Emerging Challenges to Civil-Military Coordination in Disaster Response

VOLUME VII | FALL 2015

LIAISONA JOURNAL OF CIVIL-MILITARY DISASTER MANAGEMENT & HUMANITARIAN RELIEF COLLABORATIONS

UNOCHA’s HuMOCC Platform

Civil – Military Training & Education Programs

Emerging Challenges to Civil-Military Coordination in Disaster Response CONTENTS Departments Partners The Tyranny of Distance: 31 How Domestic Lessons can be Applied to Other Nations within the Asia-Pacific By Kenneth Tingman Operational Contract Support: 36 Mitigating Challenges Faced with Civil-Military 31 Coordination in Disaster Relief Missions By Maj. Chris Hearl Building Resilience through 40 Partnerships By Taryn Ino 7 Technology Civil-Military Coordination and 50 Information Sharing in a Digital Features 19 Early Considerations Humanitarian Age 15 59 By Julia Brooks & David Polatty 7 The HuMOCC on Civil-Military Typhoon Haiyan, Cyclone Pam and Responses to Re-examining the Past Nepal Earthquake: Observations and Lessons Cooperative U.S.-Japan Disaster Identified in Humanitarian-Military-Police Emerging Diseases: 44 Preparedness and Response: Coordination and the Use of Foreign Ebola A Progress Report Military Assets By Judy Swann By Pete Novick By Ronaldo Reario Civil – Military Cooperation 24 Civil-Military 54 Training and Education 15 The Use and Team Building Programs By Col. James Reilly (Ret.), USMC 44 54 Civilian-Military Coordination Coordination of Civil- 59 in Conflict and Disaster Military and Defense 28 Interview with Scenarios Assets in Nepal In Every Issue By Vincenzo Bollettino, Ph.D. & Tino Kreutzer On the cover: Multinational military service Josef Reiterer members, humanitarian aid organization work- 3 The Director’s Letter Civil-Military Coordination Section, ers, and rescue and medical personnel unload casualties from an Indian military helicopter to a 4 Letters to the Editor United Nations Office for the Coordination Joint Task Force 505 medical triage area at Trib- huvan International Airport, Kathmandu, Nepal. 5 Contributors of Humanitarian Affairs Photo by Gunnery Sgt. Ricardo Morales/ III MEF Combat Camera 63 Calendar of Events 1 2 Letters to the Editor

The Director’s Letter LIAISON Col. Joseph Martin, USAF Editor his issue of the Liaison is Katryn Tuton LIAISON provides an open forum for stimulating focused on emerging chal- Art Director discussion, exchange of ideas and lessons learned lenges to civil-military co- Brian Miyamoto – both academic and pragmatic– and invites ac- ordinationT in disaster response. You Staff Writers tive participation from its readers. If you would Philipp Jund will see that the articles are written by Leigh A Sholler like to address issues relevant to the disaster leaders in their field - humanitarians, Researcher management and humanitarian assistance military leaders, academicians and Alan Aoki community, or share a comment or thought on partner organizations - to provide a articles from past issues, please submit them balanced perspective for a way ahead, to [email protected]. Please specify which which maximizes the strengths of Please direct all inquiries to: article, author and issue to which you are refer- both communities. Center for Excellence in Disaster Management ring. LIAISON reserves the right to edit letters to the Articles include a first-glance at CFE-DMHA has focused its efforts & Humanitarian Assistance (CFE-DMHA) challenges and innovative coordina- in the past year on the delivery of 465 Hornet Avenue editor for clarity, language and accuracy. Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam tion mechanisms faced in response expertise in training and education, s to the April earthquake in Nepal. An- information sharing, and regional Hawaii, 96860-3503 iStock other article highlights how domestic civil-military engagements. This is Phone: 001.808.472.0401 lessons learned can be leveraged in Fax: 001.808.472.0382 done in coordination with partner Website: http://www.cfe-dmha.org international responses as a way to organizations such as UNOCHA’s better prepare our partners to over- Civil-Military Coordination Section, LIAISON is a publication of the Center for Excel- come the ‘tyranny of distance.’ This while remaining postured to support lence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian can be mitigated to a degree through U.S. Pacific Command in planning Assistance (CFE-DMHA) and serves to inform its joint exercises, training, and familiar- and response to natural disasters diverse audience of current and emerging issues ization with international guidelines involving U.S. forces in the Asia- related to civil-military relations across the welcomes article submissions on the use of military and civil de- Pacific. broad spectrum of disaster relief in order LIAISON to enhance understanding among civilian and fense assets (MCDA) in disaster relief The Center would like to thank LIAISON operations. Furthermore, the Austra- military practitioners and policy makers. is a journal of civil-military disaster management and humanitarian relief collaborations and aims to engage all of our contributors to this issue. Content is prepared in accordance with the lian Civil-Military Centre (ACMC) Your insights enrich a diverse civil- and inform readers on the most current research, collaborations and lessons learned available. If you are interested Associated Press Style Guide. Contributions are in submitting an article for consideration, please email your story idea to [email protected]. looks at early considerations on military dialogue that this publica- welcomed and highly encouraged. The editor civil-military responses to emerging tion seeks to enhance. reserves the right to make editorial changes to any diseases. This is indicative of how We will soon begin work on the material submitted as deemed necessary. •Format. All submissions should be emailed to •Copyrights or licenses. All work remains the prop- the broad-partnered community can next issue of the Liaison. The theme the editor as an unformatted Microsoft Word file. erty of the author or photographer. Submission of share its knowledge and understand- will be “Lessons from Nepal and Oth- The authors in this issue of LIAISON are entirely Footnotes are the preferred method of citation, if an article or photograph to LIAISON magazine implies ing with a larger audience. er Recent Disasters”, to be published responsible for opinions expressed in their articles. applicable, and please attach any images within the authorization to publish with proper attribution. A recurring theme in this issue is in Spring 2016. Submission ideas will These opinions are not to be construed as official document as separate files as well. the need to develop new concepts to be due in November. We welcome views of, or endorsed by, CFE-DMHA, any of its •Supporting imagery. Original imagery supporting optimize civil-military coordination partners, the Department of Defense, •Provide original research or reporting. LIAISON any and all articles is welcome. Please ensure the im- your comments, contributions and or the U.S. Government. and to ensure sufficient opportuni- suggestions. Please visit our website prefers original submissions, but if your article or ages are high-resolution and can be credited to the ties for quality training are provided. at https://www.cfe-dmha.org to learn In addition to the editorial staff and contributing paper is being considered for publication elsewhere, photographer without license infringement. Images We have included three archived more about our mission, partnership authors, the editor thanks the following people please note that with the submission. Previously should be attached to the submission separately, not articles for re-examination in today’s and training opportunities. whose efforts made this publication possible: published articles or papers will be considered if embedded within the Microsoft Word document. atmosphere, including one on civil- Col. Joseph Martin, Alberto Morales, Jr., James they are relevant to the issue topic. Kenwolf, Douglas Wallace, Mick Korman, Jim military courses available to U.S. and Welsh, John Miller, Joyce Blanchard, Mike Sashin, •Biography and photo. When submitting an article, international military and humani- Mara Langevin, Rochelle Nae’ole-Adams, Dr. Imes •Clarity and scope. Please avoid technical acronyms please include a short biography and high-resolution tarian personnel. Chiu, Hilton Lim, Jeff Hensel, James Robinson, and language. The majority of LIAISON readers are photo of yourself for the contributors’ section. Jesse Wolfe, Katie Greenlee, Jenney Tagorda, from Asia-Pacific nations and articles should be ad- Melissa Aaron, Allison Symmonds, Tammy dressed to an international audience. Articles should Makizuru-Higa, Monique Wheeler, Laurence A. Duaine, Rod Macalintal, Dante also be applicable to partners in organizations or Mercado, Robert Reyes, Lloyd Puckett, Karen nations beyond that of the author. The aim is for Michel, Craig Jaques, Nelson Chang, Lt. Col. Grover successful cases to aid other partners of the DMHA Harms, Lt. Col. Cecili Sessions and Jeffrey Blau. community.

3 LIAISON Volume VII | Fall 2015 Center for Excellence in Disaster Management & Humanitarian Assistance 4 CONTRIBUTORS Vincenzo Bollettino, Ph.D., is director of the Resilient Communities Program, Harvard Humanitarian Tino Kreutzer is a program manager at the Harvard Humanitarian Initiative, and Brigham and Wom- Initiative. He has 20 years of professional and academic experience in international politics, humanitar- en’s Hospital, based in Cambridge, Massachusetts. At HHI, he coordinates the development of KoBoTo- ian action, civil-military engagement in emergencies, and the security of humanitarian aid workers. He has olbox, the leading data collection suite for humanitarian settings, where he is working with UNOCHA, spent the past 14 years at Harvard University in administration, teaching, and research. Current research the International Rescue Committee and other humanitarian NGOs on improving speed and quality of focuses on civil-military engagement during humanitarian emergencies, the security of humanitarian aid disaster assessments. He is also responsible for field implementation and training of HHI’s Peace and Hu- workers, and on the professionalization of the humanitarian aid field. He has managed training and policy man Rights Data Program. In 2014, he was seconded to the U.N. Mission for Ebola Emergency Response, development initiatives related to international humanitarian law, responsibility to protect, and peace- where he advised local response teams on data collection and data analysis in hotspot areas in Sierra Leone, building operations, and has designed security reporting systems and program evaluations for field security Liberia, and Guinea. Prior to HHI, he was an Information Management Specialist working for UNDP and measures in complex emergencies. He currently serves on the boards of Enhancing Learning and Research UNOCHA. He has 10 years experience working in humanitarian crises and recovery settings in Central for Humanitarian Assistance, Action Against Hunger, and the International Solutions Group. African Republic, DR Congo, Uganda, Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone.

Julia Brooks is a legal research associate at the Harvard Humanitarian Initiative, where she specializes in Pete Novick, a career Surface Warfare Officer (Cmdr., U.S. Navy, Ret.), subsequently worked in Navy international humanitarian law and policy for the Advanced Training Program on Humanitarian Action Emergency Management as shore installation EM, Navy region EM, Navy Anti-Terrorism Force Protection (ATHA) of the Humanitarian Academy at Harvard. She previously worked at the Foundation “Remem- (ATFP) Assistant Program Manager and lead Navy representative to Joint Project Manager Guardian, and brance, Responsibility & Future”, Adelphi Research & Consult, the German Parliament, and the U.N. High finally as Navy ATFP Program Quality Assurance Manager, supporting command and control and physi- Commissioner for Refugees as a senior fellow with Humanity in Action. She has also served at the Office of cal security systems acquisition for Navy shore installations worldwide. He now lives in South Newfane, the High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Vermont and owns Hayama Cabinetmakers, LLC. Yugoslavia in The Hague. She holds a Master of Arts in Law and Diplomacy from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, specializing in public international law, human security and transitional justice, and a Bachelor of Arts in Public Policy from Brown University, magna cum laude.

has served as a professor at the U.S. Naval War College since 2008 and teaches numer- Maj. Chris Hearl has more than 17 years of experience working in the Contracting and David Polatty ous courses on military strategy, crisis planning, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations, Operational Contract Support (OCS) environment. He is currently the director of Small Business Programs and maritime security. Dave is cofounder and co-director of the NWC College of Operational & Strategic for U.S. Pacific Air Forces and deputy for the Operations Division, Air Force Installation Contracting Agen- Leadership – Harvard School of Public Health “Joint Civilian-Military Humanitarian Working Group,” cy/KH. In this role, he serves as a primary OCS liaison with U.S. Pacific Command. He has served stateside, which explores academic collaboration areas that can improve humanitarian responses during disaster. He and in Europe, the Pacific, the Middle East, and three tours to Afghanistan. He has a MBA from the Naval is a graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy, U.S. Naval War College, and U.S. Joint Forces Staff College. He Postgraduate School, participates in several civil-military organizations, and has directly contributed to over continues to serve part-time as a commander in the Navy Reserve, and has commanded four reserve units in a dozen humanitarian assistance and disaster response events around the globe. U.S. Forces Korea, U.S. Naval Forces Southern Command, U.S. Strategic Command Center for Combating WMD, and U.S. European Command. He served on active duty from 1992 to 2003.

Col. James Reilly (Ret.), USMC, retired from the Marine Corps in 2013 after having served 30 years. Kenneth R. Tingman was a Department of Homeland Security Federal Emergency Management During his career he served in all four Marine Divisions, deployed to the Middle East in support of contin- Agency (FEMA) Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO) in the Pacific Area Office from 2007 - 2010. Dur- gency operations, responded to humanitarian disasters in the Asia-Pacific, and held senior command and ing his three years as an FCO, he deployed to 15 disasters across the nation, his final deployment being the staff positions. His last assignment in the Marine Corps was with Headquarters, Marine Forces Pacific, earthquake and tsunami in American Samoa, where he spent six months leading the disaster response. Be- where he served as the chief of staff from 2010 to 2012, and finally finishing his career supporting Pacific fore joining FEMA, Tingman spent 24 years in the U.S. Air Force as a communications officer. During his theater engagement and Southeast Asia exercises. time in the military, he served in a variety of locations and positions around the world, including serving as a military assistant to the senior U.S. Diplomat on the United Nations staff in Kosovo and was the communications squadron commander at the Prince Sultan Air Base, Saudia Arabia, on September 11, 2001. He is also a certified instructor for the National Disaster Preparedness Training Center.

Ronaldo Reario heads the Training and Partnership Unit of the Civil-Military Coordination Section, Emergency Services Branch, U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in Geneva, Switzerland. He manages the global United Nations Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination (UN-CMCo- ord) Training Programme, develops and sustains partnerships with various organizations and institutions in promoting and creating understanding on the principles and concepts of humanitarian civil-military coordination, supports training and capacity development requirements of OCHA regional and country offices, national disaster management organizations and other defense and military training institutions, including peacekeeping training centers. As an United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination member and UN-CMCoord course graduate, he has deployed to emergency missions in: Darfur, Sudan and Indonesia in 2004; Pakistan in 2005; Mongolia in 2005; Myanmar in 2008; Haiti in 2010; and the Philippines extensively.

5 LIAISON Volume VII | Fall 2015 Center for Excellence in Disaster Management & Humanitarian Assistance 6 By Ronaldo Reario, Humanitarian Affairs Officer, Training and Partnership Unit, Civil-Military Coordination Section, Emergency Services Branch, United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

ilitaries have been increasingly involved in humanitarian response operations in recent large-scale natural disasters. They are par- ticularlyM evident where affected states request, welcome or accept international assistance, including foreign military assets (FMA). Humanitarian organisations on the ground inevitably interacted with them. This trend creates significant coordination needs in terms of op- timising the use of available military assets to support priority humanitarian requirements. These may include capacity gaps in the realm of logistics (transport, air and seaport management, warehousing, commercial transport information, etc.), medical/health (out-patient and in- patient capacity, disease surveillance, public health interventions, etc.), communications (satellite-based voice and data), information management (assessment information, priorities in terms of goods-services-locations, potential gaps within estimated timeframes), and other operational issues that impinge the effective delivery of humanitarian assistance. UNOCHA The “Three Big Ones” in the Asia-Pacific Region Humanitarian and military staff members gather at the Humanitarian-Military Operations Coordination Centre in Nepal to coordinate relief after a 7.8-magnitude earthquake struck the nation. On 8 November 2013, Typhoon Haiyan (known locally as Yolanda) made landfall in the Philippines. It was one of the strongest and deadliest typhoons in recorded history. The scale and magnitude of the impact of Typhoon Haiyan created overwhelming need in the hardest-hit areas. On the ninth of November 2013, the government of the Philippines accepted the U.N. offer of international assistance and welcomed the deployment of FMA. Twen- ty-two Member States deployed FMA in the Philippines. However, only 12 stationed assets and deployed “boots on the ground” consisting of various air, sea, medical, engineering, communication assets and personnel. THE HuM OCC On 13 March 2015, Cyclone Pam hit Vanuatu creating Typhoon Haiyan, Cyclone Pam and Nepal Earthquake: widespread damage to property and sources of livelihood. Cyclone Pam is considered as one of the worst national Observations and Lessons Identified in Humanitarian-Military- natural disasters in the history of Vanuatu. On 14 March Police Coordination and the Use of Foreign Military Assets 2015, the Government of Vanuatu accepted offers of international assistance and welcomed the deployment

