Angolan Civil War, 1975-1976: Motivations and Implications
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The copyright of this thesis vests in the author. No quotation from it or information derived from it is to be published without full acknowledgementTown of the source. The thesis is to be used for private study or non- commercial research purposes only. Cape Published by the University ofof Cape Town (UCT) in terms of the non-exclusive license granted to UCT by the author. University SOUTH AFRICAN INTERVENTION IN THE ANGOLAN CIVIL WAR, 1975-1976: MOTIVATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS BY NERYSJOHN Town Dissertation submitted in fulfilment of the requirementsCape for the award of the degree of Master of Arts ofin Historical Studies Department of Historical Studies Faculty of the Humanities University of Cape Town 2002 University COMPULSORY DECLARATION This work has not been previously submitted in whole, or in part, for the award of any degree. It is my own work. Each significant contribution to, and quotation in, this dissertation from the work, or works, of other people has been attributed, and has been cited and referenced. Signature Date ABSTRACT Between 1975-1976 South Africa intervened in the Angolan civil war. The invasion of a black African country was then an unprecedented event in South Africa's history. This dissertation explores the motivations behind, and implications of, South Africa's involvement in Angola. It firstly scrutinises the rationalisations given by the government of the day, specifically the four key objectives that the Defence Force claimed it had been pursuing. These were: the protection of South Africa's investment in the Cunene hydroelectric scheme; the 'hot pursuit' of Namibian guerrillas; the response to appeals from two of the liberation movements in Angola; and finally, the need to counter communist, specifically Cuban, intervention in Angola. Consideration is then given to the key motivation behind South Africa's invasion of Angola, one which the South African government initially tried to conceal. Operation Savannah, as South Africa's intervention in Angola was officially known, was a response to actual and perceived encouragement from both black African states and the West. Intervention in Angola was seen as an opportunity to act in concert with moderate black Africa and to prove that South Africa was a reliable ally against communistTown expansion. It was also an effort to establish South Africa's credibility as a loyal ally of the 'Free World'. This exploration is revealing as to both Pretoria's worldview and its perception of its own international standing. Although there is extensive scholarship of the Angolan civil war and South Africa's intervention therein, little has been written aboutCape the domestic context of the war for South Africa itself. This dissertation examines the implications of the South African intervention in Angola from the South Africanof perspective. The ramifications for South Africa, both in the domestic sphere and the international arena, are outlined. South Africa's intervention in Angola led to international recriminations and increased isolation for South Africa. Within South Africa itself there was a stark contrast in the reaction of the white and black communities to events in Angola. In the regional context, South Africa's actions led to deterioration in its security situation, as a consequence of the continued Cuban presence in Angola and the escalation of SWAPO activity in Namibia. University ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would like to thank all those who have helped me during the research for this dissertation. Trinity College, Cambridge University generously funded my studies in South Africa. Christopher Saunders in the History Department of the University of Cape Town oversaw my progress. Personal interviews and correspondence proved crucialTown and I am grateful to all those who shared their knowledge and recollections with me. Finally, thanks to Anton Beukman for long hours of translation, Imogen Parsons and James Smither for their comments on earlier drafts, and my parents for all their support.Cape of University ii CONTENTS INTRODUCTION mSTORIOGRAPHY 3 THE LISBON COUP AND THE ANGOLAN CIVIL WAR 9 CHAPTER 1: WHY DID SOUTH AFRICA INTERVENE IN THE ANGOLAN CIVIL WAR? 16 THE CUNENE RIVER HYDROELECTRIC SCHEME 17 THE BORDER WAR AND SWAPO 20 UNIT A AND FNLA APPEALS FOR ASSISTANCE 24 CUBAN INTERVENTION IN ANGOLA 27 INTERNATIONAL ENCOURAGEMENT 37 VORSTER'S SEARCH FOR DETENTE WITH BLACK AFRICA Town 38 UNITED STATES AND 'THE WEST' 46 CHAPTER 2: WHAT WERE THE IMPLICATIONS FOR SOUTH AFRICA? 