ecieteasmlgso hnsta aeacudt ieapriua eidsm kind some period particular a give to accrued assured, have are that we things (Braidwood not, of artefact” is assemblages the condition the behind past describe a “indian of the archaeology find an to of the into when condition role among historical the particular materials merely Consequently, each brought as being. other that things humans all the between involving occurred between that relations many rendering those condition, over any relationships characterising Webmoor human-material (e.g. others privilege by and to Witmore by out set argument The argument The ( Witmore Christopher Introduction Barrett C. John antiquarianism? new The ∗ hog eain ihbcei,hdeos ae,cmato” n ftemtrasthat materials the transformed Olivier be if (cf. may and memories house material compaction”; former are water, A confront hedgehogs, picture. archaeologists bacteria, the of with part relations be through to cease humans when another fs,aew o opats rhelg nta h td ftehmnps hog its through past human the of study (Witmore the things” as of “not discipline the archaeology as practise but Materialisms—and to remains, New now material the we as are characterises so, Witmore if lead—what (Witmore might existence” they their wherever awl for to the reasons pot, the the beyond concerning “look explanations 2014 to for demand enclosure the stone eschew that a it labours or should human and past things, various upon the acted of once indications the excavating with concerned discipline ssml ipae.Tig e n“utfie ihu h eeto ua intervention human of benefit the without meaning fine” them “just giving (Witmore in on interpretation and own get and things those Things their of misplaced. making of simply the memories exclusive in is often agency the and human traditional a bear the to and given confront presence, priority human archaeologists a of that necessity the things without formation the words, other In then future, the in recalled ANTIQUITY C niut ulctosLd 2016 Ltd, Publications Antiquity eateto rhelg,Uiest fSefil,NrhaeHue etSre,Sefil 14T K(Email: UK 4ET, S1 Sheffield Street, West House, Northgate Sheffield, j.barrett@sheffield.ac.uk of University Archaeology, of Department uuaielbr fgnrtoso agr,cide lyn aei un rthe or ruin, a the in wood), game and a trees years water playing oak many children of fungi, after roots badgers, microbes, probing wood of between olive generations (rapports of of labors made weather cumulative roof strewn the series a materials to a of whether sheepfold, exposure collapse a of as of the structure little storms, a us snow of reuse tells exceptional the of often from resulted hold level things abandonment an that across memory of kind The 0) osqety sacaooynwamte ffloigtetig themselves things the following of matter a now archaeology is Consequently, 204)? : 034(06:18–66doi: 1681–1686 (2016): 354 90 ∗ ) 2014 (Witmore 2014 1)rcnl bevdta tig oo etrigone perturbing on go “things that observed recently 215) : 1) hudacaooyteeoealwta ti o a not is it that allow therefore archaeology Should 217). : 2014 1681 215). : 1958 2011 3) u ahr sue to assume, I rather, but 734), : 2014 rmwihaps st be to is past a which from ) 2007 203)? : le 02 refuses 2012) Olsen ; 10.15184/aqy.2016.216

Debate John C. Barrett of material definition or where such a period might be seen as “the cumulative labors of generations” of things. Thus, if archaeology is now to grapple with the reality of things themselves, and without recourse to the “greener pastures” of interpretation, then what more can archaeology do other than “describe and describe some more” (Witmore 2014: 204, 221)? Indeed, Olsen suggests that we let ourselves be inspired by the descriptive richness the antiquarians aimed at, which also is manifested in the accounts left us by explorers and ‘adventurers’ such as Fridtjof Nansen, Knud Rasmussen, and Helge Ingstad. The challenge is to produce rich descriptive accounts that also understand, not by heading beyond things and the immediate world, or by leaving out what arises in the momentary presence of encounter, but by allowing them a rightful share (Olsen 2012: 27). The turn to description advocated by Witmore and by Olsen must not be confused with Ryle’s idea of ‘thick description’ as developed by Clifford Geertz (1973). For Geertz, the ‘thick’ ethnographic description of events should reveal, through their interpretation, the generative logic and cultural confusions that gave those events their particular quality, while for Witmore and Olsen, there appears to be nothing beyond the relationships in an assemblage of things that might allow us to understand a particular condition. Things differ certainly, and while there is no disinterest in those different things that are identified as people (Olsen 2012: 29), neither is there an attempt to humanise all things when we recognise that these things have their own agencies as a consequence of their existence: things are simply what they are and, occurring in networks of relationships, they make a difference. The philosophical origin for the ideas expressed by Witmore, Olsen and those others who claim allegiance to the New Materialisms in archaeology draws upon the idea of a flat ontology (DeLanda 2002;Bryant2011: 245–70). Ontology concerns that which exists and this must be distinguished from epistemology, where the latter concerns the means of our knowing. What exists and what we know of what exists are not one and the same, although the distinction has not always been recognised (Bhaskar 1997 [1975]; Meillassoux 2008:8). A flat ontology describes reality as a condition that arises out of the interplay, or network, that exists between entities; an assemblage in other words where no one entity determines the form of the assemblage as a whole. Reality is therefore constituted as the equable interplay of things. In the well-worn example offered by Latour (1999), the question of whether it is the gun or the person that kills is answered simply by asserting that it is the assemblage of the person and the gun that kills, an assemblage to which both person and gun contribute ‘symmetrically’ to the unfortunate outcome. One consequence of this reasoning is that archaeological things cannot be taken as having gained their significance simply by virtue of human interpretation: they are not objects that once stood for some other value that was recognised or that was imposed upon them by the agency of the human subject. Things are never, first and foremost, ‘symbols in action’, and we can abandon such archaeological narratives in which “a boat, an elk or a reindeer can be claimed to represent or signify almost everything—ancestors, rites of passage, borders, totems, gender, supernatural powers and so on—apart, it seems, only from themselves” (Olsen 2012: 22). Instead, humans have always lived amongst the things that have worked C Antiquity Publications Ltd, 2016

