our_Activities/Launchers/Launcher_stra November 1998, London. ESA SP-346. 1999: pp. 69-78 tegy. Accessed 20 February 2015. 14 Ibid. p. 71

ESPI Report 56 14 March 2016 The European Launchers between Commerce and Geopolitics

Etages de Substitution (L3S) programme into for the emergence of a commercial launch a European programme, as part of a broader market. “package deal” with all the other European Ariane 1 successfully launched several Euro- partners.15 The Europeanization of this pean and non-European spacecraft, including French launch vehicle was agreed in a minis- Spacenet 1 for the first U.S. commercial cus- terial meeting in July 197316 and work on the tomer. However, its capacity of new launcher programme – eventually re- 1,800 Kg to GTO soon proved insufficient to named the Ariane Launcher Programme – meet the growing size of telecommunication began as early as 1974 within the framework satellites. Ariane 1 thus began to give way to of the newly established ESA. more powerful derivatives, the , with Unlike Europa, Ariane was conceived in a a payload of 2,200 Kg to GTO, and , framework where European-wide manage- which could carry a payload of 2,700 Kg. ment and responsibilities replaced a clear-cut Ariane 3 was also designed to launch two division of tasks among European nations. spacecraft at a time allowing the optimization Within the new framework, CNES was given of launch configurations.18 Interestingly, the full technical and financial delegation from development of Ariane 2 and 3 had already ESA to manage the programme, in exchange been envisaged before the entry into service for sustaining the largest share of the project of Ariane 1. By 1983, ESA also started the (62.5%), assuming the risks of cost over- development of an even larger vehicle, which runs, and ensuring a minimum of 80% indus- would become the workhorse of the European trial return to all participants in the arrange- launchers’ family: . ment.17 Although from a financial perspective Altogether, 11 successful Ariane 1 launches the development of Ariane encountered con- took place between 1979 and 1986, and siderable hostility, particularly in France, there were five successful Ariane 2 launches from a technical point of view no major hur- (out of 6) between 1987 and 1989. Ariane 3 dles were faced. The inaugural launch of Ari- made 11 flights from 1984 to 1989, all of ane 1 eventually took place in December which were successful (see Table 1).19 1979, opening a new era in the balance of power in the international space arena. Building on this success, in 1980, Ari- anespace – the world’s first commercial satel- lite launch company – was established to manage and commercialise the operations of Ariane. Since the inception of the pro- gramme, it was rather clear that the provi- sion of launch services to non-European cus- tomers would be necessary to amortize the tal Launches Number of Suc- Number of cessful over To- development costs of the Ariane rocket. Launch Vehicle Qualification Flight Last Flight However, considering that by that time all Ariane 1 24/12/1979 21/02/1986 11/11 launches into space – even those launches intended to place commercially owned and Ariane 2 21/09/1987 01/04/1989 5/6 operated communications satellites into geo- Ariane 3 04/08/1984 11/07/1989 11/11 stationary orbit – were carried out under government auspices, the decision to com- Ariane 4 15/06/1988 15/02/2003 113/116 mercialise launch activity through a joint Table 1: Ariane 1-4 Launchers.20 stock company was ground-breaking in na- ture. Even if it was initially intended as a supplementary source of financing for the Ariane 4 had its qualification flight in 1988 Ariane programme, it ultimately set the stage and soon emerged as one of the best launch- ers in its category, both in terms of perform- 15 Al-Ekabi, Cenan and Panos Mastorakis. “The Evolution ance and reliability. Thanks to its six variants, of Europe’s Launcher and Flagship Space Initiatives”. In: Ariane 4 was capable of lifting into GTO satel- Al-Ekabi, Cenan (ed.). European Autonomy in Space. lites weighing from 2,000 to 4,800 Kg, almost Springer, 2015: pp. 2-14. three times as much as the Ariane 3 16 For a detailed description of the so-called “1973 pack- age deal” see Krige, John, and Arturo Russo, A History of the European Space Agency 1958-1987. Volume 1. ESA 18 Arianespace. “Milestones”. Web. Publications Division ESTEC, Noordwijk. 2000: 363- 374. http://www.arianespace.com/about-us/milestones.asp Krige, John, Arturo Russo and Lorenza Sebesta. A History Accessed 25 February 2015. of the European Space Agency 1958-1987. Volume 2. 19 European Space Agency. “Ariane 1-2-3”. Web. ESA Publications Division ESTEC, Noordwijk: 55 http://www.esa.int/Our_Activities/Launchers/Ariane_1_2_3 17 Sillard, Yves. “France and Launchers”. In: Proceedings 2. Accessed 02 December 2015. of an International Symposium on “The History of the 20 Source: Arianespace. Web. European Space Agency”. 11-13 November 1998, London. http://www.arianespace.com/launch-services-ariane- ESA SP-346. 1999: 69-78. heritage/ariane-heritage.asp. Accessed 25 January 2015.

ESPI Report 56 15 March 2016

launcher. It performed 116 launches, 113 of and, more importantly, provide autonomous which were successful, placing a total of 182 access to space for Europe. payloads in orbit.21 Ariane 4’s technical suc- cess was accompanied by a “commercial suc- cess that far exceeded initial expectations”: 2.1.3 European Launchers: the Current Family during its service career from 1998 to 2003, For more than three decades, Ariane launch- Ariane 4 captured nearly 60% of the com- ers have served a variety of institutional and mercial satellite market, making Arianespace commercial missions, becoming symbols of the reference company for launch services Europe’s autonomy and achievements in 22 worldwide. space. Today, the family of European launch- In spite of these accomplishments, the evolu- ers includes the heavy-lift Ariane 5, the me- tion of satellite technologies and characteris- dium-lift Soyuz-ST, and the lightweight Vega tics forecast at the end of the 1980s, as well (see Figure 1). as ESA’s plans for the development of space laboratories and an autonomous human spaceflight, necessitated reconsideration of launch requirements towards heavier pay- loads, suitable for launching both telecom- munication satellites and modules to the In- ternational Space Station (ISS).23 Against this background, European ministers decided to start the development of an even more powerful launcher, Ariane 5 at the ESA Ministerial Council of 1987. Originally in- tended to be human-rated, Ariane 5’s pri- mary purpose was to launch ESA’s crewed spaceplane. Already in 1992, how- ever, the Hermes project was abandoned, since neither cost nor performance goals could be achieved. Ariane 5, unlike its prede- cessors, was designed as a two-stage launcher, making use of a single engine fu-

elled by liquid hydrogen, with two large strap-on solid rocket motors. The overall Figure 1: Europe’s launcher family.25 payload capacity of the first version (Ariane 5 Generic) was 9,500 Kg to SSO and 6,000 Kg 24 Since its introduction, Ariane 5 has been re- to the GTO. fined in successive versions, "G", "G+", "GS", The development of Ariane 5 was completed "ECA", and "ES". At present, there are two in 1996; however, it failed its first test launch operational configurations: Ariane 5 ECA, as well as three other flights in the early which mainly delivers communication satel- years of operations, making it necessary to lites to Geostationary Transfer Orbit (GTO) rely on Ariane 4 for some more missions be- with a launch capacity of 10,000 Kg, and fore discontinuation in 2003. In spite of these Ariane 5 ES, which is designed for various uncertain beginnings, Ariane 5 was able to missions to (LEO) with a maintain the dominance of Arianespace in the launch capacity of 20,000 Kg. The latter con- commercial launch market (see Chapter 4.2) figuration was also used for the launches of the five ATVs to the ISS. The exploitation of Ariane 5 is supported by the Ariane Research and Technology Accompaniment (ARTA), a 21 The large majority of these payloads (139) consisted of continuous programme designed to ensure telecommunication satellites. Arianespace. “Ariane heri- the qualification of the vehicle for its entire tage”. Web. http://www.arianespace.com/launch-services- lifecycle with regard to both the flight and ariane-heritage/Ariane-4.asp 22 Al-Ekabi, Cenan and Panos Mastorakis. “The Evolution ground segments. of Europe’s Launcher and Flagship Space Initiatives”. In: Ariane 5 is launched six to seven times a Al-Ekabi, Cenan (ed.). European Autonomy in Space. Springer, 2015: pp. 2-14. year. In addition to the ESA institutional mis- 23 Veclani, Anna Clementina, Jean-Pierre Darnis. “Euro- sions, a number of civil and security-related pean Space Launch Capabilities and Prospects”. In: missions have been launched on Ariane 5. A Schrogl, Kai-Uwe, et al. Handbook of Space Security. total of 38 institutional missions were Policies, Applications and Programs. Volume 2. Springer, launched by Ariane 5 ECA between 2005 and 2014: p. 792 24 European Space Agency. “Ariane 5 Generic”. Web. http://www.esa.int/Our_Activities/Launchers/Launch_vehicl es/Ariane_5_Generic2. Accessed 25 January 2015. 25 Source: ESA Website.

ESPI Report 56 16 March 2016 The European Launchers between Commerce and Geopolitics

Figure 2: Ariane 5 launch log as of December 2015.26

2014. The majority of launches, however, it enabled the former to complement the has been for private customers. The largest performance of the ESA launchers Ariane and demand has come from satellite operators Vega, and the latter to benefit from improved such as SES (which accounted for 15% of the access to commercial markets and improved total number of payloads) (12%), performance of the Soyuz launcher when and (10%). As at December 2015, being launched much closer to the .28 the Ariane 5 launch log stands at a total of 79 At that time, it was also in the interest of launches (see Figure 2), with contracts hav- both Europe and Russia to boost their rela- ing been signed for launches up to 2023.27 tionship in general, and cooperation in the launcher sector was seen as a tool for pursu- The European version of the Russian- ing this objective. Soyuz-ST was launched manufactured Soyuz was introduced to con- from Kourou for the first time in October solidate Europe’s access to space for me- 2011, and is designed for medium-weight dium-size missions, in particular to launch communication satellites as well as naviga- satellites up to 3,200 Kg into GTO and MEO, tion and earth observation missions. The fact including constellations of two or more satel- that the GSC can operate Soyuz has made it lites. Named Soyuz-ST, it joined the family of easier to use it for dual-use missions, as European launchers in 2005, following the happened with the launch of France’s signature of a cooperation agreement be- Pleiades constellation and ELISA satellites.29 tween ESA and , which enabled Since the very beginning, however, it has Soyuz to use Europe’s spaceport in Kourou. been questioned whether Europe should rely The decision to develop a dedicated launch on Soyuz for missions having a high political- infrastructure at the was of interest to both Europe and Russia, as 28 The agreement was preceded by the European-Russian company Starsem, which was established in 1996 to 26 Source: ESA. Web. commercialise launches with Soyuz. Starsem’s sharehold- http://www.esa.int/Our_Activities/Launchers/Launch_vehicl ers are EADS-Astrium (35%), Roscosmos (25%), Samara es/Ariane_5. Accessed 22 February 2016. Space Centre (25%) and Arianespace (15%). 27 Arianespace Press Release. “Arianespace and 29 Veclani, Anna Clementina, Jean-Pierre Darnis. “Euro- EUMETSAT announce signature of launch contract for pean Space Launch Capabilities and Prospects”. In: three MTG satellites”. 16 June 2015. Web. Schrogl, Kai-Uwe, et al. Handbook of Space Security. http://www.arianespace.com/news-press-release/2015/7- Policies, Applications and Programs. Volume 2. Springer, 16-2015-EUMETSAT.asp. Accessed 02 December 2015. 2014: pp. 783-800.

ESPI Report 56 17 March 2016

strategic value, considering that Soyuz is not step towards further strengthening European a truly European launcher. autonomous access to space.32 The lightweight VEGA (Vettore Europeo di Operational since 1968, the Guiana Space Generazione Avanzata – European Advanced Centre (GSC) is a strategically located facility Generation Vehicle) was developed as a re- that provides optimum operating conditions sult of an Italian initiative through an ESA for launching thanks to its position close to optional programme that began in 1998. the equator.33 The GSC is governed by a Vega is a four-stage launcher comprising longstanding agreement between ESA and three solid motor stages (the , -23 France that was extended to cover Soyuz and and Zefiro-9) and a liquid-fuelled fourth stage Vega installations. On the basis of this called AVUM, which is produced by Yuzhnoye agreement, ESA covers two-thirds of the in Ukraine.30 As a small launcher, Vega is spaceport’s cost and France one-third.34 The designed to seize the institutional small satel- day-to-day activities at the GSC are managed lite market (300-2,000 Kg) as well as to re- by the French National Space Agency CNES spond to the growing demand for micro- on behalf of ESA.35 CNES provides all needed satellites. Vega is capable of placing 300- range support requested by ESA and Ari- 2,500 Kg into LEO and, unlike most small anespace for spacecraft and launch vehicle launchers, can simultaneously launch multiple preparation and launch. The spaceport ac- payloads into orbit. Vega’s inaugural flight commodates various facilities, including a took place in February 2012 from Europe’s common Payload Preparation Complex, where spaceport in French Guiana. Its exploitation satellites are processed; a dedicated Upper has been supported by the Vega Research Composite Integration Facility for each launch and Technology Accompaniment (VERTA) vehicle, where satellites and launcher ele- programme, which inter alia foresaw the pro- ments are integrated; separate launch facili- curement of five demonstration flights, for ties for Ariane 5, ESA’s Intermediate eXperimental Vehicle (IXV), Proba-V, Aeolus, LISA Pathfinder, and two Copernicus Sentinels. By December 2015, VEGA has completed the accompani- 32 ment programme, and is now fully qualified Arianespace can, however, also operate Soyuz from the and ready for commercial exploitation by Cosmodrome through its subsidiary Starsem. 33 Launching near the equator reduces the energy required Arianespace for orbit plane change manoeuvres. This saves important With the successful introduction of Soyuz-ST fuel, and thus reduces costs, enabling an increased opera- tional lifetime for satellite payloads. In addition, French and Vega, the European family of launchers Guiana has a low population density and is protected from has become complete, making Arianespace hurricanes and earthquakes, thus providing ideal opera- the only launch service provider with an inte- tional conditions. grated approach in terms of performance and 34 The total amount of these costs is in the order of € 130 flexibility. The payload segment covered by million per year. Nicolini, Davide A. “Launchers Opera- tional Ground Facilities at Europe’s spaceport and in the three different launcher categories now Europe, and the global network”. ESA enables the entire range of launch require- Launchers Directorate. Presentation at ESAC 30 June ments to be covered: Ariane 5 for heavy pay- 2015. loads, Soyuz for medium payloads, and Vega 35 Even though France sustains a large part of the opera- for light payloads (see Table 2). As stressed tional costs of the GSC, it has to be also stressed that the in the ESPI book “European Autonomy in spaceport has a highly beneficial impact on the entire economy of French Guiana, which is indeed critically Space”, this will generate “an added value for dependent on the operations of the GSC. As noted in a both the commercial and institutional mar- recent assessment, the GSC provides an exceptional level kets. Besides the fact that Arianespace is now of high-technology activity and jobs, together with invest- able to offer launch service to virtually all the ment in the wider infrastructure of the region, incomes customer types, [...] the possibility of launch- generated by purchases from the wider Guiana economy (by the activities at GSC and by the workers employed ing on three different vehicles also increases there and those who visit), and support for some economic versatility for the institutional payloads and development projects. It was estimated that GSC brought might also reduce the attractiveness of in around € 13 billion of goods and services inputs over launching European institutional missions on 2000-12. Approximately two-fifths were brought in to sup- foreign launch vehicles”.31 Furthermore, the port maintenance activities with the remainder being used to support launch activities. Overall, GSC generated € 1 use of the three launchers from the European billion of value added over 2000-12. Employment at the spaceport in French Guiana has been a clear GSC base grew by 26% between 2005 and 2013, with little impact from the global downturn. The impact of GSC contributed to around 46% of import duty revenues over 30 See “Launcher Vega”. ELV website. 2000-07. Value added by GSC directly contributed to 2.8% http://www.elv.it/en/launcher-vega/composizione- of GDP over 2000-12. This figure rises to 17.7% when lanciatore/. accounting for indirect and induced impacts on the wider 31 Al-Ekabi, Cenan. “European Access to Space: Factors economy”. Cit. Del Monte, Luca and Luigi Scatteia. “A of Autonomy”. In: Al-Ekabi, Cenan (ed.). European socio-economic impact assessment of the European Autonomy in Space. Springer, 2015: pp. 137-155. launcher sector”. IAC-15. Jerusalem. 2015.

ESPI Report 56 18 March 2016 The European Launchers between Commerce and Geopolitics

Launch Vehicle Ariane 5 ECA Ariane 5 ES Soyuz Vega Height up to 53 m up to 53 m 46 m 30 m Diameter up to 5.4 m up to 5.4 m 2.9 m 3 m Lift-off Mass 780,000 Kg 760,000 Kg 305,000 Kg 137,000 Kg 21,000 Kg 1,500 Kg Payload Mass 10,000 Kg (GTO) 3,200 Kg (GTO) (LEO) (LEO) Liquid Liquid Solid Main Propulsion Liquid (LOX/Kerosene) (LOX / LH2) (LOX / LH2) (HTPB) First Launch 2002 2008 2011 2012 Reliability 52/53 – 98% 5/5 – 100% 12/13 – 92% 6/6 – 100%

Table 2: Overview of current European launch vehicles.36

Soyuz and Vega (ELA, ELS and SLV respec- tively); and a Mission Control Centre (MCC).37 for Year Year Thanks to CNES and ESA, a network of te- in M€ budget Budget Position Share of Share the total the total lemetry and tracking ground stations has also launchers been set up for ensuring adequate post- st launch activities. The network of tracking 2001 703.8 18.0% 1 budget item stations is structured around the Ariane tradi- 2002 681.1 18.7% 2nd budget item tional trajectory eastward, extending from Kourou to East Africa: Galliot in French Guy- 2003 739.2 20.0% 1st budget item ana, Natal in Brazil, Ascension in the South 2004 557.6 20.0% 1st budget item Atlantic, Libreville in , and Malindi in Kenya among the others.38 Unlike other ma- 2005 591.0 33.0% 1st budget item jor spacefaring nations like the U.S., Russia st 2006 539.5 18.2% 1 budget item and China (see Annex 3), Kourou is the only operational spaceport available to Europe. 2007 627.7 21.1% 1st budget item 2008 651.4 21.5% 1st budget item 2.1.3 The Working System: Launcher Strategy, st Development and Exploitation 2009 515.6 18.3% 1 budget item 2010 566.6 15.1% 3rd budget item

Ariane, Soyuz and Vega development pro- rd grammes are managed by ESA on the basis 2011 612.5 15.3% 3 budget item of optional programmes, subscribed to by a 2012 578.0 14.4% 3rd budget item

varying number of ESA Member-States. The rd bulk of the contributing countries are France, 2013 688.0 16.1% 3 budget item Germany, Italy, Belgium and . Over 2014 617.4 15.1% 3rd budget item

the years, the overall budget for launcher- rd related activities has accounted for a signifi- 2015 607.7 13.7% 3 budget item cant share of ESA’s budget, as highlighted in 2016 1,051.2 20.0% 2nd budget item Table 3. Table 3: ESA budget for launcher programmes.39

The different launcher programmes, along with their support programmes, are run by the ESA Launcher Directorate. As the entity responsible for the overall management of Europe’s launchers, ESA undertakes a num- 36 Reliability and launches calculated over the period 2005- ber of functions, including: 2015. Source: ESA. Web. http://www.esa.int/Our_Activities/Launchers. Accessed 22 February 2015. 37 Ariane 5 User’s Manual. Arianespace. 38 Veclani, Anna Clementina, Jean-Pierre Darnis. “Euro- 39 Source: ESA. See: pean Space Launch Capabilities and Prospects”. In: http://www.esa.int/About_Us/ESA_Publications/ESA_Publi Schrogl, Kai-Uwe, et al. Handbook of Space Security. cations_Annual_Report/(archive) and Policies, Applications and Programs. Volume 2. Springer, http://www.esa.int/About_Us/Welcome_to_ESA/Funding. 2014: pp. 783-800. Accessed 20 January 2016.

ESPI Report 56 19 March 2016

• Defining the overall strategy for Europe’s • To encourage international cooperation access to space and related launch sys- and play a leading role in future devel- tem developments; opments.41 • Approving the budget, supervising the With regard to launcher development, the projects, and monitoring costs and de- prime contractors and suppliers are selected velopments; by ESA on the basis of its geo-return policy, which reflects national financial participation • Managing the tender system and select- in the project.42 The European space launcher ing contractors for the design and devel- industry is concentrated in a relatively small opment of launchers; number of industrial firms, with a high degree • Concluding arrangements with CNES for of vertical integration.43 There are a handful the management and utilisation of the of large industrial actors and approximately GSC and with the launch provider Ari- 40 suppliers involved in the design, develop- anespace for the procurement and com- ment and manufacture processes, the major- mercialisation of launchers. ity of which are highly dependent on Ariane business.44 The overall European launcher strategy is driven by the necessity to ensure both the The working system assigns the responsibility availability and sustainability of an autono- for the whole process to a single industrial mous access to space for Europe. This means prime contractor for each launcher type. The ensuring that Europe has a “reliable, safe, prime contractor of Ariane 5 is Airbus De- available and competitive operational launch fence and Space, with Safran playing the base on EU territory, a complete family of leading role for the propulsion systems. The launch vehicles fully developed in Europe, a Soyuz prime contractor is the Russian federal European launch service provider” [able to space agency Roscosmos, while the European meet institutional and commercial demands Launch Vehicle (ELV), a joint venture be- and continuous investment in R&D capabili- tween (70%) and ASI (30%), manages ties and] to keep European industrial capa- the Vega rocket (See Figure 3). bilities and know-how at a high technological Once the launch systems are qualified, re- level”.40 In line with these overarching objec- sponsibility is handed over to Arianespace, tives, the principal axes of the European which is in charge of executing the opera- launcher strategy, as identified by ESA, are: tional launcher exploitation phase, including • To maintain the competitiveness and af- procurement from the launcher system prime fordability of Ariane and Vega launchers; contractors, and the commercialisation and launch of the rockets. Prime contractors, • To maintain the ground infrastructure however, take part in the integration of com- needed for launches; ponents at Europe‘s spaceport in Kourou to- • To foster the creation of a European in- gether with the staff of Arianespace and stitutional market for Ariane and Vega; CNES. While designed to avoid duplication of efforts, this framework presents a certain • To ensure that Europe can respond to degree of complexity, also considering that evolving market demands by continuing both ELV and Airbus are at the same time the improvement of Ariane and Vega and suppliers and shareholders of Arianespace. facilitating the use of Europe’s spaceport by the Russian Soyuz rocket; • To support European industry, technol- ogy and research capabilities by improv- ing industrial competitiveness and pro- moting innovation; • To create employment;

• To develop the next generation of 41 Cit. European Space Agency. “Launcher Strategy”. 14 launchers and the related ground infra- October 2014. Web. structures to better serve the institu- http://www.esa.int/Our_Activities/Launchers/Launcher_stra tegy. Accessed 10 November 2015. tional and commercial markets; 42 For the development programme of Ariane 6, the “geo- graphical return” principle was in part abandoned in favour of a “fair contribution”, so that the industrial share of work would be based on best technical competence and cost- effectiveness. 43 Hayward, Keith. “The Structure and Dynamics of the European Base”. ESPI Perspectives 55. 40 Cit. Al-Ekabi, Cenan. “European Access to Space: Vienna: European Space Policy Institute (December Factors of Autonomy”. In: Al-Ekabi, Cenan (ed.). European 2011): 3. Autonomy in Space. Springer, 2015: p. 141, 44 Ibid.

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BOX: European prime contractors

Airbus Defence & Space, one of the leading companies worldwide in the space industry, has been involved in the development and construction of the Ariane rocket ever since the pro- gramme was launched in the 1970s. A fully owned subsidiary of the Airbus Group, the company has accumulated huge expertise in all fields that are essential for the construction and further improvement of Ariane launchers. Since May 2003, Airbus Defence & Space is the sole prime contractor of Ariane 5, in charge of coordinating some 64 companies across Europe, and the lead manufacturer, responsible for the production of all Ariane 5 stages, along with a number of subassemblies. ELV is a company that was established by Avio and ASI in December 2000. The company’s primary tasks include: managing and planning the Vega launcher design, development, qualifi- cation and production processes. Moreover, ELV coordinates the activities of the subcontractors participating in the programme, ensures the integration of the launcher in the launch facilities, and participates with a team in the final stage of the launch. ELV is a company of the Avio Group, one of the main players in the field of aerospace propulsion. Founded in 1908, it is now owned 85% by Cinven and 15% by Finmeccanica. It is present all over the world with 18 plants, over 5,000 employees and many subsidiaries. Within its space line of business, Avio is a European leader in the development and manufacture of solid propulsion and a major player in liquid propulsion systems.

Figure 3: Launch vehicles - procurement and exploitation. 45

45 Source: Arianespace Ariane 5 User Manual Issue 5: p 1-15, with author’s re-elaboration.

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Arianespace’s capital is owned by 21 share- of improving and modernising its launchers in holders from 10 different countries. France order to ensure the availability and sustain- holds the largest share, controlling through ability of autonomous access to space over its seven shareholders 64.1% of the total. the long-term. Not surprisingly, the successor Germany has the second largest share ac- to Ariane 5 has been under debate since counting for 19.8%. The remaining 16% is shortly after Ariane 5 entered into service in split among eight other countries (Belgium, 1999. A dedicated programme, called the Italy, , , , , Future Launchers Preparatory Programme Sweden and the ). (FLPP), was launched by ESA as early as 2003. The programme was subscribed to on In terms of shareholders, the largest stake an optional basis by 14 ESA Member States has been traditionally held by CNES and structured in a series of partially over- (34.68%), followed by Astrium (28.40%), lapping stages covering the 2004-2018 time- Safran (10.57%) and a dozen other industrial frame. entities. The shareholding structure of Ari- anespace is, however, currently undergoing a Besides fostering the development of new profound revision, following the creation of a technologies capable of delivering improved Joint Venture between Airbus and Safran as a performance and reliability as well as reduc- result of the decisions endorsed at the ESA ing operational costs, a major field of activity Ministerial Council of 2014 (See Chapter 2.2). of the FLPP was the development of various launch vehicle concepts and the identification As already mentioned, Arianespace is respon- of the technologies required to make them sible for the exploitation of the Ariane, Vega possible. This activity was intended to form and Soyuz, including marketing and sales, as the basis for the key decision to be made on well as assembly and operation from the GSC the characteristics and design of the Next launch site. Exploitation of Ariane and Vega Generation Launcher (NGL).48 The objective is, however, also supported through dedi- of the FLPP was thus not the development of cated programmes, financed by ESA Member a new launcher itself, but the selection and States on an optional basis. In addition to the maturation of technologies – the targeted ARTA and VERTA programmes, annual sup- Technology Readiness Level (TRL) was 5 – to port payments have been provided through pave the way for the development of a new the European Guaranteed Access to Space launch system.49 A key issue to be resolved (EGAS) programme and the Launchers Ex- was whether to develop another heavy-lift ploitation Accompaniment Programme launcher for double launches or a medium-lift (LEAP), approved respectively in 2003 and launcher for single launches that could in the 2012 (see below). long term become replace the Europeanised All in all, thanks to the impressive record of Soyuz-ST as well. more than 500 satellites successfully Notwithstanding the technical and operational launched from the GSC and an order book of considerations related to the NGL, the real more than 58 launches to be performed in issue to be addressed was how to cope with the coming years,46 Arianespace has the increasing difficulties encountered by emerged as the world’s leading launch ser- Arianespace during the exploitation of Ariane vice provider, with sales that exceed € 1 bil- 5. These difficulties were to a large extent lion per year (approximately 40% of global the direct result of two main problems: on launch revenues – see Chapter 4.1).47 the one hand, the fact that launch prices on the commercial market were kept lower than launch and production costs;50 and on the 2.2 Preparing for the Future: other, the limited number of institutional launches performed by Ariane 5, which pre- the 2014 ESA Ministerial vented the creation of economies of scale by Council spreading fixed operational costs over a higher number of launches. 2.2.1 The Path to the Ministerial

Like other spacefaring nations, Europe has 48 been almost constantly facing the challenge See: European Space Agency. “European Space Tech- nology Master Plan”. 11th Edition. ESA-ESTEC: p. 323 49 It is of interest to note that the FLPP also looked at the 46 Arianespace’s order book is worth € 5.1 billion and potential contribution offered by rocket reusability. How- include 58 launches for 38 customers: 23 Ariane 5 ever, it eventually concluded that the NGL could be only launches, 26 Soyuz launches and 9 Vega launches. Ari- expendable, as otherwise it would not meet the framework anespace. “Company Profile”. Web. conditions of the European launch sector. http://www.arianespace.com/service-and-solutions/ Ac- 50 This situation was primarily driven by the need to cope cessed 05 December 2015. with the sharp downturn in commercial launch demand of 47 Ibid. the early 2000s. (See Chapter 4.2)

ESPI Report 56 22 March 2016 The European Launchers between Commerce and Geopolitics

In 2003 ESA Member States also approved to compete against each other. The most the EGAS programme, with the overarching visible disagreement was between France and aim of making Arianespace self-sufficient. Germany. While CNES started to strongly The programme covered the fixed production advocate a steady commitment to the devel- costs and provided around € 250 million to opment of Ariane 6, DLR showed a clear Arianespace for 6 years (2004-2010). The preference for Ariane 5 ME, inter alia because programme officially expired in December of higher German industrial involvement.53 2010. At that time, however, Arianespace Faced with the apparent trade-off between was still facing financial losses and was seek- enhancing the current Ariane 5 and investing ing public subvention of € 120 million a year. in a new Ariane 6, at the ESA Council at Min- While ESA Member States eventually agreed isterial level held in Naples in 2012 Member to continue to support Arianespace, the per- States opted to defer a decision on the new sistence of these issues started to call for a launcher until 2014. However, initial funding profound revision of the European launch was secured for the activities on Ariane 5 ME model, and in particular for a reorganisation as well as for a detailed definition study of and a progressive streamlining of the whole the new Ariane 6, with the goal of maximis- industrial process.51 At the same time, the ing commonalities and avoiding delays in need to develop a new launcher capable of commercial exploitation of the two launchers sustaining itself competitively without requir- while minimising costs for Ariane 6. At the ing public support became even more press- Ministerial Council, funding was also provided ing. to set up the Launchers Exploitation Accom- As a medium term solution, at the end of paniment Programme (LEAP), with the aim of 2010 it was decided to begin work on the providing a stable and comprehensive frame development of the Ariane 5 Midlife Evolution to support the exploitation of Vega and Ari- (ME) and to start preliminary design work on ane.54 The financial envelope agreed on Ariane 6. Ariane 5 ME, for which preliminary amounted to € 540 million, financed by 10 activities had begun in 2009, was designed to ESA Member States (Austria, Belgium, Ger- feature a new, re-ignitable upper stage that many, France, Italy, , Norway, Nether- would increase the payload-carrying capacity lands, Sweden, and Switzerland).55 by 20% and thus enable the launch of an Between 2013 and 2014, a number of pro- extra two tonnes to GTO, a crucial market for posals regarding the reorganisation of the Arianespace’s business. Ariane 5 ME was European launch sector and the selection of intended to replace Ariane 5 ECA and Ariane the future launch vehicle were discussed, but 5 ES to become Europe’s new workhorse divergences between the two major European launcher until the arrival of the new Ariane countries involved remained and decisions 6.52 However, in the climate of budgetary were complicated by the political and indus- constraints imposed by the financial crisis, trial implications of such a programme.56 In consensus on this pathway quickly vanished an attempt to remedy this difficult situation, and the two hypostasized launchers started on 16 June 2014 Airbus and Safran surpris- ingly advanced a new proposal for the devel- 51 Various solutions and initiatives have been advanced opment of Ariane 6 and announced the crea- over the last few years to reduce costs. See for instance tion of a joint venture to lead the rocket’s the rationalisation of the propulsion sector advanced by Astrium; the establishment of a direct link between Astrium and ESA, without Arianespace as intermediary proposed by the Academie de l’Air et de l’Espace; and the introduc- tion of a tax on satellite operators to finance the European 53 De Selding, Peter. “DLR’s Wörner Remains Uncon- launch sector. Another interesting initiative was the New vinced Just-unveiled Ariane design Is Right Way to Go”. European Launch Service (NELS) feasibility study Space News. 12 July 2013. launched by ESA. The study was intended to investigate 54 European Space Agency. Press Release N° 37–2012: options for a new access to space model economically European Ministers decide to invest in space to boost self-sufficient, with no need for public support to launcher Europe’s competitiveness and growth”. exploitation. The innovative principle behind NELS was 55 The typical activities covered by LEAP included the that ESA Member States participating in a future optional monitoring of the qualification status of Vega and Ariane programme for development would contribute on the basis launcher, enhancing the knowledge of launcher perform- of “fair contribution” rather than of “geographical return”. As ance and reducing the system qualification reservations a result, the industrial share of work would be based on Activities related to maintaining ESA-owned facilities in best technical competence and cost-effectiveness. See Europe and French Guiana in operational condition are Veclani, Anna Clementina, Jean-Pierre Darnis. “European also covered by LEAP. These include engine-related test Space Launch Capabilities and Prospects”. In: Schrogl, facilities, facilities required to manufacture, integrate and Kai-Uwe, et al. Handbook of Space Security. Policies, accept the launch vehicle components up to stage level, Applications and Programs. Volume 2. Springer, 2014: pp. and the launch complex where integration and launch 783-800. operations activities are performed. See: ESA Bulletin 156: 52 Cit. European Space Agency. “Adapted Ariane 5 ME”. pp. 32-33. 14 October 2014. Web. 56 See: Al-Ekabi, Cenan. “European Access to Space: http://www.esa.int/Our_Activities/Launchers/Launch_vehicl Factors of Autonomy”. In: Al-Ekabi, Cenan (ed.). European es/Adapted_Ariane_5_ME . Autonomy in Space. Springer, 2015: p. 153.

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Table 4: Ariane Family: historical timeline of development and exploitations phases, as presented in November 2015.57

development.58 Building on this, in October cycle and thus reduce the costs to be borne 2014 the ESA Director General sent ESA by Member States.60 In response to this pro- Member States a policy proposal on new in- posal, major stakeholders from ESA Member dustrial governance, and the parallel devel- States and industry worked together to de- opment of Ariane 5 ME and Ariane 6, both fine a joint ESA–industry scheme for the de- considered as complementary – not compet- velopment of Ariane 6, based on balanced ing – projects.59 responsibility, and cost and risk sharing be- tween Agency and the industrial Joint Ven- The disagreement was eventually resolved on ture.61 the eve of the Ministerial Council Meeting in 2014, with Germany and France agreeing to The official sanctioning of the new industrial skip the planned upgrade of Ariane 5 and scheme and the final decision regarding the proceed directly to the development of a sub- complete development of Ariane 6 was taken stantially reconceived Ariane 6 – making it at the ESA Ministerial Council on 2 December palatable to Germany. At the same time, 2014, in the context of the overall launcher Airbus Defense and Space and Safran pro- strategy for the next 10 years. posed to create a joint venture to lead the development and production of Ariane 6 in The Ministerial Resolution order to streamline industrial organisation, overcome the inefficiencies of the industrial The Resolution on Europe’s Access to Space acknowledged the difficulties faced by the European launch sector (inter alia, the ac- 57 Development phases are indicated in dark blue, exploi- tation in light blue. For Ariane 6, dates are indicated as count balance of Ariane 5 on the commercial presented at November 2015. Source: Albinger, Jürgen. market; the dependence of a significant pro- “MT Aerospace at a Glance”. Presentation at “International portion of European institutional launches on Conference on the European Space Launchers”. Paris, 3-4 the Soyuz launcher; the deficit of commonal- November 2015. 58 ities between Ariane 5, Soyuz and Vega, Safran Group. Press release. “Safran-Airbus Group which limits synergies in exploitation; and launcher activities agreement”. 16 June 2014. Web. http://www.safran-group.com/media/20140625_safran- airbus-group-launcher-activities-agreement. Accessed 28 September 2015. 60 Cit. European Space Agency. “Ariane 6”. Web. 59 See Dordain, Jean-Jacques. “Answer to Questions of http://www.esa.int/Our_Activities/Launchers/Launch_vehicl Germany”. Paris. 29 October 2014: pp. 17-18. The con- es/Ariane_6 . Accessed 2 January 2016. cepts developed for Ariane 5 ME were intended to be 61 See: ESA Council at Ministerial Level. “Resolution on applicable to Ariane 6 as well, thereby reducing costs and Europe’s Access to Space”. ESA/C-M/CCXLVII/Res. 1 risks associated with Ariane 6. (Final). 2 December 2014.