7 LIAISON Volume VII | Fall 2015 Center for Excellence in Disaster Management & Humanitarian Assistance 8 9 LIAISON Volume VII can befound here at https://www.cfe-dmha.org/liaison/The-HuMOCC_Full-Article Th 1 Recommendations The TyphoonHaiyanAfterActionReview(AAR) nel. medical, engineering,communicationsassetsandperson deployed FMAintothecountryconsistingofvarious air, Coordinator (RC/HC)inNepal.EightMemberStates through theUnitedNationsResident/Humanitarian Government ofNepalrequestedinternationalassistance including a7.3-magnitudeaftershockon12May.The This wasfollowedbyalargenumberofaftershocks, Nepal’s capitalofKathmanduanditssurroundingareas. nel. medical, engineering,communicationassetsandperson of FMAfromsevenMemberStatesconsistingair,sea, recommendations. response wereexaminedto developsolidandrealistic tive civil-militarycoordination duringtheemergency ones.” Thefacilitatingand hindering factorsforeffec commonalities anddifferences amongthe“threebig as baselineforcomparisonandanalysistodrawsome mandu. struck justweeksaftera7.8-magnitudeearthquakehitNepal’scapitalofKath A Nepalesesoldierreadsanewspaperarticleonthe7.3-magnitudeaftershockthat On 25April2015,a7.8-magnitudeearthquakehit The recommendationsdeducted fromanalysisoffacili- The TyphoonHaiyanAARrecommendationsareused e unabridged article, includinga comprehensive article, e unabridged listoffacilitatingfactors, andhindering | Fall 2015 - 1 - - - UNOCHA military aircraft. civil aviation and candirectlycontrolground timeof movements ofreliefitems; itdeconflictsoperationswith system servestoinformthe humanitariancommunityon of thehumanitariancommunity. Moreover,atracking and activitytocontribute tothesituationalawareness subnational levelinformed aboutmilitaryairtransport transparent trackingsysteminordertokeepnational and to supporthumanitarianpriorities. and theoptimalutilizationofuniquemilitarycapability mon situationalawarenessastheoperationprogresses military forces.Allofthesecontributetohavingacom foreign andlocalNGOs,aswellnational key playersfromnationalandlocalgovernmentlevels, sharing ofinformationamongallstakeholders,actors and In addition,co-locationmaximizescommunicationand tion, prioritizationanddecision-makingbasedonneeds. planning. Italsoenablesrapidcoordination,coopera- effectiveness andefficiencyenhancesdeliberate egy promoteshumanitariancivil-militarycoordination transparent informationsharing.Aco-locationstrat- humanitarian needsthroughopen,efficient,fast,and adopted tounderstandhostnationprioritiesbasedon coordination, whereappropriateandfeasible,shouldbe avoid duplicationandpreventconfusion. 6. Lastbutnot least,itisimportanttoinvest inhumani- 5. Anemergencyresponseshouldincludeasimple, 4. Aco-locationstrategyforhumanitariancivil-military tion andawareness.Liaisonofficersshouldalsotryto provide geographical,situationalandactualinforma- needed shouldbedeterminedanditisimportantto addition, thecapabilitiesandcomplementarysupport the lineofcommunicationorcoordinationsimple.In define priorities.Inthisrespect,itisimportanttokeep tations aswelltoextractvaluableinformation that areabletoexplainavailablecapabilitiesandlimi cilitate integrationwithresponseactorsandactivities. decision-making andresponseactivitiesaswellfa nation capacityshouldalsocontributetoinformed awareness. Thehumanitariancivil-militarycoordi- tribute totheestablishmentofacommonsituational optimize interactionandinteroperabilitycon- mechanisms shouldbeinstitutionalizedinorderto capacity indomesticandinternationalrapidresponse porting humanitarianactivitiesandoperations. awareness, aswellprioritizetheuseofFMAinsup order toestablishandmaintaincommonsituational ment Authorityandthehumanitarianclustersin to assistandinformtheNationalDisasterManage- military coordinationmechanismatthenationallevel tating andhinderingfactorsare: 3. FMAmustdeploywithcompetentliaisonofficers 2. Ahumanitariancivil-militarycoordination 1. Itisimportanttoestablishahumanitariancivil- - - - - Cyclone PamObservationsandLessonsIdentified ing andtoachieveand/orstrengthenunityofefforts. improve interoperability,toincreasemutualunderstand tarian civil-militarycoordinationcapacitybuildingto and informeddecision-making. significantly toachievingcommon situationalawareness sharing, taskdivisionandplanningactivitiescontributed tarian-civil andmilitaryactorstotakepartininformation However, thefrequencyandacceptanceofbothhumani - ous reasonsincludingissueswiththesizeoffacilities. military forcesandNDMOdidnotco-locateduetovari - ing urgenttasksrequestedbytheclusters. came problematicandresultedindelaysaccomplish FMA haditsowndecision-makingauthority,whichbe - making processesofFMA.Everynationthatdeployed efforts, andpromotedeffectiveefficientuseofFMA. was essentialinsupportingthehumanitarianresponse Vanuatu Government,showedthattheuseofFMA system gavethetransparencythatwasrequiredby the systembecamemorestreamlinedandefficient.This as 48hoursbutoftenwasachievedwithin24 around timeforactioningtherequestwasadvertised then actionedbytheidentifiedFMA.Theexpectedturn- afternoon viaadelegateoftheapprovingauthorityand to performthetask.Thetaskwasthenauthorizedthat liaison officers(LOs)oftheFMAidentifiedasbestsuited Upon grantingauthorization,therequestsweregivento ment werepresentedtotheNDMODirector-General. delivery ofhumanitarianaidoressentialpassengermove day, variousrequestsfortheuseofmilitaryassets support therequestsforassistance(RFA).Atnooneach which theFMA(bycountry)isidentifiedasbestsuitedto terms ofprioritiesandacorrespondingvettingprocessin approval processfromtheNDMODirector-Generalin manitarian priorities.Thismechanismincorporatedan to fill-uphumanitariancapacitygapsandsupporthu- accurately recordedrequestsfortheuseofmilitaryassets leads tofacilitatetheeffectiveuseofFMA. other relevantgovernmentstaff,andthevariouscluster have closeliaisonwiththeNDMODirector-General, officer wasbestplacedwithintheNDMOstructureto meetings. ItwasclearlyidentifiedthattheUN-CMCoord atu, chairedandinstituteddailyclustercoordination saster ManagementOffice(NDMO)inPortVila,Vanu- Military Partners, theVanuatuHumanitarian Team, work. Thisinvolved theFRANZJointTask Force,Pacific critical informationinkey clusters andthematicareasof ducting thesecondassessment togatherand/orvalidate A goodpracticeinrespect to jointplanningwasincon International humanitarianorganisations,foreign A hinderingfactoridentifiedwasthedifferentdecision- The civil-militarycoordinationmechanismestablished The Director-GeneralorDirectoroftheNationalDi Center for Excellence Assistance &Humanitarian 10 inDisaster Management - - - - - Lessons Identified Nepal EarthquakePreliminary Observationsand HC decidedthat humanitarianhubswould beestablished into theNepal earthquakeresponseoperation, theRC/ to Kathmanduaspartofthe UNDACTeam.Threeweeks in futureemergencyresponse operationsinthePacific. lines. Thiswillbeaninvestmentthatyielddividends by theOsloGuidelinesandAPC-MADROGuide - humanitarian civil-militarycoordinationasprovided for their understandingoftheprinciplesandconcepts standing ofU.N.andhumanitariansystems,validate their experiences,enhanceknowledgeandunder Their attendanceinthecoursewillsignificantlyreinforce that deployedtoVanuatuparticipateinthecourse. Cooperation (CIMIC)officersfromtheFRANZpartners er oftheJointTaskForcetoallowseniorCivil-Military Fiji 6-11September2015wasextendedtothecommand- militaries inVanuatuatthetimeasagreatsuccess. atu HumanitarianTeam,UN-CMCoordandtheforeign eration betweentheGovernmentofVanuatu,Vanu- accessed byrelevantentities. which couldeasilyidentifythestatusofeachrequestand manent record.AnExcelspreadsheetwasalsodeveloped The SRFwasscannedandfiledintoadropboxforper- identified eithergoods(T)orpassenger(P)movement. quests wereloggedonaservicerequestform(SRF)that assistance ofWorldFoodProgramme(WFP).Allre- of militarytransportassetsusedwasestablishedwiththe rately recordedtherequest,assignmentandidentification munications. transport, fuel,foodrations,water,sanitationandcom- supplies forthedurationoftheirmissioninterms response wereself-sufficient,usingtheirownassetsand teams tothehardest-hitareasininitialperiodof tion planning. will feedintoearlyrecoveryandlonger-termreconstruc all lossanddamagesinpropertieslivelihoods,which assessment alsogaveagreaterunderstandingoftheover manitarian needsandgapsinlife-savingassistance.The situation intheaffectedareas,validatingresidualhu- provided acomprehensivepictureofthehumanitarian together toachievethesameobjectives.Theassessments showcased howhumanitariansandmilitariescouldwork through militarytransportassets.Thisplanningprocess within arelativelyshortwindow,whichisonlydoable entailed thedeploymentof22teamstofourprovinces (UNDAC) TeamandUN-CMCoordofficer.Theplan United NationsDisasterAssessmentandCoordination Four civil-militarycoordination officersweredeployed An invitationtoattendtheUN-CMCoordCoursein The deploymentoperation emphasizedthegreatcoop- A simpleandtransparenttrackingsystemthataccu- The FMAthatdeployedeitherengineersormedical - - - 11 LIAISON Volume VII military actors, aswellthenational humanitarians, nationalandforeign to facilitating theinterfacebetween provide thephysicalspace dedicated OSOCC, theHuMOCCaimed to platform. Complementary to the itarian-military-police coordination was toprovideapredictable human- MNMCC. TheHuMOCCobjective eration. Itwasco-locatedwiththe Nepal Earthquakeresponseop- UN-CMCoord teamaspartofthe (HuMOCC) wasestablishedbythe Operations CoordinationCenter Centre (OSOCC). On-Site OperationsCoordination MNMCC andtheUNDACTeam’s situational awarenessbetweenthe coordination, aswellcommon to facilitateinformationsharingand liaison functionwithintheMNMCC MNMCC chieftohaveapermanent Lanka, Thailand,U.K.andtheU.S. pan, Pakistan,Singapore,Spain,Sri Israel, India,Ja- Canada, China, desh, Bhutan, Algeria, Bangla- officers from military liaison tion offoreign the participa- MNMCC with chaired the Nepal Army (MNMCC). The dination Center tions andCoor- Military Opera- Multi-national established a ment ofNepal hubs. the humanitarian ployed ineachof officers werede- UN-CMCoord sion, dedicated ing thisdeci- Chautara. Follow- in Gorkhaand The Humanitarian-Military UNOCHA wasinvitedbythe The Govern- | Fall 2015 and CoordinationCen- military staffmembers tion Centre(HuMOCC) in Nepaltocoordinate Humanitarian-Military use theMulti-national earthquake struckthe Operations Coordina- after a7.8-magnitude ter (MNMCC)andthe Military Operations Humanitarian and relief operations nation. Other actorswould takepartinthe Logistics Cluster andUNOCHA. composed the IPC:NepalArmy,WFP ture. Thefollowingrepresentatives part ofthestandard“MNCC” struc- function thatisusuallyactivated as ning andcoordination“trading floor” the IPCwastoreinforce plan- MNMCC. Theprimaryobjectiveof ning Cell(IPC)wascreatedwithinthe police. As of10May,anIntegratedPlan- and formulate keyrecommendations. UN-CMCoord strategyforNepal the teammembers todiscussthe organized adebriefingsession with the UN-CMCoordteamleader from humanitarianpartners. requests forassistance(RFA) coming was initiatedforthesubmissionof HuMOCC andtheIPC,aprocedure result oftheestablishment IPC onacase-by-casebasis.As As partofthehand-overprocess, UNOCHA UNOCHA

UNOCHA Figure 1:CyclonePaminVanuatuand theNepalEarthquakewereusedtovalidateTyphoonHaiyanafter-action reportrecommendations. Center for Excellence Assistance &Humanitarian 12 inDisaster Management Way Forward strengthens humanitarian coordination in general. Figure 1 validates the Typhoon Haiyan AAR recom- Perhaps in preparation for the next big natural disas- mendations in two different emergencies. “No two ter, the HuMOCC concept can be incorporated in the emergencies are the same” is a common phrase we hear preparedness planning processes and activities of natural from colleagues who have responded to multiple natural hazard-prone countries. Member States that tradition- disasters. I would add that there will always be constants ally deploy FMA bilaterally or otherwise may also benefit and variables in every large-scale emergency. The former from understanding the HuMOCC concept. would be overwhelming humanitarian needs, need for I share the HuMOCC process flow on the pervious resources and the need for coordination among respond- page, which explains how straightforward and simplified ing organisations; the latter would be more on the “how the process flow is, yet flexible enough to be tweaked to much of which is needed by whom, where and when” or adapt to the national coordination structure of the af- “how to get the right assistance to the right people, at the fected state. right time, in the most appropriate way.” Let me delve on the “constant” that is the need for humanitarian and Acknowledgements military coordination in the context of natural disasters This article was culled from the Typhoon Haiyan AAR in peacetime. The Humanitarian-Military Operations Report of March 2014, Cyclone Pam AAR Report drafted Coordination Centre (HuMOCC) offers the predict- by Dale Potter, UN-CMCoord Officer, and the Nepal able platform that can provide the space and a simplified Earthquake UN-CMCoord Mission Report submitted by process that adds value to the work of others and also Viviana de Annuuntis, UN-CMCoord Team Leader.

Nepalese military personnel speak with United Nations and Inter- national Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies staff to coordinate relief operations after an earthquake struck Nepal April 25, 2015.

The Humanitarian-Military Operations Coordination Center (HuMOCC) process flow shows how straightforward and simplified the process is, yet flexible enough to be tweaked to adapt to the national coordination structure of the affected state.

As of 16 May, the following foreign military forces were 2. Military-military coordination mechanisms such present in the country: Bhutan, Canada, China, India, as the MNMCC in the context of the Nepal earth- Japan, Pakistan, U.K. and the U.S. It is expected that most quake response should have the capacity to contribute of these forces will be transitioning out from the opera- to achieving common situational awareness, facilitate tion by the end of May 2015.2 The focus of civil-military joint planning and clarify task division. This means that coordination will therefore be placed on the dialogue and humanitarian priorities are given the first opportunity for interaction with the Nepal Army, the Nepal Police and the use of FMA in the absence of civilian alternatives dur- the Armed Police. ing the critical period. Preliminary Lessons Identified 3. Requests for the use of FMA at the sub-national 1. One key lesson identified in relation to FMA pro- (hub) level were passed through the MNMCC. Decision- vided by assisting Member States is that FMA should be making and tasking normally takes place in Kathmandu offered to the affected state and plugged into the existing at the MNMCC for use of FMA at the hub level. This was national coordination mechanisms. The bilateral alloca- not seen as a robust mechanism that expedites decision tion of FMA to specific clusters and humanitarian part- on requests to the MNMCC for tasks that are carried out ners posed challenges in the context of the Nepal opera- by FMA stationed at the sub-national (hub) level. tions. This modality does not promote the optimal use of 4. Another identified lesson is the limited understand- FMA to support the broader humanitarian priorities that ing of the national military forces at the sub-national is beyond one cluster and/or humanitarian organisation. level about the presence of humanitarian actors and FMA Discussions about the modality for the request/offer/ac- present in the area. This resulted in a minimum level of ceptance of FMA should be an integral part of the coun- coordination between the humanitarian actors and FMA try preparedness planning process. on one hand, and the national military on the other hand. It was recommended that a civil-military coordination 2 By 5 June Nepalese Army announced the departure of all foreign military personnel involved in UNOCHA relief efforts. cell be established at the sub-national level.

13 LIAISON Volume VII | Fall 2015 Center for Excellence in Disaster Management & Humanitarian Assistance 14 with widespread damage, a large number of deaths and injuries, and inaccessible or difficult-to- reach villages in need of assistance. Yet, despite the need for heavy lift equipment to clear roads blocked by landslides and rotary-wing air assets to reach remote villages, there was a fairly modest international military presence in Nepal and a notably small U.S. military presence. Although there were roughly 1,000 personnel that comprised the Joint Task Force in Kathmandu, Okinawa, and U.S. Pacific Command, the actual numbers of U.S. personnel operating in the field in Nepal was small compared to their Chinese and Indian counterparts. This is especially true when the response is compared to those that took place in Haiti in 2010 and the Philippines in 2013. Part of this can be explained at least in part by the relatively easy accessibility of Haiti and the Philippines compared to the inaccessibility of Nepal. It is also possible that close U.S. ties with the Philippines, and Haiti’s Natalie Hawwa/ USAID International Committee of the Red Cross proximity to the U.S. explain the comparatively much larger U.S. A Red Cross volunteer checks on a woman shaken by Nepal’s devastating earthquake. DART Member Mike Davis speaks to Nepali Army and the community in Bhaktapur, Nepal to figure out where people may be trapped. efforts in these two countries as compared to the limited presence of airport, major roads and bridges in supplies, including plastic sheet- the U.S. in Nepal. A better under- Kathmandu remained intact, and the ing, shelter kits, blankets, water, standing of The Use and Coordination of Civil-Military markets quickly reopened. medical supplies and emergency why the Nepalese government During the response to the initial and supplemental food in support and the international humanitarian earthquake, forces from at least 18 of USAID. In addition to delivering community did not request greater and Defense Assets in Nepal foreign militaries were deployed to aid, the task force transported 534 support through OFDA should help By Vincenzo Bollettino, Ph.D., Director, Resilient Communities Program Nepal. By May 15, 2015, militar- personnel and conducted 63 casualty explain why the U.S. military played ies from 10 countries had already evacuations.”21By contrast, China’s such a limited role in this disaster. As & Tino Kreutzer, Program Manager, KoBoToolbox, Harvard Humanitarian Initiative departed, all of whom represented military support had a very minor fo- the lead United States federal agency, search and rescue, engineering, or cus on air transport, with two helicop- it is the Office for Foreign Disaster ate morning, April 25, 2015, a magnitude-7.8 and cultural monuments. As geologists predicted, the medical staff. As of May 15, the larg- ters flying daily from a base in China Assistance, which through its Di- earthquake struck Nepal, followed by a second earthquake’s complete destruction of 489,000 homes and est presence was from China and to Kathmandu airport to carry person- saster Response Assessment Teams devastating magnitude-7.3 earthquake on May 12. damage to another 260,000, underscored the country’s India (844 and 611 troops, respec- nel and supplies to remote areas. (DART), assesses whether U.S. mili- CenteredL in the Ghorka District, the initial earthquake inadequate level of preparedness. tively). The U.S. presence included It is precisely in situations like this tary assistance is needed. destroyed entire villages, especially in Sindhupalchok Despite clear forecasts that an earthquake in Nepal was at least 286 troops from Joint Task that a major international military Challenges and Ghorka. The capital of Kathmandu was fortunate to inevitable, and plans in place to coordinate a response Force 505, tasked with air support response is expected: a natural disaster In comparison to other recent di- have escaped what would have been enormous destruc- with international humanitarian agencies and national and providing at least seven rotary- in a relatively conflict-free country, sasters, humanitarian relief efforts in tion, had the epicenter been closer to the city. Despite the and international militaries, it still took in excess of wing and 12 fixed-wing aircraft.1 The 1 CDIR 26 May 2015 Nepal were late to arrive and faced a distance, the earthquake still leveled homes and build- two weeks for aid to reach villages in Nepal’s moun- United States ultimately “delivered 2 “Nepal Joint Task Force Begins Drawing Down,” in Joint Task Force 505 News Release, accessed on May 29, 2015 at http:// multiplicity of hurdles that hampered ings, including many of the nation’s historical, religious tain regions. This is somewhat surprising given that the about 114 tons of emergency relief www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=128860

15 LIAISON Volume VII | Fall 2015 Center for Excellence in Disaster Management & Humanitarian Assistance 16 NEPAL EARTHQUAKE: National and Foreign Military Air Assets (as of 12 May 2015) one of the cluster meetings, a British ese military and Nepalese police. other notable feature of this response official mentioned that there were As with many emergencies, the that distinguished it from previous OVERVIEW AIR ASSETS IN-COUNTRY NEPAL two Chinook helicopters ready to location of multiple coordination responses. There were at least nine In-country be flown in from nearby India. As centers makes effective coordina- independent teams flying drones 8 military helicopters 25 foreign military air assets Delivering cargo of this cluster meeting (week ending tion across the response a challenge. over Nepal (excluding journalists). (not positioned in-country) 8 foreign militaries May 8), these flights were not given There were five major coordination Drones are a promising technology Pending arrival clearance either to leave India or to centers in Kathmandu alone, spread because of their ability to provide INDIA enter Nepal; the official did not say out across the city, including the high-quality imagery, virtually any- The Multi-National Military Coordination which. There were also restrictions Onsite Operations Center (OSOCC), where. Regrettably, drone operators Centre (MNMCC) is coordinating all foreign 13 military aircraft* large military transport aircraft C-17, Ilyushin Il-76 (IL-76), C-130 *Data unavailable on number of aircraft types military assets through daily meetings. The on flights carrying relief items being the National Emergency Operations faced significant challenges in Nepal, Nepalese Army has appointed a dedicated liaison officer from the MNMCC to the flown to Nepal over Indian airspace. Center (NEOC), the MNMCC, the largely because they failed to properly National Emergency Operations Centre of These flights had to stop in India first Ministry of Health, and the humani- organize themselves and to adhere the Ministry of Home Affairs. for inspection. Finally, there was a tarian staging area at the airport, as to an emergent code of conduct put The Humanitarian-Military Operations Coordination Centre (HuMOCC) was fleet of 25 trucks requisitioned by the well as the urban search and rescue together by the Humanitarian UAV established to provide the physical space 14 military helicopters 8 x medium twin-turbine transport helicopter (MI17), 6 x advanced light helicopter (ALH) World Food Programme (WFP), and team (USAR). Network (UAViators). A number dedicated to facilitating the interface between humanitarian and military actors. stationed at the humanitarian stag- Technologies of drone operators failed to register ing area at the Kathmandu Airport, Interestingly, the humanitarian with the Nepalese government and CHINA PAKISTAN which were underutilized in the response in Nepal included the use faced arrest and confiscation of their initial weeks. equipment. Moreover, an opportu- 3 x IL-76 aircraft 3 x MI17 helicopters 4 x Lockheed C-130 Hercules (C-130) of an unprecedented number of In terms of civil-military coordina- new technologies and information nity to better coordinate with local tion, it was also apparent from the applications. These included the communities and to offer a shared Multi-National Military Coordina- widespread use of digital data col- platform for the repository of imag- USA UNITED KINGDOM tion Center meetings (MNMCC), at lection tools (e.g. UNOCHA’s use of ery being collected never fully ma- 1 x C-17 Globemaster III 4x V-22 Osprey tiltrotor aircraft 3 x UH-1 helicopters 1 x C130 aircraft 3 x Boeing CH-47 Chinook (CH47) least in the first two weeks, that the KoBoToolbox in rapid assessments), terialized. Invariably, in the future, Indian and Chinese militaries were satellite-based mapping, real-time these glitches will need to be worked only marginally interested in utiliz- satellite imagery provision from Digi- out, with drone operators profession- ing this forum. Despite the fact that alized and more formally folded into RUSSIA SRI LANKA BANGLADESH tal Globe and Google’s SkyBox Imag- both militaries had the largest foreign ing, and the use of crowd-sourced the humanitarian architecture. Creation date: 12 May 2015 2 x Ilyushin IL-76 aircraft 1 x C-130 aircraft 1 x C-130 aircraft military presence on the ground, they Whereas the response to Typhoon Data source: UNDAC community mapping. The emergence Feedback: [email protected] operated within their own geograph- Haiyan in the Philippines was www.unocha.org www.reliefweb.int of large volunteer networks and com- ic areas of interest and were hardly largely heralded as a success for civil- A U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance infographic on Nepalese and foreign military air assets in Nepal as of May 12. Numbers munity-based initiatives around the continued to rise as response efforts grew. present in the MNMCC. This was de- world are transforming the humani- military coordination – a textbook spite the fact that the Indian military tarian landscape – and they were response even – the same is unlikely the efficiency of the response. There fected by the earthquake. was highlighted in two crashes by the ran their operations from their own to be said about Nepal. Instead, a were numerous logistical challenges While air transport is essential after Pakistani military on May 8, which in full swing in Nepal. Moreover, command center a mere 50 meters these groups are empowering local number of lingering questions need posed by the single runway at the most natural disasters, the situation killed the ambassadors of Norway away from the MNMCC tent. to be answered. Why, for example, Kathmandu airport, an apron that in Nepal has shown that relief in such and the Philippines, and a fatal crash communities to play an active role The setup of the MNMCC by in disaster response. For example, did it take two weeks or more for aid could not accommodate more than a particularly mountainous area re- of a U.S. UH-1Y Venom helicopter country-desks, rather than by func- to reach some mountain villages? six aircraft on the ground at any one quires a much larger pool of helicop- on May 12 that resulted in the deaths in the aftermath of the earthquake, tional desks, may have encouraged Kathmandu Living Labs coordinated How did the Nepalese government time, landslides along some road- ters, experienced pilots, and potential of six U.S. Marines and two Nepalese bilateral coordination and discour- and the international humanitarian ways, persistent aftershocks, and a alternative landing locations. soldiers. more than 4,300 people to crowd- aged more multi-lateral discussions source information on the disaster community assess needs and pri- second large earthquake. Even with Even had enough helicopters been Despite the U.N.’s well-organized by functional area. United Nations oritize delivery of aid? Why was the the Nepalese military at full deploy- available, there were other challenges and very well attended cluster meet- in just one week. More importantly, Office for the Coordination of Hu- they were able to take the reports U.S. military presence so small and ment capacity, there were not enough that would have made them difficult ings across Kathmandu, aid agen- manitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) did restricted largely to the provision of helicopters operating to deliver to use, especially early on in the re- cies also faced a frustrating set of they produced every two hours and demonstrate considerable flexibility send them to the Nepalese military, flights? What services did interna- humanitarian aid in the first weeks sponse. For one, the logistical chal- bureaucratic obstacles to the efficient and creativity in the face of the nu- tional militaries provide and were following the disaster. As of May 8, lenges mentioned were exacerbated delivery of aid. These included the Nepalese governments agencies, and merous logistical constraints men- international NGOs. However, the these effective? the United Nations had a total of two by the absence of a reliable register of build up of goods awaiting customs tioned, including the establishment A formal study of the civil-military helicopters at its disposal to deliver potential helicopter landing spots – clearance at the Kathmandu airport, accuracy and concrete applicability of of a Joint Operations Cell to discuss these reports in comparison to more coordination and international and aid and conduct missions in Nepal. exposing crews to risks and slowing difficulties faced by some countries daily requests for logistics support, domestic humanitarian response is Both the Nepalese and supporting in- down deliveries. In addition, the ter- in acquiring landing permits at the traditional forms of communication medical evacuation, engineering re- remain to be evaluated. thus needed to better understand ternational militaries had helicopters rain and extremely dangerous chang- airport, and restricted time slots quests and security issues. This Joint what did and did not work well in the (21 in total), but more were needed ing weather conditions in Nepal when flights carrying humanitar- The use of unmanned aerial ve- Operations Cell was to be comprised hicles (UAVs), or “drones”, was an- response to the Nepal earthquake. to reach the many communities af- reduced the speed of relief efforts, as ian goods were permitted to land. In of UNOCHA, WFP, and the Nepal-

