The President's Report on Progress Toward Ending Apartheid Insouth Africa and the Question of Future Sanctions

THE PRESIDENT'S REPORT ON PROGRESS TOWARD ENDING APARTHEID INSOUTH AFRICA AND THE QUESTION OF FUTURE SANCTIONS

HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEES ON INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY AND TRADE, AND ON AFRICA OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDREDTH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION

NOVEMBER 5, 1987 Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

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tj81-5 6 COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS DANTE B. FASCE LL, Florida, Chairman LEE H. HAMILTON, Indiana WILLIAM S. BROOMFIELD, Michigan GUS YATRON, Pennsylvania BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York STEPHEN J. SOLARZ, New York ROBERT J. LAGOMARSINO, California DON BONKER, Washington JIM LEACH, Iowa GERRY E. STUDDS, Massachusetts TOBY ROTH, Wisconsin DAN MICA, Florida OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine HOWARD WOLPE, Michigan HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois GEO. W. CROCKETT, JR., Michigan GERALD B.H. SOLOMON, New York SAM GEJDENSON, Connecticut DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska MERVYN M. DYMALLY, California ROBERT K.-DORNAN, California TOM LANTOS, California CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey PETER H. KOSTMAYER, Pennsylvania CONNIE MACK, Florida ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey MICHAEL DEWINE, Ohio LAWRENCE J. SMITH, Florida DAN BURTON, Indiana HOWARD L. BERMAN, California JAN MEYERS, Kansas MEL LEVINE, California JOHN MILLER, Washington EDWARD F. FEIGHAN, Ohio DONALD E. "BUZ" LUKENS, Ohio TED WEISS, New York BEN BLAZ, Guam GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York MORRIS K. UDALL, Arizona JAMES McCLURE CLARKE, North Carolina JAIME B. FUSTER, Puerto Rico JAMES H. BILBRAY, Nevada WAYNE OWENS, Utah FOFO I.F. SUNIA, American Samoa JOHN J. BRADY, Jr., Chief of Staff MICKEY HARMON, Staff Assistant MEGAN BOWMAN, Staff Assistant NANCY M. CARMAN, Staff Consultant

SUBCOMMITrEE ON INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY AND TRADE

- DON BONKER, Washington, Chairman JAMES H. BILBRAY, Nevada TOBY ROTH, Wisconsin DAN MICA, Florida DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska HOWARD WOLPE, Michigan JOHN MILLER, Washington SAM GEJDENSON, Connecticut GERALD B.H. SOLOMON, New York HOWARD L. BERMAN, California ROBERT K. DORNAN, California MEL LEVINE, California EDWARD F. FEIGHAN, Ohio CAROLE A. GRUNBERG, Subcommittee Staff Director JENNIFER J. WHITE, Minority Staff Consultant SUE E. ECKERT, Subcommittee Staff Consultant

SUBCOMMITrEE ON AFRICA HOWARD WOLPE, Michigan, Chairman GEO. W. CROCKETT, JR., Michigan DAN BURTON, Indiana JAMES McCLURE CLARKE, North Carolina DONALD E. "BUZ" LUKENS, Ohio JAMES H. BILBRAY, Nevada BEN BLAZ, Guam FOFO I.F. SUNIA, American Samoa ROBERT K. DORNAN, California WAYNE OWENS, Utah ST EVEWEISSMAN, Subcommittee Staff Director SAUL SINGER, Minority Staff Consultant ADWOA DUNN-MOUTON, Subcommittee Staff Consultant J. STEPHEN MORRISON, Subcommittee Staff Consultant (11) CONTENTS

WITNESSES Page Hon. Chester A. Crocker, Assistant Secretary, Bureau .of African Affairs, D epartm ent of State ...... 8 Thomas Donahue, secretary-treasurer, AFL-CIO, accompanied by Pat O'Far- rell, executive director, African-American Labor Center, AFL-CIO, and Peggy Taylor, assistant legislative director, AFL-CIO ...... 33 James Motlatsi, president, National Union of Mine Workers (affiliate of the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) ...... 49 Alan L. Keyes, resident scholar, American Enterprise Institute, Washington, DC ...... 50 James Mndaweni, president, National Council of Trade Unions (NACTU)- South A frica ...... 63 Richard E. Sincere, Jr., research associate, Ethics and Public Policy Center, Washington, DC ...... 72 Damu Smith, executive director, Washington Office on Africa ...... 98 Nicholas Haysom, Center for Applied Legal Studies, University of Witswa- tersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa ...... 122 APPENDIXES 1. Statement submitted by the Associated Students of the University of Cali- fornia at Berkeley, Office of External Affairs, November 2, 1987 ...... 145 2. Statement submitted by Paul A. Mazzuca, director of Peaceful Progress in Sou th A frica ...... 148 3. Ati cle entitled, "The Sanctions Surveys In Search of Ordinary Black Opinion," Indicator SA, Vol. 4, No. 2, Spring 1986, submitted by Repre- sentative Daniel Burton ...... 151 4. Article entitled, "Sanctions: Case Against Case," Financial Mail, October 23, 1987, submitted by Representative Daniel Burton ...... 155 5. Correspondence from Norman Kilpatrick, Director, Kanawha Stamp Club, submitted by Representative Don Bonker ...... 157

(11) THE PRESIDENT'S REPORT ON PROGRESS TOWARD ENDING APARTHEID IN SOUTH AFRICA AND THE QUESTION OF FUTURE SANCTIONS

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 5, 1987 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, SUBCOMMITTEES ON INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY AND TRADE, AND ON AFRICA, Washington, DC. The joint hearing met at 10:15 a.m., in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Howard Wolpe (chairman of the Sub- committee on Africa) presiding. Mr. WOLPE. The hearing will come to order. I would like to request that members of the press and others to take their seats. Our hearing today will focus on the President's Report on Progress Towards Ending Apartheid in South Africa and the Ques- tion of Further Sanctions. We have an extraordinary group of witnesses with us today, including not only prominent Americans in and out of government, but also leading South Africans, such as the president of South Af- rica's largest black trade union and the president of South Africa's second largest black trade union federation. On the eve of the President's Report to the Congress, a bipartisan, ideologically diverse group of 33 House Members wrote Presi- dent Reagan saying, and I quote: In light of the abominable and deteriorating situation in South Africa and the un- utilized potential of Western economic leverage in encouraging a negotiated, democratic solution, we urge you to implemefit the law by recommending stronger sanctions and leading an international campaign of economic and diplomatic pressure against apartheid. This is essential if the administration is to avoid the impression that it applies one standard of human rights to the Soviet Union and other Commu- nist human rights violators, and quite another to the apartheid regime of South Africa. Regrettably, the President did not heed the appeal of those 17 Republican and 16 Democratic Members of the House. He has refused to carry out section 501(c) of the Comprehensive Anti-Apart- heid Act which required him to recommend new sanctions in the absence of significant progress, during the past year, towards ending apartheid and establishing a nonracial democracy. Previously, the administration had failed to implement provisions of the Act declaring it American policy to begin negotiations with other industrialized democracies to reach international agree- (1) 2 ments on sanctions. And it had ignored a strong sense of Congress expressed in the Act to mandate U.S. sanctions through the United Nations; in fact, it vetoed such a resolution last spring in the Secu- rity Council. The administration's actions are clearly in conflict with the established bipartisan congressional consensus on American policy toward South Africa. Ironically, in his report to the Congress, the President himself acknowledges that even limited U.S. and Western sanctions have constituted one of the, and I quote, "major elements in the country's recent poor economic performance and promise to have greater long-run effects." Similarly, the "messages of outrage and frustration" sent by the United States and other interested nations are said, in the Presi- dent's own report, to have been factors in the recent positive political ferment in the white Afrikaner community. The law that more than 80 percent of the Members of the House and Senate approved last year provided for the President to abandon so-called "constructive engagement" and move beyond the static restatement of "values and goals"-the sort of tired rhetoric we heard last month in Secretary of State Shultz's speech. The Congress, in adopting a sanctions program, recognized that constructive engagement compromised not only our values but our political and strategic interests as well. The Congress recognized that the administration's policy of confronting South Africa with rhetoric alone has only exacerbated the crisis in South Africa, reinforcing the white minority's fantasy that it can hold onto its monopoly of power indefinitely, free of mounting economic costs or deepening international isolation. Thus, the effect of constructive engagement has been to invite much greater violence and bloodshed and to encourage the Afrikaners to resist the negotiations with the black majority that, in the final analysis, are the only means of avoiding a truly terrible bloodbath. Discussion of the President s report naturally leads to the question of future economic sanctions. In light of what is happening in South Africa today, and as a matter of American self-interest, I personally believe that it is high time that we strengthen and expand existing American international sanctions. That certainly is the position of the popular organizations and leaders of the black majority, including the democratic trade union movement in South Africa, the United Democratic Front, the Azanian People's Organi- ation, the South African Council of Churches, Archbishop Tutu, Reverend Boesak, and the exiled African National Congress. In future hearings we will take up specific proposals for new legislation on South Africa, including various sanctions measures. Before introducing the three panels today that will be appearing before this committee, I would like to invite my distinguished ranking member, the gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Burton, to make any opening remarks he might care to make. Mr. BURTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Before I read my prepared opening statement, I would just like to say there are a large number of South African black leaders who oppose sanctions and believe they don't work, such as Chief Buthe- 3 lezi, Bishop Lokanyani, Bishop Mokina, and others who represent the vast majority of blacks in South Africa. As far as I can see, Mr. Chairman, the President's Report on Eco- nomic Sanctions against South Africa can be summarized in two words: sanctions backfired. In fact, this was known as early as this January, when William Raspberry wrote a column with just that title in The Washington Post. He wrote: Have economic sanctions against South Africa backfired? Probably yes. Is there anybody in America who supported sanctions who now thinks that maybe sanctions weren't such a wonderful idea after all? Probably not. Well, they may not be having second thoughts in America, but they are in South Africa. The South African Council of Catholic Bishops reported on the effect of sanctions this January. According to the report, "There is no doubt that sanctions are, and will become, very hurtful to the economic and therefore social fabric of this country." A report commissioned by COSATU, the largest black trade union, warned that sanctions could result in the loss of two million jobs by the year 2000. On April 1st, COSATU Vice President Chris Dlamini said on the MacNeil-Lehrer News Hour, "* * * some people are confusing divestment and disinvestment. We have never called for companies to pull out." Also in April, Michael Buerk of the BBC reported, "The moral issue of South Africa seems so simple and is so complicated. * * * [Sanctions are] a moral gesture that even the most radical blacks here are questioning now." But the bottom line is: What do South African blacks think? Are they really for sanctions as their self-appointed representatives claim? On this question the facts are clear and documented: blacks oppose sanctions by about 3 to 1. There have been over 10 polls on the question of sanctions since 1984. In June 1984, 551 black industrial workers were asked: "There are groups of people in America and England who try to encourage banks and organizations not to put their money in factories in South Africa. Do you think this is a good or bad thing?" Twenty-six percent thought it was a good thing and 74 percent thought it was a bad idea. In May 1985, 1200 blacks were asked: "Should the outside world apply an economic boycott against South Africa or not?" The answer: 76 percent against a boycott, and 16 percent for. These polls were so embarrassing to the pro-sanctions lobby that a flurry of polls attempted to refute these results. One widely quoted poll by the London Sunday Times found that 77 percent of blacks supported sanctions. But on closer examination the question was rigged. The Times asked: "Do you think other countries are right or wrong to impose economic sanctions unless South Africa agrees to get rid of the apartheid system?" Sounds fair, but a subsequent polly by the same paper found that 39 percent of those asked didn't know what the words "economic sanctions" meant. These words just aren't widely used in South Africa. So the Times could have asked: "Are you in favor of eating 4 ice cream to get rid of the apartheid system?" And the answer would have been "yes." But the most telling poll, called the Orkin Poll. is the one that the sanctions lobby claimed "neatly overturned" the earlier surveys and proved that two-thirds of blacks are for disinvestment. A closer look shows the exact opposite. In the Orkin Poll of September 1985, 800 blacks were asked to choose between three views: First, total disinvestment (which was described as having the support of the ANC, parts of the UDF, and some unions). Second, that "foreign firms should not be allowed to invest unless they actually pressure the government to end apartheid and recognize the trade unions"-in other words, conditional investment. And third, unconditional investment. The results were: only 24 percent for total disinvestment-even though this was labeled as the ANC's position. Forty-nine percent for conditional investment, and 26 percent for unconditional investment. Mr. Orkin lumped the middle group with the radical group and claimed that 73 percent are for disinvestment. In fact, What his own poll said is that 75 percent support investment, particularly if companies work to break down apartheid by following fair labor practices along the lines of the Sullivan principles. The same poll tried to find out if blacks thought that jobs lost because of disinvestment were worth the sacrifice, quote, "in order to pressure the government to end apartheid." Twenty-six percent said yes, even if many blacks lose their jobs. Twenty-five percent said yes, if only a few blacks lose their jobs, and 48 percent said that no jobs should be sacrificed. That was in 1985. This September, Orkin took another poll asking the same question. This time 60 percent were not prepared to continue supporting sanctions if they result in jobs losses for blacks; 26 percent would accept a few jobs lost; and a miniscule 14 percent supported sanctions no matter what. A couple of weeks ago, the Financial Mail, a generally anti-government magazine in South Africa, predicted that these polls would be politically twisted by those who refuse to believe that South African blacks are overwhelmingly against sanctions. They wrote: * * * expect to hear U.S. Congressmen debating sanctions this week and beginning their speeches like this: "A survey released last week shows that an overwhelming majority of black South Africans support sanctions.* On this the Financial Mail commented: Those who oppose both apartheid and sanctions can listen, smugly, knowing that the sanctioneers don't have their facts right. That doesn't make them any less dangerous. I think it is time we stopped trying to add to the burden of apartheid by making blacks suffer, against their will, for their own good. I would just like to close with a question from the William Rasp- berry piece in The Washington Post that should be on the con- 5 science of every member of this committee and every witness before us today. Raspberry writes: The only people who can be cheered by events in South Africa, including the dev- astation of the economy and the tightening of the screws of repression, are those who believe that bloody revolution is the only solution and that sanctions, by making conditions completely intolerable for blacks, will bring on the revolution. .3 that what we really want? I think there must be a better way, and that it is not too late to turn off this road and on to a new approach that will help lead South Africa more peacefully towards a truly democratic future, without apartheid or any other form of tyranny. I would like to urge our witnesses today to help us find that road as difficult as that may be. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. WOLPE. Thank you very much, Mr. Burton. Today's hearing is actually a joint hearing of the Subcommittee on Africa and the Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade. I would like at this point to invite the distinguished ranking member of the Economic Policy and Trade Subcommittee to make any opening remarks he might care to make. Mr. ROTH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Our chairman isn t here right now but I am sure he will be with us in a short while. Mr. WOLPE. I have been advised by a good friend and former ranking member of the Africa Subcommittee, Mr. Solomon, had wanted to make a brief opening remark. I will permit him to do so at this point. If other members choose to do so, fine. I am going to ask that we try to be brief because I would like to move as quickly as we can to our witnesses. Mr. Solomon. Mr. BURTON. Mr. Chairman. Mr. WOLPE. Mr. Burton. Mr. BURTON. Could I enter some other additional information into the record? Mr. WOLPE. Surely, without objection, that can be entered here.' Mr. Solomon. Mr. SOLOMON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for permitting me to speak. Today I am going to defend the administration because this hap- pens to be a very, very important matter. So let me, at the request of the Chairman's chief of staff, be very brief because there are so many witnesses here today that we have to hear from, but exercising my prerogative as the former ranking member of your subcommittee, Mr. Chairman, I would like to say something. First of all, I just want to counter what you said when you said that the administration was in violation of several things having to do with the so-called sanctions bill. I don't believe that to be so. This hearing is, I presume, the opening event in the South Africa sanctions debate in 1988. And it seems to me that any number of questions can be derived from our experiences thus far with the sanctions against South Africa that are already in place. Is the threat of sanctions more effective than sanctions themselves? Think about that.

ISee p. 157. 6 In other words, is America's capacity to influence the situation in South Africa lost now that sanctions have been applied and the South African government can turn its attention away from placat- ing public opinion so as to concentrate now on circumventing the sanctions themselves? Do sanctions have the effect of derailing or deterring reforms that may have been planned in South Africa? Think about that. Have sanctions served to undercut the moderates of all races on the South African political spectrum while serving at the same time to strengthen the extremists? Think about that. How have sanctions affected the southern African region generally? Have sanctions caused the United States to rely on the Soviet Union fnr vital minerals and metals that otherwise would have been imported from South Africa? Think about that. That is something we have got to think about in the future. Finally, does anybody in South Africa really listen to us anymore, to us, the United States of America? And more than that, should they listen to us anymore after what we have done to them? Mr. Chairman, these are just a few of the questions that have come to my mind and I hope that the forthcoming debate will be useful in developing answers to these and many other questions. Let me just say in conclusion, Mr. Chairman, that one thing really bothers me about the sanctions issue that has been debated in the past: It seems to me that the entire issue has been framed in such terms as to give the advocates of sanctions the upper hand regardless of the circumstances. And by that I mean, if the situation in South Africa doesn't get any better, it can be argued that sanctions aren't tough enough, so let's put on more sanctions. Now, on the other hand, if the situation in South Africa does get better, it can be argued that sanctions get results, so let's place more sanctions on them. In the legal profession, Mr. Chairman, this is known as begging the question and I hope we can avoid this kind of sophistry in the forthcoming debate and really get down to trying to help black South Africans in South Africa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. WOLPE. Thank you very much, Mr. Solomon, it is good having you with us today again. Mr. Bilbray, did you have something? Mr. BiLBRAv. Yes, as ranking majority member and in the absence of my chairman on the IEPT Subcommittee I have a statement, but in deference to the time, Mr. Chairman, it is in support of this hearing, it is in support of what you are doing today, and support of what Congress did in the 99th Session. Mr. WOLPE. Without objection, it will be submitted, and I thank you for that. My distingished ranking member of the Africa Subcommittee, Mr. Crockett. Mr. CRocyom. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I do not have a prepared statement today; but I am in the process of preparing a statement on this question. 7 I see my good friend from New York is smiling. I happen to be his successor on the United States Delegation to the U.N. for the current general assembly. Mr. SOLOMON. Would the gentleman yield? Mr. CROCKEr. Yes. Mr. SOLOMON. And doing an excellent job, I might add. Mr. CROCKMEr. You had better save that until I finish. [Laughter] Next week, to the consternation, I think, of the U.S. Mission in New York, I have agreed to address the special committee on Apartheid of the U.N. at their hearings in New York. I am mindful of the fact that we recently had a Democratic can- didate who was accused of plagiarizing someone else's speech without giving him credit. So I want to take this opportunity, Mr. Chairman, to compliment you on your opening statement and to let you know beforehand that I intend to use substantial portions of it in my address to the U.N. next week. Mr. WoLPE. I assure you no objection would have been registered without that acknowledgement. Thank you very much, Judge Crockett. If there are no other members that wish to make statements, I would like to identify how we will proceed this morning. We will have essentially three parts to this hearing. We will begin with hearing from the Assistant Secretary of State, Dr. Ches- ter Crocker. We will then turn to hear from the AFL-CIO-representing the AFL-CIO today will be Mr. Tom Donahue. Then we will turn to a panel of six witnesses that will include Mr. James Motlatsi, the President of the National Union of Mine Workers, affiliate of the Congress of South African Trade Unions, or COSATU, that was referred to earlier by Mr. Burton; Ambassa- dor Alan Keyes, Resident Scholar of the American Enterprise Insti- tute; Mr. Damu Smith, Director of the Washington Office on Africa; Mr. Richard Sincere, Research Associate of the Ethics and Public Policy Center; Dr. James Mndaweni, President of the Na- tional Council of Trade Unions, South Africa, and Mr. Nicholas Haysom of the Center for Applied Legal Studies of the University of Witswatersrand in Johannesburg. It is an extraordinary panel; delighted to have this assembly of individuals today with very special experience and expertise. We are going to, because of the numbers of witnesses, have to exercise some very tight time constraints. I am going to ask all of our witnesses if they could hold to a seven-minute time limit and summarize their testimony. Their entire written statements will, of course, be entered into the record. I am going to have these little lights flash at 62 minutes and we hope that you will attempt to conclude your testimony when you see that red light go on. For our part up here, we will take a look at the time but I would like to conclude our first panel by 11:20. And if it becomes necessary to restrict ourselves to one question or whatever seems appropriate at that point, we will have to do that, and I hope my colleagues will bear with me on that. With that, I would like to now turn to our first witness of the morning, Dr. Chester Crocke'r, for his opening remarks. 8 STATEMENT OF HON. CHESTER A. CROCKER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE, BUREAU OF AFRICAN AFFAIRS Mr. CROCKER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, it is a pleas- ure to be with you this morning. I will, in the spirit of your appeal, be as brief as possible in sum- marizing my opening statement. I would like to take note others have already inserted some things in the record, I would like t make reference to the very important speech that Secretary Shultz ,nade on the 29th of Septem- ber and my own address a few days later in White Plains, New York, and as well the important meetings that President Reagan had with Presidents Kaunda and Chissano of Zambia and Mozam- bique respectively, which, when you add these events together, constitute a comprehensive iteration of our policy towards South Africa domestic and international situations. The administration has fully implemented the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act and devoted substantial resources to monitoring its impact on South Africa. I would like at this point, Mr. Chairman, to enter into the record and bring to your attention this weighty tome which reflects all of the implementing actions day by day and week by week under all the various provisions of this highly complex piece of legislation referred to as the Comprehen- sive Anti-Apartheid Act. I think it will make the record abundant- ly clear for those who choose to look at the facts that are contained therein.2 I would also take note of the fact that the recent interim GAO report on our implementation of the Act is on balance a fair and objective assessment of our efforts. That report does note a few conflicting interpretations of the Act. In interpreting the Act, we turned to the legislative history of it, to legal precedent, and in some cases to the Constitution for guidance. In no area-I repeat, in no area-has the administration failed to implement measures mandated by Congress. Since I last testified before this committee in June, conditions in South Africa have continued to deteriorate. Broad police powers have been used with chilling effectiveness in an effort to end the violent unrest in most areas of South Africa. Restrictions on the press have been intensified. The state of emergency has been-in the eyes of its authors at least-very successful, and the government has announced that it will not be lifted until the causes of unrest have been remedied. This, of course, is a bleak situation. The government has threatened to withdraw the passports of persons traveling abroad to meet with ANC and other anti-apart- eid leaders. On October 19, another door to reconciliation began to close when the government announced that it would end subsidies to universities which permit too free an expression of political views on campus. This is ironic, because wikat the South Africa government is doing completes the work begun by campus extremists of other per-

2 See appendix 1. 9 suasions who sought to muzzle viewpoints opposed to their own on South Africa's campuses. Despite these grim and stark realities, there continue to be glimmers of hope across the South African political landscape. Over the course of this decade, South Africans of all races have come to realize that change is inevitable. The Dakar meeting, which has been widely cited this year between ANC leaders and leaders of the Afrikaner community, was a bold attempt to break down barriers to communication. The Indaba experiment in Natal is another hopeful example of black and white and brown working together towards genuine power sharing in that country. Leading Afrikaners from the Dutch Reformed Church, from the Broederbond, from some of the Afrikaan-speaking universities, and certain elements inside the National Party itself have broken with apartheid's old orthodoxies. These are trends that are powerful trends, they are deeply rooted trends, and they are trends we should be doing all we can to encourage. We believe that our actions in South Africa and our policy there should proceed from and build upon these positive developments. We cannot impose a solution on South Africa's problems. Our role is a supporting one one which accepts that the future of South Africa rests in the hands of South Africans themselves. Our role is to-use the limited influence we have to steer that country away from further turnioil and blood-letting. Secretary Shultz took a very important step in this direction in his speech of September 29. What he did in that speech-and something I would underscore which has never been before by any outside leader, vis-a-vis South Africa-is to spell out in some detail our vision of what democracy could mean in a post-apartheid South Africa. We are not trying to proscribe an American constitutional plan. Rather, our ideas are meant to challenge all protagonists in the crisis there to confront seridfsly the imperatives of dialogue and negotiation. We must encourage white South Africans to shift their attention from the immediate problems to the search for a long- term political solution. And at the same time, we must challenge black South Africans to sharpen their vision of a future that includes liberation,Jfreedom and dignity. Mr. Chairman, sanctions have symbolized the outrage of many people over the injustices of apartheid. That is what is said in the President's report to the Congress. We must now, however, allow our legitimate anger to exacerbate the very problems we want to see corrected in South Africa. In this regard, it is sobering to observe that black economic deprivation is actually an asset to the South African government as it seeks to restore and maintain political control over the course of this past year. Time and again we have seen examples of black activism being vitiated by the very real need to protect one's job, one's home, and one's family. Co-option is a key element in the government's strategy to retain control, and black impoverishment creates precisely the conditions necessary for this strategy to succeed. 10 Advocates of indiscriminate sanctions and other measures designed to bring the South African economy to its knees should realize that South Africa's blacks need more, and not less, economic leverage if they are to successfully challenge the structures of apartheid. We should be a catalyst for change. We have long included in our policy carefully targeted sanctions, diplomatic and economic pressures, and an active presence, governmental and nongovernmental, on the ground in South Africa. Diplomatic pressure has been used effectively in numerous instances, and we keep at it, and we will keep at it. Political pressure has also yielded results. For example, in our firm refusal over many administrations over a number of decades to recognize the so-called homelands, which are, of course, the core of the concepts of apartheid. Those pressures are magnified when we meet as we do, and will continue to do, with leading opponents of apartheid. When Secre- tary Shultz presses all sides to abandon hardened, non-negotiable positions, and when we insist the South African government itself has a special responsibility to initiate a process of confidence building and reconciliation. We need to be in touch with everyone. We need to be actively involved with every significant element of the South African political spectrum. That is what we are doing, and we think it is the only road that can lead to the kinds of future negotiations that simply must happen in that country. Ostracism, in other words, is not going to get us from here to there. Other elements of our policy which I will briefly refer to, Mr. Chairman, include vigorous involvement in assisting the victims of apartheid through our aid programs, through our staunch support for the continued presence of our corporations in South Africa; and for all kinds of American institutional involvement, be it in the field of labor, education, various human rights organizations, legal training, and so forth. We need to help build the institutional base that will truly bring liberation in that country. In addition, because the turmoil in South Africa has repercussions beyond its borders, we believe, and we trust that growing numbers of Members of Congress believe, that it is in our interest to provide significant support tc South Africa's neighbors. So we have put forward to the Congress plans for expansion of our aid effort in the Frontline States and the countries of southern Africa. Mr. Chairman, in conclusion, there can be no doubt after all that has happened about American opposition to the brutality, the degradation, and the sheer wastefulness of the apartheid system, now, more than ever, U.S. policy towards South Africa needs to be steady, it needs to be coherent, it needs to be bipartisan. We also have an obligation when there is such a consensus, not to make matters worse in South Africa, by conveying a false impression of American division and partisan wrangling. I believe that we, the administration and Congress, are finding some common ground and can work to promote .shared goals. Thank you. [The statement of Mr. Crocker follows:] 11

PREARED STATEMENT OF HON. CHESTER CROCKER

I welcome this opportunity to testify on United States policy towards South Africa. I would also like to commend to the committee's attention Secretary Shultz's speech of September 29 and my address on October 1 in White Plains, New York. Taken together with the actions of the Presi6ent in receiving President Chissano of Mozambique on October 5 and the Chairman the Front Line States, President Kaunda of Zambia, on October 8, they constitute a comprehensive iteration of U.S. policy towards South Africa's domestic and international situations.

Despite severe reservations regarding the use of broad, punitive sanctions as an effective means of hastening fundamental change in South Africa, the Administration has fully implemented the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act and devr-ted substantial resources to monitoring its impact on South Africa. The recent GAO report on CAAA implementation is, on balance, a fair and objective assessment of our efforts. That report notes a few conflicting interpretations of the CAAA. in interpreting the Act, we turned to the legislative history, to legal precedent and, in some cases, to the Constitution for guidance. In no area has the Administration failed to implement measures mandated by Congress. The sobering conclusion 12

of the President's Report October 2 is tiat the sanctions enacted last year have produced no significant progress towards ending apartheid.

Worsening Political Climate in South Africa

Since I last testified before this Committee in June, conditions in South Africa have continued to deteriorate. Broad police powers conferred by the State of Emergency, which was renewed in June, have been used with chilling effectiveness to end violent unrest in most areas of South Africa. Restrictions on the press have been intensified. Leaders of the black opposition remain in jail while increasing numbers of their followers have regrettably accepted the thesis that violence is the only option left for achievement of meaningful change.

In recent weeks, we have seen a further hardening of the government's position. So successful has the State of

Emergency been -- in the eyes of its authors at least -- that the government has announced it won't be lifted until the underlying causes of unrest have been remedied. For the vast majority of South Africans, that is a bleak prognosis at best. At worst, it confirms that South Africa will remain in a virtual state of siege far into the future. 13

At the same time, the government has threatened to withdraw the passports of persons travelling abroad to meet with the ANC or other anti-apartheid groups. This is clearly designed to discourage white moderates from engaging in the kind of exploratory discussions which their country so desperately needs. On October 19, another door to reconciliation began to close when the government announced it would end subsidies to universities which permit too free an expression of political views on their campuses. Academics, students and thoughtful persons throughout South Africa have protested this move as another blow to fundamental freedoms. Ironically, it is the South African government which has now completed the work begun by campus extremists seeking to muzle viewpoints opposed to their own.

The inescapable conclusion is that we are no closer today than a year ago to achieving the seven objectives -- objectives which we fully share with Congress -- laid out in the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act. 14

Elements of Hope in South Africa

Despite these harsh realities, there continue to be glimmers of hope across the South African political landscape. Over the course of this decade, South Africans of all races have come to realize that change is inevitable and that a peaceful

transition to a "tuly representative form of government can

only be brought A.out through negotiation and compromise.

The Dakar meeting earlier this year between the ANC and leaders of the Afrikaner community was a bold attempt to break down the

barriers to communications upon which apartheid depends. The Indaba experiment in Natal is another hopeful example of whites and non-whites working together towards genuine power sharing. Leading Afrikaners from the Dutch Reformed Church, the

Broederbond, Afrikaans-speaking universities and certain elements of the National Party itself have broken with apartheid orthodoxy and are prepared for dramatic realignments of political power provided that essential rights and freedoms are safeguarded. These trends remain a powerful force in South African white politics which we must encourage. 15

Negotiating a Democratic Future

Our actions in South Africa should proceed from and build upon such positive developments. We cannot impose a solution to South Africa's problems. Ours is a supporting role, one which accepts that the future of South Africa rests in the hands of South Africans themselves, we nevertheless have a moral obligation to use our limited leverage to steer South Africa away from further turmoil and bloodletting.

Secretary Shultz took an important step in this direction in his speech September 29 when he spelled out in detail our vision of as democratic future in South Africa. Our vision includes a new constitutional order guaranteeing basic political freedoms and safeguarding human rights, the institution of a democratic and representative form of government and the establishment of economic rights for all South Africa's citizens.

These ideas are not an American constitutional plan for the post-apartheid era. Rather, our ideas are meant to challenge all protagonists in the crisis to confront seriously the imperatives of dialogue, negotiation and compromise. To be effective we must make it clear to all sides exactly what we stand for as well as what we are against. Specifically, we can and we must encourage white South Africans to shift their 16

their attention from immediate problems to the search for a long-term political solution. At the same time, black South i Africans need to bring into sharper focus their broadly-defined aspirations for liberation, freedom and dignity. All sides must

understand that violence only increases the likelihood of a catastrophic outcome in South Africa.

A Comprehensive Policy Approach

While last year's sanctions have reduced our access to and leverage with the South African government, they now form part of our overall policy approach to South Africa. Sanctions have symbolized our outrage over the injustices of apartheid. Yet we must not allow our legitimate anger to exacerbate the very problems we want to see corrected in South Africa. In this regard, it is sobering to observe that black economic deprivation has been an asset to the South African government in restoring and maintaining political control over the past year. Time and again we have seen examples of black activism vitiated by the very real need to protect one's job, home and family. Co-option is a key element in the government's strategy to retain control in the townships, and black impoverishment creates precisely the conditions necessary for this strategy to succeed. Advocates of punitive sanctions or 17

other measures designed to bring the South. African economy to its knees should realize that South Africa's blacks need more, not less, economic leverage if they are to successful challenge the structures of apartheid. Our policies should not work against this effort.

We can be a catalyst for change in South Africa if we choose our policies wisely. The President's policy has long included carefully-targetted sanctions, diplomatic, political and economic pressure, and an active U.S. presence, governmental and non-governmental, on the ground in South Africa.

Diplomatic pressure has been used effectively, for example, to discourage South Africa from bellicose posturing vis-a-vis its neighbors, to obtain the release of detainees, including children, and to ease at least some of the harsher restrictions of the apartheid system.

Political pressure has also yielded results when, as in our firm refusal to recognize the so-called homelands, it denies legitimacy to the apartheid system. The message is amplified it 18

when we meet with leading opponents of apartheid, when Secretary Shultz presses all sides to abandon hardened, non-negotiable positions, and when we insist that the South African government has a special responsibility to initiate a process of confidence building and reconciliation. Our political pressure is best summarized in the words of President Reagan when he declared: "The United States cannot maintain cordial relations with a government whose power rests upon the denial of rights to a majority of its people based on race. If South Africa wishes to belong to the family of Western nations, an end to apartheid is a precondition."

Our multifaceted policy requires contact with all actors in the South African drama. As white South Africans come to share the democratic goals laid out in Secretary Shultz's recent speech, we have an obligation to lend them our support and

encouragement. If they reject our premise, we must confront them with the force of our ideas and our refusal to disengage. More, rather than less interaction, is essential if we are to make our influence felt. Ostracism simply encourages the hardening of policies. 19

Aiding Apartheid's Victims

An essential component of our policy is vigorous involve cent in assisting the victims of apartheid. The aid program we initiated early in this Administration L-eaches out to all elements of the disenfranchised majority. This program was authorized at generous levels but was seriously underfunded last year at less than a third of the amount authorized by

Congress. It deserves strong congressional support. Encouragement to U.S. businesses in South Africa is another way of ensuring that Amercians contribute to the economic empowerment of South African blacks. The growing leadership

and organizational skills of black organizations -- labor, business, religious and cultural -- have already done more to alter the basic premises of apartheid than any combination of punitive measures could hope to accomplish. It is important that these black organizations have a fully engaged ally in South Africa in U.S. employers and other U.S. entitites committed to promoting equal opportunity, developing managerial 4 an technical skills, building black economic muscle, and pressing the South African government to end discriminatory practices. ti~ r

Because the turmoil in South Africa has repercussions beyond its borders, neighboring states are also at risk. Our economic and strategic interests dictate an active and vigorous U.S. effort to assist these nations as they work to reduce their vulnerabilities to South African counterpressure. Congress has a leading role to play in this regard.

