Military Technology: the Realities of Imitation

CSS Analyses in Security Policy CSS ETH Zurich No. 238, February 2019, Editor: Christian Nünlist

Military Technology: The Realities of Imitation

According to a growing consensus, globalization and advances in communication are promoting the diffusion of defense-industrial capabilities, thus eroding the established position of Western countries. The empirical evidence, however, suggests that even with newly available opportunities, including cyber espionage, the most advanced weapon systems remain very difficult to copy and replicate.

By Andrea Gilli and Mauro Gilli

Over the past 20 years, several observers, policy-makers, and scholars have warned of an impending transformation in world politics driven by globalization and the information and communication technologies (ICT) revolution. As a result of this transformation, it is alleged, countries lagging behind in military technology will be able to close the gap in military technology that separates them from the most advanced countries much more easily and quickly than they could in the past.

This view, implicitly or explicitly, underpins some of the most important foreign policy and defense issues of our times, such as the diffusion of defense-industrial capabilities around the world and its effects on international stability; the progressive erosion of The maiden flight of the Soviet “Concordski” (Tupolev Tu-144 ) succeeded on 31 December 1968 – two months before the French Concorde. Viktor Korotayev / Reuters the Western industrial leadership in the defense industry and what it means for conventional deterrence; the current and future military modernization of China and its implications for East Asia and their time by leapfrogging on foreign in- ceed, these countries need to undergo an world politics. novations through imitation, industrial es- extremely demanding, expensive, and pionage, or reverse engineering. However, lengthy process. In this analysis, we explain why existing military technology has become exponen- concerns exaggerate the ease with which tially more complex in the meantime. As a Conventional Wisdom on Imitation countries lagging behind in the defense result, imitating advanced weapon systems According to the conventional wisdom, realm can catch up technologically with and replicating their performance has not changes in the economics of production as the industrial leaders. In the past, countries become easier, as many believe, but has well as in communication and production such as Imperial Germany, Imperial Japan, rather become more difficult. This does not technologies allow countries lagging be- and the Soviet Union under Stalin man- mean that countries aiming at developing hind in military technology to skip the aged to reduce the military-technological the most advanced weapon systems are lengthiest and most expensive stages in the edge held by the most advanced states of preordained to fail. It means that to suc- development of advanced weapon systems.

