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Research The future of archaeological theory movement. Post-processual archaeology is generally associated with a critique of ecological functionalism. It rejected universal laws of culture in favour of a focus on culturally and historically contingent circumstances, within which factors ranging from ideology and power to gender and class were significant in the negotiation of social position. Artefacts were identified as material symbols, actively employed in social strategies, whose meaning was best apprehended by exploring their context. Finally, much of post-processual archaeology had a decidedly humanist tenor, emphasising the status of human beings as active, embodied social agents (Hodder 1982). It was as a result of archaeology’s ‘phenomenological moment’ in the 1990s that some of these arguments were first challenged from within (Jones 2012: 8). Phenomenology is critical of a Cartesian vision of the world as a container of inert entities, in which humans as ‘rational animals’ generate understanding in the form of mental representations. It also approves a vision of material ‘things’ as relational entities whose significance derives from their physical substance as much as their symbolic meaning (Heidegger 1971, 1977). Yet the ultimate failure of phenomenology in archaeology has lain in the widespread misapprehension that it is concerned with no more than the way that human subjects access their environment. To the contrary, some phenomenologists would actually argue that human beings happen to be the component of an integrated world through which reality reveals itself. This is, however, something that they have no choice in, and it occurs in historically particular ways over which they have no control (Braver 2014: 139). The new materialism’s most significant inheritance from phenomenology is the critique of anthropocentrism and human exceptionalism (Rae 2013: 3). That is, a rejection of the belief that human beings have an immutable nature that sets them apart from the rest of creation and that grants them a privileged position as the masters and interpreters of all other beings. In recent forms of archaeological thought, this has morphed into what we might call an ‘ontological humility’ (Wolfendale 2014: 165). Post-processual archaeologists were often at pains to emphasise the ethical dimensions of studying other human beings in the past and present, but it is now often considered a form of hubris to value people to the point of neglecting the moral demands of other kinds of entities, including material ‘things’. One dimension of this shift has been an ‘animal turn’, which insists that other animate species should no longer be relegated to the status of symbols, totems and ‘resources’, but instead identified as active agents in their own right (Overton & Hamilakis 2013: 114). The impact of this ‘post-human’ perspective has been most keenly expressed in changing attitudes towards physical ‘things’.

Things are not what they used to be In recent years, a multifaceted argument has been mounted to the effect that material entities have been systematically underestimated and neglected by the human sciences (Olsen 2012: 20). Indeed, they are reduced to one of the following: inanimate matter to which things are ‘done’; symbols invested with meaning by humans; expressions of human creativity; or mundane objects to be passed over without comment (Webmoor 2007: 567). The net effect of this is that although disciplines from archaeology to art history study ‘things’, they generally do so in order to get at something else: the people who made, perceived C Antiquity Publications Ltd, 2015

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Research The future of archaeological theory entities that we study (Witmore 2007: 546; Olsen et al. 2012: 12). Noting that modern Western thought tends to divide reality up into unequally balanced dichotomies, it advocates a levelling of the relationships between people and ‘things’, ideas and practices. It has been argued, however, that the effect of this balancing is simply to leave these dualisms in place, while reducing heterogeneous things and objects to sameness (Ingold 2012: 429). Democratic modesty, and the recognition of objects as dynamic participants in our world, has led to a re-evaluation of the ethical status of material ‘things’, particularly in the domain of heritage studies. If objects can affect us, do they merely exist for our pleasure andedification,ordotheyhaverightsoftheirown(Sørenson2013: 7)? And if objects are not ‘surrogate humans’ but operate in their own ways, should we not show greater respect for their independent role in our shared world (Olsen et al. 2012: 202)? There is, however, growing unease over the indiscriminate affordance of respect and sympathy to groups of non-humans. Does putting everything on the same level ultimately erode our capacity to prioritise the needs of disadvantaged humans (Gratton 2014: 119)? Do we really want to create a moral equivalence between migrants, disabled people, fruit flies and anglepoise lamps (Berry 2012)?

Ontology and alterity The newfound preoccupation with material entities among the human sciences is structurally linked with a ‘turn’ to ontology, the philosophical investigation of the fundamental character of worldly entities. It is argued that since at least the seventeenth century, Western thought has been fixated with the problem of human knowledge. The question of how the mind can acquire secure information about the world was more crucial than what it is we might learn (Niemoczynski 2013: 20). The philosophical movement known as ‘speculative realism’ argues that we have consequentially been caught like rabbits in the headlights of epistemology for 300 years (Meillassoux 2008). We should instead have the confidence to assert that there is a real world out there, and be prepared to speculate about the character of that world. The ‘ontological turn’ has, however, taken radically different forms in different disciplines. For the speculative realists, it is concerned with the primordial nature of a reality that is utterly independent of human cognition and cultural values (Gratton 2014: 16). By contrast, in anthropology the talk is not of ontology but ontologies (Henare et al. 2007: 6). In the past, ethnographers have generally held that the peoples whom they study have different cultural perceptions of a single material world (whose definitive understanding is implicitly given by Western science). Breaking down any division between ideas and reality, it becomes possible to argue that different people are not just interpreting the world differently, but inhabiting different material worlds with multiple ontologies (Alberti 2013: 45). A particular community may, for example, maintain that stones and people are one and the same. This need not be evaluated in terms of cultural belief. Under particular circumstances, stones can have the same capacities as human beings and cause similar things to happen; in this sense, they are equivalent (Alberti et al. 2011: 904). In a similar way, different archaeological interpretations are not just sets of abstract ideas, as they actually arise from linking real ‘things’ together (artefacts, site reports, archives, measuring equipment, soil descriptions, C Antiquity Publications Ltd, 2015