The Need for American Consensus

There can be no doubt about American opposition to the brutality, degradation and sheer wastefulness of the apartheid system. Now more than ever, U.S. policy towards South Africa needs to be steady, coherent and bipartisan. le have an obligation to speak clearly because we Americans agree overwhelmingly on what we oppose and what we favor in South Africa. We also have an obligation, when there is such a consensus, not to make matters worse in South Africa by conveying a false impression of American division and partisan wrangling. I believe that we -- the Administration and Congress -- are finding common ground and can work jointly to promote our shared goals. 21

Mr. WOLPE. Thank you very much, Dr. Crocker. After my rigid injunctions, suddenly the lights failed to operate. And for future witnesses, if we don't have that repaired, I will be using the gavel to at least indicate the end of time. I am sorry to have to do that, and I don't mean to b. rude, I hope you understand. Also, because of the numbers of members here today and our time constraints, I am going to restrict ourselves, each member, to three minutes, so that everyone can have an opportunity to ask questions of Dr. Crocker. Mr. Secretary, one of the issues that I raised in previous occasions but which I would like to raise again with you, relates to what I think many in this world perceive as a fairly dramatic difference between our approach to South Africa and our approach to other situations in the world. I raise the question in a somewhat star fashion by simply asking us all to ponder whether or not we would have resisted for so many years-I am not just here referring to the years of the Reagan administration, but even prior to that-the imposition of sanctions against South Africa, if it had been a black minority that was imposing the horrendously dehumanizing system of apartheid over against a white majority. I think we need to ask ourselves that question, because I think it highlights, perhaps a fairly dramatic double standard in the way we have approached the subject of South Africa. The question, I think, carries perhaps additional significance if you contrast what we have been doing in South Africa for so many years now, with our approach to Libya, to Poland, to Afghanistan, and to Nicara- gua, where not only have we applied moral pressure, and condemnation when we have seen human rights atrocities or acts of terrorism committed by the state, but we have also opposed economic sanctions, almost without debate in this country on a widely bipartisan basis. In some instances we have even gone beyond that to actually send arms or support to those who are struggling for their freedom. I would like for you, if you could explain to us today, why the President has not, for example, expressed similar concerns about the effects of the sanctions he supported on Libya, Iran, Nicaragua and Cambodia on the people? Why is it only in the South African case the focus is on the short-term economic cost to the population? In these other cases, were there not also costs? Did not we understand that those costs were outweighed by a consideration of the benefits of pressure on the government yielding ultimately a change in policy and the related benefit of America disassociating itself from repressive regimes that we did not want to be associated with? Mr. CROCKER. Mr. Chairman, I think theres two parts to the answer to your question. I think in the first place the question that you have posed kind of implies that we haven't had sanctions towards South Africa for many, many years. Of course, the opposite is the case. We have under Democrat and Republican administrations alike had sanctions as part of official policy towards South Africa since 1962. 22 Mr. WOLPE. Analogous to those against other countries? Mr. CROCKER. And in addition we have, of course, the additional ones that were put in place by the Congress a year ago. But we have more sanctions in place against South Africa today, Mr. Chairman, than we do vis-a-vis virtually all other countries in the world, with a very short list of exceptions. So to \imply that we have a non-sanctions policy or that the President himself is agt.i-ist sanctions without any qualification is very misleading. What our dckbate has been about is about the issue of which sanctions and with which impacts. We do think it is vital that we look at the situation in each case in terms of what is the likely impact. And also-and this is my second point, Mr. Chairman-that we ask ourselves, what is to be accomplished? What is our goal? What are we trying to do through the sanctions? If you have a case of a terrorist regime like that in Libya, presumably what you are trying to do is to get that regim,3 to either change its behavior or change its leadership. That is very different than saying to the government and people of South Africa that these sanctions are designed to achieve a fundamental restructuring of political and power and constitutional relationships in that country. We are seeking a transformation in South Africa. I know that is what you are seeking, Mr. Chairman. It is what we are seeking too. So let's weigh the means and the ends a little bit and keep that in perspective. Perhaps a sanction can send a signal of dissociation. We have done that. We have done it many times. We are not ad- verse to doing that. But if you are talking about full scope economic measures of a punitive sort, it is our view that these are more likely to have un- predictable, negative consequences for the country as a whole than they are to produce that transformation that we are talking about. Mr. WOLPE. I would like to pursue that but my time is expired. Congressman Burton. Mr. BURTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We are all concerned about ending apartheid-we just have different approaches to try to achieve that goal. But one of the things that while we are trying to eliminate apartheid, we need to be concerned about the security of the United States and the impact of our actions in Southern Africa on our defense policies and on our economic health. Mr. Secretary, Section 502 of the Anti-Apartheid Act states that the President may lift any provision of the Act if he determines that the provision is causing an increase in imports of coal or strategic minerals from the Soviet bloc. The Commerce Department has dutifully reported that imports of chrome from the Soviet Union have ballooned from 479 tons per month to 6,440 tons per month, a 1300 percent increase. Imports of antimony from the Soviets are up 98 times; industrial diamonds are up 100 times; platinum bars and plates are up 5 times; rhodium is up 31/2 times, and zinc up 41/2 times-all direct purchases from the Soviet Union. 23 So my question is, Mr. Secretary, why doesn't your report address this matter? And why hasn't the administration used its legislative authority to protect the United States from increasing dependence on our number one adversary, the Soviet bloc? Mr. CROCKER. Thank you for the question, Congressman Burton. I think the short answer is that the legislation does not in fact limit our ability to import the strategic goods. If the legislation did so, we would use the authority that is also in the legislation to get waivers so that it wouldn't be facing that problem. ., My basic point is this: The Act does not prohibit South African import of the commodities that you refer to with the exception of coal. But talking about strategic minerals, the Act doesn't prohibit it, so that is not the reason that we are not importing more from South Africa. If we are importing a varying amount from different parts of the world year to year it is market force that is doing that, not the Act. But if we saw what you are referring you-if we saw because of the Act in some sense we were seeing reductions in import of these strategic goods, we would indeed use the waiver of authority in the legislation to see that that did not happen. Mr. BURTON. There certainly are indications of dramatic increases in purchases of these very strategic minerals from the Soviet bloc and I would admonish the State Department to keep an eye on that. Mr. CROCKER. We will, sir. Mr. BURTON. Thank you. Mr. WOLPE. Judge Crockett? Mr. CROCKETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, Section 501 of the Anti-Apartheid Act states that if the President determines that the South African government has not made, and I quote, "significant progress in ending apartheid and establishing a non-racial democracy within 12 months from the date of the enactment, then," and I quote again, "the President shall include in the report required a recommendation on which of the following additional measures should be imposed," and then those measures are set forth. Now, in your prepared text here today, and I quote you again, you said, "The administration has fully implemented the provisions of the Anti-Apartheid Act." I suppose we are to conclude from that, then, that the administration has found "significant progress, and that is why in implementing the Act the President in his report has refrained from telling us what additional sanctions should be imposed." My question, Mr. Secretary, is what is that significant progress? Mr. CROCKER. Congressman Crockett, the administration has not said in its report that there has been significant progress. I think a careful reading of the report or the summary of it would make it very clear that we see the situation in South Africa in the past 12 months as in many respects grim and bleak. So we are not saying that there has been significant progress. Our view-- Mr. CROCKEM. May I interrupt? 24 If you are not saying that significant progress was made, when can we expect the President's recommendation concerning the four additional measures that we suggested could be imposed? Mr. CROCKER. Perhaps your word "could" is the operative one, Congressman Crockett. The provision of the law in Section 501 is that the President shall make a recommendation on sanctions. He has done so. It is that he should report to the Congress on the impact and the results of one year of the legislation. The reason we are here today is because of the Act, because of our report and your desire to discuss it. But the operative terms of this provision are mandatory only with respect to making a report and a recommendation on which sanctions, if any, should be imposed, and that is the unambiguous legislative history of this provision. We would point out that there was in fact considerable discussion in the other body precisely on this matter while the Act was being discussed and debated. It was stated by one member of the body that this was in fact a non-mandatory provision and that interpretation was universally agreed and endorsed. In fact, the chairman of the other Africa Sub- committee shares that view, from my testimony up there just two weeks ago. So that is, I think, our basic point. I would just add one other thing, Congressman Crockett, which is that there are several items on the list of additional measures in Section 501 which have in fact been implemented, because they were put into effect by other sections of the Act. That refers, of course, to the sanctions on steel, food, and textiles. Mr. WOLPE. Would the gentleman yield on that point? Mr. CROCKETT. Yes. Mr. WOLPE. Reading of the Act there is absolutely no reference to the words if any is very clear. The President shall include in the report required a recommendation on which of the following additional measures should be imposed. I don't know what the text is that you are referring to but it is not the law. Mr. CROCKER. It is the legislative history of the Act and it is the interpretaton, as far as we are aware, everybody who voted for it had that interpretation. Mr. WOLPE. That is simply not the case. I'm sorry, it really is not. I thank you for yielding, Mr. Crockett. Mr. CROCKETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. WOLPE. I now call upon Mr. Solomon. Mr. SOLOMON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, I would like to welcome you back before these subcommittees. It has been a long time since you have been here. You look like you have held up well. I understand you are going to be holding up even better because you are going up to my neck of the woods in northern New York for a little vacation-and there is nothing more beautiful up there than this time of the year. Mr. Secretary, a recent Washington Post article talks about the GAO having issued a preliminary report at the request of Senator Kennedy criticizing the administration for failure to comply with 25 certain provisions of the sanctions bill and for, quote, "dragging its feet on the implementation of other provisions." You touched on that a little bit with Mr. Crockett before, but how do you answer those charges? Mr. CROCKER. I find it incredible that a responsible journalist for a major newspaper could have read the GAO report and come to the conclusions in that Washington Post article. The GAO report is a balanced and fair report, it states the facts. It states what we have done. It states our view of the Act. It states all of the measures that have been taken. It seems to me that only the most careless reading of the GAO report could lead one to the conclusion of The Washington Post article. So I can't go beyond that in terms of interpreting how or why that would happen. But I would refer people who are interested to the GAO report itself rather than to The Post's version. Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Secretary, I was hoping that you would say that because I read that report word for word and I came up with the same conclusion. I don t know how this writer-Clare Robert- son-could write such an artid;e. It just doesn't hold water at all. Mr. Chairman, I know you are pressed for time and I have other questions which I had hoped to be able to ask, but with unanimous consent the record could be kept open. Mr. WOLPE. Certainly. Without objection, the record will be kept open. Mr. SOLOMON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate your in- dulgence. Mr. WOLPE. Thank you very much, Mr. Solomon. Mr. Clarke. Mr. CLARKE. Mr. Secretary, we thank you for being with us this morning. Yesterday, the Ambassador from South Africa told me that a bi- racial conference is being promoted by the government to discuss- and others to discuss-proposed changes in the constitution to provide for black representation. I wanted to ask you, is this conference going to be a reality or is it just a dream? Mr. CROCKER. I cannot speak for the Ambassador from South Africa. I am not sure which event he was referring to specifically. There is a lot of discussion in South Africa about negotiation and about s',-,ie format and some forum in which negotiation could take place. To my knowledge, there is not yet agreement on a precise format that will bring to the table the major leadership from various groups that need to be there if it is to have a significant impact. But that said, there is a lot of discussion about it and we certainly hope that that discussion will lead to progress so there can be dialogue and discussion that includes the key players. But I am not aware of any concrete game plan that has been agreed by the various parties concerned. Mr. CLARKE. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. WOLPE. Mr. Miller. Mr. MILLER. Mr. Secretary, when we talk about sanctions, obviously they can have a symbolic effect, but there is also the econom- 26 ic effect. I think it is clear that sanctions to have an economic effect you have to have more than one country imposing the sanctions. So the 1986 Anti-Apartheid Act called on the administration to seek support from other countries, particularly our European allies, in obtaining broad support for sanctions. As far as I know, the response from Western Europe has been very spotty and very mixed on this issue. Could you tell us what the prospects are for getting Western Eu- ropean nations to support the sanctions that we have passed, and what efforts the administration has made, and is making, to broaden the support for the economic sanctions? Mr. CROCKER. Congressman, I am very glad you posed that question. We do work with our allies very closely on this question. We do so in a number of fields. We compare notes and we do coordi- nate a good bit on our assistance programs, both in South Africa and the region. We compare notes that are often coordinated by diplomatic demarches. We exchange information about sanctions. But I think the question sort of implies that our allies may be waiting for us to come to them and try to get them to adopt the measures that we have adopted. As you know, and as you have said, the views of our allies on this question are very mixed. A number of the key allies have very strong views to the effect that broad scale indiscriminat? sanctions measures-trade bans, for example-are not the way to go. Those countries that take that position, in our view, show very few signs of changing their view on it. I don't think that we are inclined to seek to get countries who have those strong views, for their own very good reasons-strategic, political, their own reading of what works and what doesn't work-to try and get them to do things, some of which we also disagree with. As you know, we had a debate last year. There are many measures in the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act that we agree with; that in fact the President was prepared to propose, but there are some that we do not. We are not about to go to the British or the Germans or the Jap- anese and say, do that, if we believe the consequences will be nuga- tory for the people we are trying to help. So that is, I think, the way I would describe it. There are strong views about these issues in other countries. They also have their experience and their relationships. Mr. MILLER. Mr. Secretary, have you ever asked our allies, or has ',,e administration ever asked our allies to support the sanctions ljkat this Congress adopted in 1986? Mr. CROCKER. As I have indicated, there are aspects of that legislation-the 1986 legislation-which are not arguable to anybody. For example, there's references incorporating in that Act the arms embargo. We do talk to our allies about the arms embargo-adherence to it. We believe overwhelmingly that they have the same view of it. On the issue of nuclear trade, which I believe is covered in some detail in last year's legislation, what we do talk about-- Mr. MILLER. Given that we are running out of time, is it a fair statement of your position that the administration has asked the allies to support some parts of that 1986 Act but not other parts? 27

Mr. CROCKER. I think that would be a fair summary, yes, sir. Mr. MILLER. Thank you. Mr. WOLPE. Thank you, Mr. Miller. Mr. Solarz. Mr. SOLARZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, in the interest of time I will ask a MIRVed question with four parts, which I hope you can answer succinctly and specifically. First, you indicated in your testimony that we have had sanctions in effect since 1962 and the real debate was not over whether to impose sanctions but which sanctions to impose. Could you tell us very specifically which of the existing sanctions we have on South Africa you favor and which you oppose, which you think are productive and which you think are counterproductive? Secondly, could you tell us what the reaction of the other African countries has been to the enactment of the Comprehensive Anti- Apartheid Act of 1986? Has it been positive or has it been negative? Thirdly, as you probably know, over the course of the last few years almost half of the American firms doing business in South Africa have withdrawn from that country. This is either a good development or a bad development. You seem to think that American investment is helpful rather than harmful. I don't think there is any .magic to the marketplace. Consequently, this trend should either be encouraged or discouraged. If you feel that the withdrawal of American investment is unfor- tunate, are you prepared to recommend any steps specifically to encourage the retention of the existing American investment in South Africa? What would you possibly do to induce firms that are not doing business there now to establish operations in order to maximize what you feel are the beneficial impact of American investment? Finally, I have just heard this morning that the government of South Africa has released Govan Mbeki from prison. If this is true, that obviously is a very welcome development. Could you let us know if this is true? And if it is, has he been released unconditionally, and does it suggest that Mr. Mandela maybe released shortly as well? Mr. CROCKER. Will try to respond briefly to each of these. On the first one, which is a very complex question of which we oppose and which do we favor in terms of sanctions. I think what I would prefer to do is to leave it in this general sense, Congressman Solarz: We have taken a position that generalized trade bans, or investment bans, or restrictions on investment are the kinds of measure which, in our view, are folly. - But there are many specific things that we have had in place and things that we can look at because they have a target. Mr. SOLARZ. Name one or two, or three, that you favor, that we have in place now. Mr. CROCKER. I refer the classic case, of course, is the arms embargo, for all of its perverse results, and there have been perverse 28 results. But I think we should be dissociated in that sector. I think that is sound policy. It has been viewed that way for a long time. On the second question, African reactions to sanctions: I think it is fair to say that many African countries have been for a long time campaigning as a kind of political platform for sanctions, as a gesture, as a symbol. We find in discussions with African leaders that they appreciate this gesture of solidarity with aspirations for freedom in South Africa. We don't hear them talking a whole lot about how now we have to have yet another major round of them. We don't hear them criticizing our country because we are far ahead of the Europeans and others in this regard. What they want us to do is to get down there and bring about progress, which we are trying to do. I think your third question is a fascinating one, Congressman Solarz, I wish we had more time to explore it. I would like to see us be able together, working with Congress, to come up with measures to encourage American investment in South Africa. If the mood is there, I hope you will tell us, because that is where our thinking is. A clear signal of congressional interest in this would send a powerful message across America where company after company is being intimidated by all forms of local and other action into the belief that if you are in South Africa it means you have blood on your hands, or you are some kind of a racist. It is nonsense, Congressman Solarz, and you know it is. I hope we can have that kind of consentt, emerge in our political system-[you know,] Our view is that our companies should be encouraged to stay [that] we are doing what we can to encourage them, and we hope that others will join us. On your final point, we have the same news that you do in general terms-we don't have the details. I have had the same phone call that you probably had, suggesting that this was about to happen; the release of Govan Mbeki. We, of course, are delighted to hear that news. It is a clear and positive step, assuming it is true. But we haven't seen any details yet so I can't really comment beyond that. Mr. WOLPE. Thank you, Mr. Solarz. Mr. Bilbray. Mr. BILBRAY. I have no questions, Mr. Chairman. Mr. WOLPE. We have about seven remaining minutes. I would like to try to ask one brief question. I know that Mr. Burton also has a question as well. I want to come back to that very first subject that we discussed, Mr. Crocker, related to sanctions. The thrust of your response when I asked you to justify or explain what justification there is for treating South Africa differently from other countries in which there are egregious human rights violations. Your response essentially was that we are treating South Africa much the same, we have applied sanctions against South Africa as well. Frankly, I think that is disingenuous at best. There is a ban on nearly all trade with Libya, there's a ban on all imports from Iran, there s a ban on economic relations with Nicaragua, there's a ban 29 on all economic relationships with many economic countries, many Communist countries-to suggest for a moment that there's anything analogous in our approach to South Africa over the years where the subject of sanctions is always highly controversial, highly debatable; and it is has been resisted, not only by Republi- can administrations but by Democratic administrations, I think it's ludicrous on its face. I might say that I think it is an obvious double standard that has substantially undermined America's moral influence and, therefore, national interest and political influence-not only in Africa but throughout much of the world. Finally, I would like to address a point that you made-I will give you a chance to respond regarding the comment you just made that-you don't hear much from African leaders urging greater economic pressure and more sanctions. A number of us met with President Kaunda when he was here. I believe that President Kaunda also met with President Reagan when he was here. This conversation with us was absolutely explicit. The Chairman of the OAU, one of the leading moderate African spokesmen, was saying clearly that more economic pressure was required at this point, and was asking for greater sanctions. President Chissano was here from Mozambique making the very same point to Members of Congress, and I think to the administration. Just know what is the empirical base for your comment? Mr. CROCKER. If you are interested in the answer to that I will be glad to give it to you. President Chissano and President Reagan met for about an hour or so, and we also had other meetings with the Mozambicans while they were here. The record of those meetings would make it clear that they did not ask us to impose additional measures on South Africa. The Zambian position, I think, was basically focused on the issue of whether we are seeking repeal of last year's legislation. There was a desire for clarification on that. The President made it categorically clear that that is not his intention. He is not looking to have this sideshow become a major debate again because the real issue isn't sanctions; the real issue is policy toward South Africa. The real issue is how to stimulate dialogue; how tc build black progress in South Africa-not sanctions. Sanctions have become-they have tended to overshadow what is the real substance of the matter. Mr. WOLPs. Mr. Burton. Mr. BURTON. I have a question but I have a comment first on the chairman's very eloquent statement about us imposing sanctions and blockades and other methods on places like Nicaragua. The chairman of this committee for some time has been asked by Mr. Roth and others to do something about the atrocities that are taking place in Ethiopia-the genocide that is taking place up there; the butcher Mengistu and what he has done to his people is virtually ignored by this committee. I am very distressed that he didn't choose to bring that up in his litany of countries that we ought to be talking about.

82-205 0 - 88 -- 2 30 The other thing I would like to mention is that he alluded to Mr. Chissano, who is the Communist President or dictator of Mozam- bique; and, of course, I have a little difference of opinion with the State Department on that issue, but it seems that he has a pench- ant for always talking about these Communist leaders and what they ask of us in order to deal with the South Africa problem. But let me get back to my question. My question is this: It was estimated when the sanctions were imposed that 600,000 blacks would lose their jobs which would lead to about three million black people without sustenance in a relatively short period of time. Now, Mr. Gialamini on the MacNeil-Lehrer report said that by the year 2000 there will be two million blacks without jobs in South Africa, which translates into about 10 million people going to bed hungry. It is a real concern to me that those people within a short period of time will be right for any kind of revolutionary rhetoric that comes down the pike because they are going to want to feed their families, and they are going to be listening to the ANC and the other radical groups over there who are supported by the Commu- nists. So my question is: Don't you believe we should come up with a constructive alternative in d positive way to bring about change over there and to create economic wealth for the blacks so that internally they can put p:--ssure on the government to bring about change? For instance, it is reported that Pic & Pay, one of the largest commercial chains in South Africa, is planning on selling half its stocks to its employees, who are mostly black. What role do you think employee stock ownership plans can have in empowering South African blacks in breaking down apartheid? And are there any other steps we could take like that to bring black enterpreneurship to the fore, bring them into the main- stream economically and, therefore, put pressure internally on the South African government to bring about positive change? Mr. CROCKER. Congressman Burton, there are so many things you have said there which I would like to have a chance to elabo- rate on, but we haven't got the time. I share, as you do, a concern about the overall economic impact and political impact on black and white of a generalized sanctions approach. We have seen the report to which you referred, that it is possible, if you had full scope sanctions applied by everybody, that you could see two million black workers put out of work. It is a pretty horrific prospect. It doesn't seem to us that that is the lead to black power; it doesn't lead us from here to there. If you ask yourself who is most hurt by these kinds of measures-in terms of their power position-I would argue, based on what we have seen up to now, that in fact the government's hand is strengthened when situations become more and more and more miserable in the black townships of South Africa. The government's hand is strengthened, not the black hand. That is the way I read the realities on the ground in South Africa. 31 On your specific question-I like it, we like it. We would like to see more discussion and consideration of ideas cf this kind. We know a number of private firms are having discussion with their South African partners and subsidiaries about ideas of this kind. We think we do have a positive alternative to a purely sanctions based approach. It includes the kind of things the Secretary of State said in his speech and I cannot agree with the chairman that it is another stale speech. It was a very bold vision of the future of South Africa. We are challenging people to define what they mean by post-apartheid. It has never been done before. The reactions we have had to that speech have been very positive from across the spectrum, actually, in South Africa. So these are things that need to be focused on. But on the economic side, we like the kind of ideas you are talking about. We would like to see a signptl from Congress and elsewhere across this country that would encourage our firms to think creatively this way-to roll up their sleeves and stay. Mr. WOLPE. I shall resist the temptation to respond to my distinguished colleague, Mr. Burton's comment a moment ago, and yield for a closing question to the former chairman of the Africa Sub- committee, Mr. Solarz. Mr. SOLARZ. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, you have indicated that you are opposed to apartheid and the administration is opposed to apartheid. You have also indicated, therefore, that the real question is how you best go about facilitating its abolition. As you know, Nelson Mandela, Oliver Tambo, Bishop Tutu, the Reverend Boesak, as well as COSATU and NACTU, the two largest trade unions in South Africa representing the black workers of that country, are all in favor of comprehensive sanctions. Is it your position that you know better what is in their best interest than these people themselves do? Mr. BURTON. Would the gentleman yield on that point before the question is answered? Mr. SOLARZ. I will not yield. After I hear the answer I will be happy to yield. Mr. CROCKER. Congressman Solarz, I think it is tragic that we de- scend to this level of discussion in shaping our foreign policy. I think the points that Congressman Burton made in his opening remarks about the utility or non-utility of polling data are very pertinent here. We can find polls that point in many different di- rections here. " Yes, there are major organizations and major leaders who have taken the position you describe in part because they have been saying it for so long that it would be almost impossible for them to change their position at this point no matter what the evidence was. But when the day comes that serious Americans sit around and judge the merits of foreign policy options based on whether or not foreigners clap or boo, then it is a sorry day for America. That is my answer, first of all, to your question. We have a responsibility to do things that make sense by our lights, by our judgment. This is an issue that is thrown around so loosely. 32 The fact is, if these organizations you are referring to wanted to shut down American investment in South Africa, they could do it tomorrow. They have the tool in their hands. They could end American investment by stopping the work force at American firms in South Africa tomorrow. If they wanted an end to trade relations between South Africa and the West, they could stop them with their own hands. They haven't done so. Why is that? Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Secretary, I can only say that it is a sad day for America when we have an administration which willfully ignores the pleas for greater pressure coming from individuals who have been prepared to sacrifice their lives for the cause, on behalf of which, you say you are committed. Mr. BURTON. Will the gentleman yield? Mr. SOLARZ. Be happy to yield to my friend. Mr. BURTON. Lest the media and everybody be completely misin- formed by your statement, there are many leaders over there who don't agree with the sanctions, including Chief Buthelezi, Bishop Lokanyani, Bishop Mokina, who represent about two-thirds of the blacks in South Africa. So you could pick four or five names out of the phone book and say that they are for sanctions. But when you are talking about three leaders who represent two-thirds of the blacks in South Africa, that is a substantial number. Mr. SOLARZ. I think our time is running out. But I can only say that if somebody thinks the names of Nelson Mandela and Oliver Tambo, and a Nobel Prize winner like Bishop Tutu have been picked out of a phone book, it represents a willful ignorance of the realities of South Africa. Mr. WOLPE. I want to thank you very much for your testimony this morning and for your assistance with the committee. I will at this point invite Mr. Donahue to come forward. We are going to begin with Mr. Donahue's testimony. I would like to see if we can run through the testimony. Obviously we are going to have to recess in a moment. Mr. Clarke, if you could perhaps go now for the vote on the floor and then take the Chair so that we can keep the hearing going as much as we possibly can and save time. Let me welcome you, Mr. Donahue. The AFL-CIO has been in the forefront of the anti-apartheid struggle for so many years and has contributed so much to trade unionism within South Africa itself. I am deeply appreciative of the efforts organized labor has made in recognition of the unity that must exist among working people internationally in confronting the issue like apartheid. I thank you for that. Delighted to have you before us today and would like to invite you at this point to make a brief statement if you will and then we will turn to questions. 33 STATEMENT OF THOMAS DONAHUE, SECRETARY-TREASURER, AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR AND CONGRESS OF INDUS- TRIAL ORGANIZATIONS, ACCOMPANIED BY PAT O'FARRELL, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, AFRICAN-AMERICAN LABOR CENTER, AFL-CIO, AND PEGGY TAYLOR, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, LEGIS- LATIVE DEPARTMENT, AFL-CIO Mr. DONAHUE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me initially offer the apology of President Kirkland for his absolute inability to be here this morning. He asked me to appear for him and to extend those apologies to you, Mr. Chairman, and your colleagues. I am accompanied, on my left, by Pat O'Farrell, the Executive Director of the African-American Labor Center, the AFL-CIO's arm in Africa; and by Peggy Taylor, the Assistant Director of our Legislative Department. Mr. Chairman, you have the testimony. I would just note in passing, in attempting to summarize it, that as you note we have been actively engaged with South African problems for lots of years. Twenty-nine years ago our Executive Council began a long course of statements of interest on these issues. As far back as 1960, we supported a boycott of South African goods entering the United States. That was in support of an action taken by the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions and the U.N. General Assem- bly. Through the remaining 25 years, we have consistently called for an end to the apartheid system and for assistance to blacks seeking democracy, and fighting for freedom in South Africa, and laid particular emphasis on the need to support black trade unions there. We testified, as you know, Mr. Chairman, in 1985 and in 1986 before these subcommittees and on the Senate side for the strongest sanctions that could possibly be imposed on South Africa. We called for a ban on new investment, ending all investment guarantees, stopping IMF loans, halting the sale of Krugerrands, punish- ing the violators of the oil embargo, and embargoing the sale of arms, compelling disinvestment by multinational companies in energy and high-tech sector, and forcing disinvestment by those multinationals identified by the independent black trade unions in South Africa as being in violation of what are internationally accepted labor standards. In 1986, President Kirkland went to South Africa with a delegation of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions and he was assured by the trade union leaders of South Africa that all of these measures were supported by them and were indeed in their view essential to their struggle for freedom and independence, and had their full support. He was asked by those leaders to seek every possible avenue of pressure in the United States to end the current system. During these almost 30 years, we have similarly been active in trying to assist in the development of trade union leadership in South Africa in programs that have spanned that entire period and in giving what assistance we can to the black trade unions there in their cwn development and, in fact, have worked with more than 40 of the current list of unions in South Africa. 34 We have, as you noted, been actively involved in that struggle and continue on that course. We had, as I said, testified, Mr. Chair- man, for the fullest list of sanctions. We accepted the Anti-Apart- heid Act of 1986 as going some distance down that road and have consequently been disappointed by the failure to enforce and to adequately administer it, and most bitterly disappointed now by the administration's refusal to be responsive to the clear call of the law to come forth with recommendations for additional sanctions once there is the agreement that no progress has been made. We took a look, Mr. Chairman, at the government trade data, and you will find there the most blatant testimony of the failure to monitor and to enforce the 1986 Act. We have seen the flow into the United States of more than $130 million worth of embargoed goods during the period since the sanctions took effect. Textile imports were embargoed effective December 31. In the first six months of this year we have seen over $3 million worth of textile apparel come into the country. In that same six months, $59.4 million worth of iron and steel imports we thought banned, had nonetheless arrived in this country, enter our market in contravention of the law. We are told the Customs Service is looking into all of that, and we certainly hope so. While that has been going on, the unions in South Africa have watched those imports flow into this country, and as they looked at home they find their members being arrested and detained; being denied permission to leave their country on legitimate trade union business; union papers having to clear censorship before distribution; their publications confiscated; their offices bombed, and their officials and members subject to constant harassment. Legal strike activity has been subjected to government intervention. Their negotiations have been thwarted by government complicity with employers. And union activity has been under constant legislative scrutiny in an effort by the government to control, manipulate, and minimize the strength of the independent black trade unions of South Africa. Since the black population of South Africa can only do so much in its struggle, Mr. Chairman, we think it essential that the people of the United States do everything we can-the Congress do everything it can-to bring about an end to that system by adding to the list of sanctions all of those which have been suggested in the past. And, further, to ban investment in South Africa totally to limit the-- Mr. WOLPE. Mr. Donahue-- Mr. DONAHUE. Yes, sir. Mr. WOLPE [continuing]. Before you continue with the new proposed measures that the AFL is advancing, I would like to recess at this point to provide an opportunity for more members to receive the concluding policy section of your testimony. So if you will excuse this interruption, we will adjourn for just a very few minutes. [Recessed.] Mr. CLARKE [presiding]. I call the meeting to order. As soon as we get everybody sitting down and quieted down, I will ask Mr. Dona- hue to complete his testimony. 35 I think we can go ahead, Mr. Donahue. Mr. DONAHUE. All right. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I was just about to say that in our view the Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 desperately needs strengthening, additional enforcement, new provisions, and renewed support. We would call upon the Congress to provide for the closure of all South African consulates in this country; to restrict the entrance into the United States of South African government officials and government designated representatives, at least until such time as South African borders are open to all U.S. Citizens, including representatives of the AFL-CIO who are presently excluded. We would think further sanctions ought to prevent the publication and distribution of all trade magazines and other guides promoting investment or travel in South Africa; ban all commercials and advertisements relating to South Africa, or South African products; ensure that all goods entering the U.S. are not South Af- rican in origin regardless of their packaging or labeling; and force all U.S. companies out of South Africa immediately, coupling that withdrawal with a negotiated settlement with the representatives of the workers they have up to that point employed. While we think those measures would be significant would significantly add to the arsenal of sanctions, they, similarl- would be meaningless without effective enforcement. We think it is essential, therefore, that there be independent monitoring through the United Nations to ensure that multinational companies sever all ties witb South Africa; that the Customs Service be empowered and funded to ensure that no South African goods intact enter the United States; the Commerce Department increase its surveillance of U.S. companies operating overseas to ensure that boycott measures, disinvestment and corporate withdrawal conform with the Act; that the Treasury Department increase its surveillance of all banking and financial institutions; and the Department of Defense increase its surveillance of all arm sales to South Africa. Further, we would recommend, Mr. Chairman, that an independent tripartite monitoring group be created, made up with representatives of government, business, and labor, with the sole purpose and intent of ensuring that these U.S. agencies carry out their responsibilities under the Act. Mr. Chairman, we have been recommending substantial programs, policies, and strategies to eradicate apartheid for nearly 30 years. Each of those recommendations has met with less than complete endorsement and yet each year the stranglehold of apartheid has tightened rather than eased. It is true today that a black South African born in 1947 is now a 40-year-old adult and has known nothing but apartheid in his entire lifetime. I think that the time has come for us to add the sanctions, to enact a bill that places America very clearly on the side of those people who are committed to change in South Africa. And words alone will clearly never dent the regime in Pretoria. Action and political and economic isolation will force change. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [The statement of Lane Kirkland, President of AFL-CIO, submitted by Mr. Donahue, follows:] 36

PRPARED STATRM NT OF LANE KIRKLAND, PRESIDENT, AMExcAN FEDERATION OF LABOR AND CONGRESS OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATIONS

Twenty-nine yen ago, on May 1, 1958, the Executive Council of the AFL-CIO expressed its condemnation of the treason trial of 91 leaders of organizations opposed to the South African government's apartheid system and the denial, by government decree, of trade union rights to black workers. The AFL-CIO pledged Its support at that time to the democratic forces In South Africa - to those organizations working for the creation of a country which' would not be divided by racial differences and which would not be victimized by economic exploitation. To this end, the AFL-CIO urged the U.S. government to use its Influence In the United Nations, and elsewhere.

In February 1960, the AFL-CIO Executive Council issued a statement supporting a boycott of South African goods entering the United States. This statement was an unequivocal endorsement of recommendations made by the United Nations General Assembly and the Sixth World Congress of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU). The AFL-CIO's position included a call to the U.S. government for "a boycott of South African gold and other materials."

Throughout the ensuing twenty-five years the AFL-CIO consistently called for an end to the apartheid system and for Assistance to those inside South Africa who were fighting for their freedom. We laid particular emphasis on the need to support the black trade union movement inside South Africa. In May 1985, the AFL-CIO Executive Council once again called on the U.S. government to take the strongest possible action against the apartheid regime of South Africa and in consultation with the ICFTU and the black South African trade union movement endorsed sweeping sancetioL against Pretoria. 37

These sanctions called upon the U.S. to:

- Ban new investments In South Africa;

End all investment guarantees, export credits and trade promotion with South Africa;

- Stop new IMF loans as well as other bank loans to the South African state and publicly-owned companies;

- Halt the sale of Krugerrands and the purchase of South African coal;

- Punish violators of the U.N. oil embargo against South Africa;

- Embargo the sale of arms to South Africa, especially those used by Its military, security and police forces;

- Compel disvestment by multinational companies In the energy and high technology sectors;

- Force disinvestment by all multinational companies that have been identified by the independent black trade union movement as being In violation of internationally accepted labor standards.

b, 1986, the AFL-CIO participated in an ICFTU delegation to South Africa, AFL-CIO President Kirkland, the American labor representative on that delegation, I was assixed by the trade union leaders of South Africa that the measures listed above were essential to their struggle for freedom and independence and had their full support. He was also asked by these leaders to seek every possible avenue of pressure In the United States to end this system of government.

President Kirkland relayed these messages to Congress last year in testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee prior to the passage by the Congress of the Anti-Apartheid Act of l986. Although that Act failed to include all provisions requested by the AFL-CIO it went a long way toward reaching them. 38

During this period of almost thirty years the AFL-CIO was :aot content merely to denounce the apartheid system or call on our government to act. Throughout this period we have played an active role in supporting the courageous black trade unionists inside South Africa who were attempting to build their organizations in the face of monumental obstacles at home and the constant undermining of their efforts by detractors abroad.

Many of the black trade union leaders of today have benefited from AFL-CIO training programs. Many of the black unions received support, which helped them organize, from the free trade union movements of the world, including substantial aid from the AFL-CIO. To date more than forty of these unions have been the beneficiaries of assistance from our Federation, including affiliates of both major federations as well as independent unions.

I relate this long history of AFL-CIO action in opposition to apartheid for one reason only: The AFL-CIO's position has consistently been years ahead of the moderate postures of the U.S. government. We have been actively involved in the vanguard of this struggle and will continue to be so. It is impossible to judge today what might have happened if the U.S. government had Imposed a boycott in 1958. It is impossible to judge today what-might have happened this past year, if the Anti- Apartheid Act of 1986 had been fully and effectively enforced by the administration. It is impossible to judge today what might have happened had this administration accepted this Act and had not vetoed a similar measure in the U.N. last year.

It is up to the U.S. government to enforce the provisions of the Act. Its failure to do so undermines the Act and the desire of the majority of the American people to end apartheid by encouraging a peaceful transition to a democratic political and social structure in South Africa.

Under the Act's provisions, President Reagan was directed to recommend additional sanctions to Congress if South Africa had not made "substantial progress" in ending apartheid. While admitting that Pretoria had not abandoned its racist policies over the last year and tacitly admitting that no progress has been made, Reagan called for more "creative diplomacy" rather than recommending additional sanctions. 39

In addition, an analysis of government trade data reveals that a blatant failure to monitor and enforce the Act has allowed the flow Into the U.S. of more than $130 million In embargoed goods from South Africa since the ban on imports was enacted.

A ban on textile imports became effective December 31, 1986. During the first six months of 1987, $1.2 million in wearing apparel and accessories, $1 million in raw textile fibers and $970,000 in yarns, fabric and textile articles entered the United States.

Also during the first six months of this year, $59.4 million worth of banned iron and steel imports entered the American market in direct contravention of the law.

The U.S. Customs Service is reported to be looking into all of this. One wonders what will happen when they complete their inquiries. The law provides penalties of fines and imprisonment for those willfully violating the ban. To date, no criminal or civil penalties have been assessed.

These failures need to be corrected. During the past year, black South Africa has continued to feel the weight and abuse of the apartheid system. Nowhere Is this more evident than in the labor movement. During the past year-

- Union officials and members have been arrested and detained, most often without charges;

- Union officials have been denied permission to leave the country on legitimate trade union business;

- Union newspapers must clear government censorship before distribution;

- Union publications have been confiscated and restricted from circulation;

Union offices have been bombed and officials subjected to constant harassment;

- Union meetings have been banned, disrupted and bugged; 40

Legal strike activity has been subjected to government intervention and efforts at intimidation;

Union negotiations have been thwarted by government complicity with employers;

Union activity has been under constant legislative scrutiny in an effort to control, manipulate, and minimize strong and independent trade union developm ant.

While this onslaught is directed at the black trade union movement, the white electorate continues to ba controlled by a political machine inte.,it on maintaining its power position. The May 1997 whites-only election retained the strangle-hold of the authors of apartheid, the National Party, witnessed a dangerous swing to the far right and demonstrated that much of South Africa Is guided by the politics of fear and ignorance. The white electorate has been denied access to a truly free press, independent radio and television corporations, and, through banning orders, the voices of black opposition and their alternatives for a non-racial South Africa.

In the South African parliament, a National Council Bill has been introduced. This Bill, sponsored by the National Party, would create in 1988 a non-representative Council to design a new constitution for the country. Already discredited and rejected by the majority of the black population, the government is bent on going forward in a last ditch effort to placate a world audience without confronting apartheid itself. Apartheid is a white creation, and is a non-negotiable item for the majority of blacks in South Africa. Apartheid must be totally dismantled by the government of South Africa before reform can be achieved.

Because the black population can not engage in an apartheid dialogue, we, in the United States, must do everything in our power to pressure the white South African regime to abolish the system of apartheid, thus opening the door to reform, the enfranchisement of all people, and the creation of a non-racial society. The South African government is the principal target of this pressure because of its absolute control of the political process and almost absolute control of the economic system. 41

Most concern for the economics of South Africa has focused on foreign companies doing buness there. Less attention has been given to the government's almost total domination and/or control of certain vital sectors of the economy such as radio and television broadcasting, rail and air transport, the basic iron and steel Industry, electric power, conversion of coal into liquid fuel and control of the strategic mining and mineral industries.

While the political control by the government over all aspects of the lives of the black population has been well documented, the same government's domination of the economy is less well known. It is precisely this economic dominance which needs to be attacked. By depriving the racist South African government of markets, avenues of trade, sources of foreign exchange, meda of promotion, doors of access, and loans and other financial survival mechanisms, we can Isolate and force the hand of that racist government.

The Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 was merely the first step in this process. It is clear that the Act has not been successful due mainly to the lack of enforcement. It is clear that one year after the passage of this Act:

Investment in South Africa and U.S. companies doing business in South Africa continues;

Trade and tourism promotion with South Africa continue;

- IMF loans and other financial institution loans are still available to South Africa;

- South African coal continues to enter the United States;

Shell Oil continues to operate in the United States with impunity while exploiting South African workers;

- American arms and other implements of war continue to enter South Africa to be used against the black population; 42

- Multinational compar.es i continue to operate in South Africa or choose the avenue of withdrawal of least resistence, greatest return, and best camouflaged retention.

The Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 needs strengthening, needs enforcing, needs new provisions, needs new eitivism, and needs renewed support. With this in mind, the AFL-CIO proposes the following measures:

1) Closure of all South African consulates in ihe United States until such time as the designated representatives are chosen by South African government officials elected by all races in that country;

2) Restricting entrance into the United States of South African goernment officials, South African government-designated representatives, South African government approved spokesmen, South African businessmen, and other South African passport holders deemed supporters of the government and of apartheid until such time as South African borders are opened to all U.S. citizens, Including representatives of the AFL-CIO who are presently excluded;

3) Preventing the publication and distribution of all trade magazines and tour guides promoting investment or travel in South Africa;

4) Banning all commercials and advertisements relating to South Africa or South African products;

5) Insuring that all goods entering the United States are not South African in origin regardless of packaging, nature of transport, port of origin or port of entry;

6) Forcing all U.S. companies out of South Africa, immediately, and coupling such withdrawal with a negotiated settlement with the chosen representatives of the workers; 43

While these measures are significant, they are meaningless without the mechanism for effective monitoring and enforcement. It is critical that the The Anti- Apartheid Act of 1986 be strengthened in both its provisions and enforcement. In the area of enforcement, the AFL-CIO proposes:

1) independent monitoring through the U.N. to insure that multinational companies sever all Us with South Africa;

2) That the U.S. Customs Service be empowered, and funded to insure that no South African goods enter the United States;

3) That the U.S. Commerce Department increase its surveillance of U.S. companies operating overseas to insure that boycott measures, disinvestment, and corporate withdrawal from South Africa conform with this Act;

4) That the U.S. Treasury Department increase its surveillance over all U.S. banking and financial Institutions to insure that no loans, investment guarantees, o; export credits are made available to South Africa or companies doing business with South AfriLa;

5) That the U.S. Department of Defense increase its surveillance of all arms sales to South Africa to insure that no U.S.-made arms are sold to the South African government;

6) That an independent tripartite (i.e., government, business and labor) monitoring group be created with the sole purpose and intent of insuring that the U.S. agencies, outlined above, carry out their responsibilities under this Act 44

The AFL-CIO has been recommending substantial programs, policies, and strategies to eradicate apartheid in South Africa for nearly thirty years. Each of these recommendations have been mt with less than complete endorsement. Each year the stranglehold of apartheid has tightened, not eased. A black South African child born In 1947 is now a 40 year old adult who knows no other government than that of the racist architects of apartheid who came to power in that year. Are we going to leave the door open for another 40 years of this regime? Or, are we going to use the clout of the American people, through their government, to end the apartheid system? There are no Illusions that this one Act will end apartheid. It will be, however, an unwavering message to our black brothers and sisters of our support in their crusade.

It is time to put aside partisan politics and enact a bill that places America on the side of those committed to change in South Africa. Words alone will never dent the regime in Pretoria. Action, and the political and economic isolation which follows, will force change. 45

Mr. CLARKE. Thank you very much, Mr. Donahue. I have just one question that I would like to ask. Since you represent the union position, what was your assessment of the strike in South Africa that was carried on within the last 90 days? How did you feel about the effectiveness of it or the lack of effectiveness? Mr. DONAHUE. I think all strikes, Mr. Clarke, are desperate measures by desperate people, and I put the mine workers strike into that category. It was brought about by the failure and refusal of the corporations to negotiate decently and fairly with the Na- tional Union of Mine Workers. I would note you have the president of that union to testify before you today. He is obviously far more competent than I to testify on the full breadth and effect of that strike. But I think that it was a very clear demonstration of the strength of the National Union of Mine Workers and of the determination of black workers in South Africa that they will have their dignity respected and that they will work and live in decent conditions. I think that is very much a part of the flavor of these hearings. Mr. CLARKE. Thank you. Mr. Bilbray, do you have a question? Mr. BILBRAY. No questions. Mr. CLARKE. I have one other question. Mr. Donahue, the administration has argued that it has used diplomatic pressure effectively to obtain the release of detainees and to ease the harshest restrictions of apartheid. What is your opinion of the diplomatic approach? Mr. DONAHUE. I would certainly favor a diplomatic approach, Mr. Clarke, but it has failed. It's failure has been demonstrated over the last 30 years. The Reagan administration talked in terms of constructive engagement for a lot of years. It now speaks of creative diplomacy. I don't see that that change of name is going to accomplish anything more than constructive engagement did. I think that it is important for this Nation to clearly place itself on the side of those who struggle for freedom in South Africa. And I think the only way we can do that is not by quiet and careful or creative diplomacy, but by the imposition of the strongest set of sanctions that this Congress can devise and accept. Mr. CLARKE. How do you respond to those who argue against disinvestment and stronger sanctions by asserting that these measures impede economic growth and, therefore, the development of black trade unions in South Africa? Mr. DONAHUE. I was fascinated to note that in the President's Report to the Congress he says the growth rate in South Africa is predicted to be 21/2 to 3 percent because of the effect of the sanctions apparently, and that it would be better if South Africa had a growth rate of 5 to 6 percent. I would only note that I wish he would adopt that same policy for the United States. We would desperately like to see a desire for a 5 to 6 percent growth rate as the propellant of administration actions here at home. Specifically on the South African subject, I think, Mr. Clarke, that the South Africans have spoken far more oioquently to that subject than I can. And every South African voice I hear that 46 struggles for freedom, every such voice calls for the imposition of sanctions and for the stronger support for the struggle of South Af- ricans for freedom. Mr. CLARKE. Thank you very much. Mr. WOLPE [presiding]. Thank you very much, Mr. Clarke, and thank you for taking the Chair temporarily. Mr. Blaz. Mr. BLAZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I don't have any questions at this time, thank you. Mr. WOLPE. Mr. Solarz. Mr. SOLARZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Donahue, do I gather correctly from your testimony that the AFL-CIO would favor legislation which would require all Ameri- can firms doing business in South Africa now to withdraw their investment from that country? Mr. DONAHUE. Yes, you do. Mr. SOLARZ. Do I also understand you to be saying that the AFL- CIO would favor a comprehensive ban on all South African exports to the United States? Mr. DONAHUE. Yes, sir. Mr. SOLARZ. Would you be prepared to make-- Mr. DONAHUE. We would further support, if I may, Mr. Solarz, the closing of all South African consulates in the United States; the banning of advertisement; any promotion of tourism, and so forth. Mr. SOLARZ. How would you feel about a provision which would give the President the right to waive the prohibition on the import of strategic minerals, if he were to determine that national security, in a particular instance, required that we import some of these minerals from South Africa? Mr. DONAHUE. I would hope to see that national interest somehow very narrowly defined, but I have to have enough respect for the Office of the President to allow him to make that sort of determination if we could narrow the question of national interest. I would not like to see blanket waivers to this President or to any other. Mr. SOLARZ. What is the position of the AFL-CIO with respect to a prohibition on American exports to South Africa? Mr. DONAHUE. We would favor the complete economic isolation of South Africa from the United States and, indeed, from the rest of our "allies." Mr. SOL.ARZ. As I read your testimony, you had several points in- dicating what you thought we should do. I didn't see prohibition on American exports to South Africa. But you would favor that? Mr. DONAHUE. We would ban all trade. We would ban all trade, Mr. Solarz. Mr. SOLARZ. Both ways? Mr. DONAHUE. Both ways, yes. We think, otherwise, we are doing business with the people who persecute others and we find that unacceptable. Mr. SOLARz. Two other questions. What is your view of these two South African trade union federations-COSATU and NACTU-how representative do you consider them to be? 47 How democratic are they in the adoption and formulation of their positions? Could we fairly and correctly see them as representative of the black work force in South Africa? Mr. DONAHUE. Oh, yes, I certainly think so. The trade union federation situation in South Africa, as you well know, is a shifting and developing one. But I would certainly insist that OSATU during its years of existence, certainly CUSA during its years of existence, now NACTU and COSATU, are clearly democratic organizations and representative of the aspirations of the people they represent. Mr. SOLARZ. The positions then unions adopt are democratically arrived at? Mr. DONAHUE. Yes, I certainly would believe so. You understand I am speaking from no personal observation; I have read the materials, however, and I have every reason to believe that that is the case, Mr. Solarz. Mr. SOLARZ. Your feeling then is, that your fellow trade unionists in South Africa, democratic trade unionists, are calling upon us to enact comprehensive sanctions. Mr. DONAHUE. They have been for some time, Mr. Solarz, and continue to, yes, sir. Mr. SOLARZ. Let me just conclude, Mr. Chairman, by saying that I think that the AFL-CIO and the American labor movement has played an enormously helpful role in helping to shape American policy towards South Africa. I think you have performed a great national. service. Ycn hav,: helped to hold up the conscience of our country on one of the great moral issues of our time. I personally want to applaud .you for the role you have played and the positions which you have taken. Mr. DONAHUE. Thank you very much, Mr. Solarz. Mr. WOLPE. Thank you very much, Mr. Ponahue. As you know, we will be taking up the specific legislative measures early next year. My hope is that we will in fact, in the final judgment of this House, embrace very much the thrust of the recommendations that the AFL-CIO is making today. I welcome your involvement in that effort, and I thank you for your testimony today. Mr. DONAHUE. Thank you, Mr. Wolpe. I am sure that the House will act as it has before under your leadership, to do what is right by South Africa. Mr. WOLPE. I am sorry. Mr. Donahue, Mr. Burton has just arrived and I would like to provide him an opportunity to at least ask some questions. Mr. BURTON. I was hooked up on the floor. I apologize for my tar- diness in getting back. I have two questions. What specific steps are being taken by the U.S. labor movement to help the pro-democratic black labor movements in South Africa, first. And second, what can be done to discourage pro-Marxist elements in the labor movement which seem to advocate a violent solution in South Africa? Mr. DONAHUE. On the first question, I suspect Mr. O'Farrell could give you the most complete answer, Mr. Burton. But we have 48 continued and we have been engaged, as I said in my testimony, for 25 years with the South African black trade unions in South Africa in trying to do whatever they want done and provide assistance in whatever ways we can to be supportive in training trade union leadership, in assisting the development of programs, and helping them with support and with funds to organize workers, and to assert the rights of workers in South Africa. We have a fairly extensive program which we would be happy to submit to you. The African-American Labor Center which Mr. O'Farrell directs has run over 900 training programs in the Conti- nent of Africa during 1986 and 1987. So we are very active in providing assistance to the democratic black trade unions in South Africa, sir. Your second question was our-- Mr. BURTON. What can be done to discourage pro-Marxist Com- munist elements in the labor movement which seem to advocate a violent solution in South Africa? Mr. DONAHUE. Mr. Burton, I never approach our trade union work as discouraging anybody from anything, but rather, encouraging positive actions. We are not a Marxist movement-the AFL- CIO is certainly not a Marxist movement. We try to educate people to the benefits of the things that we have accomplished in a specific trade union approach. And I think in the final analysis, every trade unionist, every democratic trade union has to find its own way through the various ideologies and various approaches that are offered to it. I have every confidence that democratic trade unionists in South Africa or anywhere else left to their own resources-I said left to their own resources-and given substantial assistance by democratic trade union forces will find a path to a strong democratic trade union structure, and to the most effective advancement of the interest of the workers they represent. I don't see it, frankly, as our role to be discouraging anyone's ideas about any specific subjects, but rather to be advocating a more positive approach of our own. Mr. BURTON. Thank you. Mr. CLARKE. Mr. Chairman. Mr. WOLPE. Mr. Clarke. Mr. CLARKE. Mr. Donahue, just one clarification. Did you say that AFL-CIO personnel were restricted in traveling or in receiving entrance to South Africa? Mr. DONAHUE. Yes, sir. Specifically, it has been impossible for Mr. Kirkland to get a visa to go to South Africa until in 1986 he was granted a visa because he was a part of a delegation from the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions. The African-American Labor Center has been trying for four years, five years, six years, to have its representative present in South Africa, and no visa is available to him. Many of our individual trade unionists who make application for visas and identify themselves as trade union leaders are denied visas to South Africa, sir. Mr. CLARKE. Thank you. Mr. WOLPE. Again, thank you very much. Mr. DGNAHUE. Thank you very much. 49 Mr. WOLPE. Now I would like to invite our third and final panel to come forward. Would all six witnesses please come to the table As they are taking their seats, I would like to simply remind all of our witnesses that we are operating under severe time limitations today and I want to permit maximum opportunity for questions. Therefore, I amn going to again repeat my injunction, and I hope you will understand i do not mean to be discourteous, but we will allow 6 minutes or 6V minutes you will see a light go on, if these lights are working. If In ot, my gavel will come down, and I would. ask that you conclude your written testimony at that point. We, of course, will enclose as part of the committee record, the full written testimony, that you each are submitting today. I would like to invite as our first witness, Mr. James Motalatsi, the President of the National Union of Mine Workers, an affiliate of the Congress of South African Trade Unions-COSATU. Let me just say a special word with respect to the South African witnesses who are here today, I recognize, and I hope my American colleagues recognize how difficult it is for you to speak very forth- rightly to the issues that you are going to be testifying to today. I respect enormously your courage, each of you, in being willing to come forward in this kind of forum. We recognize very clearly the risks to which you may well be exposed upon your return to South Africa. I think that the testimony you are about to present can be very helpful in assisting Ameri- cans to understand the dimensions of what is happening in South Africa and presenting a very important point of view to my colleagues in the Congress, and I thank you for your presence. Mr. Motlatsi. STATEMENT OF JAMES MOTLATSI, PRESIDENT, NATIONAL UNION OF MINE WORKERS, AFFILIATE OF THE CONGRESS OF SOUTH AFRICAN TRADE UNIONS (COSATU) Mr. MOTLATSI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like also to thank those who made it possible for us to come and testify in this House. To start with, I am the President of the National Union of Mine Workers. I have brought a full mandate to talk about the sanctions against South Africa. As you know, that we are a democratic organization. The adoption of the sanctions against South Africa was made by our union in 1980-1986. In the middle of the year 1986, we were attacked by the employers that we don't have a mandate to talk about the sanctions, and they invited us to go and talk about the sanctions. We refused to do so. But, nonetheless, during that time, we had regional conferences all over the country where the sanctions issue was the first on our agenda. We held our Congress this year in February where the comprehensive mandated sanctions was one of the most important resolutions on our Congress. But, nonetheless, because we were preparing for a COSATU Congress, we circulated our resolution which we will propose to COSATU Congress. And also we received the resolutions from COSATU affiliates. Each and every resolutions were re- 50 ceived from the COSATU affiliates we were talking about the sanctions. The sanctions issue at the COSATU Congress in July was adopted unanimously by the COSATU affiliates. We have got a key mandate from our members to talk about the sanctions, particularly mandate of comprehensive sanctions against South Africa. Thank you. Mr. WOLPE. Thank you very much. Now I would like to invite Ambassador Alan Keyes, Resident Scholar of the American Enterprise Institute, and former Assistant Secretary of State. STATEMENT OF ALAN L. KEYES, RESIDENT SCHOLAR, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE Mr. KEYES. I think I would like to express my appreciation for a chance to be here today and to address this, I think, extreme critical issue. I think that mywritten testimony speaks for itself in reiterating what I hope by now is my well-known opposition to mandatory sanctions against South Africa of a comprehensive nature that would destroy the economic power base in South Africa. But in listening to the testimony today, I feel compelled to begin by saying that my sense-I don't know if there are Americans out there who would share it in listening to a lot of this discussion- there's really a plague on both your houses. We seem to have a discussion going on in this country on this issue where on the one hand we have people very highly motivated, and I think rightly motivated, by their hatred of injustice and evil, who are telling us that as a result we must do the wrong thing. Then we have others who, in the face of that understandable and enormous passion to do the right thing, are telling us that there is nothing we can do. We have the choice between doing the wrong thing and doing nothing at all. And I don't think that is satisfying. It is not satisfying to me. I don't think it is satisfying to the American people. The second point I would like to make is that we seem to also be going on the assumption that we as Americans have nothing to offer to the whole question that is of critical importance in this debate. In all humility I would like to say, I think that looking around the world today I can learn a lot about the nature and meaning of oppression that I don't know. From my colleagues and brothers and sisters, whether it is in South Africa, or in Ethiopia, or in Vietnam, or Afghanistan, these are people who really know what oppression is. But I think in realizing that none of us should forget that as Americans we have something to offer to the rest of the world because we know something about democracy. And the fact that oppressed people want an end to oppression, and that they understand the meaning of injustice, and that we need to support in every way we can that works their desire to put an end to that oppression and injustice, doesn't mean that we should forget that so many examples exist now in the world that the mere end of oppres- 51 sion does not mean the beginning of freedom. It has more often than not meant simply the beginning of new oppression. How does one avoid it? That is the real challenge here. It is not a challenge of sanctions. The challenge is the challenge of democracy. And we Americans know something about democracy And instead of addressing an issue where constantly we are being told, well, we have got to show that we are against the evil thing-I think it is time we showed that we are ready to work for the right thing; that we are ready to work in the ways that we know how, to build a democratic future in South Africa in every way that we can help to make a contribution to them. As I said in a speech sometime ago, I think the real challenge is that we want to transform the walls and pillars of apartheid into the bricks and mortars of South African democracy. That's what we want to do. We don't want to pulverize everything in the ccuntry because you can't make something out of nothing. We don't want to destroy every basis of positive strength among the people of South Africa, because after all is said and done, democracy means, quite literally, the power of the people. It is not a question of tearing down the power of a government, though that may be part of the challenge. It is a question of building up the power of the people. And that is the challenge that I don't hear anybody addressing here, really. I don't hear anybody taking it on. On the one hand, we have people advocating sanctions which are going to destroy, to a large degree, that democratic power base; and on the other hand, we have folks who are with rhetoric and so forth and so on, telling us there is nothing th-at can be done, but offering no leadership in coming up with a concrete alternative. Where is the leadership of this administration right now? Why isn't it coming forward? I can understand why a lot of people in this country, listening to this debate, are saying, well, we think that sanctions are negative are destructive, but gosh, at least those people are giving us an alternative. At least they are telling us how we can take this enormous passion we feel against evil and do something about it. And if the administration isn't willing to stand up and say that there is an alternative that decent Americans of conscience can support to build democracy, then I can understand why they are having problems, because there is such an alternative. And that alternative is to use the talent, the skill, the resources we have as Americans to shape the democratic future, to help in every way we can, to build the building blocks of democracy. We know something about that. Whether it is labor unions, and social and religious organizations, whether it is economic power in the private sector, we know that democracy is people; it is not governments. And we know that people helping people to build those building blocks- that is what will make democracy in South Africa a reality. All this rhetoric; all this talk of freedom as an abstraction, does not bring it into being, and hasn't anywhere in the world-only working for it as a positive reality will ever bring it about. And if people in this room really care about the future of South Africa, then it is time they started to dcr something besides talk; 52 and it is time they started to do something besides gesture; and it is time they started to do something besides destroy. We all know how to destroy. I can see the wrecking balls in this room. I don't see the architects. I don't see the builders. I don't see the people with a positive vision of the future ready to do something about it. Talk about power sharing-I could see ways in which power sharing can happen right now. You don't have to wait. Our companies in South Africa, if they are willing to bring blacks in massive numbers into the management cadre in their company, can have them within months making decisions that are critical to the future of South Africa. If they are willing to open up their doors to a real sharing of power with the labor unions in South Africa, they could have right now a power sharing in an economic sector that actually controls resources in the country. If we are ready to do something, we can do something. If we are only read, to talk about it and gesture, then I suppose we can do that too. But I think it is time we brought that kind of an approach to an enC" and it is time we stopped listening to people who stand for something negative and destructive or who stand for nothing, and started listening to people who stand for something, when that something is democracy; and when that something is something which we Americans can truly contribute to helping to build. We know something about that. I don't think we are ashamed in the face of any list of leadership to speak out about it. Now, you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, the leaders of African states-and meaning no offense to all of them, because I think that they have faced some enormous challenges-I would still not want to take lessons in democracy from Mr. Chissano. I am not sure I would want to take lessons in democracy from Mr. Kaunda. I believe that we Americans have somethng to offer in this discussion. And that a partnership between those who know oppression and those who know democracy will help us to end oppression and to build democracy. And that, I presume, is what we want to do. ThaDk you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. WOLPE. Thank you very much. [The prepared statement of Mr. Keyes follows:] 53

EMBARGOED UNTIL DELIVERY 10:00 A.M. NOVEMBER 5, 1987

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ALAN L. Kivu, RESIDENT SCHOLAR, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTrTUTE The debate on South Africa has been characterized by strong moral passion and indignation. The wave of emotional opposition to apartheid reached it first crest last fall with Congressional passage of a bill establishing limited economic sanctions against South Africa. This signaled a series of disinvestment decisions by major U.S. investors in South Africa. The sanctions bill temporarily slaked the moral passion aroused in the US by the issue of US relations with South Africa.

Presumably that was not its only purpose. The supporters of the sanctions bill argued that it was the best use of US leverage against apartheid. By bringing this form of pressure to bear against South Africa we would make clear America's unequivocal opposition to apartheid. We would strengthen anti-apartheid forces in South Africa. We would grasp the last chance to do away with apartheid without violent cataclysm.

The sanctions bill was presented as somehow serving the cause of peaceful democratic reform in-South Africa. Yet in the months since its passage every negative consequence predicted by the opponents of the sanctions approach has come to pass.

Black workers have been adversely affected by the stampede of disinvestment touched of by the sanctions legislation. When GM sold its South African subsidiary to local interests, 1,8o0 black workers -- nearly the entire blue collar work force-- went on strike. GM called in police to evict the demonstrators, fired 785 workers, and finally ended the strike after three weeks by threatening immediate dismissal.

When Ford's local subsidiary merged with a locally owned car company, it promised no large-ncale retrenchment. But the new company closed Ford's old auto plants in the Port Llizabcth area, leaving more than 3,000 workers to add to the city's extraordinarily high unemployment rate. According to the New York Times, "By some estimates, the Americans' withdrawal has cost 100,000 jobs in local companies that used to work for them.

The great majority of departing US companies have continued selling products to South Africa, while abandoning so-called "Sullivan code" pledges to press for black advancement and change in white attitudes.

With a few exceptions, like IBM, which has sold share- convertible "points" to all employees, "divestors" have sold out to white South Africa managers who are under far less pressure to liberalize hiring, training, promotion or political affairs strategies. 54

Ownership of capital assets in the South African economy has been further concentrated in the hands of the indigenous white establishment.

Barclays National Bank, one of the largest foreign investors and the largest commercial bank in South Africa, has pulled out, selling its remaining assets to its South African partners. The sale allows South African investors to regain control of the country's biggest bank for the first time in 61 years.

One South African merchant bank is using the list of Sullivan signatories as a marketing tool to locate potential buyouts. Some white investo,-s have made millions buying the assets of the 75 US firms that have pulled out in the last two years.

Projects in education, training and community improvement funded by major foreign investors have been damaged or eliminated.

Black-white polarization, as well as tension and violence within the black con,.munity have increased.

In backlash against international pressure government repression has increased. Pro-rvform forces within the government have been marginalize, or have gotten out. Remaining hardliners, no longer even minimally sensitive to external opinion, have had a free hand.

In the second week of April Pretoria announced a decree that bars virtually any public call fort the release of people detained without charge under a 10-month old state of emergency.

The government has clamped down on the press and other forms of free expression. Implementation of measures For racial discrimination in schooling and housing, which had been eroding in some areas, are now being more strictly enforced.

Forced removals of blacks from their homes in some urban areas, which the government pledged to halt two years ago, have once again become an issue.

Such movement as there was toward change in the white community has effectively ceased. The recent elections show a strong trend toward the hard-line, pro-apartheid rkght wing parties among the white electorate. Hesitant openness to change appears to have given way to fear and stubborn racism. 55

The election has given rise to bitter reactions in the black community in South Africa, as well as sagely despairing prognostications in the American media. The voices of ignorant passion and false expectations are becoming the prophets of furious indignation and equally false despair. Just as many of it's opponents predicted, the sanctions approach has not been the last alternative to violence, but rather an encouraging prelude to deeper polarization and eventual civil war.

In the face of the predictable failure of the sanctions currently in places, some now call for a new round of even tougher sanctions measures. Before they are once again carried away by thoughtless, emotional appeals, the American people and their representatives in Congress would do well to consider the consequences of what they have already done, and the enormous costs of persisting in this course of self- righteous folly.

America is well down the dead-end road of irrelevance to any process of relatively peaceful, democratic reform in South Africa.

The only way to sustain the sanctions approach would be through a program of multi-billion dollar assistance to South Africa's neighboring states- a program far beyond our capacity in ordinary times, and certainly out of reach during this period of severe fiscal constraint.

Given the conflicts going on in the region, any program of massive assistance to the neighboring states would imply some kind of security commitment as well. Thus the sanctions approach, far from being part of a strategy for encouraging relatively peaceful change, would in effect become a policy of U.S. support for one side in a debilitating regional war.

The label promises a remedy, but the pills contain poison. Poison for the economic power and organizational strength of blacks in South Africa. Poison for the proponents of democratic change in South Africa. Poison for the effectiveness of U.S. policy toward South Africa.

Disinvestment threatens the major tools of black activism against the structures and effects of apartheid, unions and consumer activism. As Les Waldorf wrote in the "New Republic" magazine "Although disinvestment affects relatively few workers, these workers are among the most unionized in the country. The plart closures following Ford's merger left on2-third of M CWUSA and one-fifth of NAAWU members jobless, thereby weakening two of the most militant trade unions in 'the Eastern Cape.... Disinvestment also threatens another tools of nonviolent resistance to apartheid. Last year consumer boycotts evolved into a nationwide strategy fort pressuring white businessmen to 56

oppose apartheid .... But such actions are only sustainable where the community has disposable income- 4,hich disinvestment is likely to reduce."

By weakening the tools of nonviolent resistance, disinvestment encourages the cycle of repression and violence in South Africa. In a speech before a symposium on liberalism sponsored by the South African institute of race relations, Ken Owen, one of South Africa's leading journalists and editor of the influential journal "Business Day" painted a grim picture of the future to which this cycle must lead. "A threatened sovereignty protects itself", he observed, "even limited sovereignty does so. Where protection of the security forces fails, as in Kraaifontein, armed white civilians start shooting .... A new pattern is emerging, in bits and pieces.... An irresistible force, the radicalization of the black population, is running into an immovable object in the shape of the white security forces. Both white and black communities are retreating into fortresses, and conflict occurs on the margins." Owen portrays a South Africa o4 armed gangs, brutal repression by security forces, areas controlled less by any organized government than by armed militias, dealing out death and retribution according to their own arbitrary whim. This is the portrait of a South African Lebanon, tn which the forces that might shape the country's more positive destiny are ground to nothing between unyielding extremes of violence.

If this is the future Americans want to help bring about in South Africa, the sanction approach is the way to achieve that goal. If the goal is a mure positive one, aimed at helping to build a democratic, healthy society in which all people participate equally, regardless of race, and from which all can benefit, then we must think again.

Nothing threatens the prospect of a positive future for south Africa more than the cycle of brutal government repression and violence that has intensified during the past two years. To create room for the positive forces of transformation in South Africa to work, this cycle must be broken. Yet on all sides suspicion, anger and fear fuel its momentum. Blacks argue that violence is inevitable and justified in response to government violence in violation of fundamental human rights. The government argues that repressive force is needed to maintain order when confronted by terrorist attacks.

South African authorities have frequently insisted that opponents of apartheid, in particular the ANC, renounce the use of violent means. P.W. Botha has made such renunciation his key condition for the release of symbolic ANC head, Nelson Mandela. Proponents of the ANC's tactics argue that as long as the South African government wields the power of the police and the military in South Africa, black 57

5 rciunciation of violent tactics would mean permanent surrender to apartheid. Though most South African blacks do not favor the use of violent tactics, the pro-ANC arguments strike a logically responsive chord.

As in most such situations the obvious solution to this dilemma lies in a mutual renunciation of violence, on terms that assure all sides against abuses and violations by others. But the South African situation poses a more difficult problem than usual because wiat is needed is a domestic truce, involving a government that cannot simply renounce its basic obligation to maintain order within the society as a whole. The problem is that the government's abuse of its powers has led to widespread distrust of its ability to meet that obligation fairly, distrust that prevails both inside of South Africa and without.

If the South African government is serious about reducing the threat of violence to Uouth African society, it must first aadress this problem of distrust. If it does so cre6ib'v, the du.sand that others eschew violence could receive effective support. Thus it would be possible for an agreement to be reached on the basic rules of the game for the duration of South Africa-s period of democratic transformation.'

Such activism will not be possible in the context of a simply hostile relationship with the South African government. Already the government is threatening steps that will isolate groups working for change from external support. The hostility encouraged by the sanctions approach has sharpened these threats.,

Therefore a realistic relationship with the South African government is a prerequisite for effective policy.

We cannot work exclusively through the South African government, nor do we have to. But we cannot maintain positive influence through a simply hostile relationship.

The government claims that it is still committed to reform. We should devise effective means to test these claims.

We wish to encourage dialogue among the various elements of South African Society. The recent white elections demonstrate that the present South African government enjoys the support of the majority of the white community. Without effective relations with this government efforts to promote dialogue will clearly have little practical result. 58

Apartheid is the enemy. Insofar as the government enforces the apartheid system, insofar as it abuses- governmental power in support of it, we must oppose its actions. But insofar as such opposition becomes total opposition to any relationship &'4ith the government, putting the U.S. in a purely adversarial position, we become irrelevant to prospects for democratic change in South Africa.

Realism about our relationship with the South African Government must be accompanied by strenuous efforts to develop effective, sustaining ties within the black community.

We have for too long been prey to the myth that these are mutually exclusive approaches. Proponents of sanctions encourage us to concentrate on a minority of black leadership, virtually ignoring the diversity of the black community. We should resist this tendency.

As noted again the the report to the Bishops' Conference "it seems logical that black people desperately want an end to the oppression of apartheid, and are willing to endure some hardship to see this happen. It seems however that if the policy is likely-to produce a loss of their vitally needed jobs, most blacks prove to be tentative about pressing the issue. The Commission concludes from this report that it cannot be said that blacks favor sanction and are prepared to endure the hardship, a view apparently held by a minority only, for when the stark reality of loss of jobs is presented, then quite humanly, this specter forces the preference for sanctions into the background."

A survey by Professor Lawrence Shlemmer of Natal University of the 11 major opinion polls taken among blacks in the past three years suggests three conclusions:

1. Blacks adamantly oppose apartheid and welcome pressure on the Government. 2. Blacks oppose measures that increase their economic burdens. 3. Blacks oppose measures that would decrease jobs in the modern sector.

Professor Shlemmer concludes that "The full range of surveys leads one to the conclusion that at this stage only a minority of about one-quarter or less of rank-and-file Blacks in major metropolitan areas (less if rural black are included) would support total disinvestment or full economic boycotts".

We are told that South Africa's black are desperately radicalized. But, an article in the April 1 edition of the 59

Christian Science monitor suggests a different reality. "For poorer blacks who flocked to the urban townships in search of work, to lash out against a powerful and determined state is a luxury that takes a distant second place to the struggle to work, eat, earn and provide.... Those blacks with jobs have jobs to protect. because of the most successful of the government's race-policy reforms-.the legalization of black labor union membership- these workers alio have reason to expect that working within the system is the surest way to increase their earnings. And urban blacks who are middle class, or about to be, have a greater stake to defend."We must devise policies that reach out to and work with black holding these views. Obviously Black South Africans are determined to defeat apartheid, but they are well aware of the sources of their real strength in the struggle against it. Our policies should reflect, rather than ignore this awareness.

The proponents of the sanctions approach argue that the cycle of repression has gone beyond the point where a positive approach can be effective. They argue that only the pressure of sanctions can have an effect.

But the effect of sanctions has been counter productive. By destroying the nonviolent means of struggle against apartheid, and encouraging violence, the hopeless view becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. The media in this country contributes to the impression of despair. They focus mainly on the most bitter, pro-sanctions leaders in South Africa, virtually ignoring ntore moderate elements. They refuse to report or give attention to Americans, myself included,' who speak out against sanctions and offer a more positive alternative. They have granted a virtual monopoly of public attention to the voices of blind passion, the proponents of negative, destructive approaches, the architects of confusion and false despair.

The situation in South Africa has become more deeply troubled, more dangerously polarized in recent months, partly as a result of the sanctions approach. To discourage further deterioration we sho-Lld reexamine our own actions and policies, we should reverse those steps that have helped to make our actions and policies part of the tragedy.

The greatest loss of our mistaken approach has been that bad policy drives out good. For example, because of the adoption of sanctions we were in no position to influence the South African government's response to the Indaba constitutional proposals. This blueprint for a multiracial, provincial government in Natal, worked out through negotiations among the various racial groups, offers a clear path of hope for South Africa's future. Yet because of the 60

sanctions approach, when it was laid on the table before the South African government, our influence was nonexistent.

The situation will truly be hopeless if we persist in a negative approach that eliminates the U.S. as a force for positive, relatively peaceful change. The debate on our South African policy should not be a debate over sanctions, or a self-centered preoccupation with the ghosts and vestiges of our own historic struggle with racism. If we are to play a positive role, we must devise a positive agenda, one that uses rather than undermines our role as a influence for good. For those Americans who truly care about the future of South Africa and its people, who suffer in their hearts the injustices of oppression, the blight of violence, the tragedy of destroyed hope and-potential, the importance of the South African issue does not depend upon the passions of the moment. We should seek to work carefully and persistently with the pro-democratic forces of change, and to promote a U.S. approach that can be, over time, a sustained force for nonviolent, democratic revolution.

As a first step we should stop the destruction of the bases of positive U.S. leverage in South Africa. This means reconsidering and reversing the process of disinvestment. Before the Congress considers any further steps in the wrong direction, a careful objective assessment of the impact of sanctions should be commissioned. Investors remaining in South Africa should carefully assess the impact any decision to disinvest will have on the economic and organizational power o; black South AFricans, and on the environment for change in the country.

We should devise programs aimed at maximizing the positive impact of the U.S. and other international presence in South Africa. As noted in the January 27 report by a special commission to the Southern African Catholic Bishops' Conference "a statement which says that because black South Africans are denied political rights, efforts to improve their economic, educational and social status are cosmetic or trivial, is a fallacy". Such efforts, encouraged by the so-called "Sullivan principles" were not proceeding as strongly as they should have. Disinvestment threatens to curtail them further. A decided, conscious effort must be made to reverse this damage. Improvements in wages, training, education, and the incorporation of blacks into significant managerial positions must be encouraged and increased.

Through programs of expanded capital ownership we should seek to increase the resource base of the black community. Instead of spending financial resources to disinvest, companies should be encouraged to devise schemes for financing stock purchases by black employees, for including worker representatives in corporate governing 61

structures, etc. Such measures are not remedial. Economic power is the basis of organization strength. Organizational strength is the key to relatively peaceful, democratic revolution.

Such policies would significantly strengthen the organizational base in the black community. In addition we should concentrate on further developing the positive power of South Africa's black labor movement, as well as other civic associations and groups. We should seek out and work with grass roots leaders of all persuasions, not just those popular with our media. The challenge here is of a magnitude that goes beyond gestures and resources from our government. It calls out for the involvement of all Americans of goodwill concerned about the future of democracy in South Africa. From our churches, our schools, colleges and universities, our civic and professional organizations we must extend effective hands of human contact and support to the pro-democratic farces of change in South Africa. From the grass roots of America to the grass roots of South Africa the bridges and bonds of an active commitment to freedom should be forged.

We Americans are so used to the practice of democracy that we forget what it is really all about. Not constitutions, not formal elections, not all the mechanisms and paraphernalia of government make a democracy- but people. Democracy means quite literally the power of the people- people who have the courage, the initiative and the skills to act on their own behalf. The challenge of democracy in South Africa is precisely the challenge of popular empowerment. This challenge should not be a secondary goal or an afterthought, but the primary focus and direction of our resources.

I believe that, rather than taking further steps down the self-destructive desperate road of punitive sanctions, the Congress should take the lead in focusing America's energies on this challenge. This could involve the enactment of a bill to promote democratic empowerment in South Africa. Such legislation would draw together the disparate elements of our influence on the SoLuth African situation.

It would call upon American businesses to continue and increase their efforts to make private enterprise in South Africa the engine of democratic change. To achieve this, it would lay down clear conditions for increased US investment in South Africa, conditions that assure that such investment will contribute to the enlargement and strengthening of democracy's power base in the country, and especially in the black community.

82-205 0 - 88 -- 3 62

It would provide incentives for American firms to engage in large scale training of black South Africans, with a particular view to developing a sizeable cadre of middle-management executives and moving them into the positions that determine the everyday effectiveness of business enterprises. Empowerment need not be the result of tomorrow's political dialogue. It can be made to happen today, in order to build up the forces that will carry that dialogue to a successful conclusion.

It would provide resources and other incentives for organized labor to continue and increase its contact with pro-democratic labor forces in South Africa, so that the labor movement there can sustain the depth of leadership, communication and cohesion needed to play a responsible, powerful role in shaping the country's democratic future.

It would call upon the broad range of nongovernmental institutions and groups in the United States to reach out to their South African counterparts, to undertake the massive effort needed to strengthen the non-governmental means of popular mobilization and action that are essential to the success of democratic systems.

Unlike punitive sanctions, such legislation would not be the end of America's efforts to support full democracy in South Africa. It would be the beginning. To be sure, the work involved would go beyond the facile commitments of a single hour or a single vote. They would surpass the requirements of an easy gesture of divestiture or withdrawal. The Pontius Pilate solutions that pass in some quarters for moral action would not be enough. Americans who care enough and are committed enough would have to get involved, and get their groups and communities involved in the work of supporting the grass roots forces of change in South Africa. They would have to learn from South Africans by name and in person, not from their carefully manipulated TV images.