17 LIAISON Volume VII | Fall 2015 Center for Excellence in Disaster Management & Humanitarian Assistance 18 By Judy Swann, Director Concepts and Capability, Australian Civil-Military Centre

he Australian Civil-Military Centre (ACMC) is an Australian Government initiative to improve Australia’s effectiveness in civil-military col- laborationT for conflict and disaster management overseas. ACMC hosts Quick Impact Workshops (QIW) - with representatives from across government (Australian and international), civil society, private sector and the Aus- tralian Defence Force - to draw on the experiences and observations of Australians who have been part of an international response. The QIW supports civil-military- police capability and understanding through multiagency engagement, case studies and shared information. In February 2015, the ACMC hosted a QIW on ‘Early Considerations on Civil-Military Responses to Emerging Diseases: Ebola as a Case Study’. Overview - The International Response to the Ebola Outbreak in West Africa In August 2014, the United Nations (U.N.) Security Council declared the Ebola virus outbreak in the West African subregion a ‘threat to international peace and security’. The U.N. request for assistance from member states resulted in the mobilization of technical expertise, medical capacity, humanitarian assistance, and both military and civil defense assets. The Australian Government contributed approximately AU$45 million to the international Ebola response, including the management of an Ebola treatment center in Sierra Leone contracted to As- pen Medical, and a regional Ebola response preparedness Staff of the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) and the United package focused on the Indo-Pacific. Other countries, Nations Mission for Ebola Emer- including affected states, responded in a variety of ways, gency Response (UNMEER) helped an orphanage for Ebola affected some through civil-military intervention. The United children with food, toys and cash States and United Kingdom provided a civil-military in March 2015. health response in Liberia and Sierra Leone respectively. Simon Ruf/UNMEER The Ebola outbreak has again raised concerns about the potentially devastating impact emerging diseases pose Early Considerations on As a Civil-Military Responses Case to Emerging Diseases: Study 19 LIAISON Volume VII | Fall 2015 EBOLACenter for Excellence in Disaster Management & Humanitarian Assistance 20 to human and economic welfare. The response in West cessful outcomes of the response in West Africa. Civil Africa has highlighted the need for robust regional health Society engagement was crucial. The Red Cross and architecture, and indicates a likely role for the military Medecins Sans Frontières were key first movers and were (either within affected states or through international operating on the ground instantly. They were quickly assistance) following an outbreak or pandemic in the supported by international advocates (including the U.S. Indo-Pacific region. and U.K.) and were direct in their expectations and ad- The unfolding of the crisis – initially a health response vice about where Australia could and should best support and then a ramping-up as it became more than a health other efforts. crisis – enabled Australia to build its response according- Private sector engagement – It is becoming increasingly ly, including the development of National Health Guide- clear that the private sector is an active responder in crisis lines to manage domestic preparedness and management situations. The Ebola Treatment Center established by arrangements at the border. Notably, the Australian Firestone Natural Rubber Company in Liberia became a Defence Force (ADF) had a minimal role in this instance, best-practice example of a quick and effective response. but would likely be involved in a health crisis response in The Australian Government’s engagement of Aspen our region. Medical to deliver services in Sierra Leone also highlights The following key observations were drawn from the the flexibility and availability of the private sector to sup- workshop presentations and discussion. port a government crisis response. Building understand- Key Observations ing and partnerships with the private sector, both domestically and overseas, would enhance Australia’s ability to International and Regional Health Architecture respond more effectively to crises in the region. Global health architecture - The global health architec- Command and control structures – The establishment ture is increasingly seen as not ‘fit for purpose’. There is of the United Nations Mission for Ebola Emergency a global capacity gap in response mechanisms for global Response (UNMEER) and insertion into affected coun- infectious disease outbreaks, including in coordinated tries saw some confusion about mandates and responsi- planning, decision-making, resource sharing, resource bilities. Clear lines of responsibility and reporting must management, and communications and information be established from the outset if a mission is to operate management. The current reform of the World Health effectively. For Australia, this means ensuring robust in- Sgt. 1st Class Nathan Hoskins/ U.S. Army Organisation may go some way to address this; however, teragency coordination structures, as well as governance it will remain a technical/standards agency with emer- mechanisms for working with international partners. Ef- long-term transition planning in (Above) From right, Sam Sells, military gency response dispersed across the organization. fective command and control arrangements are essential liaison officer, U.S. Agency for Interna- Health security risk in the Indo-Pacific region – Un- every crisis. In the case of Ebola, tional Development, Lt. Col. Lee Hicks, to avoid duplication and counter-productive effort. Sierra Leone and other affected coun- JFC-UA command engineer, Armed Forces derdeveloped and stretched health systems in the region Interagency coordination - The Ebola crisis underlined of Liberia Capt. A. J. Halley Moore, 1st Bat- make Australia’s immediate neighborhood particularly tries will have to grapple with a false talion commander, Maj. Gen. Gary Volesky, that Australia’s interagency planning and response is economy over coming months that commander of the Joint Forces Com- vulnerable to a major health security risk. The Indo- highly effective. The Australian Government Interdepart- mand - United Assistance, Scott Dehnisch, Pacific region has experienced increased travel, trade has been generated by substantial military liaison officer, USAID, and Gregg mental Task Force (IDETF) model is well developed and hazard-pay for medical teams, as well Gross, engineering contractor, talk to local and urbanization based on recent economic growth. At works well. DFAT’s coordination of overseas response is medical officials Nov. 3, 2014, about the the same time there are concerns with increasing drug as dealing with the recovery of main- placement of a planned Ebola central to managing Australia’s international assistance stream health systems. treatment unit in Ganta, Liberia. resistant malaria and tuberculosis in the region. Aus- efforts. However, it is also important to note that line (Right) U.N. Secretary-General Special Rep- tralia is working to help strengthen regional cooperative Communication management – resentative Anthony Banbury speaks with agencies may be called on to lead (e.g. in this case the De- The media response in any crisis medical personnel from Médecins Sans mechanisms for health security to address this, and other, partment of Health), and good practice indicates that ear- Frontières in Ebola affected countries. potential health risks. will deal with perceptions more than ly centralized coordination of effort is essential including reality, as was the case with the Ebola and inter- Operational Learnings early identification of lead agencies and points of contact. crisis particularly in local communities and regarding national Stakeholder relationships - Work should continue This process supports coordinated planning, timeliness of international travel. Effective crisis management requires media. to proactively build and nurture relationships in non- decision-making and coordination of resources. careful attention to messaging, media management and Informa- crisis periods. Well-established, long-term relationships Planning and preparedness – Tactical off-the-shelf communications. These are necessities in achieving a tion shar- were central to ensuring Australia was able to respond contingency plans play an important role in operations successful outcome and must be factored in at the start of ing – There effectively, both domestically and internationally. Re- but there is a requirement for strategic flexibility and agil- every crisis response. is common lationships between the Commonwealth and State and ity in planning. Early in the Ebola response, the Austra- theme in Media and messaging – Media pressure in a crisis can UNMEER Territory Governments were important, particularly in lian Government established clear direction on priori- lead to ineffective allocation of resources, particularly if it recent crises Australia’s early response when the focus was primarily ties. However, as international priorities and responses leads to ‘being seen to act’ taking priority over good plan- response on domestic protection and information to travellers. changed, it was important for civil-military agencies to be ning and the coordination of response efforts. Crisis re- that management of information, analysis of data and Bilateral relationships with international governments, flexible while strategic direction was being realigned with sponders, both government and nongovernment, need to sharing knowledge is increasingly important in inter- military-to-military cooperation, and international and international partners. establish as quickly as possible common clarity of vision agency international operations, and increasingly com- domestic health partnerships all contributed to the suc- Good practice also indicates that there is a need for as the basis of their respective engagement with domestic plex. Protocols and procedures for multi-stakeholder

21 LIAISON Volume VII | Fall 2015 Center for Excellence in Disaster Management & Humanitarian Assistance 22 communication management and tionally maximizes opportunities for agencies need to expose their staff to information sharing should be in- continuous improvement. U.N. training programs and multi- corporated in all crisis management Managing resources - Placing national U.N.-focused exercises. It planning. the right people in the right jobs is is too late to build this capacity once Cultural sensitivities and gender essential and experienced human re- an operation has commenced. More considerations – The international sources are fundamental to effective staff needs experience in providing Ebola response highlighted the im- outcomes. Effective coordination of operational leadership for complex portance of gender, civilian protec- resources on the ground in overseas missions, including where the source tion and cultural considerations, operations is also key. For infectious of authority may be unclear or non- particularly in areas such as women’s disease outbreak, there are consid- existent. healthcare, and safe and dignified erable duty of care issues relating Conclusion burials. Every crisis response needs to deployments. The management The ACMC’s role in identifying to take account of cultural sensitivi- of resources should include robust lessons from interagency interna- ties and gender considerations. Rapid arrangements for the wellbeing of tional operations is growing. Each identification and protection of the personnel. crisis and operation is fundamentally most vulnerable in the community Alignment of strategic priorities – different but our experiential learn- (e.g. children, the elderly, pregnant The priorities of the Australian Gov- ing indicates similarities in many ar- women and lactating mothers) ernment are unlikely to fully align eas. Robust planning, integrated and should be a priority. with those of the host nation, the straightforward advice and central Learning from others - The Ebola international community, the U.N. government coordination are the key response in West Africa highlighted or nongovernment organizations. In lessons arising from recent opera- several best-practice models from formulating policy advice to govern- tions. Australian agencies can learn across civil-society, the private ment, Australian agencies need to from these operations and increase sector, U.K. and U.S. military, and articulate how our contributions can their preparedness to lead future government. The U.K. and the U.S. do the most good, while balancing Australian contingencies. responses, led by DFID and USAID the needs and expectations of the More information on the ACMC, respectively, chose to deploy substan- wide range of interested parties. and a summary of the workshop can tial military assets in West Africa. Engagement with the U.N. - The be found on www.acmc.gov.au There is potential to consider these effectiveness of U.N. missions is models as a template or framework contingent, not only on their inter- should an ADF response be required nal leadership, but on national and in the region. The sharing of lessons international engagement with those reports domestically and interna- missions. This means that national Civil-Military Team Building By Col. James Reilly (Ret.), USMC Staff Sergeant Tom Robinson/ UK MOD

British military personnel of 22 Field Hospital arriving in Sierra Leone as a part of Britain’s military response to the Ebola epidemic in West Africa on October 16, 2014. 23 LIAISON Volume VII | Fall 2015 Center for Excellence in Disaster Management & Humanitarian Assistance 24 hile serving on active duty, I participated in ing and exercising this relationship. However, given the directed humanitarian assistance and disaster response a number of foreign disaster response (FDR) differences in government culture, personal experiences security engagement exercises and seminars. These ob- operations in key leadership and senior staff and preconceived prejudices, building the relation- servations are based on primary and secondary relation- positionsW in the Philippines and Thailand, and in support ship between civilian and military personnel tends to be ships where I was in a position to either directly contrib- of operations in Burma and Japan. These experiences harder than expected, compounded by the ad-hoc nature ute to or benefit from well-defined and equally beneficial offered me the unique opportunity to view civil-military and stressful circumstances under which a FDR opera- civil-military relationships. relationships from the tactical to the theater strategic lev- tion is executed. To mitigate some of these distractions, Setting the Atmosphere. From the outset, I found els. My positions included serving as the officer-in-charge I believe the adoption, or consideration, of the following that the initiation of the civil-military team concept was for the III Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) Disaster leadership-based intangibles will contribute to the devel- driven by the shared singularity of the mission. Add- Response Assessment Team (DRAT) in the Philippines opment of a successful civil-military relationship. ing to the concept was the extended strategic view of and Thailand; commander, Combined Support Group- I found there are three universal intangibles a civil- post disaster engagement through the identification of Thailand and senior CSF 536 liaison officer to the U.S. military team needs to focus on when developing their second and third order effects, and their impacts to both Embassy Jakarta during Operation Unified Assistance; relationship in support of a FDR operation: (1) trust that the affected nation’s and the U.S. and United Nation future operations officer, U.S. Marine Component during all stakeholders are professionally adept and uniquely Country Teams’ future recovery, reconstruction and Operation Provide Comfort; and chief of staff, Marine qualified in their field; (2) develop a mutually respectful development efforts. The success of this relationship is Forces Pacific during Operation Tomodachi. The pur- relationship based on that trust; and (3) capitalize on the primarily balanced on trust, respect, engaged civilian pose of this article is to convey those intangibles I believe perspectives and expertise that each stakeholder brings and military leadership, and a shared understanding Courtesy Photo contribute to the development of solid civil-military to the success of the team. None of this is rocket sci- between stakeholders. Civilian and military personnel discuss Operation Unified Assistance tsunami relief ence, and has been This aspect was most visible when I observed Lt. Gen. efforts in the Combined Support Group – Indonesia operations center. addressed by more Rusty Blackman (USMC), U.S. Ambassador Ralph Boyce Inclusion. Inclusion is not merely providing a liaison, qualified people of Thailand, and U.S. Ambassador B. Lynn Pascoe of but involves consistent and constant leadership engage- than myself, but Indonesia set the conditions for success during Operation ment and discussion. Establishing doctrinally correct we are constantly Unified Assistance. Their shared vision and visibly solid organizations, centers and agencies does not, in and of relearning what relationship directly influenced and positively impacted itself, describe inclusion. Inclusion is the effort taken to should be a natural the development of a cohesive civil-military team. Fur- invite either a civilian or military person into the folds of effort. We have now thermore, the vulnerability aspect of bringing together a the team, more from a relationship-building point of view come to a point disparate group in a high-stress environment was dimin- rather than as an organizational necessity. Giving equal where the civil- ished when everyone was treated as a key member of the say to recommend direction and decisions is the founda- military relationship team. An appreciation for open and frank discussions led tion of teamwork and unity of effort. has been operation- to transparency, a greater awareness of the problem, and While commanding 3d Marine Expeditionary Brigade alized and exercised was necessary to ensure a unified purpose. during an FDR operation in the Philippines and as the J-3 both in conflict and Trust and Respect. This point is worth emphasiz- Combined Task Force 536, Lt. Gen. (then Brig. Gen.) Ken in response to hu- ing only because it is the foundation for all relation- Glueck was very adept at ensuring all stakeholders were manitarian support ships, both personal and professional. Without trust welcomed into the team. He accomplished this in a vari- operations through- and respect, and an appreciation for one’s capabilities ety of ways, to include personally welcoming new mem- out the globe. The in their chosen field, everything that follows is a wash. bers to the team, making himself and his staff available to capabilities, ca- The uniqueness of experience and personality should be everyone equally, and conducting team-building events pacities and cultural viewed as a strength and seen as a conduit to the develop- outside of the work environment to solidify the inclusive uniqueness each ment of a strong and diverse team, not a detriment. nature of the ad-hoc command. individual brings Having worked with both Tom Dolan, U.S. Agency Acknowledged Authorities and Responsibilities. to the civil-military for International Development Office of U.S. Foreign USAID/OFDA is the designated U.S. federal agency to team have been Disaster Assistance (USAID/OFDA), and Sebastian coordinate foreign humanitarian assistance. Under this tested time and Rhodes Stampa, U.N. Office for the Coordination of designation, OFDA’s ability to fulfill this responsibil- Courtesy Photo again. Consequent- Humanitarian Assistance, during multiple operations and ity resides in its ‘coordinating authority’ relationship ly, we now have a exercises in Thailand and the Philippines, I was able to Col. James Reilly (third from left), commander of Combined Support Group – Thailand, briefs Ambassador to Thailand Ralph between departments and agencies, which provides the Boyce and Lt. Gen. Robert Blackman on disaster response actions to date. generation of service observe both gentlemen approach their relationships with ability to ‘compel’ but not the authority to ‘direct.’ For the members, humanitar- the military in a constructive, respectful and mutually most part, all stakeholders understand this authority and relationships. ians and diplomats with enough experience working in supporting fashion. Their approach went a long way to the subsequent relationships it generates. However, dur- Published doctrine provides the accepted framework, these civil-military environments that developing and facilitating the development of a strong and united effort ing a disaster it is easy to misinterpret compelling from architecture, mechanisms and authorities to enable a suc- enhancing these relationships should be second nature. with the military task force. These two gentlemen imme- directing, and vice versa, thus creating a level of mis- cessful civil-military relationship. Mid-level and senior- Unfortunately, it remains a struggle. diately established a level of trust and respect with their understanding that may lead to an increased separation level military education addresses this doctrine, military In that light, the following are observations of best military counter-parts, not only due to their extensive between a civilian and military unified effort. exercises familiarize and train to the doctrine, and civil- practices learned during my experiences in support of experience and acknowledged credentials, but also by the Additionally, the public assumes that the military is the military training emphasizes the importance of establish- FDR operations, and executing U.S. Pacific Command- manner in which they presented themselves. default organization in charge of U.S. disaster response