ESPI Report 56 24 March 2016 The European Launchers between Commerce and Geopolitics

Chart 1: ESA Member States contributions to launcher programme at ESA C/M 14, in M€.62

increasing competition in the worldwide cle.64 Finally, funding was secured for the commercial market) and called for the “avail- necessary upgrades to accommo- ability as soon as possible of new European date Ariane 6 at the Kourou spaceport. launch services which are not only competi- The overall proposed subscription to launcher tive without requiring public support during programmes amounted to € 4.8 billion, 95% exploitation, but also flexible and modular of which was subscribed at the Ministerial enough for responding to a wide range of Council (see Chart 1). needs, from institutional to commercial re- quirements, as well as to the uncertainties on It is noteworthy that, unlike previous Ministe- the evolution of the commercial require- rial Councils, the largest portion of subscrip- ments”.63 tions endorsed at the C/M 2014 was devoted to development activities and not to exploita- To achieve this objective, European Ministers tion accompaniment actions. The evolution of not only agreed to begin the development of the ratio between development/exploitation Ariane 6 and Vega-C, but also decided to activities from the ESA Ministerial 2001 is introduce fundamental changes in the overall represented in Chart 2. governance of the European launcher sector. In addition, Ministers agreed to fund the Launchers Exploitation Accompaniment Pro- gramme (LEAP) for 2015–16, the Future Launchers Preparatory Programme (FLPP) and the Programme for Reusable In-orbit Demonstrator in Europe (PRIDE) – the suc- cessor to the experimental IXV re-entry vehi-

62 Chart built on the data from: Bianchi, Stefano. “The European decisions of December 2014”. Presentation at “International Conference on the European Space Launchers”. Paris, 3-4 November 2015. 63 Ibid. 64 Ibid.

ESPI Report 56 25 March 2016

Chart 2: Launcher subscription by nature of activities at the past six ESA Ministerial Councils.65

• The payload capacity of Ariane 64 is 2.2.2 A Look at Europe’s Future Launchers and 11,000 Kg to GTO. (single payload) or Infrastructure 10,000 Kg with dual payload. As emphasised by ESA Director General Jean Ariane 6 Jacques Dordain in the abovementioned pol- icy proposal, the new Ariane relies upon a Ariane 6 is conceived as a modular three- substantial heritage that has no equivalent in stage (solid–cryogenic–cryogenic) launcher any previous launcher programme. As a mat- with two different variants using either two ter of fact, the architecture (and in particular boosters (A62) or four boosters (Ariane 64) the staging) is the same as for Ariane 5. The (See Figure 4). The main features of the Ari- main stage, which will burn and ane 6 concept are: 66 hydrogen, is based on the Vulcan engine of Ariane 5 ECA, while the cryogenic upper • The total length of the vehicle is around stage will be powered by a engine, 63 metres. which relies on work done for the Ariane 5 ME • The external diameter is about 4.6 me- upper stage. As for the solid rocket tres. , this is directly derived from the first stage of the Vega rocket, the P80, and will • The mass at lift-off is about 500,000 Kg also be utilised as the first stage for the up- for Ariane 62 and 800,000 Kg for Ariane coming Vega-C (see below). With regard to 64. scheduling, the upper stage and the P120 • The payload capacity of Ariane 62 is boosters will be ready in 2018. The qualifica- 5,000 Kg to GTO. tion flight is expected in 2020 and the entry into commercial operation (provision of ser- 65 vices) around 2022-2023. Source: Bianchi, Stefano. “The European decisions of December 2014”. Presentation at “International Confer- ence on the European Space Launchers”. Paris, 3-4 No- vember 2015. 66 Cit. European Space Agency. “Ariane 6”. Web. http://www.esa.int/Our_Activities/Launchers/Launch_vehicl es/Ariane_6

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Ariane 62 and 64 will provide the modularity required to adapt to the uncertainties of the future commercial market.69 In addition to that, because Ariane 62 and Ariane 64 are two configurations of the same launcher that are intended to be exploited together, this will enhance the cadence of the production rate and thus contribute to cost reduction of Ariane 64. All in all, “Ariane 64 will make the overall exploitation of Ariane profitable thanks to the revenues of double launches and provide the margins for a more competitive pricing policy of Ariane 62”.70 In 2014 economic conditions, the expected launch cost of Ariane 64 is € 90 million while the launch price is € 115 million for a dual launch. In comparison with the Ariane 5 launch price of € 165 million there is thus an estimated saving in the order of € 50 million for the full Ariane 64 and of € 25 million for each passenger of a dual launch. As for Ariane 62, the expected launch cost is € 78 million, while the launch price has been fixed at € 70 million (one satellite). This mismatch during the exploitation of Ariane 62 is expected to be covered by the profitable exploitation of Ariane 64.71 Compared to a Soyuz launch, which has a price of € 78-85 million at 2014 economic conditions, the estimated saving for an Ariane 62 launch is in the order of € 10 million. It is expected that the total savings (to be gener- ated by Ariane 6 in comparison to Ariane 5, against the boundary conditions defined in the Figure 4: Artist's view of Ariane 62 and 64.67 abovementioned document) between 2021 and 2024 for institutional missions will amount 72 The general architecture of Ariane 6 will en- to € 345 million (see Table 5). able it to cover a wide range of missions in In tandem with its commercial logic, the de- GTO, LEO, and MEO and to respond to differ- cision to proceed with a double configuration ent market needs in a cost-effective way for Ariane 6 responds to political considera- thanks to the possibility of varying the number tions as well, particularly the perceived need of boosters in the configuration. This double to overcome the current dependence of Euro- configuration is indeed a key element in the pean institutional launches on the availability new launcher strategy and responds to precise and prices of Soyuz. As a medium-lift goals with respect to both the commercial and launcher, Ariane 62 will cover the payload the institutional dimensions of Europe’s future segment as amply as Soyuz and will thus access to space. Two points deserve particular attention: first, this decision facilitated over- coming the apparent trade-off between devel- oping another heavy-lift launcher for double 69 See Dordain, Jean-Jacques. “Answer to Questions of launches or a medium-lift launcher for single Germany”. Paris. 29 October 2014: pp. 6-7. Web: launches. While Ariane 64 will retain the dou- http://www.spacenewsinc.com/pdf/dordainfile.pdf. Ac- cessed 10 February 2015. See also: de Selding, Peter. “To ble launch capability, Ariane 62 will ensure Win Over Germany, ESA Maps out How Ariane 6 Would flexibility in availability since its exploitation Save Everyone Money”. SpaceNews. 6 November 2014. will be based on single launch. Thus, it will not Web. http://spacenews.com/42472to-win-over-germany- require so much effort in terms of pairing sat- esa-maps-out-how-ariane-6-would-save-everyone-money/. ellites and scheduling of launches.68 Together, Accessed 10 February 2015. 70 Ibid: pp.6-7 71 As explained by Jean-Jacques Dordain, even though the 67 Source: ESA Website. launch costs of Ariane 62 might be higher, the target price 68 Thus overcome the pitfalls related to the double launch has been fixed to industry at € 70 million in order to take concept of Ariane 5 that has proved inefficient. Indeed, into account the result of exploitation of Ariane 62 and although the double launch capability has allowed to apply Ariane 64 together, as the exploitation of a single launcher. lower prices to customers, they require greater efforts in See Dordain, Jean-Jacques. “Answer to Questions of terms of the pairing of satellites and the scheduling of Germany”. Paris. 29 October 2014: pp. 17-18. launches. 72 Ibid.

ESPI Report 56 27 March 2016

Year Missions Launcher Savings per mission (M€) Savings per year (M€) MTG S1 Ariane 64 25 SL-1C Ariane 62 10 2021 55 MetOp SG Ariane 62 10 Galileo SG Ariane 62 10 MTG Ariane 64 25 Ariane 64 25 Juice Ariane 64 50 2022 130 SL-1D Ariane 62 10 MetOp SG Ariane 62 10 Galileo SG Ariane 62 10 Sicral Ariane 64 25 Skynet Ariane 64 25 2023 Cosmo Ariane 62 10 80 Galileo SG Ariane 62 10 Galileo SG Ariane 62 10 Plato Ariane 62 10 CSO Ariane 62 10 2024 80 INSPIRE Ariane 64 50 Galileo SG Ariane 62 10 Total savings over the four year period (M€) 345

Table 5: Prospected savings for Ariane 6 institutional launches from 2021 to 2024.73

offer the possibility of replacing the Rus- Ariane 6 Objectives sian-manufactured rocket with a truly • Family of launchers ad- Guaranteed access European launcher. Indeed, although not dressing both institutional to space for Europe officially formalised, ESA’s commitment to and commercial markets its development suggests that “Soyuz in • Advanced launch service Guiana” will ultimately remain only a tran- procurement for European sitional solution in Europe’s strategy for 74 No public funding institutional missions access to space. supporting com- • Half the costs per Kg of Besides ensuring autonomy in a strategic mercial exploita- Ariane 5, and target launch payload segment, the key “political driver” tion service prices for institu- behind the development of Ariane 62 is to tional missions as defined in 2014 help sustain industrial activities and re- Time-to-market: search capabilities in ESA Member States • Fast track development • Qualification rather than in Russia. In this regard, it is plan and simplified man- flight in 2020 important to note that supporting the main- agement rules for mini- • Fully operational tenance of a solid industrial base, improv- mised decision time ing its competitiveness and promoting in- in 2023 novation in space transportation technolo- • main stage engine gies are in the final analysis the key ele- flight proven on Ariane 5 ments for ensuring the availability and • Vinci upper stage exten- sustainability of autonomous access to Maximising com- sively ground tested space also in the future (See Table 6). monalities within • Common Solid Rocket the European Motor P120C with Vega-C Launcher Family as extension of Vega flight proven P80, to be flight qualified in 2018 on Vega- C • Progressive phasing in of Ariane 6 and phasing out of replaced launch systems – Proven reliability to first Soyuz (for institutional customers customers) and then Ari- 73 Ibid. ane 5 (for commercial cus- 74 It is however likely that Arianespace will continue to tomers) commercialise Soyuz from the Baikonur launch site, as evidenced by the signature in June 2015 of a commercial Table 6: Ariane 6 programme main objectives.75 launch contract with OneWeb (a contract to launch roughly 700 LEO satellites aboard the Russian Soyuz from the cosmodrome of Baikonur). See de Selding, Peter “Launch Options were key to Arianespace’s One-Web Win”. Space News. 25 June 2015.

ESPI Report 56 28 March 2016 The European Launchers between Commerce and Geopolitics

Vega-C stage will remain Zefiro 9 while the AVUM (Attitude Vernier Upper Module) fourth stage At the Ministerial, investments were also will also see slight modifications (mainly lar- secured for the development of an upgraded ger propellant tanks) and will be called version of the Vega launch system, the Vega- AVUM+. It must be noted that the current C (Consolidated), with an inaugural flight Vega launcher includes non-European ele- scheduled for 2018. Originating from the ments (namely, the Ukrainian-made RD- “VEga Consolidation and Evolution Prepara- 869), so a major element of the new Vega tion Programme (VECEP)” programme ap- Consolidation strategy is to fully ’European- proved at the previous Ministerial (ESA C/M ise’ the new European launchers. Neverthe- 12), the main drivers behind the Vega-C de- less, the Vega manufacturer has underlined cision, as outlined by AVIO CEO Pier Luigi 76 that “the implementation of European com- Lasagni, are: ponents will be pursued taking into account a. To strengthen and enlarge Vega’s market the constraint not to increase the launcher 77 position in the short/medium term recurring cost”. b. To decrease dependency on non- As noted, the Vega-C first stage solid motor, European sources the P120, will also serve as a strap-on booster for the first stage of Ariane 6. This c. To contribute to safeguarding European common element is considered the first true industrial engineering capabilities common block in the European Launcher d. To be in a position to better respond to Families, and is thus a key factor for the suc- long term institutional needs cessful commercialisation of Europe’s future launchers, as it will allow significantly en- Regarding the first item, in terms of perform- hanced production rates and thus decrease ance Vega-C High Level Requirements are set the costs for both Vega and Ariane. To this to 2,200 Kg in a single launch to a 700 Km effect, the Ministerial Resolution underlined circular polar orbit, and 1,800 Kg at an 800 the mutual benefit of preparing the exploita- Km Sun-synchronous orbit. This implies a tion of Ariane 6 and Vega-C together, so as 700 Kg increase on the nominal Vega per- to ensure that the overall competitiveness of formance, enabling balancing and compensa- the future launchers will be enhanced.78 tion for losses related to additional opera- tional constraints (e.g. French Space Opera- As for the launch costs and prices of Vega-C, tion Act, Policy), as well as pro- these are expected to directly benefit from viding an additional margin for complex the cadence of the production of the P120 but missions requiring significant flexibility, with- are yet to be consolidated. It is, however, out any increase in the recurring costs. The assumed that the launch cost will remain in Vega-C upgrade then is intended to pursue a the order of € 26 million. Also the price of limited increase in performance, in order to Vega-C is expected to remain in the range of remain competitive in the evolving market today’s prices (€ 35 - 45 million). Finally, it is and have greater flexibility to better accom- worth noting that the decision to adopt the modate multiple payload configurations. In P120 as a booster of Ariane 6 has contributed fact, a new payload adapter is being devel- to further alter the geopolitical balance of oped to enable the launch of a main payload launcher policy in Europe, breaking the previ- plus a small payload as well as additional ous Franco-German duopoly and creating a . higher degree of interdependence, in which Italy has increased weight. Vega-C, similarly to Vega, will be a three- stage all-solid launch vehicle with an optional With regard to the Vega programme it is liquid fuelled fourth stage for re-start and worth noting that a further upgraded version precise injection capability. One of the major of Vega for the mid-2020s is currently being features of Vega-C will be the utilization of studied: the Vega-E (Evolution). At present, the P120 engine as the first stage, replacing Vega-E is designed to feature: the P80. In addition, the second stage Zefiro • P120 as first stage; 23 will be replaced by Zefiro 40 (which will have roughly 17,000 Kg more propellant • Zefiro 40 as second stage; loading and an increased diameter). The third • A Cryogenic upper stage (LM-10 MYRA) replacing both the Zefiro 9 and AVUM+.

75 Source: Bianchi, Stefano. “The European decisions of December 2014”. Presentation at “International Confer- ence on the European Space Launchers”. Paris, 3-4 No- vember 2015. 77 Ibid. 76 See: Lasagni, Pier Giuliano. “Vega C”. Presentation at 78 See ESA Council at Ministerial Level. “Resolution on the “International Conference on the European Space Europe’s Access to Space”. ESA/C-M/CCXLVII/Res. 1 Launchers”. Paris, 3-4 November 2015. (Final). 2 December 2014.

ESPI Report 56 29 March 2016

If this configuration is eventually adopted, cessful exploitation of future European Vega-E would become a three-stage launchers on the commercial market will also launcher, with no optional fourth stage. Ac- be supported by important changes in gov- tivities to replace the current third and fourth ernance, particularly “in the relations be- stages with a single cryogenic upper stage tween industry and governments in develop- featuring a new guidance system are being ing and operating launch vehicles”.81 conducted within the context of the LYRA The necessity to introduce such changes programme. Primarily financed by ASI, the stemmed from the recognition that the Euro- LYRA programme responds to the overall pean launch model, despite being successful objective of upgrading the performance of for 30 years, will no longer be financially sus- Vega by about 30% without a significant tainable. In addition to the deficit of com- price increase. A full-scale demonstrator of monalities between Ariane 5, Soyuz and the new MYRA cryogenic propulsion system Vega, which has limited synergies in their has already been produced and tested, but a exploitation, and the lack of a solid institu- final decision remains to be taken. tional launch business base, the industrial Parallel to LYRA is the VENUS programme, a cycle, in particular, has shown numerous DLR effort to study possible German contri- inefficiencies due to the excessive number of butions to the future evolution of Vega. Two layers produced by ESA’s geo-return principle main options have been addressed: one op- and the overall management scheme. In- tion consists of replacing the Z9 third stage deed, while encouraging specialisation and and AVUM with a storable upper stage using thus being a quality enhancer, the principle of the engine, today used for Ariane 5 geographical return ultimately generated a ES.79 The other option being considered by scattered industrial landscape for both devel- Germany is to stay with a four-stage configu- opment and production activities, which in- ration but to replace the Ukrainian RD-869 evitably drove costs up. Although the stream- engine on the AVUM fourth stage with a Eu- lining of the industrial processes started as ropeanized stage. This option seems cur- early as 2005 with the launch of the Ariane 5 rently to be the preferred solution within the Recovery Plan, its limited success made it VENUS programme. In that way, “all compo- apparent that overall reorganisation of the nents of the rocket would be built inside launch sector based on a clearer division of Europe” and autonomy from foreign sources tasks between the main actors had to be would be ensured. undertaken if Europe wanted to eliminate the need for public support payments while at the Guyana Space Centre same time retaining the competitiveness of European launchers in the marketplace. The development of Ariane 6 will be accom- panied by the necessary upgrades and adap- In order to achieve this overarching goal, the tations for its main launch base, the Ariane 6 2014 Ministerial Resolution emphasises that Launch Complex and Launch Range located decisions on the development of Ariane 6 are at the Guyana Space Centre in Kourou, to be closely associated with a change in French Guyana. Relevant funding for the base governance of the European launcher sector, upgrades was secured at the Ministerial based on a balanced responsibility and cost Council, with contracts signed between ESA and risk-sharing scheme between ESA and and CNES – Prime Contractor for the launch the industrial Joint Venture (See Table 7). In base – in August 2015 valued at € 600 mil- more concrete terms, it stresses that within lion. A key feature of Ariane 6 is the horizon- this new governance, the newly established 82 tal integration,80 which, while at first will Airbus Safran Launchers (ASL) joint venture require additional capital investment to ac- “will bear all commercial market risks during commodate and build the new structures, in exploitation without support from Member the long run will lead to lower recurring costs States under the understanding that the Joint during the exploitation phase, and thus ulti- Venture will control the commercial exploita- mately offset the higher initial expense. tion of the launch service and that a number of launches will be contracted per year by different institutional actors in Europe that 2.2.3 A Revolution in Governance

In addition to the numerous synergies be- 81 ESA Council at Ministerial Level. “Resolution on tween Ariane 62, 64 and Vega-C, the suc- Europe’s Access to Space”. ESA/C-M/CCXLVII/Res. 1 (Final). 2 December 2014. 82 The ASL started operations in January 2015 with an 79 Veclani, Anna Clementina, Jean-Pierre Darnis. “Euro- operational workforce of 450 employees, though it will be pean Space Launch Capabilities and Prospects”. In: fully operational at the end of 2015 after Safran’s payment Schrogl, Kai-Uwe, et al. Handbook of Space Security. of € 800 million for having an equal stake in the joint ven- Policies, Applications and Programs. Volume 2. Springer, ture. See de Selding. Peter. “Safran to pay Airbus 1 billion 2014: pp. 783-800. for equal stake in joint rocket venture”. Space News. 27 80 Ariane 5 is vertically integrated. February 2015.

ESPI Report 56 30 March 2016 The European Launchers between Commerce and Geopolitics

consider as a collective priority and an indi- the process, with one prime contractor that vidual benefit to use competitive European- designs, builds, sells and operates the developed launchers”.83 launchers, with a supply chain – much as we do with Airbus today”.86 In short, the produc- With the new arrangements, the Member tion of Ariane 6 should be fully entrusted to States and ESA will have responsibility for ASL, and no longer through the multi-layered guaranteeing five launches per year for Ari- ensemble of stakeholders that has so far ane 6 – so as to provide a stable and predict- been pursued in Europe. able institutional launch business base over which to amortize fixed operational costs – The ASL joint venture has already planned to while for the commercial market, ASL will be take steps in this direction and, as an essen- on its own, since Member States will no tial element in this process, has expressed longer provide public support payments to the intention to ultimately acquire direct con- cover the annual losses incurred by Ari- trol over Arianespace and launcher commer- anespace, as was done in the past.84 cialization. Since its creation in January 2015, the ASL joint venture – which is already the Thus, the success of the ASL joint venture biggest shareholder of Arianespace, holding will rely, de facto, on an ESA/EC-guaranteed almost the 39% of the company’s shares – market of five institutional launches, but – as has been planning to acquire the roughly also stressed in an interview with the ESA 34% share of CNES. After the agreement Director Advisor to Director General, Antonio with the French government and the comple- Fabrizi – “this is not ESA’s own market. It is a tion of all regulatory consultation and ap- market from ESA, from France, from the proval procedures, ASL will then hold 74% of European Commission, from Eumetsat and Arianespace's share capital.87 others. Whether this all can be put together into a single bowl, a single agreement, is According to Alain Charmeau, CEO of ASL, uncertain”.85 “the project represents a key step forward following the creation of ASL. [While] Ari- Regardless of how this issue is addressed in anespace will remain legally an independent the coming years, what needs to be high- company based in Evry and will maintain all lighted is that the change in responsibilities the assets that have made it a world leader in flowing from the creation of the ASL joint launch services, launch service customers will venture involves far more than a mere directly benefit from this change of control, streamlining of industrial processes and re- because of: duction of the number of layers. There is an entire paradigm-shift in the overall govern- • An increased focus of Arianespace on the ance of the European launch sector, with far- commercial market; reaching implications. For industry, the ulti- • An optimization of Ariane 6 costs and cy- mate objective behind the regrouping of in- cles; dustrial capacity is to assume full control of the entire lifecycle (including design, produc- • A shorter loop between operators and tion, operations and commercial sales) of the the launcher industry, already evidenced new Ariane 6. by the successful creation of the first “Ariane User Club”.88 As clearly explained by Marwan Lahoud, president of the French Aerospace Industries Notwithstanding that in June 2015 the French Association: “the launcher business in Europe government and ASL signed a protocol to in the beginning of 2014 was one in which govern the purchase of CNES shares, there the vehicles were designed by government still appears to be a certain resistance from agencies, commercialized by a company the institutional side to entrust industry with called Arianespace, produced by an ensemble full control of Ariane 6. Indeed, both ESA and of companies, and then launched by Ari- CNES, while clearly in favour of increased anespace. This is not an optimal situation responsibility on the industrial side, have at […]. The optimal solution is to industrialize the same time made clear their intention to de facto remain project managers, by main- taining a seat at the design and development 83 Cit. ESA Council at Ministerial Level. “Resolution on Europe’s Access to Space”. ESA/C-M/CCXLVII/Res. 1 (Final). 2 December 2014. 86 de Selding, Peter. “New Airbus Safran Venture eyes full 84 Space News 3 April 2015. “Desire for Competitive Ari- control of Arianespace”. Space News. 8 January 2015. ane 6 Nudges ESA towards Compromise”. Web. http://spacenews.com/new-airbus-safran-venture- 85 The Commission can provide comfort through a certain eyes-full-control-of-arianespace/. Accessed 2 December degree of preference, but not a guarantee they will use 2015. Ariane 6. See de Selding, Peter. “Profile: Antonio Fabrizi”. 87 Airbus-Safran Launchers Press Release. 16 June 2015. Space News. 27 January 2015. Web. 88 Charmeau, Alain. “European Space Launchers from http://spacenews.com/profile-antonio-fabrizi-director- Diamant to Ariane 6”. Presentation at “International Con- adviser-to-the-director-general-european-space-agency/. ference on the European Space Launchers”. Paris, 3-4 Accessed 2 December 2015. November 2015.

ESPI Report 56 31 March 2016

table.89 As the President of CNES Jean-Yves opment cost),93 the new industrial organisa- LeGall quipped at a press conference: “Euro- tion still needs to be fully consolidated. Ac- pean governments didn’t approve spending 4 cordingly, the decisions endorsed at the Min- billion euros of taxpayer money [on Ariane 6] isterial 2014 will be subject to the outcome of only to surrender [to industry] all control”.90 the Programme Implementation Review in June 2016, which will indeed be a crucial milestone in the construction of the new gov- Ariane 6 New Governance Principles in ernance.94 Development and Exploitation – New exploitation cost and risk sharing What future for European Launchers? scheme The 2014 Ministerial meeting adopted a Industry Public Sector multi-pronged strategy aimed at increasing flexibility and reducing the costs of its future • Industrial investment • Only high level con- > 10% of develop- tractual require- access to space through a number of levers, ment costs ments (HLR) including the utilisation of heritage hardware, the streamlining of industrial organisation, • Only high level con- • No public funding in the maximisation of common expendable tractual requirements commercial exploita- elements and the creation of synergies be- (HLR) tion tween different market segments. All these • Industry is Design • Preserving the inter- levers – together with the guarantee of five Authority for launcher ests of all Participat- institutional launches per year – are essen- ing States in the • Bearing risks in de- tially designed to increase production rates so launcher develop- velopment and on as to generate economies of scale that will ment programmes commercial exploita- ensure competitive pricing for Ariane 6 and tion and their respective industry Vega-C without the need for public support • Competitive launch payments during exploitation. service prices for • Minimum number of commercial missions launch services con- These features inevitably raise a number of and target launch tracted per year by questions with regard to the effectiveness of service prices for in- European Institu- this strategy and, more broadly, with regard stitutional missions as tional Users to the overall prospects for Europe’s access defined in 2014 to space in the coming decade. Whereas at this point some conclusions can already be Table 7: An overview of the new industrial governance drawn, an investigation of the international 91 scheme. dynamics surrounding the European launcher sector should be provided first. Accordingly, In light of these brief considerations, it ap- the next chapter will broaden the perspec- pears quite evident that “getting ESA, CNES tive, by providing a reference analysis of the and industries to agree on a new working space transportation sector outside Europe, relationship will be as problematic as the its structure and the most recent develop- process of reaching consensus among mem- ments in terms of policies, capabilities and ber states on the development of the new practices. Ariane”.92 A dialogue between governments and industry on the scope of the overall reor- ganisation of the European launch sector is currently ongoing. While launch development contracts have already been awarded and the ASL has agreed to contribute € 400 million of industrial investment to the development of the new Ariane (roughly 10% of the devel-

89 de Selding, Peter. “Full industry control of Ariane 6 non- negotiable”. Space News. 9 April 2015. Web. 93 The contract, signed on 12 August 2015 and worth € 2.4 http://spacenews.com/full-industry-control-of-ariane-6- billion, finances the development and industrialization of nonnegotiable-exec-says/. Accessed 2 December 2015. the Ariane 6 launcher in its two versions until the full op- 90 de Selding, Peter. “New Airbus Safran Venture eyes full erational level set for 2023. The contract includes a com- control of Arianespace”. Space News. 8 January 2015. mitment of some € 680 million for initial development Web. http://spacenews.com/new-airbus-safran-venture- activities up to the Preliminary Design Review scheduled eyes-full-control-of-arianespace/. Accessed 2 December for mid-2016. The total amount for the development of the 2015. launcher will be approximately € 3 billion, including € 400 91 Source: Bianchi, Stefano. “The European decisions of million of industrial capital. Airbus-Safran Launchers Press December 2014”. Presentation at “International Confer- Release. 12 August 2015. ence on the European Space Launchers”. Paris, 3-4 No- 94 de Selding, Peter. “Desire for Competitive Ariane 6 vember 2015. Nudges ESA towards Compromise”. Space News. 3 April 92 Ibid. 2015.

ESPI Report 56 32 March 2016 The European Launchers between Commerce and Geopolitics

3. World Outlook in 2015: Analysis of Launcher Policies, Programmes and Developments

Since the onset of the only a Secretary of Defense and the NASA Adminis- handful of countries have developed expend- trator are responsible for assuring U.S. ac- able launch vehicles that can grant them cess to space, which is governed at the high- complete and autonomous access to space, est political level to serve three main goals: from Low Earth orbits (LEO) to Medium Earth independent access to space, worldwide U.S. orbits (MEO), Geostationary Transfer Orbits leadership and redundancy of procurement (GTO) and Earth escape trajectories. Such sources. countries are the United States, Russia, the The way space transportation policy is estab- Member States of ESA, China, Japan and lished in the U.S. is twofold: as legislation India. from the Congress of the United States and A few more countries, such as Ukraine, Is- as policy statements and directives from the rael, South Korea, North Korea and Iran have Executive Branch. developed capabilities to reach LEO, either Aligned with the objectives stated in the autonomously or through technology transfer broader 2010 National Space Policy,97 the programmes. Furthermore, two countries, most recent guidelines for the space trans- Argentina and Brazil, are currently in the portation sector are laid out in the National process of developing their own first LEO Space Transportation Policy of November vehicles. 2013. Its main objective is assured access to This chapter gives a global overview of na- space, to be achieved through U.S.- tional capabilities in the space launch sector. manufactured launch vehicles developed and The most recent policies and programmes of exploited by private entities with continued each established and emerging spacefaring public support. The most relevant additions in nation are presented, focusing on present- this new policy are the provisions for new day challenges and issues at stake, including entrants to launch U.S. government pay- a forecast of their position in the worldwide loads, encouraging hosting such payloads on launcher sector with a medium-term perspec- commercial spacecraft, and ultimately spur- tive.95 ring innovation and entrepreneurship in the commercial space transportation sector, still For each major spacefaring nation, current backed by public support in the form of a orbital launch vehicles are presented and large, captive domestic market, as well as detailed in Annex 1. Orbital launch vehicles access to government launch infrastructures currently under development are described in and other incentives. Annex 2. More recently, in November 2015, the United States updated its commercial space legisla- tion with the signature of the “U.S. Commer- 3.1 United States cial Space Launch Competitiveness Act” (also known as the SPACE Act, “Spurring Private Policy Aerospace Competitiveness and Entrepre- neurship”).98 This updated law explicitly al- The United States space transportation policy lows "U.S. citizens to engage in the commer- is aimed at guaranteeing “robust, responsive cial exploration and exploitation of ’space and resilient” access to space, with the ulti- resources' [including ... water and miner- mate purpose of protecting its national secu- als]".99 Furthermore, it paves the way for an rity, foreign policy, civil, and commercial in- terests through its own capabilities.96 The 97 “National Space Policy”. 28 June 2010. Web. https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/national_spa 95 The content of this chapter mainly builds on publicly ce_policy_6-28-10.pdf. Accessed 2 December 2015. available sources and documentation provided by the 98 “Spurring Private Aerospace Competitiveness and En- members of the Accompanying Group. trepreneurship Act of 2015 or the SPACE Act of 2015”. 96 “National Space Transportation Policy”. 21 November Web. https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house- 2013. Web. bill/2262. Accessed 2 December 2015. http://www.nasa.gov/sites/default/files/files/national_space 99 For a detailed overview, see: Foust, Jeff. “Congress _transportation_policy_11212013.pdf. Accessed 2 De- launches commercial space legislation”. The Space Re- cember 2015. view. 26 May 2015. Web.

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increased presence of commercial companies, BOX: ITAR both for launch and space services, in LEO

and beyond, as NASA’s focus shifts toward its The International Traffic in Arms Regula- programme. tions (ITAR) is a far-reaching set of U.S. In order to support its space transportation Government regulations that began to policy, the U.S. has over time made use of form in 1976. They encompass most ar- several additional tools that have had and eas of technology and limit the export continue to have a deep impact on the inter- and import of defence related articles and national trade in launch services. An example services. ITAR regulations define “export” of these is a series of protectionist regula- to include the entire spectrum of technical tions enacted in the field of space transporta- activities, from design, development, and tion, such as the Buy American Act (first en- production to operation, repair, and main- acted in 1933) applied to procurement in the tenance. launchers sector. These measures restrict To prevent unauthorized export of tech- public U.S. entities from purchasing goods nology to foreign nations and individuals, and services from foreign sources. As a con- the Regulations require that whenever a sequence, the U.S. has excluded launchers defence article, its technical data or re- from the World Trade Organization Agree- lated services that appear on the ITAR ment on Government Procurement, with both USML (United States Munitions List) are NASA and DoD explicitly mentioned. Even exported, the manufacturer or exporter more so, the ITAR Regulations (see Box 2) must obtain a license from the DDTC (Di- considerably impact the global trade and rectorate of Defense Trade Controls). export of space technology, including launch- ITAR regulations have been subject to in- ers. Furthermore, Presidential Directive tense debate for decades, with criticism NSPD-2 of 1990, prohibits U.S. government highlighting their whole cumbersome payloads to be launched on foreign launch framework, and the potential harm they service providers100 – unless specifically ex- are causing to U.S. commercial interests empted by the President under a number of worldwide (see for example the initiatives limited exceptions. Other measures in place on “ITAR-free” satellites). Following a are the Iran, North Korea and Syria Non- lengthy re-assessment process by the Proliferation Act (INKSNA), through which the U.S. Government on whether the regula- U.S. sanctions a number of entities, both tions were damaging U.S. exports in the private and governmental, that engage in global space industry (with some studies proliferation activities.101 More recently, the estimating the loss in sales to be up to $ 2015 Defense Authorization Act, which was 2 billion in recent years), a major change heavily influenced by the Russian-Ukrainian came into effect in 2014, when commer- Crimean crisis, prohibits the contracting of cial satellites were removed from the U.S. Russian engines for U.S. ELV vehicles (ex- Munitions List and are no longer classified cluding the order already placed in the 2013 as military exports. Furthermore, many EELV block buy contract) involved in launch- satellite components were also delisted ing national security-rated payloads (see and are no longer part of a blanket ban. below).102 However, the reformed rules relate to satellite systems and not launchers, With respect to the launcher fleet in the post- which continue to be tightly controlled by era, NASA has established a ITAR given that the technology can be di- two-phased approach to meet the need for rectly related to offensive military missile ISS logistics and resupply missions. The first systems. phase, called “Commercial Orbital Transpor- tation Services (COTS) Demonstrations”, started in 2005. Under COTS, NASA helped industry develop and demonstrate its own cargo space transportation capabilities, in- cluding launch vehicles. Industry led and http://www.thespacereview.com/article/2759/1. Accessed 2 directed its own efforts while NASA provided 103 December 2015. technical and financial assistance. 100 The NSPD-2 policy has been codified as statutory law in the 1998 Space Commercialization Act. See: “Commer- The first COTS competition lasted 10 months cial Space Act”. 28 October 1998. Web. and was completed in August 2006. Two http://www.nasa.gov/offices/ogc/commercial/CommercialS COTS Commercial Partners (CPs) were se- paceActof1998.html. Accessed 2 December 2015. 101 lected to participate in the ensuing Phase 1 of See: “Iran, North Korea, and Syria Non-proliferation Act the programme: Space Exploration Technolo- Sanctions (INKSNA)”. Web. http://www.state.gov/t/isn/inksna/. Accessed 2 December 2015. 102 “National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 103 NASA invested approximately $ 800 million from 2006 2015”. Web. https://www.congress.gov/bill/113th- through 2012 toward cargo space transportation flight congress/house-bill/4435. Accessed 2 December 2015. demonstrations.

ESPI Report 56 34 March 2016 The European Launchers between Commerce and Geopolitics

gies (SpaceX) and Rocketplane-Kistler (RpK), and a series of freezing measures that led to although the agreement with RpK was later a decrease of institutional payloads launched. terminated after it failed to complete financial Additionally, the U.S. has seen a high-profile and technical milestones. A second competi- limitation in its otherwise comprehensive tion was then held to select a new commer- autonomy in access to space: first, the cial partner, which resulted in the selection of phase-out of the Shuttle Programme led the Orbital Sciences Corporation (today Orbital U.S. to become dependent on Russian Soyuz ATK) in February 2008. The “unprecedented capsules and launches for human spaceflight efficiency” of the COTS investment resulted in and access to the ISS; then, reliance on for- "two new U.S. medium-class launch vehicles eign engine suppliers even for national pay- and two automated cargo spacecraft”.104 load launches was highlighted in the wake of the Crimean crisis. The second phase consists of competitive procurement for cargo services to support the With the National Defense Authorization Act ISS using the newly developed vehicles. The of 2015, the U.S. Congress banned the use of first Commercial Resupply Services (CRS) Russian-built RD-180 engines in national contracts were signed in 2008 and awarded security missions starting from 2019, in re- around $ 1.6 billion to SpaceX for 12 cargo sponse to Russia’s occupation of Crimea. The transport missions and $ 1.9 billion to Orbital RD-180 is the main engine of V, the ATK for 8 missions, nominally covering deliv- launch vehicle used to put in orbit the major- eries to 2016. The second round of contracts, ity of U.S. national security satellites. The CRS2, will cover deliveries from 2017 until decision was subjected to intense criticism by 2024, and were awarded in January 2016 to the U.S. industrial sector as well as the Air SpaceX, Orbital Sciences and Sierra Force, the latter in particular being concerned Corporation (with its vehi- about the risk of creating a gap in assured cle)105. access to space and redundancy options for national security payloads. Among the other With the role of NASA redirected towards the consequences of the 2015 policy decision, in study of transportation systems such as SLS November 2015 ULA stated that, because of and for beyond-LEO exploration, in the the ban, it had been impeded in its bid to last five years the private sector has been launch a U.S. Air Force GPS satellite sched- granted the possibility to compete in un- uled for 2018, effectively ceding the contract precedented ways in the U.S. space transpor- to SpaceX, the only other viable competitor. tation sphere, including areas that were pre- This was seen as a setback for DoD efforts to viously an exclusive government domain, as introduce competition into a national security was the case of manned spaceflight. launch market after years of de facto monop- oly).106 In December 2015, the new U.S. Current Status government spending bill effectively ended The U.S. benefits from several remarkable the ban on the RD-180, stating that the Air advantages in the field of space transporta- Force could award a launch contract to any tion. Some of them are the comprehensive- company “regardless of the country of origin ness of its fleet of launch vehicles (with the of the that will be used on its notable current exception of human-rated launch vehicle, in order to ensure robust spaceflight vehicles), redundant options for competition and continued assured access to 107 the same launch requirements, the world’s space”. largest captive institutional payload manifest, Notwithstanding the recent termination of the and a favourable political and financial envi- RD-180 engine ban, the issues highlighted ronment supporting the appearance of new above have been instrumental in leading to actors in the space transportation sector. policy decisions that could ensure a long- Nevertheless, in recent years the U.S. has term, positive upturn for the U.S. space also seen some critical developments that have affected its space transportation sector. 106 The global financial crisis caused budget cuts For an overview of the 2015 RD-180 debate, see: Ferster, Warren. “Defense Bill Curbs ULA Use of Russian Engines but Draws Veto Threat”. Space News. 30 Sep- tember 2015; Shalal, Andrea. “U.S. Air Force official sees 104 “Commercial Orbital Transportation Services, A New issues with space launch priorities”. Reuters. 25 November Era in Spaceflight” NASA/SP-2014-617. Web. 2015; Gruss, Mike. “McCain Urges Appropriators To Up- https://www.nasa.gov/sites/default/files/files/SP-2014- hold RD-180 Ban”. Space News. 23 November 2015; 617.pdf. Accessed 2 December 2015. Young, John. “Stay the Course on Launch Competition”. 105 Gebhardt, Chris and Bergi, Chris. "NASA awards CRS2 Space News. 11 December 2015. contracts to SpaceX, Orbital ATK, and Sierra Nevada". 107 Gruss, Mike. “Spending Bill Lifts RD-180 Ban, Puts ULA NASA Spaceflight.com. Web. Back in Competitive Game”. Space News. 16 December http://www.nasaspaceflight.com/2016/01/nasa-awards- 2016. Web http://spacenews.com/spending-bill-lifts-rd-180- crs2-spacex-orbital-atk-sierra-nevada/. Accessed 20 Janu- ban-puts-ula-back-in-competitive-game/. Accessed 19 ary 2016. January 2016.