I believe that this is the real challenge that faces the American people as we deal with the issue of our role in South Africa's future. It is not the challenge of evil, though the evils of apartheid are palpable. It is not the challenge of injustice, though the injustices of apartheid are numerous and cruel. It is the challenge of our hope for democracy, and our belief that despite every evil and injustice, people the world over have the capacity to ue free. Given its natural wealth, and the indomitable spirit of its people, black and white, I believe South Africa can demonstrate that capacity. I believe we have the obligation and the means to help. 63 Mr. WOLPE. I would like to turn now to Mr. James Mndaweni, the President of the National Council of Trade Unions-NACTU. STATEMENT OF JAMES MNDAWENI, PRESIDENT, NATIONAL COUNCIL OF TRADE UNIONS (NACTU)-SOUTH AFRICA Mr. MNDAWENI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am pleased to be able to present the views of the National Council of Trade Unions (NACTU) of South Africa before this committee. My federation, NACTU, was launched on the 5th of October 1986 as a result of the measures that took place between the Azanian Confederation of Trade Unions, which was formed in 1983, and the Council of Unions of South Africa, which was formed in 1980. We have been in the forefront of the struggle of the black workers in the country. In actual fact, if NACTU had not lost the affili- ation of National Union of Mine Workers, it would be the biggest federation of the black workers in South Africa today. NACTU's membership presently is at 350,000 paid-up membership as of June 1987 with 22 affiliated unions. NACTU has the biggest union in the country in the chemical industry: South African Chemical Workers Union, and also in the building industry, the Building and Construction and Allied Work- ers Union. At the launching of the Congress of NACTU, we adopted principles and policies which showed the democratic aspect of our federation, worker control, and working class unity, and our commitment to the national liberation struggle. We also resolved and committed ourselves to a comprehensive sanctions program as long as the racist capitalist minority regime exists in that country. If we are to look at the current situation in the country today, I find it significant that NACTU's formation to coincide with the passage of your Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986. For NACTU the past ear has been a success. Not only were we able to unify 20 unions, ut an additional two independent unions affiliate, to NACTU during the course of last year. Your Act, however, does not address or meet the needs of the NACTU, its membership, and their families. Full, complete, and manadatory sanctions is what we are looking for in all areas of U.S. relations with the racist regime of Pretoria are essential as a form of pressure against that regime. Before I comment on the Anti-Apartheid Act, I would like to say that I have heard people saying that sanctions are hurting the black people. Those people have elected themselves to be spokesmen for us, we have not elected them. Either on the basis of their own interest or for the sake of trying to oppose the opposition- political opposition. They have no mandate. We have not elected them. I want to assure you that they are not speaking for us. The situation presently in the country is as follows: 3.3 million black workers are unemployed today in South Africa. Unemployment in so-called homelands is not included in that figure. Unemployed workers in South Africa today receive only 75 percent-of their last 13 months earning, and for only 6 months. After 64 that time they receive no further income. So there is no source of income for after 6 months for black people in South Africa today. American companies operating in South Africa today are capital intensive. There are only six American companies, the largest which employ more than 2,000 workers. That's American companies. The codes of conduct such as the Sullivan Code, or the EEC code of conduct, created a semblance of equality on the 'actory premises, while outside the factory the oppressed and exploited workers face the inhumanity and hardship of the apartheid system. This is the cause of misery and frustration for the black working people in our country. This cannot be reconciled. Our argument is that if comprehensive sanctions are applied by the U.S.A. and all other countries, our suffering will be shortened, as well as our destiny towards freedom and independence. To end this repugnant system of apartheid, as well as the suffering of the oppressed and exploited masses, comprehensive mandatory sanctions must be applied. If I looked at the Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, it was intended to end the apartheid system. The racist regime has: Failed to end the state of emergency as it stands today. In fact, it was extended on June 12, 1987 for another year. The racist regime has failed to release political prisoners and trade union leaders. In fact, more are being arrested every day. Recognized political leaders such as Nelson Mandela, Zeph Motho- peng, and all others have not been released. Trade unionists from NACTU as well as from COSATU are being arrested for exercising their collective bargaining rights and strike activity. We have seen the death of nine trade unionists during this National Union of Mine Workers strike. The racist regime has also failed to enfranchise the oppressed and exploited majority. In fact, the racist regime has held a whites- only election on May 6, 1987 and continues to pass death sentences on those struggling for that same right to vote. This is ridiculous. The racist regime has also failed to end apartheid. In fact, it is being entrenched behind a disguise of reform. The apartheid government today is talking about group rights. Group rights, we all know that that is an entrenchment of apartheid system. It is no way to talking about change. They have also recently introduced the National Statutory Council bill. Group AreasAct, recommendation of the present Council, have not been accepted by the government. It has all been shelfed, so there is no change. The Population Registration Act is still in the book, and many other apartheid laws that have caused suffering to the black people in that country are still in in the decision book. The racist regime has failed to allow the flow of information. In fact, press censorship has been intensified. Whites in South Africa are totally uninformed about the situation in the townships. They are living in their own world, while the black people are facing the guns from the South African Defense Force, living in that situation. They don't inform the white people in South Africa about that. Alternative views expressed by the African National Congress (ANC) and the PAC are also being denied in our country. 65 They have also failed to enact a just political system. In fact, the tri-cameral parliament is continuing despite the fact that it was rejected by the majority of the people in the country. We have also seen an African, a so-called Coloured minister, had to kneel, apologizing to Botha for swimming in at a whites beach, whites-only beach. The Foreign Minister, on the other hand, Mr. Pik Botha, was asked to retract his statement that a black South Africa", would be the states president, and he did so. The South African government has also failed to stop its support to bandits in Mozambique and in other independent Frontline States. In fact, it is continuing to support that misery caused by them in that part of the world. The South African government has failed also to change. In fact, there has been increasing brutality, oppression, harassment, in our country. Trade union imprisonment, detention of minors, press censorship has intensified. Illegal cross-border raids have led to the loss of innocent lives throughout the Frontline States. The intention of the Anti-Apartheid Act has not been fulfilled. The President's debate in the United States today--the Reagan administration might conclude that sanctions have minimal impact. What do you expect in a period of 12 months? No effectiveness can be measured or assessed during that short period of time. The 1986 Act included a mandate to your President Reagan concerning additional measures. The mandate was for additional measures if apartheid had not ended. Apartheid still exists and it is more suppressive, oppressive and dehumanizing. The question today is not the repeal of the Act but the realization that the Act has not accomplished its results, its goals, and that additional sanctions are now essential. The only way forward is by isolating the Pretoria regime. Some 350,000 members of NACTU and all black workers in South Africa today are saying "yes" to more sanctions. Sanctions have to be imposed. Future policy of the U.S. Government toward South Africa. We say "yes" to a U.S. policy of total isolation, total ostracism, and total outrage towards the Pretoria regime until a non-racial society has been created, a democratic government based on one person, one vote is elected. We say "yes" to U.S. policy of total and unequivocal support, nonsectarian, to all organizations engaged in the liberation struggle in our country. We say "yes" to a U.S. policy that increased assistance to the Frontline States where that assistance is directed at stability and self-sufficiency. We say "yes" to a U.S. policy which forces the withdrawal of all U.S. companies operating in South Africa today. We say "yes" to a U.S. policy which closes all markets to South African goods and closes all financial institutions to white South Africa. We say "yes" to a U.S. policy which not only demonstrates its abhorrence of apartheid policies but also promotes an anti-apartheid policy throughout the world. By implementing this policy you will be with us in our struggle for freedom; you will be supporting the disadvantaged, dispos- 66 sessed, suppressed, oppressed, and exploited black majority in our country, until a non-racial democratic society is created. These are the views of the National Council of the union. I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for allowing me to present these views to you. [The prepared statement of Mr. Mndaweni follows:] 67

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JAMES MNDAWENI, PRESIDENT, NATIONAL COUNCIL OF TnADn UNIONS (NACTU), SOUTH AFRICA

1. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

I am pleased to be able to present the views of the NATIONAL COUNCIL OF TRADE UNIONS (MACTU) of South Africa before this committee. My federation, NACTU, was launched on the 5th of October 1986. NACTU membership is 350,000 paid-tp members as of June 1987 with 22 affiliated union. NACTU has the biggest union in the chemical industry in our country, S.A. Chemical Workers Union (SACWU), as well as in the building industry, Building Construction & Allied Workers Union (BCAWU). At the launching congress of NACTU we adopted principles and policies which showed the democratic aspect of our federation, worker control, and working class unity, and our committment to the NATIONAL UBERATION STRUGGLE. We also resolved and committed ourselves to a comprehensive sanctions programme as long as the racist capitalist minority regime exists.

2. CURRENT STUATION IN SOUTh AFRICA

I find it significant that NACTU's formation coincided with the passage of your Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986. For NACTU the past year has been a success. Not only were we able to unify 20 unions but an additional 2 independent unions joined during the course of the year.

Your Act, however, does not meet the needs of NACTU, its membership, and their families. Full, complete, and mandatory sanctions in all areas of US relations with the racist Pretoria regime are essential as a form of pressure against that regime.

Before I comment on the Anti-Apartheid Act, I would like to say that I have heard people saying that sanctions are hurting black people. Those people have elected themselves as spokespersons for the oppressed and exploited majority in our 68

country. They have no mandate. We have not elected them. I want to assure you that they are not speaking for us. The situation is presently:

- 3.3 million workers are unemployed In white South Africa.

- Unemloyment in so-called homelands are not even reflected in theme figures.

- Unenpoyed workers am only receiving TSAof their last thirteen month% eamnks with no further Income after that period.

- American companies operating in South Africa amecapital intensive therefore not providing the significant employment or benefits that are being portayed.

- Codes of conduct such as the Sullivan Code or EEC code created a semblnee of equalty an the faetry premises only, while outside the faclery the oppressed and exploited workers face the Ihumanity and hard hip of apartheid. Thb b the cause of mbery and bustration to the dispossessed and exploited black majority.

Our argument is that, if comprehensive sanctions are applied by the USA and allother countries, our suffering will be shortened, as well as our destiny towards freedom and independence. To end this repugnant system of apartheid, as well as the suffering of the oppressed and exploited masses, comprehensive mandatory sanctions have to be applied.

3. AN-APARTHEID ACT OF 1986

The Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 was intended, to end the system of apartheid. The racist regime has:

- FAILED to end the state of emergency, in fact It was extended on June 11, 1987 for another year;

T_- 69

- FAILED to release political prisoners and trade union leaders, in fact m'-,e are being arrested every dry. Recognized political leaders such as Nebon Mandeb, Zeph Mothoperq, and all others have not been released. "lade unionists from NACTU and COSATU ate being arrested for eervcisng their right to collecUve bargaining and strike activity;

- FAILED to enfranehbe the oppremed and exploited majority, in fact the mebt government held a whites-oly eetion on May 6, 1987 ad continues to pass death sentences on those struggling for that same right to vote;

- FAILED to end apartheid, in fac t apartheid b being further entrenched behind a disguke of reform, eqeeilly the recently Intaidcad National Statutory Courcl DIU. Group Areas Act, Population Regbtration Act, and the many other apartheid laws have not been repealed;

- FAILED to allow the free flow of Information, in fact pass censrship has been Intensified. Whites In South Africa are totally uninformed about the situation in the townships and the political alternatives expressed by the ANC or the PAC are denied;

- FAILED to enaet just political system, in fact the tri-eameral parliament Is ccntnukig despite its rejection by the majority of the oppressed and exploited mass in our country. An African (a Coloumd minater) had to kneel, apologizing to Botha, for swimming in a whites-only beach. The Foregn Minister, on the other hard, was asked to retract hb statement that a black would, one day, be president of our country of bith. Pik Botha did retract hb statement.

- FAILED to stop its support to bandits In Mozambique and in other Independent Froutline States, in fact the support continues.

- FAILED to charged and in ftet there has been increasing brutality, oppression, harassment. Trade union Imprisonment, the detention of minors, press censorship have intensified. Illegal cros-border raids have led to the bossof Innocent Ives throughout the Frontline States. 70

The intention of the Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 has not been fulfilled.

4. THE PRESENT DEBATE IN THE UNITED STATES

The Reagan Administration might conclude that sanctions have minimal impact. What do you expect In a twelve-month period? No effectiveness can be assessed in such a short period of time. The 1986 Act included a mandate to your President Reagan concerning additional measures. The mandate was for additional measures if apartheid had not ended. Apartheid still exists and is more suppressive, oppressive and dehumanizing. The question today is not the repeal of the Act but a realization that the Act has not accomplished its goal and the additional sanction measures are now essential. The only way forward is by isolating the Pretoria regime. 350,000 members of NACTU, and indeed, all black workers, are saying "YES" to more sanctions. Sanctions have to be Imposed.

S. FUTURE POLICY OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT TOWARD SOUTH AFRICA

WE SAY 'YES' TO A US. POLICY OF TOTAL ISOLATION, TOTAL OSTRACISM, AND TOTAL OUTRAGE TOWARDS THE PRETORIA REGIME UNTIL A NON-RACIAL SOCIETY B CREATED, A DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT BASED ON ONE PERSON ONE VOTE IS ELECTED;

WE SAY 'YES' TO A US. POLICY OF TOTAL AND UNEQUIVOCAL SUPPORT, NON-SECTARIAN, TO ALL ORGANIZATIONS ENGAGED DI THE LIBERATION STRUGGLE OF OUR COUNTRY;

WE SAY 'YES" TO A U.S. POLICY THAT INCREASES ASSISTANCE TO THE FRONTLINE STATES WHERE THAT ASSITANCE IS DIRECTED AT STABILITY AND SELF-SUFFICIENCY;

WE SAY 'YES' TO A U.S. POLICY WHICH FORCES THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL U.& COMPANIES FROM SOUTH AFRICA; 71

WE SAT 'YES' TO A US. POLICY WUICH CLOSES ALL MARKETS TO SOUTH AFRICAN GOODS AND CLOSES .LL FINANCIAL I-STIT UT]IONS TO WHITE SOUTH AFRICA;

WE SAY 'YES' TO A U.& POtICY WHICH NOT ONLY DEMONSTRATES ITS ABHORRENCE OF APARTHEID POLICIES BUT ALSO PROMOTES AN ANTI- APARTHEID POLICY THROUGHOUT TIlE WORLD.

By Implementing this policy you will be with us In our struggle for freedom, you would have supporteJ the disadvantaged, dispossessed, suppressed, oppressed, and exploited black mnaorlty In our country, until a non-racial democratic society is created. These are the views of the National Council of Trade Uniors and all black workers In our country. For the opportunity given to NACTU I thank you. 72

Mr. WOLPE. Thank you very much. We will recess for a very few minutes. Congressman Clarke left early so he could take up the gavel and resume the hearing upon his return. We will all return very shortly. [Recess.] Mr. WOLPE. The hearing will resume. I would like now to call upon Mr. Richard Sincere, a Research Associate of the Ethics and Public Policy Center. Mr. Sincere. STATEMENT OF RICHARD E. SINCERE, JR., RESEARCH ASSOCI- ATE, ETHICS AND PUBLIC POLICY CENTER, WASHINGTON, DC Mr. SINCERE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Wolpe, members of the subcommittee: I welcome this opportunity to give my opinions on the issue of sanctions. Let me just say that today I am speaking only for myself and not for any institution with which I am affiliated. I want to issue a very unmitigated second to that eloquent statement of Ambassador Keyes just a few minutes ago. I think everything he said must be taken into account and has been ignored in the debate over sanctions and over U.S. policy towards South Africa. The sanctions that were issued by Executive Order in 1985 and by congressional action in 1986 were not, as some people say, a policy that was just too little too late; it was simply a bad policy, period. There is no need here to discuss apartheid. We all condemn it. The system of racial separation created by Afrikaner philosophers and sociologists in the early 1940s was doomed from its beginning, and perhaps that is why the West ignored it for so long after the National Party won election by a slim majority in 1948. Who could foresee that 40 years later we would be so concerned by an obsolete, idiosyncratic, and unworkable policy like separate development? Sadly, the structures of apartheid are still with us and it is universally acknowledged-except by a few recalcitrant groups within the Afrikaner community-that apartheid must be destroyed. At issue is the pace and direction of change: What is post-apartheid South Africa going to look like? That is not for us to say. That is a job for South Africans alone. The good news for us is that, in the words of British journalist David Watt: Neither the government nor the Dutch Reformed Church any longer provides a firm philosophical foundation for the notion of permanent white superiority. Apart- heid itself, formerly a grandiose structure whose overarching consistency offered easy security to the whole tribe, is now a poor leaking ruin whose main pillars have collapsed under the weight placed upon them. The bad news is that we in the West have little power either to shore up that ruin-something none of us wants to do-or to speed its crumbling. We Americans are distressed to hear the news that the United States is impotent in some fields of foreign affairs. For a number of reasons, our policies towards South Africa have been consistently impotent. I want to emphasize: The United States cannot impose 73 its own paradigm of politics or social relations on South Africa, nor on any other sovereign nation. In the words of Dr. Christopher Coker of the London School of Economics: There is little the West can do * the black community will have to rely largely on its own efforts, [and] external actors only delude themselves and others about the extent of their political influence. The policy of sanctions intended to produce specific political, social, and economic act on the part of- South African government and society is a policy that is overbearingly arrogant, misguided, and self-righteous. Beneath a veneer of morality and high-mindedness lurks an insistent racism that is incompatible with commonly accepted standards of both international and domestic political conduct. To hold South Africa's white governors to a higher standard of behavior than the black governors of one-party states elsewhere in Africa is reprehensible, patronizing, and ultimately racist. I believe that in this statement I am echoing the concerns of the chairman earlier today, although, perhaps, with a twist. I know that this is something you do not want to hear, but the truth can sting. The pattern of U.S. policy towards South Africa over the past decade or more has been marked by failure. With all due respect to Assistant Secretary Crocker, who brought with him to the administration a very sensible policy towards South Africa, the Reagan administration has been wimpish-there is no other word-wimpish in its approach to Africa in general and southern Africa in particular. The policy of constructive engagement failed not because of an intrinsic flaw but because it was never pursued in a consistent and dedicated fashion. The policy of economic sanctions has failed and will continue to fail because it is intrinsically flawed. Never in living memory have economic sanctions succeeded in achieving the political or social goals they were designed to achieve. For example, for more than 25 years we have imposed on Cuba far more comprehensive sanctions than we could ever imagine imposing on South Africa, yet that has not prevented the Cuban military from engaging in mischievous adventures in the Americas and in Africa. Similarly, sanctions against Libya, Poland, and Nicaragua have been conspicuous by their failure to achieve noteworthy results. The literature of economic sanctions is vast and it all points to one conclusion: Sanctions don't work. They most often have precisely the opposite effect of the one intended. George Ball notes: "The psychology of the besieged is too perverse and too complex to make such sanctions more than a blunt instrument." No nation is better prepared to combat sanctions than South Africa. For over 25 years it has been gearing up for the moment when the United States and the West imposed economic sanctions. It comes closer to economic autarky than any State of its size. If the aim of sanctions against South Africa has been to liberalize a draconian and oppressive political system, sanctions have failed. Sanctions have made the situation worse. 74 As a report commissioned by the Southern African Catholic Bish- ops' Conference put it, "The application of economic pressures can only exacerbate an already serious situation." The report noted: As anticipated, the whole issue of economic pressures has clearly had a totally counterproductive effect on government thinking. The whole sanctions issue has consolidated government in its retreat from meaningful, and indeed, any reform. The bishops' report then concluded: In summary, it seems logical that black people desperately want an end to the oppression of apartheid, and are willing to endure some of the hardship to see this happen. It seems, however, that if the policy is likely to produce a loss of their vitally needed jobs, most blacks prove to be tentative about pressing the issue.... It cannot be said that blacks favor sanctions and are prepared to endure the hardship, a view apparently held by a minority only, for when the stark reality of loss of jobs is presented, then quite humanly this spectre forces the preference for sanctions into the background. Helen Suzman, the long-time opponent of apartheid and member of the South African paraliament, underscores this point: I'm only opposed to sanctions because I think they won't work. If I thought they'd work and bring the government down and change South Africa to a non-racial democracy in a short time-without destroying the economic basis of the country-I'd be ali for sanctions. If sanctions serve any purpose, it is to satisfy the desire of those who can in reality do noting to "Do something!" Contrast this, for example, with the basic premise of the Hippocratic Oath: "First do no harm." You do not treat a wound by pouring salt in it. You do not extinguish a grease fire by dousing it with water. And you do not solve complex social problems like South Africa's by using an uncontrollable bludgeon like sanctions. In my prepared statement which I submitted for the record, I analyze some of the recent political developments in South Africa and make some positive recommendations for American policy. But my most basic point is: Repeal the Act of 1986. Invest more in South Africa and enhance the social conditions in order to propel black South Africans into social and political equality, and to enhance the chances of democracy in that country, and hopefully throughout the rest of Africa as well. Thank you. Mr. WoLPE. Thank you very much, Mr. Sincere. [The prepared statement of Mr. Sincere follows:] 75

PREPARED STAm OF RiCHARD E. SINCME, JR

Chairman Wolpe, Chairman Sonker, members of the subcommittees: I welcome this opportunity to present my views among such distinguished company to this joint hearing of the Subcommittee on Africa and the Subcommittee on Economic Policy and Trade of the Committee on Foreign Affairs. The issue of U.S. policy towards South Africa is one that was neglected for far too long and it is appropriate for us to deliberate on what that policy should be. My name is Richard Sincere. I am a research associate at the Ethics and Public Policy Center in Washington, D.C., and author of the 1984 book, The Politics of Sentiment: Churches and Foreign 1 Investment in South Africa. I spent the last academic year as a Richard M. Weaver Fellow at the London School of Economics and Political Science. Today I speak only for myself and not for any institution with which I am affiliated. You have requested my opinion on the President's Report on Progress Toward Ending Apartheid in South Africa and the question of future sanctions. In brief, let me say that the policy of sanctions imposed by Executive Order in October 1985 and by Congressional fiat in October 198b was not a case of doing too little, too late. It was simply a bad policy. Period. 76

There is no need to discuss apartheid here. We all condemn it. The system of racial separation created by Afrikaner philosophers and sociologists in the early 1940s was doomed from its beginning, and perhaps that is why the West ignored it for so long after the National Party gained power by a slim majority in 1948. Who could foresee that forty years later we would be so concerned by an obsolete, idiosyncratic, and unworkable policy like separate development? Sadly, the structures of apartheid are @till with us and it is universally acknowledged -- except by a few recalcitrant groups within the Afrikaner community -- that apartheid must be destroyed. At issue is the pace and direction of

change: What is post-apartheid South Africa going to look like? That is not for un to say. That in a job for South Africans alone. The good news was reported by the late British political comsentator David Watt, in one of his last columns in the London Times earlier this year: 'Neither the government nor the Dutch Reformed Church any longer provides a firm philosophical foundation for the notion of permanent white superiority. Apartheid Itself, formerly a grandiose structure whose overarching consistency offered easy security to the whole tribe, is now a poor leaking ruin whose main pillars have collapsed under the weight placed upon them.. 2 The bad news is that we in the West have little &ower either to shore up that ruin -- something none of us wants to do -- or to speed its crumbling. Americans are distressed to hear the news that the United States is impotent in me fields of foreign affairs. For a number of reasons, our policies towards South Africa have been obviously end consistently Imptent. I went to emphasize: The United States 77 cannot impose its own paradigm of politics or social relations on South Africa, nor on any other sovereign nation. In the words of Dr. Christopher Coker of the London School of Economics, "There is little the West can do, ... the black community will have to rely largely on its own efforts, [and] external actors only delude themselves (and others) about the extent of their political influence.'3 The policy of sanctions intended to produce specific political, social, and economic acts on the part of South African government and society is a policy that is overbear"ingly arrogant, misguided, and self-righteous. Beneath a veneer of morality and high-mindedness lurks an insistent racism that is incompatible with conionly accepted standards of both international and domestic political conduct. To hold South Africa's (white) governors to a higher standard of behavior than the (black) governors of one-party states elsewhere in Africa is reprehensible, patronizing, and ultimately racist. I know this is something you do not want to hear. Truth can sting. Miles Kington war on the mark when he wrote recently: Lat us not beat about the bush here. Every government in Africa is more or less dictatorial, more or less tribal, more or less corrupt. What imkes South Africa different is that it is the only country with a white government, the only country where whites are oppressing blacks. If wr. Mugabe and his party were white, and Mr. Nkomo and his persecuted party black, Mr. Mugabe would be the most hated man in Africa. (That is why we get so upset about South Africa: what we are saying to Mr. Botha, in effect, is: 'Stop behaving like an African 78

government Behave like a white people' Our attitude is every bit as racist as theirs. We are much harder on a white regime than on a black regime. When whites oppress whites, as the Afrikaners do the English whites, or when blacks tribes, we oppress blacks, as Zulus 4do other hardly get upset at all.)

The pattern of U.S. policy towards South Africa over the past decade or more has been marked by failure. With all due respect to Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Chester Crocker, the Reagan administration has been wimpish -- there is no other word -- in its approach to Africa in general and southern Africa in particular. The policy of constructive engagement failed not because of an intrinsic flaw but because it was never pursued in a dedicated and consistent fashion. The policy of economic sanctions has failed and will continue to fail because it is intrinsically flawed. Never in living memory have economic sanctions succeeded in achieving the political or social goals they were designed to achieve. For example, for more than twenty-five years the United States has imposed on Cuba far more substantial sanctions than we will ever impose on South Africa, yet that has not prevented the Cuban military from engaging in mischievous adventures in the Americas and in Africa. Similarly, sanctions against Poland, Libya, and Nicaragua have been conspicuous by their failure to achieve any noteworthy results. The literature of sanctions is vast and it all points to one conclusion: Sanctions don't work. They most often have precisely the opposite effect of the one intended. The research of Margaret 79

Doxey showed "that a siege psychosis once engendered could be a powerful factor in sustaining the will to resist, and a useful support for governments intent on such unpopular measures as rationing consumer goods and increasing taxes. The more cohesive a society, of course, the more likely a government would be able to strength."5 draw on previously dormant or unsuspected reserves of George Ball adds: "The psychology of the besieged is too perverse and too complex to make such sanctions more than a blunt instrument.R6 If the aim of sanctions against South Africa has been to liberalize a sometimes draconian and oppressive political system, sanctions have failed. Sanctions have made the situation worse. As a report commissioned by the Southezn African Catholic Bishops' Conference put it, "The application of economic pressures can only exacerbate an already serious situation."7 The report noted: "As anticipated, the whole issue of economic pressures has clearly had a totally counterproductive effect on government thinking. The whole sanctions issue has consolidated Government in its retreat from meaningful, and indeed any, reform."a The bishops' report then concluded; In summary, it seems logical that black people desperately want an end to the oppression of apartheid, and are willing to endure some hardship to see this happen. It seems, however, that if the policy is likely to produce a lose of their vitally needed jobs, most blacks prove to be tentative about pressing the issue. . . . It cannot be said that blacks favor sanctions and are prepared to endure the hardship, a view 80

apparently held by a minority only, for when the stark reality of loss of jobs is presented, then quite humanly this spectre forces the preferenue 9 for sanctions into the background.

This conclusion is borne out by the results of a poll of South African blacks conducted by liberal sociologist Mark Orkin of the Community Agency for Social Enquiry (CASE). The CASE poll, conducted in August and September 1987, revealed that 60 per cent of South African blacks are not prepared to support sanctions if the result is substantial unemployment for blacks, 26 per cent would support sanctions that produced some but not many job losses (as the Financial Mail put it, this is the "my-neighbor-but-not-me middle position"), and only 14 per cent support sanctions no matter 1 0 how much black unemployment comes about as a consequence. Helen Suzman, the long-time opponent of apartheid and member of the South African parliament, underscores this point: I'm only opposed to sanctions because I think they won't work. If I thought they'd work and bring the Government down and change South Africa to a non-racial democracy in a short time -- without destroying the economic basis of the country -- I'd be all for sanctions. But I can't bring myself to reason it that way. I look at sanctions as purely punitive measures. And OK, I can understand the outrage that demands punitive measures. But you've got 11 to think of the consequences.

If sanctions serve any purpose, it is to satisfy the desire of those who can in reality do nothing to "Do something" Contrast this, for example, with the basic premise of the Hippocratic Oath: 81

"First do no harm.' You do not treat a wound by pouring salt in it. You do not extinguish a grease fire by dousing it with water. And you do not solve complex social problems by using an uncontrollable bludgeon like sanctions. Allow me now to turn to an analysis of the current situation in South Africa that includes some suggestions for positive actions that could be taken by the United States if we indeed want to do something that has more value than hollow symbolism. Let's look first at South Africa in the aftermath of the May 6 whites-only parliamentary election. Initially, it was believed that the results of the election showed a marked turn to the right, because the white-supremacist Conservative Party replaced the liberal Progressive Federal Party as the official opposition and drew some votes from the ruling National Party. This is not the case. A sharper analysis of the election returns demonstrates that white South African voters have in fact turned to the left since the last time they went to the polls in 1981. The overwhelming victory of the National Party proved that the white electorate as a whole, with some notable exceptions, wants to go forward with the gradual dismantling of apartheid while being assured of continued security and stability. The pace they desire is undoubtedly slower than the pace desired by black South Africans and slower than the pace desired by us in this room, but the direction they want is clear: End apartheid but proceed with caution. (A fuller explanation of this view is contained in an article by political scientist Mark Swilling, attached as Annex A, plus my own analysis in Annex F. 12 How do South Africans, with our limited assistance, take 82 advantage of this trend? John Kane-Berman is director of the South African Institute of Race Relations, an anti-apartheid group that has won worldwide admiratio for its work, and he offered some thoughts earlier this year in an article in Leadership entitled "Attacking Apartheid's Underbelly."

Kane-Berman argues that legislative reform in South Africa has always been several steps behind actual, concrete changes that have taken place. When the law refused to legitimize black trade unions, employers recognized the unions and negotiated with them anyway. When the law insisted on job reservations for skilled workers, managers trained and hired blacks for the positions in spite of the law. When the law required segregated neighborhoods, people of color moved into ostensibly white neighborhoods with little difficulty. On this particular issue, the Group Areas Act, Kane-Berman writes: "I suspect the repeal of this infamous law is becoming less a matter of principle for government and more a matter of time." 13 There are two reasons why apartheid is becoming unenforceable. "Firstly," says Kane-Berman, "blacks are simply ignoring it on an increasing scale. I don't mean overt defiance by political activists, but a much wider tendency among ordinary people, poor as well as rich. . . . White employers, landlords, and [real] estate agents are increasingly willing to co-operate, while the authorities seem less and less willing, for a variety of reasons, to intervene." 14 The second reason gets to the crux of the matter. I have made this point on numerous occasions in print, in lectures, and on television and radio, but it bears repetition (in Kane-Berman's 03

words): "Economic growth is undermining the archaic segregationist structures that were imposed on the economy in the pursuit of the Verwoerdian utopia.* 15 Helen Suzman expressed this well last April when she said: "The manner in which blacks are going to achieve progress in their demands for socio-political rights is through the workplace, through trade union activities. But they've got to be the skilled workers with demands backed by economic muscle. And to me a shrinking economy is not going to bring that about." 16 Adds Kane-Berman: "At the same time, reform is a domino process in which each change generates pressure for the next. . . . In other words, everything is inter-related: if you are going to invest money in training blacks for skilled jobs you can no longer treat them as only temporarily resident in the industrial centers."17 Obviously, to deny blacks the economic opportunities that propel them to social and political equality is nonsensical. Yet that is precisely what economic sanctions do! One black religious leader, Bishop Mizilikazi Masiya, argues that "since the imposition of sanctions by America and other countries,--the South African government has not shown any signs of bowing to any of these demands [release Mandela, unban the ANC, etc.]. Instead, we have seen many black people lose their jobs as ( direct result of sanctions. We have seen many black breadwinners deprived of a chance to make a living for their families and this in turn has deprived some black youth of a decent education as they depended upon these people for their schooling." 18 Other black leaders have made similar statements decrying sanctions. I have attached an article by labor leader Lucy Mvubelo that makes this argument (Annex C), as well as a summary of The 84

Politics of Sentiment (Annex 8) and two of my earlier newspaper columns (Annexes D and E) that cite other prominent South Africans, including Chief Gatsha Buthelezi, the chief minister of KwaZulu. Rather than punitive sanctions that affect black workers adversely and help build up the fortunes of Afrikaner businessmen -- over 100 new millionaires have emerged in South Africa since the Congress imposed sanctions last year -- we should be engaging in positive ways to lift up those who are disadvantaged. Sanctions have been a simple way to approach the complexities of South Africa. What is needed is something more creative, if more complicated. Nere are a few suggestions to stimulate your thinking. U.S. and Western businesses must continue to invest in South Africa. The Congress must repeal the silly provision of the 1986 act that prohibits greater investment by U.S. firms in that country. A major portion of this investment must be -- as it has been in the past -- designed to enhance the social conditions of South African black workers. This means contributing to black housing developments, even if it means violating the Group Areas Act; building and supplying schools from the elementary level on up, including buying schoolbooks and paying for better qualified teachers, and encouraging non-racial admissions policies at all levels; inviting black-owned or -managed businesses to participate in Joint ventures, to subcontract work, to supply raw materials, to perform the functions of any industry partner; assisting black labor unions in enhancing organizational skills, membership drives, and bargaining, and treating those unions with the same respect as their Awerican counterparts; helping the non-parliamentary black 85

and white opposition groups to continue to press for substantial changes in the outmoded apartheid laws; and advocating economic reforms such as the elimination of any color bars to entrepreneurship and the opening up of enterprise zones for small businesses. The U.S. tax code should be revised to allow tax credits or deductions to American corporations that engage in these practices; you can work out the details.

Business is not the sole carrier of this task. There are roles for other American institutions, notably the labor movement. The American Institute of Free Labor Development of the AFL-CIO can continue its-good work in helping to nurture the labor movement among South African blacks. American churches, too, can take advantage of ecumenical ties and missionary networks to contribute at the bottom levels of South African society -- by supporting soup kitchens, adoption agencies, religious schools, hospitals and clinics, legal aid services, and prison visitation. There is also a role for the government. The National Endowment for Democracy and the human rights bureau in the Department of State can each assist human rights groups and the non-parliamentary opposition. Especially deserving groups are

Black Sash and the Detainees' Parents Support Committee. Our government should encourage dialogue with the Institute for a Democratic Alternative for South Africa, the United Democratic Front and its constituent organizations, Inkatha, and other groups (to name a few but not to exclude any). We must support the blossoming political debate, the intellectual ferment that characterizes contemporary South Africa. I-orSouth Africa's future, the battle of ideas is significantly more important than 86

the violent combat in the townships. In no case should the U.S. government or any American individual or institution seek to impose its views on any South African individual or institution. Neither should the government force any organization to accept monetary or other material aid if the proposed recipients fear that their cause would be compromised by -any reel or perceived "strings attached." To do less would undercut the fundamental human dignity of South African citizens that we are trying to nourish. On the political level, we must sijpport -- morally and materially -- efforts such as the KwsZzilu-Natal Indeba, a process of designing a non-racial provincial government that can serve as an example to other regions in South A-rica, and, when it works, to those doubters that remain in the National Party government in Pretoria. The Indaba among other events and trends represents what John Kane-Berman cells "creative erosion." What I have outlined here -- and don't think I mean to exclude any cther ideas -- are steps that erode the basis of apartheid. Added tc the condemnation of apartheid by the largest Dutch Reformed Church in its synod last year, this erosion will act quickly to do positively what sanctions have failed to do and will fail to do negatively: Destroy apartheid. 87

ANNEXES: A. Mark Swilling, "Wrong! The Trend Is Left," The Weekly Mail (Johannesburg), May 15 to May 21, 1987 B. Summary of The Politics of Sentiment: Churches and Foreign Investment in South Africa C. Lucy Mvubelo, "A Voice from South Africa," The Washington Times, February 7, 1985 D. "Sanctions Wrong Way to Fight Apartheid," USA Today, June 10, 1985 E. "It's Morally Wrong to Dictate to Botha," USA Today, August 29, 1985 F. "Beg to Differ: South Africa Is Moving Left, Not Right" New York City Tribune, May 28, 1987

NOTES: 1. Washington: Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1984; 2nd edition, 1987. 2. David Watt, "Tilting the pillars of apartheid," The Times (London), February 27, 1987, p. 12. 3. Christopher Coker, The United States and South Africa, 1968-1985: Constructive Engagement and Its Critics (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1986), p. ix. 4. Miles Kington, "The croquet solution to apartheid," The Independent (London), October 23, 1987, p. 16. 5. Coker, The United States and South Africa, 1968-1985, pp. 30-31.

6. George Ball, The Discipline of Power (Boston: Little, Brown, 1968), p. 245.

7. Quoted in "A note of clerical caution on sanctions," The Weekly Mail (Johannesburg), January 30-February 5, 1987, p. 1--- 8. Quoted in Michael Hornsby, "Sanctions pressure fails to change Pretoria thinking," The Times (London), January 28, 1987, p. 10.

9. "Report to Bishops: Sanctions Counterproductive," The Wall Street Journal, January 29, 1987. 08

10. "Sanctions: Case against CASE," Financial Mail (Johannesburg), October 23, 1987, p. 60. 11. Quoted in Tony Allen-Mills, "The constant campaigner," The Independent (London), April 1, 1987, p. 17. 12. See Richard Sincere, "A Critique of the 'Kairos Document,'"-This World 20, Winter 1988 (forthcoming). 13. John Kane-Berman, "Attacking Apartheid's Underbelly," Leadership, Volume 6, Number 1, 1987, p. 74. 14. Ibid. 15. Ibid. 16. Quoted in Allen-Mills, "The constant campaigner," p. 17. 17. Kane-Berman, "Attacking Apartheid's Underbelly," p. 74. 18. Pamphlet distributed by Jesus Christ for Peace in Southern Africa, "Anti-Sanctions Campaign for the People of Southern Africa," September 1987. Annex A a WUlO.Y MAL. Usy 1 10 MW 21, 197

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paties and the peels bEtrovided the state with a patia. Tnnayeision for the mrepo- 90

Annex B

ETHICS AND ,PUBLIC POLICY CENTER M y J

The Politics of Sentiment: Churches and Foreign Investment in South Africa By Richard E. Sincere, Jr. Foreword by Lucy Mvubelo S outh Africa is a complex and controversial country. It has a high level of industrial development, and its rich mineral resources and location make it of strategic value to the West. At the same time, it has art apartheid system that among other things excludes blacks from political participation, a system widely criti- cized in the United States and Europe. Many critics contend that the West should put pressure on South Africa to eliminate apartheid by withdrawing corprate investment there. Other critics argue that the operation of foreign firms helps break down racial barriers, challenges the apartheid system, and promotes constructive change. In the forefront of the debate are Western churches and religious organizations. Virtually all church members believe that apartheid is wrong. The disagreement is over how to change the situation. Some church leaders believe that revolutionary methods are essential. They support groups that seek to overthrow the present government and institute majority rule. Others believe-as does the U.S. government-that desirable changes can best be promoted by evolutionary means. Those who favor revolutionary change are likely to support disinvestment as a tactic. Most advocates of disinvestment believe that (1) South Africa is the worst violator of human rights in today's world (some insist it is worse than Nazi Germiany or Stalinist Russia); (2) the volume of U.S. investment in South Africa is considerable; (3) U.S. investment strengthens the apartheid system; (4) external pressure can induce political change; and (5) withdrawing U.S. investment will bring about positive change in South Africa. Conversely, most opponents of disinvestment believe that (1) South Africa, with a limited, democratic government capable of peaceful change, has the potential for greater justice; (2) the volume of U.S. investment there is relatively insignificant; (3) U.S. 91

investment does, nevertheless, support constructive change; (4) external pressure seldom brings about desired domestic policy changes; and therefore. (5) withdrawing U.S. investment will have no positive result but may set back constructive change. The appeal of disinvestment is widespread. Its American supporters include members of Congress, state governors, and mayors of major cities. At least five states and twenty cities have adopted legislation to divest themselves of stock in companies doing business in South Africa; others are considering similar laws.