1682 adaWlae( Wallace Sandra ontology Depth beyond go to need “ the that of insights in written the more has seek some Renfrew to them and Colin describe description accounts? to antiquarian then of and richness assemblages the those describe to merely archaeology people carried and floated simply example, for boats, (Olsen where water and on things, other to relation in h itrclpoesso aeilcniin hti ssrl h ako rhelg to archaeology of task the from, surely emerge is stratification thus it a and that ontology’, conditions of, ‘depth material manifestations a understand. of are for processes things case historical description of the the the unrewarding assemblages generating reassert and where revealed to flat given existences, be be view, a of to must possible such more sequences only to nothing material the alternative is of is The there this things. ontology: course between flat of relationships a long-term But underlying to a any happened. commitment things, of have the of manifestation to assemblages the seems being the just of in process, instead change trajectory, ongoing historical an whose in sequence getting moment of one way Sibbesson a simply in & as was agriculture materials (Jones to to achieved transition return the was their how re-describingBritain of of take interpretations detailed mark to archaeological a the Sibbesson, conflicting as for and the us Jones calling beyond offered what is now exactly he have is that example, this Yet one doubt sequences. I material this of by cataloguing and means he whatever and 5), ealsu otiko nacaooywtottePs;ta s ihu eaaerealm separate a without is, that (Witmore Past; yonder” argument Witmore’s the over that without lived posture archaeology were the an lives reject of where and think conditions to past us of “enables reality the accept us let ( Bhaskar’s ftehmnps uthv enlk omk tpsil o st ana archaeological an gain to us for possible reality the it what make ask to and reality. like Bhaskar that been follow of have can knowledge we must so past and human past, the a of of knowledge our make do we itr feegn rprista a tece costelnetpsil iesae(cf. scale time possible longest the across stretched has a Smail that describes properties therefore emergent stratification of This chemistry. history from atoms, emerge of structure mechanisms physical biological the from and emerge mechanisms chemical way, this In mechanisms. ehncllmttosipsdb h aso hsc;booia rcse ant however, cannot, processes biological physics; of laws the by imposed limitations mechanical ( Thompson D’Arcy that reason this for each conversely, is It where, level. but preceding originated, the to they reduction whence by from explained be level cannot the level of laws or regularities u shsoyntigmr hntefraino aeilasmlgs n sterl of role the is and assemblages, material of formation the than more nothing history is But elt sitisclysrtfid n hsa ( Bhaskar and stratified, intrinsically is Reality aslcpcte o euil oayo h nrni aslcpcte fteprsnrto nor parts the parts possess of between capacities that relations causal (reducible) wholes intrinsic the the or of of any systems any to basic of reducible more features not by capacities are causal determined features nor emergent to Ontologically reducible features. neither are features emergent Ontologically 2008 1979 ,adi hc h mretpoete tec ee utacmoaethe accommodate must level each at properties emergent the which in and ), , 2010 2011 1997 1942 129–49). : a eetyepaie h rhelgcliprac fRoy of importance archaeological the emphasised recently has ) 17] ruetfrasrtfido et nooy obegin, To ontology. depth or stratified a for argument [1975]) eonsdta h ein fbooyms ofr othe to conform must biology of designs the that recognised ) h e antiquarianism? new The explain 2013 1683 2014 Slesen&McGeever & (Silberstein .FrJnsadSbesn hstransition this Sibbesson, and Jones For ). 1997 o h atcm bu”(Renfrew about” came past the how 0) ed o aeteps,but past, the make not do We 204). : 9 xrse hsa taicto of stratification a as this expresses 19) : C niut ulctosLd 2016 Ltd, Publications Antiquity 1999 186). : 1982 :