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transportation sector. Budget cuts have trig- to the lack of a clear purpose or mission for gered a more active search for cost reduction SLS.108 measures, and have spurred competition ULA is currently developing upgrades for its between U.S. launch providers, from which main launchers, in order to reduce costs and SpaceX has benefited the most. Similarly, the enhance launch manifest flexibility, such as a lack of autonomous human spaceflight capa- Common Upper Stage for IV and Atlas bilities and U.S.-manufactured engines has V, and a dual payload adapter. Furthermore, encouraged more political pressure to re- in view of launching manned capsules such as assert national independence, with the in- ’s CST-100 within the NASA Commer- volvement of private companies in the devel- cial Crew Programme, ULA is also pursuing opment of U.S.-made engines for human- the human rating of . The 2015 Con- rated spaceflight vehicles and manned cap- gressional ban on the Russian-made RD-180 sules for LEO and possibly beyond. engine also prompted ULA to decide to de- As of 2015, the U.S. was developing or up- velop a next-generation vehicle (NGSL) called grading a series of orbital and suborbital Vulcan, retiring the medium version of Delta launch systems that will enter service and IV already in 2018-2019 for commercial rea- commercialization in the upcoming decade. sons, and ultimately replacing both families The main actors involved are NASA, ULA, of launchers. Vulcan will be designed upon SpaceX, and Orbital ATK for orbital vehicles, the existing subsystems and components of as well as Blue Origin, Virgin Galactic and Atlas V and Delta IV to achieve lower risk and XCOR Aerospace for suborbital vehicles and quicker development. In particular, key fea- engine development. Additionally, several tures of the new vehicle will be an American- small U.S. companies are pursuing the devel- made engine, the BE-4 manufactured by Blue opment of small launchers (see Chapter Origin (with the Aerojet Rocketdyne AR1 as a 4.3.5). second option), a step-by-step introduction of new stages, and will possibly feature a de- The Space Launch System (SLS) and gree of reusability of its engine section start- Orion/MPCV (Multi-Purpose Capsule Vehicle) ing by 2024. Vulcan is scheduled to be ini- is a NASA-led effort aimed at developing a tially available around 2019, with perform- very heavy-lift manned spaceflight capability, ance levels equivalent to or above Atlas V. in accordance with its new mandate to focus The turn of the decade would then see all on beyond-LEO exploration. SLS rises from three ULA launchers (Vulcan, Atlas V, and the ashes of the cancelled Constellation pro- Delta IV Heavy) exploited in parallel, in order gramme, thus drawing heavily on the to satisfy U.S. government and national secu- concept, with the J-2X engine derived directly rity needs, with only Vulcan remaining opera- from V and boosters derived from the tional in the long-term. ULA also foresees a Space Shuttle SRBs. Following an initial plan reduction of launch sites from five to two, for a modular vehicle with a performance of one on each U.S. coast, which would reduce 70,000 to 130,000 Kg to LEO, budgetary costs but at the same time impact schedule constraints and no small amount of criticism reliability and flexibility for commercial cus- led to the adoption of a “block upgrade ap- tomers. This in turn would suggest that U.S. proach” which envisages a 70,000 Kg (SLS institutional actors could still be the prime Block 1 Initial Capability) version by 2018, customer targets for Vulcan and ULA. and ongoing studies for an expanded 130,000 Kg version (SLS Block 2 Evolved Capability), The commercial success of SpaceX Falcon 9, to be made available in time for the NASA with its aggressive pricing policy and persis- Mars manned exploration programme tent pursuit of reusability for the rocket first- planned for the 2030s. Criticism of the SLS stage, is one of the disruptive factors that and Orion programme revolves around the has unsettled the launch industry in recent necessity of such a vehicle, at least in its years. Following the first launch of Falcon 9 in Block 1 version. Indeed, some critics noted 2010, in just 5 years SpaceX was able to that ULA and SpaceX future heavy-lift vehi- capture almost 50% share of the global cles (Vulcan Step 3 and ) could commercial market, also benefitting from the be human-rated and able to serve as carriers difficulties and launch failures encountered by for commercial crew capsules, fulfilling most the other established commercial launch ser- if not all manned spaceflight needs in and vice providers, such as ILS and . around LEO, and even in a financially com- Although the company suffered its first petitive manner. At the same time, the Gen- launch failure in June 2015 it is continuing eral Accountability Office has recently pointed the development of improved Falcon 9 Merlin

108 Boozer, R.D. “The downhill slide of NASA’s ‘rocket to nowhere’ ”. The Space Review. 25 August 2014. Web. http://www.thespacereview.com/article/2583/1. Accessed 2 December 2015.

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engines to allow for a 30% increased lift ca- mercial attractiveness of its launchers on the pacity. This key development enables SpaceX worldwide market could be further enhanced. to launch GTO satellites while retaining With SLS and Orion being developed by NASA enough fuel to continue its first-stage landing for the purpose of manned spaceflight and attempts. The new engine was featured in cargo capabilities beyond LEO (in addition to Falcon 9’s first launch following the June fail- their use for “other payloads and missions ure that took place on 22 December 2015. that substantially benefit from the unique Notably, on the same flight, for the first time capabilities of the SLS”),109 and therefore ever, the first stage of the upgraded Falcon 9 currently not intended for the commercial autonomously landed with success on a pad market, the U.S. commercial launcher sector on Earth. Regarding manned spaceflight, in will chiefly comprise ULA, SpaceX and Orbital addition to its demonstrated capability to ATK. Potential new players arising particularly carry cargo to the ISS with the Dragon cap- in the small-launcher or air-to-space market sule, SpaceX is also developing a manned niches, and companies offering suborbital configuration for its capsule under the NASA flights for space tourism purposes will com- (CCDev), with a plement them. first flight foreseen by 2017. ULA’s new launcher, Vulcan, will possibly The third major U.S. player in orbital focus on the large captive U.S. institutional launches is Orbital ATK, which has obtained a payloads. ULA could, however, also pursue a share of U.S. institutional launches over the larger presence on the worldwide commercial past few years, particularly through the Mino- market thanks to the increased pricing com- taur family, Pegasus XL for small payloads, petitiveness of its new launcher. Neverthe- and Antares launches with the cap- less, it should be considered that Vulcan, like sule for ISS supplies within NASA’s Cargo Atlas V and Delta IV before it, will be an ex- Resupply Services programme. Facing in- pression of U.S. sovereign power in granting creased competition in the U.S. institutional the country assured access to space. customers segment, it is now pursuing the comeback of its Athena rocket in the respon- SpaceX, already a prime worldwide player in sive launch services for small payloads niche, offering launch services, could capture a and expanding Antares’ performance. Addi- greater share of the global launch market tionally, the Antares launch failure in October through the imminent upgrade of its Falcon 9 2014 led the company to accelerate its plans rocket and completion of Falcon Heavy. to replace the old Soviet-made and refur- Moreover, in December 2015 the company bished NK-33 main stage engines with the succeed in landing the first stage of its Russian-made RD-181. The Cygnus for ISS rocket, demonstrating the feasibility of verti- resupply was successfully launched again, cal landing technology also for orbital flights. atop an Atlas V rocket, in December 2015. A reusable (and eventually low-priced) Falcon 9 rocket could be particularly appealing for Blue Origin, the company founded by Ama- more risk-prone satellite operators and cus- zon’s founder Jeff Bezos, is employing an tomers. Furthermore, SpaceX’s strategy of incremental approach from suborbital to or- establishing several spaceports from which to bital flight. It initially focused on sub-orbital launch – and land – its rockets anticipates spaceflight capabilities by developing the New increased requirements in flexibility and Shepard spacecraft which, notably, at the launch frequency to cope with a potential end of 2015 achieved a vertical soft landing increased demand for launch services. of both its capsule and rocket booster after achieving sub-orbital flight up to 100 Km. The Additionally, the development of Falcon company is further involved in the develop- Heavy, now expected for a first flight in 2016, ment of the BE-4 engine for ULA’s Vulcan, as would give to the company a competitive well as the cryogenic BE-3 engine both for advantage, being the first heavy-lift vehicle the and the second stage of (21,200 Kg to GTO) developed in decades, Vulcan. and available on a market without direct competitors, at least until 2023. Should Fal- Outlook con Heavy be made reusable, the additional fuel requirements to land all the three Falcon In the medium-to-long term, U.S. launcher 9 cores would reduce its overall performance policies and development efforts will certainly put it again in a forefront position in the global landscape, as well as re-affirm the nation’s autonomy in access to space on all

levels and for all purposes. Furthermore, 109 should a proposed revision of export control “H.R.2262 - U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competi- tiveness Act”. Web. https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th- regulations take place, as advocated by many congress/house-bill/2262/text. Accessed 2 December actors in the U.S. industrial sector, the com- 2015.

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by around 30%,110 consequently putting it in tion from the post-cold war status quo. In line with other large GTO vehicles currently fact, relations between Russia and Kazakh- available or in development but presumably stan in space have become strained due to with an added cost advantage. the periodic rise of disputes regarding Baikonur. More recently, the bitter 2014 Cri- As noted, in all probability the company will mean crisis jeopardized business and coop- also enter the large U.S. national security eration links between Russian and Ukrainian satellite market following obtaining certifica- companies, further underlining Russian’s tion to launch military and intelligence pay- foreign dependence regarding the launcher loads, possibly starting with a next- sector. As stated by its President in 2008, generation U.S. Air Force GPS satellite in Russia needs to ensure its “ability to carry 2018, for which ULA was unable to bid.111 out all kinds of space launches from (its) own The success of Orbital ATK’s Antares both in territory, from automatic satellites to manned the commercial and institutional sector will spacecraft and interplanetary probes”.112 largely depend on the successful introduction Consequently, several measures have been of the first-stage engine. Nevertheless, the undertaken and ongoing initiatives have been decision to adopt Russian-made RD-181 en- stepped up. gines for Antares will require an entirely new The main priorities outlined in the “Space DoD certification process, thereby putting Activities of Russia in 2013-2020” pro- Orbital ATK and Antares in an unfavourable gramme are guaranteed Russian access to position to compete for U.S. institutional space; the development and utilization of launches compared to SpaceX and ULA. space hardware and technologies; and fulfil- ment of international obligations in the space sector.113 3.2 Russia The programme, which foresees two imple- mentation phases (2013-2015, completing Policy the existing Federal Space Programme 2015, and 2016-2020), also pursues the long-term The fall of the Union of Soviet Socialist Re- objective of consolidating the Russian space publics (USSR) caused a deep fracture, with sector by placing its programmes and sub- shockwaves and ripples that a quarter of programmes under a co-management century later still shape regional geopolitics scheme between Roscosmos, which acts as and the space sector of the region. Following executive managing body, and the Ministry of the events of 1991, several key space manu- Defence, continuing a trend that started al- facturing industries of the former Soviet Un- ready in 2002. This consolidation process has ion were suddenly located in the territory of proceeded at an uneven pace in the past 15 independent nations, such as Ukraine, while years, advancing faster when politically moti- the , Russia’s main vated following a string of launch failures, but spaceport, belonged to the newly-created also suffering from delays as a result of the Republic of . 2009 economic crisis and worsened financial In the past two decades Russia has neverthe- situation. The quick succession of reform less been able to fully pursue and expand all plans, often only partially implemented, has its space activities either because the contri- led to a lack of stability and has increased bution of Ukrainian industries to the Russian uncertainty in the Russian space sector. space transportation activities was limited to The latest of these reform plans was ap- small-to-medium sized launchers, i.e. mainly proved by the Russian President in January refurbished ICBMs such as and Rockot; 2015 and by the Russian Duma in May 2015. and through bilateral agreements such as the A new State Corporation, Roscosmos SC, was long-term lease of Baikonur from Kazakh- created which ultimately consolidates under stan, to the tune of around $ 115 million its name about 62 developers and manufac- annually, until 2050. turers of space hardware and systems previ- In recent years Russia has nurtured a ously under United Rocket and Space Corp, stronger impulse to achieve complete auton- omy in access to space, resulting in an evolu-

112 “Opening Remarks at a Meeting with the Security 110 A reusable Falcon 9 has a 30% reduced performance Council on Russia’s Space Exploration Policy for the compared to an expendable Falcon 9, due to the amount Period through to 2020 and Beyond”. 11 April 2008. Web. of fuel set aside for landing manoeuvres. http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/24913. 111 Gruss, Mike. “ULA Punts on GPS 3 Launch Contract Accessed 2 December 2015. Long Sought by SpaceX”. Space News. 16 November 113 “Russian space program: a decade review (2010- 2015. Web. http://spacenews.com/ula-declines-to-bid-on- 2019)”. Russian Space Web. Web. gps-3-launch-contract-long-sought-by-/. Accessed 2 http://www.russianspaceweb.com/russia_2010s.html. December 2015. Accessed 2 December 2015.

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and another 11 entities including launch site strong presence on the worldwide launchers operators and service providers. landscape, chief amongst them being quality assurance and reliability issues, an increase A noteworthy factor that characterizes the in prices affected by domestic and non- status of the Russian space sector is that domestic factors, as well as perceived re- private companies, as understood in the duced autonomy in access to space. Western sense, are almost totally absent. While in the early phases following the fall of Starting from the autonomy issue, the more the Soviet regime international joint ventures and more evident dependence on spaceports were formed with U.S. and European compa- not located on Russian territory has been nies to enhance competitiveness and get addressed with the development of new easier access to the Western market, the launch infrastructures and consolidation of increased experience acquired and a existing ones. Considerable resources from strengthened national economy have led to a Russia’s space budget have been allocated gradual withdrawal from such international towards the upgrade of existing launch infra- projects and joint ventures, particularly in the structure, including the construction of a new form of shares buy-back. Ongoing plans to launch site on Russian territory. The cos- restructure the space sector envisage further modrome of Plesetsk will be further over- re-nationalization of the few remaining pri- hauled to be able to launch the next genera- vate companies, such as , with the tion of Russian launchers, while the building core of industrial entities carrying out of the new Vostochny spaceport, started in launcher development and exploitation now 2008, has been stepped up, with plans to organized in a way that allows full state own- make it the new main Russian launch site for ership. Furthermore, all Russian launch infra- all types of Russian launch vehicles by the structures, including test facilities and launch end of the decade. Nevertheless, construction complexes, are owned by the State, with works on Vostochny spaceport are being some such as Baikonur (and the future plagued by delays and mishaps in its de- ) under the responsi- sign,114 ultimately leading to uncertainties bility of Roscosmos through TsENKI, and about the date of its readiness. others such as Plesetsk under the control of Regarding reliability, the increase in failure the Aerospace Defence Forces. rates of launcher vehicles, both reconverted Another priority measure being undertaken is and aging ICBMs such as Rockot and Dnepr, to decrease technological dependence on but also and Soyuz including its upper space-related hardware components as well stages, has started to cause alarm among as raw materials, currently imported primarily commercial satellite operators and Russian from Ukraine, and to establish domestic as- institutional customers themselves. Proton, in sembly and production lines. Unlike in the particular, has suffered heavily from launch 1990s, Russia today imports around 70% on failures, which have happened six times since average of the electronic components re- 2010, allowing competitors such as Ari- quired for its satellites. Furthermore, as a anespace and SpaceX to conquer an almost- consequence of the strained relationships 50% each share of worldwide business in with Western countries following the Ukrain- 2014 and 2015.115 Furthermore, failure of the ian crisis, Russia is putting in place an import upper stage of Soyuz caused the un- substitution programme, turning to other controlled re-entry and subsequent destruc- countries (e.g. China) to purchase basic elec- tion of an advanced remote-sensing military tronic components. satellite, Kanopus-ST, in December 2015. To overcome these critical issues and cope Current Status with evolving demand and increased reliabil- A quarter of century after the fall of the So- ity needs, Russia has concentrated its efforts viet Union, the position of Russia in the on the modernization and consolidation of its launchers sector is still strong, with the – launcher vehicles, such as the development somewhat tarnished – ability to offer com- of the new modular Angara family, formally mercial launch services at low prices and full started already in 1992, while phasing out state control over the exploitation of its

launcher systems. The launchers sector fur- 114 thermore enjoys the support of a constant Bodner, Matthew. “Russia's New Rocket Won't Fit in Its New Cosmodrome”. The Times. 02 October 2015. and large domestic institutional market, and Web. the retirement of the U.S. Shuttle programme http://www.themoscowtimes.com/business/article/russia-s- has given Russia a monopoly in human ac- new-rocket-won-t-fit-in-its-new-cosmodrome/536827.html. cess to space. Accessed 2 December 2015. 115 Space News Editorial. “Welcome Back, Proton”. Space However, Russia now has to face a number of News. 08 September 2015. Web. critical issues that threaten its until-recently http://spacenews.com/editorial-welcome-back-proton/ . Accessed 2 December 2015.

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the Rockot and Dnepr vehicles as the refur- be instrumental in determining how Russia’s bished ICBM stockpile diminishes. The new prospects in the commercial launcher sector family would enable Russia to streamline the develop. This notwithstanding, Russia’s al- manufacturing process, exploit flexibility and most unparalleled expertise and know-how in modularity and ultimately provide the capa- launcher systems, accompanied by strong bility to launch a complete range of small-to- political support, will undoubtedly allow the large payloads. The plans for the Angara country to retain a forceful role in worldwide family span from the small-launcher Angara space transportation also in the future. 1.2 to the heavy lift Angara 7, with Angara 3 (still only at a concept stage) intended to gradually replace Soyuz, and Angara 5 (in an advanced stage of development, with 9 test 3.3 China flights left as at Dec 2015)116 as a future replacement for Proton, post-2020. Both A5 Policy and A7 also see the possibility of being hu- The Chinese space programme is character- man-rated. ized by increasingly ambitious goals, stead- However, the worsening economic situation fast progress through continuously increasing of Russia, sparked by falling oil prices and budgets and workforce, and the objective to economic sanctions imposed by Western be self-sufficient while attaining a prominent countries following the Ukrainian crisis, have position in the international space pecking forced substantial budget cuts to the space order. Initially focused on Earth observation programme, which ultimately led to scale and navigation systems, China’s space pro- down and postponement of the most far- gramme now encompasses the whole spec- reaching plans. Development efforts have trum of space activities. High-level objectives focused so far on Angara 1.2 and Angara 5, range from robotic exploration of Mars and which performed inaugural flights in 2014 the in the 2020s, to human and 2015 respectively, delaying the other spaceflight, with an independent space sta- Angara versions, 3 and 7, to later dates. tion fully operational by 2022 and manned lunar missions envisioned by 2030. Outlook The most recent space policy guidelines were 117 The Russian space and launcher sector is published in a 2011 White Paper, following th evolving from a post-cold-war status quo. the publication of the 12 Five Year Plan that However, this is taking place as its relations gives regular guidance for the Chinese with Western countries, following a period of planned economy. The paper recognizes the rapprochement in the late 1990s and early importance of the space sector and its activi- 2000s, are today wavering and increasingly ties for the nation’s overall development conflictual, due to geopolitical disputes, par- strategy, as well as for China’s economic and ticularly due to the Ukrainian crisis and the social development, now entering a crucial Syrian civil war. Furthermore, severe eco- phase with deeper reforms and transforma- nomic difficulties add an element of uncer- tion of the country’s pattern of economic tainty and instability to the evolution of the development. It stresses the peaceful pur- whole space sector. poses of its programmes, maintaining inde- pendence and self-reliance while at the same Determined to achieve greater independence, time pursuing a further opening to the out- Russia has recently severed the already dam- side world and international cooperation. aged ties with the Ukrainian space sector, and is posed to gain autonomy from Kazakh- For the period 2011-2016, the White Paper stan’s Baikonur launch site once its new defined a wide number of tasks, such as spaceport is completed. The ongoing reform strengthening basic capability in space sci- and re-nationalization of the Russian space ence, technology and industry; continuation sector, and an accelerated pace of develop- of major programmes in human spaceflight, ment of the new Angara family, are trying to Earth observation, navigation, space science; address critical issues such as reliability as satellite telecommunications, development of well as increased costs and industrial ineffi- space infrastructure; and promotion of the ciencies. satellite application industry, amongst others. In particular, for the launchers sector it af- The success of the industrial governance re- firms that China “will build a stronger space form process, as well as the resolution of quality assurance and reliability issues, will 117 White Paper on China's Space Activities in 2011, Infor- mation Office of the State Council of the People's Republic 116 Zak, Anatoly. “Angara-5 to replace Proton”. Web. of China. 29 December 2011. Web. http://www.russianspaceweb.com/angara5.html. Accessed http://www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/node_714 11 December 2015. 5648.htm. Accessed 2 December 2015.

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transportation system, keep improving its gets those countries in which China has a launch vehicle series, and enhance their ca- particular strategic interest, for example oil pabilities of entering space.”118 exporters, as well as African nations and neighbouring countries, in exchange for their As a matter of fact, the Chinese space trans- natural resources and raw materials. Within portation sector enjoys strong and continuous the framework of the “Asia-Pacific Space institutional support both in development and Cooperation Organization“ (APSCO) pro- exploitation, while at the same time all the grammes, China’s primus inter pares position space industry and corporations involved in has enabled it to increase the demand for space development are fully government- launching satellites using its Long March owned. The China Great Wall Industry Corpo- rockets.121 Such a strategy fits within the ration (CGWIC) “is the sole company author- broader effort of China to use space to ized by the government to provide commer- emerge as an alternative to the United cial satellite launch services and space tech- States, and claim political leadership of de- nology to international clients”.119 Further- veloping countries, in both Africa and Asia. more, CGWIC is part of the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC), a large-scale conglomerate of more than 130 Current Status companies, representing the main contractors China’s comprehensive range of launch vehi- 120 of China’s space programme. cles is successfully exploited to satisfy impor- In recent years, Chinese space activities have tant domestic demand and fulfil all China’s tried to progressively open up to international current needs, granting the country access to trade. Nevertheless, a number of important all orbits, to crewed and cargo launches for factors strongly impact China’s presence in LEO, and to exploration missions beyond the international launchers market, chief Earth orbit, among those being foreign policies of export Current plans to increase the performance of control as well as a closely intertwined mili- the vehicles envisage a new consolidated tary and civil space programme, despite re- family of Long March launchers that will also cent attempts to decouple the two. exploit modularity to maximise economies of A key issue is that China does not adhere to scale in production, as well as using less toxic the Missile Technology Control Regime fuel, thus reducing environmental concerns. (MTCR), and since 1999 it has been targeted Regarding launch sites, China has three fully by a ban on licenses to launch U.S.- government-owned spaceports, while a components by Chinese launchers. Indeed, fourth is being constructed. The new Wen- current U.S. export control restrictions chang Satellite Launch Centre will provide a (prominent among which are the ITAR regu- number of key advantages such as being the lations, see Box 2) forbid any U.S. satellite country’s southernmost launching site, allow- parts from being exported to China. As a ing for a substantial increase in payload mass consequence, China is excluded from compet- as required by the future space exploration ing in the international launch services mar- programmes; and its location on the South ket for any major Western communication China Sea will reduce concerns about east- satellite, whereas Chinese launchers can still ward launches, as their trajectory will not be commercialized for those few foreign sat- pass over densely populated areas. ellites that are independently built, which do not include U.S. components restricted by The Chinese space sector is one of the most ITAR. heavily affected by U.S. export control re- strictions. The impact of such measures, and As a workaround, China has developed an the often-difficult China-U.S. relations, has original strategy by offering on the interna- been double-fold. At first, they undoubtedly tional market comprehensive packages that benefitted non-Chinese vehicles, preventing include the launch of a Chinese-built satellite Long March rockets from playing a greater on a Chinese launcher. Different packages role in the worldwide commercial launchers are offered, such as for GEO market despite their good reliability and satellites and for small remote cheap prices. At the same time though, they sensing satellites, but also a payload piggy- forced the Chinese launcher sector to remain back option is available. This approach tar- self-reliant and essentially independent from foreign actors and factors, thus largely in control of its manufacturing costs and not 118 Ibid. 119 subjected to currency fluctuations. Cit. “Company Profile”. China Great Wall Industry Cor- poration. Web. http://www.cgwic.com.cn/about/index.html. Accessed 16 December 2015. 120 For a detailed overview of Chinese space industrial 121 See Aliberti, Marco. “When China Goes to the Moon…”. governance, see: Aliberti, Marco. “When China goes to the p. 244 and references therein. SpringerWienNewYork. Moon…”: p. 15-23. SpringerWienNewYork. 2015. 2015.

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In addition to independence from foreign use not only for offensive purposes but also variables, other factors such as traditionally for military defensive functions, such as sur- low labour costs as well as a fully subsidized veillance and communications. industry with high production rates theoreti- During the same year, following the success- cally allowed Chinese launchers to be priced ful completion of its LEO vehicle programme, on the market significantly lower than its Japan sought to achieve full access to space international competitors. While prices for the beyond LEO by signing a technology transfer launch packages offered by China have agreement with the U.S., thus enabling im- shown a tendency to increase in recent years, port of -Delta launch vehicle technology it must be kept in mind that the commerciali- and ultimately achieving GTO access capabili- sation of the launchers remains driven by a ties in 1981 with the N-II vehicle. A review of political agenda, offering in-orbit capacity in this technology transfer programme in 1975 exchange for access to resources or improved led the U.S. to recognize the emergence of relations where there is a strategic interest. Japan as a potential “very able competitor” in Therefore, the price factor could be put in the the space market, therefore subjecting fur- background (eventually through additional ther transfers in launchers technology beyond subsidies) when compared to the greater the Thor-Delta level to export control rules geopolitical and strategic benefits of this pro- and regulations. Consequently, Japan started gramme for China. to consider the development of autonomous capabilities in accessing outer space through Outlook Japanese-only technology, initiating the de- With its ambitious plans for a new Long velopment of the H-II launch vehicle in 1984. March rocket family, new and improved Even with the decision to pursue the devel- launch infrastructure, and an ever increasing opment of its own launch vehicles, another budget and workforce dedicated to its space example of the historically strong depend- programme, there is no doubt that China will ence of Japan on the U.S. with respect to continue to expand the scale and scope of its space activities is the 1990 U.S./Japan Satel- space activities in the coming decade. lite Procurement Agreement, which essen- Against this background, China could indeed tially obliged Japan to open up the procure- look at the opportunity to increase substan- ment market for governmental satellites (ex- tially its role in the worldwide commercial cluding R&D) to competitive bidding. launch market during the course of the next In response to the changed geopolitical envi- decade, by further pursuing and expanding ronment of the past two decades, both its comprehensive launcher strategic pro- worldwide and particularly in East Asia, Ja- gramme package and by offering competitive pan’s space policy has evolved accordingly, launch solutions to global satellite manufac- with a gradual abandonment of the strict turers. “peaceful purposes” interpretation of space Nevertheless, the ability to engage with the activities, towards a more general concept of worldwide launcher market is severely con- “non-aggressiveness”. This change was first strained by geopolitical factors, first and recognised in the 2008 “Basic Space Law”, foremost its relations with the U.S. and the enabling applications for military purposes latter’s policies in technology and export con- and at the same time promoting commer- trol, and it is not obvious that this will change cialisation. Consequently, the security dimen- anytime soon. sion of space gained increasingly greater importance in the following “Basic Plans for Space Policy” released in 2009, 2013 and 2015.122 It is only during the last year that 3.4 Japan Japan, for the first time, has made an explicit link between its space capabilities and its Policy armed forces, with specific reference to China’s in-space activities.123 Japan’s space transportation policy, and more generally the historical evolution of its space programme, has been strongly influenced and shaped by the nation’s situation following 122 Presentation at UNCOPUOS Legal Subcommittee. the end of the Second World War, with a “Current status of Japan’s Space Policy and development prominent role played by the United States of legal frameworks”. Vienna, 16 April 2015. Web. until a few decades ago. http://www.unoosa.org/pdf/pres/lsc2015/tech-03.pdf. Ac- cessed 2 December 2015. 123 A peculiarity of Japan’s historic space pro- Kallender-Umezu, Paul. “Japan Begins National Secu- gramme resides in the fact that the Japanese rity Space Build-up”. Defense News. Web. http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/air- Diet explicitly excluded such uses with a space/space/2015/04/12/japan-national-security-space- Resolution passed in 1969, ruling out space buildup/25412641/. Accessed 14 December 2015.

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Current Status a gradual shift of responsibility from govern- ment to industry will continue. Currently, Japan has an established capability to reach all orbits through a comprehensive It is worth noting that these developments in fleet of vehicles. Its small launcher Epsilon the Japanese launcher sector mirror to a cer- can place a 700 Kg payload into LEO, H-IIA tain extent those currently being undertaken has a performance of 10,000 Kg to LEO and in Europe. In this sense, a double conver- 6,000 Kg to GTO, and H-IIB regularly trans- gence between Europe and Japan can be ports cargo to ISS through the HTV vehicle. observed: in the first instance, the new Euro- pean launchers’ industrial setup is getting This fleet successfully satisfies the needs for closer to the Japanese model in which JAXA is Japanese institutional missions, which be- passing responsibility for the development tween 2007 and 2014 have all been launched and exploitation of launch vehicles to Mitsubi- by Japanese launchers, with the exception of shi Heavy Industries. At the same time, the a few LEO missions. Nevertheless, Japan’s setup and configuration of future Japanese presence on the commercial launcher market launch vehicles resemble closely the devel- is still very limited, despite government sub- opment of Ariane 6 and Vega-C, both in sidies as well as a favourable exchange rate terms of performance and timeframe of for the yen. Commercial Japanese satellites availability on the market.126 are in fact mostly launched by foreign vehi- cles, as the H-II’s are too highly priced to be Cooperation in launch services between competitive. MHI achieved the first commer- Europe and Japan dates back to the late cial launch contract only in late 2013, but it 1990s, started through commonality studies was not until November 2015 that an up- between Ariane 5 and H-II A/B that ulti- graded version of H-IIA secured the first mately coalesced into a commercial launch dedicated commercial mission, launching a backup agreement between Arianespace and Canadian-owned satellite. As stated MHI, signed in 2004. This agreement allows a by MHI, its launch costs are slowly being European commercial satellite scheduled to reduced as the company assumes more and be launched by Arianespace to be launched more control over the rockets’ operations, on a Japanese rocket in the case of technical with the goal being to continue to serve Ja- problems, and vice versa.127 Both launch pan’s institutional sector and additionally providers advocate a similar backup agree- accommodate two or three H-IIA commercial ment for the launch of institutional satellites missions per year.124 but this would require a bilateral agree- ment128 and might not be possible until the In terms of future developments, the 2015 next generation of respective launch vehicles Basic Space Plan envisages continued devel- enters service. opment and exploitation of Japan’s space transportation systems. In particular, the Outlook small launcher Epsilon is being upgraded (Epsilon phase 2) to further reduce launch Recent developments in Japanese Space Pol- costs, and reach a performance of 1,500 to icy must be seen in the context of Japan’s 1,800 Kg to LEO by 2017,125 thus expanding increased geopolitical awareness in the global Japan’s access to LEO and competing directly and regional context. with other similar-class small launchers such as Vega. Proposing itself as an equal partner to the U.S., and perceiving China’s space activities The development of H-III, started in 2013, as a threat, Japan is looking for partnerships will continue over the next five years, ulti- and alliances, with the new intent of using its mately providing a family of modular launch- space activities as a means to serve its politi- ers by 2020/2021 with a performance of 2,800 to 6,500 Kg to GTO, at lower costs than the current H-II, with additional plans to 126 For an overview and comparison on the existing EU-JP further study synergies between Epsilon and space cooperation activities, see La Regina, Veronica. H-III. To achieve anticipated cost reductions, “Space sector. EU-Japan Business and Technology Coop- eration Potential”. Tokyo, 2015. Web. http://www.eu- japan.eu/sites/eu- japan.eu/files/reports/MINERVA/space_sector_EU- 124 De Selding, Peter. “Japan’s H-IIA Launches Telstar 12 Japan_cooperation_presentation.pdf. Accessed 14 De- Vantage in Commercial Debut”. Space News. 24 Novem- cember 2015. ber 2015. Web. http://spacenews.com/japans- H-IIA- 127 Arianespace - EU-Japan Business Round Table 27-28 launches-telstar-12-vantage-in-commercial-debut/. Ac- April 2015. Web. http://www.arianespace.com/news-on- cessed 2 December 2015. the-move/2015/4-28-2015-EU-Japan.asp. Accessed 2 125 Kallender-Umezu, Paul. “Japan to Take Incremental December 2015. Approach for New Epsilon Launcher”. Space News. 11 128 Claudon, Jean-Louis. “Cooperation in Launch Ser- April 2011. Web. http://spacenews.com/japan-take- vices”. Arianespace. 08 October 2014. Web. incremental-approach-new-epsilon-launcher/. Accessed 11 http://www.eu-japan.eu/sites/eu-japan.eu/files/10.2-3- December 2015. Claudon.pdf. Accessed 2 December 2015.

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cal and diplomatic goals across the Asia- 1990s with the GSLV Mk II. India has pro- Pacific region.129 With full emancipation and gressively developed indigenous industrial independence from a decades-long U.S. in- capabilities assimilating such technologies, fluence, Japan has the potential to position leading to the now-autonomous development itself in the next decade as a modern and of a fully Indian-made upper stage for GSLV even more mature space power. Mk II (also called GSLV).130 Japan in fact envisages a 50% increase in One of the primary objectives of the Indian satellite institutional domestic demand during space programme for the 2010-2020 decade the period 2015-2024 compared to the previ- is to complete its range of launch vehicles to ous decade, with QZSS (Quasi-Zenith Satel- avoid relying on foreign launchers for its na- lite System) navigation satellites and IGS tional payloads, particularly the multi- (Information Gathering Satellites) Earth Ob- purpose INSAT communication satellites se- servation satellites experiencing the biggest ries. In fact, the lack of a heavy-lift vehicle growth, thereby greatly expanding inter alia able to place large Indian telecommunication national remote sensing capabilities. National satellites in GEO orbit makes the completion institutional satellites would add up to 39, of its launcher fleet a crucial priority. excluding HTV launches to the ISS. However, India has also ambitions to expand its space since the domestic rate of launches per year activities to human spaceflight in the longer will still be limited, this could possibly push term. Albeit with a relatively small budget Japan to explore an increased presence on allocated so far, India has pursued the devel- the worldwide commercial market, as already opment and testing of re-entry and landing indicated by the plans of MHI for the up- prototypes, and is aiming for a fully autono- graded H-IIA. mous manned space vehicle to LEO by 2020. How and whether it will be successful in achieving commercial success in the long Current Status term will undoubtedly be determined by the competitiveness of the H-III launcher, and Following a positive sub-orbital test in 2014, this requires that the measures put in place and the first successful flight of the indige- to reduce development costs – such as the nous cryogenic stage in August 2015, the ongoing industrial reorganization and stream- development of GSLV Mk-III, a highly priori- lining – will be effective. tised 4 tonnes-class GTO launcher, is now scheduled for completion in 2017. India’s presence on the worldwide commer- 3.5 India cial launcher market has been very limited so far, mainly due to the decision to size its launcher vehicles production to satisfy just Policy the needs of its domestic demand, and the Since its beginnings, India’s national space lack of a heavy-lift vehicle for large GEO tele- programme has been characterized by a communications satellites. Nevertheless, its strong civilian focus, rather than being driven PSLV launcher achieved noticeable success in by military interests as it has historically been launching small satellites, often piggybacked the case of other space-faring nations – with on domestic LEO payloads. This was the case the exception of Japan. The national priority for example for several European satellites in space infrastructure and applications has such as DLR-TUBSAT, Agile and Proba. It is been chiefly Earth observation and telecom- noteworthy that ISRO stated its interest in munications, given the vastness of the coun- privatizing the small launcher PSLV within a try and its susceptibility to natural disasters four-year timeframe, handling integration and launch of the rocket to an industrial con- Benefitting from early technology transfers in sortium of the Antrix Corporation.131 Such the 1970s, such as the European en- privatization would enable increasing the rate gine, and later the Russian upper stage for of launches from 12 to 18.132 the GSLV Mk I, India achieved access to LEO in 1980 with the PSLV launch vehicle, and to GTO with medium-sized payloads in the early 130 Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO). Launch- ers – Overview. Web http://isro.gov.in/launchers. Accessed 129 Japan recently started providing official development 2 December 2015. assistance (ODA) to developing countries, in order to 131 Laxman, Srinivas. “Plan to largely privatize PSLV op- support their procurement of satellites of space services. erations by 2020: ISRO chief”. The Times of India. 15 See Aliberti, Marco. “When China Goes to the Moon…”: p. February 2016. Web. 208. SpringerWienNewYork. 2015. See also: “Signing of http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Plan-to-largely- Japanese ODA Loan with the Socialist Republic of Viet- privatize-PSLV-operations-by-2020-Isro- nam”. Japan International Cooperation Agency. Web. chief/articleshow/50990145.cms. Accessed 22 February http://www.jica.go.jp/english/news/press/2011/111102.html 2016. . Accessed 2 December 2015. 132 Ibid.

