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CSS Analyses in Security Policy CSS ETH Zurich N0. 168, February 2015, Editor: Christian Nünlist

Sinai Peninsula – from Buffer Zone to Battlefield The neglect of the Sinai and growth of a security vacuum on the peninsula has transformed ’s backwater into a stronghold of militancy, with implications of not only national, but also regional and global significance.

By Lisa Watanabe

On 10 November 2014, the deteriorating situation in the Sinai was thrust into the spotlight when the most capable and active Salafist jihadi group on the peninsula, An- sar Bayt al-Maqdis (“Supporters of Jerusa- lem”, ABM), pledged allegiance to the so- called Islamic State (IS) and renamed itself the “Sinai Province”. However, it has really / Abu Mustafa Ibraheem been at least a decade since the alienation of the local population from the central state and the erosion of the latter’s author- ity in the peninsula began to provide fertile ground for such groups to emerge on the Sinai. The security vacuum created by the fall of the Mubarak regime in 2011 pro- vided a further impulse for the transforma- tion the Sinai into the site of a full-blown insurgency and a haven for jihadi groups, some of which have links to global terrorist Palestinians run as smoke rises after a house is blown up during a military operation by Egyptian networks. military and secu- security forces in , on the Egyptian side of the border with the (30 October 2014). rity services in particular have been target- ed by Sinai-based violent Islamist groups since the 2013 coup. well as to engage in kidnapping for ransom. are thought to be involved in smuggling However, the Egyptian authorities are not As such, European states, including Swit- goods, weapons, and explosives into Gaza their only target. Several of the Sinai-based zerland, have an interest in promoting an via a network of tunnels originating in groups have launched attacks on Israeli tar- improved situation in the Sinai. northeast Sinai. Salafist jihadi groups that gets and used the tunnel networks con- share al-Qaida’s ideology or have recently necting the Sinai with the Gaza Strip to Armed Groups on the Sinai pledged allegiance to the IS are also be- their advantage, giving them the capacity The is home to a range of lieved to be based in this northeast corner to affect the delicate triangle of relations armed non-state actors, including militant of the Sinai. In the coastal areas along the between Egyptian, Israeli, and Gazan au- and Islamist groups. Lack of ac- , Islamist militant groups based thorities. Of additional concern is their po- cess to the area makes it difficult to gain a in mainland Egypt that primarily target tential to target civilian aircrafts, tourist clear picture of the state of affairs. Howev- the Egyptian authorities are thought to be resorts, and on the , as er, Hamas and other Gaza-based militants most active. Little is known about the pre-

© 2015 Center for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zurich 1 CSS Analyses in Security Policy No. 168, February 2015

cise relationship between these groups, Sinai Bedouin Tribes and Gas Pipelines though some degree of logistical overlap and cooperation is discernable. Their main sources of revenue come from illicit activi- ties made possible by the Sinai’s well-es- tablished smuggling economy and contri- butions from foreign Islamist militant groups.