Debate John C. Barrett be understood by reduction to either chemistry or, ultimately, to physics. The emergence of each level therefore represents a major transformation in mechanisms, spanning from the birth of the universe to the emergence of life on earth (Morowitz 2002). The additional implication is that history has directionality, and a significant transformation in this trajectory obviously occurred when the mechanisms of biology emerged from those of chemistry. Although we might specify the chemical conditions necessary for life, our understanding of how life originated remains speculative at best; as Stuart Kauffman put it: “Anyone who tells you that he or she knows how life started on the earth some 3.45 billion years ago is a fool or a knave” (Kauffman 1995: 31). Living things are distinct from non-living things in virtue of the mechanism of their development: non-living things tend towards their lowest possible energy state (water flows downhill, radioactive particles decay), whereas living organisms dissipate energy as a means of sustaining their own growth and development through the process of metabolism. Biological evolution thus describes a stratified trajectory traced out by the major steps in an evolving complexity that emerged with simple cells and culminated with complex multi-cellular organisms (Maynard Smith & Szathmary´ 1997). Living and non-living matter are therefore ontologically distinct, and the historical conditions that are the object of archaeological enquiry were those that emerged out of the co-existence of both from the time that human life-forms first evolved. The degree, and the basis, upon which humanity, in its various forms of humanness, might be regarded as a distinct and emergent form of life should surely be one very difficult issue that archaeology might be expected to address (cf. Barrett 2014a). These emergent historical conditions arose in the interplay between the physical stability and decay of things and the colonisation of niche environments by forms of life whose appropriation of available sources of free energy ensured their own continuity and development. Humanness has evolved by reworking the architectures and technologies of particularly complex and diverse niche environments, and by widening the range of energy sources it has been prepared to degrade (Ryan & McKevitt 2013). It is the residues of these environments that form the basic data that are available for archaeological investigation. The diversity in this human project has arisen out of the different ways that humans have found the contexts of their existence to be of significance for them, not because they convert the material world into symbols, but because things have been recognised in terms of their qualities, and it has been by the practical engagement with those qualities and by embodied references to the qualities of existence itself that life has been found to be both possible and meaningful. The archaeology of the interdependence of human life forms and the architectures of their existence is an issue that has recently been explored by Ian Hodder (2012: 64–87).

Conclusion The social world is indeed formed in the enmeshing of humans, plants, animals and things (Latour 2005), but how that enmeshing is achieved, and the consequent forms of life and of materialities that emerge from it, is surely the object of historical enquiry. This requires that we confront questions concerning the depth of existence, and it is these questions that are abandoned by the recent archaeological ‘turn’ to a new materialism. In its place we are C Antiquity Publications Ltd, 2016

1684 B 06 osbepltclsrcuefrthe for structure political possible A 2016. – the for necessary conditions possible Some 2014b. – nepa flvn n o-iigtig?Tenwmtraittr per osen need no Acknowledgements see to appears turn understanding. materialist an new such The for evolving provide things? the to non-living from emerged and aim histories living should whose of be archaeology conditions emerged interplay surely past never But of past can movers. complexity and the prime the caused, of of understand never to number conditions were any the which to that reference of by reason trajectories claim explained, the simple ever systems, the should open archaeology for complex say that past, from to doubt the another nothing I has explained yet processes. it have than that historical to reason worrying, the simple of more the dynamics and for the theory significant, about archaeological more of is fashions the things’ antiquarianism. in to new shift a ‘return than more called little so be to The seem can archaeology in Materialisms’ ‘New survey the geometry, with combined stone, and (Olsen non-existent experience” brick, be craft mortar, would and of Aqueduct labor, that Hadrianic physicality physicality’ “The raw ‘raw that: a the read Corinth, we without served when that forgotten aqueduct be Hadrianic to the world. seems classical built the who of economies slaves slave was the It in expression portions one found smaller community, increasingly human by the by resources of ever) of (as control by marked and systems, appropriation energy agricultural disproportionate of the of evolution long-term storage political The resources upon 2016). while and claims 2014b, their sustained (Barrett flows legitimate were to populations the animals human enabled and of that plants emerged structures restructuring humans, of a populations as particular which evolved systems ( agricultural Sibbesson to and Jones as things o hi omnso nerirvrino hstx:nn r mlctdi h iw xrse here. expressed reviewers views References two the in and implicated Ion are Alexandra none Doonan, text: Roger this Crossland, of Zoe version to earlier grateful an am on many I comments discussed their have and Ion for me, Alexandra with and issues Doonan these Roger of Crossland, Zoe Crawley-Jackson, Amanda Boyd, Brian communities agricultural human insightful of some beginnings of inventiveness The Rindos the assemblages. with (cf. lie material not of did description certainly systems the but little offered ARRETT fatqains steatninpi oacetatfcs hntercn xrsin of expressions recent the then artefacts, ancient to paid attention the is antiquarianism If ecsl pnTn:CmrdeScholars. Cambridge Tyne: upon Newcastle beyond Early and the Linearbandkeramik in Neolithic uniformity and Diversity (ed.) ordinary? Wijk the van I. & Hofmann D. Haack, F. Amkreutz, L. in Linearbandkeramik?, Academy. archaeology and science from (ed.) Bickle P. & Whittle in A. domesticates, by Europe of colonisation http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1380203814000105 humanness. ..21a h aeilcnttto of constitution material The 2014a. J.C. , 1984 rhelgclDialogues Archaeological ,btnihrwr hymrl etraini hfigsqec of sequence shifting a in perturbation a merely they were neither but ), 95.Ofr:British Oxford: 39–51. : al amr:teview the farmers: Early oehn u of out Something 1 65–74. 21: 2013 505–15. : h e antiquarianism? new The tal. et ml.Temjrtasto rmhunter-gatherers from transition major The imply. ) 2012 1685 120). : B B [1975]. 1997 – D B G RYANT RAIDWOOD HASKAR EERTZ E L philosophy nepeaino cultures Geertz of C. interpretation in culture, of view interpretive rgtn Harvester. Brighton: http://dx.doi.org/10.3998/ohp.9750134.0001.001 Humanities. Open (MI): 60.4.02a00100 733–36. 1892–1957. ANDA ..2011. L.R. , .17.Tikdsrpin oad an towards description: Thick 1973. C. , .1979. R. , .2002. M. , .15.Vr odnChilde, Gordon Vere 1958. R. , http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/aa.1958. odn Continuum. London: . els hoyo science of theory realist A mrcnAnthropologist American C h osblt fnaturalism of possibility The h eorc fobjects of democracy The niut ulctosLd 2016 Ltd, Publications Antiquity nesv cec n virtual and science Intensive –0 odn Fontana. London: 3–30. : odn Verso. London: . 60: n Arbor Ann . The .