As a result, catching up technologically in ones: They are intended to operate in hos- and civilian industries today differ mark- the military realm should be allegedly easi- tile airspaces where they will need to avoid edly, so much so that even the defense and er and quicker than it used to be. Among detection, tracking, and engagement by en- commercial divisions of companies like the many changes purported to have emy’s integrated air defense systems or jet Boeing enjoy limited opportunities for brought about this change are the global- fighters. This poses as whole new set of synergies. Moreover, the fact that some ization of production and the resulting dif- problems, given advances in sensing tech- components are dual-use does not mean fusion of industrial capabilities around the nologies and signal processing. Consider that commercial companies will be able to world; the advent of real-time communica- that minor defects in the design or in the integrate them successfully with thousands tions and faster spread of knowledge and application of radar absorbing material are of other defense-only components; or that information; the increasing digitalization sufficient to compromise the low observ- commercial companies will have the neces- of data and the opportunity to steal it ability to radar of a “stealth” aircraft – for sary expertise to ensure mutual compatibil- through cyber espionage; and the availabil- example, if a couple of screws are not per- ity among all the components, or the test- ity of software assistance for each stage of fectly aligned with the aircraft’s airframe. ing and production facilities required to the production process, which could com- detect and address vulnerabilities in the pensate for the lack of experience or capa- The Challenge of Imitation platform as a whole. bilities on the part of the imitating coun- As complexity increases, the number and tries – i.e., computer-assisted design depth of possible incompatibilities and vul- Second, the development of modern weap- (CAD), computer-assisted manufacturing nerabilities increase exponentially when on systems takes many years and often de- (CAM), and additive manufacturing (3D developing a weapon system. Anticipating, cades, during which myriad problems may printing). detecting, identifying, understanding, and emerge. Even apparently minor ones, such addressing all the possible incompatibili- as the oxidation of rubber seals, might pose Increasing Complexity ties and vulnerabilities entails extensive ef- a fatal threat to the platform being devel- The mainstream view, that catching up fort, experience, and time. Countries trying oped. The incompatibilities and vulnerabil- technologically has become easier and will ities that emerge during weap- become even easier, seems to ignore a con- China has struggled ons development are the comitant change in weapons production, inevitable product of integrat- namely the exponential increase in the tremendously in imitating ing components that are not complexity of military technology over the US 5th generation jet fighters. fully tested and developed; of past century. This has made the imitation of developing weapon systems the most advanced military platforms sig- that operate under challenging nificantly more difficult – so much so as to to copy a foreign weapon system will hence and previously unexplored environmental countervail the facilitating effect of global- face a possibly infinite number of stum- conditions; and of having to deal with the ization and new communication and pro- bling blocks: without the necessary indus- counter-measures and counter-systems of duction technologies. trial capabilities and experience, imitating more advanced enemies. The solutions to countries might not even be able to detect, these problems are often found in less than Weapon systems today encompass a much identify, or understand the problems they straightforward ways, entailing extensive larger number of much more sophisticated encounter. trial-and-error and the cooperation of components and subsystems than in the multiple teams of designers, engineers, sci- past. For example, the software for US jet First, attaining and maintaining the indus- entists, and specialized workers, each of fighters has increased from the 1,000 lines trial, scientific, and technological capabili- whom bring their own expertise to the ta- of code in the F-4 Phantom II (1958) to ties required for copying advanced weapon ble. As a result, a part of the knowledge de- 1.7 million lines in the F-22 Raptor (2006) systems has become extremely difficult. rived from this process is often tacit – it and 5.6 million lines in the F-35 Lightning While in the early 20th century European cannot be written down in terms of general II (2015). Even a very low defect rate, such countries could use their commercial in- rules and principles. This feature provides as that reported for the US aerospace industry to develop state-of-the-art weapon defense companies with an important ad- dustry in 2000 (5.9 defects for every 1,000 systems, this is no longer possible. Weap- vantage vis-à-vis would-be imitators. lines of code), will lead to an extraordinari- ons development entails very specific prob- ly large number of problems whose solu- lems that have no equivalent in the com- Empirical Realities tions might be mutually incompatible, and mercial sectors, such as safe storage of The evidence from the defense industry thus require additional (and hence exten- explosives activated by electronic circuits does not support the conjecture that imi- sive, expensive, and frustrating) effort. This within a ship or an aircraft; or reducing the tating modern weapon systems has become is the reason why, nowadays, software has chance of detection to enemy sensors such easier than it used to be, nor is there any become the primary source of delay and as radar and sonar. For this reason, each indication to back up the claim that global- cost overrun for major defense projects. platform under development requires spe- ization and new technologies are facilitat- Moreover, modern weapon systems are ex- cific dedicated equipment, laboratories, ing technological catch-up. With regards pected to operate under extremely de- testing facilities, and specialized personnel to the alleged role of dual-use components, manding environmental and operational – such as test ranges with radars operating it is useful to consider the case of the Aegis conditions. Jet fighters like the F-35 fly at at different frequencies and providing anti-missile defense system, one of the supersonic speed, which entails very strict overlapping coverage; climatic laboratories most advanced military technologies of the requirements in terms of materials em- and supersonic wind tunnels; test pilots U.S. Navy, which it fielded in 1983. The ployed and airframe design. Modern jet with combat experience; or welders with Aegis system relies on dual-use technology fighters like the F-35 face not only envi- submarine-specific experience. This degree for more than 75 per cent of its compo- ronmental challenges, but also operational of specialization means that the defense nents. Nevertheless, it remains unrivaled in