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Research The future of archaeological theory between the two or to identify archaeological interpretations as more or less successful approximations of reality (Fowler 2013b: 31). This suggestion hereby introduces the theme of interpretation, which is treated with some ambivalence in the contemporary literature. At least two recent publications advocate a form of archaeology that comes ‘after interpretation’, although what they each mean by this differs considerably. Jones and Alberti reject the figure of the interpreting archaeologist, aloof from both their evidence and contemporary society (2013: 16), and emphasise instead the imbrication of theories, techniques, people and apparatus described by Fowler (2013a: 235). But for Olsen, the over- interpretation of artefacts and the attempt to make them tell us about past societies should be rejected in favour of a more descriptive approach (Olsen 2012: 22). As a result, he argues that archaeology should attempt to reconstruct material memories rather than narrative history. This contrasts with other new materialisms that emphasise the specific historical circumstances in which ‘things’ and people interact (e.g. Bennett 2010: 24). While neither account rejects interpretation altogether, there is clearly a problem that it is often understood as a search for deep meanings and hidden truths. The alternative has always been to see interpretation as the way in which understanding is generated from being in the midst of events and experiences, finding one’s way through the world.

Networks and the social Just as contemporary archaeologies sometimes claim to be post-interpretive, there is also talk of a turn ‘beyond the social’ (Webmoor 2007: 569). For thinkers influenced by network theories, society is not something that already exists, but something that people and ‘things’ conspire to bring into being (Latour 2005: 4). Increasingly, archaeologists are comfortable with the view that societies may be made up of diverse entities, rather than being composed exclusively of intersubjective relations: perhaps less a post-social archaeology than an extended notion of the social (Lucas 2012: 260). In the case of the Eurasian Neolithic, for instance, it may be helpful to consider people, animals and artefacts becoming bound together to create new kinds of communities (Thomas 2015: 1082). These perspectives are generally informed to some extent by the actor-network theory (ANT) of Bruno Latour and colleagues (Latour 2005). For Latour, nothing ever operates in isolation, but actants form networks that produce effects. Anything can be an actant—a person, a microscope, a cartoon character—so long as it can enter into alliances with other actants to bring about change (Harman 2014: 37). No actant is more ‘real’ than any other (a mythological deity may be as ‘effective’ as a stone monument), but they may be stronger or weaker, attracting more or fewer allies. Such an approach is relational, seeing reality created by the mediations and translations that take place between actants, but it none the less presents the latter as self-contained entities that can become uncoupled in order to create new networks (Harman 2009: 144). In our discipline, the network approach has been impressively employed by the symmetrical ‘school’ in casting the business of investigating the past as an ‘ecology of practices’. As its followers note, the history of archaeology often focuses on a succession of ‘great men’ or sets of socio-political circumstances (Olsen et al. 2012: 37). What are left out are the battalions of plane tables, wheelbarrows, trowels, pencils, section drawings and C Antiquity Publications Ltd, 2015

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Research The future of archaeological theory emergent rather than attributable to any one element (Fowler 2013b: 23). The notion of assemblage deliberately blurs the conventional boundary between culture and nature, so that both ecologies and societies can, together and independently, be assemblages. Although their components may include ‘inanimate’ objects, assemblages are alive even though they are not bounded organisms (Lucas 2012: 188). Assemblages may be more or less ‘territorialised’, meaning that they may either become more stable and coherent, or prone to break apart to form new combinations. For our discipline, one of the attractions of the concept is that it is equally applicable to sets of artefacts existing in the present and to social or ecological entities operating in the past (Jones & Alberti 2013: 28). Assemblage theory offers a novel approach to agency, which it presents as confederate, compositional and distributive (Bennett 2010: 33). Neither ‘things’ nor people act in isolation, and outcomes are emergent rather than attributable to any single entity. This view has been used by John Robb (2013) in his discussion of the spread of the European Neolithic, and by Jane Bennett in her classic account of the 2003 North American electrical blackout (2010: 25). Yet as Bennett recognises, this approach raises serious ethical difficulties. It is one thing to say that several millions of Americans were inconvenienced by a cascade of effects generated by an assemblage of electrons, managers, power lines, trees and wind. But we might have reservations about treating a historical event such as the Holocaust as an assemblage of disparate entities if it in any way reduced the scale of human responsibility, illuminating though it might be. Indeed, although we might wish to reject anthropocentrism, archaeologists will probably continue to concern themselves with humanity, if only as a historically emergent phenomenon (Barrett 2014: 68). Embedding humanity in heterogeneous assemblages of vibrant materials and living organisms demands that we should focus on the process of life. In one view, it is essential that we should distinguish between living and non-living matter, recognising that only the former is capable of self-production (Barrett 2014: 72). The alternative, however, is that living assemblages are composed of both organic and inorganic matter (Protevi 2012: 248). For instance, soil is composed of both humus and a mineral component. Organisms are a specialised kind of entity, in which the process of life is enclosed. From this perspective, not only causality but animacy and vitality are best understood at the level of the assemblage rather than that of the individual organism. Nevertheless, the entities that make up assemblages are differentiated according to their capacities, such as intentionality and skill. Equally, we might wish to argue that thinking is not something that is enclosed in a single brain, but involves an ‘extended mind’ that encompasses the flows and fluxes of the physical world (Ingold 2012: 438). This would amount to a revised form of panpsychism, in which we think and experience with and through the world, rather than about it (Shaviro 2014: 63).

Conclusion In continuing to develop, and in experimenting with, the ‘new materialisms’, archaeological thought has not achieved a new consensus so much as identified new areas of interest. It is to be expected that debates over history, realism, humanity, interpretation, alterity and C Antiquity Publications Ltd, 2015

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Received: 1 October 2015; Accepted: 5 October 2015; Revised: 10 October 2015

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