25 LIAISON Volume VII | Fall 2015 Center for Excellence in Disaster Management & Humanitarian Assistance 26 efforts. This misconception can be the U.S. military and allows the mili- solid civilian-military relationship. explained by the very visible capabili- tary to focus solely on executing the Quite frankly, what works for one ties the military possesses, the news approved requests for assistance. set of individuals, or in one environ- attention the military receives, and This fact was most noticeable ment, may not work for another. It the organizational structure the mili- when 3d Marine Expeditionary all comes down to putting one’s ego tary is known for. Eliminating this Brigade executed a FDR operation aside and recognizing that the United misunderstanding becomes the mili- in the Philippines in December States is represented by a multitude tary’s responsibility. It is important 2004. U.S. Embassy Manila assigned of agencies, all experts in their field, for external agencies to understand their political-military advisor to all oriented towards achieving the the United States disaster response the Philippine National Disaster objectives – meeting the needs and authority, and for the military to Management Agency to assist in the requirements of the affected na- ensure that the doctrinal authorities prioritization of Philippine requests tion – while simultaneously acting as are not impacted by the military’s for support from the military joint a trusted and valued partner to the influence. task force. By the embassy’s direct world. Our list of successful disaster Where I saw the civil-military involvement with the Philippine response operations far exceeds those relationship truly benefit both parties relief effort, they were able to convey of our failures, with the deciding was OFDA prioritizing and validat- a realistic expectation of support, factor being the strength of the team, ing the requests the U.S. military ex- assist in the prioritization effort, a team forged on solid leadership, ecutes. This role protects the military, position the Philippine Government trust, respect, acknowledged roles, while also validating OFDA as the for recovery and reconstruction ef- and an inclusive shared vision. face of U.S. coordination efforts with forts, while concurrently freeing the the affected nation and the inter- military joint task force to execute Interview with Josef Reiterer, national humanitarian community. the requested assistance. Due to the very visible presence of To paraphrase Lt. Gen. Blackman Civil-Military Coordination Section Chief, when he served as the commander of CSF United Nations Office for the Coordination of 536: the military’s goal is to depart the stage while the audi- Humanitarian Affairs ence is still applaud- ing. That audience LIAISON Staff is both the affected nation and the U.S. Embassy Country nited Nations Office for the Coordination Team. The objective of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) Civil- is for the U.S. mili- Military Coordination Section Chief Josef tary to work them- ReitererU has spent the better part of two decades working selves out of a job to improve civil-military coordination. Beginning his while also posturing international career with the civil-military community in the affected nation, 1991, he served in Syria as a military observer and later Courtesy Photo the U.S. Embassy, as a weapons inspector. He joined the UNOCHA office and the interna- U.S. Army medical personnel and staff from International Medical Corps in Geneva in 1999 where he led the training program on work together to treat victims after Haiti was devastated by an earth- tional humanitarian humanitarian civil-military coordination for nearly eight quake Jan. 12, 2010. community for future years. In June 2008, he spent the next two years with the success during the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, also leading a the U.S. military in FDR operations, recovery and reconstruction efforts. training program before returning to UNOCHA in 2010. there is a natural tendency for inde- A strong civil-military team will Since June 2013, Reiterer has spearheaded the U.N.- pendent humanitarians, local organi- work together to ensure that not only system’s focal point on humanitarian civil-military zations, and even the affected nation are the immediate response require- interaction in his current position in Geneva. to go directly to the military, primar- ments synchronized and aligned, but ily because the military possesses the the enduring post-disaster require- capability to accomplish the task im- ments are addressed also. mediately. Having a proactive OFDA In conclusion, there is no cookie- presence alleviates this pressure on cutter approach to establishing a

27 LIAISON Volume VII | Fall 2015 Center for Excellence in Disaster Management & Humanitarian Assistance 28 LIAISON: How does the Civil-Military foreign military forces deploy with evolved quite a bit, if not to say it international disaster response envi- humanitarian-military gateway – a Coordination (CMCoord) section fit knowledgeable civil-military liaison is completely different. In the 90s, ronment? If so, where? concept that comes from Haiti and into the overall coordination picture? officers. we were mobilizing military and JR: Yes. I think some military forc- Haiyan, Vanuatu, and now Nepal, Josef Reiterer: The objective for civil defence assets for international es are buying into the Multi-National which we are trying to conceptualize, our section is clear: we work with L: What challenges do you see disaster relief operations. From 2000 Coordination Centre (MNCC) con- so we can navigate from one platform international civilian and military repeatedly between civilian organi- to 2010 our focus was mainly on the cept – this is progress. This provides to the other without becoming one organizations to bring appropri- zations and the military in disaster coordination challenges related to so- us with a clear starting point when and the same. ate aid faster to the people in need. response operations? called integrated peacekeeping mis- we want to establish the dialogue Now, how our coordination work JR: An inconsistency of ap- sions, and after 2010 we are involved with the humanitarian international L: Are there any new challenges fits into the overall coordination proaches; this starts with adherence in access negotiations and talking responders and the host nation. that are emerging with the military landscape is a bit more difficult; in to existing guidelines and policies on to armed, non-state actors. Just by On communications and informa- response to mega-disasters? most circumstances, a coordination humanitarian civil-military coordi- looking at the three major eras, it is tion technology, many militaries JR: Yes, there are. When I started umbrella exists with the humanitar- nation, continues with the infrequent obvious that the skill set of a humani- deploy with an open, unclassified sys- my work as a civil-military coordina- ian coordinator and the Humanitar- collaboration with on-site coordi- tarian civil-military coordinator was tem. This helps us a lot, since we are tor in the 90s, I could not imagine ian Country Team. In some situa- nation platforms, and ends with completely different in 1999 from working with a simple virtual plat- that 15 years later I would be sitting tions, in particular where crises do the lessons to be learned from joint the one required in 2015. In 1999 form to coordinate. There are many on a Chinese medical ship. What I not recognize international borders, response operations. The challenges we were really emergency managers. more areas such as joint training and want to say is there are new actors it becomes more complicated. I am have changed over time: two decades Now we are diplomats, mediators, exercises where we made progress responding to mega-disasters. Some not saying that humanitarian civil- ago we were discussing if interna- negotiators, we are focusing much and prepare our people better to for the right reason, some out of geo- military coordination becomes an tional militaries should or should not more on communication techniques respond jointly. political interest. We are not ques- end in itself, but it takes a tioning any of the decision-making different dimension when we L: Are there any civ-mil challenges processes back home leading to the are trying to deconflict re- that are specific to the Asia-Pacific? deployment of military forces, we are gional military action from a JR: Speed! The Asia-Pacific is the dealing with the massive challenges more localized humanitarian most disaster prone region in the on-site when military forces less aid system. At the local level, world. The more sudden an emer- trained in international disaster relief we are responding in small gency occurs, the faster the response operations hit the ground. pockets, whereas the military must be. In protracted humanitar- traditionally responds to the ian crises hours do not count, in L: Moving forward, what would whole region. earthquakes they do. The only way you like to see to improve coordina- to be fast now is training and capac- tion? L: How can U.S. and for- ity building, response preparedness, JR: When we tour around the eign militaries best plug into joint training, joint exercises, and world and visit our military training UNOCHA’s coordination the other preparedness work of the and learning institutions, we still see initiatives? regional UNOCHA office and actors. us – UNOCHA – teaching humani- JR: Here, we must do much tarian civil-military coordination more on our side; good L: Do you think it is easier for the policies and guidelines. Learning initiatives are underway. We military to plug into the humanitar- does not happen with one speech of would wish that every nation ian structure or for humanitarians to an UNOCHA staff. The Oslo Guide-

intending to respond with UNOCHA plug into a military structure? lines, the Military and Civil-Defence military forces to humanitar- JR: It won’t work. The military Assets (MCDA) Guidelines in com- UNOCHA personnel discuss humanitarian aid operations in the Humanitarian-Military Operations Coordination ian crises participated in our Center in Nepal. has specific needs for coordination plex emergencies, the Inter-Agency global forums on humanitarian and the humanitarians have spe- Standing Committee Reference Paper civil-military coordination. We do be involved in humanitarian work, with talking to people all across the cific needs for coordination. So one on Civil-Military Interaction and the not see nations being fully repre- now we are mainly discussing how spectrum of actors one can find in concept, which is under develop- Guide for the Use of Armed Escorts sented at this moment. This is one best to coordinate with them. By de- a humanitarian crisis. And, we have ment and was now applied for the must become part of the learning area at the strategic, global level. On fault, militaries are on-site already. made huge improvements, in par- third time in the Nepal crisis is the curriculum of all militaries sup- the operational level, we would ask ticular at the policy side, but also on Humanitarian-Military Operations porting humanitarian action - and all responding militaries buy into a L: How has the coordination envi- building a coordination capacity to Coordination Center (HuMOCC). preferably before and not after an predictable interface where assistance ronment evolved over the course of respond. It’s a concept, which bridges from the operation. is prioritized based on humanitar- your career? Have there been im- military MNCC to the humanitarian ian principles and criteria. On the provements in specific areas? L: Have you seen any lessons response operations. Maybe the way tactical level, we would wish that JR: Since I joined in 1999, it has learned become best practices in the forward is to provide a gateway - the

29 LIAISON Volume VII | Fall 2015 Center for Excellence in Disaster Management & Humanitarian Assistance 30 PARTNERS

By Kenneth Tingman, Retired Federal Coordinating Officer, Pacific Area Office, Federal Emergency Management Agency

. S. Lewis, the great British author once wrote, “True friendship begins when one person says to another, `What, you too? I thought I was the only one.’” Around the world, whenC personnel involved in disaster and emergency management domestically share experiences with others who work internationally, they may experience this sentiment. I write this based on a spirit of friendship and partnership borne from experiencing a common problem, which transcends unique circumstances. Emergency management personnel domestically and abroad experience many of the same challenges as they prepare and respond to disasters. In a practical sense, individuals performing disaster response activities speak the same language, regardless of country, program, agency, funding source or type of disaster. In the profession of disaster and emergency management, domestic and international humanitarian disaster responses are frequently viewed as distinctly separate, however, this article postulates that there are more critical similarities than differences and it behooves all of us to learn and share information, build and foster relationships with international partners, and recognize we may be able to improve outcomes for disaster relief victims and responders. In recent months, two events have reinforced my belief that domestic and international disaster work are similar, have applicability to each other and are not mutually exclusive. The first was a presentation I attended at the Civil-Military Interaction Workshop, organized by the Australian Civil-Military Centre and hosted by the

31 LIAISON Volume VII | Fall 2015 Center for Excellence in Disaster Management & Humanitarian Assistance 32 An Antonov AN-225 cargo plane, the world’s largest fixed wing aircraft, approaches Pago Pago airport in American Samoa. The plane carries generators contracted by the Federal Emergency Management Agency to assist the nation with electrical power restoration after an earthquake and tsunami struck in 2009.

Casey Deshong/ FEMA

Malaysia Peacekeeping Centre. One of the speakers was logistics and movement control decisions were being a Malaysian Army physician, Lt. Col. Mohd Arshil. Lt. made from the east coast of the United States, relayed Col. Arshil spoke about his disaster experiences, which through California and Hawaii and then to American included the Indian Ocean Tsunami, United Nations Samoa. With as many potential points of failure as there missions in East Africa and East Timor, the International were in the thousands of miles the coordination crossed Security Assistance Force mission in Afghanistan, as well nature); culture considerations; language considerations; ration (PDD) within six hours of the event. Interestingly, – like with an international response effort in the Pa- as domestic disasters in Malaysia. He spoke passionately, unique military perspective; unique sheltering; host na- Governor Togiola Tulafona of American Samoa was in cific – things worked relatively smoothly as we received intelligently and universally, drawing no distinctions tion fatigue; unity of effort; lead federal agency; disaster Hawaii when the tsunami struck, leaving him without an supplies and personnel. It may not have been easy every between his disaster work at home and his disaster work declaration process; and employment of the humanitar- emergency management staff to write up the request for a step of the way, but all of the logistics professionals, both abroad. On the contrary, his emphasis was the common ian principles. As the Federal Emergency Management disaster declaration. Through a series of phone calls with civil and military, worked hard to overcome problems, experiences in all of his work. Specifically, he shared that Agency federal coordinating officer (FCO) in the Pacific Gov. Tulafono, I was able to coordinate a disaster decla- collaborated as one federal team and kept the affected most of the medical work and many of the cultural chal- Area Office from 2007 – 2010, I faced many of these chal- ration request that had been drafted by my regional head- population of American Samoa at the forefront of their lenges were the same for him at home and abroad. I had lenges. In 2009, the earthquake and tsunami that struck quarters. He reviewed it and with minor corrections, actions. never heard anyone talk so seamlessly about domestic American Samoa was my last disaster as an FCO. signed it, and it went from the regional headquarters to The military is often the tool of convenience when fac- and international disaster response. The earthquake and tsunami struck early in the morn- FEMA’s national headquarters, then to the White House ing large, logistics problems in disaster response – they The second event was the 2015 International Tsunami ing of September 29, 2009 and wrapped around the main for action by the President. This process was coordinated are very good at quickly moving things and people from Symposium, “Making the Pacific Ready for the Tsunami island of Tutuila. Thirty-five people were killed, with throughout the day and each level was waiting for the one place to another. We had a requirement to deploy a Threat” at the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Ad- hundreds injured; 2,750 houses damaged; 275 houses request and ready to expedite it. large number of power generators, plus all of the associ- ministration (NOAA) Headquarters in Pearl Harbor, Ha- and 28 rental units destroyed; four schools substantially Due to the quick granting of a PDD, we were able to ated equipment (transformers, cables and fuel), in a short waii. Laura Furigone, NOAA deputy assistant adminis- damaged; one school destroyed; and the Satala Power activate other federal agencies, as well as the military. amount of time. We did not want to ship any equipment trator for Weather Services and deputy director, National Plant was substantially damaged and inoperative. I be- A robust team of more than 50 federal personnel was separately and find ourselves with generators but no way Weather Service, spoke about the United States domestic lieve the disaster response to the earthquake and tsunami deployed on a Coast Guard aircraft that very night. to connect them to the power grid, so we wanted to re- program known as NOAA’s Weather Ready Nation. The in American Samoa has applicability to future disaster In less than 24-hours after the event, the team was on ceive the shipment as one package. As the logistics team program addresses building community resilience in the responses in the Pacific and I offer the following observa- the ground in American Samoa performing a variety examined the requirement and tried to find a resource face of increasing vulnerability to extreme weather and tions. of response work. From the perspective of the affected to match this requirement, it became clear the distance water events. She highlighted that she intended to take population, a large team of federal and military response would require multiple trips for military assets to bring Disaster Declarations and Leadership all of the equipment in. A decision was made to contract this program global and include other nations. The “tyranny of distance” will complicate disaster re- personnel arrived before they woke up the next morning. I was again energized at the prospect of a domestic This act of government coordination was a firm symbol two flights of the Antonov, the world’s largest aircraft, sponses in the Pacific, both domestically and internation- instead of military airlift. This was a good example of disaster program being modelled for use internationally; ally. As a result, the Solomon Islands include a discussion of full commitment to the people of American Samoa. that a domestic disaster program could have applicability In both domestic and international disaster responses, having a requirements process that could match a need on the tyranny of distance in their domestic disaster with the most appropriate resource. At times civilian so- beyond the borders of one country and be used to help response planning. One of the best ways to mitigate the there will be a disaster declaration process and all levels of equip disaster responses internationally. government must be prepared to act quickly and collab- lutions are a better fit to mitigate the logistical challenges tyranny of distance is to ensure that a disaster declara- posed by the tyranny of distance, and governments need In the U.S. Pacific Command area of responsibility tion is granted as quickly as possible. A timely declaration oratively. Familiarizing the disaster declaration process (AOR) international disasters occur on a frequent basis. at each level to prevent delays to the process should be to maintain strong civil-military relationships to best will energize personnel, funding and outside assistance, meet those challenges. In addition, there are a number of significant condi- but without this first step all other steps are delayed. It the first step by governmental leadership. tions that all disaster responders must meet head on is incumbent upon government personnel at all levels to Logistics Use of the Military and eventually overcome in the AOR to be successful. I be familiar with the thresholds and processes required The tyranny of distance can also wreak havoc with The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Hu- would offer that in the Pacific there are more commonali- to request a disaster declaration from either regional or logistics and movement control. I know there were nu- manitarian Affairs’ (OCHA) Oslo Guidelines are “guide- ties based on the unique AOR than there are differences national leadership. merous logistics hiccups; however, to those of us on the lines for the use of foreign military and civil defense based on domestic policies. For example: the “tyranny In response to the earthquake and tsunami in American ground in American Samoa, most of those problems were assets (MCDA) in disaster relief”. One of the most basic of distance”; logistics; Pacific Island Nations (the insular Samoa, we were able to get a Presidential Disaster Decla- invisible. Although this was a U.S. domestic response, tenants of the Oslo Guidelines is that of last resort, which

33 LIAISON Volume VII | Fall 2015 Center for Excellence in Disaster Management & Humanitarian Assistance 34 states, “military and civil defence as- Support to Civil Authority (DSCA) tsunami completely destroyed one of sets should be seen as a tool comple- program, which provides unique the two power plants. A joint power menting existing relief mechanisms military resources in support of civil committee was formed consisting of in order to provide specific support authorities, similar to the interna- personnel from the territorial emer- Operational Contract Support: to specific requirements, in response tional Oslo Guidelines. gency management office, FEMA, to the acknowledged ‘humanitarian The local U.S. Army Reserve unit the American Samoa Power Author- gap’ between the disaster needs that had just returned home from a de- ity and USACE. Within two weeks, Mitigating Challenges Faced with Civil-Military the relief community is being asked ployment to Iraq and was not going this committee had developed a to be denied three-phase approach for restoring supporting power. The first phase required the Coordination in Disaster Relief Missions their family deployment of 52 FEMA generators and friends; that would be distributed at critical (i.e. most supplies are contracted and integration with all stakeholders they all locations along the power grid. The By Maj. Chris Hearl, Deputy out to commercial sources, either is stressed as a key element. Another showed up phase-one generators were op- in advance or under a just-in-time element is the understanding of the in uniform erational in six weeks and stayed in Operations Division Chief, philosophy). On the military side, secondary and tertiary effects of and ready to place for three months. The second Air Force Installation the process of acquiring goods and executing contracts in a given area, work the first phase called for the placement of Contracting Agency - services from commercial sources such as positive or negative impli- day! The re- 28-megawatt generators at the site Operating Location Pacific coupled with the necessary planning cations to economic stability, host serve soldiers of the destroyed power plant and for, coordination with, and integra- nation politics, etc. performed was to last for 18 to 24 months, until fter a disaster, there is no tion of contractors, is known as Op- OCS is not simply the art of buying a number a permanent power solution was shortage of personnel and erational Contract Support (OCS). things, that’s known as contract- of tasks, but implemented. Remarkably, five years organizations with good in- As part of this concept, coordination ing or procurement. OCS takes into the most later, the phase-two solution, which tentionsA who want to drop in on the Casey Deshong/ FEMA noteworthy was conceived within the first weeks scene and assist those in need. This Federal Coordinating Officer Kenneth Tingman and American Samoa Governor Togiola was work- of the response, remains operational. is both a blessing and a curse. While Tulafono sign a memorandum of agreement Oct. 7, 2009. The memorandum outlines the ing with the The role the USACE team played was roles and responsibilities between the territory and the Federal Emergency Management having boots on the ground can be Agency in disaster recovery after an earthquake and tsunami devastated the country. Red Cross and simply invaluable and the stopgap helpful to organize relief efforts, it FEMA Corps measures they helped create are now can also be a strain on communica- to satisfy and the resources available to distribute supplies to the villages. having long-term effects. tion and resources; resources that to meet them.” Culturally, the distribution of goods Every disaster that I have re- could otherwise be directed toward Throughout the Pacific, however, is done through the village chief, or sponded to had some very prominent survivors. Around the globe, the many military forces are the first Matai. As it turned out, many of the commonalities: an affected popula- assumption can be made that any responders in their countries, so it reserve personnel held Matai titles, tion, a host government that needed relief effort associated with a disaster is common to see militaries early in and they could speak Matai. Using assistance, unique cultural sensitivi- will involve some variant of a civil- the disaster response process. Many uniformed Matai led to an unprec- ties, a process to request assistance, military response. Poor coordination populations in the Pacific even expect edented level of transparency for a planning process, logistics and between civil and military organiza- to see military personnel perform the distribution and made the entire prioritization of resources, response tions may bring additional challenges vital roles in disaster response; see- effort run extremely smoothly. The objectives, the use of unique military and constraints beyond the damage ing uniformed personnel provides a lesson here is that, while use of the capabilities, and the necessity that and despair already experienced by degree of comfort and reassurance to military to distribute goods is not a agencies coordinate and collaborate the population. Proper planning, the affected population, such was the common practice by humanitarians on response activities. The tyranny of coordination, and where appropri- case in American Samoa. The mili- around the world, it is effective in the distance makes these challenges even ate, integration, can help mitigate the tary response was unusual because it Pacific, especially among the island more acute in the Pacific. The more realities faced during a humanitarian consisted of Hawaii National Guard nations. information that we can share with assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR) personnel, active duty personnel in Power Restoration each other about disaster experienc- event. the form of a Defense Coordinating Loss of power and the restora- es, especially in this vast region, the There are many ways to coordinate Office and Defense Coordinating better prepared we will be to respond 1 tion of power is a huge challenge in a multi-agency landscape. One of Element (DCO/DCE), a local U.S. among Pacific Island nations simply to the next disaster, whether do- the most effective routes is to engage Army Reserve unit and U.S. Army because there is no way to borrow mestic or international; the mission appropriate stakeholders before an Corps of Engineer personnel (US- power from neighboring nations. is still the same – to save lives and incident occurs and open up a fruit- ACE). Domestically, the DCO/DCE mitigate suffering, and in the process, The lack of backup power, based on ful dialogue. Most relief supplies Tech. Sgt. Beth Anschutz/ U.S. Air Force is activated as part of the Defense the tyranny of distance, is a com- foster international partnerships. are in some way non-organic to the 1 Of note is that USPACOM’s Joint Task Force – Homeland One of the most effective ways of coordinating civil-military operational contract support in disaster Defense (JTF-HD) and a Navy Frigate, the USS Ingraham, all mon theme. In American Samoa, the organization providing the relief supported the DCO/DCE. response environment, is through the Joint Contracting Support Board platform, which gathers the necessary players before a disaster strikes.

