Violence, Narcotics and Poverty: a Harmful Cocktail in Afghanistan
Center for Advanced Directorate of Research Defense Studies Innovation for Peace Defense Concepts Series June 2006
Violence, Narcotics and Poverty: A Harmful Cocktail in Afghanistan
CADS Staff
A Troubled Past Years of violence have taken their toll on all aspects of Afghan society, politics and economy. Afghanistan has been traversed by countless invasions, foreign rule and bitter infighting: from Alexander the Great's invasion of the country in 328BC to the 1219 Mongol invasion led by Genghis Khan to 19th century British rule and subsequent coups. A Soviet withdrawal from the country in 1989 after a decade-long brutal occupation precipitated a bitter power struggle that culminated in civil war. Bands of mujahideen (“holy warriors”) financed, armed and trained by the United States, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and China during the Soviet occupation fought a vile war for political control of the country. The mujahideen split into two loosely-aligned opposing factions: the Northern Alliance and the Taliban (Afghan Mujahideen). The subsequent victory of the Taliban ushered in an era of harsh totalitarian rule.
In the aftermath of the Taliban’s rise to power, the Northern Alliance, led by a group of tribal warlords, fled to northern Afghanistan, Iran and Central Asia. The Northern Alliance remained there until 2001, when the United States intervened to oust the Taliban regime, which harbored Osama bin Laden—the mastermind of the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States. In its war against the Taliban, the US used Afghan militias as proxies, thereby augmenting the power of tribal warlords throughout Afghanistan and impeding the consolidation of power by a new central authority. It is in this power vacuum that terrorism and the narcotics trade have flourished in Afghanistan. [OQ1]
Contemporary Challenges and an Uncertain Future The country's current democratic leadership, formed in 2004 under President Hamid Karzai, Afghanistan's first democratically-elected president, has faced a major domestic security challenge. Despite political change, insurgent violence continued in 2004, reports the US State Department (2006), led by the Taliban, al-Qaeda, Hizb-e-Islami Gulbuddin and Jaish-al Muslimeen. These and other rebel groups continue to attack, threaten, rob and kill local villagers, political activists, NGO workers, government officials and foreign soldiers in the fledgling democracy. The effect of these terrorist activities on the ability and willingness of much-needed aid organizations to operate in Afghanistan is of particular concern. After Taliban forces killed 33 NGO workers in 2005, 10 more than in 2004, various United Nations (UN) agencies and nongovernmental organizations began downscaling or eliminating their programs in the country due to the lack of security. (Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor 2005)
These attacks intensified in 2005, during which 15 suicide bombings were undertaken, compared to three in 2004. (Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism 2006) Direct fire combat with Coalition forces declined, suggesting that insurgents now seek new measures to disrupt military Copyright © 2006 Center for Advanced Defense Studies. All rights reserved. 10 G St, NE, Suite 610 :: Washington, DC 20002 :: 202 289 3332 :: www.c4ads.org Center for Advanced Directorate of Research Defense Studies Innovation for Peace Defense Concepts Series June 2006 and international aid operations. Afghan insurgents have taken cues from their counterparts in Iraq, relocating when Coalition forces attempt to clear an area then returning after their departure.
Counterterrorism forces faced increased attacks throughout 2005 previous to the National Assembly and provincial council elections in September of that year. Despite Taliban threats, only minor attacks occurred, and the elections boasted a 53% turnout from the 12.5 million registered voters. Increased foreign troop presence provided for rising tensions between Afghans and Coalition forces. A May 2006 traffic incident involving US troops promptly escalated into the most intense rioting since the Taliban’s removal from power.
The known link between insurgent activity and the illicit narcotics trade in Afghanistan is also of grave concern. While in power, the Taliban made much progress in eradicating the country's opium production. Following the recommendation of the United Nations Drug Control Program (UNDCP), the Taliban banned domestic opium production in 2000. The 90% decrease in production that followed the ban was reversed with the overthrow of the Taliban and the rise of warlords. During the Hamid Karzai's presidency, opium production has risen 657% from 2001 levels. The UNDCP reported Afghanistan as the leading opium producer in 2005 with a harvest in excess of 4,100 tons. (UNODC 2005) The resurgence of the opium trade has help fund militias and warlords who traffic the drug. (The Economist 2004).
Afghanistan is also plagued by a dearth of economic opportunities. Many Afghan citizens are now engaged in illicit activities in an attempt to overcome their socioeconomic circumstances. Severe poverty and underdevelopment[OQ2], as characterized by a lack of education, health care, legitimate employment, infrastructure and social services, has led many Afghans to turn to the richest parties—mostly warlords and drug lords—for employment and sustenance. In many cases, the lucrative opium trade presents opportunities to escape from abject poverty. According to UNODC, the average opium farmer stands to earn ten times more per hectare than a legitimate cereal and grain farmer. (UNODC 2005) Furthermore, more destitute farmers deprived of access to sufficiently fertile lands are often forced into sharecropping agreements, which generally require the cultivation of opium poppies. (National Drug Control Strategy 2006) Much of the support for militias and insurgencies in Afghanistan thus owes to socioeconomic conditions rather than ideology, despite a small Muslim Arab minority driven by extreme fundamentalism.
Looking Ahead The international community must coalesce around the effort to promote human development in Afghanistan if the fledgling democracy, a potential poster child of democracy for the Middle East, is to survive. Economic advancement of the Afghan people will foster a greater sense of respect for the democratically-elected central government. Provided with more opportunities to support themselves and their families through legal activities, Afghans will be less inclined to directly or indirectly support insurgents and warlords, who currently exploit the country's socioeconomic conditions to further their own cause.
Copyright © 2006 Center for Advanced Defense Studies. All rights reserved. 10 G St, NE, Suite 610 :: Washington, DC 20002 :: 202 289 3332 :: www.c4ads.org Center for Advanced Directorate of Research Defense Studies Innovation for Peace Defense Concepts Series June 2006
Sources 2004. “Afghanistan.” Military Technology 28.1: 278-279. [OQ3] Al-Arian, Laila. 2004. ”Central Asia.” The Washington Report on Middle East Affairs 23.1: 42. Ashimbayev, Maulen. 2003. “A Kazakh View: Challenges and Threats to Security in Central Asia.” Defense and Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy 31.11-12: 12. Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor 2005. Afghanistan: Country Reports on Human Rights Practice. Washington, DC: US State Department. Center for Advanced Defense Studies. 2005. “One Crop May Hide Another: Poppy Cultivation in Afghanistan and Possible Alternatives. Washington, DC: Defense Concepts Series. Economist, The. 2004. ”Special Report: Voting in Warlord Country-Afghanistan.” The Economist 373.8396: 21. Human Rights Watch. May 24, 2005. “Afghanistan: Violence Surges.” New York:
Copyright © 2006 Center for Advanced Defense Studies. All rights reserved. 10 G St, NE, Suite 610 :: Washington, DC 20002 :: 202 289 3332 :: www.c4ads.org