The most operationally capable and prolific Salafist jihadi group is “Sinai Province” (formerly ABM), which claims to have been founded in 2012 by . The group is al-Qaida-inspired, though no di- rect organizational link with al-Qaida ex- ists. Its members are mostly local Bedouin, though it recruits from the wider , including the Syrian battlefield, and North . The group initially carried out attacks on Israeli targets, such as the city of and the pipeline that trans- ported natural gas through the Sinai to Is- rael until 2012. However, following the 2013 coup, it declared war on the Egyptian military and security forces. Recent high- The MSC sympathizes with Sinai Prov- , are reported to have been trained in profile attacks include the attempted assas- ince, and it, too, declared its support for the MJN camps in Libya. The MJN is believed sination of Interior Minister Mohamed IS in February 2014. to have received funding from AQAP, and Ibrahim Moustafa in September 2013, the to have recruited for and carried out acts on bombing of the security directorate build- al-Jihad in the Sinai Peninsula (also behalf of AQAP and AQIM, and Moham- ing in Mansoura in the in De- known as al-Qaida in the Sinai Peninsula) mad Jamal was believed to have connec- was founded in 2011, at the tions with Sinai Province and Islamist ex- The grievances of the Bedouin same time announcing its in- tremists in . tention to “fulfil the oath of rendered them vulnerable to Osama bin Laden”. The found- The Growth of Militancy radical . er, Ramzi Mahmoud al- A number of factors have enabled armed Mowafi, who was Osama bin Islamist groups to take root and proliferate Laden’s physician, broke out of in the Sinai. The peninsula has never been cember 2013, the near simultaneous bomb- prison in 2011 and by the end of that year well integrated with mainland Egypt. Its ings in in January 2014, and the had formed Ansar al-Jihad in the Sinai isolation is not merely physical; the local downing of an Egyptian military helicop- Peninsula, declaring allegiance to al-Qai- Bedouin, who make up 70 per cent of the ter with a shoulder-fired missile near da’s Ayman al-Zawahiri. The group claimed local population (approximately 200 – in the same month. The responsibility for a number of attacks on 300,000), feel a greater affinity with the group was also responsible for the two big- the gas pipeline that transports natural gas people who inhabit the lands to their east gest attacks since the ouster of Mohammed through the Sinai to and previously than with mainland Egyptians. Indeed, Morsi, one again in Sheikh Zuweid on 24 to , and an August 2013 attack on the some of the Bedouin tribes in the Sinai, October 2014, which left some 30 security paramilitary is be- such as the Sawarka, Rumeilat, and Tara- personnel dead in a suicide bomb attack, lieved to have been linked to the group. been, also inhabit Gaza and Israel. This, and another involving four incidents in coupled with the Israeli occupation of the North Sinai on 29 January in which at least Another group that has connections not Sinai from 1967 until Israel’s complete 30 people were killed. only with al-Qaida leaders, but also with withdrawal in 1982, has caused the Cairo al-Qaida in the Islamic (AQIM) authorities to view the Sinai Bedouin with The Shura Council in the En- and al-Qaida in the suspicion, barring them from employment virons of (MSC) is another of (AQAP), is the Mohammad Jamal Net- in the military and security services, and the more prominent groups. Founded in work (MJN), established by Mohammad appointing tribal leaders and their People’s 2012, MSC is an umbrella group compris- Jamal Abu , a local militant, who Assembly candidates. ing several jihadi groups based in Gaza. It was imprisoned during the Mubarak era opposes the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli Peace and released in 2011. Until his arrest in Alienation of the Sinai Bedouin from the Treaty and has tended to focus on Israeli 2012, Mohammad Jamal was the leader of state has also been generated by the failure targets. It has claimed responsibility for a a City cell in Cairo, believed to be of Egyptian governments to respond to cross-border improvised explosive device planning attacks inside Egypt. However, he their socio-economic needs. Plans to de- attack in June 2012 and for rocket attacks established training camps not only in velop the area under Anwar were on the Israeli cities of Sderot in March Egypt, but also in Libya. Some of the at- largely abandoned under . 2013 and Eilat in April and August 2013. tackers of the US embassy in Benghazi, The development of tourist resorts on the

© 2015 Center for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zurich 2 CSS Analyses in Security Policy No. 168, February 2015

coast of the Gulf of , such as Sharm Demilitarized Zones on the Sinai since 1979 -Sheikh, tended to be perceived by the Bedouin as benefitting mainland Egyptians and pushing them further into the interior. Development of the northern part of the Sinai through the creation of agribusiness and the gas pipeline to Israel and Jordan was similarly viewed as a means exploiting Bedouin land, to which the Bedouin them- selves have no ownership rights.