the world. Moreover, after France, Germa- cess to foreign designs and blueprints as Further Literature ny, Italy, and the UK had decided to devel- well as to foreign know-how and experi- op a similar system in the 1990s, it took ence. However, even in these instances, Wedo Wang, Reverse Engineering: Technology of Reinvention (Boca Raton, them two decades to field their Principal translating foreign information into a FL: CRC, 2010). Anti Air Missile System (PAAMS), fol- working weapon system has proved much Norman Friedman, Naval Firepower: Battle- lowing repeated problems and failures. more difficult than generally accepted. The ship Guns and Gunnery in the Dreadnought Similarly, access to foreign designs and case of Spain in the submarine sector is Era (Barnsley, UK: Seaforth, 2008). blueprints is not sufficient to replicate an telling. After extensive cooperation in with Douglas Dalglleish / Larry Schweikart, advanced weapon system. The Soviet France on submarine design and develop- Trident (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois Union experienced these challenges in the ment, Spain decided to develop its own in- University Press, 1984). 1970s, when it managed to get its hands on digenous submarine. However, when the Christine Anderson / Merlin Dorfman (eds.), the designs for the Anglo-French super- project had almost been completed, Span- Aerospace Software Engineering: sonic airliner Concorde. Because of the re- ish engineers discovered a design flaw in A Collection of Concepts (Washington, DC: American Institute of Aeronautics and semblance between the airframe of the the new S-80 submarine: because of weight Astronautics, 1991). Concorde and of the Soviet replica (the imbalance, it would not be able to resurface Obaid Younossi et al., Military Jet Engine Tu-144), the latter was sarcastically nick- after submerging. This problem, which is Acquisition: Technology Basics and named “Concordski” by Western journal- currently being addressed, requires the Cost-Estimating Methodology ists. However, beneath the surface, it was lengthening of the hull. In additions to the (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2002). deficient in many realms, as the Soviet in- cost and delay that this modification will dustry lacked the experience and industrial entail, Spain will first need to expand its capabilities to understand the designs and docking infrastructure, as the existing one replicate the processes, materials, and tech- is too small for implementing the required nologies used by Western European and changes. North American companies. gines, radar, and missile navigation and Finally, there is little reason to believe that tracking systems. Moreover, China has also There is little reason to believe that digital the increasing digitalization of data will relied extensively on traditional espionage, technologies have brought about or will make the transfer of know-how easier. For including the recruitment of spies who bring about a revolutionary transformation, example, standardized digital data did not worked for the most advanced Western de- either. For instance, software assistance is ease or accelerate the transmission of com- fense companies; the illicit purchase of no substitute for the experience, intuition, plex design information among different proprietary data from foreign companies; or understanding of designers, engineers, companies participating to the Eurofighter and the purchase of foreign weapon sys- or specialized workers, but can only com- Typhoon project, as the working practices tems from abroad with the goal of reverse- plement their skills. This was evident dur- of some of these companies were initially engineering them. China has also cooper- ing the development of the F/A-18 Hor- too different, which required that practices ated with countries such as Israel and net. CAD failed to predict the F/A-18’s were standardized before the companies Russia through joint-production programs aerodynamics problems, and provided little could take full advantage of digitalization. with the goal of enhancing its industrial Along the same lines, additive capabilities in aerospace; and it violated Developing advanced weapons manufacturing can be very ef- some licensing agreements with the goal of fective for the production of producing indigenous copies of foreign is a long, difficult, and expensive parts for repair and mainte- weapon systems. Last but not least, China process. nance, but cannot produce en- is, without doubt, one of the countries that tire subsystems or modules has benefited the most from globalization (such as turbofan engines or ra- in recent decades, enjoying an unprece- help in finding a solution – which was dar systems). In turn, only specialized dented inflow of foreign direct invest- eventually found due to the experience of workers with extensive experience can car- ments. As a result, some of the most im- the engineers at McDonnell Douglas and ry out the replacements of defective or portant companies in aerospace have extensive reliance on wind tunnels testing. damaged parts in very advanced weapon opened subsidiaries or started joint ven- Similarly, CAD is not a magic solution to systems. tures in China. engineering and industrial problems, as the UK learned during the development of its China’s Cyber Espionage Campaign Nevertheless, China has struggled tremen- Astute-class nuclear-powered submarines. What about cyber espionage? Over the dously in imitating US fifth-generation jet The British shipbuilding industry in fact past few years, many have worried that cy- fighters. The Chinese J-20 Black Eagle dis- had to modify its CAD software extensive- ber espionage might completely change the plays several features on the front, sides, and ly before it could employ it to address the dynamics of industrial capitalism. Some rear that would significantly increase the idiosyncratic requirements of submarines. have gone as far as to claim that it might chance of detection to enemy radar (namely, Moreover, the employment of CAD re- bring about the greatest transfer of wealth canards in the front and unshielded engine quired shipyard workers who could inter- in history. The case of China provides a nozzles in the back). China has also strug- pret and understand CAD outputs – which particularly convenient test. China is one gled with the development of reliable and in turn takes extensive training and time. of the countries that has relied most exten- powerful low-bypass turbofan engines that sively on cyber espionage: according to provide both enhanced maneuverability We reach the same conclusion when look- some accounts, it has stolen some 50 tera- (thrust-vectoring) and sustained supersonic ing at cases of defense cooperation, which byte of data about the US stealth aircraft, speed (supercruise). China has in fact en- generally give a less advanced country ac- as well as about key subsystems such as en- countered never-ending problems with the