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Outlook very low during the 2003-2012 decade, in- creased considerably in 2013, leading to a With more than one-third of its overall space more concrete possibility for Argentina to budget devoted to the development of launch achieve independent access to LEO in the vehicles, it is expected that once the GSLV foreseeable future, thus meeting its domestic Mk-III is ready for deployment in mid-2017, needs. India will pursue the development of other elements of its space programme, such as human spaceflight, but also further develop 3.6.2 Brazil cryogenic technology to improve GSVL Mk-III performance, as well as possibly developing a To achieve access to space, Brazil has been fully-reusable two-stage-to-orbit launcher. pursuing three different and parallel ap- proaches: the development of an autono- Having developed a complete family of mous vehicle, a joint international develop- launchers able to satisfy domestic demand, at ment of a GTO launch service from Brazil, the beginning of the 2020s India could then and negotiations to launch foreign vehicles look to substantially increase its share of the from Brazilian territory, so as to exploit and worldwide launchers market by offering in- maximise its favourable geographical position creasingly viable launch solutions, accompa- around the Equator. nied by moderately cheap prices. Following the results achieved by its military programme in the 1970s, further development of domestic launcher 3.6 Other Nations vehicles was shifted to civilian entities. The 2013 policy on space activities recognizes the need for “more launches and more launch- 3.6.1 Argentina ers”, thus “achieving the capacity to launch Argentina started developing sounding rock- from Brazilian territory” with a capacity to ets (Canopus and ) in the 1960s, and “meet both domestic and foreign demand”. initiated a multi-national missile programme Brazil has long been developing its Veículo named Condor I and II in the 1970s, which Lançador de Satélites (VLS) a programme was ultimately terminated in 1993. Since that suffered a major setback with the 2003 then, the focus of the Argentinian National accident that led to the death of 21 key per- Space Programme, which is planned and exe- sonnel of the programme and halted any cuted by the national space agency, CONAE, further launcher development. While devel- has been put on peaceful use of space sci- opment was taken up again in the late 2000s, ence and technology, to satisfy the country’s the 250 Kg-to-LEO payload capacity of the needs mostly in terms of Earth and maritime fourth VLS-1 vehicle, scheduled for a test observation. flight in 2016, is already judged to be insuffi- cient to cope with Brazil’s needs. Noting the high dependence on third parties for access to space, and increasingly recog- The “Cruzeiro do Sul” programme, initiated in nizing the need for an autonomous capability, 2005, aims to give Brazil independent and in the 2004-2015 Space Programme CONAE autonomous access to space by 2022, with has been pursuing the development of tech- the development of a family of 5 launch vehi- nology in propulsion, engines, navigation, cles initially based on the VLS design, of guidance and control, with the ultimate goal which two are currently being developed. The of developing a launch vehicle dedicated to first one, VLS-Alpha, is directly based on the light domestic payloads for Earth Observa- lower part of VLS-1 and aims to reach a per- tion. formance of 500 Kg to LEO in 2018. VLS-Beta is an evolution of VLS-1, possibly employing The current status of launch vehicles, devel- Russian technology such as liquid upper oped by CONAE and the state-owned com- stage engines, with a projected performance pany VENG S.A., is at a technological demon- of 800 Kg to LEO by 2020. strator level (VEx 1 tested in 2014, VEx 5 launches initially scheduled for 2015), with In addition and in parallel with domestic plans to build up technological know-how in launcher development, Brazil has pursued the order to reach a performance of 250 Kg to road of an international cooperation agree- LEO with the development of the II ment with Ukraine. Following initial talks vehicle,133 and an improved performance of started between the two countries in 2002, a 1,000 Kg to LEO with Tronador III. The level bi-national Ukrainian-Brazilian joint venture of funding of launcher programmes, while company, Alcântara Cyclone Space, was formed in 2006, for the development and operation of the launch complex Alcântara 133 Tronador I was flown once in 2007, as the first flight of Launch Center in Brazil, and to launch the the technology demonstrator programme. Ukrainian-made Cyclone 4 vehicle. Neverthe-

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less, several factors have caused important capability. At the same time, the very fa- setbacks that now jeopardize the completion vourable position of Brazil’s territory for of the programme. The infrastructure con- launches and low labour costs are positive struction works on the Alcântara site were factors that could lead to a significant advan- suspended in 2008 following environmental tage in the commercial market, particularly and social concerns regarding the impact on should a domestic vehicle eventually be de- the surrounding population. Construction veloped. activities were then restarted but halted again in 2013; in early 2015, reportedly only 48% of the dedicated launch site for Cyclone 3.6.3 Iran 4 was complete. At the same time, the vehi- Iran’s space programme is mostly aimed at cle manufacturing process encountered sev- the development of small Earth Observation eral delays in Ukraine, starting with the need satellites, and the small launch vehicle tech- to obtain a Russian-Ukrainian Technology nology to put them into orbit autonomously, Transfer agreement, which was signed only in within a paradigm of professed peaceful uses 2009. Furthermore, the international context of outer space but responding to military and also strongly affected the Alcantara-Cyclone security needs. A more ambitious objective is programme, with the Crimean crisis worsen- the establishment of human spaceflight capa- ing relations between Ukraine and Russia and bility. reportedly leading to pressure from the U.S. to not use the Cyclone vehicle. With the Space activities are supervised by two closely commercial viability of Cyclone 4 now ques- connected national entities: the Iranian tioned due to the long delays and the Space Council (ISC) under the President of changed international market, and the lack of the Islamic Republic, and the Iranian Space the necessary export control agreement with Agency (ISA), under the Ministry of Commu- the U.S., it has been reported that the Brazil- nication and Information Technology, ian Presidency is now preparing to terminate founded in 2005. Iranian space policy and its the strategic partnership with Ukraine - with budget are currently framed in Five Year the hope also of improving relations with Plans, the latest of which covers the period Russia in the context of the VLS-Beta devel- 2011-2015. opment. Historically, the Iranian launcher programme With the objective of exploiting its favourable relied on foreign technology transfers. Sha- geographical position for orbital launches, bab ballistic missiles, which now constitute Brazil also started negotiations with Israel on the core of its launch vehicles, were devel- the launch of the Shavit vehicle from the oped in collaboration with the Democratic Alcantara launch site. This initiative was, People’s Republic of Korea, in particular the however, impaired by the 2008 court order Taepodong and No-Dong ballistic missiles that halted the expansion works of the launch programmes, as well as with Chinese tech- site on the grounds of environmental and nology from the Long March vehicles. Cur- social concerns for the local population. How- rently, Iran uses the -1 launch vehicle to ever, in mid-2015, the Brazilian government put small payloads into LEO, with 9 test was reportedly conducting talks both with the launches carried out in the period up to 2014. U.S. and the Russian governments, with the A better performing vehicle, Simorq, was objective of further opening the Alcantara announced in 2010 and declared to be Iran’s launch site to foreign launchers.134 main launcher vehicle in 2013. It has three launches scheduled in 2016, with an esti- Four factors impact negatively on the current mated initial performance of 60 Kg to LEO status of the Brazilian space transportation with possible increases up to 700 Kg of pay- sector: a low budget, that has been so far load. Other launchers reportedly being devel- allocated mostly to the Alcantara-Cyclone oped are Qoqnoos (Phoenix) and a solid-fuel programme; a lack of investment from pri- launch vehicle called Ghaem, evolved from a vate firms; no guaranteed institutional satel- 2-stage ICBM, which is scheduled for devel- lites market; and moderate ambitions in the opment during the upcoming Five Year Plan overall space programme. of 2016-2020. However, the cancellation of the Cyclone 4 Given the scarcity of information available, project could free up important funding that and the overlap between space launcher and could be devoted to developing a domestic military ICBM development, the Iranian launchers programme is hard to assess –

134 Boadle, Anthony and Winter, Brian. "Exclusive: Russia, U.S. competing for space partnership with Brazil". Reuters. 15 June 2015. Web. http://uk.reuters.com/article/us-brazil- space-idUKKBN0OV22C20150615. Accessed 15 Decem- ber 2015.

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other than confirmed LEO access capability the political implications that such coopera- for very small payloads.135 tion entails, international exploitation cannot be expected to be pursued at a significant 3.6.4 Israel level in the coming years. The rationale of the Israeli space programme 3.6.5 North Korea is the operational needs of its military forces, in the context of the ongoing conflicts in the The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea Middle-Eastern region, and to ensure non- space programme was initiated in the 1980s, dependence on foreign capabilities. In par- with the foundation of the Korean Committee ticular, the need to place into orbit small re- of Space Technology (KCST), a state-owned connaissance satellites (Ofeq series) led to agency responsible for the development and the development of the Shavit launch vehi- operation of the country’s space activities. cles, based on the Jericho 2 ICBM technology, Following the signature of the Outer Space itself originally derived from the French Das- Treaty and the Registration Convention in sault MD-620. 2009, the Supreme People’s Assembly adopted the Law on Space Development in The Israeli space sector has thus been wholly 2013, creating the National Aerospace Devel- characterized by military purposes since its opment Administration (NADA). With very inception in 1981, followed shortly thereafter little information publically available, the by the foundation of the Israeli Space Agency country’s overall space programme is still (ISA) in 1983. In 2013, within the framework unclear, due to the fact that its launchers of a new space policy, the two-year budget programme heavily overlaps with missile and for ISA was significantly increased (approxi- ICBM development. Officially, however, the mately from € 2 to 38 million), with the aim focus is on developing Earth Observation of creating a civil space programme and systems. boosting the competitiveness of Israel’s space industry. The initiative was reportedly suc- Having acquired Soviet SCUD missile tech- cessful, achieving in 2014 its goal to catch a nology in the 1960s, in 1998 North Korea $ 1 billion share of the worldwide space mar- launched its first space vehicle, Taepodong-1, ket well before the target of 5 years. It must heavily based on ICBM-level missile technol- be noted that while national space policy is ogy. This first, unsuccessful, launch was fol- defined by ISA, a civilian authority, Israel’s lowed after a decade by two launches of the space launch capability and development are Taepodong-2 vehicle in 2009 and 2012, still driven by the military. which both failed to place into orbit their ex- perimental Earth Observation payloads. In Having reached autonomous capability to 2012, North Korea ultimately succeeded in reach LEO with small satellites (approx. 400 launching a small, 100 Kg payload into LEO Kg to 700 Km), and with infrequent national with the Taepodong-2 (or -3) vehicle. payloads launches (on average one every 3 While the performance of Uhna-3 seems to to 4 years), Israel has also sought to com- be very limited, in 2012 North Korea pre- mercialize Shavit on international markets. sented plans for of a more capable Uhna-9 Since its main launch site, Palmachim Air vehicle, possibly being developed since 2006. Force base, is reserved for national institu- A few days after its controversial fourth nu- tional missions only, and prograde orbits are clear test, in February 2016 North Korea an- not allowed due to concerns regarding the nounced the successful launch of a small trajectory of the launch vehicle over densely satellite, Kwangmyongsong-4, using its populated areas and critical territories, Israel Unha-type rocket.136 It is, however, manifest has explored the possibility of launching that these activities are mainly intended to Shavit from foreign launch spaceports, such support Pyongyang’s brinkmanship strategy as Cape Canaveral in the U.S. or Alcantara in vis-à-vis the international community. Brazil. Nevertheless, those initiatives have not been pursued to their end, inter alia be- Further development of the North Korean cause Israel considers the Shavit launchers to launcher programme is expected to continue be a national strategic asset. at an unpredictable pace, considering that the current launcher expertise level is still With Shavit-2 meeting Israel’s national strongly based on old Russian missile tech- launch requirements, and commercialization nology, the difficult economic conditions of having to rely on foreign launch sites, with all the country, and the isolation and sanctions imposed by the international community, 135 See for example: Clark, Stephen. “Iranian satellite successfully placed into orbit”. Spaceflight Now. 2 Febru- 136 Karako, Thomas. “North Korea’s February 2016 Satel- ary 2015. Web. lite Launch”. Center for Strategic and International Studies. http://spaceflightnow.com/2015/02/02/iranian-satellite- Web. https://csis.org/publication/north-koreas-february- successfully-placed-in-orbit/. Accessed 16 April 2015. 2016-satellite-launch-0. Accessed 22 February 2015.

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with the notable exception of its cooperation 2.137 With a payload performance of 1,500 with Iran. Kg, it would allow Korea to autonomously launch its KOMPSAT-class satellites. Following a feasibility review of space development 3.6.6 South Korea projects, triggered by the two consecutive South Korea’s space programme aims pri- failures of KSLV-1, South Korea decided to marily at developing autonomous expertise in push to achieve domestic space access in- space technology, particularly domestic stead of buying 10 Russian KSLV-1 first launch vehicles, Earth Observation and mete- stages as initially planned. Subsequently, the orology. In this context, South Korea seeks development of KSLV-2 experienced a major recognition as a space power both at regional acceleration at the end of 2013, with in- and global levels, with an expansion strategy creased funding and the appointment of a that foresees a continuous increase both in South Korean industrial prime contractor. It funding and manpower for the space sector. aims at flight tests in 2017 and full capability in 2020. The infrastruc- Since 2005, South Korea’s government has ture will also be upgraded accordingly by the established and updated a National Space end of the decade. Plan every five years. It is currently imple- menting its 2nd Space Development Promo- The long-term vision for access to space also tion Basic Plan, approved in 2011 and cover- foresees an evolved launch vehicle in 2030 ing the 2012-2016 period. To reach the es- (3,000 Kg to GTO) and a heavy-lift vehicle in tablished objectives, the Korea Aerospace 2040. Considering the continuous budget and Research Institute (KARI), which is in charge workforce increases, the success in fulfilling of the civilian space programme, has estab- previous National Vision objectives, good lished a 20-year, long-term approach, further economic stability and a strong business broken down into two segments, with 2010 drive in the country, South Korea is expected and 2020 milestones. to enter the commercial launchers market at some point, although the timing of such an In the launchers sector, South Korea has event and the competitiveness of its launch- pursued the development of the KSLV-1 (Ko- ers remain difficult to estimate at this stage. rea Space Launch Vehicle, also known as Naro-1) small launch vehicle in cooperation with Russia, building upon know-how and 3.6.7 Ukraine domestic capabilities initially developed Until 25 years ago, the Ukrainian space sec- through the Korea’s Sounding Rocket Pro- tor was an part of the former Soviet gramme (KSR). Union’s space programme. As such, it was The bilateral agreement between KARI and not designed to be self-reliant but instead Khrunichev signed in 2004 provided for joint focused on developing and manufacturing development of KSLV-1 in which Russia sup- ICBMs and launch vehicles, according to the plied the first stage, which has commonalities general paradigm of decentralization and with the Angara first stage, while the second regional specialization that characterized stage was based on Korean technology de- USSR industry of the time. On the dissolution rived from the KSR. After two launch failures of the Soviet Union around one-third of the in 2009 and 2010, KSLV-1, with an initial whole USSR space industrial base resided in performance of just 100 Kg to LEO, achieved Ukrainian territory, but the country notably success in its third launch in 2013. The suc- lacked the satellite manufacturing sector, as cessful launch of KSLV-1 allowed KARI to well as launch infrastructures. complete its first milestone of the plan, which Since the late 1990s, international coopera- included also acquiring autonomous capabili- tion has been a key element for the devel- ties in Earth Observation and multipurpose opment of the Ukrainian space sector and its systems (achieved with three KOMPSAT and overall space policy. Cooperation agreements COMS-1 satellites), and the development of were signed in 1998 between Ukraine and key infrastructures including launch facilities Russia, and later with Kazakhstan for the use and an associated (Naro and development of Baikonur launch pads. Space Center). Examples of international joint ventures suc- In accordance with the goals outlined in its

“Vision 2020” plan, such as “independent 137 development of space launch vehicle with “Next Phase of Korea Space Launch Vehicle II, Imple- mentation of Korean Model of Space Launch Vehicle II high reliability and high efficiency”, in 2011 Development System”. Korea Aerospace Research Insti- South Korea started developing an upgraded, tute Press Release. 12 July 2015. Web. fully-Korean made LEO vehicle named KSLV- http://www.kari.re.kr/cop/bbs/BBSMSTR_000000000031/s electBoardArti- cle.do?nttId=1205&pageIndex=1&mno=sitemap_02&searc hCnd=&searchWrd= . Accessed 2 December 2015.

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cessfully pursued by Ukraine to commercially 3.7.1 Autonomy, Commercialisation and Privati- exploit its launch technology and vehicles are sation of Access to Space ISC Kosmotras, Sea Launch, SIS, the Cy- clone-Alcantara programme with Brazil, the In all countries with autonomous access to provision of the AVUM upper stage motor for space, the development of launch systems Vega and the first stage for Orbital Sciences’ has been at least initially driven and funded Antares. by “governments, not companies, for funda- mentally national rather than commercial Ukraine’s space policy is defined by the Na- reasons (i.e. assured access to space capa- tional Space Programme, usually established bilities, avoiding reliance on foreign nations for five-year periods, and developed by the for space transportation needs, driving eco- National Space Agency of Ukraine (NSAU) nomic growth and technological progress, (State Space Agency of Ukraine since 2010). and national pride)”.138 Traditionally, A long-term national space policy plan for the autonomous access to space has been period until 2032 was approved by SSAU in achieved either through indigenous develop- March 2011, this plan aiming to achieve the ment during the Cold War (U.S., Russia, long-term goals through four implementation Europe), or through bilateral cooperation with phases. The policy foresees development another country so as to reduce development within the frame of international cooperation; time and overcome issues of non-proliferation development of launch vehicles and subsys- restrictions (Japan, South Korea, India). tems, in particular rocket engines; extension Given that the development of launch capa- of Ukrainian presence in the commercial bilities has historically derived from ICBMs, launch services market by virtue of its large technology transfer issues have played a array of vehicles (-2SLB, Zenit-3SLB, crucial role when a country is a participant in Zenit-3SL, Dnepr, Cyclone 4, and Air the Missile Technology Control Regime Launch). (MTCR) (See Table 8). The current status of Ukrainian space activi- Russia has been at the forefront of leveraging ties, and of the launcher sector in particular, its launch technology as a means of exercis- is heavily affected by the 2014 Crimean cri- ing influence. To illustrate, it has transferred sis, and ongoing acute political tensions with entire plans of its Scud missile to DPR Korea; Russia. The crisis led to the decision of the it has provided cryogenic engine technology Ukrainian leadership to discontinue all coop- to India, and an unspecified liquid upper eration ties in the defence sector between the stage to Brazil; it has designed South Korea’s two countries, and as a consequence both the KSLV-1 first stage; and has marketed several Zenit and Dnepr programmes have been sus- engine technologies to the U.S. pended, as well as other key activities in the delivery of space control systems and raw Conversely, the U.S. has kept a rather hesi- materials to Russia. These measures were tant profile with respect to bilateral coopera- followed by the decision of Roscosmos to tion in launcher technology, though the un- exclude all Ukrainian vehicles from the Rus- derlying objective is the same as Russia’s: sian Federal Space Programme. The gap that advance – and defend – national interests. now separates two countries that were suc- Apart from the transfer of Delta technology to cessfully and closely cooperating until a few Japan in the early 1970s, the U.S. has gener- years ago is increasingly widening. ally tried to prevent the dissemination of sensitive launcher technology, by inter alia adopting a stringent regime of export control regulations. In addition to that, it is of inter- 3.7 Policies and Politics of est to note that the US has also exerted po- Access to Space: an Over- litical pressure to prevent the development of launch capabilities in several countries. For view instance, Argentina, South Africa and Brazil have been deterred in their efforts to develop This chapter has so far provided a vertical autonomous launch capabilities on the basis overview of the space transportation sector in of MTCR adherence considerations and the established and emerging space launch pow- potential use of technology for obtaining ers. When comparing their policies and ongo- ICBM capacity that could threaten U.S. inter- ing development efforts from an overall, ests. transversal perspective, a number of general trends can be outlined.

138 Cit. Berteau, David and Gregory Kiley (project direc- tors). “National Security and the Commercial Space Sec- tor. An Analysis and Evaluation of Options for Improving Commercial Access to Space”. Washington: Center for Strategic and International Studies, July 2010.

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Like the U.S., Europe has also been rather Moving back to the general dynamics in the inactive when it comes to technology trans- field, it can be noted that once launch capa- fers. The most relevant exception is the bilities have been established in a country, transfer of Ariane’s Viking 2 and Viking 4 the commercialisation of the vehicle on the engine technology to India, approved by international market (i.e. the provision of France in the late 1970s. Once indigenized, launch services to customers that have not these technologies have been used to support contributed to its development) has been the development the PLSV and GSLV launch- generally pursued, so as to generate econo- ers. The utilization of launch technology as a mies of scale and allow the amortization of tool of European S&T based diplomacy, how- fixed operational costs over a larger number ever, has never been really explored to its of customers and create revenue. While full potential, primarily due to the rather commercialisation efforts have not been a complex intergovernmental approach so far priority for launch vehicles that have had pursued by European countries to implement access to a large national government market their launcher strategy, as well as to the of- (e.g. the U.S.), in contexts such as Europe it ten diverging strategic views of ESA Member has been key to ensure that the flight sched- States and a degree of deference to the US. ule remains full and, consequently, that the capacity of the launcher system is utilised to an extent that would be impossible to achieve Country Country Component if launches were exclusively institutional. of desti- Launcher of origin / Motor nation When pursued, the commercialisation of launchers has been generally accompanied by USA Thor/Delta Japan and H1 a privatisation of operations. Following the Viking2 and PLSV - example of Arianespace, the major launch France India 4 GSLV powers have opted to transfer the exploita- tion of their launchers to private or semi- Russia RD-180 US Atlas V private entities, as summarised in Table 9. Russia RD-181 US Antares Russia C-12 India GSLV Mk-I Angara tech- South Russia KSLV-I nology Korea Russia RD-251/2 Ukraine Cyclone Ukraine RD-869 Europe Vega China LM plans Iran Safir

Table 8: Relevant worldwide launchers’ technology trans- fers in the past decade. (Table not exhaustive)

Country Launcher Funding entity Operating entity Atlas, Delta DoD United States Falcon SpaceX * SpaceX Antares Orbital Sciences Corp. * Orbital Sciences Corp. Ariane Europe ESA / CNES / ASI Arianespace Vega Proton Roscosmos Khrunichev/ILS Russia Rockot TsSKB Progress/Starsem Soyuz Dnepr SSAU and Roscosmos ISC Kosmotras Russia/Ukraine Zenit-3SL Russian Space Forces Sea Launch, Zenit-2&3 SLB Japan HII-A & B JAXA Mitsubishi Heavy Industries China Long March People’s Liberation Army CGWIC PLSV INDIA ISRO Antrix GLSV * Indirect funding provided through DoD/NASA.

Table 9: The privatization of launchers' operations.139

139 Source: “Government Space Markets 2013”. A Euroconsult report. 2013: p.180.

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The progressive shift of responsibility from former to complement the performance of the institutional sector to the private one the ESA launchers Ariane and Vega, and the initially involved only the commercial exploi- latter to benefit from improved access to tation of the launcher itself, but in recent commercial markets and the improved per- years it has been expanded to include also formance of the Soyuz launcher when being development efforts, with such companies as launched much closer to Equator. At that SpaceX, MHI, and ASL becoming increasingly time, it was also in the interests of both active. This trend, however, can so far be Europe and Russia to boost their relationship, observed only in the U.S., Europe and Japan. and cooperation in the launcher sector was seen as a tool for pursuing this objective. In Notwithstanding this progressive shift of re- 2003, the Alcantara Cyclone Space joint ven- sponsibility and increase of private funding, ture (ACS) was created between Brazil and both the development and commercial exploi- Ukraine with the aim of providing an equato- tation of launchers continue to be politically rial launch base for Cyclone 4. While recent and financially backed by interested govern- hurdles of a financial and political nature are ments through a variety of means, including now hindering the advancement of the ACS laws, policies and practices, including pro- project and more broad cooperative ar- curement practices. The complex interaction rangements, the resolve to obtain access to a and influence exercised by both market and launch base close to the equator continues to non-market forces in the commercial launch be a driver for international cooperation, as industry will be detailed in Chapter 4 below. evident from the negotiations that are con- What is of interest to note here is that inter- tinuing. As noted, Brazil and Israel are nego- national cooperative undertakings have taken tiating an agreement for the setting up of a place over the years, responding to both mobile launch infrastructure for the launch of commercial and political drivers. Shavit from Alcantara. In addition, there is an Cooperative arrangements during exploitation increasing number of countries that do not have shown a varying degree of intensity, have indigenous launch capacities but are ranging from mere assistance in commerciali- actively looking for launch service providers zation to launch hosting. The first interna- willing to operate their vehicles from a launch tional joint ventures were created in the mid- base in their territory, as is the case of South 1990s with the aim of exploiting launch vehi- Africa and possibly the United Arab Emirates. cles developed in the former USSR. Their Finally, another relevant area of cooperation creation proved to be a good compromise can be seen in the area of back-up agree- between divergent interests, as they allowed ments. In 2003 for instance, Arianespace, Western countries to maintain some control Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI) and Boeing over new competitors in the launch market, Launch Services signed a mutual backup while enabling the Russian and Ukrainian agreement for commercial satellite launches. partners with insufficient national budgets to The agreement established the Launch Ser- secure funding and acquire hands-on com- vices Alliance (LSA) that involved the Ariane mercialization know-how. The four major 5 launcher, the H-IIA launcher and Sea Joint Ventures, namely International Launch Launch. The backup agreement does not Services (ILS), Eurockot Launch Services, involve manufacturing. After the bankruptcy Sea Launch and Starsem, were set up be- of Sea Launch, in 2006 Arianespace and MHI tween 1995 and 1997. In addition to these, a signed a new agreement that “combines the joint venture within the former Soviet Union, satellite launch offerings for Ariane 5 and the the International Space Company (ISC) Kos- H-IIA and both companies can jointly propose motras, was created in 1997 by Russian, launch services with the flexibility of launch- Ukrainian and Kazakh entities in order to ing a satellite on either of the two vehicles to ensure continuity of launch operations. guarantee launch dates for commercial satel- Several international cooperation initiatives lites”.140 Although no backup mission has, as also covered development/exploitation of yet, taken place, this agreement has been ground infrastructure. The utilization of viewed by both Europe and Japan as a useful launch sites on foreign territory has been of model, from both a technical and political particular relevance for Russia, which has perspective. signed an agreement with Kazakhstan in order to ensure a long-term lease of the Baikonur Cosmodrome and its associated 3.7.2 Ongoing Developments facilities until 2050 at an annual fee of $ 115 Beside the general dynamic presented in the million. Particularly noteworthy is also the previous section, a number of concomitant successful exploitation of Soyuz-ST from the GSC. As already highlighted in Chapter 2.1.2, 140 this cooperative undertaking was of interest Robinson, Jana. “Europe-Japan Strategic Partnership: The Space Dimension”. ESPI Report 40. Vienna. April to both Europe and Russia, as it enabled the 2012.

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trends can be observed today. All major formance and reliability. Cost savings are spacefaring nations are in the process of up- being pursued through a variety of means, grading their flagship families of launchers including the development of new modular and launch infrastructure, primarily driven by families of launchers that maximise common the need to reduce costs and increase com- expendable elements (in all major space mercial competitiveness, while strengthening launch powers); systematic reorganisation of national autonomy and expanding existing industrial governance and streamlining capabilities to accommodate more ambitious manufacturing processes (mainly in Europe, goals. Japan, Russia), the fostering of disruptive technological innovation (mainly in the U.S.); Following two decades in which international and breaking up past situations of monopoly joint ventures were common and successful (in the U.S.). within the global launch industry (e.g. ILS, Sea Launch, Eurockot), the current trend is Upgraded or brand new launch vehicles from for spacefaring nations to strengthen and all major nations will enter service in the next increase national autonomy in achieving ac- ten years (see Table 10), while current cess to space, without having to rely on fac- launch systems will be progressively phased tors such as foreign-made rocket engines or out. In addition, the club of nations with foreign spaceports that could hamper the autonomous access to space could expand in realization of their own space programmes the future with the entrance of Brazil and due to unfavourable geopolitical develop- Argentina. As detailed below in Chapter 4, ments. This trend is being observed in the future supply conditions will possibly lead to a U.S., Europe and Russia. Additionally, the situation of overcapacity and increased com- new spaceports being constructed in Russia petition among launch service providers. and China will grant them more autonomy, as After decades of complete reliance on gov- well as additional redundancy to respond to a ernment funding to develop launch vehicles, potential need to increase launch frequency. a new paradigm is gradually emerging in the Moreover, the trend of using launch capabili- launch industry of several countries. As men- ties as a geopolitical tool is growing. Instead tioned above, in upcoming years private ac- of proposing technology transfer agreements, tors are positioned to become even bigger several countries such as China and Japan stakeholders in the development and exploi- are offering or trying to offer to countries of tation of launch vehicles, principally in the geopolitical interest turn-key packages com- U.S. but, to a lesser extent, also in Europe posed of the launch of a rocket and satellite and Japan. In contrast, in countries such as of own manufacture. Russia and China, the development and ex- ploitation of launch vehicles are expected to A second major trend characterizing all cur- remain firmly under the control of state- rent development efforts is the imperative of owned companies. achieving cost reduction. This follows decades in which launcher development was mostly driven by the goal of ensuring increased per-

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4. Current Dynamics and Future Trends

Building upon the analyses and findings of centrated in the pioneering space powers, the the previous chapters, this chapter will put U.S.S.R. and the U.S. Even though some the spotlight on the major features and dy- other countries started to perform their first namics shaping the global satellite launch launches quite early (France in 1965, Japan industry. Starting with an overview of histori- in 1970, China in 1970, the cal data and trends in space launch activities, in 1971, India in 1980), their level of activity, the chapter will provide an analysis of the even combined, remained well behind that of global launch market, with particular empha- the two superpowers. As late as 1989, the sis on the complex interaction between mar- U.S.S.R. and the U.S. still accounted for 90% ket and non-market forces.141 The third part of of the total number of launches performed the chapter will be devoted to thoroughly (87 out of 96 launches). identifying and discussing key unfolding Diversification in the number of countries trends and developments that will likely af- conducting orbital launches began to emerge fect the supply and demand conditions of in the 1990s and has progressively consoli- access to space over the next ten years. dated over the past 10 years. As shown in Table 10, there was a total of 777 launches conducted by launch providers from Russia, 4.1 Launch Activity Outlook the U.S., Europe, China, Japan, India, Iran, the multinational company Sea Launch, Is- During the first 30 years of the space age, rael, South Korea and North Korea in this orbital launch activity remained heavily con- period.

Multi- Year Russia U.S. Europe China Japan India Iran Others Total national 2006 25 18 5 6 6 1 - 5 - 66 2007 26 19 6 10 2 3 - 1 2 69 2008 26 15 6 11 1 3 1 6 - 69 2009 29 24 7 6 3 2 1 5 1 78 2010 31 15 6 15 2 3 1 - 1 74 2011 31 18 7 19 3 3 1 2 - 84 2012 24 13 10 19 2 2 3 3 2 78 2013 32 19 7 15 3 3 - 1 1 81 2014 32 23 11 16 4 4 - 1 1 92 2015 26 20 11 19 4 5 1 - - 86 Total 282 184 76 136 30 29 8 24 8 777

Table 10: Worldwide orbital launches between 2006 and 2015.142

In spite of a significant drop in launch activity accounting for 76 launches and a 9.8% share since the early 1990s, Russia continued to be of the total number. the world leader in the number of launches in Taken together, these four launch powers the period 2006-2015. It performed 282 undertook the 87.3% of all launches per- launches, accounting for 36.3% of the total. formed in the period 2006-2015. The remain- The U.S. followed in second position, with a ing 12.7% was split between Japan (30 23.7% share, while China, with its 136 launches), India (29), Multinational Sea launches, had the third largest share, 17.5% of the total. Europe was in fourth position, 142 Others: Israel (2 launches in 2007, 1 in 2014) South Korea (1 launch in 2009, 1 in 2010, 1 in 2013); North 141 All data in Chapter 4.1 have been compiled using ESPI Korea (2 launches in 2012). Out of the 777 total launches Space Policy, Issues and Trends database, and Federal during this decade, 720 successfully placed their payload Aviation Administration Annual Reports. in orbit.

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Launch AG (24), Iran (8), South Korea (3), The 777 launches performed in the period North Korea (2) and Israel (2). 2006-2015 put into orbit a total of 1688 spacecraft. Chart 3 shows that the number of Table 10 also provides useful indications on spacecraft per year has substantially in- the trends in launch activity over the past 10 creased, going from 117 in 2006 to 265 in years. It shows in particular a progressive 2015, with a peak of 296 in 2014. The expo- rebound of orbital launches, with the total nential increase in the number of payloads number increasing from 66 launches in 2006 launched in the last few years is due to the to 86 in 2015. Launch activity has now grown advent of very platforms (less to regain the level of the early 1990s – when than 10 Kg), which allows a larger number of the overall number of launches was around spacecraft per launch. Approximately, more 90 per year – though it is still far from reach- than half of the spacecraft launched in 2013, ing the peak of 1967 when 139 launches 2014 and 2015 were very small satellites. were performed.

Chart 3: Number of launches vs. spacecraft, 2006 - 2015.

to 64 in 2015, while the number of commer- Commercial and Non-Commercial Launches cial launches has fluctuated from a peak of 28 in 2008 to a trough of 18 in 2011. The vast majority of launches has been for institutional customers, whose demand con- On average, there have been 22 commercial tinues to account for the largest part of the launches per year against 55 non-commercial global launch market. Of the 777 launches launches. The ratio of commercial to non- conducted during the past 10 years, 552 commercial launches thus remains highly were undertaken for institutional customers imbalanced, commercial launches accounting on a captive basis, while 225 were commer- for only the 29% of the global launch market. cial launches. The Federal Aviation Admini- stration (FAA) defines a commercial launch as Commercial Launches by Orbit “a launch that is internationally competed The biggest share of commercial launch ser- (including institutional ones), or privately- vices is the launching of GEO telecommunica- financed”.143 tion satellites. Even though the total number Chart 4 shows that over the last 10 years the of payloads launched into GTO is lower than number of non-commercial launches per year the number of non-GTO payloads, in GEO the has progressively increased from 45 in 2006 share of payloads accessible to launch pro- viders through competition is larger than the

143 non-accessible ones, as the demand is driven Cit. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). “Commercial by commercial satellite operators like SES Space Transportation: 2014 Year In Review.” Washington D.C. February 2015

ESPI Report 56 54 March 2016 The European Launchers between Commerce and Geopolitics

Chart 4: Commercial versus non-commercial launches, 2006 - 2015.

