The Hammer and the Anvil: The Convergence of United States and South African Foreign Policies during the Reagan and Botha Administrations by Michael Patrick Hendrix Dissertation presented for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at Stellenbosch University Department of History Promoter: Prof. Albert Grundlingh Co-Promoter: Karen Smith December 2012 Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za Declaration By submitting this dissertation electronically, I declare that the entirety of the work contained therein is my own, original work, that I am the sole author thereof (save to the extent explicitly otherwise stated), that reproduction and publication thereof by Stellenbosch University will not infringe any third party rights and that I have not previously in its entirety or in part submitted it for obtaining any qualification. Date: November 24, 2012 Copyright © 2012 Stellenbosch University All rights reserved Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za Abstract This study is an historical analysis of the American policy of Constructive Engagement and serves as a comprehensive review of that policy, its ideological foundation, formulation, aims, and strategies. This study also serves as a detailed assessment of the policy’s ties to the South African Total National Strategy. Constructive Engagement, according to the Reagan Administration, was designed to lend American support to a controlled process of change within the Republic of South Africa. This change would be accomplished by encouraging a “process of reform” that would be accompanied by American “confidence building” with the apartheid regime. Before this process could begin, however, the region had to be stabilized, and the conflicts within southern Africa resolved. With the assistance of American diplomacy, peace could be brought to the region, and South Africa could proceed to political reform within the Republic. In reality, the most important aims of Constructive Engagement were to minimize Soviet influence within the Frontline States of southern Africa and remove the Cuban combat forces from Angola. These goals would be largely achieved by supporting and encouraging the South African policy of destabilizing its neighbours, called the Total National Strategy. This alignment inexorably led to a situation in which global policy issues eclipsed regional concerns, thereby making the United States a collaborator with the apartheid regime. Consequently, South Africa was allowed to continue its program of apartheid while enjoying American encouragement of its policy of regional destabilization, particularly its cross-border attacks into Angola and Mozambique. The U.S. support for the apartheid government offered through Constructive Engagement made the policy vulnerable to criticism that the apartheid regime’s “experiment with reform” was not a move toward liberalizing the Republic’s political system but that it was tailored to deny citizenship through the establishment of Bantustans, a point that provided ammunition to domestic opponents of Constructive Engagement. For a time, U.S.-South African cooperation was effective; the Frontline States were grudgingly forced to accept Pretoria’s regional hegemony. However, dominance of the Frontline States did not improve the security of the South African state. The African National Congress had not been defeated and was determined to make the Republic ungovernable. Furthermore, by the late-1980s, Pretoria could not dominate southern Africa and Angola, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe, which, although crippled from years of war, appeared poised to reassert themselves in the region. For South Africa, the Total National Strategy had failed, and coexistence with its neighbours would be a necessity. Without a powerful apartheid regime with which to reduce communist influence in southern Africa, the Reagan Administration abandoned Constructive Engagement. Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za Opsomming Hierdie studie is ’n historiese analise van die Amerikaanse beleid van Konstruktiewe Betrokkenheid en dien as ’n omvattende oorsig van dié beleid, sy ideologiese grondslag, formulering, oogmerke en strategieë. Dit dien ook as ’n gedetailleerde beoordeling van die beleid se bande met Suid-Afrika se Totale Nasionale Strategie. Volgens die Reagan-administrasie was Konstruktiewe Betrokkenheid bedoel om Amerikaanse steun te verleen aan ’n beheerde proses van verandering binne die Republiek van Suid-Afrika. Hierdie verandering sou bereik word deur die aanmoediging van ’n ‘hervormingsproses’ wat met Amerikaanse ‘bou van vertroue’ met die apartheidregime gepaardgaan. Voordat dié proses kon begin moes die streek egter eers gestabiliseer en die konflikte binne Suider-Afrika opgelos word. Met behulp van Amerikaanse