Views of the Churches The World Council of Churches has devoted a great deal of effort and money to the struggle in South Africa. Two elements underlie its actions: a legitimate theological, ethical, political, and social concern about the injustice of apartheid, and a belief that the best way to fight apartheid is to support revolutionary (including terrorist) activities aimed at overthrowing the government in Pretoria and replacing it by a non-white regime. The WCC believes that this objective should be advanced by economic sanctions also, including boycotts and disinvestment. Most church leaders in South Africa, however, appear to support continued economic investment from abroad and thus to be against disinvestment. The exceptions are leaders of the South African Council of Churches (notably Bishop Desmond Tutu) and independent groups such as the Christian Institute of Southern Africa. The supporters of investment encourage businesses to promote the welfare of their black employees by folowing the Sullivan Principles (which promote equal pay for equal work, equal opportunity, and other non-discriminatcry practices) or the similar South African Council of Churches' Code. Many of them insist that disinvestment would hurt most the very people it is intended to help, while others express doubts about the efficacy of any externally imposed strategy. American church views vary considerably, but they generally have five characteristics: (1) A deep and laudable concern for justice. (2) A tendency to accept myths and half-truths about South Africa. (3) The use of vague and emotion-colored language that often obscures the issues. (4) A disposition to ignore the views of South Africans-including both black and white church leaders- who favor increased American investment. (5) A tendency to focus narrowly on dramatic schemes or grand gestures instead of gradual paths to change, with the result that the churches fail to translate their legitimate concern into realistic courses of action. Few if any church statements, whether from the World Council or from America i religious bodies, refer to South Africa's strategic 92 value to the United States and to the rest of the free world. They do not consider what would happen if a regime unfriendly to theWest were in power in South Africa during a conflict between the Soviet Union and the Western Alliance. The omission of geostrategic considerations-the importance of maintaining the Cape route and

"This is an important book on an important question.... I hope this careful study will dissuade well-meaning, compassionate, and thoughtful Americans from pressing for shortsighted laws calling for divestment and disinvestment. Such laws will set back the cause of human rights and peaceful change. They will hurt the South African economy and the very persons their advocates seek to help." -From the foreword by Lucy Mvubelo General Secretary, National Union of Clothing Workers the safety of shipping in the South Atlantic and Indian Oceans, the dependence of the West on essential minerals from South Africa- from church statements is a serious and telling one. The preservation of justice and freedom in the West is not a trivial matter-If disinvestment might help to pave the way for the takeover by a pro-Soviet regime, or a radical-right Afrikaner regime that feels betrayed and humiliated by the West, then all genuinely concerned persons-church leaders, statesmen, business leaders, and ordinary citizens-must consider the possible consequences on the larger cause of freedom in the world.

Economic Facts and Political Realities Since the eary 1970s, South Africa's economy has been changing rapidly. More and more blacks have entered the work force as managers, clerks, and foremen-jobs traditionally associated with the white middle class. Steadily increasing demands on economic productivity have led employers to bend or violate apartheid laws. Wage differentials between white and black workers have nar- rowed; blacks are gaining more economic clout as consumers, savers, investors, and entrepreneurs; and labor unions organized by and for black workers have claimed a place at the bargaining table with management and white unions. Together these economic factors, plus increasing educational levels among blacks, are changing South African society. And as blacks increase their economic power and gain experience in organizing and leadership, their political power is likely to increase also. The combination of South African economic conditions that por- tend greater political participation by blacks and U.S. corporate practices that generally beneft black workers and their families has 98 led many leaders from all of South Africa's racial groups to oppose disinvestment and other economic sanctions. Political, religious, and labor leaders have stated that sanctions would be of dubious value and may in fact be detrimental. Among those expressing f his view are clothing-worker union leader Lucy Mvubelo, auto-worker union leader Fred Sauls, Zulu chief Gatsha Buthelezi, black banker Llewellyn Mehlomakulu, black urban councillor S. I. P. Kgama, Indian businessman J. N. Reddy, and Indian lawyer Pat Poovalingham. In a 1984 poll of black industrial workers taken by Lawrence Schlemmer of the anti-apartheid Institute of Race Rele- tions, 75 per cent said that despite their anger and discontent over the political situation, they firmly opposed economic sanctions in general and disinvestment in particular. Since U.S. investment represents less than 20 per cent of foreign capital in the country, and -,nly about 4 per cent of the total capital in South Africa, it is unlikely that withdrawal would have a pro- found effect on the economy. In fact, most U.S. investments would be taken over by Western European corporations, which account for most foreign investment in South Afica. Withdrawing U.S. investment would, however, reduce the constructive influence that Americans can exercise in South Africa. American firms have been the leaders of the movement toward non-segregation in the workplace, equal and fair employment practices, equal pay, training for better jobs, and other similar improvements in the treatment of non-white employees. The United States can encourage desirable change in South Africa only if it is economically, socially, and politically engaged there.

The Politics of Sentiment: Churches and Fo.eign Investment in South Africa By Richard E, Sincere, Jr. 1o6 pages January 1985 Paper $8 ISBN 0-89633-088-5 !ncludes name index and bibliography

This summary may be reprinted in whole or in part if credit is Rtlwn. Please send one copy to the Ethics and Public Policy Center.

Ethics and Public Policy Center 1030 Fifteenth Street N.W. Washington, D,C, 20005 (202) 682-1200

82-205 0 - 88 -- 4 Annex C FEBRUARY 7,19M5

LUCY MVUBELO * SOWEWroSouth Africa

tt- ldeqd eeas anbea tifl~wil A voice from South Africa paradoiandTbewhlo issueotw InotmAriaeson tib1eautiful, internal atim d eumal American and European firms. Christian clabcw in America pressures to isola South Africa who m mmvl is now being fo- and "ewhab outside SoauthAfrica Asian.be felt cby al ofncolorew - black white. from the WAMrn damswocim but lowed by many So Afrian com- ha tims the lead in the hm-aus- I am not omvinced. The qwpetc as is imiortmt to b Ipmin of isotio, dis The vitality of South Africa's Uniatmtr chwh leaders ae 60,CD Americans bec e ft affos re In P t, md andegroe I mu econuOn offers momehope to South often mitsuided and often ill- es the United Stages And ma Don't brok off cants, and African blacks than destructive. informed. and their stamps and South Africa. relations that in au don't advate deangemat and hems of premure from abroad. activity rain unexaIed in hr"Man- opom eam~reaer withdrawal of tuorei Investment . Unlike so many Africans liht of the acual coudltioms in lo.and stacbt throughout Afrim OWy idig mo m n - the dhoughouf the coutoutw and in South Afr I am a ulow md tmade uneo" trade unions, the political Sooth Africa itself who still live in hophmbow theordlmory kan dire povrty. middle-.ds blacks Those who insst the Qaristion og Me scbooh, the osbm ewnahom a alslonintperhasp requires them to worker suffers under the die sesocatio - wt South Africa visiw armlost7 efei a aparmid In cm brngabosut allkea postuv a car or a washf machine, Thes revolutionary change in South SouthAfricawmait flerorlipa- people. d otrs who aspire to a Africa ftail to acknowledge any ion by my black coorueandall smila Standard oftlivin now have ratuirminSopthAfricaandhiloss 0op in the eogmmy1andpoicl Ouslders cm influsnce it. bAt a stake in pamct refm which - or they cr a ind ey in - the syshmnnt my beoved cau only touh pertdpatlen m by don oot man they will notomntnue eects violm reolution will ha I'hav heard all the arumet -to agitate forcefully for their I bope OWtcarefulrefction al and proposal for changgour Foreign nwstmam h" n d rightul voice inpolticoL socilaend dwudkuomtincompmliw- jm for thomands of Aftrimn wok- economicaffair ate.L dthoaghfuAmneriasfrom Ift. Lucy Umubelo is w seoc- era who would othervi be unsm- By visiting an the withdrawal of sn- for shortsighted law call- yetw7 of the National Unto. of ployed. Thanks to the polides of oencmpanis - even of only in for divestment and disiveM- Cjoehing Wors in South Aftlca fotep msfopimt bem.k- Ameican firms -- di P - P -t This m osr sfbawn srjva- works: hm - siglatWW"advocates we asking a sum al wd to The Poitics of Sendma wage -n often ger than number of black emer to eaci- Soh lows wi sK beck the cnse. Churdies and Foreign Invesonont In dh nae gained by block =*. of human rights and p aful South Africa. by RlchadSboceue, to ea In South Afrin coutbacks realistic mow of attaining wider P. They wMhunt the Souot be MNblshe "himonth by thujtk Thse workn a *the buedltsof OP eol~adbigherlivingsem African eCmod nd the My per- iciand Public POlc Cente equalooetnby coda aoPted by dftrde am their advacass sak sowhep. I II II

Annex 0

We 12A MONDAY, JUNE10. 1985. USATOOAY IIRICHARD E.SINCERE Jr. TOOAYhopes 1W 1"USA1serveas aboun fo better An epposl view I P IN rke theUSA fly Sanctions wrong way LrjrjvYamone Clft"= Sk~ lUAU-A~enRK NtaV to fight apartheid WASIWCI - Thean Aat IM huse- Ch*,V for dniaveneelad * OW hOf 114Scae of es geoC. economic @aucton lltm Pet cbea ad andSouth rnWn Ak bankupLb ItI 05-6001M1.1 INlh ,ok

ratherUan bya adlEed of =Mm OPINION' ateradoi ChM GeatWie.

The Debato bard Paheaatoa G Zulu 14040:iEa stk SOUTH AFRICA t:y= bay, ttVIWI! tZOM*Af = a 1wackeuue,i iok $WM fopauremy"ift t 5brm lawft e onble wouM0 lactres MMme o godVFN Mpiis Iabe rSos ar eos ale- ula molme nI Maam hutAI flke foe Iajls,= EN&Se10 ulmtbbteelwoba 11MOMmaw1t cior eaposts tPobo ~ iJAMa - -P000"YS-A.Seu~~~etunrei LaP €ed bia I The three other guest columnits were,

Jeff Riggenbach a w0E8 - lobs, 1Borael1 W hb m and oft executive producer of the nationally == forcelIk AbMaIbe. loud AMen malut syndicated radio program "Byline" comeLUr oumorei Mcdemcrla apelr t a oad Iafrod0 rOPdhnbe for the Cato Xnatitute butwouoead. NMIINI& AMM =16nifma2 M= bra hut AM"W Leon W. Sullivan WWl beamyouchma bee os pb&W bonus, author of the Sullivan principles for but~ccomesac re moarn,ebaw bufat110Mt eaaUlueUPates &AzAtl corporate conduct In South Africa, and ma alaseehebe pastor of Zion Baptist Church, Philadelphia Ben Brown television editor of USA TODAY fduhoaer, a butaA ad 1e wh o h f -eau poe.beeta- Sk anWd umanMstOMv ve l rasu W1*-6* onMMeaowaersypete ant willev unces re u OW*WcvQi - wrongand "oelin e myMedpineorpWesoaubdrib0m 96

Annex E

AUGUST 29. 1985

RICHARD E. SINCERE JR. An eqplobg Vew It's morally wrong to dictate to Botha WASXINGTON- FU poUt- Rkhrd E Sbhom Jr, au- Ical participation byall racial thor of The Politicsof Seat- UAdetc pousI South A - meat Orumbes andForeign rice l helte. hnvestmentIn South Africa. The =uelo k%will this Swr at the ftyanPuc, come about by violent or The ccle of v~olenc tha ho claied more thn 60 beenout *1the question under the 9 aeid * ta o the Ilveslbepad yer mi io t adtIs he nm Oef Sanction are an etall U.& iovernmeat - or US.cidt- nate budgeonmtha ennol dl wa - todftate the trm ofe Unurmkthe "Pod OW from setilementofSouth Africa'spo- the "bmed b howeverm Me)ctrcoubli Ittha isthe orresl of Wehn FrenCrince the sacin "tomovement on =open

revere constre-eca amdlateosby VlIIGIO Has and p Ishlment will ireng the b"ea f eA foreign country, whether rebtwlon partiesend VwheW friend or foe, prt*bm6Oftamth amew advocateAnsaSo, ohimcited - thby platformtto say ode who macborn now cautiously support the sdvoo UN taprests. 1dj0l Anapen fou s basV Internal politUcal dynamics anceFa are a"eaenuthey andPon"ie awy- fored AMlAs wonderbefore are dicme r preler1tW the CoqtW boycottbed any to 31rheile aa andes, effect00 UPAde. sAnsilon. Us. oc dauld Slarbtlgow othv thus ecuaedgu *ouain SouthAfrica. Wroen& polikl paW 114 and humanI denro mora a = wooriq to suppot to hlpMom~ IN carIsesomernet-etpllo IN4 that ety Te.o of blackbradeulo n 6 1eadeM- Ala Vormit. P,W. daisOWe entrallcheead cer fJor ,.or of wercol DohA.0a4in bothw" N* ored and inns In 103I. the son Mandele and Desmonmd

Io we 1M4 anmth 0epa1 lawsforbidding mutace Wa In the eatme, Presided Uti artie earlierdol yea, to nameAN a few. legislation. sad Congress Soch changes would have shouldNMldn the vdO 77 97

HWYRK CITY TRIBUNE 7 THURSDAUINA 28,1987 wKOu~ SINM~ Annex F Be to Differ. South Aftica IsMoving Left Not Rigt LONDON vrtitlt thotirt s hbeoofepressie act*siad Pres epieoatWmd naly" af the May I wtesody a anc siteant rnsaiedtoathe presspWe eeut emcatena Sot Akt trade deawthat tle eoaut's tgappe'stoa di paveartanm .tnsas ide whe veliro had edidedto reject roefm of apwtea p oreenaemeytat R t Al tyf mld sobe and hadmoved finly to the righean th poca se. *moq.but rmd ind-ucd o hi d rom tUum. I view sW tteect - Sowt Akt's wWt P onf hamsft fteatflmA maybedaed een lave,in act, movedto the WAaetee the kaa hiSaab Atrcs en , pok pe.Muh vs ma ettoe in191. ti ead 0( ft" isaIad . a ..- n. Noaasuttriaing m" wttirbatocWienpretotioes adOw %aaWieash taeepumad Wytwad M - VM -t IeCWttas w PA "trht tbe Waef Mat a teUNate Py to sN4qgfbr a edob Pena let-"imtoakerntativ" newspaperrm ba d indJohm. subetweeWtm qnda odi. O ipheM cawr resart. btthe MayIse euatpoe scentiat bat smaa a s.ha Wand S c Akkeafd me SwAq ev ietha Le pressIsh totrderstantad the ador a Lendoo- hitaesd Caso "lst s C it dyetnaead Sot Aktemyoltt, tosreaat Wiser- Hew" by lostob hiy any nol tea sp 3 preoagthe nw miate he the rt-ng Nootd Pory Oft). coupledna bsaosoetsby the ten Proes- lb maty autsders it appnd thess btdeyaeretoa aweFederl Party (PI3 and pit"6r the righiting wear plen Vatas jcamw.) Patrist Cocative Paty (CP).aa a riratwd ttt raeneomenheitdissuofeadWbrMal, danar artePrenedWeter I N - OtheeOWoveti. pathe lhaehokd d NeOMParty to pressoje djas Sonimeoe eian see iseth 4the Mis,pe sow "The Nationa Party, once the demndsme yeas . guardian and leader of the right, Par nteqw L&NOterlof dlGodran,1* mis now stands with both feet in the brokeaway kornediedarty tobom imDaoatak& middle. Partyin Il hI t .. MWtea"day. Ik ml aenot qal ri betig VWOqqet0

Stti, eyhat s sould lbae beenobvlout to uy asoad ebsereraat th Saab Aim poded hielaoasudam sicehdtgmn ,sk dl itly tothe lkOtbItNainr P n thit pa,o' andbader-tl ter1W am sads mt both 6in this 1,The Pit. don* eae-rtW by Ameraieanor S ,pa , a ta.t mr the Casr dU1Des w aetbekar staideroc aaes a reactionar aotad pre -F - - sawerem forgft Lt twant say ii his am eat1hbaksofsa SieCoewier Pry hi 197 astibdy eetti 9 Conuervatveis in pm!hipsa thoamedthe Plini Pry i 1961 ...in daia reform wAcM&W& f sputaltb hi 1962,ims ~e as hitwe tie0 cOaN VaedbefortdOnh N milljatoneeInsmao bwedamn potisa poapeaadm-dby the cr What Ws banned be duediiole lut 6Pd sin IM75byPresident PLW. Boths. "ba dwtastedbay pedo Ofbe Posey111 doils 1mat"swks Setg StashAhm pot hy iamwoak%a 1110Se W atoeaadeftwd.pt a 962,sidgisvbritoaamits oppoitin to Setight bal1967." dim poicmaTike baledia robe &deaaed byNi 0 di aslyi i ames es vte i d icom today m At !!a* wee pdatigthe da iSotAtics a"s rettto am red aryatoe wndmuat oanseto A patlt s aTtsCUibaei dy ba pltttma and rst Th1wheli atm hoteer. rath e ashraw a eadeeWreak wiatte paratwahave edttoftedpoloe n attneropposed by pastmit embracoa t PF?w nt er tea, mausdcite t ctoappartiesehiseocntwlyeotd thie arko foatit'etenineredtnofLo, &efolrttisntbeae the La. Onethetas othe &odeta of sky"~ macn's tscifrge,the poeteoat retormsdeitebtod bY Robert Reiicd~nttceKh~vttbatdriertawlyioho Laletonoearid the Pecgesotes "ynAutoyz eitrd- ntocq.reoititnifte cerxatte cie. tea prulOnifatiVAN h rcttot boidetn)ai. Ioe betLet Or matt. Prt,b,tcec yenemithait Pelte .aco -ere a char pat ren owhenAkartto tain eta firt eklcd V; %'o-cos 18WO Threeenxtmples, bait both Ame ra I'a~itS-tt Afri- cnhsoyprovitdat kat asbtcmerntif' rcn wnfl peite change intact cocrot..' .t-iltd scety. Dem Wartal seen hiselect-n Perlatcte "tt the begatotttofa n spu%4A heope inSouth Abma.*o sdWis aCkAOMshe MAa*W% Carry the spen ito the m Adeta t neateteottan.- (The neat electot. by t way. isesete tAr19Na niece tsit, Ye~Anraomo.) Tbe taedInSouth Abao ycbte isto t hift -or peettopan"wa aetely to t cente. Deoste t Waled 0d a1aZoeentgneC tihe Ccnsereat,esan yatbsera athen ej eottktae.h amyhe tat the Qangetatiaeseepruosteeiw e h t winet to the klanblaessictaa e-patbeoli aiced throo porbaitiy debate,Wttere te ae o se ijomatowukand we j slowpres iltitnt 98 Mr. WOLPE. I would now like to turn to Mr. Damu Smith, the Di- rector of the Washington Office on Africa. Mr. Smith. STATEMENT OF DAMU SMITH, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, WASHINGTON OFFICE ON AFRICA Mr. SMITH. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I have supplied a full text of my statement to the committee. I would like to thank you and the committee for extending an invitation to me this morning to testify on behalf of our office, which, since 1972, has been fighting for a new U.S. policy toward southern Africa, including the imposition of comprehensive mandatory sanctions against the apartheid regime. In that light we join with COSATU and NACTU and the other anti-apartheid organizations who are calling for such measures from our government. I want to be very specific and concrete this morning in respond- ing to some things that President Reagan said in his report issued a little more than a month ago. As we have said this morning, and many others before me, that the President called for nothing but an undefined "period of active and creative diplomacy to bring the peoples of South Africa together for meaningful negotiations." In other words, Mr. Chairman, do nothing. The President's report reiterates numerous unsubstantiated arguments in favor of the failed and rejected policy of "constructive engagement." One of the things that the President does in his report, Mr. Chairman, is he talks about how sanctions have had minimal impact on trade because of South Africa's ability to find substitute markets. And he also says that "after years of contending with embargoes on arms and oil, South Africa has shown itself adept at evading sanctions." While he does this, Mr. Chairman, he does not talk about how the potential for impact of the relatively weak sanctions adopted by Congress last year has beer. minimized by the administration's own lax enforcement of the law and its actions to prevent the imposition of coordinated sanctions by the international community. We must remember that last year's sanctions were passed over Reagan's vigorous opposition and veto. And although those sanctions are significant, they are limited, they are weak, and they are circumventable. And because of the President's fundamental opposition to those sanctions, he has undercut the law by the imposition of weak regulations. , For example, uranium hexaflouride, which has been exempted from the ban on uranium, and licenses have been granted for the importation of uranium intended for re-export. If it has been easier for South Africa to find alternative markets, Mr. Chairman, it is because this administration, in violation of the intent of this law, has consciously blocked the international imposition of the limited U.S. sanctions against South Africa. 99 The law states that the President should convene in interution- al conference in order to get our allies to do just that. There have been no negotiations. There have been no international conference. To date, the major industrialized nations have imposed weaker measures or have omitted sanctions included in the U.S. sanctions package. Coal, for example, the South African export second in importance as a foreign exchange earner only to gold has not been banned by many of these countries. Our government, Australia, O.anada, Denmark, France and Sweden have banned South African coal. But Britain, West Germa- ny, Italy and Japan continue to import large quantities of coal. The U.S. prohibition on coal, therefore, has been undermined by the administration which has done nothing to pressure these allies to join the ban on South African coal. So while this administration argues that sanctions do not work, and while others on this panel argue the same thing, this administration has obstructed the global application of sanctions against South Africa, while this Secretary of State has campaigned around the world for global measures against Iran, and this government maintains total sanctions against Libya and Cuba. Despite the adoption of some limited measures, the major industrialized nations, Mr. Chairman, continue to trade extensively with and invest in the apartheid economy. They provide critical support to Pretoria in the form trade credits and bank loans, energy production such as oil, technology transfers (computers and electronics), and capital equipment such as heavy machinery. As long as the United States, Britain, France, West Germany, Israel, Canada, Italy, Japan and other nations, along with oil companies and arms dealers, continue to do such business with South Africa, Pretoria will be able to circumvent and to minimize the impact of sanctions and existing U.N. supported bans on oil and arms. What I am saying, Mr. Chairman, is this: The President cannot have -t both ways. You cannot impose selective sanctions, undermine their limited effectiveness with weak regulations and lax enforcement, block their global application and then argue at the same time that sanctions don't work. You simply can't have it both ways. The President claims that sanctions have exacerbated unemployment; when in fact, Black Sash and other organizations have said very clearly before sanctions unemployment in some bantustans it was as high as 90 percent, and remains as high as 90 percent because of apartheid, not because of sanctions. The purpose of sanctions, Mr. Chairman, is to increase the cost of maintaining apartheid to whites. If you ban bank loans, all bank loans, to South Africa, if you prohibit short-term trade credit, that is going to hurt white South African businesses, not blacks in South Africa. One of the most incredible things that the President said in his report was that the main impact of this investment has been to damage fair labor standards programs in South Africa. We ask, what is the President referring to? Is he inferring to the inhuman, cramped, single sex hostels; the lack of death and accident benefits, and slave wages, which black 100 mine workers raise as issues in their most recent strike, which was brutally repressed by the mining conglomerates? No fair labor standards exist for black workers in South Africa. Mr. Chairman, one of the other arguments that the administration continues to make, and others on this panel continues to make, Is that economic growth and the openness of the South Afri- can economy have been among the major forces eroding apartheid. They also offer the best chance of bringing about this end. Mr. Chairman, the two major periods of economic growth in South Africa were the early 1960's and 1976 and 1978 when international gold prices skyrocketed. Yet these periods are renowned for the Sharpesville and Soweto massacres. And during the same period of time, the massive poverty, malnutrition, chronic health problems, massive unemployment, and all the other miseries of like associated with apartheid were part of that era. Mr. Chairman, in conclusion, I would like to state that in addition to imposing-working to impose comprehensive economic sanctions against South Africa as incorporated in the Dellums bill, H.R. 1580, and I hope this committee will have the courage and the will to adopt that legislation. We also believe that it would be very important for this administration to support the nations in their efforts to withstand South Africa's economic destabilization; focus on the Namibian independence; end U.S. support for the Savimbi rebels in Angola; and continue to support the peoples of southern Africa in their quest for freedom, liberation, and justice. Thank you very much. Mr. WOLPE. Thank you very much, Mr. Smith. [The prepared statement of Mr. Smith follows:] 101

PMAM STATIINT or Dmu Surm, EXcuTIv DIRcToR, WASINGTON 0MC3 ON ARImCA Than you, Mr. Chairman. I wesas this oppoctunity to testify before you:, suboonmttse conoerning the PteMent's assememnt of the situation in southern Africa and the Lpact of the enwctions against kuth Africa passed by Congress 'last yoa. I na eis Dou Smith and I am the RWoutive Diretor of the Washington Office or Africe, a fIfteen yea old church and labor union sponsored lobby and research organisation. As a lesding national anti-spartheid orgenia- tion, the Washington Office an Africa works for the removal of all U.S. governmental and corporate support for apartheid in southern Africa end for the implementation of national policies that promote freedom, justice and self-determination in that troubled region. Mr. Chariman, you are to be comwended for your leadership in calling this hearing. Congress and the nation need to give careful and sustained attention to the increasing violence and oppression perpetrated by the Pretoria regime against the black people of South Africa and southern Africa. The cenorehip of news from South Africe makes your attention to developments there even more critical at this time. Congress must also assess critically the President's Report of October 2nd, and respond to #he President's refusal to propose additional measures against South Africa when he found that there has been no significant progress toward ending apartheid. You are to be conended, furthermore, for the leadership which you and others in Congress provided for the passe of a nations against South Africa in the 99th Congress. As required by PL 99-440, the Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, President ltegan, sent to Congress on October 2, 1987, a report on the extent to which South Africa has made progress toward ending the system of apartheid and establishing a nonracial deaccracy in South Africa. It requires that, "if the President determines that significant progress has not been vade... the President shall 102

ql.i,.y bY r,, R,tj Eh. Vaublngt m Qf In cwAi.. inolud*... a reo andation on which... additional measures should be inposed." The lIM state that the measure of such progress to that South Afric mstt rep l the state of emergency, respect justice under lw for citizens of all races, release all political prisoners and trade union leaders, permit free participation in the political process to all groups, establish a timetable for the elimination of all apartheid laws, negotiate with representatives of all racial group the future political system in South Africa, and end military and paramilitary activities aimed at neighboring states. Pretoria has ot none of these condition. The President acknowledged that there has been no progress toward ending spartheid but, as apected, he blamed that lack of progress on the U.S. position of limited sanctions on South Africa. Because of his conviction that "punitive snctions are not the best way to bring freedom to South Africa,* the President has chosen to dlscbey the law by refusing to recounend additional measure. Rather, he calls for an undefined 'period of native end creative diplomecy... to bring the peoples of South Africa together for meaningful negotiations.' The President's report reiterates numerous unsubetantiated arguments in favor of the failed and rejected policy of "costructive engagenst.0 It is built on a foundation of erroneous and misleading Assuptions about the magnitude and scope of the crisis in South Africa and the extent of support there and in the U.S. for the strongest possible pressure against the Pretoria regime.

IMUMDL DWACT (F SANMO he President reports that sanctions have had minimal impact on ... trade

because of [South Africa's] ability to find substitute markets.,. It add that "after years of contending with bergoes on arm and oil, South Africa bas 103

mtIWnnf bM D anmith. MWsiNgo offce oCAfriWa Shm itself ~ at eva Ing s tiM." The President attributes the minimal impact of current sanctions to the

availability of alternative msrketq and South Africa's adeptness in evading sanctions. ' However, he fails to report that the potential impact of the weak sanctions adopted by Congress has been minimized by the Administration's own lax

enforcement of the law and its actions to prevent the i position of coordinated sa-ctions by the international community. The current U.S. sanctions were passed over President Reagan's vigorous opposition and veto last year. Although significant, these sanctions are weak, limited, and circumventable. Because of the President's fundamental opposition to sanctions, he has undercut the law by the position of weak regulations. For example, uranium hexaflouride is exempted from the ban on uranium and licenses have been granted for the import of uranium intended for re-export. The circumvention of the ban on uranium and the Administration's failure to implenent other provisions of the law has been documented in a report by the General Acounting Office. South African trade has benefitted from the loophole In the ban on new investments which permits short-term trade financing. Other loopholes permit the rescheduling of outstading loans, the reinvestment of profits from South African operations ad the acquisition of South African securities and financial instruments by U.S. nationals. These and many other loopholes in the law have allowed business-as-usuail in many sectors of the South African economy. It has been easier for South Africa to tLind alternative markets because the Reagan Administration, in violation of the intent of the sanctions law, has consciously blocked international imposition of the limited U.S. sanctions against South Africa. In Section 107 of the current law, the Congress urges the 104

TesisMy by DAM Smith. Washington Office on Africa President to seek international cooperation "as a prerequisite to an effective anti-apartheld policy..." Section 401 says that OIt is the policy of the United States to seek Internationacocperative agreements.. .to bring about the complete 'dismantling of apartheid" and directs that negotiations with "other industrialized democracies and other trading partners of South Africa...should begin prcr4ptly" and that within 180 days of enactment, the President "should convene an international conference... in order to reach cooperative agreements to Inpose sanctions against South Africa..." Th7ere have been no negotiations and no international conference. Moreover, the U.S. representative to the UNSecurity Council on February 20, 1987, vetoed the international imposition of sanctions identical to those adopted by the United States. To date the major industrialized nations have ispoe4sd weaker mnures or have omitted sanctions included in the U.S. sanctions package. Coal, for example, is the South African export second in inportasce as a foreign exchange earner only to gold. The U.S., Australia, Canada, Denmark, France and Sweden have banned South African coal. 'HoeverBritain, West Germany, Italy and Japan continue to import large quantities of it. The U.S. prohibition on coal has been undermined by the Aministration which has done nothing to pressure these allies to join the ban on South African coal. While the Administration argues that sanctions do not work and has obstructed the global application of sanctions against South Africa, the Secretary of State has campaigned vigorously for global measures against Iran and the U.S. maintains total sanctions against Libya and Cuba. This hypocritical stance reveals the true intent of the Administration to protect the apartheid regime from sanctions. Despite the adoption of sone lined measures, the major industrialized nations continue to trade extensively with and invest in the apartheid 105

TRtimmy by Dam Smith. Washingt. cLffI~Af~c

oconomy. They provide critics. aug)rt to Pretotia in the form of trade credits and bank loais, energy prod..on (oil), technology transfers (conputere and electronics), and capital equilvent (heavy machinery). As long as the U.S., Britain, France, West Germany, Israel, Canada, Japan and other natJons, along with oil companies and arms dealers, cotinue to do such business, Pretoria will be able to circunyvent and to minimize the impact of sanctions and existing MIN supported bans on oll and arms. The president :an not have it both wys. The U.S. cannot Iripose elective sanctions, undermine their limited effectiveness with weak regulations, block their global application and then argue that sanctions do not work

SACIONS HUMT BLAMK

7be Presidwt claims that *to the extent that our sanctions contribute to South Africa's economic problem, Owe wiii have contributed... to an increase in !blasr*j wumloytent... The President's claim that sanctions have exacerbated the unesployment ad hardships of blacks seeks to absolve Preteria of responsibility for its brutal oppression of the black majority. Apartheid is the principal cause of unemployment and suffering in South Africa. The apartheid economy is built upon the exploitation of cheap labor. The South African goverrirent has established bantustans and relocation carps in the barren countryside to create vast puols of people who can be forced to work for slave wages, under horrendous conditions, in its mines, domestic service, factories and farms.

Representatives of the Detainees Parents Support Committee and the Black Sash have estimated unemployment rates before sanctiort at betw. en 35% and 50%. In some areas, like the bantustans, the rate is as high as 90%. 106

YMKU X by_Damu aith. Wahi. ton Off too an &Criaa Long before the discussion of sanctions, apartheid was creating suffering for black people. Apartheid is responsible for a high infant mortality rate (251 in some rural bantustans), a high tuberculosis rate (200 cases per 100,000), a high *incidence of malnutrition (as high an 79 in rural villages) and unjust and inadequate health care (1 doctor to 5000 people in rural areas, compared to I doctor per 1000 people in-urban areas serving mainly white people). An Cpra- tion Binger study M'ugust 1987) provides evidence that the rate of malnutrition in some South African rural areas exceeds that of Botswana, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

Suictions oriticl *i eda "concern' for suffering blacks. only when the campaigns for divestment and sanctions over the years began to gain rinentun and threaten U.S. profit-making in South Africa did the suffering of black South Africans become an issue for opponents of sanctions. Since sanctions have become a reality, U.S. corporations, certain members of ConqLess and the feagan Administration have further escalated their rhetoric proclaiming concern for "the victims of apartheid," declaring that "sanctions will only hurt those we seek to help." Little was heard from these detractors about the enormous suffering caused by apartheid to its victims long before sz.nctione ard divestment emerged at the center of the debate about U.S. policy toward southern Africa. Archbishop Tutu and others have derided the sudden sy pathy of these critics of sanctions. The welfare of black South Africans has been na. a principal argument against sanctions whereas similar reservations about the effect of sanctions on Poles, Cubans, Libyans, or Nicaraguans have not even been mentioned. Blake call for oe anctions 107

MTam= hy Dlm Smith, Washington Office on Afir Ia Labor unions, churches (see appendix 'A') and politicui groups in South Africa have appealed to the U.S. and other nations to impose stiffer and comprehensive sanctions against their government. They recognize that a total trade ban and disinveetnent wouol result in some increased unevplonent. But they recognize, also, that apartheid is the principle cause of unemployment and the misery they suffer from daily. Just as the Union of Hineworkers accepted the loss of income and jobs and the threat of violence, when over 350,.300 miners struck for higher wages, black South Africans and Namibians have decided that they are prepared to aorep. a short-term increase in suffering in order to bring an end to the perpetual oppression of apartheid slavery. The widespread [

I ai hv fli. hfih. WaOir~g t~Etfrm (. JAhiza

Intesnatioml trade fInoning i white South African buinesees. O course,

there will be 5oEm unnpl~woyInt relaousdLons for the blink labor fo-oe it oaprehenaive smntions are Imposed on South Africa. n pitet of this, the majorityy of black Ikuth AfMcanst soustmied to suffering under Waath id, hove, stated nd re-ate.d their support for comprehensive moonml .mrctim , The present regier has der6ietpLeted over Wndover N.itn its 1ntienasmlgtxne and its unwillingness to willingly move toward@ a real solution, Ti is why our recent Congtesl resolved to support the call to: 'effective pressure which will assist In btining about a non-violent, truly deniora- tio and non-reolal South AftLo' Wehave declared support for cairehen- sive randatoty Pconmrin samtion as one of the few options left to thos fighting to end apartheid. (CCUAIU, Uapturobr 24, 1987) CBATUham been Joined in the call ftw stronger sanctions %ainat Pretoria by NACM# the sow largest federation of trade unions, the National UJon of ineworkere, the South African Council of Churche, the threei illi vi Ltvber United Damorati Front, the African National Congress and other ogamnimatitrm, The Preedente report ignores their appeals.

The President limnta the witirmeswl of milowi bumiisese 1gm Mouth Africa byt sqinge *...tta mt painful impmt of this treid toward dieinvestint has been the dLseaprp e of oasny-frded olel, he.aL-ln sduaoi.onal, ard jab training program designed to Lqnove living stwlagda and arem q~ tu- nitle for BLek South Afriomomn aloe again, the Preident ii'eee the I int. lb@ key point I@ that auh corporate sponsored sooll ond Woootional program do not aodd(rs th@ sttuc- 109

.utwnyMiDm=-ikltI, WdaniftitAn CULsA- iiiiga tanal natuti amd injustices of the qaiuhed syctoc. C'OLW hm ast it clea1 tht, ths arisi in out flountry to BuvotM ed e mot be RolVid thtowh superfllal reform. Only a d@oautic state ced ijtplont a Pztojr that Wild adres. th@ gross ineqduaIo ad rtotf utute out aety to coat th@ ioM1@ of tIe Majority of Uur poWle.' T'he reality Lis that U.N. vopotationo In SOuth Aft fra tuat tr-ott uii apartheid lawo and thoemfo witlim the Itrewok of to ta@lat 4athoId syoi, kwh plertjd do not, And@Amot# fuid taY Altm te syoto whiiel oppwmse the blick tiejotity. In fact, accor to §hek~kuhlo Slhtya. Puth African Uroariso~ Prnj@ots Officer, "CANIcOqporai 0ocial rosponibility ptjrmur) i Ijtortontsd in ch a way m o pmsevo ad kpcausto tLh sMtAW ox by, tf instoocod L§upotlnt yteially weeutatd @ehools, telhmikuin id unIvesities aid dmveopIng tmacily seNroqAtid t@oitlontial a (e.WNWM NUL, WOWt , 10107) t Prident pr i es the contribution of 9,9, cporatiofls to the wlfari I blacks Wi ats that, duringg the poat decide, gags craite havs Ruti meaty 0200 [illion OnR du aWt, tliningt aid ctwility iqftroVrlotJ Pdojeto. N ' s h is unrlistic to suppose that a 70 c lntpo jetOfl per yea contribution by buuinoase baa dono aythiN to M1@isstt the auftarira cetai by apartheidi 1ThaPresdet'arport never iintions that. 1e@s then 10% of black South Africans hdve been affected by AWfof the very lihitud U.9, coporate social ptogrt, JAiording to Denil W. Purnfll, secutive Uiteot Of SignatOly CORWNe Staltent Of Pfiffliplee, '§ullivan pItAUrId dflact M. Million blaclks at Mnriucstid §U@69,1 Hiefientioad thatk hig ontUoto iN'OdM 'adoptive schools Aaid osth clinics which (gullivan mUanies §uw~mt but do not wholly pay fot.' Oily those working for U14% cotroatioN or Votential 110

TstlM by DaMu Smith. Washington Office on Africa employeee have very limited access to any jdb training and on-the-job social benefits. Since U.S. corporations employ less than It of the Black workforce, very few will be assisted by improved working conditions or employment c(portu- hities. Corpocations benefit atbid.