(10% of the total demand for GTO payloads 10 years (Chart 6), Russia has a substantial over the past 10 years), Intelsat (8%), and lead, with 93 launches, accounting for the Eutelsat (6%). 41.3% of the total number. Europe was in second position, with 53 launches and a Conversely, the non-GTO launch market has 23.6% share. With 46 commercial launches, been mainly driven by an institutional de- the U.S. had the third largest share, account- mand largely captive to domestic launch ser- ing for 20.4% of the total. The Multinational vices. Over the last 10 years, the strongest Sea Launch enterprise followed in fourth po- demand has come from the government of sition with 27 launches and a 10.2% share. Russia (32% of total demand), the U.S. China, India and Japan split the remaining (25%) and China (19%). Launches open to 4.5% share of commercial launches. competition in this segment are generally driven by the demand of countries with no launch capacity. Commercial Launch Revenues Chart 5 shows a breakdown of commercial Revenue from the 225 commercial launches launches by orbit type for the last 10 years. over the last ten years amounted to an esti- mated $ 18.4 billion. With a total of $ 9.34 Out of a total of 225 commercial launches, billion, Europe earned the highest amount of there were 148 launches to GTO and 77 commercial launch revenue during this pe- launches to non-GTO orbits. There was a riod, corresponding to 45% of total revenue. brief jump in the number of commercial GTO With $ 5.56 billion earned by its 93 commer- launches in 2008 and 2009, but this trend cial launches, Russia had the second largest has not continued over the past six years, as amount, accounting for 27% of the total. The the number of commercial GEO launches U.S. was in third position, with total revenue decreased back to 15 in 2010 and to 10 in of $ 3.28 billion (16%), followed closely by 2014. The number of non-GTO launches has Sea Launch, which earned $ 1.87 billion fluctuated, between a low of 3 in 2005 and a (9%). China’s four commercial launches gen- high of 12 in 2014. erated revenue of $ 300 million (2%), while India earned $ 92 million from its two com- Commercial Launches by Country mercial launches in 2007 and 2014. Finally, Japan performed its first commercial launch When looking at the commercial launches in 2015, generating revenue of $ 113 million performed by specific countries over the past (See Chart 7).

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Chart 5: Commercial launches by orbit type, 2006 - 2015.

Chart 6: Commercial launches by country, 2006 - 2015, and historical average market shares.

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Chart 7: Commercial launch revenues in M$, 2006 - 2015.

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the total cost of launching, the insurance rate is indeed a major concern for commercial sat- ellite operators. Availability and minimum 4.2 The Structure and Dy- delays in the time from shipment to launch are namics of the Space likewise key factors. The specific performance of a vehicle, its flexibility in orbit injection Launch Market strategy, in handling delays and in successfully integrating the payload with the vehicle (see Annex 4), as well as technology-security safe- 4.2.1 Geo-economics of Launchers guards, are also essential. Finally, the envi- In light of the limited number of players ronmental footprint – on both Earth and space launching commercial payloads and of the – is progressively becoming a relevant consid- small number of commercial launches per- eration. The criteria and priorities for selecting formed each year, providing an assessment of a launch service, as defined by commercial the commercial market for launch services satellite operator EUTELSAT, are presented in through an analysis of demand and supply Chart 8. conditions could appear a relatively straight- What needs to be highlighted is that even by forward exercise. In fact, such an assessment introducing a number of approximations and is highly problematic, as the typical economic translating all these factors into costs and measurements of comparing the price paid for prices, market conditions for launch services a commodity with the quantity bought would – prove to be atypical at best when looking at in the case of launch vehicles – be encum- the overall demand and supply dynamics. bered by a number of factors. Unlike typical customer-oriented services, To begin with, there are practical complexities which respond predictably to price changes, in the construction of a meaningful set of eco- the overall demand for launch services has nomic data, because: a) there is no standard been rather irresponsive to the conditions on destination in space for all payloads and no the supply side. As aptly underlined in a study clear separation between the different market on the commercial space sector by the Center segments (LEO, MEO, GEO, etc.); b) different for Strategic and International Studies, a “brief launch vehicles have different capabilities in review of launch trends compared with launch terms of mass, orbit and fairing configura- prices suggests rather strongly that factors tions; c) even for the same basic vehicle, each other than price dominate the launch demand launch is unique, since each payload and cus- equation. Launch prices were fairly constant tomer generally requires customised services; from 1993 to about 2000, but launches fluctu- d) a given launch may include multiple pay- ated from a peak of 35 in 1996 to a valley of loads (dual manifesting), with the secondary 16 in 2001, as prices were falling. Prices fell payload deeply discounted in price; e) com- through 2003 as the number of launches fell, mercial satellite operators may negotiate so- and launches increased in 2007, as prices called Multiple Launch Agreements (MLA) with increased”.147 Thus, the impact of price on the providers, as inter alia done by Intelsat, SES, overall demand has not been relevant. In eco- and ;144 f) launch prices vary in what 145 nomic terms, the demand curve for launch is actually included in the launch service. services has been inelastic so far, meaning What further clouds the market picture is that that improvements on the supply side have the price of a launch is only one of the many not been able to stimulate additional demand, considerations guiding the selection of a which on the contrary, remains most closely launch provider, and not always the most im- related to overall growth in commercial space portant one. An equally important factor is the applications, (particularly telecommunications) reliability of a launcher, given that the key that is, the capabilities provided by satellites. rationale behind the selection of the launch This paradigm may, however, change if lower provider is to ensure the success of the mis- cost satellites become more prominent or if sion and that the selection of a “vehicle with launch prices decrease in a more radical man- high reliability translates into reduced insur- ner. ance rates for companies who choose them”.146 Representing a substantial part of Report Topic. Web. https://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/ 144 Euroconsult. “Satellites To Be Built & Launched By ast/media/q22001.pdf. Accessed 10 September 2015. 2022”. 2013: p. 111 147 See Berteau, David and Gregory Kiley (project direc- 145 Herzfeld, Henry R, Ray A. Williamson, Nicolas Peter. tors). “National Security and the Commercial Space Sec- “Launch Vehicles: an Economic Perspective”. Space tor. An Analysis and Evaluation of Options for Improving Policy Institute. Washington D.C. September 2005: p.9 Commercial Access to Space”. Washington: Center for 146 Cit. Federal Aviation Administration. “Selecting a Strategic and International Studies, July 2010, Launch Vehicle: What Factors Do Commercial Satellite http://csis.org/publication/national-security-andcommercial- Customers Consider?” Second Quarter 2001. Quarterly space-sector.

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1) Flexibility means ability to offer orbit-raising strategies minimizing duration and/or propellant consumption 2) Technical services with respect to compatibility with spacecraft: fairing volume, shock, vibration, RF … 3) Operational simplicity refers to duration of mission integration analysis and launch campaign

Chart 8: Criteria and priorities for selecting a launch service according to commercial satellite provider EUTELSAT.148

When looking at the factors associated with It could be argued that the inelasticity of supply capacity, these even more clearly launch demand mainly stems from the reveal that launchers cannot be treated as fact that supply improvements have al- “just another commodity”. Indeed, due to the ways been rather marginal. Although predominant influence of non-market forces, since the early 1970s it has been as- the market conditions for launch services sumed that access to space will become remain far from truly commercial. much less expensive over the time, As a strategic enabler for the conduct of any launch prices have historically remained military, civil and commercial space endeav- within the same order of magnitude. This our, as well as constituting a key element for is primarily due to the unchanged under- promoting technological and industrial capa- lying technology of chemical propellants, bilities and fostering national pride, access to the long R&D investment cycle and the space has always been within the remit of relatively small quantity of launchers pro- national policy and decision-making. Gov- duced, which has prevented the creation ernment needs and missions have driven of true economies of scale etc. Thus, a launch capability developments irrespective drastic reduction in terms of launch of the market conditions to achieve what are prices, as a result of technological innova- essentially non-economic goals and objec- tion and more profound production effi- tives. In order to ensure the availability and ciencies (see Chapter 4.3), could induce sustainability of autonomous access to space, demand to become more elastic. governments provide foundational support to their launchers, thus retaining a high degree of freedom of action at international level. This is shown inter alia by the lack of a multi-

148 Source: Mussalian, Raphaël. “Launch Service Re- quirements: From the point of view of satellite communica- tion operators”. Presentation at “International Conference on the European Space Launchers”, Paris, 3-4 November 2015.

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lateral trading regime and the fact that Mem- limits or quotas for foreign launches) as well ber States of the WTO have neither listed as the role of the Export Credit Agencies space transport services among their obliga- (ECAs) should be recalled. ECAs are govern- tions under the Agreement on Government mental or quasi-governmental agencies that Procurement, nor have made specific com- inter alia facilitate the commercialization of mitments within the General Agreement of launch services either through the provision Trade in Services (GATS) framework. of direct loans, as in the case of the U.S. Export-Import Bank, or by providing govern- Not only development, but also subsequent ments with guarantees for loans, as for the exploitation has been sustained by the public French-based Coface, the Russian EXIAR, and sector. In this regard, it is of interest to note the Chinese Sinosure. Thus the more inter- that no single launch service provider has ested governments back ECAs, the more a been so far able to sustain itself only on the given launcher increases its possibility of basis of the market for launch services. Public gaining a share of the commercial market. support during exploitation on the commer- cial market has typically materialised in two All in all, the extent of public support is so forms: the first is the guarantee of a stable wide and engrained in the structure of the and predictable launch business base that is launch business that even for internationally ensured through the captivity of institutional competed launch contracts, the commercial payloads to domestic launch systems;149 the space launch market cannot be aptly labelled second is the direct injection of public funding as a “free and fair” trade environment. In that compensates the limited demand by addition to that, another important piece of covering a part of the exploitation costs. evidence of the dominance of non-market Governments typically consider these costs forces is offered by such security-related as “sunk”, or unrecoverable. As a conse- issues as non-proliferations concerns and quence the actual cost of a launcher in terms government protection of space technology of development and operations is not neces- through export control regulations. sarily reflected in the offering price, as would These measures have had – and continue to happen if launchers were “just another com- have – a deep impact on the global launch modity”. However, even if commercial cus- market, because they can strongly affect the tomers do not ultimately pay the expenses ability of launch vehicles to compete interna- that would arise in a purely market-driven tionally by de facto restricting their potential system, this modus operandi is not disadvan- customers. While not directly intended to put tageous for governments that sustain produc- a limit on global competition, export controls tion and exploitation costs. Indeed, commer- regulations ultimately have the effect of ex- cial customers ultimately ensure that the cluding some competitors and rewarding oth- flight schedule remains full and, conse- ers. It is of interest to note that although the quently, that the capacity of the launcher majority of spacefaring nations have adopted system is utilised to an extent that would not export control measures for sensitive items, be possible to achieve if launches were exclu- U.S. export license schemes – and in particu- sively institutional. In short, thanks to com- lar ITAR – remain those that have the great- mercial demand, launcher systems can be est impact globally. Since most commercial produced and operated in numbers large satellites make use of U.S.-manufactured enough to make prices more convenient for components, these measures are an effective institutional customers. tool for controlling the participation of non- The predominant role of government in the U.S. commercial launch service providers in launch industry thus has the effect of hiding the commercial launch market and thus for investment and supporting costs, and clarifies ultimately freezing potential competitors out why launch price setting is structurally differ- of it. To illustrate, the successful commer- ent between the government that developed cialisation of the Chinese LM rockets on the the launch system and other users of the global market continues to be primarily hin- vehicles that did not fund its development. dered by U.S. refusals to release export li- censes for their payloads. Among the variety of tools national govern- ments deploy to sustain the competitiveness In light of all these considerations, it be- of their launch vehicles, the utilisation of comes evident that the market – or more policy directives and regulations that are de properly the markets – for launch services facto intended to limit foreign competition cannot be properly assessed through the (see for instance the adoption of quantitative application of a purely economic approach. The playing field is shaped as much by geo- political as market forces and its dynamics 149 This type of support enables amortizing fixed costs over thus respond to what can be defined as a more launches and enhances the competitiveness of a geo-economic paradigm – to use the termi- given launcher, because it creates economies of scale that reduce the price of a launcher. nology of Edward Luttwak – i.e. they are the

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result of the interaction between economic shuttle as a commercial launcher.153 In the and political forces.150 While market forces end, the private sector could not compete impact the strategies of launch services pro- with the government-subsidised Shuttle viders, politics heavily shapes the structure of launch prices and the production lines for the the market and the commercial competitive- two ELVS began to close down. After the ness of the players. explosion of the Space Shuttle Challenger in 1986, and the realization that the U.S. could The complex interaction between economic not rely on a single launch system, a presi- and geopolitical drivers becomes more ap- dential directive in August 1986 banned parent when examined in the context of the commercial payloads from the Shuttle (ex- overall evolution of the launch market. This cept for Shuttle-unique payloads) in favour of analysis will also help to better frame current a “mixed-fleet” approach. This policy change and future trends in this highly strategic sec- offered a renewed opportunity for U.S. indus- tor. try to seek commercial customers in competi- tion with Arianespace. In the short term, 4.2.2 The Evolutions of the Launch Service Mar- however, the resulting changes in the U.S. ket commercial launch strategy provided an opening for Europe, and Ariane launchers Historical Overview took advantage of this opportunity. From the mid-1980s, the number of European com- Opportunities to provide launch services on a mercial launches grew significantly and commercial basis began to emerge in the Europe gained the majority share of the early 1980s, with the increase of commercial commercial market, also thanks to the intro- uses of communication satellites and as a duction of the more powerful Ariane 4 in result of two landmark developments world- 1998.154 wide: the creation of Arianespace and the The U.S. first tried to counteract the domi- U.S. decision to commercialize access to nant position of Arianespace through a Sec- space through the use of the Space Shuttle. tion 301 petition initiated in 1985 pursuant to The first commercial launch service contract the Trade Act of 1974.155 The petition, which was signed by Arianespace in 1981 with the was initially filed by the company Transpace U.S. company GTE Spacenet as the client,151 Carrier Inc. (TCI), claimed that Ariane was while the Space Shuttle launched its first unfairly subsidised by European governments commercial payload in November 1982. and accused Arianespace of predatory pricing The U.S. had made the decision in the late and of illegally dumping its launch services on 1970s to migrate all commercial and gov- the U.S. market. The Reagan administration ernmental payloads to the Space Shuttle, so was requested to retaliate by imposing sanc- that the proposed fleet of seven vehicles tions and prohibiting Arianespace from com- could be used to their fullest extent and sig- mercialising its launchers on the U.S. market. nificant cost reductions could be made by However, the commercial and political assault taking advantage of economies of scale.152 In put forward by the Office of U.S. Trade Rep- 1984, the U.S. Congress also passed the resentative ultimately failed, as Europeans Commercial Space Launch Act as a means of were able to demonstrate that their practices encouraging private companies to develop and policies were undertaken also by the U.S. commercial ELVs. All in all, however, the in the provision of launch services through its policy pursued by the U.S. was contradictory. Shuttle Programme. Accordingly the petition On the one hand, the U.S. government was was eventually withdrawn.156 offering to turn over ownership and operation The U.S. thus turned its efforts towards the of existing expendable launch vehicles (Delta establishment of mutually agreed trading and Atlas) to the private sector for commer- rules with Europe. In 1990, President Bush cial use; at the same time, it was pursuing an aggressive policy of marketing the space 153 Cit. Logsdon, John. “Commercial Launch Industry”. Encyclopaedia Britannica online. http://www.britannica.com/ 150 Luttwak uses the word geo-economics to describe the EBchecked/topic/332323/launch- mixture of the logic of conflict with the methods of com- vehicle/272750/Commercial-launch-industry>. Accessed merce that characterises the new world politics in the 12 September 2015. aftermath of the Cold War. Cit. Luttwak, Edward. “From 154 Futron. “The Declining U.S. Role in the Commercial Geopolitical to Geo-economics, Logic of Conflict, Grammar Launch Industry”. Futron Report. June 2005. p.2. of Commerce”. The National Interest, No 20. 1990: p. 17- 155 See Kriege, John. “The History of the European 24. Launchers: an Overview”. In Proceedings of an Interna- 151 Arianespace. Web. http://www.arianespace.com/about- tional Symposium on “The History of the European Space us/milestones.asp. Last accessed 10 September 2015. Agency”. 11-13 November 1998, London. ESA SP-346. 152 Herzfeld, Henry R, Ray A. Williamson, Nicolas Peter. “Launch Vehicles: an Economic Perspective”. Space 1999: p. 69-78. Policy Institute. Washington D.C. September 2005: p.9 156 Ibid: p. 77.

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announced his National Space Policy, setting 1990s European and American vehicles had the stage for “The Rules of the Road” trade reached rough parity in terms of market negotiations.157 Also these talks, however, share: in 1995 there were 8 commercial failed to achieve a mutual understanding on launches by the U.S. compared to seven fair trading practices between the U.S. and European launches.160 European representatives, especially because In order to circumvent part of the restrictions the many military-related issues – that the enclosed in the bilateral agreements and U.S. was not disposed to deal with – eventu- increase their presence on the commercial ally stalled the discussions. marketplace, Russian and Ukrainian entities At this point however, two new players had opted for the creation of the abovementioned tried to step into the commercial launch mar- joint ventures. ILS, Eurockot Launch Ser- ket: China, and the former Soviet Union. The vices, Sea Launch and Starsem were all set entry of these non-market economies en- up between 1995 and 1997. countered great resistance from both the In addition to the commercialization of ex- U.S. and Europe. For one thing, the new Soviet launchers (Proton, Soyuz and Zenit), competition was seen as particularly menac- the mid-1990s also saw the development of a ing because of the low prices it offered. In new generation of U.S. vehicles through the addition, the vast arsenal of launch vehicles Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) maintained in particular by Russia by far ex- programme of the DoD: Boeing’s Delta 4 and ceeded commercial demand during the early ’s Atlas 5. Thus, in the latter 1990s. Finally, considerations on missile pro- half of the 1990s the launch service market liferation continued to raise strong concerns witnessed an expansion of supply, although it despite the end of the Cold War. In order to remained characterized by stable launch cope with the perceived threat and to avoid prices and little price dispersion among dif- potentially disruptive market practices, bilat- ferent providers. This can be in part ex- eral trade agreements were negotiated by the plained by the attitude of the U.S.: on the U.S. with China, Russia and Ukraine and one hand the U.S. wanted the Atlas V and signed in 1989, 1993 and 1996.158 Through Delta IV to be commercialized, on the other it these agreements, the U.S. intended to pro- did not allow a commercial price structure. In tect its launch industry against the new com- part, such a situation can be explained by the petitors by imposing quantitative limits (or fact that by that time demand was relatively quotas), regulating pricing and redirecting robust and, what is more, projections were the defence-oriented launch sectors of China showing an even stronger commercial mar- and Russia towards commercial-oriented ket, largely driven by the launch of Non- launch production. As noted by Reed, the Geostationary Orbit (NGSO) telecommunica- three bilateral agreements more broadly tion constellations like Iridium, Teldesic and served as both trade agreements and as po- Globalstar. In 1998 the FFA forecast an aver- litical bargaining chips for achieving foreign age of 31 NGSO commercial launches per policy objectives; in particular for the pur- year from 1998-2010, with an additional av- pose of encouraging market reforms in non- erage of 25 commercial GSO launches during market economies and reducing the incen- the same period.161 tives for countries to engage in illicit dual use technology exports”.159 The optimism about the growing demand from commercial satellites led the Clinton While Europe was not an active player in the administration to announce that, at the expi- negotiation of these bilateral trade agree- ration of the three trade agreements on ments, it ultimately benefited from such U.S. launchers, the U.S. would replace “negotiated initiatives. Indeed, with such a framework in trade” in commercial launch services with a place, the Ariane launchers and the new gen- “trade environment characterized by free and eration of U.S. ELVs developed after the open interaction of market economies”.162 Challenger accident (Atlas 2 and Delta 2) Accordingly, in December 2000 launch quotas continued to dominate the commercial mar- were removed. Unfortunately, the emergence ket of the early 1990s. Even though Ariane 4 of a market-oriented trading environment had several years head-start, by the mid- remained somehow elusive, primarily due to the profoundly changed market conditions of 157 Reed, James L., “The Commercial Space Launch the early 2000s. Market and Bilateral Trade Agreements in Space Launch Services”. American University International Law Review, Volume 13, Issue 1. 1999. p 170. 160 Futron. “The Declining U.S. Role in the Commercial 158 For a detailed analysis of the three agreements see Launch Industry”. Futron Report. June 2005. p.2. Reed, James L., “The Commercial Space Launch Market 161 See FAA Commercial Forecasts 1998. and Bilateral Trade Agreements in Space Launch Ser- 162 Reed, James L., “The Commercial Space Launch vices”. American University International Law Review, Market and Bilateral Trade Agreements in Space Launch Volume 13, Issue 1. 1999. Services”. American University International Law Review, 159 Cit. Ibid. p. 182. Volume 13, Issue 1. 1999.

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Contrary to the earlier market forecasts, in opoly that had characterised the late 1900s, the early 2000s the commercial launch mar- with Arianespace and ILS dictating launch ket experienced a sharp downturn: not only market prices. Dispersion in launch prices did the operators of the proposed NGSO con- decreased and prices returned to the previ- stellations enter bankruptcy or cease opera- ous ranges (from $ 75 to $ 100 million per tions; the overall demand for satellite com- satellite to GEO).165 Notwithstanding the re- munication started to level off dramatically as turn to flight of Sea Launch’s Zenit rocket in a result of the telecom stock market crash September 2011, the commercial market that occurred in 2001 and a cyclical downturn domination of the Ariane-Proton duopoly con- in new GEO commercial satellites. Ironically, tinued to consolidate in the period up to this contraction in demand ran in parallel to 2013. By that time, however, the underlying the substantial growth in supply capacity dynamic of the launch service industry had resulting from the arrival of converted ICBMs already set the stage for the emergence of a and the maturation of Sea Launch. With the completely new landscape for commercial large number of ex-Soviet launchers no launch activities. longer subjected to quantitative limits and able to profit from low production costs, Recent Evolutions competition intensified, leading launch pro- viders to a price war. Due to this situation of Over the past few years the commercial overcapacity, the market became a “buyer’s launch market has experienced a number of market”, with satellite operators in a position major changes. The most visible and struc- to benefit from bargain launch prices, with a tural change is the abrupt advent of SpaceX, price of as little as $ 50 million for a commer- which in the span of a couple of years has cial GSO.163 Against this background, Euro- established itself as a fierce competitor on pean and American launch vehicles found it the commercial launch market. Thanks to its increasing difficult to capture shares of the large backlog of U.S. institutional payloads market on economically viable conditions and and the significant support received from the inevitably called for strong political backing U.S. government through the COTS pro- and additional financial support. gramme (see Chapter 3.1) the company has been able to pursue an aggressive penetra- In 2003 ESA Member States launched the tion pricing strategy in the commercial mar- European Guaranteed Access to Space ket.166 With a published price of $ 61.2 mil- (EGAS) programme, through which they cov- lion per commercial launch to GTO, Falcon 9 ered the fixed operational costs of the new rockets provide the cheapest launch solution Ariane 5 ECA launcher and provided around in the commercial market, consequently 164 250 million euros a year to Arianespace. In threatening the position of established launch the U.S. both Boeing and Lockheed Martin providers. Since the launch of its first GTO received additional financial support from the commercial satellite (SES-8) in December Air Force to maintain their EELVs production 2013, SpaceX has built a significant commer- lines, and in 2005 announced plans to merge cial backlog for Falcon 9 (36 as at June their launch operations into a Joint Venture, 2015), winning many “customers that for- the ULA, in order to provide cost savings to merly would have been all but certain clients the government. Yet, for the two EELVs it of Europe’s Arianespace launch consor- remained impossible to commit to the price tium”167 or of ILS. war initiated by Sea Launch and Proton and they exited de facto from the market to con- In parallel to the successful comeback of the centrate on the captive institutional missions U.S. on the commercial market, a series of of the DoD and NASA. failures of the Proton and Zenit rockets in 2012 and 2013 has led potential customers In the second part of the 2000s, commercial to avoid signing new launch service contracts satellite demand progressively recovered, with ILS and Sea Launch. In 2014, for the while competitive pressure decreased follow- first time, no commercial launches were ing the withdrawal of the newly established booked on the Proton-M and Zenit launch ULA from the market. Consequently, com- services, an occurrence that clearly demon- mercial launch services became almost exclu- sively a domain for European and Russian launchers. With the Sea Launch bankruptcy in 165 Euroconsult. “Satellites To Be Built & Launched By 2009, the launch market reverted to the du- 2022”. 2013. 166 It should be highlighted that prices paid by the U.S. government are substantially higher than those charged to 163 Euroconsult. “Satellites To Be Built & Launched By commercial operators and have been estimated by NASA 2022”. 2013. to correspond to up to three times that of commercial 164 Al-Ekabi, Cenan. “European Access to Space: Factors prices. of Autonomy”. In: Al-Ekabi, Cenan (ed.). European 167 Cit. De Selding, Peter B. “Satellite Operators Press Autonomy in Space. Springer, 2015: pp. 137-155.p.145. / ESA for Reduction in Ariane Launch Costs” Space News. See ESA Bulletin 2003. 14 April 2014.

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strates the strong volatility of the launch Trend Relevant Examples market. • Production lines of Among its most immediate effects, the com- Innovative ap- SpaceX’s Falcon 9 mercial success of Falcon 9 – combined with proaches in de- • Ariane 6’s integrated pro- the string of failures of Proton and Zenit – velopment and ject teams with industrial has created a situation where commercial production partner for co- satellite launch contracts in 2014 and 2015 engineering were exclusively signed by Arianespace and • P120 motor shared be- SpaceX. While in the heavy GTO segment Flexibility tween Ariane 6 and Vega- Ariane still holds almost a monopoly, compe- through vehicle C tition has already become stiffer in in the modularity • China’s New Long March market for smaller GTO payloads (below Family (LM-5, LM-7) 5,000 Kg), with Falcon 9 strongly competing against all GTO launch providers. Also in the • Tailored solutions for LEO segment, whose commercial offer has commercial customers of- been in the past entirely dominated by con- fered by Arianespace and verted Russian ICBMs (Dnepr and Rockot), SpaceX • Reduction of turn-around the market penetration of SpaceX has proved Launcher com- times successful. moditisation • New injections orbits This expansion of supply has been warmly • Multiple launch sites tar- welcomed by satellite operators – which look geting specific customers, for increasing diversity in launch offerings – enabling increases in and has inevitably generated market pres- launch rates (e.g. sures on SpaceX’s competitors to lower their SpaceX) own prices. Quite notably, in mid-2014 Eutel- Extension of • Development of SpaceX’s sat announced that the company would use payload capacity Falcon Heavy the lower prices it can get from SpaceX (very small and • Development of LM-9 and against Arianespace in negotiations for launch very heavy LM-11 contracts. launchers) It is in response to this increasing price com- • Increasing focus on eco- petition that some major initiatives were friendly fuels by China kicked-off in 2014, including the creation of Environmental and Europe the ASL joint venture (see Chapter 2.2), as considerations • Formal disposal of spent well as ULA’s plans to strategically restruc- launcher stages by all providers ture its launch business – reducing its launch

offer to one vehicle, Vulcan – while imple- Table 11: The evolving space launch service offer.168 menting an incremental development pro- gramme to build a partially reusable and much lower cost launch system over the next decade. In October 2014, ULA also an- 4.3 Unfolding Trends in De- nounced a major restructuring of the work mand and Supply processes and workforce in order to decrease launch costs by half. Needless to say, one of The worldwide landscape of space launch the reasons given for this restructuring and systems could experience fundamental the new cost reduction goals was competition changes in the next decade, owing to several from SpaceX. new trends in both the supply and demand All in all, the commercial launch market, al- for space transportation services. beit far from being a sector of free competi- Potentially disruptive technologies are cur- tion, seems to have become ever more re- rently in the process of being developed and sponsive to price pressures, with increased tested for space launchers, such as first- competition leading to an intensification of stage recovery and reuse, non-vertical cost reduction efforts, and possibly to new launching as well as 3D printing manufactur- approaches and disruptive innovation in the ing processes. These game-changer concepts domain of access to space (see Table 11). have the potential to bring a new era of cheaper launch costs, thereby facilitating a more democratic access to space, in which a

168 Source: Author´s re-elaboration of Linares, Lucia. “Worldwide Competition in Launch Services”. Presentation at “International Conference on the European Launchers”, Paris, 3-4 November 2015.

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much larger number of space users could platforms to move from the point of insertion directly benefit from space activities. to final position without the need for other propulsion sources. In the telecommunication satellite market, which constitutes the lion’s share of GTO The immediate advantage of using technol- market revenues, 2015 witnessed the intro- ogy such as the main satellite thruster is that duction of the first all-electric propelled plat- it greatly reduces fuel loads, resulting in a form, a solution that could lead commercial substantial lower satellite mass than tradi- operators to create lighter or more capable tional all-chemical or hybrid systems. As a satellites. Furthermore, an almost exponen- consequence, the lifespan of a full EP plat- tial rise in the launch and utilization of small form can be considerably longer, in the order satellites weighing less than a few hundred of 50-70%,170 leading to a higher return on kilograms has opened the door for unprece- investment (RoI). A drawback of this ap- dented plans to place constellations com- proach is the longer time required for orbit posed of thousands of satellites into LEO, raising, particularly from GTO to GEO, which dedicated to Earth observation or to provide is in the order of several months longer than global broadband and telecommuni- all-chemical satellites (delayed RoI). Hence, it cations. is for commercial satellite operators to decide and evaluate the financial and schedule dif- Other technological advancements are paving ferences between the two platforms. the way for a number of advanced space activities, which could become everyday While the economic benefit of fully electric business by 2025. Those new activities could propelled satellites is still to be determined, take place in or near Earth orbit, such as in- the adoption of such propulsion systems is an orbit satellite servicing and active debris re- increasing trend: for delivery in the period moval, but also in the longer term, such ac- 2016-2022 around 10% of satellite orders tivities as mineral resources exploitation and were for full-EP, adding to the first four Boe- missions. ing 702SPs in 2015. However, industry esti- mates predict that at least 50% of the com- It is not within the scope of this report to mercial geostationary satellite market will address the practicality of these ventures and make use of a kind of electric propulsion in concepts. However, the following paragraphs the medium-term,171 and that by 2022, a will highlight some developments that have quarter of all satellites will be all-electric.172 the potential to strongly affect demand and offer for space launch services in the me- Considering their recent adoption, the impact dium-term. This is to put in place ideas on of all-electric satellites on the launchers mar- the evolved landscape in which the new ket is still unclear. The significantly lower European launchers will enter into service, mass of such satellites could lead to two dif- ultimately contributing to the reflection that ferent scenarios for satellite operators to will be provided in Chapter 5. consider: either using the mass savings to keep constant payload capacity and thereby exploiting more dual/multiple-launch configu- 4.3.1 All-Electric Satellites rations, which allows for potential savings of The use of electric propulsion technology for 20-50% on launch costs for the satellite satellite manoeuvres has been available on owner; or pursuing greater payload capacity, the market for two decades, and has been maintaining the satellite mass constant and extensively used in space science missions. in this way increasing the mission’s overall Only recently though, has electric propulsion revenue. gained prominence as one of the trend- It is worth noting that the first scenario (i.e. setting technological advancements for com- reduced satellite mass and dual launch), by mercial telecommunication satellites propul- virtue of cheaper launch costs would open up sion. In these missions, electric propulsion new business opportunities, which were has been used so far only for north-south deemed at first economically unfeasible due station keeping and/or for partial orbit raising in a hybrid system together with chemical 170 propulsion. In 2015, for the first time a new Frost & Sullivan. “Space Mega Trends – Key Trends class of all-electric systems, the 702SP plat- and Implications to 2030 and Beyond”. August 2014: p. 10. Web. https://www.frost.com/reg/file- form manufactured by Boeing, was success- get.do?id=4483847&file=1. Accessed 2 December 2015. fully launched on a SpaceX Falcon 9 171 Airbus Defence & Space. “Space Systems. Mission and rocket.169 Electric propulsion enables these system requirements for Electric Propulsion”. 25 Novem- ber 2014. Web. http://espace- ftp.cborg.info/epic_2014/d1_s2_1_EPIC_AirbusDS.pdf. 169 Svitak, Amy. “Dawn of the All-Electric Satellite”. Aviation Accessed 2 December 2015. Week. 16 March 2015. Web. 172 Safran Group. “Satellite propulsion and equipment”. http://aviationweek.com/space/dawn-all-electric-satellite. Web. http://www.safran-group.com/space/satellite- Accessed 2 December 2015. propulsion-and-equipment. Accessed 2 December 2015

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to high launch prices. At the same time, elec- as ISS-launched cubesats from the tric propulsion is also considered a key en- NanoRacks system.176 abler for new, innovative multi-mission Plans for such very large constellations were transportation platforms, for example tugging noticed by the public when, at the end of applications to transfer payloads between 2014, the International Telecommunication LEO and GEO, as well as on-orbit servicing173 Union (ITU) registered several early filings for or multi-debris removal missions. massive, unprecedented constellations of satellites, numbering from hundreds to thou- 4.3.2 Satellite (Mega) Constellations sands.177 Some examples are SpaceX/Google plans for a 4,000-satellite constellation in The return of large satellite constellations, Low Earth orbit, OneWeb’s 650 broadband particularly small satellite clusters (on aver- satellite network, 250 small sat- age satellites weighing less than 500 kg), is ellites dedicated to Earth observation, and one of the most noticeable trends in the proposals from less known actors with con- commercial satellite market. stellations of up to several hundred satellites Historically, the satellite industry was headed each. As a matter of relativity, it is worth towards the development of telecommunica- noting that in 2015 the total number of op- tion satellite constellations as early as the erational satellites in orbit amounted to 178 late 1990s, in order to provide global tele- around 1300. phone and data services. Some companies, The primary purpose of some of these con- such as Globalstar, Iridium and , stellations is to provide low-latency internet achieved the full deployment of their constel- broadband to every corner of the planet - not lations, while many others only reached ear- reachable by terrestrial broadband anytime lier stages of development of their systems. soon - but other applications are also being Following increased competition from terres- pursued, ranging from high-resolution Earth trial-based GSM telecommunication networks, Observation – pioneered by Skybox Imaging and the bursting of the telecom/dotcom bub- and Planet Labs – to meteorology. ble at the turn of the century, such grand plans were abruptly halted, forcing the major While it is beyond the scope of this study to constellation operators into Chapter 11 bank- delve deeply into the details, practicability ruptcy and reorganization.174 and commercial viability of such ventures (to name a few, competition with established In recent times, possibly owing to the tech- GEO telecommunication systems and related nological developments (such as miniaturiza- new technological improvements, such as tion of electronic components and electric High-Throughput and software-defined satel- propulsion) that have spurred an almost ex- lites), it is important to reflect on the impact ponential rise in the use of small satellite that such mega constellations could have on platforms, satellite constellations - or more the launcher sector. precisely, mega constellations - are back in the plans of both newcomers and established In mid-2015, the largest ever commercial commercial satellite companies. 175 launch contract was signed between OneWeb and Arianespace: a € 1.3 billion deal to In addition to technological progress, a key launch 650 to 720 of Oneweb’s LEO satellites development favouring this development is in aboard the Soyuz vehicle. The contract en- fact today’s launchers market and the variety visages a tight launch rhythm (one launch of launch options, which promise reduced every five weeks), in order to place such a costs for small satellites: there is an emerg- large amount of satellites in orbit within a ing fleet of small launchers, increased launch two-year timeframe between 2017 and 2019, possibilities for piggybacking primary pay- at a pace of around 36 satellites per launch. loads, as well as innovative approaches such To cope with such an increased frequency of launches and considering its current launch manifest, which is largely dominated by

176 Foust, Jeff. “The ups and downs of smallsat constella- 173 Frost & Sullivan: “Space Mega Trends – Key Trends tions”. The Space Review. 22 June 2015. Web. and Implications to 2030 and Beyond”. August 2014: p. 12. www.thespacereview.com/article/2776/1. Accessed 2 174 Foust, Jeff. “The return of the satellite constellations”. December 2015. The Space Review. 23 March 2015. Web. 177 De Selding, Peter. “Signs of a Satellite Internet Gold www.thespacereview.com/article/2716/. Accessed 2 De- Rush in Burst of ITU Filings.” Space News. 23 January cember 2015. 2015. Web. http://spacenews.com/signs-of-satellite- 175 It should be, however, noted that none of the planned internet-gold-rush/ Accessed 2 December 2015. mega-constellations (including Globalstar and Iridium) 178 Union of Concerned Scientists. Satellite Database. have never produced comprehensive business plans that Web. http://www.ucsusa.org/nuclear-weapons/space- allow to make a thorough assessment of their economic weapons/satellite-database.html. Accessed 2 December viability. 2015.