64 INTERNATIONAL RECRIMINATIONS AND DIPLOMATIC RAMIFICATIONSCape 64 DOMESTIC REACTION TO THE WAR of 81 SOUTH AFRICAN PRESS 81 DOMESTIC POLITICAL DEBATE & PARLIAMENT 85 HERSTIGTE NASIONALE PARTY AND RIGHT-WING OPPOSITION 92 OPPOSITION FROM THE BUSINESS COMMUNITY 93 WIDTE PUBLIC OPINION 95 BLACK REACTIONUniversity TO THE WAR AND THE SOWETO UPRISING 98 THE SECURITY SITUATION & ITS IMPACT ON THE DEFENCE FORCE 107 THE COMMUNIST PRESENCE IN ANGOLA 107 ESCALATION IN SW APO ACTIVITY III IMPACT OF ANGOLA ON THE DEFENCE FORCE 115 CONCLUSION 132 BIBLIOGRAPHY 137 INTERVIEWS & CORRESPONDENCE 147 111 ILLUSTRATIONS Figure 1: Map of Angola Figure 2: 'Angola: The Truth' (Cartoon by Abe Berry) Figure 3: Political Cartoons from Die Burger Figure 4: Artist's Depiction of the 'Battle of Bridge 14'. Figure 5: Club of Ten advert in The Times Figure 6: 'Angola Follies' (Cartoon by Abe Berry) Figure 7: 'Sacred Cow: Defence' (Cartoon by Abe Berry) Figure 8: South African Prisoners of War Town Figure 9: A Defence Force Fatality Figure 10: 27 March 1976, Painting by Len Lindeque Figure 11: 'Credibility Gulch' (Cartoon by AbeCape Berry) of University iv A R .I - ( --"--' Town Cape of "-"r- I I \I BOTSWANA ROM!If _ _ _ , ANGOLA RJiI~ ..... _ ............ University Figure 1: Map of Angola [Taken from D. Spikes, Angola and the Politics ofIntervention: From Local Bush War to Chronic Crisis in Southern Africa (McFarland & Company, Jefferson, North Carolina, 1993), p. xvii] Town Cape of University Figure 2: In 1975, the Defence Force covertly invaded Angola and Prime Minister Vorster tried to keep the fact secret from South Africa. [A Berry, Act by Act: 40 Years ofNationalist Rule in South Africa, A Cartoon History ofApartheid (Lowry Publishers, Johannesburg, 1989), p. 62] INTRODUCTION 'In all history there cannot be many instances of a country going into a foreign war without the knowledge of its people'. (Allister Sparks, The Mind ofSouth Africa, 1990)1 In 1975, South Africa covertly invaded Angola and its troops advanced to within two hundred kilometres of Luanda? Although evidence of South African intervention in the Angolan civil war was published in the international press, Prime Minister B.I. Vorster tried to keep the fact secret from South Africa. 'Operation Savannah', as the intervention was officially known, was the first occasion since the Second World War that South African soldiers were sent to fight and died outside their country's borders? Also, for the first time in modern South African history, white soldiers found themselves as prisoners of war in black African hands. As the' Angolan' origins of the civil war became subsumed by its Cold War context, the escalation of Cuban and Soviet intervention and the end of American involvement led the South African Defence Force to retreat in early 1976. The Angolan civil war has been examined as a Cold War case study, and theTown chronology of super-power escalation has been endlessly revised. However, little has been written about the domestic context of the war within South Africa itself. This dissertation seeks to examine the South African intervention in Angola . from the South African perspective. It aims to place the militaryCape episode within its broader context of both ' domestic developments within South Africa and the country's position on the world stage. It outlines 'what' happened and 'when', but also seeks to examineof 'why' and 'with what implications.' South Africa's military intervention on foreign soil, although a regular event by the 1980s, was extraordinary in 1975. It appeared that Pretoria had leamt to live with the FRELlMO government in Mozambique and come to accept the inevitability of majority rule in Rhodesia. Why then, in Angola, did Vorster abandon his government's oft-quoted principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of other states? University When writing about South Africa during the apartheid era it is necessary to employ the racial terminology commonly used at the time. Although classification of this kind is found objectionable by many, including this author, in the interests of accuracy terms such as 'black', 'white' and 'coloured' cannot be avoided. In this dissertation South West Africa is referred to as Namibia (a name recognised by the United Nations from 1966) but 'Rhodesia' is retained for Zimbabwe during the period before 1980. The Democratic Republic of Congo, formerly known as Zaire and previously the Belgian Congo, is referred to here as Zaire. 'Congo' refers to Congo-Brazzaville, formerly the French Congo. 1 A. Sparks, The Mind of South Africa: The Story of the Rise and Fall of Apartheid (Heinemann, London, 1990), p. 305. ' 2 A small number of South African instructors/advisers got within 25 kilometres of Luanda. 3 Volunteers from the South African Air Force had participated in the Berlin Airbridge and with the United Nations forces in the Korean War, but no ground troops were involved in either episode. 1 Consideration will be given to the ramifications for South Africa, both in the domestic sphere and the international arena. In South Africa the defenders of apartheid had three major fears: the advance of communist powers to positions of influence in countries neighbouring South Africa, the further decline of Western support for South Africa and the growth of international black unrest in support of a liberation struggle. Pretoria's intervention in the Angolan civil war led to a deterioration on all three fronts.