While the President Pakes much in his report of the contribution of U.S. corporations to the social welfare of blacks in South Africa, he says nothing about the apartheid wages paid by those corporations to their bleck workers. hxcording to the Investor Research Responsibility Center (IRYC), over the last three years some U.S. businesses have been inching their minimum wages up to 50 over the black poverty level. But most copaniee continue to start woters below the poverty level. If U.S. businesses operating in South Africa paid living wages, then employees would have less need for corporate handouts. Corporate taxes contribute to the maintenance of the apartheid system. Moreover, U.S. corporations provide vital economic and technological support to the apartheid economy. IBM may have ad social welfare programs in South Africa. But, IM technology and products continue to automate the apartheid system which represses black South Africans. The President's assessment of the "trend toward disinvestment* is unsubstantiated. Since 1980, 113 U.S. corporations have announced plans to "withdraw" frov South Africa. But of that 113, only 7 corporations (including Ashland Oil, Bell and Howell, Boeing, Eastemn Kodak and Elolair) have actually disinvested from South Africa. Disinvestment is when a corporation removes ALL of its money, equipment, technology, products and services from the apartheid economy. Many of the corporations claiming to have "disinvested' maintain service contracts, warehouses leasing arrangements, technology exchanges, licensing agreements, 111

u int!U= by fnw amith. Waah JtyW ia nn i~ a end receive a peaontoge of the Sales of their products in South Africa. For exiaple, although Cooa-Cola enounoe that it was withdrawing, the ouipan mintains a licensing agromnt and tll profits fcam the sles of its products in South Africa. Consequ.ntly, the soft drink giant stJll supports apartheid. The President argues that U.S. corporations Its a ptogresive fore" for change in South Africa nd glorifies the benevolnot of their meageroer prmte social programs. In fact, U.S. corporate support fo& apstthed rpiolesion conti.ues, and ultimately U.S. businesses In South MLie do more to butts apartheid than to help Its victira.

(rn at the mt Incredible tal ,tas bytthe Pmident In the report is that Otbe in isect of disinvesmt i h beau to dame faL lbow Etiardt peogirm In South Africa. Weask, what Is the Preident referring to? Does he refer to the inhuman ni oroiped single sex hostels, lack of death andaccident benefits aid @love we@ which black mineworkera raised s issues in their most recent strike, brutally repressed by the mining congl rates? No fae laor standards exist for block worker* In South Africa ad Namibia.

MICTZ D U.5 ZWWL U C U M MR= Ith President reports that surwtiou have rewlt in %a wked reduction in c blity to persuade the IMuth Afrlomt goierlnwt to wit respnibly anm rights Lasmes.* The Preeldent expect. peqle to believe that before ,ontina, the Miftnis- tration had persuaded the apartheid regi e to ek' teponibly on any hunan 112

itmiiv by Dii Smith. t/Mhin@ tion Cf ice on Mr ia rights issues. Nothing could be further from the truth. Under the Rean dainstration and previous U.S. ministrations no such perssion ever existed. Before last October's sations, the utterly failed policy of constructive bngaegement persuaded' the Botha regime in 1964 to adopt a deceptive new constitutional arrangement ard tri-cameral parliament which sought to etitrench apartheid by coopting Indians aind so-called "coloreds", totally excluding tAe black majority, and perpetuating white power. It was this crucial move by the apartheid regime which convinced blacks of the futility of pressing for reform and precipitated an unprecedented wave of anti-apartheid struggle which, in turn, sparked intensified anti-apartheid protests in the U.S. and throughout the world from 1984 to 1986. The South African government responded with the

roet brutal repression, resulting In the deaths and detentions of thousands and the Lmposition of two states of emergency. In fact, it was the failure of the Reagan Administration's constructive engagement policy to "persuade" South Africa to do anything to stop its internal and external policies in southern Africa, which forced the American people and the Congress to finally repudiate the Msanistration' policy toward South Africa.

SADIM MVEM DVWH U.S. QkXW The President states that "Bouth African mhite leaeerhip ba reacted defiutly towards these neres amd conclude that the impact of sanctions "on the goveret itself and its political choice. (ha] not advmred our goals., Naturally, the apartheid government, receiving an unexpected rebuke from the United States after years of support from the Reagan Administration's constructive engagement policy, reacted defiantly towards sanctions. No governments 113

TMUTMMU by DaMi Sith. Washington Office on Afica would ever openly edmit that it was capitulating to the pressure of sanctions. Despite their outward defiance, white South Africans have been respon- slve to pressure, and are anxious to prevent the application of stronger Measures by the United States. The South African government has been c(xidectJng an extensive campaign against sanctions, except in the case of its own sanctions against neighboring states. Both argues that sanctions will not work and that they will only hurt blacks. Ibis concern for the welfare of blacks does not seam to restrain Pretoria's policies which lead to the detentions, shootings, forced removals and impoverishment of black South Africans. According to Sheena Duncan, former President of the Black Sash and currently the acting Associate General Secretary of the South African Council of Churches, the white business commnity in South Africa is very responsive to international eooncaic and political pressure. Since the imxposition of sanotioims, a number of business leaders and Afrikanrs have met with the outlawed African National Congress, and spoken more forcefully against the state of emergency and other harsh measures by the goverrmant. A small but growing namber of Afrikaners in South Africa, Including some prominent politicians and intellectuals have become increasingly critical of the Nationalist Party's policies and have publicly sought to distance themselves from som of Botba's actions. ven the Presi- dent's Report concedes that, in response to sanctions, 'the single ray of hope ... was the appearance of ferment within the Afrikaner comuity where there Is increasing public discussion of power sharing." Although the denial of national political rights to blacks has been a fundamental creed of the National Party, the combined external and internal pressure has forced the white minority regime to attempt to show that it is moving toward appeasing black political aspirations. The Botha government has 114

Tummm by Dinmi BmIth. W-hic"n OMne an Afrina o~intd several reform comssions and take other ateps aimed at showing anti-manotioi forces in the U.S. and throughout the world "evidenace that reforms) is on the horizon in South Africa - which is not the issue. Many of the so-called reforms resurely "window dressing' for the same brutal apartheid policies. For example, the South African President's Council comission recorsmading reform guarantees "that moet of South Africa will remain racially segregated" (Wlah.L1tonPoat, October 6, 1987) , The commission's proposals are rightly conduin as being Oneo-apartheido by anti-apartheid leaders in South Africa. But much of this charade would never have been launched if the threat of U.I.-od global sanctions did not loom close to beaming reality. Raim warps Prenident'a analy is The President misrepresents the results of the 1987 whites-only elections as a nationalistic backlash to foreign interference,' which has "put a brake on any inclination toward fundamental reform...0 In the May 1987 whites-only elections the National Party won an overwhelming majority of the seats in Parliament. Altbougb other duastIc Latis ard the io of seirity ware featured in the Scuth African election, tbere wa virtually no diemsicon of U.S. wanotions. President Botha waged a campaign calling for a mandate for his definition of reformm. He did this while brutally repressing anti-apartheid opponents and militarily attacking South Africa's black-ruled neighbors. Under these circumstances, the generally conservative white electorate gave him the mandate he wanted.

There are two fundamental errors in the President's assessment of the South African political situation. He believes that change in South Africa will cone through reform in the apartheid system. This contradicts the view of the majority, bl&2k South Africans, that apartheid can not be reformed but must 115

i'wy byvlw r~n it~. Waainton Of in n Afrlna

.i removed. The President's report is built on the racist precorrqtion that a future of racial justice and representatives government in South Africa depends upon whites.

ft Pmeside1 argues that weconmdo growth ai te pamees of the South Africa sooco have beun a the mjor Fmre e-lagoin aWtbeJd. May also ofer the best ot bringing daout Its and. Mny opponents of actions like Helen Suan (of the Progressive Federal Party in South Africa), Jerry Falvell and conservative meibers of Congress have also advanced this argument and have called for increased investment in South Africa and no more sanctions. Like the Pcesident they believe that econcaic growth of the apartheid econceW leads to iwreesed economic power for blacks, stronger unions, improved education, and le-tter social conditions. Hoxmic development and growth, they hold, will aid blacks in the long torn by eventually ending aiartheld. The two major periods of econowdo growth in South Africa were the early 1960's and 1976-78 iwen international gold prices skyrocketed. Yet those periods are renowned for the Sharpville and Soato msacres. Rereeion in South Africa has consistently increased. At the same time, the widespread poverty, malnutrition, chronic health problem, massive uneploynt, forced removals and other miseries of life, which have characterized black suffering in South Africa, continued unabated. The President's Report gives no evidence to support the contention that economic growth leeds to greater political power for blacks. Furthermore, continued or increased investment in South Africa will primarily benefit whites and increase their stake in the exploitative, repressive apar- 116

theid system, They would be less likely to relinquish their monopoly of political power when they as dealing irom a position of econmic stngth Zncreased investmfent in southern plantations wnd rising profit from the eloitation of slave would not hae led to freedom or political enfanchiemnt for slave in the antellum USlE South,

WU MA Ofl

The President's Report never mntiona Naibia, where one ad a halt million blacks suffer under rwist apartelld colonial rule. Thi is a particular filing f the report, because the sanctions aplied to South Africa by the Anti-Autheld Act of IO ue aloaplied against Namibia. Official U.N. policy procilae support for UN resolution 435, the internationally accepted plan for Nibiani lrdependence. Yet despite this, the President offers no information or analysis on the effects of the continued, illegal South African coctation of Nmibia. Nor does he provide my sesesmnt of the impact of notions on the lives of black Namibiaer. Zn 1967, the U.S. vetoed a UiLted Nations security Council resolution calling for the Impoliion of mandatory global oophbnsive economic sanctions against South Africa, which hid been proposed In iepone to South Afri's opposition to Hamibilan independence. The Reagan Aulinlstration's inalitence on the witidrwal of Cuban troops Lice Angols " a preoondtion for Naibian indepen- denm prolongs South African domination and exploitation of Namibis and the suffering of the Nwtbian people. A free Namibia would be a significant "sanction" against South Africa. Bskonoically, Namibia's rich natural resources provide substantial income for the engines of apartheid. Militarily, Namibia is pivotal for South Africa's war 117

T by Da i Washington Offiea-Afri against Angola and other neighboring states. South Africa provides bases ud training for UNIA forces in northern Namibia. The termination of South African control of Namibla would bring the cost of the war of destabilization uloeer to home for whites.

IIILTMMI Anm an~isu3M Fm X3cnno nwicHAz. oEMsnamnoN Te President states that there has bew an increase in regional tensions* In ltIern Africa. Hs says, further, that South African security forces have rsisd abia, Botswmaa, Moambqpe, auasiland a Zimbabwe. as argues that "sMaUcx [by the U.S.) wre followed by an increase in sch Ill-c sidere actions., The President erroneously implies that if there had been no sanctions there would have been no increase in South Africa's deetabilization of its neighbors. South Africa's economic, political and military destabilization is part of its Total strategy" to protect and perpetuate aparthel domination at bone and in the region, much like Nazi Germany did to extend Nazism to the rest of Dirope. ih 1-policyof total strategy w not a5cptd cc ilemeted because of sanctions. Petocia has escalated its attacs against its rsigbircs since the mid 1970a d early 19W9 when white rule began to collass in these cumtris. South Africa formulated "total strategy" as an official doctrine aimed at stopping an alleged "communist onslaught'. Pretoria has always sought to protect the privileged white way of life which has also been built on the exploitation of labor and natural resources of the southern Africa region. It is interesting to note that this section of the report never motions Angola, where the Reagan Administration has allied itself with South Africa by its covert military aid to the Pretoria-backed UNITA rebels, led by Jonas 118

Thstiuu by fu .Smith.WMhin Of ins on Afria Savlzbi. The U.S. has provided more than $30 million since 1986 to Saviabi's rebels who help South Africa destabilize the Angola government and ecmW'. The war in Angola escalates daily. AlthoNh the President criticize. South African 'covert operational against neighboring states, the CIA channels covert U.S. military aid to Savinbi. Moreover, continued Reagan Administration support for South Africa has actually encouraged Pretoria to maintain its support for the Renamo rebels in Mombiqe, despite official U.S. support for the FRlUIND government. Angola d Moabique are South Africa's principal targets for regional destabiliza- tin . And South Africa believes that it can continue to attack these and other

countries in southern Africa and never fear a strong U.S. o: Wasten response. Thus, the very South African destabilization policy which the Administration claims it condemns, is actually aied and ernouraged by U.S. policy.

mom (r DOIm IU I 1 i8 ALL 2W Is PUINZ The report clearly indicates that the President is committed to doing nothing in South Africa. Constructive engage ma t has failed, yet the President proposes rwch the sam by urging nothing more than an undefined period of active and creative diplomacy'. Although the President says that the U.S. should *do al that Is possible to bring the peoples of South Africa together for meaningful negotiations leading to the building of a democratic society," his report proposes P tangiolq steps towards that goal. He continues his opposition to sanctions by violating the law which mandates that the President recommend additional measures if South Africa has not nde significant progress toward ending apartheid. Once again the American people and the Congress are forced to define U.S. 119

timMW bv DrMiMith. Washington OfM10e on Arica policy in southern Africa. Stronyer sanctions against South Africa must be mandated by Congress and fought for by the people of this coUntry and the world. Several sanctions measures are pending. These include loophole closing ea&ires, such as the elimination of tax credits to U.S. cczpsnies operating in South Africa, the prohibition of bidding on U.S. oil leases by oil companies operating in South Africa, a ban on the importation of South African and Nmibian diamords, and a limitation of South African investments in the United States. Ultimately, the necessary response to the deteriorating conditions and increasing repression in South Africa is comprehensive econoedc sanctions. Rereentative Ronald V. Dellumw (D-CA) has introduced H.R. 1580 which mandates a total trade embargc and disinvestment from South Africa. In addition to imposing its own measures, the U.S. muet take the lead in the international imposition of comprehensive sanctions. The Washi .tg.1ost (October 13, 1987) reported Archbishop Desmord 71utu's response to the President's Report. According to the gt, 11utu was, "sharply critical of President Reagan and British Prima Minister Margaret Thatcher for not applying harsh enough sanctions against South Africa.0 He as quoted as saying, Ii it were blacks who were oppressing whites, you would have the marines here. Tltu's critical remarks are a stark reminder of the Intense feelings among a broad spectrum of South African blacks who continue to view U.S. policy as being supportive of white minotity rule in southern Africa.

Comprehensive sanctions alone, inposed by -he U.S. and other Western porers,

are not the only means o~osupporting the struggle in South Africa, nor will comprehensive sanctions be a quick fix solution to the crisis in the region. However, strong sanctions are a critical part of the long term process of 120

ThStUM_ by Daru Smith. Washinton Off ice on Africa

removing the existing layers of strategic economic an political m ort Wic the Intexnational oomunity counties to provide foe the WArthesd regime. In addition to isposing stiffer sanctions against South Africa, Congres mat also beigbtem the impact of antics on South Africa by increasing U.S. aid to the nations of southern Africa, a vocating immediate U.S. port for kmibian lndependeam without precciditicno, and terminating U.S. military mpport for South Africa's war against Angola. Mhese and other measures would support the liberation struggle of the black majority, raise the cost of apartheid to white South Africans and increase the likelihood that a combination of internal snd external pressures will bring an end to apartheid. 121

TeatiM by DsM Smith. Washington Office on Africa appendix A. SOM Wmn C ANDuSwt CrL u OrwM s SMMicri Frank Chikane, General Secretary, South African Council of Clurches (excerpts from a telex to the National Council of Churches of Christ, Oct. 9, 1987) For us, sanctions must be understood comprehensively to include oil non-military action by the world comunity of states that is intended to contribute to the immediate ending of apartheid. Sanctions will Include economic, military, diplomatic, cultural and any other action that seeks to exclude South Africa from the community of nations and is designed to increase the cost of maintaining apartheid especially to those who benefit most from it. The general view of the unions is that while sanctions ay be painful to the people initially, the choice is to suffer pain forever or to suffer increased pain over a shorter period in order to extirpate the root causes of the suffering of the people. The Second National Congress of COESAU called for coprehen- sive End mandatory sancticns, monitored by the United Nations Security Council. COSA pointed out that selective sanctions, as applied hitherto, are actually dangerous and counter-productive because they create serious regional unemployment, further monopolization of the South African economy and generally serve the interests of the trans-national corporations and state. CCTAUI has called on the world community to accept the fact that the ending of apartheid means a change of government, for if they come to accept that reality they may be able to prescribe the correct combination of sanctions. The South African churches have recognized the fact that the authentic voice of the oppressed people as expressed through their unions and political organizations has been a call for sanctions with a sting against the South African Government. In response to the problem that may be created by sanctions, the Methodist Church of South Africa has pointed out that the responsibility for any hardship that may arise lies with the South African Goverrvent and not with the people who are struggling to free themselves from the snare of apartheid. The Catholic Church in southern Africa has pointed out, in an explanatory paper, that the issue of who controls investments is indissolubly bound up with the question as to who controls society as a whole. Thus they argue, the question is not simply one of job lose with disinvestment or job creation with investment. Those who are concerned with job creation must also be concerned w.th the creation of a new economic structure in South Africa. In conclusion, we wish to point out that the issue of sanctions against the apartheid regime mst be seen in the context of the total struggle against apartheid. It will not be sanctions alone that will bring about an end to apartheid but the determined struggle of the people of South Africa. Their call to the international community is that if they cannot see their way clear to support their just struggle the least they can do is to stop supporting and propping up the apartheid regime. Sanctions are one way in which the international community can embark on a programme of "constructive disengagement' from the apartheid system and thereby leaving it open for the people to smash it, and extirpate it from the face of the earth. The South African Cou.il of Churches joins the majority of the people of South Africa in calling for immediate comprehensive and mandatory sanctions that are aimed at sapping the energy of the apartheid state. We believe that the imposition of such sanctions is the only way to effect change in South Africa with minimum violence. 122 Mr. WOLPE. Our last witness today will be Mr. Nicholas Haysom of the Center for Applied Legal Studies at the University of Wits- watersrand in Johannesburg. We are very pleased to welcome you to the United States and to this hearing this afternoon. Mr. Haysom. STATEMENT OF NICHOLAS HAYSOM, CENTFR FOR APPLIED LEGAL STUDIES, UNIVERSITY OF WITSWATI RSRAND, JOHAN- NESBURG, SOUTH AFRICA Mr. HAYSOM. Mr. Chairman, I should mention that I speak on behalf of no organization. I am both an academic and a civil rights lawyer and I speak in my personal capacity. I think the debate over appropriate foreign policy options into which we are all impelled has frequently been framed as choosing the most appropriate technique to avoid a violent confrontation in South Africa. It is my submission that South Africa is currently characterized by high levels of violence, techniques of policing and repression that resemble the techniques of warfare. And the question we really have to ask ourselves is for how long? Before giving examples which would illustrate the point I am making, I would like to draw attention to the state of emergency, more specifically because I believe that the state of emergency itself encourages the techniques of warfare. When the state of emergency was declared, many civil rights lawyers asked themselves why was it necessary to declare a state of emergency. Under South Africa's normal legal regime, the executive possesses powers which would be characterized as emergency powers in any other country. I think an examination of the state of emergency, though, reveals that there were two aspects to it. The first was that it sought to exclude legal supervision over the police and the security forces. It did so by providing an indemnity clause, or by providing an ouster clause-that is a clause which sought to limit the capacity of the courts to interfere with the security forces, to set aside their actions, or to set aside the proclama- tions in terms of their powers. The emergency sought to prevent access to detainees by lawyers, thus putting the jailors of detainees in a position in which the detainees would not be inspected by outside agencies. And the state of emergency framed powers in a way in which the courts could not intervene. Secondly, the state of emergency removed a more global eye, to remove the press from photographing the security forces in the course of their duties during the state of emergency. When you have the combination of extremely wide martial law powers in the hands of the security forces and an inability and a legal regime that says that when they overstep that mark there shall be no remedy and limited redress. And one really has a prescription for order without law; a prescription which would allow the security forces to stray into the gray areas between legality and illegality-to embark on a pacification program. 123 We don't know exactly how the security forces have been con- ducting themselves in the townships during the three states of emergency, mostly because there is no way in which the press can monitor, and in which lawyers could more properly bring actions. But the practices whica occurred prior to the state of emergency in the first state of emergency are cause for considerable alarm. I just want to refer to three examples. SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT [SSG] The first was the use of SSG shot on a procession moving from one funeral to another in the Lunga community in 1985. Now, I shall point out that SSG shot is a heavy caliber shot. Each pellet from the cartridge will kill. When it s fired, as it was in Lunga, it will penetrate into that crowd spreading, as I recall, one meter in 30-unable to discriminate between men, women, children or pass- ersby. And in that one fatal savage volley, over 20 people were killed and 48 people were injured. Nineteen of the 20 people killed were shot in the back or the side, and a good proportion of those killed were children. There was some talk of revising crowd control technology but the police are still equipped with R-4 combat rifles. In an inquiry into the use of R-4 combat rifles to disperse a gathering in the Winter- veldt squatter community outside Pretoria, evidence was led that the R-4 is a weapon of war. It fires a high velocity unstable bullet. If it strikes an adult anywhere in the body-above the wrist, above the ankle-it will probably kill him because it shatters the bones and arches it does not touch. And that gun is used on children. But perhaps the most not-i -nd gross example of the use of the employment of the maximum force policy is the Trojan horse example-in 1985 as I recall the date. On that day police disguised themselves in boxes on the back of a truck and in a macabre game of hide and seek in which the rules are changed so that adults have real guns and live ammunition, they drove through an area in which they knew children were stoning vehicles passing-and they jumped out and shot at the children, killing three, including a pass- erby. Now, it is clear to me that those techniques are the techniques of a country at war-a country at war with its own population. The police have been asked to comment on the use of these weapons and recently have commented that they regard what they call European crowd control techniques as ineffective in South Africa because of the climate, and other factors. Mr. Chairman, I also want to refer to another phenomenon which has emerged in South Africa apart from the direct policing practices of the security forces, but for me one that is intimately connected with the repression under which South Africans now exist. And that concerns the so-called vigilante phenomenon. Vigilantes in South Africa are black groups internal to the townships which seek out largely anti-apartheid activists, or community leaders, or trade unionists, and harass and kill them. The number of people killed by these groups has risen dramatically recently. In a study done of vigilantes-a study I should mention was done by myself-of 13 such communities in which the vigilante phe- 124 nomenon had emerged, a pattern was revealed in which it could be, I think, safely stated-and I have stated it in South Africa-that there was a tacit police support for the vigilante phenomenon. Now, that is all that is required to give one group a license to do what it likes. In some areas I should mention that there was more than a reluctance to prosecute vigilantes, thaf there was evidence of more direct participation by the authorities in the initiation of such groups. Those groups have been very effective, not only in terroriz- ing communities but in disorganizing them, because they are able to target anti-apartheid activists in a way in which the security forces were simply unable to do. Mr. Chairman, I would just simply like to conclude by stating that more recently an even more disturbing phenomenon has begun to raise its head in South Africa, and that is a pattern of assassinations-the most recent being two months ago-I can think of, offhand, of 11 persons in the last two or three years have been assassinated, in not one case has a suspect been identified and prosecuted. And that should be seen in marked contrast to the vigorous policing undertaken by the security forces to prosecute what they consider as agitators or persons who are a threat to state security. Finally, Mr. Chairman, I am not suggesting that the problom in South Africa is one of inhuman or rogue policemen. I am suggesting a more systematic manifestation of a country at war with itself. For there to be peace in South Africa, the police would have to be accountable to those that they police, and the government would have to be accountable to those that it governs. Mr. WOLPE. Mr. Haysom, I thank you very much for your testimony. We have a little time-and we want to conclude the hearing by 1:30, so I will use a five-minute rule now since we have a little bit more leeway here, and apply it to myself, of course, as well as to my colleagues. Let me begin with just one comment pertaining to the testimony today from South African witnesses. I think it is very helpful, especially for an American audience, particularly in the last several months with the South African censorship, with the inability of television to film the events that were transpiring and continue to transpire in South Africa, there has been lessened visibility of the issue of South Africa in the American political scene. I was privileged in the last few weeks to view two new movies- three, actually-that have just been developed. One, "Cry Free- dom," which is being released this week in theaters across the country which portrays the lives of Stephen Biko and Donald Woods-extraordinary film. I hope that every American will take advantage of the opportunity to view a true story, and one that I think puts a very human face on the statistics that we use to char- acterize the levels of repression and inhumanity that take place on a daily basis in South Africa, and also the enormous courage of people who are struggling against that system within South Africa. The other film, 'Mandela," also has extraordinary emotional impact. It is now showing on Home Box Office on a regular cycle. 125 The third was a documentary-its premiere took place this week. This is a documentary of the life of Dr. Beyers Naude, the Afrika- ner who has played such an important role in the anti-apartheid movement and went through quite a metamorphorsis himself over the years. I hope that these films provide an opportunity for Americans to experience in a much more direct, concrete, real fashion, the reality of South Africa. I think your testimony, coming on a firsthand basis, and reacting to experiences that you are enduring, and also to the debate that is taking place at the policy level, is enormously helpful to all of us in the Congress and to the American public, and I thank you for that. There have been-one of the central arguments that you have heard in opposition to sanctions legislation is that it has essentially been counterproductive. I am asking this of the South African par- ticipants first to begin with, but I will invite others to respond. The sanctions legislation has been counterproductive, producing defiance by the white government, a whiteward tilt in the May 1987 elections, and has served only to hurt black South Africans. I would be interested in the reaction of the black trading leaders who are present to that kind of analysis. It strikes me that if there is any group of people, any set of constituencies that ought to be more sensitive and who stand essentially to lose the most by virtue of the application of economic pressure and sanctions it is workers within the unionized, urbanized trade union labor force. I would be interested in your reaction to that kind of analysis. Mr. Motlatsi. Mr. MOTLATSI. I think this argument has been used for a long time in particular in the United States that the blacks will suffer the most. We are suffering at the present moment under this regime system. For example, we were engaged in a strike recently. We followed all the legalities in that country. But at the end of the strike, 45,000 were dismissed, 9 lost their lives because of the intervention of the state. And we have a very clear mandate from our members who are saying mandatory comprehensive sanctions must be imposed against South Africa. The argument of saying we will suffer the most won't work-we are suffering now. We are being paid starvation wage. We don't have the right to vote. Why should we be told by an outsider that we will suffer while we are suffering? They must not tell us what we want. We are telling them what we want. What they must do is to do what we ask of them. You cannot tell me how you would like to assist me. I will tell you how should you assist me. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. WOLPE. Thank you. Mr. Mndaweni. Mr. MNDAWENI. If I may just put forward I think what I actually outlined in my own testimony and that is presently there is suffering in the country, and I mentioned the question of unemployment. Basically those figures I gave do not include the homelands situation which is unaccountable in terms of white South Africa.

82-205 0 - 88 -- 5 126 And secondly, on the question that in the homelands you will find that there are, in actual fact, a lot of poverty, starvation, in those areas because the people that have been put. there as puppets by the Pretoria regime to administer that area are a natural fact mismanaging the funds as well as the committee council which impose upon the community in our townships are also misman- aged. There is quite a record to the fact that funds have been mis- used. Now, in the homelands people are dying today, you will find that basically in a very big hospital there are no doctors, and people are dying just like that, unless at the time they are sent either to a big hospital in neighboring areas where people are even dying there. So the situation at the present moment is just outlining the death-it is desperate. You also look at the question to say that we as trade unions what we are facing and, are being told within the factory premises-and now when you go out you will find yourself not able to talk then. That is frustrating, it is irreconciliable. It is unbeliev- able. What is frustrating to us as trade unionists at the present moment is how do you actually account for such a thing. So the black people are suffering presently. You will find that people have been made to pay for houses for a number of years those houses in natural fact small, matchbox houses in very bad shape and they are not being attended to by anybody. You will find that that sitution is just untolerable. The distance that black people have to travel, for instance, expected to get to work and to be productive, for that matter, you will find that is a long distance. So the black people are faced with all the hardship in that country. So there are two things we have to ask yourself: One, how do you end such a system? In terms of ending the system has failed in a number of bad times. So now the last solution we are looking for in terms of achieving our freedom is that sanctions have to be upright as a means of achieving a peaceful means as a last resort-- Alternatively, now we have to look at that means because the South African regime is violent right now and that is the situation which we find ourselves in at the present moment. Mr. WOLPE. It seems that you are saying that the only alternative essentially to a more violent struggle is the application of sanctions? Mr. MNDAWENI. Will you just repeat? Mr. WOLPE. You are saying that essentially you see this as an alternative-the only alternative to a more violent form of struggle. Mr. MNDAWENI. Yes, I believe that this is a last resort of a peaceful means that have to be applied. Mr. WOLPE. Okay, thank you. My time is expired. Mr. Keyes and then Mr. Smith. Mr. KEYEs. I guess I just want to say a couple of things. One, I think that it is very true, that there is a situation of great suffering already existing in South Africa, and that many black South Africans-indeed, if you include the homela IdS, most black 127 South Africans are in a situation of serious oppression and deprivation not only of their rights but of their lives and livelihood in many instances. What bothers me, I suppose, is that in a situation where most people are deprived of any power, we should take a means that will deprive those few who have some access to power of the power that they have. Particularly I am thinking now of people in the labor movement. When I hear someone say, well, everybody in South Africa has starvation, which a lot of people do. But when the management in the mines offered a package of 15 to 23 percent wage increases to the large mass of mine workers, one-third of the miners went out on strike and two-thirds of them did not. Two-thirds of them seem to have made the judgment that they are not on starvation wages and that in fact the package was a package that they were willing to live with, that they were not going to die from. I don't mean that to disparage the move that was made by the National Union of Mine Workers, since I think it demonstrated the significant power potential of blacks in South Africa in the context of a functioning economy. The second point I would like to make is that from my point of view, I suppose, who says something is very important, but what they say is more important. And whether I am an American or somebody else, I have to judge the positions that are taken by anybody on the basis of what logically appears to be their consequences. And what logically appears to be the consequence of making people weaker-of those who have jobs take them away; of those who have the potential for power through labor movements, destroy the context in which that power exists. I don't care who says that is a good idea. If that is what is going to happen, it is just logically inconsistent. You don't make people stronger by making them weaker. You don't make them more powerful by taking away the little power that they do have. I think the real question that faces us, therefore, is how we build on that basis of power to make it larger. One final point on the homelands in general-and I am not dis- agreeing necessarily with the approach that has been taken overall by the international community-but we have to remember that one of the reasons that the situation in the homelands is so much worse than it is elsewhere in Africa is because the policy of isolating the homelands has been followed quite effectively. We did leave the people in the homelands alone with the oppressive apartheid system and, therefore, in contrast to people elsewhere in South Africa who have a little power, the people in the homelands have no power whatsoever. I think that that is a major difference, that the consequences of isolating black people in South Africa with their government can be seen quite clearly in the homelands. We did it there and the consequence has been that they have nothing to struggle with. So I think that between the alternative of leaving people with nothing to struggle with, sure, you can say sanctions. The last alternative before is quite clear: You remove the non-violent instru- 128 ments and destroy their basis and, of course, what you are going to get is violence. I think that that argument, therefore, doesn't hold water. We need to start thinking in positive terms here because if we don't we are not going to achieve positive results. Mr. WOLPE. Mr. Smith. Mr. SMITH. Mr. Chairman, I find it absolutely incredible the kind of statements that have been made on this panel in response to your question. One of the key questions that has to be answered in this debate is what do you do to take away the power that the whites have in South Africa? I haven't heard any of those who are opposing sanctions on this panel talk about that. Whites are the ones who maintain apartheid in South Africa. They have the power. If Mobil Oil, Caltex, the other companies that are in South Africa are supplying that regime with the petro- leum that allows it to do what it does in the townships, in Na- mibia, and against neighboring states-without oil, the military machine of South Africa could not function. I haven't heard Mr. Keyes or the other panelists talk about what do you do to take away that power from whites to continue to do that. Black South Africans are saying, we want you to cut those links to deprive whites of the power to continue to victimize us in our townships. Mr. Chairman, let me say one more very brief thing. I was in southern Africa this summer. I visited a refugee camp in Lusaka, Zambia where there was South African refugees, Namib- ian refugees, refugees from Botswana. This camp was bombed by the South Africans on May 19th, 1986-a refugee camp, no military target. No sanctions caused the South African government to do that. And everybody in that camp that I spoke to, young people, women, old people, said, please, we are thankful to the American people that you did what you did last year but please go back and do more and apply sanctions. Now these are the people-I am standing before them, they are barely clothed, they have nothing, and they are calling fPir sanctions. I think that Mr. Keyes and others who are opposing sanctions need to listen more carefully to what black people are saying in South Africa. Whites are the ones who are saying no sarCtions. Yet, they are the ones who maintain the power in South Africa and who are executing the kinds of injustices against black people that those from South Africa on this panel are describing today. I cannot understand the kinds of statements that have been made today on this panel. Mr. WOLPE. Mr. Motlatsi, one additional comment, then I will yield to Mr. Burton for his question. Mr. MoTLAsI. I would like to comment to what Mr. Keyes said about two-thirds of the miners who agreed to accept the offer. That is not true at all. I would like to remind Mr. Keyes that out of 129 more than 340,000 who went on strike, and more than 80,000 were non-members NUM. I think Mr. Keyes as he is against the sanctions against South Africa and at the same time Mr. Keyes is talking about the black oppression in South Africa, Mr. Keyes seems so sympathetic as he said about the oppression of the black people in South Africa, but indeed, Mr. Keyes is loving-more than he loves the black people in South Africa because he doesn't come forward with the solution how should the United States administration can take that up from the white people who are shooting the people on the streets- but when we are calling for sanctions for which we are taking sanctions as the peaceful solution inside South Africa. Now, Mr. Keyes would like to tell us what kind of solution can he bring into our country. Sir, we are saying to you and your administration: impose sanctions. If not, we will see how we will do. Thank you. Mr. WOLPE. Mr. Burton. Mr. BURTON. This has been an extremely interesting day for me. I have learned a lot. My views have been reinforced, however, and I want to tell you why. I am absolutely convinced that the apartheid system is reprehensible. It should be changed. Making a minister kneel before people because he swam at a white beach is something that should never be tolerated, and the whole world should look upon that with disfavor. The shooting of children indiscriminately because there were people that were rioting and doing things they shouldn't should never be tolerated, and the whole world should look upon that with disfavor. But what Mr. Keyes and others have said today is that by destroying a society, or trying to destroy it, or bringing it down, you are not really going to solve the problem; you are merely going to lead to a civil war where nobody wins and you end up with a bloodbath and it is totally counterproductive. There are people, there are groups, that want to exploit this problem for their own ends. The Soviet Union and her surrogates want control of the southern tier of Africa. That is evident because of the billions of dollars in military assistance they have poured into Angola and Mozambique, and they are trying to get their toe into Zimbabwe with the MIG-29s, and they have been supporting the ANC and the Communist Party of South Africa. So their intent and they are on achieving power in South Africa through surrogates. They have got 45,000 Cubans in Angola. I think their main objective is not so much the quality that the blacks seek in South Africa as it is to get control of a very vital and strategic place in the world. We all want apartheid to end. I know that a lot of people here probably don't believe that but I think apartheid is repugnant. It is ow do you go about achieving that goal. I think imposing sanctions simply won't work. It is like trying to catch water in a sieve. There is always going to be somebody trying to make a buck that will take up the slack. If we pull out there will be somebody from France, Japan, or some other country that 130 is going to come in and buy those plants, or invest in there, tbe- cause they can make money. And you are never going to get everybody-- We have tried sanctions all over the world. We tried it with Muammar Qadhafi. We tried it with Iran-it hasn't worked. It won't work in South Africa. What you will do is you will end up shifting wells someplace else. But it is not going to solve the problem. The way to solve the problem, I think, is what Mr. Keyes has alluded to, and that is through improving the plight of the blacks in South Africa by entreneurship, providing additional inv estment into the black townships so the blacks can build up their economic strength and power, and thereby put pressure on the government internally. The sanctions I don t see as a logical solution to the problem. But I do have an increased awareness and an increased sympa- thy for the blacks in South Africa because of the repression. One thing that was not pointed out by Mr. Haysom was that he talked about the vigilantes and the killings that are going on, and we abhor that. But we also abhor what the ANC has been doing by necklacing people who don't agree with them; by incorporating children into their legions and inciting them to do terrible things, perpetrate atrocities on other people, putting tires around their neck, burning them to death, and kicking them, and beating the dead corpses. We don't support that either. So there is bad on both sides. The objective, however, in my view, is to find a solution and we are not going to be able to impose that from outside. I think that has been made clear. The United States can't impose our will on South Africa, either the blacks or the whites. But what we can do is we could come up with some positive solutions. I think that helping blacks invest in companies through stock ownership; helping black entrepreneurship; putting more industry through investment in black townships and creating more black jobs is going to be a step in the right direction. And toward that end I would like to ask former Secretary Keyes if he has any specifics that he would like to bring to our attention right now. Mr. KEYES. I do, I think, if I could take a minute. But before I start I would like to say one thing. It is probably true that you can't beat guns with butter. This is what you are telling me, I think-can't beat guns with butter. The great difficulty is, however, that if you say how are we going to take the guns out of hands of South Africans-sanctions aren't going to do that. As a matter of fact, the arms embargo has increased the self-sufficiency of the South Africans in terms of arms, in terms of the weapons that are killing people. And the sanctions, while they destroy the modern economic sector, are not going to destroy that arms industry. That is one of the great ironies of this whole situation. So the South African white power structure will still have the guns in its hands-and I think we all know this-but you will no longer have such weapons as you have in terms of your power to 131 mobilize in the context of a functioning economy-you won't have that weapon. So such weapons as they have they will keep. Such weapons as you have will be taken away by sanctions, and I don't see where that gets us. My concern here is that I believe that as long as you have a society in which a majority of the people-black and white-are still depending on a functioning economy still care about it, still get their livelihood from it, then the people who make that economy work, the black people of South Africa, are very powerful in their interests. And that we should be finding ways to increase the dependence of all South Africans on that economy; not decrease it. And by doing so, we will increase the power of black South Afri- cans. And when we increase the power, there are specific ways. I think that first off we look at the corporations that everybody is saying should get out, and we should ask, how can we change the com- plexion of those corporations, quite literally. How do we move blacks into positions of power and decision-making over those resources that the corporations now control; move them into positions where they really make a difference-in a massive way, not in a token way. Now, at the middle management level and upper management level, let them take over the companies. I would throw that challenge down to the companies of all stripes that are doing business in South Africa. Let's see if you are willing to share power today with black South Africans, because you can do it. You don't have to wait on the dialogue or the government-it can be done now. Second, in terms of the labor movement in South Africa, I think that what has happened over the course of the last several years is awesome in my mind. I have the most enormous admiration for the labor leaders in South Africa because I frankly don't know how you did it, over the obstacles that you face, and the dangers that you face every day, I sincerely don't understand how you have managed to put together such a powerful too, but you have done it. You have done it. And I don't think it should be destroyed. I in fact think that'one should be working to broaden the base of that movement until it encompasses every working black person in South Africa. That has to be the goal. And on the day that one does that, you will not just have a little power, you will have enormous power. And anybody who wants the economy of South Africa to work will have to deal with you about how it works and on what basis it works. That is a goal that we can contributed a grat deal to, we Ameri- cans, because we have resources, know-how, expertise, that can support you in those efforts to build a leadership, the infrastruc- ture of communications, the cohesion, and the financial resources that you need to make that powerful tool work. And third of all, I think there are a whole range of organizations in South Africa outside the labor movement that are aimed at mo- bilizing the black people of South Africa in the religious and other context. And I think that we too in the United States have an enormous range of nongovernmental organizations with tremendous resources at their disposal--human and financial. 132 And what I am asking is: How were we building the bridges and funnels that can take the resources we have and use them to sup- o rt the resources of mobilization that blacks in South Africa ve? So we have three major areas that can be addressed; not the do- nothing policies of the administration and not the do-the-wrong thing policies of the sanctions people; but doing the right thing to build democracy. That is what I am talking about. I think that if we were serious about it, we could not wait for 5 years or 10 years. We can start to make change happen now by changing the balance of power in South Africa now, and that is what I think needs to be done. Mr. BURTON. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. WOLPE. Mr. Clarke. Mr. CLARKE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My question is really what positive steps we can take in this situation. We have heard all the complaints about sanctions. I think Mr. Keyes has made really the one suggestion that we bring blacks into management positions. And, of course, all of us who have been in industry know that is easier said than done, and you can't do it overnight. It certainly is a good idea to broaden the base of the labor movement. But where do we get participation in government? Where do we get black voting power? What are the concrete steps we can take? I would like to ask anybody for help on that one. Mr. SINCERE. That was a very good question. Sanctions are foreign policy on the cheap-they are a tremen- dously uncreative way for dealing with complex issues. There are creative things we can do, and in fact which have been done and We must continue to do them. Mr. Keyes mentioned bringing blacks into management positions. That is a step to take. But U.S. firms in South Africa, especially those that have adhered to the Sullivan principles, have already started at what is frankly a minimal level, the investment in improving social conditions: housing developments. In fact, building black housing developments and helping blacks to obtain homes in contravention of the Discriminatory Group Areas Act; building schools; buying textbooks; paying for teachers; trying to provide a base of education for those people in South Africa who have suf- fered under discrimination and who are disadvantaged. Besides business there is a tremendous room for the American labor movement to contribute in helping to build the South African labor movement and help them to achieve power, to empower those who are presently weak. There is room for the American churches and social agencies to contribute to legal aid funds, to social services, even to things like soup kitchens, the same things that churches do here. They can take advantage of very strong and very historical ecumenical ties and missionary networks throughout southern Africa. Mr. WOLPE. If I may interrupt-I don't hear anything about political power and I think that was the thrust of Mr. Clarke's question. 133