35 LIAISON Volume VII | Fall 2015 Center for Excellence in Disaster Management & Humanitarian Assistance 36 account the broader process and impacts across a given JCSB established drives the dialogue early in planning, Furthermore, before going into a particular environ- supplies, civilian agencies may be expending unnecessary landscape. For example, taking OCS into account when effectively getting the right people around the table early ment, it’s important for planners to focus efforts on effort to obtain the same supplies. If the civilian agencies responding to a HA/DR event, the supporting nation may enough to establish relationships, and understand any conducting an analysis of the operating environment. are not communicating assessments of infrastructure choose to obtain non-critical, readily available supplies limitations or poor assumptions that either side may Doing so will allow planners (and those later in charge of capacity such as airfield or roadways, the military may be from local businesses instead of bringing those supplies have in a given contingency event. With respect to HA/ execution) to best posture for and respond to any contin- making poor assumptions in their planning efforts and in with organic forces, as a way of infusing money into DR response, the primary two agencies who work closest gency. This analysis includes an assessment of the avail- in turn, making false promises to government leaders in the local economy. One has to be careful to not compete with the military in determining the appropriate level of able infrastructure, currency conditions, employment terms of the level of support the military can provide. for critical or limited resources, but if readily available, response are the Federal Emergency Management Agency situation, economic factors, military and cultural condi- Ultimately, civil authorities are in charge of HA/DR injecting currency into the local economy may increase (FEMA), when stateside, and the United States Agency tions, nongovernmental organization (NGO) presence, activities. This puts the military in a supporting role. This efforts to stabilize the area, maintain or increase employ- for International Development (USAID) for events taking and any other information providing a clear picture of often means the military needs to be very careful to allow ment, build coalitions of support networks, and so on. place in a foreign country. These two organizations are what to expect when going into a given JOA. Situational the local government or appointed civil authority to lead These positive effects of applying OCS will not only sup- the U.S. lead for HA/DR response efforts and will rely awareness is extremely challenging when developing the response and provide them with as accurate informa- port the immediate needs of the disaster, but also garner heavily upon military support in areas such as airlift and priorities and assessments associated with a disaster. Both tion as possible. The forces and equipment the military stronger relationships in the long-term. other logistical matters. Integrating these two organiza- civil and military organizations conduct various versions brings to bear can be substantial, but are often misunder- When applying OCS, it’s also important to understand tions as appropriate into a JCSB process will streamline of analysis on locations within a given operational area. stood by civil authorities. That means the military needs ways to leverage the whole-of-government approach to the broader coordination efforts. When outside the U.S., As the response is underway, this analysis should contin- to be as transparent as possible and even proactive in a given operation. While OCS is not exclusive to HA/DR USAID is the lead agent for coordinating with other civil ue and serve leaders with the need for any adjustments to sharing information. Likewise, as the requirements gen- events, nor is it based solely on civil-military interaction, organizations such as the International Committee of decisions on the ground. Civil and military organizations erator, the civilian leadership needs to provide clear, ac- through effective use of OCS, the military can facilitate an the Red Cross (ICRC) and United Nations Organization sharing information of their respective analysis before, curate, and timely information to the military so that they effective platform for working with their civilian counter- for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA). during, and after an event is critical to success. The JCSB may support in the most efficient and least disruptive parts during a HA/DR event. Although ICRC nor UNOCHA need to necessarily be and subsequent working groups provides for a platform manner. There are multiple automated tools out there for One of the most expeditious ways of doing this is invited to all JCSB iterations, having USAID participate, for all stakeholders to share information at the unclassi- facilitating this coordination, but given the rate of change through holding a recurring Joint Contracting Support can serve as a critical link to sharing information accord- fied level. and other dynamics associated with HA/DR events, hu- Board (JCSB) in your joint operating area (JOA). A JCSB ingly. On the military side, the primary stakeholders for The footprint, organic capability, politics, costs, chain man discussion at the face-to-face and telephonic level is an OCS concept discussed in Joint Publication 4-10, a JCSB include any unit in the JOA charged with procur- of command, constraints, responsibilities, and even often proves most accurate. For contracted solutions, the and is initially held during military operation phase ing goods or services for their customer, to include the objectives are often very different between civilian and JCSB represents a defined solution for communication “zero”, to bring various agencies together to understand associated senior contracting official, related contracting military organizations. Understanding upfront where challenges. constraints and capabilities, deconflict common con- units (squadrons, brigades, etc.) and representatives from these factors cross will allow both sides to be more ef- There are still other challenges that a better under- tracting requirements, and even determine the most the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), Defense Lo- fective and minimize any negative secondary or tertiary standing of the OCS concept can help mitigate or avoid. appropriate contract mechanism to execute requirements gistics Agency, and General Service Administration, just effects to either party. Competition for resources and un- Competition for resources is an often overlooked chal- for the customer. Doctrine gives us flexibility in when to name a few. Furthermore, once an event occurs, those due strain on existing infrastructure are two of the biggest lenge. Personnel on the ground want to be proactive and to hold the JCSB and who to invite. As such, the JCSB same stakeholders already have a relationship established areas where poor communication between the civil and responsive to the needs of the people. Not factoring in platform is a great venue to have open communications and can continue to meet and coordinate their efforts military agencies pose a problem. If the military is not the reality of others on the ground doing the same thing between civilian and military representatives. Having a through a joint response. communicating about how many aircraft are bringing in will bring confusion and inefficiency at best. Addition- In a disaster response environment, relief flows in from assisting states, nongovernmental organizations and foreign militaries. To minimize duplication of efforts, civil- military coordination should take part prior to a disaster.

Staff Sgt. Melissa White/ U.S. Air Force

37 LIAISON Volume VII | Fall 2015 Center for Excellence in Disaster Management & Humanitarian Assistance 38 By Taryn Ino, Program Assistant, Building R3ADY Asia-Pacific n 2011, economic losses from natural disasters, such as the Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami and the Southeast Asian floods, totaledI nearly $400 billion; more than 75 percent of the damage occurred in the Asia-Pacific region.1 That Resilience same year, at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Summit in Honolulu, R3ADY Asia-Pacific was launched as the Asia-Pacific Disaster Risk Reduc- tion and Resilience (APDR3) Network by U.S.-based organizations from academia, civil society, government, military, and philanthropy on the premise that there are steps we can take to mitigate the risks Courtesy Photo/ U.S. Army through and impacts of natural disasters by working together U.S. forces and civilians integrated with service members from Canada, Australia and the United Kingdom during the largest contract support exercise to date, Operational Contract Support Joint Exercise 2015, on Schofield Barracks, Hawaii. across all sectors of society. A lot has changed since 2011 – including the name, ally, sometimes having too large of generators first. This single action while working within a structured APDR3. The organization rebranded as R3ADY Asia- a responder footprint can actually resulted in not only a quicker re- chain of command. Sometimes in a Pacific in September 2014, and remains committed to inhibit the ability to provide for the sponse to those in immediate need, HA/DR response the civil authorities reducing the risks of natural disasters and building re- local population. If the sustainment but streamlined the civil authority’s need military assistance in executing Partnerships silient communities and economies through innova- of outside helpers is taking scarce ability to stabilize the community, rapid deployment for relief sup- tive and strategic partnerships. resources away from those in need, and drove positive relations between plies, without the military being in 1 “2011 peak year of disaster losses in the world,” UNmultimedia.org, March 2, 2012.http:// no one wins. If we don’t clearly un- the U.S. military and Japanese civil charge of operations. With civilian www.unmultimedia.org/radio/english/2012/03/2011-peak-year-of-disaster-losses-in-the- world/. derstand the relationship and com- authorities into the future. authorities in charge of leading direct munication struggles between civil Military professionals responding response, this leadership brings with and military organizations, we drive to a HA/DR event often think tacti- it the challenge of asking for the ap- A landslide early counter-productive behavior. cally; how do we solve the problem in propriate levels of indirect support. warning system siren One example of a competition for front of us? OCS teaches us to think FEMA and USAID are the federal sits above a village in Central Java, resources being avoided was after more operationally, even strategical- agencies charged with being the Indonesia. the 2011 Great East Japan Earth- ly. How do we best solve the problem frontline in coordinating with civil quake. U.S. military bases in the in front of us, without causing unin- authorities for U.S. support to HA/ area experienced damage as well as tended consequences for our partners DR events. Bringing the organiza- off-base infrastructure. Rather than and allies? tions into the JCSB process will help seek out supplies and services im- The goal behind OCS is to spur build relationships early, provide for mediately from the local contractors, a transformational culture change exchange of ideas, and posture both the base leadership, through frequent within the DOD, getting everyone the civil and military authorities to communications with the off-base to think outside the box and con- best respond in the event of an emer- civil authorities, understood that sider all effects of OCS. Through gency. In the U.S. Pacific Command generators would be a high-demand increased communication and early JOA, there has been no shortage of item for the population. Genera- planning, that change can take place. HA/DR events, and every indication tors in the area were in low supply Broadening the concept beyond is that they will continue to be an and difficult to acquire from outside military operations brings with it unfortunate reality in our environ- sources. The military leadership took new challenges, but still boils down ment. Bringing civil and military a strategic pause in their efforts to to transparency, planning and open stakeholders together early will serve contract for generators and instead communication between the civil and to leverage our lessons observed requested reach-back support from military organizations charged with from the past, turn them into lessons the U.S. mainland. This allowed for responding to contingencies. learned now and problems avoided first responders, displaced persons, The military is structured for rapid in the future. and other local authorities to obtain deployment and immediate impact

39 LIAISON Volume VII | Fall 2015 Center for Excellence in Disaster Management & Humanitarian Assistance 40 R3ADY fulfills its mission by tor of R3ADY. “It’s slightly harder The UGM team designed unique aligning the resources and expertise to sustain attention on R3 because early warning equipment locally so of multiple sectors and industries, preparedness doesn’t create a sense that it is less expensive than existing building knowledge for informed of urgency like disaster response.” devices and more appropriate for action, and designing effective solu- R3ADY’s work is aimed at main- local conditions. UGM researchers tions and strategies spurred by a streaming disaster preparedness make adjustments for each com- shared responsibility. A great part across all sectors, and creating lasting munity, based on local cultural and of R3ADY’s successes stems from its connections between stakeholders economic considerations. Further- expansive network and relationships. from different sectors before a disas- more, they have discovered that a The 12-member advisory board high- ter strikes. key component to the success of the lights the diversity of key partners, Building Resilient Communities system is active participation by the which include military organizations R3ADY has had recent success community in the process, so com- (U.S. Pacific Command), govern- garnering attention and action on munity residents understand the mental organizations (FEMA and preparedness from its collabora- risks and feel a sense of ownership NOAA), philanthropies (Ford Foun- tion with the University of Gadjah over the devices. dation and Rockefeller Foundation), Mada (UGM), the University of UGM’s approach of engaging com- private companies (Chevron) and Hawaii (UH) Social Science Research munities and installing early warn- Kepano Kekuewa Kepano Kekuewa academic institutions (University of Institute, and Pacific Disaster Center ing systems both raises awareness Two women carry loads up a steep hill in an Indonesian village. University of Gadah Mada (UGM) develops and implements early warning instruments in com- Hawaii), to name a few. The growing of disaster risks and saves lives. In munities based on social, economic and cultural conditions; The village leader stands with his mother in front of his home, where an early warning system server (PDC) on community-based early transmits data back to UGM via mobile phone network. involvement of military organiza- warning systems in Indonesia. Land- November 2007, just months into the system devices were installed in seven Sendai, Japan in March 2015. At the disasters can disrupt tourism-depen- tions in natural disaster management slides are one of the most frequent project, an early warning device in locations, mainly on Java Island. world conference, R3ADY, UGM, dent hotspots through a sudden drop provides ample opportunity for disasters in Indonesia, and in 2014, it Pagentan rang four-hours ahead of a In the last year, R3ADY facilitated UH and PDC highlighted the com- in tourist arrivals and damage to the civil-military coordination through was the most dangerous, causing 408 landslide, allowing 35 households to UGM’s connection and collaboration munity-based early warning systems infrastructure critical to the sector. R3ADY. Engagement of military deaths and displacing nearly 80,000 evacuate before the landslide buried with new partners, which expanded project, shared best practices, and Making an entire tourism destination organizations in preparedness activi- residents.4 In December 2014, more 10 homes with no casualties. More its effective early warning practice discussed policy mechanisms and safer and more resilient ultimately ties helps to cultivate relationships than 70 people were killed in a major recently, in Sijeruk Village, when an to 27 locations. The R3ADY project resources needed to expand and scale benefits local communities and liveli- between multiple stakeholders and landslide in Banjarnegara. early warning instrument sounded also helped to raise the visibility of the project nation- or region-wide. hoods by safeguarding employment ease the challenges of coordination Using UGM’s community-based its alarms, a majority of the people UGM’s efforts at the national level. R3ADY organized several other and protecting assets. when the military is asked to assist landslide risk assessment and early relocated to a safer area before the Following the deadly December events at the WCDRR to emphasize Based in Hawaii and surrounded and manage disaster response. warning project as a case study, the land moved 2-3 meters. 2014 landslide in Banjarnegara, the the importance of multi-stakeholder by a bustling tourism industry, In 2013, Super Typhoon Haiyan team developed a framework bridg- Collaborating with R3ADY has President of the Republic of Indo- partnerships for disaster risk reduc- R3ADY invited the United Nations tore through the Philippines, result- ing bottom-up (community-based) helped UGM connect with new part- nesia ordered the National Disaster tion and resilience. One of R3ADY’s Office of Disaster Reduction (UNIS- ing in more than 6,000 fatalities and and top-down (regional or national) ners to extend and expand their in- 2 Management Agency (BNPB) to in- events focused on a multi-stakehold- DR) to speak with stakeholders about affecting nearly 13 million people. approaches to disaster risk reduction. novative practice. R3ADY has helped stall landslide early warning systems er approach to building resilience in an emerging program focused on The 2015 Nepal Earthquake resulted The framework is an innovative and to bridge UGM’s work with the in all landslide-prone areas. BNPB a tourism destination, and featured hotel resilience in October 2014. in over 8,600 fatalities and displaced replicable approach to disaster risk efforts of various government and 3 appointed UGM to install 20 early input from experts in government, R3ADY, the Pacific Risk Manage- an estimated 2.8 million people. reduction activities, and has been nongovernmental partners, opening warning systems on Java and other private sector and academia. ment ‘Ohana (PRiMO), and the These events serve as recent remind- successful in actively engaging mul- new opportunities for collaboration. islands. Under the national Landslide Hawaii Tourism Authority organized ers of the importance of working to tiple sectors at all levels. “One example is the collaboration Strengthening Community and Risk Reduction Masterplan (2015- a meeting with hotels to learn about mitigate risk in the Asia-Pacific, one “Disaster mitigation is the respon- with Mercy Corps for the installation 2019), BNPB will install 1,000 early Economic Resilience of Tourism and provide feedback on UNISDR’s of the most disaster prone regions of sibility of everyone, not only the gov- of landslide (early warning systems) warning systems over five years, in plans. the world. ernment,” said Dr. Wahyu Wilopo, in Bandung Barat District, West Java Destinations collaboration with UGM. “It became clear that hotels, es- “There are many existing orga- the head of Central Laboratory, Province,” added Dr. Wilopo. “The Tourism is an important industry In addition to bridging new part- pecially larger chains, had existing nizations that focus on disaster Geological Engineering Department, collaboration was initiated after the to many communities and economies ners to expand UGM’s early warn- disaster management plans in place,” response – a critically important Gadjah Mada University. “R3ADY donor meeting in Jakarta.” in the Asia-Pacific region, contributing system project, R3ADY has also said Bavishi. “What were missing phase of disaster management – but improves collaborations and net- Through formal exchanges and ing to a significant portion of nation- helped identify and organize op- were partnerships with critical stake- R3ADY was created to focus on R3, working between the government, workshops, as well as informal intro- al income and employment. In 2013, portunities to share lessons from the holders.” or risk reduction and resilience,” private sector and community.” ductions, R3ADY has succeeded in Asia and the Pacific welcomed 248 project, such as at the Asian Minis- Despite hotels being built tsunami- says Jainey Bavishi, executive direc- Begun in 2007, UGM has imple- cultivating concrete commitments of million international tourists, with equipment, expertise, and resources terial Conference on Disaster Risk tourism earnings of $359 billion.5 resistant, having installed hurricane- 2 “Quick facts: What you need to know about Super Typhoon mented a community-based landslide Haiyan,” MercyCorps.org, November 14, 2013. http://www. to extend the positive impacts of Reduction in Bangkok, Thailand in rated windows, and training staff mercycorps.org/articles/philippines/quick-facts-what-you- early warning project in Central Java. However, the region is highly vul- need-know-about-super-typhoon-haiyan. UGM’s project. June 2014, and at the Third United and personnel on evacuation plans, 3 “Nepal-Earthquake: Fact Sheet #14,” USAID.gov, May 4 “17 percent of Indonesians live in landslide-prone areas: nerable to natural disasters. Natural 18, 2015, http://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/ Agency,” TheJakartaPost.com, March 30, 2015, http://www. Before the partnership between Nations World Conference on Di- 5 “UNWTO Tourism Highlights, 2014 Edition,” UNWTO. they could only recover and resume documents/1866/05.18.15-USAID-DCHANepalEarthquakeFact- thejakartapost.com/news/2015/03/30/17-percent-indonesians- org, http://dtxtq4w60xqpw.cloudfront.net/sites/all/files/pdf/ Sheet14.pdf live-landslide-prone-areas-agency.html R3ADY and UGM, early warning saster Risk Reduction (WCDRR) in unwto_highlights14_en_hr_0.pdf, pp 7 operations if the airports, roads, and