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European government demand for Soyuz-ST, improved capabilities and multi-mission pos- Arianespace affirmed that it will explore the sibilities.182 possibility of launching Soyuz from the Baikonur Cosmodrome via the Russian joint- venture Starsem, as well as from the Plesetsk 4.3.3 Rocket Reusability launch site (which has a Soyuz launch pad), if Launcher technology has evolved continu- 179 need be. ously since the pioneering work undertaken SpaceX plans for a mega constellation of in the early 50s, allowing for improved per- 4,000 broadband satellites would not have a formance but without achieving any major or commercial end per-se, but would fit with game-changing breakthrough. Roughly ’s vision of a human settlement on speaking, the way we access space today is Mars. Hence, the constellation is seen as a the same as 30 years ago, with parameters means to generate enough revenue to fi- such as cost and reliability in the same order nance such an endeavour.180 The details of of magnitude. the SpaceX constellation are still unclear, A general shift towards more environmental- even more so as some top executives down- friendly fuel is a current trend, but it is the 181 played the project in October 2015, but it much-discussed concept of reusability that in is reasonable to assume that the satellites principle has the potential to profoundly will rely on the company’s own rockets to be change the way access to space is achieved placed into orbit, particularly by exploiting in the near future. reusability of the first stage – should eco- nomic feasibility be proven. Since the 1960s, there have been regular calls for a reusable launch vehicle (RLV), The possible additional demand for launchers chiefly due to its potential to provide low due to the potential deployment of large con- cost, reliable and frequent access to space. stellations is too early to assess at this stage, Most projects were in the form of single- apart from the remarkable Arianespace- stage reusable rockets that could launch and OneWeb contract. Pending further develop- land vertically (SSTO VTVL), or single-stage ment and concrete materialization of such reusable rocket planes that could launch and initiatives, the sheer number of satellites land horizontally (SSTO HTHL). Various de- envisioned to provide global broadband cov- signs and plans were proposed in the follow- erage would undoubtedly lead to a hard-to- ing decades, alongside the continuous tech- meet demand for LEO/MEO launch services. nological advancements in engine technology This increased demand will then be added to and material science. Nevertheless, with the the ongoing deployment and upgrade of notable exception of the partially-reusable other non-GEO constellations such as Galileo, Space Shuttle (and the similar, but only once Iridium NEXT, Skybox Imaging, O3b and flown Soviet ), a comprehensive reus- Globalstar 2G. able system has never been developed either More generally, through low manufacturing because it was deemed technologically un- costs and not mandating dedicated launch achievable, or economically unfeasible – as vehicles, small satellite clusters are beginning ultimately was the case for the Space Shuttle to set the trend for improved space capabili- programme. ties, also enabling penetration into densely Until 2014, all major industries and launch populated orbital space. The benefits of such service providers were still shrugging their clusters with respect to large satellites are – shoulders and dismissing reusability for at least in theory – the reduced financial risk, launchers as a “been there, tried that” sce- nario that would lead nowhere. While low- level research was still being pursued,183 feasibility studies of the past decade consid- ered several features, such as a very high 179 De Selding, Peter. “Launch Options were Key to Ari- launch rate to break-even on cost, a weight anespace’s OneWeb Win”. Space News. 26 June 2015. penalty for additional fuel, and ground instal- Web. http://spacenews.com/launch-options-were-key-to- arianespaces--win/. Accessed 2 December 2015. 180 De Selding, Peter. “SpaceX to Build 4,000 Broadband Satellites in Seattle”. Space News. 19 January 2015. Web. http://spacenews.com/spacex-opening-seattle-plant-to- build-4000-broadband-satellites/. Accessed 2 December 182 Frost & Sullivan: Space Mega Trends – Key Trends and 2015. Implications to 2030 and Beyond. August 2014: p. 6. 181 De Selding, Peter. “SpaceX President Downplays 183 E.g. see: L. Innocenti, C. Dujarric and G. Ramusat. “An Commitment To Building Broadband Constellation”. Space Overview of the FLPP and the Technology Developments News. 27 October 2015. Web. in RLV Stage Structures for Elevated Temperature Appli- http://spacenews.com/spacex-president-downplays- cations”. ESA – D/LAU-SF. 2003. Web. commitment-to-building-broadband-constellation/. Ac- http://adsabs.harvard.edu/full/2003ESASP.521...57I. Ac- cessed 2 December 2015. cessed 2 December 2015.

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lation safety provisions as reasons to con- unveiled its concept, called , at the sider rocket reusability impractical.184 beginning of 2015, although its research and development reportedly had been undertaken Nevertheless, the economic imperative to since 2010. It envisions an autonomous hori- achieve cheaper access to space still con- zontal landing system for the first-stage en- vinced some that reusability could be one of gine that would enable the main engines and the main pathways to lower the price per kilo avionics of the launcher (representing around required to place a payload into orbit. 70% to 80% of the total value of the launch With its promise to decrease launch costs by vehicle) to be recovered and refurbished.187 one order of magnitude by 2020, and the Following a qualification flight scheduled for concrete attempts it made to try to land the 2025, Adeline could be implemented in the first stage of Falcon 9 on a floating in new Ariane 6, with the possibility of being 2014 and 2015, SpaceX undertakings gener- adapted to any launcher. ated a shockwave through the launch indus- In April 2015, along with the presentation of try, ultimately putting reusability firmly back its new Next Generation Launch System, in the spotlight. It has now become a recur- Vulcan, ULA also presented an ambitious ring theme, with almost every major launch project for mid-air recovery of the engine service provider and manufacturer consider- section188, named “SMART”. Similarly to Ade- ing or developing plans to recover parts of line, this would allow ULA to reuse the most their upcoming new launch systems, whilst expensive portion of the first stage – the adopting different approaches. booster main engines.189 As with Airbus, it is The SpaceX path for reusability envisions a not expected to become an effective part of vertical landing for the first stage of its Falcon the Vulcan launch system before 2024. 9 rocket. Technology demonstrator tests at Other major national actors that provide ac- low altitude with the Grasshopper vehicle cess to space are also considering reusability were first started in 2011, and after failed for their new generations of launchers. In attempts in 2014 and early 2015, on 22 De- India, ISRO is considering a series of tech- cember 2015 SpaceX finally achieved success nology demonstrator missions for a Two in landing the first stage of the upgraded Stage to Orbit fully re-usable vehicle,190 and Falcon 9 on a ground launch pad. The same this concept is reportedly also being studied approach was followed by Blue Origin. In for Chinese as well as Russian new launchers, November 2015 it flew its New Shepard vehi- albeit with much less detailed plans. In addi- cle to the edge of space (100 Km above sea tion, several smaller companies, mostly U.S. level), and successfully landed both sections based, are also pursuing partially reusable of the vehicle, capsule and booster rocket, vehicles, particularly focusing on air-to-space vertically.185 What is more, the same vehicle systems for small payloads (see paragraph was re-launched in a subsequent test in 4.2.5). January 2016, with a successful second land- ing. While in principle promising, the prospective cost reductions from using reusable vertical Other major launcher manufactures have launch systems rather than expendable rock- decided to follow a different path: both Airbus and ULA approaches aim not at recovering the full rocket first stage with a vertical land- Launchers”. Presentation at ESPI Autumn Conference. 21- ing, but to focus only on the engine section, 22 September 2015. Web. which contains most of the value of the vehi- http://www.espi.or.at/images/stories/dokumente/Presentati cle. In both cases, this approach aims to en- ons_2015/Autumn_Conference/Jean-Marc_Astorg.pdf. sure that the launcher is ready to fly again Accessed 07 December 2015. 187 with the same level of quality and reliability, “’s solution to reuse space Launchers”. Web. reducing as much as possible the time, proc- 186 http://airbusdefenceandspace.com/reuse-launchers/. esses and costs of refurbishment. Airbus Accessed 2 December 2015. 188 Ray, Justin. “ULA chief explains reusability and innova- tion of new rocket”. Spaceflight Now. 14 April 2015. Web. 184 Svitak, Amy. “NASA, CNES warn SpaceX of Chal- http://spaceflightnow.com/2015/04/14/ula-chief-explains- lenges in Flying Reusable Falcon 9 Rocket”. Aviation reusability-and-innovation-of-new-rocket/. Accessed 2 Week. 05 May 2014. Web. December 2015. http://aviationweek.com/blog/nasa-cnes-warn-spacex- 189 “United Launch Alliance Unveils America’s New Rocket challenges-flying-reusable-falcon-9-rocket. Accessed 2 – Vulcan”. ULA. 13 April 2015. Web. December 2015. http://www.ulalaunch.com/ula-unveils-americas-new- 185 Foust, Jeff. “Blue Origin Flies – and Lands – New rocket-vulcan.aspx. Accessed 2 December 2015. Shepard Suborbital Spacecraft”. Space News. 24 Novem- 190 Indian Space Research Organization - Reusable ber 2015. Web. http://spacenews.com/blue-origin- Launch Vehicle - Technology Demonstration Program successfully-flies-new-shepard-suborbital-vehicle/. Ac- (RLV-TD). Web. http://www.isro.gov.in/technology- cessed 2 December 2015. development-programmes/reusable-launch-vehicle- 186 For a possible reusability economic scheme, see for technology-demonstration-program-rlv-td. Accessed 2 example: Astorg, Jean-Marc. “Technical (R) Evolutions in December 2015.

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ets are strongly dependent on a number of This innovative manufacturing process, al- factors that are still hard to assess. Detrac- ready hailed as the third industrial revolution, tors of this approach point to the fact that the constitutes a paradigm change at the very very basic principle of reusing a single rocket bottom of the manufacturing chain: it in- could lead to reduced economies of scale volves creating a solid object from a series of until now realized from the production of layers, each one printed on top of the last, rocket stages and motors in great numbers typically by melting powder or wire materials for expendable systems. This is even more and starting from a computer-designed important when considering that a Falcon 9 model.192 Among its advantages, there is the rocket contains 9 Merlin 1D engines (and its possibility to create very complex geometries larger version, Falcon Heavy, will use 27 Mer- impossible to make in traditional ways, lead- lin engines), whereas an Ariane 5/6 has only ing to potentially enormous mass and cost one, the Vulcain 2 (a configuration similar to savings with respect to traditional manufac- ULA’s NGLV, powered by the BE-3 engine). turing, as well as huge savings in material Such crucial differences point to different wastage.193 approaches and attitudes to first-stage reus- 3D printing is a less discussed technological ability from different manufacturers. Addi- breakthrough in the space and launchers tionally, the increased fuel required for re- sector, so far limited only to a few key com- entry manoeuvres substantially diminishes ponents such as small satellite structures and rocket performance, i.e. the mass available satellite propulsion parts as well as for some for the payload, with some estimates num- parts of launcher systems (e.g. the Super- bering it at up to 30%.191 Finally, the cost Draco thruster used by SpaceX’s Dragon cap- and time required to inspect and refurbish a sule). NASA has already hot-tested a rocket rocket stage are still largely unknown. In engine that was 75% composed of 3D printed fact, it is clear that while for ELVs the produc- parts.194 In the coming years, as the technol- tion costs account for the largest share and ogy progresses, it could be the key to drasti- can be determined to a great extent in ad- cally reducing the cost of access to space, vance, for RLVs this share would be opera- even more so than reusability. tions costs, which are uncharted territory as of today. Even more unknown is the reliability With substantially increased performance due of such a refurbished vehicle – the factor that to the large mass saving and other perform- ultimately will determine its appeal to typi- ance gains in the order of two digits,195 once cally risk-averse large commercial satellite this technology reaches maturity, possibly by operators. 2025,196 its widespread employment in launcher manufacturing could lead to mass With SpaceX and Blue Origin acting as a pio- production of still expendable, yet much neers, should reusability become an everyday cheaper launch vehicles. reality following both companies successful landing at the end of 2015, they will also become the first companies to have to con- 4.3.5 Non-vertical Launch and Small Satellites cretely address the concerns around this new technology – as well as reaping the potential Vertically launched rockets have so far been benefits, both in orbital and suborbital flights. the most viable option for launching into Nevertheless, it is unlikely that reusability will space. Nevertheless, alternative approaches have a large impact on the overall launch sector in the short term – except for possibly 192 spurring an accelerated pace of similar devel- ESA - 3D Printing For Space: The Additive Revolution. opments by competitors – until the technol- 16 October 2013. Web. http://www.esa.int/Our_Activities/Human_Spaceflight/Rese ogy as well as the business case are proven arch/3D_printing_for_space_the_additive_revolution. solid. Accessed 2 December 2015. 193 Mass savings could be of the order of 50% with respect to traditionally manufactured components. See for exam- 4.3.4 Additive Manufacturing ple: Wolfgang Veit. “Additive Manufacturing (AM) for Space (and Earth) Applications” presentation at the Pre- Additive manufacturing technology, popularly paratory Meeting for the High Level Forum “Space as a known as 3D printing, is positioning itself to Driver for Socioeconomic Sustainable Development”. Vienna, Austria. 19 November 2015. become a revolutionary technology also for 194 launchers, potentially as paradigm shifting as See: “Piece by Piece: NASA Team Moves Closer to Building a 3-D Printed Rocket Engine”. NASA Press Re- re-usability, but less in the public eye. lease. 17 December 2015. Web. https://www.nasa.gov/centers/marshall/news/news/release s/2015/piece-by-piece-nasa-team-moves-closer-to- 191 Grondin, Yves-A. “Musk lays out plans for reusability of building-a-3-d-printed-rocket-engine.html. Accessed 21 the Falcon 9 Rocket”. NASA Spaceflight. 03 October 2013. December 2015. Web. http://www.nasaspaceflight.com/2013/10/musk- 195 Ibid. plans-reusability-falcon-9-rocket/. Accessed 2 December 196 Frost & Sullivan: Space Mega Trends – Key Trends and 2015. Implications to 2030 and Beyond. August 2014: p. 8.

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have been pursued in the past, in some in- While today’s small satellite revolution is stances with some success. One example is undoubtedly exciting for developers and po- assisted air-to-launch systems, in which a tential users, it is also a cause for concern rocket carrying the payload is first brought to from the space debris mitigation and regula- a very high altitude by a conventional air- tory perspectives. While small satellites of all plane, then detached to reach the escape kinds should indeed meet the appropriate velocity necessary to inject the payload into debris policy regulations (as well as technical orbit by rocket propulsion. measures to ensure their timely de-orbit), it is also true that their exploitation could Such systems have the capacity to inject into greatly benefit from the development of dedi- orbit only a limited payload, typically less cated small launchers, offering orbital injec- than 500 Kg. Therefore, during the age of tion capabilities tailored for these kinds of large, chemical-propelled massive satellites, missions. non-vertical launch solutions, while still looked at with interest, could cover only a A number of companies around the world are small niche of the global space launch land- in fact starting to meet that challenge. Some scape. Until 2015 in fact, the most successful examples of small, non-vertical launch sys- non-vertical launcher was Orbital Sciences’ tems currently being developed are DARPA’s Pegasus, an airplane-assisted, air-to-space ALASA (although its development was rocket with a capacity of up to 450 Kg into stopped in December 2015), XCOR Aero- LEO and 42 launches between 1990 and space’s Lynx Mark III, Orbital Sciences’ Pega- 2013.197 sus II (and resurrected Athena vehicles), Swiss Space Systems’ SOAR, Virgin Galactic’s A recent increase in the use of small satel- Launcher One, Stratolaunch Systems, and lites, particularly in the nano/micro mass Reaction Engines Limited’s .201 range,198 has the potential to become a game-changer for small and air-to-space In the U.S. in particular, the development of launchers, with an increasing number of such small launcher systems has been stimu- commercial operators, as well as institutional lated, for more than a decade, by the DoD’s actors, now exploring opportunities in this quest for “responsive launch” capabilities, segment. In fact, a total of 510 small sats are which would allow it to launch satellites or to be launched in the next five years,199 a payloads into orbit on relatively short notice. 66% increase compared to the average over Since traditional rockets have a lag of two or the last decade. While in 2015 the small sat- more years between contract and launch, the ellite market segment generated but a frac- DoD has put efforts into dramatically short- tion of the global revenue, some estimates ening that timetable, driven by what military put its worth around $ 7.4 billion by 2020.200 officials say is a need to quickly plug gaps in space capabilities or deploy new ones in re- Currently, the majority of small satellites and sponse to emerging military requirements. in particular cubesats are using opportunistic rides alongside main payloads on large rock- The Skylon spaceplane from UK-located Re- ets, exploiting excess capacity when it is pos- action Engines, based on a previous project sible. This leaves their exploitation often “at from the 1980s known as HOTOL, has the the mercy” of the decisions of the main pay- potential to become the first “true” single load owner, in terms of launch schedule and stage to orbit, fully reusable spaceplane. orbital parameters, yet increasingly, “conven- While still at an early design phase, it claims tional” rockets are offering piggyback possi- a significant payload capacity, up to 15,000 bilities even for free. Kg to a 300 Km equatorial orbit, or 11,000 Kg to the ISS (almost 45% more than the capacity of the ATV).202 The company has 197 See: Orbital ATK. Pegasus Air Launch System Fact- secured significant funding from the British sheet. Web. http://www.orbitalatk.com/flight- government as well as ESA and BAE Sys- systems/space-launch- tems, which nevertheless constitutes only a vehi- fraction of the projected billions required in cles/pegasus/docs/FS002_02_OA_3862%20Pegasus.pdf; and: Pegasus Mission History. Web. overall programme costs. In 2015, its hybrid http://www.orbitalatk.com/flight-systems/space-launch- air breathing rocket engine called SABRE, vehi- around which the Skylon spaceplane is built, cles/pegasus/docs/Pegasus%20Mission%20History.pdf. passed a U.S. Air Force feasibility test, dem- Accessed 2 December 2015. 198 Buchen, Elizabeth. “2014 Nano/Microsatellite Market Assessment” and “2015 Small Satellite Market Observa- 201 For a complete list, see: Messier, Doug. “Updated list of tions”. SpaceWorks Enterprises, Inc. smallsat launch vehicles”. Parabolic Arc. 04 October 2015. 199 Messier, Doug. “Euroconsult sees large market for Web. http://www.parabolicarc.com/2015/10/04/updated- smallsats”. Parabolic Arc. 02 March 2015. Web. list-smallsat-launch-vehicles/. Accessed 2 December 2015. http://www.parabolicarc.com/2015/03/02/euroconsult-sees- 202 Reaction Engines – Space Access: Skylon. Web: large-market-smallsats/. Accessed 2 December 2015. http://www.reactionengines.co.uk/space_skylon.html. 200 Ibid. Accessed 2 December 2015.

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onstrating the potential of such technol- Also on the U.S. side, increased development ogy.203,204 efforts have been initiated to eliminate de- pendence on Russian engines to launch na- The future availability of reactive, non- tional security payloads (see Chapter 3.1) vertical launch solutions for small payloads and on Russian rockets for human space- could generate competition with vertical vehi- flight. Similarly, Europe is developing the cles currently available or in development, Ariane 6 partly in order to overcome its reli- such as Vega, , Epsilon and PSLV ance on the Russian-made Soyuz. More (taking into account that Rockot and Dnepr broadly, most spacefaring nations, including will be phased out in the near future). It must the U.S., Europe, and Russia, are now devel- be noted though that solid rockets maintain a oping production capabilities for critical com- strong record of reliability. Moreover, they ponents that are not yet domestically avail- are able to cover a higher mass range in able. Finally, a growing number of emerging terms of performance, albeit at a greater space nations is seeking to limit dependency cost. on third parties by acquiring (Argentina and How vertical and non-vertical launch systems Brazil) or further upgrading (Israel, South will compete to inject small satellites into Korea, Iran) their own launch capabilities to orbit will largely depend on the viability and LEO (see Chapter 3.6). price of such non-vertical launch solutions, as While access to space still firmly remains in well as on how the small satellites market the hands of national governments, the role itself will develop. It is currently expanding in of private actors (and private investment) is a context of relative lack of regulations: in all ostensibly increasing. In the U.S., SpaceX is probability small satellites will be increasingly currently developing its vehicles with consis- subject to stricter guidelines in the future, in tent private investment, while benefitting particular in terms of space traffic regulation from the NASA contracts awarded to the and debris mitigation. On the other hand, company. Pushed by this game-changing ultimately a more regulated environment approach, ULA also recently begun develop- could be favourable for the small satellite ment of the new Vulcan launch vehicle with segment by providing planning stability and private funds. In the case of Europe’s Ariane security of use. 6 launcher, € 400 million of development capital has been requested as “industry’s share”. While this amount is still a tiny frac- 4.4 The Future Landscape tion of the € 4+ billion required to develop the new Ariane 6, the overall level of respon- Even though the space transportation sector sibility entrusted to industry is unprecedented is a highly dynamic environment, a number (see Chapter 2). Finally, in Japan the gov- of trends and their possible impact on the ernment is also taking steps to stimulate future landscape can be discerned. private capital to enter the launch industry and to provide a legal framework for private One of the most visible trends is the companies’ spaceflight initiatives.205 strengthening national autonomy and the reduction of interdependence among the An even more striking trend is the rapid players. This tendency has been intensified change in the main competitors on the com- since the 2014 Crimea crisis, which marked mercial market. In the span of a few years, the end of the historical cooperative under- the longstanding Ariane-Proton duopoly has takings that Russia and Ukraine put in place come to an end. New competitors have en- in the mid-1990s. While disengaging from tered the commercial market, as demon- multinational joint ventures, and repatriating strated by the entry of SpaceX and its al- their shares to Russian entities, Russia also most-50% market share of GTO revenues in started to accelerate the construction of a 2015 (with Arianespace acquiring a similar new launch site on its territory to replace its share), and by the efforts currently being dependence on Baikonur and put a stop to undertaken by launch service providers that the future use of vehicles not entirely manu- previously were mostly inactive. factured domestically (see Chapter 3.2). In Japan, MHI has announced its intention to compete on the commercial market with the support of export financing mechanisms and 203 by offering packages (satellite construction Davies, P., Hempsell, M. and Varvill, R. “Progress on 206 Skylon and SABRE’’, IAC-15-D2.1.8, and references and launch) to emerging nations. In the therein. 204 A comparison analysis of the launch costs per Kg be- tween a reusable Falcon 9, Falcon Heavy and Skylon can 205 See “Private-sector rocket launch legislation eyed”. be found at: https://theconversation.com/spaceplanes-vs- Yomiuri Shinbun. 3 June 2015. reusable-rockets-which-will-win-51938. Accessed 15 206 Euroconsult. ”Satellites To Be Built & Launched By December 2015. 2022”: p. 106

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U.S., ULA has started to proactively revitalise eventual materialisation of disruptive innova- its efforts to capture commercial payloads, tion for access to space. A potential game- motivated at least in part by the astonishing changer could result from demonstration of success of SpaceX. the commercial viability of reusability, achieved for the first time by SpaceX and China has started to offer a portfolio of alter- Blue Origin, and further envisaged by ASL native launch solutions for its platforms (re- and ULA. stricted on the international market by U.S. export controls regulations) and also India is It should be highlighted, however, that this currently seeking commercial launch oppor- growing competition is taking place in a mar- tunities for its GSLV to offset vehicle devel- ket in which it is assumed that overall de- opment and operations costs. Even if ITAR mand in the GTO segment will remain stable restrictions continue to limit the impact of over the medium term, bar a substantial de- Chinese launch vehicles and domestic de- crease in launch prices.207 Additional supply mand limits the availability of GSLV, it should could thus potentially lead to a situation of not be overlooked that these launch vehicles overcapacity similar to that of the early are still benefiting from low production costs, 2000s, consequently leading to the emer- enabling them to possibly step forward with gence of a buyer’s market, in which price prices lower than those currently being of- would be the strongest differentiator between fered. providers. Moreover, in all the major spacefaring na- Should a substantial decrease in launch tions significant development programmes prices occur as a result of some major break- are currently underway (See Table 12, Table through (e.g. routine rocket reusability, wide- 13, Chart 9 and Annex 2). In the 2020s, the spread adoption of additive manufacturing, new GTO-capable vehicles will be Ariane etc.), the way will be paved for a large in- 62/64, Vulcan, Falcon 9/Heavy, H-III, Long crease in demand for launch services and the March 5/7, GSLV Mk-III, and Angara A5, current structure of the commercial launch alongside previous generation vehicles until market will be substantially disrupted. their respective phase-outs. Non-GTO vehi- In the LEO segment, the number of national cles will be represented by Vega-C, Epsilon-I, actors with initial capability is poised to in- Long March 6/7, Minotaur-C, Antares, Falcon crease. Since the LEO segment is constituted 9, PSLV, Soyuz 2.1v and Angara 1.2. in principle by a large majority of institutional The next decade will thus be characterized by launches, the growing number of launcher a larger offer of launch vehicles in the com- solutions would at first be aimed at satisfying mercial market. As major development ef- domestic demand in an autonomous fashion. forts progress towards operational readiness, Additional supply options in this market seg- offering increased flexibility and promising ment will reduce the share of payloads acces- cost reductions, competitive pressures are sible to launch providers, through competi- expected to further stiffen and to challenge tion. the position of established actors. At the same time, however, the rising num- Already now, however, access to space ber of commercial ventures interested in de- seems to be becoming even more responsive ploying their small satellites fleets in low or- to cost and price pressures. While in the past bits, including large broadband constellations, decades increasing performance and reliabil- will generate increased demand for flexible, ity were the key goals behind the develop- affordable and possibly tailored launch solu- ment of new launch vehicles, cost reductions tions. This demand could be met both by are now becoming ever more a driver. From traditional small and medium launchers, but a technology point of view, the largest devel- also possibly by non-vertical launchers, with opment programmes currently underway in the two systems then competing to reduce many spacefaring nations all aim at reducing the cost-per-Kg to orbit in this segment. costs and increasing flexibility, continuing the trend of modular families of launchers with maximisation of common expendable ele- ments. Rationalisation and streamlining in- dustrial organisation has also become a common feature among all space launch pro- viders. Price targets of the upcoming launch vehicles remain in the same order of magnitude as today’s prices, but increased competition can be expected to lead to a further intensifica- tion of cost reduction efforts, and to the 207 See FAA 2015 Forecasts.

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Performance to Launch Price Commercial Ca- Launcher Single/Dual GTO (Kg) (M$) pacity /yr. Europe 208 Ariane 62 4,500 - 5000 75 12 Single Ariane 64 9,500 – 10,500 125 12 Dual U.S. Vulcan step 1-2 4,500 – 13,000 100 - 200 2 Single Falcon 9 4,000 – 5,000 60 10+ Single & stacks Falcon Heavy 6,400 – 20,000 85 - 135 10+ Single & stacks Russia Angara A5 5,000 – 12,000 100 5 Single & stacks Proton 209 6,300 80 - 100 n.a. China 6,000 – 14,000 TBD 1-2 210 Japan H-III 2,000 – 6,000 60 - 100 2 Single India GSLV Mk-III 4,000 – 5,000 50 - 75 1 Single

Table 12: The future competitive landscape for Ariane 6 (at 2015 economic conditions).211

Chart 9: Estimated price vs. performance for future commercial GTO launchers.

208 For comparison purposes, the estimated prices for Ariane 62 and 64 in the chart are converted in M$. 209 Until phase-out. Price is heavily susceptible to rouble fluctuations. 210 Subject to ITAR restrictions. 211 Launch price estimations and other key parameters for GTO vehicles under development, potentially intended for the com- mercial market. Source: authors’ elaboration of data from presentations and interventions at the “International Conference on the European Space Launchers”. Paris, 3-4 November 2015.

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Vehicle First Timeline Name Flight 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 Ariane 62 2020 Ariane 64 2020 EUR Vega-C 2018

SLS Block I 2018 SLS Block II > 2021 Falcon Heavy 2016

USA Vulcan Step 1 2019 Vulcan Step 2 2023 Athena III TBD

Angara A3 > 2020 Angara A5 > 2016 RUS Angara A7 > 2028

Long March 5 2016 2016 CHN > 2023

H-III > 2020

JAP Epsilon ph.2 > 2017

GSLV Mk-III > 2016

IND

KSLV-II 2020

KOR

VLS Alfa/Beta 2020

BRA

Tronador III TBD

ARG

Table 13: New launchers and indicative timeline for the scheduled first flight.212

212 GTO-capable vehicles (including SLS not intended for the commercial market) are in blue. NGTO vehicles are in orange. Source: ESA and authors’ elaboration.

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5. What Prospects for European Launchers?

Building upon the analyses and findings of ers are essentially designed to decrease the previous chapters, an overall assessment launch costs and to generate economies of the current European strategy on access to of scale so as to ensure competitive pric- space and the medium-term prospects for ing for Ariane 6 and Vega-C without the European launchers will be provided in the need for public support payments during first part of Chapter 5. This will in turn be exploitation. used as a basis to present and discuss policy • The success of this new launcher strat- options to best cope with the potential areas egy will rely de facto on the guarantee of of concern identified in the assessment. an institutional launch business base, which might be difficult to ensure, how- ever. ESA has been the only institution to 5.1 Europe’s Strategy on Ac- provide a clear commitment to using European future launchers (see Chapter cess to Space: an Assess- 2), whereas ESA Member States have ment not so far committed. As for the EC, it may provide some comfort in terms of The reference analyses laid out in Chapters 3 procurement policy, but probably not a and 4 above provide the basis for an overall guarantee on the use of Vega-C and Ari- assessment of the strategy set up by the ESA ane 6. Ministerial Council and, more broadly, of fu- • The projected way forward remains to a ture prospects for Europe’s access to space. large extent conservative rather than Key points are highlighted hereafter. trend setting, at least for the new heavy- • The new European strategy on access to lift vehicle. The Resolution sanctions a space as defined by the 2014 ESA Minis- revolution in terms of processes (effi- terial is a politically well-balanced com- ciency-driven industrial reorganization promise that follows a period of intense and governance), but a mere evolution in disagreement between ESA Member terms of product – as the development of States, most notably Germany and the new launchers, Ariane 6 in particular, France. However, the decision to proceed is not technology-driven but cost-driven with the development of Ariane 6 was and subsequently will primarily rely on taken as late as 18 years after the quali- consolidated technologies. fication flight of Ariane 5, and the rocket • While flexible enough to respond to a itself it will enter into service 24 years wide range of needs, Ariane 6 has a later. This is in stark contrast to deci- strong commercial focus, and it is highly sions historically taken by the ESA C/M tailored to satisfying demand from com- on the development of the Ariane mercial satellites operators. This com- launcher family, when the development mercial focus might make it more diffi- of each subsequent generation was de- cult to serve the main purpose of the cided well before the qualification flight Agency’s missions. Furthermore, Ariane of each previous Ariane rocket (see 6 is not designed to be human-rated. Chapter 2, Table 4). Consequently, Europe will not be able to • The Resolution lays down a multi- conduct autonomous human spaceflight pronged strategy aimed at maintaining missions in the foreseeable future. robust launch competencies while in- • In terms of production costs, Ariane 6 creasing flexibility and reducing costs will be 40% less demanding than the through a number of levers, including the current generation.213 However, the de- utilisation of heritage hardware, the velopment phase will still require a sub- streamlining of industrial organisation, stantial financial investment focused on the maximisation of common expendable elements and the creation of synergies between different market segments, and 213 Interview of Arianespace CEO Stephane Israel. Bayart, the guarantee of five institutional Bertille, and Guillermard, Veronique. “Arianespace a su launches per year. All the identified lev- réagir à la concurrence”. Le Figaro. 12 December 2015.

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making use of heritage and consolidated as currency fluctuations and export re- technology. The new launcher will realize striction considerations, indicate that the cost savings principally by virtue of main competitors for Ariane 6 will be Fal- modularity, common design synergies as con 9/Heavy and Vulcan, and probably well as industrial reorganization and by GSLV Mk-III, H-III and Angara A5 streamlining. The core objective is to (see Chapter 4.4, Table 11 and Chart 9). eliminate the need for public support • The new launcher strategy appears to payments during exploitation while main- project the current policy reality over a taining a competitive pricing policy. Apart 15-year period in the belief that the cur- from this, however, European stake- rent strong market situation and benefi- holders have not clarified what the over- cial financial scenario (with near-zero in- arching goals of Ariane 6 and Vega-C are terest rates and favourable exchange in terms of market share (e.g. Is Ariane rates) will last.215 Potential oversupply or 6 looking for a market duopoly with changed market conditions could lead to Space X, or is it looking for dominance?). more aggressive competition on the Still, the risks to be borne by Member commercial market by national actors - States due to market fluctuations are including a new price war similar to what minimised, at least in principle. Industry, the sector experienced in the early as prime designer – and exploiter – will 2000’s, with governments subsiding their carry those risks. launchers even more than today. Should • There are limited margins of profit for this scenario materialise, it might be dif- Ariane 6. As noted, the expected launch ficult for Ariane 6 to maintain its com- cost of Ariane 64 is € 90/100 million petitiveness, unless some form of finan- while the launch price is € 115 million. cial backing from ESA Member States is This surplus will however be largely de- reintroduced. In the meantime, the ex- voted to covering the mismatch between tent of support to the exploitation of Ari- the expected launch costs (€ 78 million) ane 5 for the period 2016-2023 also re- and launch price (€ 70 million) of Ariane mains unsettled. 62 (See Chapter 2.2.2). Crucially, this • Furthermore, the new launcher strategy reduced margin allows little room for may not have been able to completely manoeuvre in case of a price war. Higher calibrate the strength of certain key fac- margins can be expected for Vega-C, tors such as the determination and focus provided that the difference between of emerging powers and the eventual production costs (in the order of € 25 success of new entrepreneurial efforts in million) and launch price (ranging from € establishing and commercialising game- 35 to 45 million) can be maintained. changing launch technologies and ap- • The European benchmark on the future proaches. Indeed, the introduction of dis- GTO market should not be only SpaceX’s ruptive innovation technologies currently Falcon 9 or Falcon Heavy. The main GTO pursued by several launch providers, launchers of the 2020s other than Ariane most notably first-stage reusability as 6 will consist of Vulcan, Falcon 9/Heavy, well as non-vertical launch systems, H-III, Long March 5/7, GSLV Mk-III and could dramatically affect the new Euro- Angara A5. Considering respective pean launchers’ future prospects and the phase-outs, the number of GTO-capable anticipated competitive edge by the time vehicles will be about the same as today. it enters into service or soon thereafter. However, compared to today’s situation • The roadmap for Vega, which just re- in which the commercial GTO market is cently entered its commercial exploita- almost equally split between Arianespace tion phase following the successful end of and SpaceX, the future will probably see the VERTA programme, appears to be an increased degree of competition as robust. However, the underlying objec- more players will be interested in captur- tive of fully ’Europeanising’ the new ing a share of the commercial market European launchers will not be achieved (that, remarkably, is not expected to un- until the Ukrainian-made engine present dergo a stronger cycle in the mid- 2020s).214 This could easily lead to a situation of overcapacity with respect to 215 Indicative of this, is the speech of Arianespace CEO launch demand. However, the require- Stephane Israel at the French Assemblée Nationale on 12 ment to satisfy the respective institu- May 2015, in which he affirmed the possibility that Ari- tional and domestic markets first, as well anespace could outcompete SpaceX. e.c. Web. http://www2.assemblee-nationale.fr/14/commissions- permanentes/commission-des-affaires- economiques/secretariat/a-la-une/audition-de-stephane- 214 See Euroconsult “Satellites To Be Built & Launched By israel-president-directeur-general-d-arianespace . Ac- 2022. World Market Survey”. Euroconsult. 2013. cessed 17 December 2015.

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in the Vega fourth stage is replaced. This ity and prices of the Russian-made will happen possibly only in Vega-E (see Soyuz. The era of international joint Chapter 2.2.2). In addition, while the ventures seems to have reached an forecast evolution of the lightweight Vega end at this stage. into what will de facto be a medium-lift Several countries are putting a launcher (the performance envisioned for o strong emphasis on upgrading their Vega-E would be up to 3,000 Kg to GTO) launch infrastructure, also through will meet the demand for launches of the construction of new spaceports, smaller payloads into GTO, it leaves open while Europe will continue to rely on the question of how to best meet the the Kourou site. While located in ever-growing demand for small/micro one of the most advantageous loca- satellites. Unless both Vega-C and Vega- tions in the world, the Guyana E are made simultaneously available, Space Center will remain the only there could be considerable difficulties in spaceport for Ariane and Vega in terms of the pairing of satellites and the the foreseeable future, with inher- scheduling of launches. ent risks. • Regarding the NGTO environment, it will In addition to Russia, countries such probably continue to be dominated by o as China and Japan are increasingly captive institutional demand, but the interested in using their launchers growing number of commercial applica- as a geopolitical tool to support tions (and the related constellations) their foreign policy objectives. In points to a possible increase of commer- this respect, new trends are emerg- cially competed contracts for small ing. While in the past it was the launchers. Still, there will be high compe- launcher technology itself that was tition to deliver payloads to LEO/MEO or- leveraged by means of technology bits between Vega-C, Epsilon, Long transfers, today’s efforts are taking March 6/7, Antares, Athena III, Falcon 9, the shape of offering to target coun- PSLV, Soyuz 2.1v and Angara 1.2. tries a complete service package • One of the main drivers behind the de- (which includes launch, satellite, velopment of Ariane 62 and Vega-C is to and technical support to the domes- replace Soyuz-ST. A major reason for tic ground infrastructure). This new this decision was that Soyuz does not policy reality might have potentially sustain European industrial activities. disruptive effects in the launch mar- Therefore, the decision down-prioritises ket. Currently Europe seems to the fact that the presence of the Russian- have no comprehensive plans for made Soyuz-ST at the Guyana Space how to respond to this new ap- Centre represented much more than proach. mere technical and economic coopera- There is a double convergence be- tion; that the presence was a significant o tween Europe and Japan’s launcher geopolitical signal. The eventual phase- developments in terms of govern- out leaves open the issue of finding an ance schemes and launcher per- analogous valuable mechanism for Euro- formance. Commonalities in per- pean-Russian cooperation in space.216 formance and timeframe can pro- • When comparing Europe’s current strat- vide a basis for cooperation and the egy on access to space with policies and continuation of the current backup recent developments in the other major agreement for commercial services, spacefaring nations (see Chapter 3), the including possibly extending this following observations can be made: agreement to institutional launches as well. At the same time, the re- Europe is following the worldwide o spective launchers are positioned to trend of strengthening sovereign compete against each other in fu- autonomy in access to space, by re- ture markets. alizing an all-European family of rockets and thereby overcoming the • It could be argued that the U.S. and current dependence of European in- Europe are heading in opposite directions stitutional launches on the availabil- with regard to the structure of their insti- tutional launch markets. In the U.S., the

216 launch sector has been characterized by As inter alia urged by ESA Director General Johann- an ULA monopoly since 2006, with Atlas Dietrich Wörner, a new European-Russian space coopera- tion endeavour at a high political level should be found. and Delta as the only viable options for See the ESA Director General’s intervention at Q&A panel launching national security payloads. The during the “International Conference on the European DoD is seeking to foster competitiveness, Space Launchers”, Paris 3-4 November 2015.