Largely excluded from the formal economy and unable to cultivate the land legally, the Bedouin developed a parallel economy in the Sinai, smuggling drugs and contraband into Israel through a network of tunnels. The three main tribes straddling the border with Gaza (Sawarka, Rumeilat, and Tara- been) dominated this illicit trade. To the south of the peninsula, near the Israeli Red resort of Eilat, the Azazmeh and La- heiwat tribes have smuggled migrants as well as cigarettes and drugs into Israel. The smuggling trade in the Sinai saw a signifi- cant increase following Israel’s withdrawal depots in North Sinai were plundered. The sought to pressure Hamas into taking fur- from Gaza in 2005 and as a consequence of collapse of the Libyan regime also in- ther action to sever the link between groups its blockade of Gaza in 2007. By 2009, il- creased the quantity and sophistication of in the Sinai and Gaza by augmenting its licit trade with Gaza was reported to have weapons being smuggled into the Sinai, control over the Gaza border crossing and become the Bedouin’s principal source of some being smuggled into Gaza and others restricting fuel supplies to Gaza. Neither income, with trading routes extending as to groups in the Sinai. The lack of central measure met with a great deal of success. far as Libya and . authority presence also enabled some Bedouin imprisoned after the 2004 and During the ’s presidency, The grievances of the Bedouin, their alien- 2005 attacks to break out of prison. a mixed approach was again employed. ation from the state, and a growing antipa- Morsi indicated his willingness to respond thy for Israel rendered them vulnerable to The Government’s Response to the socio-economic grievances of the radical Islam. A key juncture in their radi- Since 2011, the central authorities have at- Bedouin and initiated talks with the Sinai’s calization appears to have been the crack- tempted to restore their presence in the Si- armed groups, mediated by Salafists and down on violent Islamist networks in the nai through both political and military former Salafist jihadists. He also supported Sinai following the 2004 attacks in the measures. The Supreme Council of the a relaxing of the overground movement of tourist resorts of Taba and and Armed Forces (SCAF) relaxed restrictions people and goods into Gaza. Despite these the 2005 attack in Sharm el-Sheikh, which on over-ground crossings, attempted to fa- efforts, however, fighting in the Sinai con- led to mass arrests and the imprisonment cilitate intra-Palestinian reconciliation in tinued, prompting a return to a military re- of local Bedouin with Salafi jihadists. The the hope of re-establishing Fatah’s author- sponse. II was launched Israeli pullout of Gaza in 2005 also acceler- ity over Gaza, and restarted talks with in mid-2012, aimed at protecting the Suez ated radicalization of local Canal, eliminating armed Islamist groups, Bedouin, as did the 2007 Israeli 800 Egyptian households and destroying the tunnel network. blockade of Gaza. As the Bedouin became more depend- were given 48 hours to vacate Following the 2013 coup, the new authori- ent on smuggling to Gaza, they their homes before the military ties in Cairo adopted a more aggressive also fell under the ideological strategy, leading to mass arrests and hard influence of Hamas and Salafist destroyed them. security measures. In October 2014, the jihadi groups based in Gaza. government imposed a curfew and a state- Another factor was the arrival of a number Bedouin tribal leaders aimed at renegotiat- of-emergency, and destroyed homes in the of previously Gaza-based clerics in the Si- ing the social contract with the Bedouin. Sinai’s border area with Gaza to create a nai following the Hamas crackdown on However, negotiations met with resistance buffer zone 14 kilometers long and half a Salafist jihadi groups in the territory. from the security forces and were overshad- kilometer wide. Roughly 800 households owed by concerns about the country’s over- were given 48 hours to vacate their homes The fall of Mubarak in 2011 provided local all stability. The SCAF thus launched Op- before the military destroyed them. While Bedouin with an opportunity to assert eration Eagle I in mid-2011, involving the 2014 did see a reduction of terrorist at- their authority in the Sinai. Following con- largest movement of Egyptian troops into tacks, the methods of Egyptian President frontations with armed Bedouin, Egyptian the Sinai since the 1973 October War, in an Abdel Fattah el-Sisi are reminiscent of security forces abandoned a number of effort to drive Salafist jihadi groups out of Mubarak’s and could add fuel to Bedouin their posts, and weapons and munitions North Sinai’s urban centers. The SCAF militancy.

© 2015 Center for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zurich 3 CSS Analyses in Security Policy No. 168, February 2015