41 LIAISON Volume VII | Fall 2015 Center for Excellence in Disaster Management & Humanitarian Assistance 42 “The Boxing Day Tsunami diverse partners from different sec- was a learning experience for tors to connect, communicate, and Phuket,” she added. “Similar to collaboratively plan for resilience. Re-examining the Past: Hawaii’s hotels, there has been Often, organizations have different extensive disaster management missions and goals, and see the world Cooperative U.S.-Japan planning done by Phuket busi- through distinctly different lenses. nesses. Often these plans are de- R3ADY, itself founded as a multi- veloped independently, and the sectoral partnership, is able to suc- Disaster Preparedness challenge was whether they will cessfully bring together organizations work in conjunction with the to see the world beyond individual other sectors’ efforts if another missions to address on-the-ground and Response: disaster occurs.” problems in collective and sustain- By building on the existing able ways. work that has been done and Besides making connections A Progress Report shifting the focus from indi- through its network, another way vidual assets and organizations R3ADY is helping connect diverse By Pete Novick to working with a network of partners for resilience is through stakeholders, the project will its innovative guide, known as n 1997, the commander of U.S. Naval Forces Japan (CNFJ) established make the destination as a whole R3SOURCE. Currently under devel- a position – emergency management (EM) officer – and I had the good fortune to be the first incumbent. Our tiny office of one prepared a presen- Cheryl Anderson more resilient. Other critical opment, R3SOURCE will provide tation,I and by way of introduction, went around to other U.S. military head- stakeholders must be integrated tools and guidance for anyone inter- Sani Tanaka from University of Gadah Mada dem- into the process, including local ested in building successful cross- quarters in Japan to brief staff personnel primarily in operations, plans, logistics, onstrates landslide monitoring equipment for com- medical and civil engineering. The audiences were attentive and polite; their munity members of Tegklik villages, who have been government officials; key compa- sector partnerships by drawing from trained to use the equipment to prevent disaster. nies in the tourism sector, such the experiences, pitfalls, and lessons most frequent question: “what is emergency management?” Fast forward eighteen years, and we can see that the increasing sophistication other critical infrastructure were up as hotels; representatives of local of existing partnerships. R3SOURCE infrastructure assets, such as airports, will be an online interactive guide, of bilateral and multilateral civil-military and military-military planning, coor- and running, and workers were able dination, training and most importantly, actual disaster response operations, has to return to work. ports, hospitals, and utilities; relevant scheduled for launch in July 2015. community organizations; and oth- Updates will be available at www. elevated EM in importance not only for what it does – helping people displaced Taking the hotels’ feedback into by disaster and protecting property – but also for the complementary support it account, R3ADY decided to pursue ers. r3ady.org. An initial workshop in Phuket R3ADY has been engaged in a provides to other missions. In comparison to other military missions, that often a destination-approach to resilience require large capital investment, EM initially asks you only to bring an open planning, bringing together mul- brought together representatives of range of activities in over the past local hotels and hotel associations, several years and has experienced mind and a sharp pencil to the table to learn about responding to the world’s tiple stakeholders to coordinate and supply of come-as-you-are events.1 collectively plan for disasters and the telecommunication industry, several early successes bringing hospitals, and the Governor’s Office together diverse organizations at In 2000, we discussed our initial efforts toward host nation civil and military quicker recovery. R3ADY partnered coordination in an article published in Liaison (Vol. 2, No. 1), the highlights: with the Earth Observatory of Singa- to gauge interest in a multi-stake- different levels, and helping to sus- holder destination resilience pro- tain these relationships long-term. pore to pilot the Enhancing Disaster • Kanagawa Prefecture Government (KPG) Manual for Mutual Help (1998): and Climate Resilience in Asia’s Key gram, and received positive feedback. By creating a culture of collabora- Future steps will be collectively map- tion around disaster risk reduction, U.S. Army Japan (USARJ), CNFJ and KPG coordinated development of a Tourism Destinations Project in manual to promote more effective coordination to support disaster response Phuket, Thailand. ping and assessing vulnerabilities, R3ADY hopes to continue to make examining existing plans for gaps, strides toward mainstreaming part- operations. KPG, USARJ and CNFJ subsequently used this manual in support of Following the 2004 Boxing Day Japan’s annual national disaster exercises and demonstrations. From the onset, Tsunami, occupancy rates in Phuket identifying infrastructure vulnerabili- nerships for a more resilient future. ties, and developing tangible plans. these exercises involved the exchange of information in response to scripted dropped significantly. The Tourism exercise events. Authority of Thailand reported that The methodology, lessons, and best practices from Phuket will be docu- • TRANSPORTEX (1999): In this two-day exercise, USS Fort McHenry (LSD- following the Boxing Day Tsunami, 43) and Japan Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSDF) ship JDS Ōsumi (LST- 20 percent of the 100,000 tourism- mented in order to eventually serve as a guide to be scaled and replicated 4001) conducted demonstrations of disaster response capabilities (at sea phase) oriented workers were immediately and participated in a humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR) opera- 6 in other tourism destinations. fired. Those who remained em- tions seminar (in port phase). This exercise was one of the first USN–JMSDF ployed struggled to support them- Connecting Diverse Partners efforts to demonstrate disaster response capabilities, and provided a valuable selves and their families without tips Critical to the tourism resilience 7 precedent for follow-on disaster response coordination and exercises, and real- and commissions from tourists. project, or any project aimed at world responses to natural disasters. 6 Jumpei Ichinosawa,”Reputational disaster in Phuket: the secondary impact of the tsunami on inbound tourism”, Disaster building resilience, is bringing to- 1 In this article, Emergency Management (EM) refers to planning, preparedness and response operations for natural and man-made Prevention and Management: An International Journal, Vol. 15, disasters, including terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction, and involves response to complex humanitarian emergencies involving Iss 1 pp. 115 gether key stakeholders from mul- displacement of people and destruction of property. EM planning, preparedness and response operations, also referred to as Humanitarian 7 Rosemary Behan, “The people need us...’ Rosemary Behan “ Assistance and Disaster Relief (HA/DR), are focused on meeting the immediate needs of displaced populations and include providing The Daily Telegraph (London), February 05, 2005, LexisNexis tiple sectors. It can be challenging for water, food, shelter, sanitation, transportation, medical care and other critical needs delivered by trained, certified and logistically sup- Academic. www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic ported first responders.

43 LIAISON Volume VII | Fall 2015 Center for Excellence in Disaster Management & Humanitarian Assistance 44 and military personnel were invited to observe these ex- Government with relief supply operations as part of the ercises, which provided the basis for continuing dialogue annual Japan-wide disaster drills. and response coordination efforts. It should be noted Although not part of the above civil-military coopera- that U.S. Navy and Japanese civil fire departments, under tion discussion, it should be noted that JMSDF and the their mutual aid agreements, enjoyed close working rela- U.S. Navy also participate in Pacific Partnership, the tionships and some integrated response capabilities. largest humanitarian and disaster response preparation DOD established Joint Project Manager Guardian mission in the Indo-Asia-Pacific. From its origins as a (JPMG) as the acquisition authority for systems and response operation following the 2004 Indian Ocean equipment to support WMD response operations at U.S. earthquake and tsunami, which killed nearly a quarter of military installations worldwide, including mass notifi- a million people, Pacific Partnership has grown in size cation, equipment to support first responders, hot zone and scope. operations and personnel decontamination. Navy lessons Marking its ninth mission in 2014, Pacific Partnership learned from those initial efforts informed the JPMG provided direct assistance to Vietnam, Cambodia, and acquisition process. the Republic of the Philippines. A JMSDF ship, JDS Kuni- JPMG fielded the WMD installation response capabil- saki (LST 4003), served as the primary mission platform ity package to Commander, Fleet Activities Yokosuka - the first time Pacific Partnership was led from a partner (CFAY) and U.S. Navy Hospital Yokosuka in 2006. In nation’s vessel. subsequent U.S. demonstrations and exercises, Japanese Clearly, both U.S. Navy and Japanese civil and military military and civil personnel had the opportunity to ob- leaders recognize the value of increased bilateral civil- serve the drills and participate in post-event discussions. military and military-military emergency management Over time, coordination for response to natural disasters coordination. The detail and thoroughness of Japan’s was seen on both sides as the priority. preparedness planning and funding, mitigation efforts, Meanwhile, local U.S. Navy efforts to strengthen bilat- public awareness campaigns, emergency alert and noti- eral coordination for natural disasters continued at the fication systems, and coordination demonstrate a keen city level. In 2007, CFAY and Yokosuka City, where the commitment to the welfare of all citizens and residents. main part of the U.S. Navy installation is located, signed Tsunami, a term now used all over the world, is a a memorandum of understanding for disaster prepared- Japanese word which means ‘wave in the harbor’ ness and disaster response operations. The MOU serves It was named long before the event was understood. Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Dylan McCord/ U.S. Navy as the basis for coordinating response to natural disasters In the many years of bilateral coordination for disaster The U.S. and Japan have a long history of military-military and civil-military cooperation in disaster preparedness and response, including after the Great East as well as opportunities for coordination, training and ex- preparedness and response, the foundation of friendship Japan Earthquake in 2011. Here, Rear Adm. Robert Girrier, left, commander of Carrier Strike Group (CSG) 7, explains operations supporting earthquake and tsunami ercises. In furtherance of this MOU, CFAY and Yokosuka and partnership between the U.S. and Japan has hope- relief efforts to Japan Self-Defense Forces Lt. Gen. Eiji Kimizuka, commanding general of Joint Task Force Touhoku, March 31, 2011. City held an exercise that summer to demonstrate mutual fully moved us away from merely naming an event to • Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on Coor- U.S. military disaster response planning, which included support to a displaced population following a simulated understanding it in a profound and useful way. Together dination for Disaster Preparedness and Disaster Relief both natural and man-made disasters, moved quickly to earthquake. the U.S. Navy and Japan have made civil-military and Operations (1999): In the first bilateral, service-to-service counter another emerging threat: terrorist use of weapons In April 2008, CFAY signed a similar MOU with Zushi military-military cooperative planning, preparedness and MOU of its type, JMSDF Maritime Staff Office and CNFJ of mass destruction (WMD). City, which also hosts part of the CFAY installation com- response to disasters a key element of bilateral coopera- agreed to protocols for disaster response notification, in- In response to challenges posed by this new type of plex. The MOU formally acknowledged that the CFAY tion, and have used and built upon agreements for nearly formation exchange and coordination. Having a formal disaster scenario, and as part of the fiscal year 2001 and and Zushi City would work together in the event of a two decades to the benefit of both nations. bilateral coordination mechanism in place is important 2002 Supplemental Appropriations Acts (P.L. 107-38, natural disaster, such as a tsunami or earthquake. The views expressed in this article are the authors own. in Japan, as it provides operational guidance for coordi- P.L. 107-117 and P.L. 107-206), Congress appropriated Following the Great East Japan Earthquake on March nation, where the absence of such guidance may make billions of dollars to the Department of Defense. A por- 11, 2011, the U.S. military conducted response opera- it more difficult to engage in both preparedness plan- tion of the funds ($3.5 billion in FY01; $11.9 billion in tions under Operation Tomodachi (Japanese word for ning and actual response operations. Japan Self Defense FY02) went to the Defense Emergency Response Fund friend(s)). The operation lasted from March 12 to May 4, Forces are integrated into national and prefecture disas- (DERF) and other DOD operations and maintenance ac- and involved substantial U.S. Army, Navy, Marine Corps ter planning and response, and this MOU opened the counts. The funding was immediately available to source and Air Force support, and highlighted the close partner- window to expand the range of coordination between the off-the-shelf equipment and systems acquisition, sup- ship between the United States and Japan in response to a U.S. Navy and JMSDF, and made subsequent coordina- plies, and service contracts for personnel and training. civil emergency. tion easier. In 2002-2003, with DERF funding support and guid- Since then, the U.S. Navy and Japan civil and military ance from Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet (COMPAC- organizations have continued building on this founda- In the two years following the original article, the FLT), CNFJ and Commander, Fleet Activities Yokosuka tion and the Navy continues to support Japan’s annual terrorist bombing of USS Cole (DDG-67) and the 9/11 (the associated shore installation) developed and fielded disaster exercises, which take place around the nation terrorist attacks struck at the heart of EM prepared- one of the Navy’s first organic WMD incident response on September 1st. For example, in 2012, Naval Supply ness. While the CNFJ - JMSDF bilateral coordination capabilities, providing detection, warning, protection, de- Systems Command Fleet Logistics Center Yokosuka for natural disaster planning continued at a steady pace, contamination and medical response support. Japan civil personnel provided assistance to the Tokyo Metropolitan

45 LIAISON Volume VII | Fall 2015 Center for Excellence in Disaster Management & Humanitarian Assistance 46 n January 28 and 29, 2015, disease threats. A number of these investments focused response training, and U.S. Pacific Command conducts Banyan Analytics conducted on building surveillance and laboratory capacity, which outreach, military-to-military training, and joint medi- U.S. Military Assistance to may be adapted to address other health issues such as cal diplomacy missions within its area of responsibility. InternationalO Health Emergency Re- Improving Response hemorrhagic fevers. Some nations in the Asia-Pacific, The National Guard also hosts a successful engagement sponse: Examining Frameworks for an however, have faced challenges building the capacity program for capacity building, the State Partnership Ebola-like Disaster in the Asia-Pacific, needed to respond to health threats and maintaining Program. Administered by the National Guard Bureau, a two-day tabletop exercise and high- existing investments using limited resources. Applying the program aims to meet U.S. foreign policy objectives level discussion involving domestic and to International Health capabilities-based analysis methods can help planners through support of U.S. security cooperation missions. international participants. The exercise identify local and regional gaps in capabilities, providing As a domestic force, the National Guard maintains consisted of four events followed by leaders with a more informed decision-making process defense support of civil authorities as a primary mission, moderated discussion that focused on for initiating, implementing, and maintaining public and this focus allows for not only military-to-military the following topics: (1) international Emergencies health investments. engagement but also civilian-military and whole-of- health response resources and the pro- Understanding the response capacity of the impacted community engagement.2 The U.S. Government should cess to request U.S. support, (2) ap- By Elizabeth Nathaniel, Analyst at ANSER, nation can also help define criteria for what constitutes continue to invest in and leverage these programs to aid propriate use of Department of Defense & Frances Veasey, Principal Analyst at ANSER and an emergency by identifying clearer thresholds for when partner nations with building response capabilities. assets for health disaster response, (3) the impacted nation would be overwhelmed. Since expo- Coordination and Communication in International force protection issues and adapting Deputy Director of Banyan Analytics nential growth of cases during an outbreak can quickly response operations, and (4) risk com- overwhelm local capacity and the existing international Health Emergencies munication challenges and effective response system is too slow to keep pace with such a The current response system for health emergencies risk communication approaches. This crisis, knowing the is too slow to address the rapidly evolving needs of a tabletop exercise provided an opportu- limits of impacted growing epidemic, and it may be further delayed by time- nity to discuss approaches for effective, nations in advance distance factors in the Asia-Pacific. coordinated international response to a could allow interna- Discussions highlighted the time taken to identify, health emergency in the Asia-Pacific. tional response orga- request, and receive international support as a key chal- Discussions highlighted three main nizations lead time lenge to effective response to health emergencies. A lack themes for improvement: public health for possible move- of bilateral and multilateral frameworks and agreements preparedness, coordination and comment of resources for international disaster response can slow access to munication, and challenges related and support prior resources and hamper coordination among interna- to the use of U.S. military assets for to the point that the tional partners. Developing preexisting relationships response to international health emer- disaster overwhelms and established frameworks with all partners, including gencies. This article represents a cross- the country. regional forums such as ASEAN, NGOs, and private-sec- section of the discussions from the Given the im- tor partners, using a “whole community” approach,3 will event; further discussion on these topics portance of public improve coordination of international disaster response with additional research and analysis, health preparedness operations. along with additional discussion topics, activities, discussions Response requires effective communications to share may be found in the final After Action focused on the need situational awareness information and avoid duplication Report.1 to further expand of effort. Focusing on Public Health outreach programs Use of common language becomes an issue for in- in the Asia-Pacific to ternational response, since responding organizations Preparedness build partner capaci- might face foreign language barriers as well as differ- Shifting focus to the preparedness ties for monitoring, ing terminology. U.S. frameworks for coordination and phase can help ensure the local capacity detecting, and re- communication such as the National Incident Manage- to rapidly recognize and respond to an sponding to disease ment System and the Incident Command System pro- outbreak, containing the health threat outbreaks. vide standardization and scalability that can help guide before it reaches crisis levels. The United States operations involving a variety of actors. Some nations in Many nations have made invest- engages with part- the Asia-Pacific have begun to develop organizational ments of some level into public health ner nations in the structures and frameworks based on U.S. models, with initiatives, driven by concerns about Asia-Pacific for U.S. outreach programs supporting such efforts. Beyond pandemic influenza and other endemic this bilateral work, the U.S. could work with international Eric Weiner capability building through a number partners to develop regional response agreements and 1 Elizabeth Nathaniel, David Hamon, Frances Veasey, Elin Gursky, Eric Weiner, Seongjin “James” Ahn, Thao “Liz” Nguyen. “U.S. of programs. The an international coordination framework to allow more Military Assistance to International Health Emergency Response: A USAID official describes challenges encountered during the U.S. military response to Ebola in West Examining Frameworks for an Ebola-like Disaster in the Asia- Africa at the Banyan Analytics tabletop exercise. U.S. Agency for International Development provides rapid delivery of resources. While the systems do not Pacific,” after-action report by Banyan Analytics, an ANSER Institute, 2 The National Guard State Partnership Program, Annual Report, Fiscal Year 2013. Falls Church, VA; workshop held in Honolulu, HI, January 2015. direct investment and program development, the Centers 3 “Whole community” refers to expanding incident management principles beyond government- http://www.anser.org/docs/banyan_analytics/US_MilitaryHealthAs- centric emergency management systems to involve engagement with individuals, communities, sistance.pdf. for Disease Control provides epidemiological and rapid NGOs, and the private sector.