diplomasie kon vrede in die streek bewerkstellig word, en kon Suid- Afrika oorgaan tot binnelandse politieke hervorming. In werklikheid was die vernaamste oogmerke van Konstruktiewe Betrokkenheid om Sowjet-invloed binne die Frontliniestate van Suider-Afrika te minimaliseer en die Kubaanse gevegsmagte uit Angola te verwyder. Dié doelwitte sou grootliks bereik word deur die ondersteuning en aanmoediging van Suid-Afrika se beleid om sy buurstate te destabiliseer, wat as die Totale Nasionale Strategie bekend gestaan het. Hierdie ooreenstemming van belange het noodwendig gelei tot ’n situasie waar globale beleidskwessies streeksaangeleenthede oorskadu, en sodoende die Verenigde State van Amerika ’n kollaborateur van die apartheidregime gemaak. Gevolglik is Suid-Afrika toegelaat om sy apartheidprogram voort te sit terwyl hy Amerikaanse aanmoediging van sy beleid van streeksdestabilisering geniet, veral sy oorgrensaanvalle in Angola en Mosambiek. Die Amerikaanse steun vir die apartheidregering wat deur Konstruktiewe Betrokkenheid gebied is, het die beleid vatbaar gemaak vir kritiek dat die apartheidregering se ‘eksperiment met hervorming’ nie ’n stap in die rigting van die liberalisering van die Republiek se politieke stelsel is nie, maar eerder toegespits is op die ontsegging van burgerskap deur die vestiging van Bantoestans, ’n punt wat ammunisie verskaf het aan teenstanders van Konstruktiewe Betrokkenheid binne die VSA. Die VSA-RSA-samewerking was vir ’n tyd lank doeltreffend; die Frontliniestate moes skoorvoetend Pretoria se streekshegemonie aanvaar. Oorheersing van die Frontliniestate het egter nie die veiligheid van die Suid-Afrikaanse staat verbeter nie. Die African National Congress was nie verslaan nie en was vasbeslote om die Republiek onregeerbaar te maak. Boonop kon Pretoria teen die laat-1980s nie Suider-Afrika domineer nie en Angola, Mosambiek en Zimbabwe, hoewel verswak weens jare se oorlogvoering, het gereed gelyk om hulle weer in die streek te laat geld. Vir Suid-Afrika het die Totale Nasionale Strategie misluk, en naasbestaan met sy buurstate sou ’n noodsaaklikheid wees. Sonder ’n magtige apartheidregime waarmee kommunistiese invloed in Suider-Afrika verminder kon word, het die Reagan- administrasie Konstruktiewe Betrokkenheid laat vaar. Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za Acknowledgements I would like to thank Professor Albert Grundlingh of the University of Stellenbosch’s Department of History for his patience and guidance in completing this dissertation. The time he spent getting me through the process from concept to completion is evidence of his personal and scholarly generosity. I would also like to take this opportunity to thank Karen Smith and Patrick McGowan for their time and guidance. I would also like to thank Chester Crocker for giving me the time to discuss the issues of this dissertation and Patrick Buchanan for his useful correspondence. I would like to express my gratitude to the staffs at the University of Stellenbosch, the National Archives of South African, the Citadel Military College, the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, the National Security Archive at George Washington University and the National Archives in Maryland. On a personal level, I would like thank my many friends and family for their encouragement and help. Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za Table of Contents Declaration 1 Abstract 2 Opsomming 3 Acknowledgements 4 Chapter 1 6 1.1 Introduction 6 1.2 Problem Statement and Focus 6 1.3 Literature Review 11 1.4 Methodology and Approach 14 1.5 Limitations 14 1.6 Outline of Chapters 16 Chapter 2 19 2.1 Prelude to Constructive Engagement: The United States and South Africa (1948-1980) 19 2.2 The Truman and Eisenhower Administrations and the Foreign Policy Approach of a New Sovereign State 19 2.3 Kennedy and Johnson Administrations 24 2.4 Nixon Administration 29 2.5 Carter Administration 45 2.6 Conclusion 56 Chapter 3 64 3.1 From Theory to Practice: The Formulation and Implementation of Constructive Engagement 64 3.2 The Reagan Doctrine 64 3.3 Constructive Engagement 74 3.4 United States-South African Rapprochement, 1981-1986 82 3.5 Conclusion 92 Chapter 4 97 4.1 Introduction: Fears of a “Total Onslaught” 97 4.2 A Total National Strategy 99 4.3 “People’s War” 114 4.4 State of Emergency and the Total Strategy 120 4.5 Regional Cooperation—A Constellation of States 125 4.6 The End of the Decade, the Advent of Destabilization 128 Chapter 5 136 5.1 The Total National Strategy and Regional Hegemony 136 5.2 Non-criticism of South Africa’s Destabilization Campaign 150 5.3 The Diplomatic Tract 153 Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za 5.4 The Resumption of Destabilization 168 5.5 Conclusion 170 Chapter 6 177 6.1 The Demise of Constructive Engagement 177