Mr. SINCERE. Political power does not just come out of nothing. Political power must exist because other power has preceded it. Mr. WOLPE. Are you suggesting-- Mr. SINCERE. The United States cannot impose on South Africa a decision to invite blacks into government. We can ask for that but we cannot impose it. The South African government has in fact started to establish structures. In fact, just two days ago in KwaZulu and Natal a joint black-white executive took power. Mr. WOLPE. Mr. Clarke, this is your time, but would you yield for me just to continue this just for a moment? Mr. CLARKE. Yes, sir. Mr. WOLPE. I find it absolutely extraordinary-and I tried to contain myself up until this moment because I frankly think the lack of response to the questions that have been posed are so self-evident it may not require rebuttal. I guess I am so frustrated, in an emotional way, at this point. The reason very simply is, in response to the question what should be done? Both you and Mr. Keyes point to things that can be done to elevate the economic position of blacks in one fashion or another. Reference has been made to-not only in corporations, but the mobilization of a church community, the organization of labor trade unions, as if to suggest that the fundamental problem in South Africa is incapacity of blacks to organize themselves; when I think most observers would suggest that the problem in South Africa is not the blacks, but the whites who have a monopoly of power. This is a regime that maintains itself in power entirely by utilization of force. I find it intriguing that every response to a question of what should be done talks about the situation as if it were the blacks' problem rather than the whites' problem. I don't quite understand why the shift in focus. Mr. HAYSOM. Mr. Chairman, could I just reply? Mr. WOLPE. Yes. Mr. HAYSOM. In general terms, it seems to me that the non-negotiable-the bottom line for a peaceful and secure South Africa in which my children could grow up would be one in which the political aspirations of blacks are met. In my view, that would mean at a minimum universal adult suffrage in South Africa. Now, to get to that position, it seems to me, the cost of apartheid has to outweigh the benefits of privilege-and I don't think they do at this stage. Mr. KEYES. Could I, since I have been asked to address that question. I think my position at least is being mischaracterized here, because I am not talking about economic improvements for blacks, although I think that is a good thing. I am talking about power, and politics is power. And democracy is what it literally means-demos is people and cratos is strength or power-the power of the people. So when you talk about building a democracy, you are asking yourself how you build power. Now I know there are a lot of people in the United States of the liberal and other persuasions, who be-

82-205 0 - 88 -- 6 134 lieve that the only power that exists in a democracy is government power. I look around this country and I know that in spite of-you are exalted gentlemen but you don't run the country; the people run the country. This country is a democracy because of all the things that people in it can do for themselves: in the economics sphere and in the nongovernmental sphere. And through those organizations they shape what you do. They make you what you are. And that is what democracy is about. And you can have universal suffrage and legislation-- Mr. WOLPE. Mr. Keyes-- Mr. KEYES [continuing]. Just let me finish. You asked a question, let me answer it. And if you don't have these direct power structures in which the people control and participate, you don't have democracy. When I talk about the building up of the labor movement, it is not an economic improvement-that is power. As I say, on the day when you have leaders in South Africa who can look their white counterparts in the eye and say, either you sit down and talk to us about X, Y and Z, or this economy doesn't move. That's not economic improvement. That is power. And on the day when you have people in massive numbers working in key areas of the South African economy, which can happen tomorrow or the next day in American businesses, so that whites have to sit down-and when they are talking about how resources are to be used in the private sector, they have to work with black people who are in key positions and management positions about how those resources are to be used and distributed. That is power. A lot of people talk about power in terms of its forms, not its substance. A lot of people in Africa did that. They talked about power in terms of its form. They didn't pay attention to the substance and they are just as dependent today as they were before independence. It is time we changed that approach. It is time we started to concentrate on the real sources of power and not do things that will achieve power in form and destroy it in substance. So when you talk about politics, sir, if you don't mind my saying so, I believe that you are talking about power. And that what I am addressing is the agenda of power for the black majority in South Africa. And that is the only way they are going to achieve it, by building it up, and by using the strategic position they have in the South African economy to translate their role into the most enormous instrument they can find. That is not-that is not a peripher- al issue. That is the central issue. And you want to talk about making whites feel the pain-it shouldn't come from outside. They should be forced to deal with black folks in South Africa in order to get rid of that pain. And there is only way to do that-not to legislate it in Washington but to put it in the hands of black people in South Africa. And how do you do that? Through precisely the means that I am talking about. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. WOLPE. Mr. Mndaweni would like to comment. Mr. MNDAWENI. I just want to have an immediate response to that in terms of the means. The American companies have been for 135 a long time in South Africa and that has not happened. So what he is actually saying, doesn't actually address the real issues. When you look at the question of housing, for instance, housing-the cost of housing is out of proportion. The wages that black people are getting at the moment, paid by the American companies, cannot make us afford those houses. And secondly, the question of school-to say building schools and to teach the very same gutter education does not help us because that education is an inferior education which does not take us anywhere. In actual fact, the argument advanced here is saying that accept reforms which have been rejectable to us. We are looking for an alternative change. And I think the alternative change if they were to move to the right direction would be, one, the question of releas- ing all the political detainees; second, the release of political prisoners and allow political activity in the country. And probably following that direction the government would eventually seen to be moving in the right direction. Presently they are talking about groups, and groups is trying to entrench the apartheid system. Talking about groups-racially divided people. So the South African government has not moved in terms of its direction-it is still moving and entrenching its position. Mr. SINCERE. Mr. Chairman. Mr. WOLPE. Mr. Sincere, I am going to ask, if-we can turn to Mr. Dellums-I have one more question I would like to put to you directly which would give you an opportunity to respond at that point. So let me yield four or five minutes to Mr. Dellums. Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Chairman. Mr. WOLPE. I'm sorry, first of all, to Mr. Solomon for five minutes. Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Chairman, I normally would not have inter- ceded there, especially not for my good friend Ron Dellums because I know he is very much interested in this, but I am pressed for time myself and being a member of the subcommittee and committee I need fo make my statement. Mr. WOLPE. I just had not turned in that direction; I apologize. Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Chairman, one of the problems seems to be that too many people are putting political power before the answer to the real questions. There are those of us on both sides of this issue, as Dan Burton has said, that hate apartheid-I do. I hate it with a passion. But we have to, as other members of the panel have said, come up with answers. And you know, when it comes to political power, we are not in this country a complete democracy as such. We have two Senators from -New York State and two Senators from Ver- mont, who represent 500,000 people. They have equal votes with the two Senators from my State, New York State, who represent 18 million people. That is not fair, but it is a part of our government. We are willing to go along. You can compare what they have in Zimbabwe today. Is that a democracy? No. And you can see what is happening in Zimbabwe. 136 I point out a couple of things because I want to get to what maybe the answers might be: how we can make some progress, real progress? You look at Taiwan, you look at South Korea-do you know what the literacy rate is? I will say to you gentlemen on the panel: Do you know what the literacy is in those two countries today? It is almost 100 percent. Do you know how it got that way? Because the standard of living-and that is the whole key to what we are going to talk about here-the standard of living wa aised so high. The literacy rate became so high that democracy is automatically now taking place. The reason is job opportunities, housing, education, health- those four things. I have just returned from South Africa, and I covered that vast country; I talked to people who were for sanctions, and who were against sanctions. I talked to people from all walks of life. To get back to Mr. Motalatsi's question, he wants you to talk to the people-I think he said the gut people. I talked to those people. And every one of them -aid that they were hurt by sanctions. If we are going to help solve the problems that are in South Africa, if we are going to help get rid of apartheid, they are going to have a mass infusion Mr. Chairman, a mass infusion of private capital into that country, because that is what is going to produce the job opportunities, the health, the education. That is what they need there. We have done exactly the opposite. Because when I talked to the people, they were being helped by American business and industry. American business and industry were pumping private capital in there. And it was turning over to localities in different parts of the country where they were building senior citizens' homes, hospitals, housing, and progress was being made. Now I see just the opposite. I was so shocked when you talk about when the chairman said he was amazed, and somebody down there said they were shocked-I was shocked too, to find out that things are going backwards now, and God know, that is not what we want. If we are going to solve the problem, we need to have an influence there. We have lost-we, the United States of America-have lost our influence in South Africa. The right wing has become more powerful. The governing party now, which is now a moderate body, is being forced by the right to go back towards apartheid. That is not the answer. What we need to do is to go in there and be an influence again. But we need to do it in a much greater effort than we have ever done before. I can appreciate all of the statements from everybody there. I know you are all very sincere about it. But I will tell you, in my opinion, 50 years from now, if we continue to throw sanction after sanction after sanction against South Africa, they are not going to have any revolution. They are going to have exactly what they have today, that we all detested: apartheid. What we need to do is get in there and work together and we will solve the problem. Thank you. Thank you very much, Mr. Solomon. 137

Mr. WOLPE. Now for our last questioner, the author of the version of the anti-apartheid legislation that passed the House last year calling for the total emnl).t'go in South Africa. Mr. Dellums. Mr. DELLUMS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee. I deeply appreciate the fact that I have been given the opportunity to sit in on these hearings, and at this point the opportunity to make a brief statement. The last time I was invited, Messrs. Crocker and Keyes were the witnesses at that time, and I was again given the opportunity to raise a question. The question that I raised at that time was, if you opposed the imposition of sanctions in the context with South Africa, what is your alternative? First of all, let me preface my remarks by saying, I choose not to make any of the panelists the issue. The suffering and the dying and the human misery of people in South Africa is a large enough issue that we don't have to tribulize it by making individual per- sonalities at this table the issue. So I choose not to contribute to that to stay as focused as I can. I have paid, however, Mr. Keyes the ultimate respect that I can pay an adversary, and that is to listen very carefully to the gentleman's argument. When asked: What is your alternative? Mr. Keyes has eloquently laid out his alternative. And my response is that it is not an alternative. And my response is that I have listened to you so carefully that I have come to realize that when you strip away the eloquent words, the proposition is not a proposition that is a proposal in lieu of sanctions. If you are saying, Mr. Keyes, that the role of the United States ought to be to help our brothers and sisters in South Africa, who are trade unionists, develop maximum power, then I will say, I have no problem with that. I Join you in that effort. Let's just not make it a CIA operation. Let s do it up front, and let's be educa- tive, let's provide economic resources and whatever. But that is in no way a measure that would stop sanctions on the part of this country. That is not a proposal that says, I have the answer to not imposing sanctions in that situation. You ought to be doing both. The second point. One of the words that was used the last time was the paternalism and the patronizing nature of the United States attempting to impose sanctions in the context of South Africa. I would ask this rhetorical question: Is it not even more profoundly paternalistic and patronizing to suggest to a group of black trade unionists in South Africa who have come public asking this country to impose sanctions, to then turn to them and say, I dis- count your concern. I have greater intellectual and political awareness that leads me to another position. You can't argue both sides of the fence. I think that is the height of arrogance. That is the height of paternalism. If black people in the context of South Africa are saying, we are suffering now, and whatever minimal suffering or whatever time oriented suffering will result as opposed of the imposition of total sanctions against South Africa, they are saying, bring the sanctions 138 in the name of freedom, then I think it is arrogant; it is presump- tuous; it is absurd, to then turn to those brothers as a peer on this panel who are calling for total sanctions and then say, but I have a thought process that leads me to a superior position than yours. You can't argue both sides. One other point. There has been, Mr. Burton-Mr. Solomon- there have been a great deal of discussion in the last several weeks suggesting that the imposition of sanctions on South Africa has forced the situation to deteriorate. I challenge that. Number one, full sanctions have never been imposed. What we have in place at this moment is a weak, compromised, watered down version of sanctions on the one hand, and weak and ineffective and non-committal enforcement of those sanctions on the other hand. So I would suggest to my colleagues that we each have our respective political positions, but don't let it rest on the argument that in some way sanctions have created a worsening situation, because I would argue that sanctions have never been fully imposed in the context of South Africa. And that if you really want to determine whether or not full sanctions makes sense in the context of South Africa, then impose the sanctions, not go part of the way. One of the interesting things about the conservative response on the floor of Congress last year when our version of the bill passed in a voice vote, was that a number of our conservative brethren on the other side of the aisle said, we don't believe in sanctions but if you are going to go, go whole hog-and you supported our version of the bill. Now whether that backfired as a strategy, I don't know. But there were some intellectually honest conservatives-I don't suggest you are not-but there were some intellectually honest conservatives who said, we don't agree with sanctions, but if you are going to impose them, impose total sanctions, then we can determine the efficacy of the effectiveness of sanctions. To summarize: Number one, I don't think that full sanctions have ever been tested in the context of South Africa. And if you can make that evaluation after we have imposed total embargo, after we have imposed total disinvestment, then we can determine whether that works. Secondly, with all of Mr. Keyes' eloquence, I choose not to make the gentleman the problem. I am simply saying to you as I have said to you in private, and I say to you in public, that your proposal is not a substitute for sanctions. If you want to help to strengthen our brothers in South Africa in the labor union movement, let's go at that. Let's be overt about it. But at the same time, that is not an intelligent, and rational, and articulate argument in opposition to the imposition of sanctions. Let's do both. I don't think that it is easy to argue that you cannot. Finally, I will say to Mr. Sincere, I listened carefully to yjur as- sertions, sir. I would Just say to you as a black man in this society, that we have not dealt with all of these issues in the context of the United States. We talk about improving black trade union movement in South Africa while at the very same time we are attempting to destroy the labor union movement in this country. I can give you examples. 139 We are talking about enhancing of employment and dealing with the problems of racism and oppression in South Africa and we continue to see millions of human beings living victimized lives in the context of the United States. You talk about corporate escalation of black and third world people in the context of South Africa. I can show you that 10 million blacks who live in poverty right now, millions of human beings living desperate lives in this country-and I don't see the tremendous effort to assist in that regard-millions of homeless human being in our own society. So let's take some of that energy and focus that energy on addressing this issue and then our mirror to the world can be one of great credibility, at the time that we address the human misery of our own people, strengthen our trade union movement on the other hand. Finally, I would like to thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, for this opportunity. These hearings are great hearings. Obviously, they are not hearings that are going to change Mr. Dellums and Mr. Burton. Mr. Burton stands where he stands and Mr. Dellums stands where he stands. The question is whether we can stand on our respective ground with credibility and with integ- rity. I am simply saying that I don't think there is credibility to the argument that sanctions do not work, because we haven't imposed them. And I don't think there is credibility to the argument that the gentleman's assertion that strengthening the South African trade union movement is really an answer that should shut the door on the alternative of the imposition of sanctions. I thank you for your generosity, Mr. Chairman. Mr. WOLPE. Thank you, Mr. Dellums. Let me permit Mr. Keyes and Mr. Smith to respond to-again, I was going to-Mr. Sincere wishes to also. Fine, go ahead, Mr. Keyes. Mr. KEYES. I guess I just have one brief response to Congressman Dellums, and I am glad that he-and I agree on the importance of a dispositive instrument, as I know we have in private in fact. But I don't think it is very hard at all to say that sanctions are incompatible. If you shut down the theater, you can't put on the play. And to tell me that you want to strengthen the role of the labor unions and what is happening, is not incompatible with shutting down the theater, is a problem for me. It is just not common sense. Now, it is very simple. If you shut down the theater, you can't put on the play. So if we shut down the economy, we are shutting down all of the potential roles, and power roles, that labor unions and other organizations growing out of that economy can play for blacks in South Africa. It is a very simple response. It is a very common sensical response. And at the end of the day, I guess I am not so worried about where you and I stand. I am not so worried about where Congress- man Burton stands. I am worried about where the American people will stand, because I think they will regret it. If we try this experiment, we smash up things, the problem is that once we have 140 smashed it up, once we have deprived people in South Africa of these instruments, and once the experiment is done, if we come to the conclusion that it was a mistake, the sad thing is you won't be able to put it back together again. You won't be able to get all those companies back in there. You won't be able to get the economy functioning. You won't be able to reproduce the role that black South Africans can now play in the context of an economy that offers something to people in South Africa. So I think we should be very careful about these experiments, and because we can't control the consequences. It is the same thing that is true of violence and conflict. I look around the world with so many people saying, in the end violence is inevitable-and I imagine everybody who is fighting in Lebanon thinks that they are doing the right thing, and that they are justified, and that they are fighting against people who are evil. And some of them are certainly right, just as black people in South Africa are right. But that doesn't help us to stop that war. It doesn't help us to bring them back from that maelstrom. Once you unleash the dogs of war, you can't bring them back. Once the maelstrom begins, we can't raise our hands and say let the storm be silent. So I think we have to be very careful that the means we use don't unleash consequences that we can't undo. Thank you. Mr. WOLPE. Mr. Smith, and Mr. Sincere, and I will ask if you will be fairly brief. Mr. SMITH. Mr. Chairman, between 1960 and 1980, during the 20- year period, 4.5 million blacks were forcibly removed from their homes into barren bantustans throughout South Africa. During this period of time, Mr. Chairman, 69 blacks were slaughtered at Sharpesville. In 1976, almost a thousand young people were slaughtered in the streets by the South African security forces. Mr. Chairman, this occurred at a time when the United States corporations were there in full force in South Africa supplying these so-called-as Mr. Solomon mentioned, these so-called social programs, which, by the way, affect less than one percent of the black South African work force anyway when U.S. corporations were there in the force that they were. But during this period of time that people keep referring to economic growth, and how we were there doing this and doing that-tbi3 is what was happening to black people in South Africa. Mr. Chairman, let me add this one important thing. Today on the bantustans in South Africa-we were speaking to Allistair Sparks the other day from The Washington Post, a correspondent there, and he was mentioning to us that in five of these bantustans Taiwanese and Israeli companies are employing black workers in these bantustans at the rate of $7 to $15 per week-in the bantustans. Now, that is the same thing like setting up a McDonald's store on the slave plantation, so the slaves can go and get ham- burgers, so the slaves can get jobs at slave wages. That is the kind of thing that is happening right now. Mr. Keyes and others keep talking about we have got to be in, we have got to be in, we have got to be in. 141 Mr. SOLOMON. Would the gentleman yield at that point-just that point? Mr. SMITH. Yes, sir. Mr. SOLOMON. I have to agree with exactly what you are saying-and that is deplorable. But everywhere I went in South Africa, on every plane I took in hip-hopping all across the country of South Africa, the plane was loaded with Japanese and European businessmen. And they are doing exactly what you said, and they will be doing it 50 years from now. That is why you ought to be here asking us for a massive infusion of private capital into your country because then the problem will automatically solve itself over time. Mr. SMITH. I am from St. Louis. [Laughter.] I don't want to take up any more time. The final point that I wanted to make, Mr. Chairman, was that we are dealing with a problem of a structural situation in South Africa. Apartheid must be dismantled completely. You can't amend it here, amend it there. You can give a little money to blacks for housing in one township. But when they walk out of those houses, Mr. Chairman, they have to go out into the streets and walk under a state of emergency, under a dusk-to-dawn curfew, where there are people being round- ed up in the middle of the night and they are being incarcerated by the thousands in the jails of South Africa. No U.S. inputs of the kind that some of our parents are talking about today has brought down the state of emergency, and that is the fundamental problem. We have got to deal with the structural situation in South Africa, and that is the main problem. Apartheid must be dismantled, not amended and cosmeticized. Mr. WOLPE. Thank you very much, Mr. Smith. Mr. Sincere, I would like to give you an opportunity to respond as well. But I also wonder if I could ask the one question I said earlier that I wanted to ask of you. You were making the argument earlier that sanctions don't work and you cited several countries. I guess my question to you is, did you oppose, do you think, or would you have opposed, and do you think they should be removed? The sanctions now in effect, that have been placed earlier in the context of Poland, against the Soviet Union, with respect to Nicara- gua, with respect to Iran, with respect to Libya, is it your position that those sanctions should be removed if they are still in place, or should not have been imposed in the first instance? Mr. SINCERE. Yes, precisely. Mr. WOLPE. I applaud your consistency. I want to return to that in just a moment, but would you care now to react? Mr. SINCERE. I am profoundly disappointed at what has been going on here this afternoon, because both members of the committee and members of this panel have tried to turn this into a debate about who hates apartheid more, when in fact we all abhor apartheid. We all want to do, as Mr. Haysom has said, is achieve a state of stability and peace in that country where his children and grandchildren can grow up without any fear of oppression and where universal suffrage would exist. 142 We all equally abhor the system that is in place now. Yet, what we should be talking about here is: What is the best means of dealing with the problem. That does not mean that we have the solution because we are Americans, not South Africans. The solution to South Africa's problems is in the hands of South Africans-black and white and everyone else. I think it is very disappointing also that we keep talking in terms of skin color which puts us on the same level as the racists who inspired apartheid to begin with back in the 1940s. We should be talking about individuals, and we should be talking about empowering individuals who can form groups, who can challenge oppressive policies. And the way to do that, in part, are the positive means that I have suggested, the positive means that Mr. Keyes has suggested, and to say that this is not part of the solution is simply nonsensical. Sanctions are part of the problem. Sanctions are an easy and emotional and sentimental way of dealing with the complex problem. I think that it is incumbent on the Congress of the United States to realize our limits as a power and also our tremendous capabili- ties in encouraging and enhancing democracy in South Africa. Mr. WOLPE. I am going to close the hearing at this point. I want to make a brief closing remark. I want to again express my personal appreciation to those members of our subcommittees for their attendance today, and to the South Africans, who by their presence and by their testimony, have put themselves at additional risk in an already very dangerous situation. I thank you for that. It is especially important, as I said at the outset, that Americans be exposed somewhat more directly to the South African experience. There are two points I want to make. The first is, there is a real danger, a terrible danger, that we Americans tend to project onto the South African situation our own experience at home with our own racial history and with our own civil rights struggle. The con- ventional wisdom as we Americans look at that struggle, was that it was an evolutionary process facilitated by the mobilization of populations, by economic change, by economic growth. It is that model that Mr. Sincere and Mr. Keyes constantly referred to in addressing the South African situation. I think it needs to be noted that history is replete with examples where economic change and development did not yield liberaliza- tion or democratization, but were accompanied instead by increased totalitarianism: Nazi Germany, Stalinist Russia. Indeed, South Africa itself, over the past couple of decades in which you have ex- pandaed industrialization, accompanied by expanded trading power, and accompanied by intensified repression. This notion that somehow the American experience offers automatically some kind of lesson about the inevitability of economic change yielding political change is, frankly, something not borne out in history. Secondly, when you use that analysis, what it does is-to draw attention to those that are victimized by the system rather than the system itself. 143 I find extraordinarily fascinating the extent to which those who offer other solutions, solutions that are focused upon ways of assisting blacks-in Mr. Keyes' words, becoming empowered-when in fact, blacks have no problem becoming empowered other than under the South African white minority regime that takes away power; that disenfranchises them, that inserts police power when blacks in fact begin to assert their own power through trade unions or through other organized forms of action. It is a nice, convenient fashion of blaming the victim, and thereby ignoring the fundamental core of the problem, which is apartheid itself. This is a government that exists by force of violence. We ought to keep that in mind. 26 million people do not willingly acquiesce in their own subjugation. If it were not for the guns of the government, this is a government that would collapse tomorrow. It is not a government based upon consent. While I certainly understand there are differences of view in terms of the impact of sanctions, I agree fully with Mr. Dellums, that to shift the focus away from the source of the problem, which is the white regime, and make it sound as if somehow there is something wrong with black incapacity to organize and become empowered, is really to do a beautiful job for the regime itself. I think that is tragic even if unintentioned, I think it is a tragic consequence of that kind of analysis. Finally, the last point: is the double standard under which we operate regarding South Africa. I applaud you, Mr. Sincere, for your consistency. When I asked you are you at least saying that you don't think sanctions should be employed anywhere else. The fact of the matter is, however, that sanctions have been employed in all these other situations-very drastic sanctions, involving total cessation of economic relationships, very punitive sanctions of a whole variety of sorts. We have all gone through the history and litany of those instances and I am not going to repeat that. The fact of the matter is, we have had a very different response to South Africa, notwithstanding the acknowledgement on all sides that this is probably the most egregious human rights violator in the world today. Mr. SINCERE. That is ludicrous. Mr. WOLPE. Fine. You have had your say, let me just finish my remark. My only observation is that there has been a double standard in our policy; not in your analysis, because you have been consistent-but in our policy. I think the question that we have to ask ourselves is, why? What is different about South Africa? I have the feeling that the racial issue, that is, our tendency in America to see issues in a racial way, is a factor; one factor among others, that I think has been responsible for the racial double standard. I think what we need to understand, that is the way much of the world sees the history of our policy towards South Africa. It is the perception of a racial double standard that has done much to" undermine our moral influence, our political authority and, there- 144 fore, our national interest, not only in southern Africa but throughout much of the world. That is what is also at stake as we debate the issue of sanctions. In all these other cases we have understood that the application of sanctions would in fact mean real cost to the populations affected. We understood in advance that when sanctions were imposed against Poland that there were going to be Polish workers that would be affected by those sanctions. We recognize that notwithstanding that cost, that the government itself-the only hope of moving the government down the road was that kind of pressure, that would yield short-term costs, longer term benefit. Even if that change did not occur, the United States did not want to be an accomplice to the repression that was taking place within Poland. The same analysis I am sure motivated reaction and responses we have taken in the course of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan or with respect to Libya, on and on. So my plea is that at least that we take a look. I mean, if you want to be consistent and oppose sanctions in all instances, fine, but at least recognize that the policies we have applied as a country have not been consistent and people are asking why. Let me again thank all of the panelists for their testimony. As Mr. Burton indicated a moment, ago, we don't agree. I think you may have gotten some hint of that. But he said this is perhaps one of the best hearings we have had on the subject and I certainly concur. I thank you all very much. Thank you. The hearing stands adjourned. [Whereupon, at 2:05 p.m., the joint hearing was adjourned.] APPENDIX I STATEMENT SUBMITrED BY THE ASSOCIATED STUDENTS OF THE UNIVER- SITY OF CALIFORNIA AT BERKELEY, OFFICE OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, NOVEMBER 2, 1987 INTRODUCTION We, the students of the University of California at Berkeley, have made explicit over the years our staunch opposition to the morally repugnant and repressive apartheid regime of the Union of South Africa. Our call for socially responsible policies on the part of our public institutions has been consistently fervent. The responsibility to human rights that was finally recognized and demonstrated by the Regents of the University of California, the California State Legislature, and the Congress of the United States of America in 1986 is now jeopardized by the Reagan administration. It is imperative that this 100th Congress renew and strengthen its commitment to the elimination of apartheid. One of the mechanisms through which this can be expedited is the imposition of more stringent sanctions rather than the unwise return to "constructive engagement." EDUCATION IN SOUTH AFRICA - The South African regime has made institutions of higher education a focal point for maintaining "order" within the apartheid system. "Government subsidies accounting for 80% of university budgets will be made contingent on steps by the institutions to enforce government-imposed restrictions on political activism and certain criminal offenses." Chronicle of Higher Education, October 28, 1987. Such criminal offenses include the printing of banned publications, boycotts, strikes, and unlawful gatherings. * While 80,000 out of only 4.5 million whites were enrolled in universities in 1980, only 7,000 out of 21 million Blacks were enrolled in universities. Washington Office on Africa. • The educational disparity between Black and white school children is tremendous. Washington Office on Africa reports: *While education for whites is free and compulsory, education for Black children is neither compulsory nor free: these children must pay fees for books and tuition. *The government spends $1,115 per capita for whites who make up only 16% of school-age population while it spends only $170 for each Black child. Black children make up about 72% of school-aged population. *The student to teacher ratio for whites is 20 to 1, but that ratio for Blacks is 47 to 1. Even with that ratio, there is still no room for 2 million Black students. *54% of black children leave school without completing the third grade. *The government has increased salaries of some Black teachers since sanctions were imposed, but has not correspondingly increased the amount of needed resources. * 48.7% of government expenditures on education, excluding "independent homelands" where the total expenditures are much less, went to white education. Weekly Mail, October 2-8, 1987. * In addition to demanding sanctions, students in South Africa are protesting against their racist curriculum. (Washington Office on Africa. ) Since the government does not have to say why it detains students, it is possible to infer that it does so in response to these protests. - Throughout 1986, the Detainees Parents Support Committee estimates that "10,000 children under 18 years of age" were detained under the emergency regulations. "Evidence of torture in detention was revealed in many court cases or in affidavits collected by monitoring groups." InternationalDefenceand Aid Fund, Briefing Paper Number 22, March 1987.

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• In 1986,the regional destabilization policy of the South African government directly resulted in the deaths of no less than 140,000 children in Angola and Mozambique, according to UNICEF. Countless other children suffer as the result of disease, the loss of parents and loved ones, and injuries sustained while attempting to defend their homes. Rather than attending school, children nine, ten, and eleven years of age are armed, according to Amnesty International, and trying to defend their countries against the predatory aggressions of South Africa. THE STUDENT MOVEMENT AGAINST APARTHEID The above-stated facts illustrate the abhorrent conditions for our fellow students and youth in the Union of South Africa. We will continue to express our solidarity with the oppressed peoples of Southern Africa as long as these conditions and the repulsive apartheid regime persist Through the exercise of the rights and privileges afforded us by this nation, we have been able to raise the consciousness of the American citizenry with regard to the plight of South Africa's people. The free speech protections of our Constitution and the democratic principle of civil disobedience have been instrumental in our movement. Such rights and principles should be afforded to the students of South Africa as well. The students of the University of California have utilized every conceivable channel to express our support for a free and democratic South Africa. We called on our Regents to divest from companies doing business in South Africa by using the official mechanism through which they hear students' concerns. When this proved futile we engaged in acts of non-violent civil disobedience. Over 1,000 anti-apartheid activists were arrested on the Berkeley campus in the 1985-86 school year. While the majority of those arrested were students, the campus movement included faculty and staff members as well. Through the combined pressure on the part of the nine U.C. campuses and the California state legislature, the Regents were ultimately convinced that the moral repugnance associated with the apartheid regime mandated the divestment of University monies from all companies profitting from that nation's system of oppression. The California legislature's opposition to apartheid and support for sanctions was due in large part to the student protests and the intensive lobbying efforts of concerned students. We applaud the actions taken by the Regents, the California legislature and the U.S. Congress in 1986 and we now ask that the Congress show its resolve by imposing further and more stringent sanctions. THE NEED FOR SANCTIONS The South African government's lack of response to the pressures exerted by the Congress exhibit a fundamental recalcitrance and illuminate the need for action of a more punitive nature. The conditions in South Africa have not improved, not because sanctions are ineffective in and of themselves, but because the present sanctions are too limited to have a significant impact. The racist apartheid ideology is so heavily entrenched within the social structures of South Africa that a little persuasion, as reflected in President Reagan's policy of constructive engagement, or limited sanctions will never be enough to cause the power elite to abandon their present system of oppression. The failures of such policies are obvious: the present regime is as repressive as ever. It would be difficult to argue, therefore, that the United States would somehow diminish its influence through the imposition of stricter sanctions; we have no influence. 147

The people of South Africa realize this and this is why an overwhelfting majority of them have called for punitive sanctions against the South African government. The Council of South African Trade Unions has voiced its support for sanctions even though they would theoretically be the first group within the country "hurt" by such a policy. Apartheid is a long standing policy. Therefore, we must, as they are doing, consider long-term remedies rather than possible short-term dangers. CONCLUSION In light of the above testimony, we, the students of the.University of California at Berkeley, strongly urge the United States Congress to impose complete and total political and economic isolation on South Africa. 148

APPENDIX 2

STATEMENT SUBMITTED BY PAUL A. MAZZUCA, DIRECTOR OF PEACEFUL PROGRESS IN SOUTH AFRICA

We are a nonpartisan ecumenical group of Americans from diverse backgrounds and viewpoints, united by a common interest in seeing that American relations with South Africa contribute, to the extent possible, to a speedy but nonviolent transformation of that country into a pluralistic multiracial democracy. Because we are active in pursuing this goal, we believe we should be included in the category of 'anti-apartheid activists' referred to by the press.

Together with a colleague on our board, Armistead Lee, I visited South Africa last May. just after the general elections. We were guests of the Building Industries Federation of South Africa, and we were particularly interested in observing the efforts of that federation to train thousands of unemployed city dwellers, mostly black, to become skilled tradesmen and help alleviate the shortage of low-cost housing. But we were also interested in meeting parliamentarians, journalists, trade unionists and opinion leaders from diverse backgrounds and racial origins. We made a particular effort to meet the leaders of the remaining American-owned business firms and the heads of social service agencies now facing s funding crisis because of the de- parture of so many Sullivan signatory companies. Our contacts included such prominent white South Africans as Alan Paton, F. Van Zyl Slabbert,aod Denis Worrall. Among the outstanding and impressive blacks we met were Lucy Mvubelo, head of the Garment Workers Union and Shakes Tshabalala, Executive Director of the Black Management Forum.

In all of these contacts, we sought insights into the effects of the sanctions enacted in the Comprehensive Anti-Apar- theid Act and the current movement, particularly in American chrches, to force the remaining American companies tn sever &4l connections with South Africa. Had these efforts "sent L message", as intended? Had they encouraged the blacks and other nonwhite victims of apartheid? Had they strengthened those liberal elements in the white community who had been working for years for the elimination of ra,:ial barriers and the inclusion of all races in the franchise? Had they encouraged the Botha govern- men and the more militant organizations of the black community to abandon the preconditions on both sides which stand in the way of meaningful negotiations? In short, have sanctions worked?

The answer we received to these questions, from almost every South African we met, was a most emphatic NO. In a perverse sense, we found that sanctions had worked, to be sure. They had worked to strengthen the right wing of the political spectrum, to enrich some South Africans, Europeans and Asiatics, who had acquired American assets on the cheap. Having anticipated that American and EEC sanctions would be adopted, President Botha had no more reason to listen to chiding from abroad, and as more 149

American firms left to escape the "hassle factor' at home, Boths was increasingly relieved of the pressure from the business executives who had been most iaportunate in demanding an end to the state of emergency, the release of political prisoners, and the repeal of the Group Areas Act. These measures appeared to be the next steps on the reform agenda, and we believe they sight well have been adopted by now but for our disastrous efforts to impose them through threats and ultimatums. Now the entire process of reform, of dismantling of apartheid, came to an abrupt halt and even some reversal after the adoption of our misguided sanctions. These, together with the mounting wave of terrorism in the townships, encouraged Botha to turn back to the right, to confront the increasingly restive former Nationalist Party hardliners who saw the reforms as a rejection of traditional National Party principles.

So, Botha waved the flag, called for a circling of the wagons and a defiance of those sanctimonious foreign hypocrites-- those people who have rewarded social reforms with more sanctions and seemed bent on nothing less than the destruction of the South African economy. The liberal Progressive Federal Party was decimated. Moderate black leaders were discouraged as they saw well-meaning Americans and Europeans beguiling the teenage anarchists of the townships , and their mentors in Lusaka, with the illusion that there was no need to renounce violence or accept gradual changes since salvation would surely come from outside intervention.