47 LIAISON Volume VII | Fall 2015 Center for Excellence in Disaster Management & Humanitarian Assistance 48 necessarily need to follow the Incident Command System Force protection issues will impact the scope of U.S. TECHNOLOGY model, an established framework for decision-making military support in a country with an infectious disease and coordination would improve the effectiveness of an outbreak. international response. Social unrest and civil disturbance, driven by local in- Civil-Military Coordination and Public messaging impacts response and requires estab- stabilities and fears due to a disease outbreak, can create lishing proactive and flexible risk communication strate- security concerns for responding personnel. Arming U.S. gies. military personnel during humanitarian operations, how- Conducting effective risk communication with differ- ever, creates additional issues such as impacts to contin- Information Sharing in a Digital ent audiences is a difficult process that requires under- ued coordination with nongovernmental organizations. standing the language, culture, and informational needs NGOs are key to health emergency response since they of each group, particularly in a health emergency when represent a majority of the personnel involved in public organizations must also consider the health literacy and health and medical response operations, but coordination Humanitarian Age beliefs of the audience. Risk communication strategies and cooperation of NGOs with the military has been a must also identify appropriate spokespersons and meth- topic of debate. In a 2006 article, the Executive Director ods of disseminating information that work for each of Médicins Sans Frontières–USA, Nicolas de Torrenté, audience. Governments and response organizations need stated that there is a fundamental incompatibility be- to coordinate messaging to ensure that public messages tween using the military and conducting humanitarian are accurate and appropriate, especially during health operations, and he urged NGOs to avoid working in close emergencies, when public fears of health risks are often cooperation with militaries.4 On the other hand, some high. Existing risk communication resources can guide advocate better civil-military integration for both civilian the development of risk communication strategies that authorities and NGOs in light of increased military in- ensure effective messaging to differing audiences during volvement in humanitarian affairs. In large-scale disasters a health emergency, but participating response organiza- involving multiple response organizations conducting tions must coordinate messaging with the host nation to varied response and relief operations, coordination needs provide a single, unified message. to occur across all fronts to avoid duplication of efforts and ensure that gaps in capabilities are met in a timely U.S. Military Support to Health Emergency UAVs were used extensively manner. U.S. decision-makers must have a better under- to document damage after an Response standing of the impacts of such decisions on coordina- earthquake devestated Nepal. The U.S. military has capabilities that could support tion of response operations with civilian organizations Jessica Lea/DFID response to a health emergency, including some that fall when planning to alter arming orders or standing rules of outside the traditional response role that the military engagement. takes. Conclusion By Julia Brooks, Legal Research Associate, collection, fusion, and sharing. These included systems, The U.S. military may support humanitarian response applications, and software that helped enable the verifica- Both long-term, chronic health crises and emerging Advanced Training Program on activities when there is no civilian agency that can do so. tion of individuals’ safety, identification and reconnec- infectious disease threaten the health security of popula- To meet response requirements for a health emergency, Humanitarian Action, tion of missing persons, the provision of aerial imagery tions in the Asia-Pacific and internationally. Working the U.S. military may not be limited to the typical types of Harvard Humanitarian Initiative from satellites or UAVs, and the mapping of terrain, in- prior to an outbreak to improve access to health care, support that it provides in other types of natural disasters. & David Polatty, Associate Professor, frastructure damage, internally displaced persons camps build capabilities for detecting and addressing infectious Discussion of the types of support the U.S. military would and other humanitarian needs. This proliferation of disease outbreaks, and strengthen coordination and com- U.S. Naval War College provide in a health emergency focused on traditional mis- digital action, with the aim of supporting the humanitar- munication methods will enhance population health in he recent international humanitarian response sions including infrastructure support, transportation, ian response on the ground, highlights dramatic changes the near and long terms. The U.S. Government has a role to the 7.8-magnitude earthquake in Nepal and logistics. While many individuals argued that the in the information environment for humanitarian to play in improving health security internationally and highlights the critical importance of effective U.S. military would not be involved in either direct pa- civil-militaryT coordination to help those in harm’s way; responses since the 2010 Haiti earthquake. What remains has committed to do so not just with the U.S. military’s tient care or training of medical personnel, the U.S. mili- to be seen, however, is how humanitarian and military role in the recent Ebola epidemic in West Africa, but also however, it also highlights the challenges of harnessing tary has conducted these activities in real-world response responders - each with their own systems and method- through preparatory activities in line with the Global the digital humanitarian revolution to improve responses operations. Given the history of engagement in medical ologies for information sharing and technological coor- Health Security Agenda. Continued reexamining of past to natural disasters and complex emergencies. assistance for training purposes and in humanitarian as- dination - can leverage this digital revolution towards event responses and scenario-based exercises can help or- With over 8,600 people killed and 8.1 million people sistance and disaster relief operations, there is precedent more effective civil-military coordination in emergency ganizations develop a clear picture of gaps that need to be affected (over one quarter of Nepal’s population), the for involvement of U.S. military medical professionals international humanitarian community responded to the responses. in providing treatment during a health emergency. The addressed and the best ways to do so in order to promote greater global health. earthquake, but still required significant logistical and Information Sharing and Technological requirement of U.S. military assistance in this role would transportation support from regional and international depend on the capacity of civilian organizations, but, if militaries. The “digital humanitarian community” also Coordination in Civil-Military Engagement they are overwhelmed, the U.S. military has the proven sprung into action, using information communication Civil-military coordination during sudden onset and capability to provide medical services in austere and crisis 4 Nicolas de Torrenté, Executive Director, Médicins Sans Frontières–USA, “Humanitarian NGOs manmade disasters is an increasingly relevant and rou- Must Not Ally with Military,” European Affairs, 1 May 2006, http://www.doctorswithoutborders. technologies (ICTs), including crowdsourcing, social conditions. org/news-stories/op-ed/humanitarian-ngos-must-not-ally-military. media, and numerous platforms to facilitate information tinely debated topic throughout humanitarian, academic,

49 LIAISON Volume VII | Fall 2015 Center for Excellence in Disaster Management & Humanitarian Assistance 50 and military circles. This coordina- overwhelming flow of information Office for the Coordination of Hu- Kobo Toolbox is now the preferred the Nepal earthquake, the introduc- Recommendations to Better tion becomes even more difficult from a variety of sources, including manitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) will data collection tool of UNOCHA, tion of military capabilities into the during complex humanitarian social media (e.g. Facebook, Twit- modify its existing disaster coordina- and has helped provide humanitar- relief effort further complicates the Enable Civil-Military Information emergencies and conflict settings due ter, and YouTube), SMS texts (with tion platform, the Global Disaster ian responders in Nepal with near information sharing and coordina- Sharing and Coordination to the magnitude of the problems photos and videos), unmanned aerial Alert and Coordination System real-time information on community tion arena. As one example, the U.S. As well intentioned as DOD’s em- encountered and the requirements vehicles (UAVs), and commercial (GDACS), and its resident Virtual needs. military relies heavily upon the All ployment of APAN has been, it may that often exist for combatants to high-resolution satellite imagery On-Site Operations Coordination In the wake of the Nepal earth- Partner Access Network (APAN) be perceived as counter to the over- protect non-combatants from armed provided by companies like Skybox Centre (VOSOCC). There are a num- quake, a small local NGO, Kath- to communicate and help coordi- arching goal of militaries acting in a attack. Despite significant advances Imaging and DigitalGlobe. The abil- ber of highly interactive internet- mandu Living Labs, had a profound nate with other military organiza- supporting, rather than leading, role over the past decade in improving ity to collect, process, analyze, and ul- based coordination and mapping impact on relief activities by mo- tions and non-U.S. partners during during humanitarian relief activities. these civil-military interactions, timately disseminate this information tools available today, including the bilizing volunteers to crowdsource crises. APAN is an extremely capable In accordance with UNOCHA’s Oslo information sharing and technologi- to decision-makers for use in hu- OCHA-sponsored HumanitarianRe- information into their existing map system that has been used for over Guidelines on the Use of Foreign cal coordination remains particularly manitarian responses is no easy task. ponse.info and ReliefWeb.int, along database using the OpenStreetMap 15 years by the U.S. Department of Military and Civil Defence Assets difficult between militaries and platform. Prior to the quake, Kath- Defense (DOD) during humanitarian (MCDA) in Disaster Relief – as well humanitarian organizations. mandu Living Labs mapped over 70 assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR) as enduring humanitarian principles Namely, international militar- percent of the areas that were most operations, as well as exercises and of neutrality and independence – ies normally depend on highly- impacted by the earthquake, which simulations that allow militaries to MCDA should only be used as a last specialized (and often classi- later enabled over 2,400 volunteers rehearse for crisis response. resort, with humanitarian organiza- fied) military communications to conduct post-quake analysis by As effective as APAN has been dur- tions leading the relief activities and systems, whereas the humani- comparing before and after satellite ing HA/DR operations in the past, it MCDA supporting these organiza- tarian response community, in imagery to determine the size and is advertised as providing “collaborations’ efforts to address specific stark contrast, uses unclassified scope of destruction - and ultimately tive solutions for the DOD” with the gaps in relief requirements. Since it systems, making collaboration helping the Nepalese military and goal of fostering information sharing is neither feasible nor advisable for difficult across the civil-military humanitarian responders to priori- between DOD and non-DOD enti- humanitarian organizations to adopt divide. With the exception of tize their rescue and relief efforts in ties. Once the U.S. begins a military military communications systems, formal alliances such as NATO, a much more efficient and effective HA/DR operation, APAN is typically the U.S. and other militaries that an- most militaries operate their manner. activated to support the response swer the call to provide support dur- own independent communica- Many of these coordination mech- effort. Other militaries and NGOs ing complex disasters must become tions systems that do not easily anisms are already helping to incor- are invited to join this collaborative more knowledgeable and proficient integrate with other nations’ porate the Digital Humanitarians’ website, which adds yet another layer in the use of existing and emerg- systems. Furthermore, the afore- vision of information sharing and of technology to what is already a ing humanitarian ICTs in order to mentioned revolution in ICTs coordination in the future, and find- very complex and rapidly evolving improve the overall effectiveness and in the humanitarian community ing ways to apply them now. How- ICT environment. While the intent efficiency of civil-military coordina- over the past few years is quickly ever, the proliferation of so many is to offer one platform for other tion. Furthermore, both militaries altering the way responses are ICTs has caused further coordination organizations to coordinate closely and humanitarian organizations coordinated and managed. Most, challenges - leaving organizations with the DOD, often times civil- must figure out how to harness and if not all militaries that routinely (Clockwise from top left) Skybox Imaging aids the search for Malaysia Airlines flight MH370; DigitalGlobe helps first responding to the Nepal earthquake military actors continue to rely on responders direct search and rescue operations after devastating flooding in Croatia; UNHCR shares an infographic integrate the myriad new ICTs to respond to humanitarian crises on Nepal’s earthquakes and aftershocks on humanitarianresponse.info; UNOCHA’s Global Disaster Alert and Coordi- overwhelmed by an ever-increasing separate information systems – with facilitate more effective humanitarian have struggled to keep up with nation System predicts tsunami behavior in real-time. flow of disparate digital data and DOD personnel becoming heavily responses. The move towards more the remarkable pace of change information. The task now is to reliant on APAN for their informa- common and streamlined use of across the ICT environment. Patrick and a few other thought (and with Crisis Mappers and OpenStreet- develop a means of integrating this tion gathering and coordination, and ICTs for informational sharing and A Digital Revolution in Humani- action) leaders are moving quickly Map, and other widely used plat- data and information into commonly the humanitarian response com- coordination will not only enhance from human-intensive crowdsourc- forms like Ushahidi. The UN-SPI- accessible, legible and actionable munity at large using some (or all) the organization and efficiency of tarian Information Sharing and ing of information to much faster DER Knowledge Portal also provides formats, and triaging and prioritizing of the previously mentioned tools. In civil-military responses, but could Coordination and possibly more reliable computer open source space-based informa- efforts to better align the energies of some instances, information con- also result in faster and better tar- Patrick Meier’s recently released solutions that rely upon artificial tion to humanitarian organizations, digital humanitarian volunteers with tained on a plethora of other systems geted humanitarian responses where book, “Digital Humanitarians,” intelligence to perform the same and has been heavily leveraged for the operational needs of humanitar- may simply be “copied and pasted” and when they are needed most. exceptionally describes the rapidly analytical processes, and rapidly critical information during the Nepal ian agencies and militaries on the into APAN so it is easily accessible The following four recommenda- changing landscape and dynamic get information into the hands and earthquake response. Additionally, ground. to DOD planners and responders - a tions may help to improve civil-mili- nature of information gathering minds of decisions-makers in the innovative data collection tools such Attempts to Provide Military rather inefficient means of informa- tary information sharing and coordi- and sharing within the humanitar- humanitarian sector. as Kobo Toolbox are leading the way tion sharing. nation in future emergencies: ian community. The proliferation of In the midst of this incredible in providing post-disaster assess- Solutions for Information Shar- digital humanitarian revolution, it ments that more accurately record Training and Education “big data” across fixed and mobile ing and Coordination Provide militaries with education platforms worldwide provides an remains to be seen whether the U.N. and reflect conditions on the ground. During massive disasters such as

51 LIAISON Volume VII | Fall 2015 Center for Excellence in Disaster Management & Humanitarian Assistance 52 and training on existing and emerg- demic institutions around the world conferences. For example, the May ing humanitarian ICTs, and humani- should create additional opportuni- 2015 Humanitarian Technology tarian organizations with a better un- ties to further train potential crisis conference held in Cambridge, Mas- Re-examining the Past: derstanding of military capabilities. responders, emphasizing the impact sachusetts, and through online fora, While this may sound like a daunting of ICTs and social media in changing to explore current and future trends task, efforts are already underway the nature of information sharing in in humanitarian response and dis- Civil – Military at places like the U.S. Naval War humanitarian responses. cuss more innovative and efficacious College (NWC), where a partner- Research ways of working together. Informed Cooperation Training ship with the Harvard Humanitarian Dedicate members of humanitar- by research, this routine exchange of Initiative (HHI) allows an exchange ian response teams to data collection, ideas amongst humanitarian re- of faculty and ideas, influencing analysis and sharing during and after sponders from all sectors – including and Education curriculum taught to both U.S. and disasters in order to evaluate the NGOs, governments, academia, and international military officers, as well effectiveness of civil-military coor- militaries – can further build trust as humanitarian leaders and re- dination, as well as other aspects of and confidence and help ensure that Programs when we meet to address the next complex disaster, we will Liaison Staff respond in a more collaborative, synchronized, and effec- he question of military involvement in humanitarian assis- tive manner, using ICTs to tance/disaster relief (HA/DR) operations has been a conten- their fullest potential. tious issue in disaster management and response. On one hand, someT non-military relief organizations such as the United Nations Common or nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) may feel uncomfortable Understanding of the working together with military entities, fearing this cooperation could Current Situation damage their neutrality, thus endangering personnel in the field. On the Explore the possibility of other hand, civilian organizations realize that the military can quickly developing one integrated sys- bring unique capabilities to the table without which the delivery of aid tem across humanitarian and to disaster victims might not be possible. military actors for information Today, we can draw from numerous examples, good and bad, to sharing and communication highlight the importance of functioning civil-military cooperation. The during emergency response. 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami, as well as Typhoon Haiyan in 2013,1 are The rapid proliferation of digi- just two examples of how civil-military cooperation can greatly improve tal humanitarian efforts and the effectiveness of disaster response, while the response to Hurricane technologies necessitates the Katrina in 2004 clearly showed how a lack of civil-military cooperation could make a bad situation worse.2 However, experiences like Hurricane sponders. The Center for Excellence humanitarian response. Such re- creation of a joint clearinghouse to Katrina or the Haiti Earthquake3 in 2010, and their aftermaths, led to in Disaster Management and Hu- search efforts can quickly yield valu- coordinate and connect the specific the realization that much still needs to be done to improve civil-military manitarian Assistance (CFE-DMHA) able results, and become integrated needs of emergency responders – cooperation in HA/DR scenarios. also runs several exceptional courses into existing and future academic both humanitarian and military – Since the early 2000s, the number and diversity of education and to better educate military personnel. offerings to provide students with a with the efforts of digital humanitar- training programs and opportunities in disaster management has UNOCHA’s Civil-Military Section is better understanding of the lessons ians. While numerous new ICTs will grown substantially. Not only are numerous domestic and international another key organization that offers learned, including challenges and op- undoubtedly be developed and uti- universities offering undergraduate, graduate, and post-graduate degree training to international militaries in portunities to facilitate more effective lized across the humanitarian space programs, U.S. military service academies and staff colleges teach class- this area. Additionally, such efforts civil-military coordination. Similar in the future, there is a critical need es in civil-military cooperation and disaster management in addition to are needed to bring humanitarian or- research is needed with respect to for leadership in coordinating civil, courses, symposia and conferences hosted by various NGOs. ganizations and militaries together to the impact of new ICTs (e.g. social military and “digital” humanitarian Academic institutions worldwide offer degree and certificate pro- practice and learn how to better share media, crowd-sourced mapping, efforts. Challenges notwithstanding, grams in Emergency and Disaster Management. In 2000, universities information and coordinate their UAV imagery, commercial satellite if key actors can agree to direct the offered 25 graduate programs, 16 bachelor degree and 14 associate de- responses. This can occur through imagery) in order to harness the true majority of their situational aware- gree programs to potential students. By 2015, the number of programs training courses, tabletop, computer power of these rapidly changing tech- ness building activities to a central, increased dramatically, showing the increasing demand for profes- and field simulations, or military di- nologies for humanitarian response. UNOCHA-endorsed platform, all saster simulations and exercises like responders may have a more accu- 1 Center for Excellence in Disaster Management & Humanitarian Assistance (CFE-DMHA), “An inside look into USPA- COM response to Super Typhoon Haiyan,” February 2015 (via http://reliefweb.int/report/philippines/inside-look-uspacom- U.S. Pacific Command’s “Rim of the Dialogue rate and timely understanding of the response-super-typhoon-haiyan-february-2015) Continue the tremendous dialogue 2 United States House of Representatives. A Failure of Initiative: Final Report of the Select Bipartisan Committee to Pacific.” In addition to using existing current environment on the ground Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina. 109th Cong., 2nd sess. H. Rept. 109-377. Washington, already taking place across the globe, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2006. Print. (https://www.uscg.mil/history/katrina/docs/USHouseOfRepKatrina- events to rehearse response collabo- during complex emergencies. 2006MainR1eport.pdf) both in person at workshops and 3 Margesson, Rhoda and Maureen Taft-Morales, “Haiti Earthquake: Crisis and Response,” Congressional Research Service; ration, key organizations and aca- 02 February 2010 (via https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41023.pdf)