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so as to ultimately reduce the spiralling erations set out hereafter are not specific launch costs for its satellites and provide recommendations but rather open points of the necessary procurement redundancy reflection for possible implementation in or- for assuring access to space. This en- der to ensure the future competitiveness of deavour was met by success with the Europe’s launchers and optimise their strate- rise of SpaceX as a second launch service gic value. Considerations of political feasibil- provider having completed the Air Force ity, affordability and effectiveness will be laid certification for the launch of national se- out at the end of the chapter, while concrete curity payloads.217 policy recommendations will then be provided in Chapter 6. In Europe an opposite process could be in the making. First, the end of the European- The following propositions have been grouped Russian Eurockot joint venture is all but cer- in five different – yet strongly interlinked – tain, as the reconverted ICBM Rockot is pro- areas: future commercial launch market; gressively phased out.218 In the coming disruptive technological innovation; use of years, no European company other than ASL launchers as geopolitical tools; human space- will be able to provide launchers and launch flight; Europe’s spaceports. services. Second, as the industrial govern- ance reform of the European space transpor- tation sector proceeds, CNES’s share of Ari- 5.2.1 Enhancing the Commercial Competitive- anespace is set to be acquired by Airbus Sa- ness of European Launchers fran Launchers, thus ending the presence of As already noted, the supply and demand the institutional stakeholder in the launch conditions of the launch market in the next service provider. This situation has already decade cannot be forecast accurately. How- started to create serious concerns for both ever, the anticipated stability in demand cou- commercial satellite operators and satellite pled with overcapacity in supply could easily manufacturers like Thales Alenia Space lead to a price war similar to that experi- (TAS). As emphasised by TAS Senior Vice enced in the early 2000s, consequently forc- President Christophe Wilhelm in a presenta- ing launch service providers to adopt more tion at the “International Conference on the aggressive stances and arguably pushing European Space Launchers” on 3 November governments to subsidise their launchers 2015 in Paris, “an integration of Arianespace even more than now. Since one of the main in ASL is, first of all, a significant market drivers – not to say the most central one – verticalisation move where one of its share- behind the development of Ariane 6 and holders (Airbus Defence and Space) is also a Vega-C is to eliminate the need for public major satellite manufacturer. [Ensuring] Ari- support during exploitation, it is clear that a anespace’s future growth potential and mar- series of measures will be necessary if ket competitiveness requires that major anti- Europe wants to avoid such an eventuality. trust safeguards [will] be put in place to Five potential policy measures are outlined maintain the customer trust from all satellite hereafter. manufacturers”.219 In addition, should a European preference clause be enforced for 1. Ensuring – and ideally expanding – a the procurement of launch services for insti- solid launch business base for European tutional customers, a monopoly situation launchers is certainly the most relevant would de facto materialise with regard to the measure for generating economies of provision of launch services in Europe. scale and thus ensuring competitive prices for Ariane 6 and Vega-C.220 This objective could be achieved by either en- forcing a European preference clause for 5.2 Europe’s Way Forward: all European institutional missions or by Some Reflections introducing innovative – and so far unex- plored – solutions such as the provision Based on the areas of concern identified in of launch packages to developing coun- the assessment above, the following sections provide a set of reflections on how to over- come the challenges identified. The consid- 220 “For the first time, the meeting of Ministers for Space Policy also raised the issue of setting up a mechanism for 217 SpaceX will probably launch its first U.S. Air Force jointly addressing requirements and terms and conditions satellite in 2018. for the supply of launchers for institutional space missions. 218 Eurockot has on its backlog three Copernicus Sentinel Access to space is an essential element for space activity. launches for the EC, scheduled for launch in 2016. Finding ways to guarantee this access under the best 219 Cit. Wilhelm, Christophe. “European Space Launchers. possible conditions is a major challenge for Europe.” EU- Launch Services: Expectations from a Satellite Manufac- ESA informal Space Council, 30 November 2015. Web. turer”. Presentation at “International Conference on the http://www.eu2015lu.eu/en/actualites/communiques/2015/ European Space Launchers”. Paris, 3-4 November 2015. 11/30-ue-ase/index.html. Accessed 16 December 2015.

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tries by leveraging Official Development vehicles should be achieved through the Assistance (ODAs) (see below). adoption of alternative measures. Among these, the practice of providing ODA to Europe is noticeably the only space actor developing countries to support the pro- in the institutional field that simultane- curement of European service packages ously finances the development of an (satellite, launch service and ground sup- autonomous fleet of launchers, and yet port) could arguably be an effective – often purchases launch vehicles from for- though highly controversial – mechanism. eign providers.221 Thus, the enforcement Considerations of the political feasibility of a “buy European” clause for all Euro- that relate to the implementation of this pean institutional satellites could ulti- measure are provided later in the chap- mately provide European future launchers ter. What needs to be highlighted is that with the institutional support they need endorsing such an option would allow to maintain their competitive edge in the Europe to tackle the need to increase its global market without direct financial strategic presence with developing coun- subsides. tries, particularly those interested in es- However, it has to be stressed that a tablishing their own space infrastructure. comprehensive and legally binding 2. Another possible measure to support agreement might prove hard to reach. European launchers in the global market For one thing, the legal process would be is to reinforce the role of Export Credit extremely complex, as ASL would have to Agencies (ECAs) in a more effective man- reach an agreement with each satellite ner. While the importance of ECAs is of- operator, including the various national ten overlooked, in fact they play a cru- governments and the European Commis- cial, strategic role for the satellite and sion.222And this could potentially clash space launch industry. Quite ironically, with some national legislation requiring their importance becomes clearer when commercial competition in the procure- they fail to operate properly. Thus, when ment of services. the activity of the U.S. Export-Import In addition, there are visible political hur- Bank was not re-authorised by U.S. Con- dles. Whereas in the current setup Euro- gressional budget appropriations, there pean satellite operators, either commer- were very negative repercussions on the cial or institutional, have the possibility to competitiveness of U.S. aerospace indus- choose their launch option from the tries. This in turn gave a considerable ad- worldwide offerings (export control re- vantage to European operators, with the strictions notwithstanding), under a “buy year 2015 being a record year in terms of European” regime this possibility would contracts signed (for satellite export). In cease, with the inherent risk of discour- response to these undesired effects and aging rigorous cost reduction efforts by the growing pressure of the U.S. Aero- industry, as happened during the period space Industries Association, the U.S. of ULA monopoly in the U.S. market. This Senate eventually attached an amend- risk would however be offset if the ment to the Transportation Bill of 30 July agreed fixed pricing can be maintained. 2015 reauthorizing the Ex-Im Bank. Finally, it should be noted that even by Whereas in Europe the French-based Co- introducing a European preference clause face already plays an important role in the expansion of the launch business supporting European satellite exports and base would not necessarily be sufficiently the commercialization of Ariane launch strong, in light of the limited demand for services, its effect is somewhat limited by institutional missions in Europe. its national character. European stake- Given that the often-raised suggestion to holders could thus contemplate the crea- expand national launch demand in Europe tion of a pan-European ECA in which the can only materialise through radically resources of all actors involved are changed demand, ideally the expansion pooled to support the overall European of the launch business base for European space industry more strongly. As an al- ternative, the European Investment Bank (EIB) could be mandated to support the 221 For instance the Italian COSMO Sky-Med constellation activities of European satellite manufac- and German SAR-Lupe, launched by U.S. and Russian turers and Arianespace. In both cases, rockets respectively. the European External Action Service 222 On some of the legal issues related to the guarantee of (EEAS) could play an enabling role, so as a European institutional market for Ariane 6, see de Seld- to link the provision of European space- ing, Peter. “Profile: Antonio Fabrizi”. Space News. 27 January 2015. Web. http://spacenews.com/profile-antonio- related services to the foreign policy ob- fabrizi-director-adviser-to-the-director-general-european- space-agency/. Accessed 2 December 2015.

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jectives of the European Union (see be- also be interested in the establishment of low). a more stringent regime for commercial launches with regard to compliance with 3. In order to enhance the commercial com- environmental requirements, where it has petitiveness of Ariane 6 and Vega-C, the a rather strong competitive position. launchers themselves could undergo some further technical development. As It has to be stressed that this way for- noted in Chapter 4.4, the demand for in- ward has a low level of political feasibil- creased payload capacity is expanding at ity, given the need for the convergence of both ends of the mass spectrum: devel- interests of many different and heteroge- opment plans in many nations neous nations.224 the return of very-heavy-lift launchers, as 5. Finally, the long-term competitiveness of well as a growing number of small European launchers could be greatly sup- launchers (mostly led by private company ported by the introduction of game- efforts). On the larger side of the mass changing technologies, as detailed in the spectrum, ESA and ASL could explore the following section. possibility of reinforcing the performance and flexibility of Ariane 6 with an up- graded Ariane 66 (equipped with 6 5.2.2 Promoting Disruptive Technological Inno- boosters, for a capacity of 13,000 Kg to vation in Europe GTO, as currently being studied by CNES) in order to effectively respond to the pro- As previously noted, the long-term competi- jected market conditions of the next dec- tiveness of European launchers will not come ade. On the smaller side of the mass as a matter of course. Irrespective of the spectrum, the development of a cheaper, potentially successful commercialisation of micro-launcher system (a mini-Vega, so Ariane 6, the increasing dynamism of the to speak) could offer great potential in international launch industry and the harden- terms of capturing the ever-growing mi- ing of international competition pose chal- cro/nano satellite launch market (see lenges that Europe must necessarily continue Chapter 4.3.5) – ideally making use of to confront. Such challenges dictate a steady the small spaceports and launch bases al- and constant investment in launch capabili- ready present in several ESA Member ties that go beyond Ariane 6 / Vega-C. In States (see Chapter 5.2.5). particular, they dictate a strong commitment to the pursuit of disruptive innovation and to 4. Another possible way to support the leapfrogging by way of new technologies. competitiveness of European launchers in the future commercial launch market is – When it comes to disruptive innovation, how- at least theoretically – to achieve interna- ever, Europe is often regarded as a ’follower’ tional consensus on trade rules. Since rather than a ’trend setter’, especially when one of the main drivers of the new Euro- compared to the “fast moving, risk-loving and pean launchers is to eliminate the need pioneering” Silicon Valley entrepreneurs. for public support during exploitation, While this general view does not do justice to European stakeholders could arguably the actual reality,225 it is perhaps true that become interested in encouraging a tran- the often-praised, if not idolised, “Silicon sition of the commercial space launch Valley” mind-set is a typical American phe- market from an era of discriminatory nomenon. government support structures toward a However, as innovation economist Mariana “free and fair trade” trade environment. Mazzucato has poignantly pointed out, the Such a concept of “free and fair trade” mythmaking about Silicon Valley’s wildcat should not necessarily be intended as entrepreneurs often forgets that many of the trade free from substantial government seeds were planted by public sector agen- support structures in the development of launch vehicles, but it could be thought of as achieving mutually agreed upon trad- ing rules (such as the absence of distort- ing grants or subsidies, inducements to Launch Services”. American University International Law Review, Volume 13, Issue 1. 1999. p 170. international customers, offering of addi- 224 The difficulty of establishing a regime for commercial tional services, or providing unregulated launch services mainly stems from the fact such a regime government funding).223 Europe could would require cooperation mechanisms rather than simple coordination. Constructing international regimes to solve cooperation problems is inherently more complex, as they arise when individual and collective incentives cannot be 223 On general considerations on the benefits stemming aligned without adequate adjudication and enforcement from a “free and fair” trade environment in the launch mechanisms. market see Reed, James L., “The Commercial Space 225 For one thing, WIPO Patents statistics prove that Launch Market and Bilateral Trade Agreements in Space Europe is a leading innovation centre.

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cies.226 Indeed, what is often heralded as a the last few years.228 Interestingly, at the product of Silicon Valley creativity is in fact “8th Annual Conference on European Space government-funded and backed research. For Policy”, even EC DG GROW Director Philippe example many of the technologies that make Brunet highlighted the possibility of the EC the iPhone so smart (the Internet, the GPS, becoming more actively involved in activities the Siri voice-recognition services and the related to future launcher development.229 multi-touch screen) were in fact the offspring Additional funding could thus, for instance, be of R&D efforts pursued by the government, allocated to pursue technological reusability and more precisely by DARPA.227 In a similar of the first stage of an Ariane rocket, thus fashion, DARPA has played – and continues complementing the too modest research ef- to play – a crucial role in backing the com- forts currently undertaken by ESA and indus- petitiveness of SpaceX’s launchers (see try. Besides the fact that such efforts are not Chapter 3.1). easy to implement within the EU Framework There is no DARPA-equivalent in Europe, and Programmes, it should be emphasised that only a rather marginal involvement of the supporting the development of potentially military. R&D efforts in the launcher sector disruptive technologies in the launcher sector have been essentially driven and supported does not necessarily mean that Europe by ESA and a few national agencies, while the should follow the same path as SpaceX. most important pan-European instrument for Whether or not reusability proves cost- pursuing technological innovation in general effective, choosing this path would continue is the EU Framework Programmes for Re- to make Europe a follower rather than a search and Technological Development. trendsetter. Europe must find its own path. And there are already several examples of In this respect, it could be argued that pursu- potentially disruptive space transportation ing disruptive technological innovation is a technology in which Europe could take the domain where not only ESA but also the EU lead and gain an economically profitable should consider taking action. Two main rea- competitive advantage. sons supporting complementary efforts can be pinpointed. First, the EC is generally bet- One of the most prominent examples is Reac- ter positioned to initiate programmes that tion Engines’ Skylon space-plane. As men- pursue disruptive innovation. As opposed to tioned in Chapter 4.3.5, thanks to its SABRE sustaining innovation, the outcome of disrup- engine, this project has a large potential to tive innovation is not guaranteed and thus it break the rules of the game and put Europe entails stronger risk and uncertainty in terms at the vanguard of access to space in the of pay-offs. In this sense this type of innova- coming decades, though to achieve this it tion requires strong political commitment and needs even stronger financial and political support – something that can more easily be support. Additive manufacturing is another provided by the EC, which in principle has a recent technological advancement that could more risk-tolerant mandate Second, the EU constitute a game-changer for a plethora of as an actor has an interrelated number of manufacturing activities, including the satel- interests and tools to support disruptive in- lite and launcher industry. Ultimately novation in terms of industrial policy, promo- cheaper, more flexible and environmentally tion of European industrial competitiveness sound than traditional manufacturing, 3D and research and innovation schemes. printing is expected to cause a global indus- trial revolution and become the backbone of Possible EU efforts towards ensuring the future industrial manufacturing for decades to competitiveness and sustainability of Euro- come (see Chapter 4.3.4). While European pean launch capabilities over the long term industries already have a lead in this new should thus be seen as complementary – not sector – and ESA’s push forward in this sense alternative – to those of ESA. The EU could allocate an amount of seed funding within the

current Horizon 2020 Framework pro- 228 gramme. Indeed, several proposals on the See: Horizon 2020 Call H2020-COMPET 2015 of 4 November 2014 for research into breakthrough technolo- topics of “independent access to space” and gies to provide access to space and for research into Key “bottom-up technologies at low TRL” for in- Enabling Technologies with relevance for the fields of dustrial competitiveness were approved in energy production, energy storage, material and struc- tures, additive layer manufacturing techniques, etc. 229 See the intervention of Philippe Brunet during the panel “Upheavals in sight in the launchers’ market” at the “8th Annual Conference on European Space Policy”. Brussels. 226 Mazzucato, Mariana. “The Innovative State”. Foreign 12-13 January 2016. See also: de Selding, Peter. “Brunet: Affairs. January/February 2015: 61-68. EC Should Have Hand in Designing Europe’s Next-gen 227 In the U.S the research and development effort for Rocket”. SpaceNews. 12 January 2016. Web. military technology is an important part of U.S. innovative http://spacenews.com/brunet-european-commission- activities and of the government's technological policy as a should-have-hand-in-designing-next-gen-rocket/. Ac- whole. cessed 25 January 2016.

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is commendable230 – stronger financial and Ariane 5 developments – constantly risk en- political commitment by the EU would not dangering an effective decision-making proc- only enable Europe to maintain its edge, but ess for Europe’s policy on access to space.231 also allow European industries to widely ex- Not only that, but to a very large extent ploit 3D printing for launcher manufacturing these structural constraints have also pre- and therefore reap the benefits (primarily cluded the possibility of leveraging European cost savings) for new generations of launch- launchers as potential diplomatic tools. ers. Alternatively, a EU-sponsored effort to It can be argued that the proactive involve- test potentially disruptive technologies could ment of a super partes institution, such as be directed to exploring ground-breaking the EU, may be necessary to better capitalise space transportation concepts, including non- on the geopolitical dimension of access to rocket space launch concepts (e.g. mass space, independently from the specific inter- drivers). ests of individual states. Irrespective of the specific concepts to be Like many other countries, the EU has pro- explored, what needs to be more broadly gressively developed a proactive S&T diplo- highlighted is that Europe should avoid play- macy to promote its goals, which has now ing S&T catch-up, but choose its own path to emerged as one of its most important axes of technological innovation, in space and else- cooperation with third countries and has where. gradually been extended to cover space af- fairs as well. As aptly argued by Nicolas Pe- 5.2.3 Boosting the Strategic Value of Launchers ter, the increasing inter-linkages of the EU’s S&T and foreign policy are particularly impor- Other than the driver of commercial competi- tant in space activities, as space has always tion, there also appears to be a strong geo- been a domain of high S&T politics.232 political rationale behind the possible pro- Launchers could thus be leveraged more in a active involvement of the European Union in geopolitical sense, so as to: a) strengthen the launcher sector. As already emphasised Europe’s political profile and b) provide in previous chapters, not only is it a strategic stronger support to the EU’s foreign policy necessity for launchers to be secured for the objectives. conduct of any space undertaking, but they are also instruments at the service of a vari- Given that launchers are one of the most ety of policy objectives, including foreign tangible icons of a nation’s space activities, policy. The way Russia, China and more re- the creation of a stronger EU brand in the cently Japan have been leveraging their field can be seen as of considerable impor- launch vehicles on the international stage is a tance to affirming Europe’s role as a strong very clear example of this. political actor in space and to substantially increasing European actorness and presence If looked at from a purely geopolitical per- on the international scene. In addition, spective, Europe’s launcher geopolitical strat- launchers could be instrumentalised as a tool egy appears un-optimised at present: not for international alliance building with exist- only are European launchers not embraced as ing or emerging space powers and for S&T potential diplomatic tools; more importantly, based diplomacy. As noted, one possible op- their strategic significance is overlooked. It tion is the provision of a ’complete launch suffices to recall that current launcher-related package’, (including launch, satellite and activities, including the management of the ground segment support) to developing coun- launch infrastructure in French Guiana, are tries interested in establishing their own programmes subscribed to by ESA Member- space infrastructure. In a similar manner to States on an optional basis: arguably, some- what Japan has been doing (see Chapter thing not truly reflecting a strategic good! 3.4), this strategy could even utilize ODA to Moreover, Europe’s policy on access is char- build-up institutional demand for European acterised by structural constraints of a politi- launchers outside Europe. While certainly cal nature, which ultimately reflect the inher- controversial from the perspective of interna- ently national character of European politics 231 (in space and elsewhere) and ESA’s lack of an A broader reflection on this issue cannot ignore the explicit political mandate. The constraints – broader misalliance between national and pan-European interests, not only in the launcher domain, but in the very which are well exemplified by the past dis- concept of the European project itself. The necessity for a pute between France and Germany on post- “Grand Strategy” for pan-European geopolitical endeav- ours is becoming increasingly evident as Europe faces a growing number of internal and external crises with discor- 230 ESA - 3D Printing For Space: The Additive Revolution. dant national voices. Leadership and enhanced coopera- 16 October 2013. Web. tion are ultimately needed to put Europe on a firmer foot- http://www.esa.int/Our_Activities/Human_Spaceflight/Rese ing. arch/3D_printing_for_space_the_additive_revolution. 232 Peter, Nicolas. “The EU’s emergent space diplomacy”. Accessed 2 December 2015. Space Policy 23. 2007: pp.97-107

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tional development, such a move could prove gramme seem to be clearly going in this di- very effective geopolitically, although it would rection.233 re-introduce conditionality at a time when In this respect, interesting parallels could be such concepts are out of favour. Another drawn with the role of private companies in possible option for Europe is to leverage “dis- the energy sector: like launchers, the avail- carded” launcher technology as a tool for ability of natural resources such as oil and alliance building with emerging space powers natural gas is a strategic necessity to be se- with ambitions for own launch capacity. While cured for national security. And like the certainly worthy of consideration, this possi- commercialisation of launchers, energy ex- bility appears less pursuable under current traction and distribution activities are pre- conditions where technology transfer agree- dominantly commercial undertakings per- ments - which were instrumental in kick- formed by private companies, yet at the starting the space transportation programme same time they continue to be instrumental- of many space nations – are today in sharp ised as geopolitical tools in support of the decline. This notwithstanding, it should be foreign policies of the major powerhouses.234 recalled that countries that are determined to These few observations already suggest that achieve own launch capability will be success- also in the launcher sector the ever- ful in the shorter or longer run, and hence increasing role played by private companies the question for Europe is whether it wants to like SpaceX, MHI and ASL could in the future be seen as a friend in these endeavours. Pro- lead to a progressive commoditization of ac- viding “last generation” technology might be cess to space; a commoditization that would, the best way to build alliances while not un- however, be likely to be complemented by dercutting the technological excellence of the enactment of strategic actions in support current generation launchers. of the foreign policy goals of their respective Irrespective of the specific way launchers can governments.235 be instrumentalised, it is quite evident that In the short term, the possibility for ASL to these are important objectives that not only be assigned with functions of political support individual European countries and ESA, but to the foreign policy objectives of the EU more properly, the EU, have the legitimacy to seems unrealistic, essentially due to the still address. The crafting of such arrangements fragile European diplomacy and lack of a one- goes well beyond the mere scope of techno- voice system in Europe, but the potential is logical and industrial cooperation. There are there and should not be overlooked. political payoffs at stake; payoffs from which the EU (specifically the EEAS) might harvest benefits, and it is thus safe to argue that 5.2.4 Pursuing Autonomy and/or Cooperation in through more active involvement in the sec- Human Spaceflight? tor the EU could better ensure the consis- tency of such initiatives with its overall for- In the assessment, attention was drawn to eign policy action. In such a scheme, the role the fact that Ariane 6 has a strong commer- played by ESA could become that of a “broker cial focus, and it is in a certain sense almost beyond the border” in service of a pan- exclusively tailored to satisfying the needs of European grand strategy defined by the commercial satellites operators. In light of EEAS. the large revenues generated from the launch of commercial satellites the decision appears Yet other potential pathways could also be rather straightforward, but at the same time considered. the question is how to serve the other impor- As already mentioned in Chapter 3.7 and 4.4, tant interests of ESA. Human space explora- one of the most important trends in the U.S., tion is certainly one of these. Whereas Ariane European and Japanese launch sectors is that industry is being entrusted with more and 233 more responsibility in developing and exploit- Boadle, Anthony and Winter, Brian. "Exclusive: Russia, ing a strategic asset like launchers. With the U.S. competing for space partnership with Brazil". Reuters. 15 June 2015. Web. http://uk.reuters.com/article/us-brazil- progressive shift in responsibility from the space-idUKKBN0OV22C20150615. Accessed 15 Decem- state to the private sector, the question that ber 2015. arises is whether in the future private com- 234 Also see the concept of “Energy security”, as the inter- panies will be able to support national foreign section of national security and the availability of natural policy objectives through the utilisation of resources for energy consumption. See for example: https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/topics/energy- their launch vehicles. The recent manoeuvres strategy/energy-security-strategy. Accessed 07 December of SpaceX vis-à-vis the Brazilian space pro- 2015. 235 This may not be the case for those countries in which access to space is still firmly under the control of state- owned companies, such as China and Russia – which again is a situation akin to the status of their energy sec- tors.

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5 was originally conceived to be human-rated play in global space exploration will ulti- by design (although never exploited in this mately depend on its actual capability in the sense), Ariane 6 does not envisage such a field.240 possibility at this stage. However, feasibility considerations must also This choice will have important, long-term be properly taken into account. Any decision consequences for Europe. As ESA will not be for Europe to develop an independent human able to conduct autonomous manned mis- spaceflight capability would require not only a sions for the foreseeable future, the conse- huge financial effort – which spans from quence is that ESA will continue to promote rocket and capsule development to launch human spaceflight through a paradigm of site upgrades and maintenance – but also a “cooperation and interdependence”. This ap- very high degree of political will and support. proach is evident for instance in the agree- This political dimension – which is arguably ment with NASA to develop and supply the missing in the science-based and technology- Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle (MPCV) focused approach of ESA to exploration ac- with the ATV derived Service Module, which tivities – is an indispensable element for de- will provide the spacecraft with propulsion, veloping key capabilities in human spaceflight power and thermal control. and becoming substantially involved in new major undertakings. It is no coincidence that Whereas it is clear that for Europe any future such ambitious European programmes as space exploration scenario can only be Hermes and Aurora did not ultimately pan achieved through international coopera- out. Nor is it a coincidence that, in spite of tion,236 many – including ESA Director Gen- the considerable efforts of ESA over the eral Johann-Dietrich Wörner 237 – have sug- years, a comprehensive and long-term vision gested that international cooperation should for space exploration and human spaceflight not lead Europe to give up on home devel- in the post-ISS period is still lacking. In opment, and that it should ideally develop full short, the development of autonomous capa- spectrum capabilities to be on equal footing bilities will need financial backing and a in future cooperation endeavours with other sound political commitment at the highest space powers. Without a complete portfolio of level, which could then empower ESA to pur- capabilities, Europe’s ability to shape the sue and craft ground-breaking endeavours in priorities and timing of future endeavours, its human spaceflight. And, besides national ability to attract partners, and its overall po- governments, a supra-national actor such as sition in the “space hierarchy” will be dimin- the European Union could support pan- ished. In addition, not possessing critical European efforts in this domain. technologies required for independent human spaceflight, Europe could run the risk of be- In this respect, a previous ESPI report has ing kept out of the “critical path” and ulti- explored the possibility of embedding such mately lose its voice on programme imple- goals within the framework of a new flagship mentation, also in terms of decision- programme by the European Commission.241 making.238 The report showed that more pro-active EU involvement in this field could bring to human Therefore, to avoid such risks and exercise its spaceflight activities the political dimension ‘space power’ to the fullest extent possible, that is currently lacking in Europe, in addition Europe should “demonstrate clear leadership to more solid financial investments for the across a wide range of space sectors, includ- implementation of a major undertaking in this ing space exploration, by having ambitious domain. Concretely, an EU space exploration plans and objectives of great appeal to its flagship programme could be devoted to the stakeholders, as well as to potential interna- development of new complementary capabili- tional partners”.239 The role that Europe will ties that have not been mastered through national and ESA programmes, and thus the 236 This is evident from the policy orientations of all Euro- technologies required for the development of pean stakeholders that have emerged since the first ESA- a human-rated launch vehicle. EU Conference on Human Space Exploration that was held in Prague in October 2009, and regularly reiterated in a number of documents, including the EC working docu- ment “A role for Europe within a Global Space Exploration Endeavour” released in August 2013 237 Oral intervention of ESA Director General Johann- Dietrich Wörner during a Q&A panel at the “FFG Forum” in Vienna, 16 September 2015. 240 See for example: De Winne, Frank. “European Auton- 238 On these points see Peter, Nicolas. Space Exploration omy in Space: Human Space Flight”. In Al-Ekabi, Cenan. 2025: Global Perspectives and Options for Europe. ESPI European Autonomy in Space, Chapter 10. SpringerWien- Report 14. Vienna. August 2008. See also Aliberti, Marco. NewYork.2015. “When China Goes to the Moon… “. SpringerWienNewY- 241 See Aliberti, Marco, and Arne Lahcen. “The Future of ork. 2015. European Flagship Programmes in Space”. ESPI Report 239 Cit. Ibid: p. 6. 53. Vienna. November 2015: pp. 40-46.

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5.2.5 Securing Europe’s Gateways to Space of Soyuz-ST with Ariane 62 and Vega-C, European stakeholders should consider the In contrast to all other major spacefaring possibility of concluding a new agreement to nations, which enjoy the availability of more ensure the availability of Soyuz from than one spaceport on their continental terri- Baikonur/Plesetsk also in the next decade. tory, Europe continues to have all its eggs in one basket, as the Guyana Space Centre Some considerations should be also directed (GSC) is the only European spaceport avail- to the future management of the Guiana able for launching Ariane and Vega rockets. spaceport. As already noted, the GSC is not a In the case of the sudden unavailability of the truly European infrastructure, being financed Kourou launch pads, due to natural, acciden- through an ESA programme subscribed to on tal or geopolitical reasons, European launch- an optional basis by a limited number of ing autonomy would disappear. In addition, European countries. Even acknowledging that according to the plans of CNES for the GSC the funding of the GSC will likely be secured upgrades, the theoretical maximum launch after the expiration of the current financial capacity of Ariane 6 from Kourou will be 17 scheme, it is also clear that the management launches per year,242 (i.e. one launch every of a strategic asset – indispensable for three weeks). autonomy in space – should ideally be sus- tained through a Europe-wide effort. In the In order to tackle the inherent risks posed by wake of the financial crisis, the necessity for these factors, a number of options could be increased “Europeanization” of the Guiana considered. Whereas the ideal solution for spaceport was already raised at the 2008 building a second, Ariane 6-capable space- Ministerial Council, and reiterated in the reso- port within the continental territory of Europe lution on the GSC for the period 2012-2017, or in another strategic location (e.g. within adopted at the 2012 ESA Ministerial Council. the Italian-owned Space Centre, near Malindi, Kenya)243, would clearly present A dedicated debate among all European vast financial, political and security-related stakeholders on the future setting of the GSC constraints, European stakeholders should should be seriously considered. Beside this, continue to keep ready an array of measures European stakeholders could also explore the to ensure redundancy of launch options and potential of setting up additional European to address the potential need for increased spaceports for small launchers to capture the frequency of launches. The Europe-Japan increasing demand for small satellites, and backup agreement (the so-called Launch even space tourism in the future. Andoya Service Alliance) is certainly one of these Space Center in Norway, Space Cen- mechanisms (see Chapter 3.4), but should ter and Kiruna in Sweden are in fact very well perhaps be extended to include government suited to accommodating a range of polar launches.244, 245 Similarly, Arianespace’s ar- orbit missions and further infrastructure could rangement with Starsem – which foresees be developed through a Europe-wide effort. the possibility of using the Baikonur/Plesetsk In addition to that, the UK’s efforts to build a Cosmodrome for the launch of Soyuz-ST in spaceport viable for commercial flights are case of necessity – has been of utmost im- worth noting,246 with two potential locations portance for Arianespace, as evidenced by shortlisted as at the end of 2015. the successful conclusion of the Arianespace- OneWeb contract in summer 2015. In the light of the future phase out and replacement 5.2.6 Propositions Overview When evaluating the possible implementation

242 of the various policy measures proposed in See Astorg, Jean-Marc. “The Ariane 6 System: On the previous sections, some key indicators Board-Ground interfaces and launch facility. Presentation at “International Conference on the European Space need to be taken into account. Three evalua- Launchers”. Paris, 3-4 November 2015. tive criteria prove to be particularly impor- 243 The spaceport, developed in the 1960s in cooperation tant: political feasibility, financial afforda- with NASA, was used to launch Italian and commercial bility, and effectiveness, which were meas- satellites on-board the American rocket until 1988. ured on a five-level scale (very low, low, me- While the base is still operational to track ESA, NASA and Italian satellites, the main offshore launch platform (San dium, high, and very high). The overall Marco) is no longer in use. For further information, see. assessment of the propositions discussed in Agenzia Spaziale Italiana. “Luigi ”. paragraphs 5.2.1 to 5.2.5 can be visualised in Web http://www.asi.it/en/agency/bases/broglio . Accessed Table 14. 10 October 2015. 244 Claudon, Jean-Louis. Presentation: “Cooperation in Launch Services”. Arianespace. 08 October 2014: p.7. 246 UK Space Agency, Department for Business, Innova- Web. http://www.eu-japan.eu/sites/eu-japan.eu/files/10.2- tion & Skills, Ministry of Defence, Foreign & Common- 3-Claudon.pdf. Accessed 2 December 2015. wealth Office. “Shaping the future of the UK space sector”, 245 On this point see Robinson, Jana. EU-Japan Strategic 30 April 2014. Web. Partnership: The Space Dimension”. ESPI Report 40. April https://www.gov.uk/government/news/shaping-the-future- 2012: p. 31. of-the-uk-space-sector. Accessed 02 December 2015.

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Political Financial Proposal Effectiveness feasibility affordability

Enactment of a European preference Low High Very high clause

Expand the launch base through ODA Medium Medium High

Establishment of a Pan-European ECA Medium Medium High (e.g. EIB)

Development of an “Ariane 66“ configu- High Medium High ration

Development of a “mini-Vega” Low Medium High

Achieving mutually agreed upon trading Very low Medium Low rules

Seeding fund for disruptive innovation High Medium High

Use of 3D printing for launchers manu- High Medium High facturing

Provision of ODA for launch services Low Medium High

EEAS involvement in technology transfer Very low Medium High

ASL support to European foreign policy Low High High

Development of a human rated launcher Very Low Very low High

New spaceport/launch pad for Ariane Low Very low Medium and Vega

Launch backup agreements Medium High Medium

Utilization of launch sites in Europe for High Low High small launchers

Table 14: Overview of potential policy measures.

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6. Conclusions and Recommendations

By any measure, access to space has been a NASA’s technologically innovative reusable true success story for Europe. Despite uncer- Space Shuttle”.248 tain beginnings, pan-European cooperation Greatly supported by well-defined goals, by a efforts have guaranteed the availability of an strong dose of Gaullism and also by “une part independent, reliable and efficient means for de chance”, the first Ariane turned out to be launching into space for over more than three stunningly successful. decades. The Ariane family of launchers has become a symbol of European autonomy and As for Europe’s future path, the implementa- achievement in space, and more broadly a tion of additional policy actions may prove “tangible sign of what Europe can do when it necessary to ensure that the decisions en- is genuinely united when it resolves to pursue dorsed at the 2014 Ministerial Council will European goals and there is the shared wis- steer Europe’s access to space in a direction dom to see what should be avoided”.247 as bright as it has been in the past. This path will meet its first key milestone in June 2016, Thanks to an impressive launch performance, when ESA, ASL, and its subcontractors will the Ariane 5 rocket, the most recent and review the preliminary design of Ariane 6. major evolution of the Ariane launcher family, This will be followed by another ESA Ministe- has emerged as a global point of reference rial Council, which will be convened in Lu- for commercial launches and a cornerstone of cerne, Switzerland, in late 2016. European institutional launches, while the exploitation of lightweight Vega is proving A variety of possible policy measures has very fruitful. been already explored in the previous chap- ter. While not all these propositions can be Whereas European launchers have many easily implemented, primarily due to consid- achievements to look back on, the great dy- erations of political feasibility, affordability namism of both the supply and demand con- and effectiveness (see Chapter 5.2.6), there ditions of the international launch industry are concrete steps that can be taken to en- has been posing challenges that Europe has sure the long-term availability and competi- had to confront. In order to ensure the long- tiveness of autonomous access to space for term availability and commercial sustainabil- Europe. Relevant recommendations and pos- ity of its gateways to space, the ESA Ministe- sible concrete policy options are the follow- rial Council of 2 December 2014 approved ing: the development of a new modular family of launchers and sanctioned radical changes in 1. It is recommended that the debate on the structure of the European launch sector. Ariane 6 and Vega-C follow-ups should be pursued in the very near future. Ideally, Such decisions will probably go down in his- decisions on a possible Ariane 66 configu- tory as a turning point for Europe, compara- ration and on Vega-E should be taken as ble to the very first decision to proceed with early as the ESA Ministerial Council of the development of Ariane itself. Indeed, 2016, and those on Ariane 7 well before there are interesting parallels between the the Ariane 6 qualification flight in 2020 – two historical junctures. Just like the years which also needs to be confirmed. It is before the 2014 Ministerial Council, the Minis- also recommended that these decisions terial Conference of July 1973 was preceded become part of a unified “European by a period of intense disagreement between Roadmap for Access to Space” that will the two leading European nations, France and pave the way for a smoother decision- Germany. And just like Ariane 6, the first making process in the future, and ulti- Ariane was born – to use the words of John mately make Europe a more pro-active Kriege – “at a time of great uncertainty and and trend-setting actor vis-à-vis the rap- ambiguity […]. The overriding fear in the idly evolving worldwide landscape of ac- minds of many was that Europe was investing cess to space. in an obsolete technological concept, which could never be commercially competitive with 248 Kriege, J. “The History of the European Launchers: an Overview”. In Proceedings of an International Symposium 247 Cit. Charles Hanin, President of the 1973 European on “The History of the European Space Agency”. 11-13 Space Conference. November 1998, London. ESA SP-346. 1999: 69-78.