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HODDER, I. 2012. Entangled: an archaeology of the – 2012. After interpretation: remembering archaeology. relationships between humans and things. Chichester: Current Swedish Archaeology 20: 11–34. Wiley-Blackwell. OLSEN, B., M. SHANKS,T.WEBMOOR &C.WITMORE http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/9781118241912 (ed.). 2012. Archaeology: the discipline of things. JONES, A.M. & E. SIBBESSON. 2013. Archaeological Berkeley: University of California Press. complexity: materials, multiplicity, and the RENFREW, C. 1982. Explanation revisited, in transitions to agriculture in Britain, in B. Alberti, C. Renfrew, M.J. Rowlands & B.A. Segraves (ed.) A.M. Jones & J. Pollard (ed.) After interpretation: Theory and explanation in archaeology: the returning materials to archaeological theory: 151–72. Southampton Conference: 5–23. London: Academic. Walnut Creek (CA): Left Coast. RINDOS, D. 1984. The origins of agriculture: an KAUFFMAN, S. 1995. At home in the universe.Oxford: evolutionary perspective. London: Academic. Oxford University Press. RYAN,T.&S.MCKEVITT. 2013. Project Sunshine. LATOUR, B. 1999. Pandora’s hope: essays on the reality of London: Icon. science studies. London: Harvard University Press. THOMPSON, D.W. 1942. On growth and form. – 2005. Reassembling the social: an introduction to Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. actor-network theory. Oxford: Oxford University SILBERSTEIN,M.&J.MCGEEVER. 1999. The search for Press. ontological emergence. Philosophical Quarterly 49: MAYNARD SMITH,J.&E.SZATHMARY´ . 1997. The major 182–200. transitions in evolution. Oxford: Oxford University http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-9213.00136 Press. SMAIL, D.L. 2008. On deep history and the brain. MEILLASSOUX, Q. 2008. After finitude: an essay on the Berkeley: University of California Press. necessity of contingency. London: Continuum. WALLACE, S. 2011. Contradictions of archaeological MOROWITZ, H. 2002. The emergence of everything: how theory: engaging critical realism and archaeological the world became complex.Oxford:Oxford theory. London: Routledge. University Press. WEBMOOR, T. 2007. What about ‘one more turn after OLIVIER, L. 2011. The dark abyss of time: archaeology the social’ in archaeological reasoning? Taking and memory (trans. A. Greenspan). Walnut Creek things seriously. World Archaeology 39: 563–78. (CA): AltaMira. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00438240701679619 OLSEN, B. 2010. In defense of things: archaeology and WITMORE, C. 2014. Archaeology and the New ontology of objects. Lanham (MD): AltaMira. Materialisms. Journal of Contemporary Archaeology 1: 203–46. http://dx.doi.10.1558/jca.v1i2.16661

Received: 21 September 2015; Accepted: 15 January 2016; Revised: 15 January 2016

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