The Sinai and Egypt’s Neighbors nent fixture, Tel Aviv has de-facto accepted of a haven for jihadi groups persist. The The combustible mix of militancy in the the remilitarization of eastern Sinai and is population remains alienated from the Sinai also has the capacity to affect Egypt’s currently relying on the Egyptian military state and economically dependent on illicit relations with Israel due to attacks on Is- to at least contain the situation in the Sinai. activities. In addition, repression of Islam- raeli targets and the smuggling of weapons Thus far, Israel has largely refrained from ists in Egypt and heavy-handed treatment into Gaza. The 1979 Egyptian-Israeli pre-emptive measures inside Egyptian ter- of Sinai Bedouin are likely to feed the Peace Treaty that has underpinned the cold ritory, instead passing on intelligence gath- Salafist jihadist narrative and generate sup- peace between the two countries did not ered in Gaza to Egypt. The continuation of for their cause. Ultimately, develop- envisage a situation in which non-state ac- stable relations, nevertheless, will depend ment measures that boost the integration tors in the Sinai would jeopardize their re- on good faith between the two neighbors. of Bedouin into the formal economy and spective security. Under the Treaty, the Si- provide alternatives to smuggling are need- nai is divided into zones. In Zone A, close The situation in the Sinai also has implica- ed. Engaging tribal leaders and including to mainland Egypt, Egypt may station a tions for relations between Cairo and - the Bedouin in state structures in the Sinai mechanized infantry division of some mas. During the final years of the Mubarak are also likely to be important in improving 20,000 troops. In Zone B, four border se- regime, Egypt had expressed growing con- relations between the Cairo authorities and curity may be stationed in sup- cern about synergies between Gaza-based the local population, as well as improving port of civilian . In zone C, close to militants, Hamas, and the Sinai Bedouin. the security situation in the peninsula. Israeli border, no Egyptian military pres- Nevertheless, once in power in Gaza, Ha- However, the poor state of Egypt’s public ence is permitted. The Multina- finances and the myriad challenges facing tional Force and Observers Since 2011, Tel Aviv has de-facto the country as a whole mean that the needs (MFO), a multinational mili- of the Sinai may continue to be neglected, tary force created as an alterna- accepted the remilitarization of despite the promise to invest in the Sinai tive to a United Nations peace- eastern Sinai. following the recent January 2015 attacks. keeping force in 1981, is tasked Countries seeking to support Egypt’s tran- with monitoring these provi- sition and stability in the , including sions. The MFO is funded by Egypt, Israel, mas sought to demonstrate its importance Switzerland, could play a valuable role in and the US, and also receives contributions for stability and cracked down on Salafist supporting local dialog initiatives and to from other countries, including Switzer- jihadi groups in Gaza, causing some to flee stimulate sustainable development and land. In Zone D, within Israel, Israel may to the Sinai, where they could operate more creation that benefit the local Bedouin. station four infantry battalions. freely and form ties with Bedouin tribes Support for small-scale agricultural pro- and Egyptian and foreign Salafist jihadis. duction aimed at niche markets, provision Despite these restrictions, the treaty does Efforts by the authorities in Cairo to sever of microcredits, and support for small- and provide mechanisms for ad-hoc changes in these connections still pose a challenge to medium-sized enterprises, for example, the level of Egyptian forces in the Sinai, Hamas’ authority in Gaza, however. De- could all be means of providing legal eco- provided Israel agrees, and such changes struction of the tunnel economy, for in- nomic activities to the Bedouin. have taken place in the past. Since 2011, stance, would deny Hamas a taxable source there was only one instance when Egyptian of revenue. military forces deployed to Zone C with- out prior permission, but on that occasion, Outlook Dr. Lisa Watanabe is a Senior Researcher at the they withdrew following Israeli alarm. No long-term solution to the problem ap- Center for Security Studies (CSS) at ETH Zurich and While Israel does not want to see the re- pears to be in sight. The factors that con- a member of the think tank team “Swiss and militarization of Zone C become a perma- tributed to the insurgency and the creation Euro-Atlantic Security”.

CSS Analyses is edited by the Center for Security Studies (CSS) at ETH Zurich. Most recent issues: Each month, two analyses are published in German, French, and English. The EU Foreign Policy: From Ashton to Mogherini No. 167 CSS is a center of competence for Swiss and international security policy. The Neo- of the “Islamic State” No. 166 Editors: Christian Nünlist and Matthias Bieri The US Campaign against the “Islamic State” No. 165 Lectorship: Christopher Findlay Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems: Future Challenges No. 164 Layout and graphics: Dahinden Internet Governance: Time for an Update? No. 163 ISSN: 2296-0244 The Challenge and Tragedy of Irregular Migration to Europe No. 162 Feedback and comments: [email protected] More issues and free online subscription: http://www.css.ethz.ch/cssanalysen © 2015 Center for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zurich 4