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2. A dedicated European-wide R&D seed 6. The possibility of building a second funding or programme (also at start-up launch site for Europe’s upcoming level) for targeting disruptive technologi- launchers should be considered to ensure cal innovation – particularly, but not only redundancy and cope with the potential – in the domain of launchers, should be need for increased launch frequency. At established. Funding could be provided by the same time, in view of the converging more risk-tolerant actors such as the dynamics and similarities between Euro- European Commission – and due to the pean and Japanese launcher pro- absence of geo-return constraints, in a grammes, extending the Europe-Japan steadier manner than today. launch backup agreement to cover insti- tutional missions would provide a greater 3. In light of the future phase-out of Soyuz margin for assuring Europe’s access to from GSC, an alternative and symbolic space in case of the unavailability of instrument for European-Russian space Kourou. When compared to the highly cooperation should be identified. Since it demanding – in both political and finan- is unlikely that future cooperative under- cial terms – establishment of a second takings will directly involve access to launch site for Ariane 6, such a move space – also considering the general would entail rather marginal efforts, while trend of strengthening national autonomy at the same time providing politically and privatisation or re-nationalisation of relevant benefits to be harvested. Equally the industry – the historical capacity of importantly, European stakeholders Europe to act as a bridge- and coalition- should consider the possibility of conclud- builder should be more firmly enshrined ing a new agreement to ensure the avail- into the broader framework of a “Euro- ability of Soyuz from Baikonur/Plesetsk in pean Vision for Space”, in which other the next decade. options are explored. Among these, the idea of a Moon Village, recently promoted 7. The development of full spectrum capa- by the ESA Director General, could in- bilities in access to space, and in particu- deed provide an even more symbolic and lar the development of a human-rated effective framework for cooperation in the launch vehicle and re-entry system, post-ISS period, resulting in a bold inter- should not be put on the backburner, but national endeavour endorsed at the very more actively discussed among all Euro- highest political level. pean constituencies within a broader vi- sion for space exploration in the post-ISS 4. The creation of a “pan-European ECA” period, by inter alia considering the po- should be considered. In this respect, the tential benefits offered by the involve- European Investment Bank could be en- ment of both European institutions and trusted with dedicated functions of sup- private companies in future space explo- port for the export of European satellites ration and human spaceflight activities. and launch services, with the ultimate goal of providing a larger launch business 8. Finally, the potential benefits offered by base both for current and future Euro- more active involvement of other EU in- pean launch systems. stitutions, particularly the EEAS, should be considered with regard to a more effi- 5. ESA and its Member States should assess cient exploitation of launcher-related the possibility of better leveraging exist- technology or services for S&T-based di- ing small spaceports / launch pads such plomacy. Among the possible options, the as Andoya and Kiruna or the upcoming provision to developing countries of launch facility in the UK, by incorporating “launch package agreements” through the possibility of accommodating new ODA could be a highly effective geopoliti- light-weight launch vehicles. These infra- cal move for also providing indirect sup- structures are well suited for polar orbit port to the European space industry. The missions and would thus enable the cap- benefits of assisting the building of geo- ture of the ever-growing demand for political alliances through the transfer of small/micro satellites. Such decisions ‘previous generation’ technology to coun- would ideally be accompanied by the in- tries intent on developing own launch ca- troduction of an even smaller configura- pabilities should also be kept in mind, tion of the Vega rocket or even by open- particularly at this time of generational ing these spaceports to international changeover in launchers in Europe. launch service providers.

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Annex

buted in 2002, and can deliver a payload of up to 22,560 Kg into LEO and 14,400 Kg into A.1 Worldwide Expendable GTO, in its Delta IV Heavy version. Orbital Launch Vehicles as SpaceX – Falcon 9 at 2015 With a first successful launch achieved quite recently, in 2008, with the and in 2010 with the Falcon 9, Space Exploration U.S. Technologies Corporation (SpaceX), a private company founded by billionaire Elon Musk, ULA – Atlas V and Delta IV has quickly imposed itself as a major player in the commercial launchers market. Its Fal- The United Launch Alliance (ULA) consortium, con 9 v1.1 medium-to-heavy lift rocket has a joint venture of Lockheed Martin and Boe- achieved 18 successful launches and one ing formed in 2006 to provide spacecraft failure as at October 2015, and has a launch launch services to the U.S. government, cur- manifest of more than 30 future launches in rently provides the Delta IV and Atlas V fam- the next few years.249 The dual-stage vehicle ily of launchers. Both are heavy-lift vehicles is powered by SpaceX-manufactured engines, with the capability of reaching GTO. The Atlas the Merlin 1D, and can launch the Dragon V is considered the workhorse of the U.S. cargo module to resupply the International launchers, with 127 successful launches for Space Station, a large payload to LEO (up to the overall Atlas programme, and a reliability 13,150 Kg) or a medium-sized payload to of 100%. Originally a product of the U.S. Air GTO (up to 4,850 Kg). Its launch pads are Force’s Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle located at Cape Canaveral Air Force Station Program (EELV), it is now manufactured and (CCAFS) and Vandenberg Air Force Base operated by ULA, which also commercializes (VAFB). it in the U.S., while in the worldwide com- mercial market it is sold by Lockheed Martin Orbital ATK – Antares, Minotaur-C, Pegasus XL Commercial Launch Services (LMCLS). It consists of a (CCB) The Antares vehicle is the first two-stage powered by a Russian RD-180 engine, a Cen- cryogenically fuelled rocket commercialized taur upper stage, and can also use up to five by Orbital ATK, a company previously focused solid-rocket strap-on boosters attached to its on solid-fuelled rockets such as Pegasus, first stage. The CCB engine is manufactured Taurus and Minotaur. The Ukrainian company by RD Amross, a joint venture between Pratt Yuzhnoye, with two engines derived from the & Whitney Rocketdyne and NPO Energomash, Russian NK-33 originally developed for the a company largely owned by the federal gov- Soviet Union’s heavy-lift N-1 rocket in the ernment of Russia, while the upper stage 1960s produces its first stage. The second engine is manufactured by Aerojet Rocket- stage is produced either by Alliant TechSys- dyne. Its various versions can deliver up to tems or by Orbital according to customer 18,500 Kg into LEO and 8,900 Kg into GTO. needs. Antares is launched from the Mid- While in principle available on the commercial Atlantic Regional Spaceport (MARS) located market, due to high prices and a launch on Wallops Island (Virginia), provides access manifest dominated by government missions, to LEO (up to 5,700 Kg), and can also carry it has attracted little commercial business. the Cygnus cargo module to the ISS. Delta IV is the second family of rockets de- The Minotaur family is derived from con- rived from the EELV and now manufactured verted U.S. ICBMs. Its latest version, Mino- and operated by ULA, which also markets it taur C, is a small, four-stage solid-propelled in the U.S., while Boeing Launch Services launcher derived from the Taurus launcher commercializes it worldwide. Delta IV is family, designed as a quick reaction launch available in five variants, constituted by a (CBC) and various 249 SpaceX - Launch Manifest. Web. cryogenic upper stages with engines manu- http://www.spacex.com/missions. Accessed 02 December factured by Aerojet Rocketdyne. It first de- 2015.

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vehicle mostly intended for small national Soyuz FG and 2.1 a/b/v security payloads. It is aimed at placing small payloads up to 1,160 Kg to LEO or 1,600 Kg Thanks to its three different launch sites - to SSO. Following several failures in 2009 Baikonur, Plesetsk and the Guiana Space and 2011, it has now been upgraded, with a Centre (GSC) - the Soyuz 2 achieves great first launch scheduled for 2016. versatility in placing medium-sized payloads into any orbit, as well as being currently the Conceived by Orbital as a low-cost system to only launcher system certified to carry astro- launch small satellites to LEO, the air- nauts to the ISS. The Russian companies launched Pegasus XL can place in orbit light- TsSKB-Progress and NPO Lavotchkin manu- weight payloads up to 450 Kg. In service facture its first two stages, and the third since 1994, it has seen reduced launch rates stage is built by NPO Lavotchkin. The vehicle in the past few years (only three since 2008) comes in two versions, an older Soyuz FG as piggyback options with other launchers used for human spaceflight programmes, and have flourished. the currently commercialized Soyuz 2. The launch service providers for Soyuz 2 are Ari- anespace for the GSC launch centre, and its Russia sister company Starsem for launches from Rockot Baikonur. Developed from refurbished intercontinental China ballistic missiles (ICBM) components by Khrunichev and marketed by Eurockot, a Long March 2 joint company between Khrunichev and As- trium, the Rockot is a three-stage launch Built by the Shanghai Academy of Spaceflight vehicle predominantly used for sending scien- Technology (SAST) and marketed by the tific, Earth observation and climate monitor- China Great Wall Industry Corporation ing satellites into LEO orbit - it is scheduled (CGWIC), the Long March 2 launch vehicle is to launch EU Copernicus satellites Sentinel provided in two versions, 2C and 2D. Long 3A, 2B and 5P in 2016. It can deliver up to March 2C is predominantly used to place pay- 2,150 Kg in LEO from the Plesetsk launch loads in SSO orbit, and is launched from Jiu- centre. quan Satellite Launch Center (JSLC). is launched from JSLC, Taiyuan Dnepr Satellite Launch Center (TSLC) and Xichang Satellite Launch Center (XSLC). Long March 2 The Dnepr is another launch vehicle derived series launch vehicles have a capacity of directly from a surplus of Soviet ICMBs, the around 3,850 Kg to LEO or 1,300-1,900 Kg to R-36 (known outside the USSR as SA-88), SSO. and refurbished by the Ukrainian company PA Yuzhmash. The launch service provider is a Long March 3 joint project between Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan, ISC Kosmotras. It is suitable for The three-stage Long March 3 family, mar- launching medium-sized payloads (up to keted by the CGWIC and manufactured by 3,700 Kg) or clusters of small and micro sat- the China Academy of Launch Vehicles ellites into LEO from the Baikonur Kos- (CALT), constitutes China’s commercially modrome or the Russian Dombarovsky mis- available vehicles to place payloads into GTO. sile base. It is available in several variants (3A, 3B, 3BE, 3C) with various boosters and fairings, Proton-M combining a GTO capacity varying from 2,600 to 5,500 Kg. It is launched at XSLC. International Launch Services (ILS), a U.S.- Russia joint venture, provides and commer- Long March 4 cializes the Proton-M, the latest iteration of an historical Russian launch family. Manufac- The , also known as the Chang tured by Khrunichev and launched from the Zheng 4C, CZ-4C and LM-4C, previously des- Baikonur Kosmodrome, Proton-M is a four- ignated -II, is a 3-staged stage vehicle mainly suited for government rocket with a performance of 4,200 Kg to LEO and satellite operators aiming at the geosta- or 2,800 Kg to SSO. It is launched from the tionary orbit, with a GTO capacity of 6,920 Jiuquan and Taiyuan Satellite Launch Cen- Kg. ters. It is manufactured by SAST and com- mercialised by CGWIC.

ESPI Report 56 90 March 2016 The European Launchers between Commerce and Geopolitics

Long March 6 satellite configurations, with a capacity of up to 1,750 Kg to SSPO and 3,250 Kg to LEO. Long March 6 (also known as Chang Zheng- Notably, the PSLV also successfully launched 6) is a recent vehicle developed by China the first Indian Moon mission, the Aerospace Science and Technology Corpora- Chandrayaan-1. tion and the China Academy of Launch Vehi- cle Technology. It features two solid stages GSLV Mk-II (also known as GSLV) and a restartable third stage to allow preci- sion orbital injections. Its performance is With a payload target of 2,500 Kg to GTO and 1,500 Kg to LEO, or 1,080 Kg to a 700 Km 5,000 Kg to LEO, the Geosynchronous Satel- SSO, and achieved a first launch from the lite Launch Vehicle (GSLV) is the main me- Taiyuan launch site in late 2015. It is ex- dium-lift, three-stage launcher developed by pected that the launcher will be made com- India, using proven components from the mercially available. PSLV programme. In addition to the delivery of communication satellites to the geosta- tionary orbit, the GSLV programme was pri- marily developed to launch the multi-purpose The Long March 11 is a solid-fuel rocket de- INSAT (Indian National Satellite System) signed to meet the need to rapidly launch class of satellites, to satisfy the country’s satellites, and developed by CALT. It was first needs in terms of telecommunication, broad- launched on 25 September 2015, carrying a casting, meteorology and Search and Rescue payload of microsatellites to SSO. There is, operations.250 however, a dearth of information regarding the specifics of this new launch vehicle.

Japan H-IIA/B Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI) designed and built the two-stage liquid H-IIA and H-IIB launchers, which are Japan’s main launch vehicles. Coming in two versions for the for- mer, and one for the latter, H-IIA is mainly used to launch payloads to LEO, GTO and Earth escape orbit. The larger H-IIB currently launches the H-II Transfer Vehicle (HTV) to the ISS, but recently has been made avail- able on the commercial satellite market. The launch site is located in . Epsilon Developed for the small-satellites market, the solid-propelled Epsilon rocket was intended to provide a low-cost, easy and efficient launch service. Its three-stage configuration can carry up to 700 Kg to LEO, but it can also place payloads into SSO by using a liquid post-boost stage. It is launched from the .

India PSLV CA, G and XL The Polar (PSLV) is India’s main launch vehicle for Sun- Synchronous Polar Orbit (SSPO) as well as LEO. It consist of a four-stage system pro- duced in several variants, specialized in 250 Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) - Geosyn- launching medium-to-small payloads (mini- chronous Satellite Launch Vehicle. Web. and micro-class satellites) also in a multi- http://isro.gov.in/launchers/gslv. Accessed 2 December 2015.

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Summary of Current Expendable Orbital Launch Vehicles. 251

Launch Launch Service Performance range (Kg) Launch Site Vehicle Provider LEO SSO GTO GEO Europe Guyana Space Ariane 5 ECA Arianespace 10,500 Centre Guyana Space Soyuz-ST Arianespace 4,400 3,200 Centre Guyana Space Vega Arianespace 1,500 Centre USA 9,800 – 7,700 – 4,700 – Up to Atlas V series ULA/LMCLS CCAFS, VAFB 18,800 15,000 8,900 3,900 2,800 – 1000 – Delta II ULA CCAFS, VAFB 6,000 2,100 Delta IV Me- 9,400 – 7,700 – 4,400 – 1,200 – ULA CCAFS, VAFB dium 14,000 11,600 7,300 3,100 Delta IV ULA 28,800 23,600 14,200 6,800 CCAFS, VAFB Heavy 4,900- CCAFS, VAFB, Falcon 9 v.1.1 SpaceX 13,100 5,300 KSC, Brownsville 3,850 – 2,900 – WFF, CCAFS, Antares Orbital ATK 5,650 4,450 VAFB, KLC 1,000 – 700 – WFF, CCAFS, Minotaur Orbital ATK 3,360 1,830 VAFB, KLC Russia Proton M / Khrunichev 19,800 4,400 1,900 Baikonur Block DM Plesetsk, Angara 1.2 Khrunichev 3,800 Vostochny 7,000 – Baikonur, Ple- Soyuz 2-1.a/b TsSKB Progress 8,300 setsk Vostochny Plesetsk, Soyuz 2-1.v TsSKB Progress 2,800 2,600 Vostochny Soyuz FG TsSKB Progress 7,130 Baikonur China Long March 2 Jiuquan, Taiyuan, CGWIC 3,850 2,100 series Xichang Long March 3 6,000 – 5,100 – 2,600 – CGWIC Xichang series 11,500 7,100 5,500 Long March 4 CGWIC 4,600 3,100 1,420 Xichang Wenchang, Tai- Long March 6 CGWIC 1,500 1,000 yuan, Jiuquan, series Xichang Japan 2,900 – H-IIA series MHI 10,000 4,400 Tanegashima 6,000

251 Data as at December 2015, including vehicles not commercially active. Source: ESA.

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H-IIB MHI 16,500 Tanegashima 700 – Epsilon JAXA > 500 Uchinoura 1,200 India 2,100 – 1,050 – 1,100 – Satish Dhawan PSLV Antrix/ISRO 3,700 1,750 1,500 Space Centre Satish Dhawan GSLV Mk-II Antrix/ISRO >6,000 >2,300 2,500 Space Centre Ukraine Zenit-3F SIS/Yuzhnoye 13,900 4,000 1,900 Baikonur Zenit-3FU SIS/Yuzhnoye 4,500 4,100 2,100 Baikonur Multinational Sea Launch/ Ener- Zenit-3SL 7,300 6,200 Odyssey Platform gia Zenit-3SLBU SIS/Yuzhhnoye 4,900 1,900 Baikonur Rockot Eurockot 2,100 1,600 Plesetsk Dnepr-1 ISC Kosmotras 3,700 2,300 Yasny, Baikonur Proton M ILS 23,000 Baikonur Proton M / ILS 6,900 3,300 Baikonur Breeze M

Falcon Heavy’s first flight is scheduled for 2016. Its first stage will be composed of proven tech- nology, such as central Falcon 9 v1.1 engine A.2 Launch Vehicles under cores, and two side cores from the upgraded Development Falcon 9, for a grand total of 27 Merlin 1D en- gines. Its intended performance is 53,000 Kg to LEO, or 21,200 Kg to GTO, and it is already U.S. designed to meet all the current requirements for human rating, and to benefit from first- ULA – Vulcan stage reusability technology. It will be launched from the Vandenberg Air Force Base.252 The New Generation Launch System (NGLS) being developed by ULA stems from the deci- NASA – SLS sion to stop the use of Russian-made RD-180 engines for national security missions, which The SLS (Space Launch System) is NASA's constitute the majority of Atlas V payloads. It planned very heavy-lift rocket intended to re- foresees a process based on several steps, place the cancelled Ares-5 concept, targeting initially based on reliable Atlas V and Delta beyond-LEO exploration and high energy, technology. Vulcan should be flown starting in deep-space missions, chiefly sending humans 2019, with a target performance of 18,000 Kg to Mars. It will make use of several proven to LEO and 8,900 Kg to GTO. A further step elements from the Space Shuttle programme, scheduled for 2023 envisages a new upper such as the Solid Rocket Boosters (SRB), to stage called the Advanced Cryogenic Evolved reduce the upfront development time and Stage (ACES), allowing for greater mission costs, and will be NASA’s fist human-rated ve- flexibility. Its target performance, although still hicle since the Shuttle itself. Its 2-phase devel- susceptible to further changes, is 37,000 Kg to opment approach (“Block 1” and “Block 2” con- LEO and 18,000 Kg to GTO. Finally, the last figurations) envisions reaching a 70,000 Kg step in 2024 foresees the introduction of Sensi- LEO capacity for 2018, and a 130,000 Kg per- ble, Modular, Autonomous Return Technology formance for 2021. The manned version of SLS (SMART) technology, allowing the recovery of will feature the Orion Multi-purpose Crew Vehi- the propulsion system of the first stage. cle. Its first launch will take place at in Florida. SpaceX – Falcon Heavy 252 SpaceX – Falcon Heavy. Web. Already purposed as “the most powerful opera- http://www.spacex.com/falcon-heavy. Accessed 02 De- tional rocket in the world by a factor of two”, cember 2015.

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Russia launch site is the new Wenchang Satellite Launch Center. Angara 1.2 Long March 7 The smallest Angara under development is the Angara A1.2, which consists of one URM- The Long March 7 is devised as a modular 1 core and a modified Block I second stage. family of medium-lift rockets intended to It can deliver 3,800 Kg of payload to a 200 replace the current LM-2, LM-3 and LM-4 Km x 60° orbit. A modified Angara 1.2, called families. Therefore, its intended performance Angara 1.2PP, made Angara's inaugural sub- varies from 3,000 to 10,000 Kg to LEO, and orbital flight on July 9, 2014. The flight car- 1,500 to 6,000 Kg to GTO depending on the ried a mass dummy weighing 1,430 Kg. An- rocket configuration. It will make use of the gara A1.2PP consists of a URM-1 core stage Wenchang Satellite Launch Center, with a and a partially fuelled 3.6-metre diameter first flight scheduled for early 2016, and will URM-2, allowing each of the major compo- be commercially available. nents of Angara A5 to be flight tested before that version's first orbital launch, conducted Long March 9 on December 23, 2014. Angara will primarily be launched from the , To allow for long-term outer space explora- and in future from Vostochny. tion objectives, including manned Moon mis- sions, CALT is also developing a three-stage, Angara 5 very heavy-lift vehicle, under the name Long March 9. Its performance would be similar to The second Angara being developed is the NASA’s SLS, i.e. 130,000 Kg to LEO. The first Angara A5, which is intended to replace Pro- flight is scheduled no earlier than the 2030s, ton as the major Russian heavy-lift launch and, like the SLS, it is not intended for the vehicle after 2020. It consists of one URM-1 commercial market. (Universal Rocket Module) core and four URM-1 boosters, a 3.6m URM-2 second stage, and an upper stage, either the -M Japan or the KVTK. Angara A5 has an overall pay- load capacity of 24,500 Kg to a 200 Km x 60° H-III orbit, and can deliver 5,400 Kg to GTO with Intended to replace the current H-II at a Briz-M, or 7,500 Kg to the same orbit with lower cost, the two-stage H-III rocket will be KVTK. It is currently in an advanced test featured in three different configurations, phase, with 9 test flights left as at end 2015. having zero to four strap-on solid boosters in It will be also proposed in a manned version, a configuration not unlike the planned Ariane called Angara A5P, with a capability of 18,000 6. Its intended performance is up to 6,500 Kg Kg to LEO. to GTO, with a first flight planned for the early 2020s from the Tanegashima launch Angara 7 site. The A7 concept envisages six strap-on URMs each one with one RD-191 engine, and a India larger core stage for increased fuel capacity. Its intended capacity is 40,500 Kg to LEO, GSLV Mk-III 12,500 Kg to GTO and 7,600 Kg to direct GEO orbit. The long-sought Indian evolution of its GSLV, the GSLV Mk-III heavy lift vehicle, has been under development by ISRO since the early China 2000s, with a scheduled first flight now envi- sioned for 2017. Composed of three stages, Long March 5 including a cryogenic upper stage, it is aimed China’s next-generation heavy-lift launch at deploying satellites up to 4,000 Kg to GTO, system, the Long March 5 family, is currently but the vehicle has also been designed to be under development by the China Academy of human-rated, in order to possibly deliver an Launch Vehicle Technology (CALT). Six ver- ISRO-made exploration vehicle into orbit as sions of LM-5 are envisaged, aiming at a well. A proposed upgrade would increase the maximum payload capacity of 25,000 Kg to payload capacity to 6,000 Kg to GTO. LEO and 14,000 Kg to GTO and potentially commercially available. The designated

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Summary of Orbital Launch Vehicles under Development. 253

Launch Performance range (Kg) Launch Site First Flight Vehicle LEO SSO GTO GEO Europe Ariane 62 5,000 Guyana Space Centre 2020 10,000 – Ariane 64 Guyana Space Centre 2020 11,000 Vega–C 1,500 Guyana Space Centre 2018 U.S. CCAFS, VAFB, KSC, Falcon Heavy 53,000 21,200 2016 Brownsville 5,200 – 3,700 – KSC , CCAFS (VAFB, Athena III TBD 5,500 4,300 WFF) Vulcan Step > 18,800 > 8,900 3,900 CCAFS, VAFB 2019 1-2 Vulcan Step 3 37,000 18,000 8,700 CCAFS, VAFB 2024 SLS Block 1 70,000 KSC 2018 SLS Block 2 130,000 KSC 2021 Russia 2,400 – 1,000 – Angara A3 14,600 Plesetsk, Vostochny > 2020 3,600 2,000 Angara A5 24,500 5,400 3,000 Plesetsk, Vostochny 2016 Angara A5P 18,000 Plesetsk, Vostochny 2016 Angara A7 40,500 12,500 7,600 Plesetsk, Vostochny > 2028 China Long March 6 Wenchang, Taiyuan, 1,500 1,000 2016 series Jiuquan, Xichang Long March 7 3,000 – 1,500 – Wenchang, Taiyuan, 5,500 2016 series 10,000 6,000 Jiuquan, Xichang Long March 5 18,000 – 6,000 – Wenchang 2015 series 25,000 14,000 Long March 9 130,000 ? > 2023 Japan 2,800 – H–III Tanegashima 2020 6,500 Epsilon phase 1,500 – > 750 Uchinoura > 2017 2 1,800 India Satish Dhawan Space GSLV Mk-III 8,000 4,000 2017 Centre Israel Shavit LK-2 800 Palmachim TBD Republic of Korea KSLV-II 1,500 Nora 2020

253 Data as at December 2015. Vehicles with a performance of under 500kg were not considered. Source: ESA.

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Argentina Tronador III 1,000 Puerto Belgrano TBD Brazil VLS Alfa/Beta 500 – 800 Alcantara 2020

A.3 Overview of Major Orbital Launch Sites

Name Location Operator Main Launch Vehicle Europe Guyana Space Centre French Guiana, France CNES Ariane 5, Vega, Soyuz-ST U.S. Cape Canaveral Air Force Atlas V, Delta, Falcon, Athena, Florida, USA USAF Station Minotaur, Pegasus Kennedy Space Center Florida, USA NASA Falcon 9, SLS Atlas V, Delta, Falcon, Athena, Vandenberg Air Force Base , USA USAF Minotaur White Sands Missile Range New Mexico, USA USAF Kodiak Island, Alaska, Kodiak Launch Complex AADC Antares, Athena, Minotaur USA Wallops Island, Virginia, Antares, Athena, Minotaur, NASA USA Pegasus XL Mojave Desert, Califor- USAF Pegasus XL nia, USA , Marshall Omelek Island SpaceX Falcon 1 Islands Kwajalein Atoll, Marshall Reagan Test Site U.S. Army Pegasus XL Islands Brownsville Texas, USA SpaceX Falcon 9 Russia Angara, Soyuz, Cosmos, Cy- Mirnyi, Arkhangelsk, Plesetsk Cosmodrome FSA clone 3, Rockot, Soyuz 2-1.v, Russia Start-1 Kzyl-Ordinsk, Kazakh- Proton, Soyuz, Cosmos, Cyclo- Baikonur Cosmodrome FSA stan ne 2, Dnepr, All Russian upcoming manned Vostochny Cosmodrome Amurskaya, Russia FSA and unmanned LV Dombarovsky, Oren- Yasny FSA Dnepr burg, Russia Barents Launch Area Barents Sea, Russia VMF Shtil, China Jiuquan Satellite Launch Gansu Province (Inner CLTC , 2D, 2F Center (Shuang Cheng Tzu) Mongolia), PR China Taiyuan Satellite Launch Shanxi Province, PR CLTC Long March 2C,4 Center (Wuzhai) China Xichang Satellite Launch Sichuan Province, PR CLTC Long March 2C, 2E, 3A, 3B Center China

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Hainan (Wenchang Satellite Island, PR China CAS/CLTC Long March 5, 6, 7 Launch Center) Japan Uchinoura Space Center Kagoshima, Japan JAXA Epsilon Kagoshima, Japan JAXA H-IIA, H-IIB, H-III India Satish Dhawan Space Cen- Sriharikota, Andhra ISRO PSLV, GSLV tre Paradesh, India Other Puerto Belgrano Naval Base Bahia Blanca, Argentina Arg. Navy? Tronador South Australia, Austra- Woomera RAAF lia Centro de Lançamento de Maranhão, Brazil DCTA VLS Alcântara Unnamed launch site Semman province, Iran ISA Safir, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeni Shahroud, Iran ISA Space Launch Facility Palmachim Air Force Base Palmachim, Israel IAF Shavit Goheung Jeollanamdo, Naro Space Center KARI KSLV Rep. Korea Sohae Satellite Launching Cholsan, North Pyoun- KPA Unha Station / Pongdong-ri gan, DPR Korea Tonghae Satellite Launch Hamgyong, DPR Korea KPA Unha Ground / Musudan-ri

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Figure 5: Map of major worldwide orbital launch sites. 254

254 Source: FAA. “The Annual Compendium of Commercial Space Transportation 2016. pp: 32-33.

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A.4 Technical Compatibility Between Launchers And Satellite Bus255

LEO TAS Airbus Orbital LM OHB NG BALL ME NEC Antares ‡ ‡ Ariane 5 9 9 9 ‡ Athena 9 9 Atlas 9 9 Delta 9 9 9 9 9 Dnepr 9 9 Epsilon 9 9 Falcon 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 Minotaur 9 9 9 9 Pegasus 9 9 9 PSLV 9 Rockot 9 9 ‡ Soyuz 9 9 9 Vega 9 9 ‡ Zenit 9 9

GEO TAS Airbus Orbital LM Boeing SSL OHB NG ME NEC Ariane 5 9 9 9 9 9 9 ‡ 9 9 Atlas 9 9 9 9 9 Delta 9 9 9 9 9 Falcon 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 GSLV 9 H-IIA 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 Long 9 9 9 9 March Proton 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 Soyuz 9 9 9 9 Zenit 9 9 9 9 9 9 Angara ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ 9 = Developed and Performed ‡ = Under Development

TAS = Thales Alenia Space OHB = OHB Airbus = Airbus NG = Orbital = Orbital ATK ME = Mitsubishi Electric LM = Lockheed Martin NEC = Nihon Electric Corporation Boeing = Boeing Ball = Ball Aerospace & Technology SSL = Space Systems Loral

255 Source: La Regina, Veronica. “Business Partnership and technology transfer opportunities in the Space sector between EU and Japan”. EU-Japan Center For Industrial Cooperation. Tokyo, 08 June 2015. Author’s re-elaboration.

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List of Acronyms

Acronym Explanation A ACES Advanced Cryogenic Evolved Stage APSCO Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organization ARTA Ariane research and technology support programme ASI Agenzia Spaziale Italiana () ASL Airbus Safran Launchers ATV Automated Transfer Vehicle AVUM Attitude Vernier Upper Module C CBC Common Booster Core (Delta IV) CCAFB Cape Canaveral Air Force Base CCB Common Core Booster (Atlas V) CCDev Commercial Crew Development (NASA Programme) CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy CGWIC China Great Wall Industry Corporation CNES Centre Nationale D’Etudes Spatiales (French Space Agency) CONAE Comisión Nacional de Actividades Espaciales COTS Commercial Orbital Transportation Services (NASA programme) CRS Commercial Resupply Service (NASA programme) CSDP Common Security and Defence Policy D DDTC Directorate of Defense Trade Controls DLR Deutsches Zentrum für Luft- und Raumfahrt (German Space Agency) DoD U.S. Department of Defense E EC European Commission ECA Export Credit Agency EEAS European Union External Action Service ELDO European Launcher Development Organisation ELV European Launch Vehicle (Company) ELV Expendable Launch Vehicle EELV Expendable Launch Vehicle Program (U.S. Air Force) EGAS European Guaranteed Access to Space EO Earth Observation

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Acronym Explanation ESA European Space Agency ESP European Space Policy ESPI European Space Policy Institute ESRO European Space Research Organisation EU European Union F FAA Federal Aviation Administration FLPP Future Launchers Preparatory Programme FP Framework Programme G GATS General Agreement on Trade in Services GDP Gross Domestic Product GEO Geostationary Orbit GSC Guiana Space Centre GSLV Geosynchronous Launch Vehicle GSO GTO Geostationary Transfer Orbit H H2020 Horizon 2020 HTV H-II Transfer Vehicle HSPG High-Level Space Policy Group I ICBM Intercontinental IGS Information Gathering System ILS International Launch Services INSAT Indian National Satellite System INKSA Iran, North Korea and Syria Non-Proliferation Act ISA ISRO India Space Research Organization ISS International Space Station ITAR International Traffic in Arms Regulations ITU International Telecommunication Union IXV Intermediate eXperimental Vehicle J JSLC Jiuquan Satellite Launch Center K KSC Kennedy Space Center L L3S Launceur a Trois Etages de Substitution

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Acronym Explanation LEAP Launchers Exploitation Accompaniment Programme LEO Low Earth Orbit LMCLS Lockheed Martin Commercial Launch Services M MARS Mid-Atlantic Regional Spaceport MEO Medium Earth Orbit MHI Mitsubishi Heavy Industries MLA Multiple Launch Agreement MPCV Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle (Orion) MS Member State MTCR Missile Technology Control Regime N NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration NGL Next Generation Launcher NGLV Next Generation Launch Vehicle (Vulcan) NGSO Non-GSO launch NGTO Non-GTO launcher O ODA Official Development Aid P PSLV Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle Q QZSS Quasi-Zenith Satellite System R R&D Research and Development RLV Reusable launch vehicle S S&T Science and Technology SAR Synthetic Aperture Radar SAST Shanghai Academy of Spaceflight Technology SLS Space Launch System SRB Solid Rocket Boosters SSA Space Situational Awareness SSO Sun-Synchronous Orbit SSPO Sun-Synchronous Polar Orbit SSTO Single stage to orbit T TRL Technology Readiness Level TSLC Taiyuan Satellite Launch Center

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Acronym Explanation U ULA United Launch Alliance USML United States Munitions List V VAFB Vandenberg Air Force Base VECEP VEga Consolidation and Evolution Preparation Programme VEGA Vettore Europeo di Generazione Avanzata VERTA Vega Research and Technology Accompaniment programme W WTO World Trade Organization X XSLC Xichang Satellite Launch Center

ESPI Report 56 103 March 2016

Acknowledgements

The authors are grateful to the distinguished assistance and support throughout the re- members of the Accompanying Group – Ralph search and writing process of the report. W. Jaeger, Arturo de Lillis, Nicolas Peter, and Finally, Matteo Tugnoli would also like to ex- Per Tegnér – all of which attended on a per- press his personal gratitude and thanks to sonal basis, for the invaluable contributions Ersilia Vaudo Scarpetta from ESA and to all of and expert insights they provided during the those who made his fellowship at ESPI possi- course of the project. Sincere thanks are also ble, in particular Gabriella Arrigo from ASI extended to the ESPI Director, Peter Hulsroj and Sara Cavelli from SIOI. and to the whole ESPI team for their constant

About the Authors

Marco Aliberti Matteo Tugnoli Marco Aliberti has been working as a Resi- Matteo Tugnoli has worked as a Resident dent Fellow at the European Space Policy Fellow at the European Space Policy Institute Institute (ESPI) in Vienna since January (ESPI) in Vienna, Austria, since January 2015 2014. His main research areas include Space under a fellowship from the Italian Space Exploration and Human Space Flight, Gov- Agency. His main research areas include ernance and International Relations of Space, Space Science and Exploration and Access to Asia’s Space Programmes, particularly those Space. Prior to joining ESPI, he was a trainee of China, and Access to Space. Mr Aliberti in the Relations with Member States Depart- first joined ESPI as a Research Intern in Oc- ment of the European Space Agency in Paris, tober 2012, after completing a Master of Ad- France. His previous work experience in- vanced Studies in Space Policy and Institu- cludes working as Research Assistant at the tions and attending the ESA/ECSL Summer National Institute for Astrophysics in Bologna, Course on Space Law and Policy. Prior to Italy. He has a Bachelor of Science in - that, he graduated in Oriental Languages and omy and a Master of Science in Astrophysics Cultures at the University of Rome “La Sapi- and Cosmology, from the University of Bolo- enza”, and obtained a Master in International gna, Italy. He also has a Master in Space Relations from the Italian Diplomatic Acad- Policies and Institutions, from the Italian emy (SIOI). He also pursued International Society for International Organizations in Asian Studies at the University of Naples Rome, Italy. “L'Orientale” and Security Studies at the In- stitute of Global Studies – School of Govern- ment in Rome.

ESPI Report 56 104 March 2016

Mission Statement of ESPI

The European Space Policy Institute (ESPI) provides decision-makers with an informed view on mid- to long-term issues relevant to Europe’s space activi- ties. In this context, ESPI acts as an independent platform for developing po- sitions and strategies.

www.espi.or.at