The committee has heard, from other witnesses, the saple evidence that the pain of sanctions end disinvestment has fal- len most severely on the black population, already suffering from heavy unemployment. From some witnesses, though, you have heard the straightfaced assurance that' the blacks are willing to accept more suffering for the seke of freedom. These witnesses cite as authority the words of a diminishing group of self- anointec spokesmen who invariably seem to occupy positions cos- fortably sheltered from the impact of ssnctiona.Their advice is based on the incredible assumption that the government is watching for "signals" from Washington, that apartheid rests on the support of American cars and computers, and that if South African capitalists are made sufficiently uncomfortable they will order Botha to change direction.

In our own conversations with South African blacks we found some who denounced sanctions not merely because it caused thea disproportionate barm but because its effects were obviously counterproductive. With some others, however, we encountered s pusling ambiguity and an obvious reluctance to be quoted as criticizing the position espoused by ANC leaders. Later, Alan Paton and F. Van Zyl Slabbert'and Dennis Worrall.confirmed our suspicions that many prominent blacks are intimidated. They fear violent retribution or, at least, social ostracism if they are quoted as opposing sanctions. Lucy Mvubelo, who had the courage to speak out, has had her house firebombed twice. 150

But black South Africans will report their sentiments when queried by scientific public opinion polls in which their responses are confidential. Some ten such polls, under different auspices, record an average of three out of four voting against sanctions and disinvestment when the questions are put without bias. A different answer will result, of course, if the question is phrased so as to preordain the response, i.e., should foreign companies threaten to leave unless the government ends spartheid? Despite all the evidence, many South African blacks, like many Americans, retain the illusion that such threats will work.

You may ask why it is that we, if we are as offended by apartheid and as devoted to power-sharing as we profess, have reached such a different conclusion from other "anti-apartheid activists" on the issue of sanctions. It may be because we judge policy options by results, rather than intentions. Senator Ken- nedy seems to consider this a fault. He chides the President for not understanding the intentions of the Congress in passing the so-called "anti-apartheid" act last October. It is unfair, he says, for people to expect sanctions to end apartheid overnight. It seems that the real purpose was to make clear the abhorrence of the American people and to cheer people in Zambia.

The people we encountered in South Africa asked if there is not some more benign way in which we Americans can expiate our guilt feelings--some way less painful to the most vulnerable elements in their society. If we judge policies by results, we should expect that at least they would move events in the right direction. We should be using our very marginal influence to help, not to undermine, those South Africans working for peaceful change.

Economic sanctions have usually failed, and particularly where the country being pressured is as self-sufficient and as well prepared to resist embargoes as is South Africa.It takes a great deal of faith, or credulity, to believe that a heavier dose of a clearly ineffective therapy will somehow effect a cure. 151

APPENDIX-3.

ARTICLE ENTITLED, "THE SANCTIONS SURVEYS IN SEARCH OF ORDINARY BLACK OPINION," INDICATOR SA: VOL. 4, No. 2, SPRING 1986, SUBMITrED BY REPRESENTATIVE DANIEL BURTON TIlE SANCTIONS SURVEYS In Search of Ordinary Black Opinion By Prof Lawrence Schlemmer sune eidrnce on %hetheror not ran,.and-file T'hearnrides, opinions and interests of rank-and-file blacks support sanctions black people in South Africa are frequently taken as a pivola, reference in the debate about economic aftera plethora ot social suseys published in sanctions against the country. One of the faiourite the media over the past 30 months. great viguments holds that sanctions %ll/ most harm the confusion exists o,,er the extent of domestic people the% are intfrded to help - ordinary blacks black support for sanctions. At least eleven sure¢s who, according) might be eipecied to oppose the have been conducted inside South Africa, some of measures. them leading to diametricafl, opposed conclusions In concerned political this ves there is ample evidence from the a sense social science ow.,esihe Against for the confusion. public media that most prominent black spokespeouple actors and apology eirkera-parliamentar organizations and the rainutne Most of the difficult) lies in the interpretations of Sdurches support sanctions. ranpng from trade ihe sure finding' b) authors hith dissenting tmbargms to disnvestment A frequent argument siev, points. msseIf included, and in the necessaril, heard from these quarters Li that most black people brie presentation of our findings in the mcd, There Would be prepared to suffer additional privation in a is an ohs ous need to attempt to reconcile the campaign aimed at dcstrosing apartheid While tho difertnt findings in order to shed constructi e lieN on in black dmter argmcnrt doe; not go unchallenged the isso. sldts - see frnr;cr editor Obed Kunne 'Soti h Africa, Di a,:d Nuts . in the Sandas Tribune, 5 October 1980 and the regular oppoition to sanic;ii'rL apresied hi Chief Bithelezi and hikurha Basic Propositions finding (see - tics i popular e vspoint among A balanced interpretation of the major qunkespeoplc e folloing simple ,140044nt, of sanction abroad box) can be facilitated b) It ab-out the contemporary position, 0! with iestert, proposition, African society , fntromerei has res~irfaced black people in South debate on the meris of imposing more t "Swrnnw.n comp ctel) reject apartheid and Lr-r .a ncl,oniand w'arrants reiionsidera:son of the. * Most blacks * VCAtC*t~ SoVC, SopNCjlt;E 152

obviously wckom pees,ures or innuences bought to bear on the go ernment which -ill promote socio- political change. * Most rank-and-filit blacks, being people Aho are either in poerty, have low incomes and/or ive in The Ayes and families w ith a large number of defendants. would not like to experience a fall in already precarious A Brief Guide tc Tm, Mojor hving standards as a consequence of slow gro%th or stagnation in the South African economy. * The unemployment and under-employment rate is 1n4 IR(M lM"tHDK0tlO PO4(1 :A,S, l$ FrS hagh in South Africa. affecting anything up to two hIo.'W. "nas an*t a NIama8& &Od . milhon people, mainly) blacks Black people are dl g irvn qn To unlikely to support any policy or programme which further reduces the capacity of the economy to .Matilool d so6W eWmwfa M.b Id" create jobs. The best jobs available in South Africa Swtp NSI an a# co m0y fr adP bw.-S are those created in the modern industrial, w SS# 1 0 .aaeq% 565&"o commercial and financial sectors. 4fw"qi, 7^% In large measure attitudes toward sanctions are the I-q Io4m Mraw~w 0 f %, w result of black respondents ,eighing the first k5- M.e *w M bow S a~ 4am rve" proposition aganst the second and third -n onq a fty" I 116aM #m .v propositions above. The sanctions weapon is generally iram - To *MO-4rm%fyn kAn0.1 Mafy 1;% precnted as capable of both influencing the South WP"" V" -Wa, V4 -* we hiso& Go d b am African government and white establishment, and of hi'-' weakening he economy and employment growth tarn.k IwnN~r004"C 'sI" Wa a S Limha b In this context the choice boils down to the extent to MW% PM~'~ of564 tirs flp which black people are willing to endure increased pritatIon for the sake of political pressure on the 10abor 19A NOmWasyff l" y Ni k1 1awet we ~s.A government, and whether the) would see that S 6A aw%"m. o d S mm U vq.ia pressure as likely to be effective * is trwV e kow 4. W br" An argument put forward by some conservative and CWi-0q 'ilmu n 1% by some radical protagonists is that disinvestment will benefit the South Afncan economy by encouraging more appropriate technologies. import subsitullon, greater labour intensity of production. and a THEIMUKU SCI|Nt" I($SURC'l(OIL AHPI'k,SURYlfY concentration on consumption-led as opposed to h11t Ai pwiw P.A bibal Noto . ot inscstment.led growth As is always the case in 4 Moil%Af of bbam complex economic issues, there is some truth in such * m '..W,WM 6 WOa arguments ai m yMiV As a radical point of view. however, this argument is senously flawed Firsti, if the South African government were to perceive at to be possible to so redirect economic development policy as to weather P*mi ItM AM16M0rr%4 ,pddi -q of N an a P99 mu the effects of sanctions in this way. he sanctions campaign would lose its whole point - that of r - Ira coercing government into change Secondly, if sanctions and disinvestment have some bad effects and some good effects they wall also not be effective DoI b. S% in ifluencing a determined and resilient South Afrcas government Hence the effects will be borne *=w4dSbiS. tsa *W M AMW a orsr.. Amor m b y the South Afncan population without any particular pohical purpose. The truth of th4 matter is that the South Afrtcan %W."nsdoIion6. economy is an open one vvhich has become increasingly reliant on external capital over the past amNie -a am atmwunf 4t ptb % -ammort i b'br Iia0 30 years. Sanctions and disinvestment may stimulate masKNW umcw some short-term growth but in the long term the economy will run into severe balance of payment Sn problems vhich, in turn. will co)nstrain employment to -hyso is. growth and expansion generally. Sanctions will 11T-hDsa bprys 95% probably hase considerably more negative than oi It as. positive effects; hence popular perceptions about sanctions are broadly 'e-. correct tMESiJMAT tTAiSIlt JchoR"%bvff PNbM- 1%5A a* MMs M" 45, W& LkoMadmj W 1.a - PMmptp-w. nkwo The Arbitrory Choice *tqm.ry- -1 obt of r fsOpp ff qpat An'. hnfe Where ike questions (see box) put to blacks are posed OPP' imaWmoi S1% in simple terms as a choice between continued fnb naop OMyi6, gorp.s d Mow t b.j, A. investment or disinvestment with no embellishments p To 0 MV up" W0r k..' or suggestive references to political effects (I e io

iisDrotSA Va'4ijit2 StNG, 1956 153

yopswho upon sanctionsor to the effect on job creation), Teven.)five percent ot more of rank-and- file black respondents opposedisinestmenit (Schlemmer, June 1984 November 1964 HSRC: Nays on Sanctions July 1984,Mas 19851 Where the respondents are better educated (HSRC: February 1985) or are Surys 8 Block Respon selected in a snap survey which tenda to bias sampling away from industrial workers towards easily interviewed unemployed you tb or serviceworkers INW110S:ID41 hDAY W I IVY (Star: February 1985), opposition to disinvestment drops but a majorii) still opposedisinvestment. In all these instances of neutral forced choice, the respondents h Mais a il split in favour of continued insestmeni. M 0Oisat o a Ina Isiai putting economic welfare above -1 =t ae " iow vaguely understood am NO or-f is W5- political considerations l* low A .itis wo t 61sad I. . M a In studies %here the quetion is coloured by references * b."i 0600 M' is MiuisaMi doWsf a" b" fwe to the political purpose of disimestmeni. support for sanctions increases in cases Ahere only two choices are given. T'he first London Sunda) Times stud) (August 1985) obtaned "economic a 77 percent endorsement of Pite aowti ip~u~iu sa sanctions' when the question asked linked the sanction; to *getting nd of aparlhetd'(see surse box) Mise jp ,-1v47W:PO $r A ~snO OkIC . A subsequent poll b the same organisation (Jul% 1986) has, howeser. in'alidated the first poll b% establishing that nearly 40 percent of black tiE ORIKN/COMUUNtl"AsN"IFolt MoiAL MaOWRY Cast, respondents did not knoA (or care) what 'economic SWltt sanctions' meant Economic sanctions are big words which esen most middle class people do not full% t1 oustiarL rio N iti toiaesrnnS opetesmil swv 'Pt Lie Capenw understand To use these phrases sn a poll statement 1 which is then aso:iated with a more easily laA twa a aIMA pl4iW ME MWd Moiilw 6 understood political effori is a clear case of se- -.po surissississi - senous bias The use b) the HSRC of the word 'bo)cot' is defensible since this has become a well- known phrase Isam~ Th. s. pi 6e W" M lasi Is;% we . 'an. in black political Ide (school boycott, si mesii, us.1. is, s iaie w i onve atn consumer boycott, etc ) bmV rf nsi aahVInI W e faruc -a 40ft UWW K"&V' Hence, when black sur,,e) respondents are askc : to balance vagueness against pressure to end apartheid tNO~d&.aasass 11 onser s bw 0 M lisa they choose the latter This can hardly be construed Woodb a b #a W hs. 5pis itb* wagsitsrp. Ps0w. M, 11me~ * d ftips nis as support for a wthdra.al of investment capital or -~ &as hbvfa Ms - siahhi 4%, CMNo! prohibitons on South African exports, hosseser 61 WL I uis s "Wt,.1. 06tFa'wn a Is iAMA y as M~-a.Is t The Qualified Options asAsy st 'a WW atsW 41. "Aii limm.. vw*A"WSJ fie D- It In cases%here more than two options are gis en, U~r iswit,=m it s,his~q of at mi, WIn '- sea ko the qualified altcrnarises gain a great deal of support This is es.idenced in Orkin's CASE stud (September 1985) and in the IMS (July 19's6) studs. as wel as in the further question in my 1984 sunev There is an obviou, reason for thrs. The qualified alternatives allow black respondents to balance and W.6id MpiOftWiu W14L 16 0 s endorse both their political interests (propotsmon I a saa AW't we#$ @1 INpO-V. abse) and their economic interests (propositions 2 and 1 It is entirel predictable that this should ,.- p"A'a, we lass onu p, MMiv"i pet''s a MWsl of I& Aid'.8' "sar happen. Orkin has interpreed the qualified option as disimestmen Hi' middle position is redll. not pan disinsesiment but rather qualified insesrmenl Pressuring the government to end apartheid and recognising union', ae stncesuli 5 . ssw . , bsi. h the ariouS code, 31 V of emplo-sment conduct encourage and which are pip- usiasof'S W. adopted by most la-ger multinationals For most foreign fisn this is 'con%tructise engagem'nT' and Mis, 5 d mis. .5~a 12 iU not disinsestment 2t sit -it@IApis-a r-;, o wp it In Orkin's sure onlN one quarter support full o 1,7se son - wu sa5W' shuea. disinestment This is the same as the proportion supporting the total d Isimestmesh position in m% earlier surseys It is also not much higher than the average proportion supporting the (total) "boycotl [ .D , Al")gV V, d N, 2 K N - 19P., 154

showed clearl, that rno' blacks wanted pr sure on '1the system of apah. I. and due to publicty in the media, the cond.i il ,n,¢imcnt option has prohabl) crystalliscd a-. th. favoured position The CASE study and thc I SSIMS stud) compared with preceding finding-, tend to suggest this trend Operaie sanc:i r' a- t. South Afnca are not ai comprehensLii or t in their scope Tbe present lesel of sanc isonsn'.i s.,Il be supored b. a majont; of blacks. whi nbili rot cnidorse rather, more puntie mcasur- ) ,s I . ions are' more than Ikeh to conform to the r itchet principle, with present mcu,,urcs htng qIjsd ii due course by more stringent action Werirc,i the issueof current black opinion on total or comprehensis sanctions remains highly t0e ant +i The main point ai 'hi, ,tge. then, is that it can still be said that no sum.is -nu f i h questions were po-ed in %ir ple 0:-' r : 1ani iguage has proved that a Mrj sorltsr-, i. . ," i g to endorse cornpThensise -, . tie economic sanctions that nYoU:,redu,: the sir 'is f the ccoroms to create jobs ad usetadetc i u-i i.sly true that a majority of bNask spok'p r;, . ,.mrcrs of the middle-class intelligenLtrv, siud,,nis ad ivrgumen support sanctions Tis is not surprpisin since their interests and m ses Ar -1 I is rather than economic The; would Lsdoubticdl becrvf tifom an econornc collapse If It meant a consequent collapse of the South African government -a unlikeLy outCome. hovi,c er

Surveys and Policy Social sursey)s cannot define specufic policies - it is up to peLic. makers to decide ,hat mi- of proisions are likely to ahiese effect;%e pressure for change in S0c101Afen s w',cdnhi'y in arOWe tonfy "ude ee-buanto South Afnca without damaging the longer-ran wzdeeuer;hcncd an a an~-:y1986 -.#en Prtu., pe v a interests of black people In taking these decisions, biuukdeonlacit ueedtLesos bcw'uelpc% polcy makers abroad must be mndful not onl) of the immediate effects of their decisions but of the in the three HSRC studies or the most recent indirect effects and longer-term consequences as ritionMS stud> (see survey box) well In fact. if one considers the pording of the total The sanction campaign. whether it succeeds or not, disinvesment option in th CASE survey, it is oser and above the other serious pressures on the surprisir g that as few a' 24 percent of black South Afican economy, can grasely undermine respondents supporteC it. The total disinvestment confidence among insestors, importers of South position is presented at,being supported by 'the ANC. Afncan goods and international bankers Once the PAC, Azapo, many members of the UDF and investor confidence is undermined it may never be some trade unions'. Given the large collective support fully recovered, even in a changed South Africa. for these organisations that Orkin's own survey shows, the 24 percent of !ndorsement which this The most important question for responsible policy option actually gained is low indeed makers abroad is whether sanctions will be sufficiently effective to induce the-South Afrrcan The full range of surveys leads one to the conclusion government to make concessions which are that at this stage only a mionty of about one substantial enough to satisfy the pro-sanctions lobby quarter or lrsa of rank-and-file blacks in major There is hardly any convincing evidence that this metropohltan areas (less if rural blacks are included) will be the cast. Minister Pik Botha's statement to would support total disinvestment or full economic Witbank on 3 July 1986, suggests the opposite. 'The boycotts Th.ir reasons, as m surveys and others sooner sanctions come the better. We will show the hase shown, are simply that tley would not wish to world we will not be made soft.' This slew scems to endure collectie economic punishment in the beincreasing perasie ungovernment circles sanctions process. Statements like these could be bluff and bravado but they could Olso reflect hardening coliectis determination If there is an) doubt on this issue, Evaluating the Findings then ptotagonists of sanctions should be %erycautious The 'conditional investment' position - interrered as about the effects of their strategy, as the massof qualified disinvestment by some enters like Orkin rank-and-file blacks in South Africa undoubtedly are. - on the other hand, may well have gained support Clearly, the majority of black people welcome o er the 30 monthperiod c--ered by the sur-seys. enrernal pressure on the South rican government, The wider range of reaalts in my earlier surveys The question is how much and of what kind D I. 11 N04CAtOESA Vo.'iaNuo2SK N1,i 955

BEST AVAILABLE COPY 155

APPENDIX 4

ARTICLE ENTITLED, "SANCTIONS: CASE AGAINST CASE," FINANCIAL MAIL, OCTOBER 23, 1987, SUBMIIrED By REPRESENTATIVE DANIEL BURTON

SANCTIONS Case again CASE Sma.teaaf sactfiom hers and abroad - out ofrfour supportedinetment under some apartheid." their theories voiderfire - areincresingly coditions. The question: Is the Sacrifice worthwhile? relyinon atstiical gymnasticsto bolster Orkin's interpretation was that 73% of The answers: 26% said yes, even if many tkhicaise. The argument that blacks support urban blacks favour some sort of dislnvest- blacks would lose their jobs; 25%said yes,if sanctionsand are willing to suffer has never ment, He lum.ed those whotook the middle few blacks would lose their jobs; and 49% ke" Suitoedbfseac. position - whichhe called "conditional dis- said the sacrifice of jobs is not worth it Tht Is again ear, with the release by the investment" - with those in the radical In other words, half of the blacks did sot Community Agencyfor Social Enquiry position. believeit is worthwhile to lose jobs in the (CASE) of the findings of a survey of black We call the middle position "conditional campaign to fight apartheid. And that frac- opinion."Blacks do back sanctions, warns investment," since it refers to controlling the tion rises to nearly three-quarters if you survey," said a front-page headline in the flow of new investment, nectkicking out the include those who want only a few blacks to Weeky Mail- 'Despite hardships, support old. And the conditions are hardly tough: lose jobs (those who, for example, aren't foepressure higher than in 1985." many would argue that businesses should willingto suffer but would tolerate a bit of The report begins: "As the international actively campaign against apartheid and re- suffering among their neighbours). sanctionsmovement struggles to maintain its cognise trade unions At ,at, it seems, they would support sym- momentum,a major nationwide survey re- Orkin, then, isright only to the extent that bolic- or ineffective - sanctions that send leasedyesterday has revealed that two-thirds 73%of blacks don't want business as usual. a message but don't create hardships. They of black South Africans support Sanctions. But that does not demonstrate the support apparently don't want to suffer more than "Thesurvey wasconducted during August for blanket disinvestment claimed by those apartheid makes them suffer. and September by the Community Agency who quote the 73% figure. Now, a look at this year's offering from forSocial Enquiry. This was the Samegroup Of course, a middle position in any poll is CASE - which, we expect, will also be whichcompiled a similar, controversial re- going to gather a fair amount of support The widelymisinterpreted. The poll, which sur- parttwo years ago showingthat most blacks fight is over who can claim that middle ve)ed rural as well as urban blacks, gave supporteddisinvestment by foreign com- ground. Our less radical interpretaton issup- respondents three choices on sanctions panies." ported by another question in the 1985 poll. The findings 26%opposed sanctions, fear- It's a shame that the sometimes thought- The question began by noting "some people ing they would stunt economic growth; 46% ful Weekly Mail has failed, so uncritically, say disinvestment may cause some blacks to said sanctions should be applied until the for CASE's half-truths. To understand this losetheirjobs, but the sacrifice is worthwhile South African government lifts the State of year's survey, it helps to know what was in order to pressure the government to end Emergency, fre political prisoners, unbans wro=.with the interpretation or the widely quoed 1985 poll to which the Mail refers. Tnis report clearly establishes the fact that a decisivemajorityof urban black South Africanssupport someform of disinvestment as a means of helpingto..e- apartheid," MarkOrkin, a Johannesburg sociologist and a CASE director, wrote about the 1985 sur. vey. "Whstever other jnstirtcatioeu might now beadvanced by the advocates or investment, iheycan no longer maintain their posture of deferringto democracy, of seeking to respect theavailable indications of black opinion." Orkin's findings did no; justify his confi- dent oonclusions. Urban blacks were given a three-way choice- between encouraging unbridled nvestment!kicking out all foreign invest- mnt; and a middle position to "limit or restrict investment." The middle position aid "foreignfirms should not be allowed to Inst hers unless they actively pressure the governmentto endapartheid, and recognise the trade unionschosen by the workers." The results:26% supported investment, 24%supported complete withdrawal, and 4% tookthe middle position of conditional istiesletiL Ia other words, three out four rejected wvUles withdrawal, the most radical posi- sin and the goal of many anti-apartheid acivistsand lawmakers outside SA. Three N&asDALAX OCTOBER23 1987 156

niasgtheir speech like th: "A sury te- political prtoera. and abandons apartheid to continue supportingsanctions if they e sut in job lossesfor blacks; 26%would agree ksed last weekahows that a overwhelming and 21% said ssnctioas shouldbe enforced majority of black South Africans support government Warten- to seing sone bs nt many job losses(the ubconditionally until the "my-nelghbour-bet-not-me" middle posi- sanctions.... der* power. Those who oppoe both apartheid end two-thirds of blacks support tion); and just 14%s "pporte4sanctionsDo Therefore, of UnCmploymenL sanctions can Un, smugly, knowing that sanctions matter the amount the sanctioteen don't havetheir facesrights. a problem with this This is nota portrait o( groupof POpe There is, however, formore unctions and mor That doesn't make them anykus dangerous question (besidesthe universalpolling Prob- whoare caring Leavingthe snctx debate to the Left lem of a middle position gathering support suffering.Compared to the 1915 survey. Blacks want wary of the potential only genrtes more untruths. because it is a middle position). Blackswho blacksare even more jobs, the end of apartheid end freedom- a Stand n the middle ground are basically effects of sanctionson employment. combination that onlydemocatic opitalism - specificsteps We must coacbsdethat many of ,bose who opting for concrete action really support can deliver. U Pretoria must take - overa somewhat don- said they support "sanctions" symbolic moves that enpres outrage at giveconcept, "sanctions." out of Wits professor Lawrence Schlemmer has apartheid - but don't throw blacks criticised some other polls on the same work. respondents That wouldexclude trade boycotts on,say, grounds: "When black survey which have are asked sobaltact vagueness against pres- coal and agricultural products, choosethe latter. bit black workersin the targeted fields. And sure to end apartheid they in those This can hardly be construedas support for it wouldinclude investment only or prohibi- cas where assets are either turned ever to withdrawal of investment capital workers remain cm- tions on South African exports, however." black workers,or black respondents ployedunder South African bosses. (And, In other words,what do the we might ask, howexactly are these steps agree to when they support sanctionss" to is in the supposedto cnd apartheid') effect change? The answer,gain, to bear US congress- job-loss question. Nonetheless, expect men debating sanctions this week and begin- This time around, 60%were not prepared 157

APPENDIX 5

CORRESPONDENCE FROM NORMAN KILPATRICK, DIRECTOR KANAWHA STAMP CLUB, SUBMITTED BY REPRESENTATIVE DON BONKER SURFACE MINING RESEARCH LIBRARY BOX $024 CHARLESTON, WEST VIRGINIA 25361 40.w. (304 346-3404 Nnm Kflpark, Director June 9, 1987

Hon. Don Bonker,Chairman Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade House Committee on Foreign Affairs House of Representatives Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Congressman Bonker:

On behalf of the Kanawha Stamp Clu',I would appreciate this letter and supporting documentation being entered into the record of the South African sanctions oversight hearing being held on June 11.

I would suggest to you that the Department of State and-Treasury have gone beyond the intent of Congress and the general intent of the South African Sanction Law by announcing a ban on importation of "commercial" postage stamps from South Africa, Transkei, South West Africa, Bophuthatswana and two other areas associated with South Africa.

This has resulted in giving the South African government a million dollar windfall at the expense of American collectors. It has saved the South African government thousands of dollars annually. This is so because South Africa (and a few other nations like the Isle of Man) unlike most stamp-issuing entities pays on its own for air mail am-dregistration. Thus, when I order a first day cover and a set of new stamps from South Africa they pay more than double what I pay them to ship the items to me. I enclose samples of orders I have received from Zambia ( where I have to pay) and Pretoria (where I do not). It would hurt the South African government a lot more to increase their money-losing sales to U.S. collectors than to force them to save their money as Treasury is doing.

The problems this is creating for stamp collectors, who were never warned this was coming until after all public hearings were over on the bill are illustrated by the enclosed. The letter to-me by Mr. NcPeek represents one level of problem. The letter from Scott, the basic American catalog, representE. another. Further, Scott has cut off listings of South Africa and South West Africa stamps issued after November 24, 1986 although those of us with "standing orders" at Pretoria were legally able to receive orders through April of this year.

Another problem is that Treasury missed one and I received the enclosed first day cover from South West Africa. What am I supposed to do with it, burn it or get arrested? I would really appreciate some answers or regulation changes on this sort of thing.

I have tried to get some things straight with Treasury on my own. It has not worked very well. But I can tell you that after two phone calls from Ms. Cheryl Opacinch and one letter from Richard Newcomb have revealed a lot. First, Treasury/State intend to blame all this confu:;ion on the Congress. So far as I can see it is entirely their fault.

Ms. Opachinch let slip in her call to me earlier today that they consider the stamp ban to be the same sort of thing they have done to Cuba and Libya. Those actions, as I understand it, were executive and do not involve the issue of "Congressional intent". Let me add that I assume stamps and coins are considered as a single market/product by Congress 158

as they are in the private sector. Thus, the Congressional decision to ban all South African gold coins (which does hurt the South African government some) indicated Congress did NOT intend to ban imports of their silver coins, copper coins or their stamps. Ms. Opacinch repeatedly has indicated Congress order the stamp ban, in her discussions with me and tries to downplay the decision by the Department of State to get into this area,

To help clear up some of this mess, for members of my stamp club and myself, I wrote a letter to her boss, after her first call to me. I thought that that would clear things up. From it I got a letter tdat deals with only one question I asked. And I got another phone call; today.

In 'it Ms. Opacincn clair your office "couldn't" have been told they did mot at first plan to get into the postage stamp issue at all. This is contrary to your letter to West Virginia Congressman Alan Mollohan. She also said they would refuse to answer my last two questions in my May 5 letter. (Likely because they would reveal how little they knew about what they are doing.) She did admit they did not realize they were "freezing" the American "standing order accounts" in Pretoria, to the benefit of the South African government. And that they did not realize that government lost mom y on shipments to individual collectors like myself.

She did say that she believed stamps from South Africa purchased from private sources today and issued by the Union of South Africa, Cape Colony, Lord Baden-Powell, etc. "might" be legal to import since they were not products of the Republic of South Africa. But that all stamps issued trom 1961 on (after they pulled out of the British Commenwcalth, changed to the Republic of South Africa, and changed from British money to the "rand") would be illegal to import, even though they come from private sources in Southern Africa and the South African government long ago (before the act) received the only .evenue it ever will receive from their sale.

She also insisted that the Newomb letter is correct on the one point they did answer; about my receiving stamps/covers from small time trading with a pen-pal and donating a couple of such items to my non-profit stamp club's auction. No benefit would come to me from all this and it would actually cost me to do the trading. I aksed hew they could charge me for such a "crime" and tell a jury that such was the intent of the Aniti-Apartheid Act?

This got her upset. She seems to think I am coming up with ways to give them trouble. In truth several of us donate items to these auctions. I just don't see how legally imported covers/stamps can become illegal "commercial" items if I donate them to a non-profit organization. (I don't count them on my income tax either.)

She also admitted to me today that State/Treasury likely "could" have avoided all this by citing first day covers and postage stamps from the six associated stamp-issuing entities involved under Section 545.208, c which allows publications and printed matter to be imported even if government issued (ie South African Digest). Rather they have left them under Section 301.

I would suggest that perhaps a resolution saying philatelic material should be included under the protected items involved in 545.208c might resolve this entire matter.

Let me add that I am a member of the NAACP, and support the Southern Poverty Law Center. I won a "Man of the Year" award from the Washington Afro-American Newspaper in 1964 for my civil rights activities in the D.C. area. In 1977 1 obtained a promise (not kept) frum Presidetn Jimmy Carter to stop South African coal import, back when jobs were segregated on the mines and black workers could not belong to "legal" labor unions. I have since suggested we break diplomatic relations with Pretoria. And yes, I have visited South Africa and Pophuthatswana twice, in 1984 and 1986.

Eta 159

So far as the "independence" of stamp issuing entities such as Transkei, Venda, Clskal,and Bophuthatswana go, my opinion is that their relationship to South Africa is similar to that of the Comsonwealth of Puerto Rico to the United States. But sinca America allows Palau and similar places we control to issue their own stamps I see no reason for these "homeland" stamps not to receive at least the same treatment as South African stamps. All do postal duty in the international mails I can assure you.

anaot S ck, iector Kanawha Stamp Club 160

DONALD L. MACPEEK 1518 VILLAGE DRIVE SOUTH CHARLESTON, WV 74 'O March 16, 1987 Norman Kilpatrick Box 5024 harleeton, W.Va. '25361 Dear Norman$ In the past week or ten days, the restrictions concerning the Iportation of South African, South Went African" and homelands stamps hiave become more clear and appear to have hardended in interpretation. it now issue supplier has stated that he will no longer supply stamps of these areas. Agents of the government has written and visited hi. as well as other maj or dealers in this material nd hare made it clear that the government intends to onforo the ban on impormation with conviction of violation carrying the penalty of fine, imprisonment or/and confiscation of stock In which material issued after the effective date of the embargo or material issued earlier which cannot be reasonably proven to have been in the country prior to the embargo is found. The American Philatelic Society states that-they must operate under a directive from the Office of Foreign Assets Control, U.S. Treasury Dept. which makes the importation of these material illegal. Overseas members of the APS cannot send to the APB Sales Division salesbooks containing stamps of these areas R3JARDLBSS' of the date of issue. The receipt of mail with correct franking from these areas into the US in not importation. However, the receipt of mail matter bearing excessive posta--or containing unused copies of such stamps IS considered importation. It is expected that mail from these areas will be examined at ports of entry both for air and sea mail and proper action taken or planned. In the case of Cuba, for a long time now, the embargo has held and the trafficking in post- Castro stuff is Just not practiced in the trade for fear of confiscation. True, it is sometimes difficult if not impossible to prove when a certain older stamp may have arrived. However, having been in several situations brought on by ou government where it was up to me to prove I was innocent I shall elect to ,tot test the water Regardless of what you have told me, I have seen enough in the press and been given nough detail frm both the wholesale .and retail trade to convince ae that the federal government intends to enforce this met of rules and my plan is to obey the law. I cannot and will not subject my holdings to improper confiscation, even temporary nor can I suggest that anyone else try it. Maybe this is not wha your representatives in Congress have led you to believe. Nevertheles, this is what those in positions to know have told me is what has developed. I will acquire no further new issues and add older material only with a signed affidavit that the vendor held the mater 1 in stock prior to the embargo. My guess is that better material from Sath Africa and South West Africa will not be adversely affected but that the holders of large stocks of homelands material are in troubai with material which won't sell. What are you going to do? Regards 161 ScottPublishing Co. 911VANOEMARK ROAD, SIDNEY. OHIO 45365 513-49&080?

-March 27;41987 -,

iMr.•. , Norman". Kilpatrick ,, - . ",' 4, . Box '5024~ ,P'-y-k4-".. '. -,,.. ")$* / " :'-: Charleston'; WV 25361 . .. . Dear Mr Kilpatrick:

,Thanks for your.-letter, ofMarch 22,--with enclosuret>:'The- 1material"you sent confirms our belief that we are proceeding correctly.,--'

Acot, isiunder- nollegal: obligationto-:cease .listrc the . stamps- oFSouth Africa;' etc.",just -..as we are under nolegal obligationlto not list Cuba, North Korea, etc. Our belief, however,:,is that to continue'.to list such items during times of a commercial embargo promotes the-Aillicit trade of material.&We neither, want.to'be-'art"of such-an activity nor in. anyway. even, feel that we are part of such.. Therefore, to be very safe and at peace with ourselves, we choose to honor the embargo. Since ly,

chrdLe Sine ,Editorial-'Director.. 162

WASHINGTON

FAC No. 105290 May 15, 1987

Dear Mr. Kilpatrick: I am writing in response to your letter of May 5, 1987 regarding the effect of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act, Public Law 99-440 ("the Act"), upon the purchase and trade of South African stamps. Before addressing your specific questions, it might be helpful to review a relevant provision of the Act. Section 303(a) of the Act prohibits United States importation of articles "grown, produced, manufactured by, marketed, or otherwise exported by a parastatal organization of South Africa." Section 303(b) of the Act states, in relevant part, that "the term 'parastatal organization' means a corporation, partnership, or entity owned, controlled, or subsidized by the Government of South Africa." The Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control ("FAC") has issued regulations implementing the section 303 ban on imports from South African parastatal organizations (31 C.F.R. 545.208, published at 51 Fed. Reg. 41907, November 19, 1986). The regulation provides, at section 545.208(a)(2), for a limited transition period allowing United States importation of products from South African parastatal organizations if they are imported pursuant to. a contract entered into before August 15, 1986, and received by a national of the United States by April 1, 1987. The Department of State has been delegated the responsibility for determining which corporations, partnerships, or entities are parastatal organizations within the meaning of the Act. A listing of parastatal organization was published by the Department of State on March 20, 1987 (copy enclosed). These listings are not all inclusive.

The Department of State has advised FAC that South African governmental "statal"U entities, such as those stata entities issuing South African etamps, should be consider-ed parastatal within the -zaani"-s fSection 303 of the Act. United States importation of articles "grown, produced, manufactured by, marketed, or otherwise exported" by a parastatal organization for commercial purposes is banned by section 303 of the Act. Thus, the parastatal ban applies to the United States importation ofuth African stamps for commercial_ Irposes, bu Doto o tthe uUJ o -f o§ ca h stamps for the movement of mail. 163

-2-

Therefore, with regard to the specific questions you raise concerning the purchase of South African stamps from South African entities, such stamps could not be purchased and imported into the Unit-ed States, unless they were imported pursuant to a contract entered into before August 15, 1986, and received by a national of the United States by April 1, 1987. Further, we would no regard U.S. importation of South African stamps from trading with pen pals as Prohibited bv the Act if it is not conducted on a commercial basis (e.g., aedinimus exchange of stamps worth $10.00 or less in value would be permissible, if for the personal use of the pen pal and not for resale). We would regard the planned donation of such stamps to a stamp club for purposes of auctioning them as a ommercialtransactci. As your letter explains, although you would not directly receive a financial benefit from this transaction, the ultimate purpose of the import would be for commercial purposes and is, therefore, prohibited. I appreciate receiving the additional information provided in your letter, and hope that this response will be useful to you. Sincerely,

R. Richard Newcom Director Office of Foreign Assets Control

Mr. Norman Kilpatrick Surface Mining Research Library P.O. Box 5024 Charleston, W. Va. 25461

Enclosure .4

164

SURFACE MINING RESEARCH LIBRARY BOX 5024 CHARLESTON, WEST VIRGINIA 2531

(304) 346-3408 Nermam Kilpatrkk, Directot May 5, 1987

Mr. R. Richard Newcomb,Dlrector Office of Foreign Assets Control Department of the Treasury Washington, D.C. 20220 Dear Nr.' Newcomb: U.S. Senator Robert C. Byrd has been kind enough to forward to me your letter to him of April 7, 1987 concerning your agency's involvement in blocking commercial shipments of recent stamps from Southern Africa.

While I believe there are valid arguments that answer the statements you made in defense of the State Department decision to cut off new stamp shipments from Son-r.hAfrica's Philatelic Services, I do wish to debate that at this time.

Rather, I would like to follow up on the phone conversation I had with a member of your staff a few weeks back and ask for written answers to the following questions.

Is it all right for me to purchase "classic" Southern African stamps, such as Cape of Good Hope triangles and Hefikeng siege stamps, from private dealers or auction houses in South Africa7 (The siege was when the boy scout idea was first developed)

Is it all right for me to purchase South African, etc. stamps from private dealers (who are not government "fronts") issued up to August 1986? (in South Africa)

Is it all right for me to purchase South African, etc. stamps from private dealers (who are not government "fronts") issued after August 1986? (in South Africa)

May I trade with a pan pal for some Southern African stamps Issued after August 1986 and donate them to my stamp club? (My club would than auction them off with other stamps donated or otherwise given them, and I would receive no financial benefit from such donation.)

Wcre you aware that the "standing order accounts" Americans have with Philatelic Services and Intersapa have been converted into Rands and are not under our control? They can not be refunded or used for purchase of non-philatelic items produced by Philatelic Services.

Were you aware that South Africa's government loses money on every stamp and first day cover, etc. they send individual stamp collectors like me? This Is so because, like the Isle of Man and unlike Zambia and Zimbabwe they pay, at their expense, for air mail and registration for each order. Thus, if I order 10 Venda postcards, their costs are more than double what I pay them. On regular standing order account shipments of stamps and covers they also lose money, although the amount is less than on heavy items such as post cards. i Thank you for your answers to these questions.

Yours sincerely,

Norman Kilpatrick 0

82-205 (168)