53 LIAISON Volume VII | Fall 2015 Center for Excellence in Disaster Management & Humanitarian Assistance 54 Organization Course Audience Course Goals Length sionals with backgrounds in disaster Civil-Military Cooperation Centre of Civil-Military Cooperation International Military Enables participants, officers and NCOs, 10 days management in nongovernment and Excellence (CIMIC) Staff Worker Course who are or will be appointed as CIMIC government organizations.4 The last Staff Workers, to conduct CIMIC activi- 15 years saw the establishment of 10 ties across the full spectrum of military doctorate programs, while the number engagement in a modern operational of graduate programs has more than doubled (52 programs), and the bach- environment, up to and including corps/ elor’s programs available quadrupled component command level (59 programs). The number of associ- Civil-Military Cooperation Centre of Civil-Military Cooperation Humanitarians Enables participants, officers and NCOs, 10 days ate’s degrees offered went from 14 to Excellence (CIMIC) Field Worker Course assigned as CIMIC Field Workers, to con- 48. Graduates from these programs duct CIMIC activities across the full spec- can be found in a wide variety of trum of military engagement in a mod- emergency and disaster management ern operational environment, up to and related positions. Many of those can be found with government agencies, such including corps/component command as Federal Emergency Management level Agency or U.S. Agency for Interna- United States Agency for International Joint Humanitarian Any U.S. military, DOD Highlights the role of USAID/OFDA as 2 days tional Development; international Development Office of U.S. Foreign Operations Course (JHOC) civilian or contractor the lead federal agency for U.S. disaster organizations such as the U.N. Office Disaster Affairs (USAID/OFDA) response, and explains the process of for the Coordination of Humanitar- requesting of US DOD assets in support of ian Affairs (OCHA); and national foreign disaster operations. and international NGOs. FEMA has a comprehensive list of U.S. schools Australian Civil-Military Centre Civil-Military Leaders’ Senior government and Facilitates high-level collaboration in 2 days offering these programs, which is fre- Workshop nongovernment officials multinational responses to conflicts and quently updated. It can be found here: from the Asia-Pacific region disasters https://www.training.fema.gov/hiedu/ llegelist/#pubHealthPrograms U.N. Office for the Coordination of Hu- U.N. Civil-Military International "action-officer" Improves responsiveness, effectiveness, 4 days Disaster management courses with a manitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) Coordination (UN CMCoord) level humanitarians and efficiency of humanitarian relief opera- distinct focus on civil-military coop- Course military planners tions and advocates for the use of and eration are fewer, but their number adherence to guidelines for the use of is also increasing. Military training MCDA in disasters institutes, such as the Marine Corps U.N. Office for the Coordination of Hu- Supporting Humanitarian International Military Improves effectiveness of humanitarian 3 days Civil-Military Operations School, manitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) Action in Responding to action in natural disasters and complex several U.N. departments, to include Emergencies and Disasters emergencies where military forces are the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the U.N. System Staff (SHARED) Course present, by providing knowledge and un- College, as well as multinational orga- derstanding that enable them to provide nizations (e.g. NATO’s Civil-Military the right support at right time to right Cooperation Centre of Excellence), people in appropriate manner provide courses to improve civil-mili- Center for Excellence in Disaster Man- Health Emergencies in Large U.S. and international Provides participants with an understand- 10 days tary cooperation. The target audience agement and Humanitarian Assistance Populations (H.E.L.P.) military personnel and ing of the major public health issues to be of these institutions is mainly military civilians with backgrounds addressed among populations affected personnel, but most are also open to civilians. Some courses focusing on in public health, medicine, by natural and man-made disasters and civil-military coordination are: humanitarian assistance conflicts and disaster management •The Civil-Military Cooperation Center for Excellence in Disaster Man- Humanitarian Assistance U.S. and international Enhances the ability of the military to 2-4 days Centre of Excellence instructs a Civil- agement and Humanitarian Assistance Response Training (HART) military, DOD civilians and plan and execute disaster response op- Military Cooperation (CIMIC) Staff contractors; priority to erations in a multinational environment 4 Ankersen, Christopher, “Civil-Military Cooperation in Post- Conflict Operations: Emerging Theory and Practice,” Routledge, 28 deploying U.S. personnel September 2007 or those supporting deploying personnel 55 LIAISON Volume VII | Fall 2015 Center for Excellence in Disaster Management & Humanitarian Assistance 56 Worker Course, open to international military, and a and international institutions [e.g. RedR Australia and backgrounds in public health, medicine, humanitarian and military personnel, better coordination of relief Field Worker Course open to humanitarians. The institu- the Center for Excellence in Disaster Management and assistance and disaster management. efforts in disaster responses, and changes in military tion is an NATO-accredited training institution and hosts Humanitarian Assistance (CFE-DMHA)], also host the doctrine have reduced the military footprint in disaster other course on civil-military coordination. Other institu- course. The course is aimed at improving the efficiency of •The Humanitarian Assistance Response Training management and humanitarian assistance operations. tions like the Australian Civil-Military Centre also teach a humanitarian operations and concentrates on civil-mili- (HART) Course, also offered by CFE-DMHA, is geared The military’s unique capabilities (logistics, includ- selection of these courses. tary coordination in disasters and complex emergencies. toward U.S. and international military, DOD civilians ing strategic air lift and rotary wing lift, infrastructure The audience is half civilian (humanitarian community / and contractors. Priority is given to deploying U.S. per- repair, imagery, command and control, and communica- •Civil-Military Leaders’ Workshop at the Australian government disaster management organizations) and half sonnel or those supporting deploying personnel. The aim tions) can be brought to bear very rapidly and in austere Civil-Military Centre. This workshop targets senior military. OCHA also sets a 20 percent minimum female of the course is to enhance the ability of the military to environments – more so than civilian counterparts – still government and nongovernment officials from the participation in the course. The CMCoord audience is the plan and execute disaster response operations in a multi- play an important role in those operations, but the ways Asia-Pacific region and has been offered since February most diverse of all the courses. national, multiagency environment. in which those capabilities are being incorporated has 2014. The workshop facilitates high-level collaboration in become more consistent. As education and training op- multinational responses to conflicts and disasters. •Supporting Humanitarian Action in Responding to Creating an effective civil-military cooperation educa- portunities increase in the future, the quality of those Emergencies and Disasters (SHARED) Course is also an tion system still remains a difficult task. However, the programs will improve as lessons learned from previous •The Joint Humanitarian Operations Course (JHOC) is UNOCHA program. It is designed for international mili- quality of educational courses is improving steadily, since HA/DR operations are incorporated in the curriculums. a two-day live course, developed by USAID/OFDA. The tary personnel who may be tasked to respond to emer- lessons learned from disaster relief operations are incor- The participants will be able to better define the role they course is given to military personnel. Any military orga- gencies (natural disasters and complex emergencies), and porated into course curricula.5 Considering the different want to play in disaster situations, the need for specific nization, to include civilian and contractor personnel, can also for key personnel of military training institutions doctrines and goals of humanitarian and military forces, skills will be better described, and the moving pieces will attend, as well as specific, requesting units. The key point and peacekeeping training centers. OCHA conducts this the wide variety of training and education opportunities be better coordinated; all in all, improved civil-military of JHOC is to highlight the role of USAID/OFDA as the course as requested by a specific country. available is providing both civilian and military actors coordination education has the power to increase disaster lead federal agency for U.S. disaster response. with a sound basic training and education to effectively response capabilities of all disaster response stakeholders. •The Health Emergencies in Large Populations respond to natural disasters. •The U.N. Civil-Military Coordination (UN CMCo- (H.E.L.P.) Course, offered by CFE-DMHA is a two-week Over the last 15 years, the landscape of disaster man- ord) Course is aimed at an international military and course, providing participants with an understanding agement and humanitarian assistance has changed civilian audience. The U.N. Office for the Coordination of the major public health issues to be addressed among substantially. Improvements in education for both NGOs of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) will conduct this populations affected by natural and man-made disas- 5 Wheeler, Victoria and Adele Harmer, eds., “Resetting the rules of engagement: Trends and issues four-day live course, if requested, for a specific country ters and conflicts. The course is open to national and in military-humanitarian relations,” the Humanitarian Policy Group, HPG Research Report 21, March 2006 (via http://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion- if it has ongoing emergency operations. Several national international military personnel as well as civilians with files/273.pdf)

International military personnel take the Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) Staff Worker Course at the Civil-Military Cooperation Centre of Excellence; U.S. military and Department of Defense personnel attend the Joint Humanitarian Operations Course. U.S. Army Pacific PAO

57 LIAISON Volume VII | Fall 2015 Civil-Military Cooperation Centre of Excellence Center for Excellence in Disaster Management & Humanitarian Assistance 58 Re-examining the Past: Civilian-Military Coordination in Conflict and Disaster Scenarios Liaison Staff

espite that the foundations of international risks of humanitarian actors (who could be mistaken for at a nadir in the 2003-2006 timeframe, policy reviews humanitarian law are more than 150 years old, soldiers in disguise), but also led to duplication of efforts considered whether military involvement in HA/DR tension continues to color the relationship and dilution of resources due to a lack of coordination.1 during conflict or peacetime could ever be successfully amongD military actors, government civilians and nongov- In 2003, the U.S.-based consortium of NGOs, InterAc- coordinated with civilian activity. ernment organizations (NGOs) regarding the provision tion, was loudly pressing for U.S. government and mili- The decade between 2002 and 2012 was character- of humanitarian relief during conflict and peacetime tary agencies and NGOs to participate jointly in policy ized by “comprehensive” and “stabilization” strategies emergencies. reviews, and educational and training reforms to revive within global military apparatuses that sought to combine Since the middle of the 20th century, tensions have a climate of “cultural exchange” that they contended had humanitarian, military and other spheres of action under been fueled by increased military participation in relief existed in the 1990s.2 They pointed to a time when – they a political objective. During that period, military support activities both within and beyond conflict, to include said – members of the armed forces, NGO staffs and to HA/DR outside conflict scenarios included the 2004 responses to natural disasters. Some argue that military policy-makers underwent training and exercises together Boxing Day tsunami, the 2005 Kashmir earthquake, and participation in multinational disaster relief scenarios to become familiar with each other’s roles and goals in floods in Pakistan and the Haiti earthquake, both in 2010. is not problematic because of the apolitical atmosphere. both conflict and non-conflict operations.3 The U.S. alone deployed the armed forces 40 times for Others view overreliance on military assets during disas- InterAction was not alone in noting the strained rela- HA/DR missions between 2004 and 2012.6 ter relief as intensifying the humanitarian community’s tionships that had evolved from the Iraq and Afghanistan Despite this range of experiences across continents problems of independence and impartiality because the interventions, nor in linking these strains to a decrease and varying constellations of players, after action reviews global public sees the two communities working together in coordinated training. Wheeler and Harmer (2006) continued to underscore misunderstandings between ci- in one operation and presumes they will be cooperating underscored that tensions between NGOs and military/ vilian and military responders. Still, it remained obvious in others, including conflict. political actors peaked when U.S. administration officials that the world’s national militaries were set to continue Notwithstanding the political debate on whether the cited NGOs as “force multipliers” and military forces in their involvement despite the humanitarian commu- military should participate in disaster response, the fact Afghanistan began delivering aid.4 Indeed, during the nity’s resistance to civil-military coordination structures remains that military forces are involved in humanitar- early years of Operations Iraqi and Enduring Freedom that stemmed from experiences in Iraq and Afghani- ian assistance and disaster response (HA/DR). Civilian (OIF and OEF), then U.S. Agency for International stan. Indeed, military organizations at the national and agencies and humanitarian actors have been attempt- Development Director Andrew Natsios told U.S.-based multinational levels have codified guidance for military ing – with varying levels of success – to adapt their own NGOs working in Afghanistan that they should identify involvement in humanitarian activity as evidenced by the responses in order to garner the best levels of cooperation themselves more explicitly in the field as having received 2005 U.S. Department of Defense Directive 3000.05 and they can from military actors and to reduce the risks to U.S. funding in order to bolster recipients perceptions NATO’s “Comprehensive Approach”.7 civilians during relief operations in contested or insecure that the U.S. intervention was constructive.5 These overt Given the prevailing tensions and obvious facts that environments. efforts to incorporate NGOs’ operations and efforts into institutional cultures, political use of humanitarian relief In the early years of U.S. involvement in Iraq and the political objectives of military interventions triggered and agency guidance statements were unlikely to change, Afghanistan, military and humanitarian actors were debate over U.S. and international policy and guidance HA/DR partners began to consider again whether failures fumbling their way forward on how best to perform regarding civilian and military integration in complex in coordination could be remedied by reviving civilian- humanitarian relief tasks amidst varying levels of conflict. emergencies. military training and education programs. Two disaster Although Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) and With relationships between civilian and military actors response missions provide insight into the answer: the cross-U.N. integration were tried, they proved less than 1 Bishop, James K., “War in Afghanistan and Iraq: Aberration, or the Shape of Things to Come?” 2010 Haiti earthquake and 2014 Typhoon Haiyan in the Liaison, Center of Excellence in Disaster Management & Humanitarian Assistance, Volume III optimal, and the U.S. armed forces continued to unilater- Number 2, 2003, p. 50 Philippines. 2 InterAction, “A Humanitarian Exception to the Integration Rule,” Policy Statement, December ally undertake aid and development activities that blurred 2011 (http://www.interaction.org/sites/default/files/InterAction%20statement%20on%20integra- The January 2010 Haiti earthquake killed upwards of tion%20-%20FINAL%2015%20Dec%202011.pdf the lines between military and humanitarian actors. 3 Bishop, p. 48 4 Wheeler, Victoria and Adele Harmer, eds., “Resetting the rules of engagement: Trends and issues 6 Metcalfe, Victoria, Simone Haysom and Stuart Gordon, “Trends and Challenges in Humanitar- Humanitarian actors argued that this type of military in military-humanitarian relations,” the Humanitarian Policy Group, HPG Research Report21, ian Civil-Military Coordination: A Review of the Literature,” Humanitarian Policy Group of the March 2006 (via http://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/273. Overseas Development Institute, May 2012 (via http://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/ involvement not only increased the physical security pdf), p. 5 publications-opinion-files/7679.pdf), p. 5 5 Wheeler and Harmer, p. 8 7 Metcalfe et al, p. 7

59 LIAISON Volume VII | Fall 2015 Center for Excellence in Disaster Management & Humanitarian Assistance 60 300,000 people and left two mil- multinational response, to include: ended two weeks into the response tion – in addition to Canadian forces’ the international community’s civil- developing formal changes to its lion homeless in Port-au-Prince. lagging establishment of a cluster when the need for emergency, heavy extensive peacekeeping experience military coordination mechanisms civilian-military coordinated training The context within which the quake system; wasting time on debating lift and remote access ended. Fi- that includes providing humanitarian can alleviate some of the challenges. program. If so, it reflects recognition struck was one of poverty and politi- leadership structures; and, potentially nally, the Philippines government assistance – proved to be of critical Many hope that personal experiences that the personal relationships and cal instability. The upshot was that the most damning, excluding local was prepared to handle the early import. of education and training across knowledge that have proven critical the earthquake response included not involvement due to language barriers emergency requirements and had Recent disaster relief scenarios pro- the civil-military divide can become in disaster relief missions cannot be only emergency humanitarian relief and locations chosen by responding formed on-going relationships with vide successes for examination, but ubiquitous. Although there has not developed once an emergency has be- but also assistance in restoring po- agencies/militaries for meetings and U.N. agencies and NGOs. Within 3-5 given the reality that military forces been an integrated international gun. And without these relationships litical institutions and development activities.11 days of Haiyan passing over central will also participate in HA during planning. Those failures were explicitly Philippines, aid was moving onto af- conflict, can disaster relief experi- Cpl. Dave Balun, a medic from the The immediate challenges to the linked to global partners’ inability fected areas15 via coordination among ences teach us lessons for coordi- Canadian Disaster Assistance Response Team checks a local Filipino child in relief effort were shortages in trans- or unwillingness to communicate, the Philippines national government, nation in all realms? a refugee camp outside of Roxas city portation and limited communica- and the national Haitian leadership’s the armed forces of the Philippines Humanitarian actors accept – on November 16, 2013 after Typhoon tions systems, both of which became decision not to support InterAction’s (AFP), and 57 countries, 29 foreign some grudgingly – that military Haiyan devastated the area. priorities of various responding contention that pre-disaster exposure militaries, U.N. agencies and interna- involvement in HA/DR will con- militaries;8 the Préval administration and education can overcome in- tional NGOs. tinue. Thus, humanitarian workers also listed priority needs as: search emergency challenges and in-conflict The global military response to must recognize that this involve- and rescue assistance, an off-shore disputes. Indeed, the 2010 Haiti Haiyan was not without controversy, ment means civilians are linked medical ship, electricity generation shortfalls stand in stark contrast to but its effectiveness was not disputed. – rightly or wrongly – to military capacity, and communications equip- after-action reviews of the multina- Lessons learned set various military actors, potentially putting humani- ment.9 The U.N. Office for the Co- tional response to Typhoon Haiyan actors’ involvement in contrast with tarian actors at risk.16 It is clear ordination of Humanitarian Affairs where many of the actors have long- each other to examine what worked that some individuals on both sides (UNOCHA) team became the lead standing relationships or had trained best and what could be improved. harbor doubts and resentment. coordinating agency, but a succession together in the conduct of disaster The U.S. military response garnered Humanitarian actors fear they may of UNOCHA-led entities made up response operations. several very specific criticisms, the be made complicit in inappropri- of differing partners soon evolved. As with failures in Haiti, successes most important being that com- ate or ineffective assistance, and The Joint Operations Tasking Center in the Philippines must be contex- munication lapses occurred for two military actors fear that their own (JOTC) stood up in late January, and tualized. First, early storm warnings reasons: 1) the U.S. lodged informa- forces may face intensified host then an UNOCHA Civil-Military by Philippines authorities alerted tion in the classified realm; and 2) public resistance if intervening Coordination (CMCoord) team con- locals, led to pre-storm evacuations the U.S. and U.N. agencies did not military forces do not pick up the vened.10 However, the U.N. Stabiliza- and prompted preparatory planning exchange liaisons in the field. “humanitarian slack.” tion Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), and information sharing by Manila’s Meanwhile, the Canadian armed Disputes over the legitimacy of U.S. Southern Command and the key regional partners.12 Second, there forces’ experience providing relief some military interventions and Cpl. Darcy Lefebvre/ Canadian Forces Combat Camera Canadian armed forces were already was a clear role for military respond- in Capiz Province was held up as publicized civilian organizations’ operating in partnership with civilian ers early in the operation due to their exemplary. Canada was a stakeholder rejection of political goals for hu- effort to revamp and revive shared and exposure, misunderstandings, counterparts without going through heavy lift capabilities to clear and with U.N., local entities and NGOs manitarian relief severely complicate training and educational experiences duplication of effort and physical UNOCHA bodies. establish temporary infrastructure in direct, unclassified communica- civil-military coordination during in a systematic way, the U.N., the risks become more likely. Global and local actors were able that allowed other actors to perform tion in the “Command Center” in the conflicts. These disagreements, then, U.S. and several Asia-Pacific nations to overcome immediate transporta- their tasks.13 Third, coordination at Roxas Provincial Capitol building. bleed over into relationships during have initiated training programs and tion and communication challenges the local level was robust rather than Canada’s armed forces were able to training and disaster relief missions. other efforts to educate and train mil- through coordination, but the ad- leaving all coordination to national, be effective because Canada moved Examples of extremely effective mili- itary leaders and government officials hoc solutions employed were not strategic-level officials.14 Fourth, clus- control of its response out of its Em- tary participation in disaster relief in the challenges, best practices and documented into lessons learned ter management ensured activation bassy in Manila and placed it directly have reduced some resistance on the lessons learned from civil-military that led to a longer-term coordi- and deactivation of clusters, inform- under commanders at the local level. parts of both military and humanitar- disaster response and humanitarian nated effort. In part, the problem lay ing partners of when to contribute In addition, all of the Canadian play- ian communities, but these successes relief operations. in the national government’s lack and when to stop. For example, the ers and many of the NGO and U.N. often depended on the personalities Even the primary U.S. proponent of political legitimacy and overall U.S. armed forces’ major operations personnel in Roxas had personal of those deployed as part of NGO, of civil-military coordinated training lack of authority or capacity, but relationships with each other and government or military missions. and education, InterAction, does not 11 Humanitarian Practice Network (HPN), “Looking back, after-action assessments also found moving forward: Applying the lessons learnt from the Haiti previous experience and training Although many of the issues of feature this issue in its recent annual Earthquake response,” http://www.odihpn.org/hpn-resources/ fault in the weak leadership of the hpn-event-reports/looking-back-moving-forward-applying-the- in multinational HA/DR exercises humanitarian relief during both reports, suggesting the organiza- lessons-learnt-from-the-haiti-earthquake-response 12 Center for Excellence in Disaster Management & Humanitar- and operations. The role of military- natural disasters and conflict are tion may be working quietly behind 8 Margesson, Rhoda and Maureen Taft-Morales, “Haiti ian Assistance (CFE-DMHA), “An inside look into USPACOM Earthquake: Crisis and Response,” Congressional Research response to Super Typhoon Haiyan” February 2015(via http:// civilian participation in HA/DR related to the abilities of host coun- the scenes to overcome strains by Service; 02 February 2010 (via https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/ reliefweb.int/report/philippines/inside-look-uspacom-response- R41023.pdf), p. 2 super-typhoon-haiyan-february-2015, p. 11 preparedness exercises and educa- tries’ political and civilian structures, disputes over the U.S. military role 9 Margesson and Taft-Morales, p. 3 13 CFE-DMHA, p. 12 10 Margesson and Taft-Morales, p. 8 14 CFE-DMHA, p. 14 16 Metcalfe et al, p. 10 in Iraq and Afghanistan before

61 LIAISON Volume VII | Fall 2015 Center for Excellence in Disaster Management & Humanitarian Assistance 62 CALENDAR OF EVENTS

1 Association of Southeast Asian Nations ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting-Plus Experts’ Working Group on Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Table-top Exercise August 5 – 7 Vientiane, Lao PDR 7 2 Association of Southeast Asian Nations 22nd ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) 9 August 6 Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia 3 1 4 3 International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies & CFE-DMHA Health Emergencies in Large Populations 2 8 (H.E.L.P.) Course August 17 – 28 Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, USA 5 6 4 Multinational Communications Interoperability Program Pacific Endeavor Exercise August 31 – September 11 Manila, Philippines

5 U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Civil-Military Coordination (CMCoord) Course September 6 – 11 Suva, Fiji 8 Association of Southeast Asian Nations 6 Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat 3rd ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus 46th Pacific Islands Forum Leaders Meeting (3rd ADMM-Plus) September 7 – 11 November 4 – 5 Suva, Fiji Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia

United Nations Secretary General 7 United Nations Secretary General 9 World Humanitarian Summit World Humanitarian Summit Global May 26 - 27, 2016 Consultation Istanbul, Turkey October 14 – 16 Geneva, Switzerland

63 LIAISON Volume VII | Fall 2015 Center for Excellence in Disaster Management & Humanitarian Assistance 64 Center for Excellence in Disaster Management & Humanitarian Assistance 4 5 6 Hornet Avenue • JBPHH , HI 9 6 8 6 0 - 3 5 3 0 • CFE.DMHA.FCT @ PACOM.MIL ( 8 0 8 ) 4 7 2 - 0 5 1 8 • ( 3 1 5 ) 4 7 2 - 0 5 1 8 [ D S N ] • ( 8 0 8 ) 4 7 2 - 0 3 8 2 [ FA X ] W W W . CFE-DMHA . O R G