On the Conflict Resolution Potential of Self-Determination Referendums
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Research Collection Doctoral Thesis Pax Populi or Casus Belli? On the Conflict Resolution Potential of Self-Determination Referendums Author(s): Germann, Micha Publication Date: 2017 Permanent Link: https://doi.org/10.3929/ethz-b-000164781 Rights / License: In Copyright - Non-Commercial Use Permitted This page was generated automatically upon download from the ETH Zurich Research Collection. For more information please consult the Terms of use. ETH Library DISS. ETH NO. 24213 PAX POPULI OR CASUS BELLI? ON THE CONFLICT RESOLUTION POTENTIAL OF SELF-DETERMINATION REFERENDUMS A thesis submitted to attain the degree of DOCTOR OF SCIENCES of ETH ZURICH (Dr. sc. ETH Zurich) presented by MICHA GERMANN Master of Arts UZH in Social Sciences, University of Zurich born on 8.8.1985 citizen of Schaffhausen and W¨aldi(TG) accepted on the recommendation of Prof. Dr. Lars-Erik Cederman, ETH Zurich Prof. Dr. Simon Hug, University of Geneva Prof. Dr. Nicholas Sambanis, University of Pennsylvania 2017 Abstract This dissertation investigates the conflict resolution potential of self-determination referendums. Over the past few decades, the use of referendums in the context of conflicts over secession and autonomy has proliferated remarkably. Self-determination referendums are also increasingly advocated by the international community, from Bosnia to Northern Ireland, East Timor, and South Sudan. However, very little is known about their ability to resolve conflicts over self- determination peacefully. Several perspectives can be found in the existing literature. While some see self-determination referendums positively, others see them as prone to incite violent conflict, and still others argue that self-determination referendums are likely to contribute to peaceful conflict resolution under some but not other conditions. To date, very little systematic empirical evidence exists to support either of these views. In this dissertation I develop an argument that the conflict resolution potential of self- determination referendums depends on whether their terms have previously been agreed by the two main parties to separatist conflicts, states and self-determination movements. I argue that mutually agreed self-determination referendums are likely to create a positive dynamic and increase chances for peace. Several reasons are made out, all generally related to the high legitimacy associated with agreed self-determination referendums. First, they are likely to foster perceptions of fair decision-making. Second, they may contribute to a reversal of hostile images. Third, they may lead to referendum-related coalitions that are willing to support their outcome. Fourth, they may sometimes push forward a peace process that would otherwise be blocked. And finally, they may increase the durability of settlements and alleviate commitment problems. By contrast, I argue that if self-determination referendums are unilaterally invoked by a state or a self-determination movement, they become more likely to inflame tensions than to reduce them. The legitimacy of unilateral self-determination referendums is often contested. Unilateral referendums are thus unlikely to have any of the beneficial consequences associated with agreed referendums. Rather, they are likely to entrench grievances, to generate reputation costs, and to reduce the bargaining range available for a negotiated settlement. Thus, unilateral self-determination referendums are likely to increase the risk of separatist armed conflict. The hypothesized effects of agreed and unilateral self-determination referendums are eval- uated through a series of statistical tests. The main challenge this presents is the endogeneity of agreed and unilateral self-determination referendums to conflict processes. Finding agree- i Abstract ment on a self-determination referendum often requires a substantial willingness to compromise, whereas this willingness is typically lacking in the case of unilateral self-determination referen- dums. Thus, while agreed referendums tend to emerge in rather peaceful and benign contexts, unilateral referendums tend to emerge in situations with an already significant ex-ante risk of separatist armed conflict. To counter the emanating threats to causal inference, I employ multiple regression in an effort to partial out the causal effects of agreed and unilateral self- determination referendums. The list of covariates is carefully assembled based on a separate analysis of the determinants of agreed and unilateral self-determination referendums. Relying on new data on self-determination referendums and noncolonial self-determination disputes in European and Asian countries, I find strong support for the argument that prior agreement on the