engine intended for the J-20 – including the center of international politics. More- To anticipate, detect, identify, understand, explosions during ground tests. In fact, the over, continued technological progress has and address all the possible incompatibili- indigenous engines China has mounted on given rise to potentially revolutionary tech- ties and vulnerabilities, countries need the J-20 have proven to be unreliable and nologies in the defense sector, such as un- equipment, laboratories, testing facilities, manned and autonomous sys- and specialized personnel as well as exten- There is no substitute for the tems, cyber-capabilities, and sive experience with the system being de- industrial capabilities and quantum computing. Over the veloped and the environmental and opera- past few years, many have wor- tional context in which the system will be experience necessary to develop ried that globalization and new deployed. While countries might be able to advanced military platforms. communication and production learn from others’ mistakes and experience, technologies might reshape the the development of advanced weapon sys- defense industry by promoting tems will remain a long, difficult, and -ex underpowered – moreover, they do not pro- the diffusion of the capabilities, experience, pensive process, especially in light of in- vide either high maneuverability or sus- and know-how from developed countries creasingly capable counter-systems and tained supersonic speed. Last but not least, to less developed ones, in the process de- counter-measures. there are serious doubts that China has priving the former of an advantage they been able to close the military-technologi- have enjoyed at least since the Second cal gap vis-à-vis the US in the electronics, World War. given that China has apparently also en- countered problems with the least demand- In this analysis, we have argued that this Dr. Andrea Gilli is a Senior Researcher in Military ing part of the onboard software, the flight- view lacks empirical support. Globalization Affairs at the NATO Defense College in Rome, control software. There is then no reason to and new communications technologies Italy and an affiliate at CISAC, Stanford University. believe that China has had more success permit the real-time transmission of un- The views expressed in this article do not when it comes to the most demanding part precedented amounts of data. New infor- represent those of NATO or of the NATO Defense of the onboard software, which carries out mation and production technologies allow College. automatic detection of enemy aircraft at for much more complicated computations Dr. Mauro Gilli is a Senior Researcher in Military long range, exact geolocation, and high- and simultaneously permit a higher level of Technology and International Security at the confidence identification, as well as precise precision in manufacturing. None of them, Center for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zurich. and continuous target tracking. however, provides a substitute for the in- Some of the ideas presented in this brief are dustrial capabilities and experience neces- discussed more at length in their recent article Conclusions sary to develop advanced military plat- “Why China Has Not Caught Up Yet: Military-Tech- With the rise of China and the resurgence forms. The complexity of modern weapon nological Superiority and the Limits of Imitation, of Russia, Great Power rivalry and mili- systems gives rise to a never-ending num- Reverse Engineering, and Cyber Espionage,” in: tary-technological competition are back at ber of incompatibilities and vulnerabilities. International Security 43/3 (Winter 2018/19).

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