terms of self-determination referendums shapes their conflict resolution potential. In line with expectations, I find that agreed self-determination referendums decrease the probabil- ity of new outbreaks of separatist armed conflict while increasing the probability that ongoing separatist armed conflicts come to an end. Also in line with expectations, I find that unilater- ally initiated self-determination referendums increase the risk of new separatist armed conflicts and, where violence is already ongoing, the risk that separatist armed conflict continues. An extensive sensitivity analysis reveals that most results are robust to a great number of alter- native measurement and specification choices, including fixed effects estimation, as well as to the possibility of hidden bias due to omitted confounders. The only partial exception emerges for the effect of agreed self-determination referendums on outbreaks of new separatist armed conflicts. Overall, the findings of this study suggest that self-determination referendums have value for conflict resolution, but only in situations where agreement can be reached between the key stakeholders on their terms. ii Zusammenfassung Diese Dissertation untersucht das Konfliktl¨osungspotenzial von Selbstbestimmungsreferenden. Innerhalb der letzten Jahrzehnte hat sich die Zahl der Selbstbestimmungsreferenden stark vervielfacht. Selbstbestimmungsreferenden werden auch zunehmend von der international Ge- meinschaft gef¨ordert, so etwa in Bosnien, Nordirland, Osttimor, und Sudsudan.¨ Jedoch weiss man bis heute nur wenig uber¨ ihr Verm¨ogen, zur fiedlichen Konfliktl¨osung beizutragen. In der existierenden Literatur finden sich verschiedene Pespektiven. W¨ahrenddem einige Selbstbestim- mungsreferenden positiv gegenuberstehen,¨ sehen andere in ihnen ein Potenzial zur Konflik- teskalation. Wieder andere betonen, dass Selbstbestimmungsreferenden nur unter bestimmten Bedingungen zur Konfliktl¨osung beitragen k¨onnen. Bis zum heutigen Zeitpunkt existiert kaum systematische empirische Evidenz, welche eine der verschiedenen Perspektiven erh¨arten wurde.¨ In dieser Dissertation entwickle ich die These, dass das Konfliktl¨osungspotenzial von Selbst- bestimmungsreferenden davon abh¨angt, ob sie unter gegenseitigem Einverst¨andnis der beiden wichtigsten Parteien in separatistischen Konflikten—Staaten und Selbstbestimmungsbewegun- gen|zustandegekommen sind. Ich argumentiere, dass einverst¨andliche Selbstbestimmungsre- ferenden oft eine positive Dynamik ausl¨osen und die Chancen auf Frieden erh¨ohen. Dies aus mehreren Grunden,¨ welche alle aus der von einverst¨andlichen Selbstbestimmungsreferenden aus- gehenden hohen Legitimit¨at hervorgehen. Erstens tragen einverst¨andliche Referenden oft zu Perzeptionen von gerechter Entscheidungsfindung bei. Zweitens k¨onnen einverst¨andliche Refe- renden zur Umkehr von Feindbildern beitragen. Drittens fuhren¨ einverst¨andliche Selbstbestim- mungsreferenden manchmal zu Koalitionsbildungen um das Referendum, welche willens sind, den Referendumsausgang zu schutzen.¨ Viertens k¨onnen einverst¨andliche Referenden manch- mal einen Friedensprozess voranbringen, der andernfalls blockiert w¨are. Schliesslich k¨onnen ein- verst¨andliche Referenden die Resistenz von Abkommen verst¨arken und Commitment-Problemen vorbeugen. Im Gegensatz dazu argumentiere ich, dass von Staaten oder Selbstbestimmungsbewegun- gen unilateral initiierte Selbstbestimmungsrefenden Spannungen eher erh¨ohen denn reduzieren. Die Legitimit¨at von unilateralen Selbstbestimmungsreferenden ist oft umstritten. Es ist des- halb unwahrscheinlich, dass unilaterale Referenden eine der genannten positiven Konsequenzen von einverst¨andlichen Referenden haben. Eher tragen unilaterale Referenden zur Bildung von Leid- und Frustrationsfaktoren bei, zum Entstehen von Reputationskosten sowie dazu, den Ver- iii Zusammenfassung handlungsspielraum fur¨ ein Abkommen zu reduzieren. Unilaterale Selbstbestimmungsreferenden erh¨ohen deshalb oft das Risiko fur¨ bewaffnete separatistische Konflikte. Die hypothetisierten Effekte von einverst¨andlichen und unilateralen Selbstbestimmungsrefe- renden werden mittels statistischer Tests evaluiert. Das Hauptproblem hierbei stellt die Endoge- nit¨at von einverst¨andlichen und unilateralen Referenden zu Konfliktprozessen dar. W¨ahrenddem einverst¨andliche Referenden oft ein substanzielles Mass an Kompromissf¨ahigkeit erforden, fehlt dieser Willen zum Kompromiss bei unilateralen Referenden in der Regel. W¨ahrenddem sich ein- verst¨andliche Referenden deshalb oft in eher friedlichen Kontexten ereignen, finden unilaterale Referenden eher in Kontexten mit einem signifikanten ex-ante Risiko fur¨ bewaffnete separatisti- sche Konflikte statt. Um den davon ausgehenden Gefahren fur¨ kausale Inferenzen entgegenzuwir- ken wende ich multiple Regressionsmodelle an, um die kausalen