Return of the Arabs: Al-Qa`Ida's Current Military Role in the Afghan

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

Return of the Arabs: Al-Qa`Ida's Current Military Role in the Afghan FEBRUARY 2008 . VOL 1 . ISSUE 3 Return of the Arabs: their positions with mortars, RPGs, Valley of eastern Afghanistan. In this machine guns and AK-47s. valley they fought with greater effect Al-Qa`ida’s Current against U.S. troops in 2002’s Operation Military Role in the While many media savvy Arab Anaconda, an asymmetric guerrilla Afghan Insurgency volunteers earned a reputation as fight that more closely resembled the “gucci jihadists” during the Soviet mujahidin’s skirmishes with Soviet period, some did move on to become heliborne Spetsnaz troops in the 1980s. By Brian Glyn Williams seasoned fighters. In the late 1990s, for example, Bin Ladin helped make the Following the mixed success of Shah- in the pashtun tribal belt, from Arab jihadist dream of fielding a bona i-Kot, the remaining Arab fighters the JDAM-blasted ruins of Usama bin fide Arab jund (army) come true when retreated over the border into Pakistan Ladin’s bombed out terrorist camp he formed the 055 International Brigade where they were given sanctuary by at Darunta near Jalalabad to the “red to fight against the Northern Alliance. major Taliban leaders such as Jalaladin zone” between the volatile provinces Based in Rishikor, a former Communist Haqqani, who had fought alongside of Khost and Paktia, local Afghans are base just outside Kabul, this foreign Arabs in the Khost area during the increasingly talking in concerned tones legion—which was often known as the 1980s. Up and coming middle-ranked about the return of the “Araban” or Ansars (Companions)—played a key role Taliban commanders, such as Baitullah “Ikhwanis,” as Arab fighters are known in the Taliban’s defense of Kabul against Mehsud and Nek Muhammad, also in Pashtu.1 Wealthy al-Qa`ida financiers Northern Alliance leader Ahmad Shah provided the Arabs and Islamic are said to be lurking in the distant Massoud, and in the Taliban conquests Movement of Uzbekistan jihadists with mountains distributing large sums of Northern Alliance General Rashid sanctuary in the Waziri tribal lands of of cash to Pashtun tribes on the other Dostum’s capital at Mazar-i-Sharif and North and South Waziristan. Another side of the Pakistani border, hardened Massoud’s capital of Taloqan. Pakistani tribal agency to the north, Arab fighters from Iraq are rumored to Bajaur, served as the third fallback area be training Pashtuns in the previously In addition to their activities as for retreating Arab fighters. Ominously, taboo tactic of suicide bombing and terrorists who attack “soft” civilian all three border agencies previously had al-Qa`ida leaders are reported to have targets, as seen in the case of the a history of serving as rear area staging an increasingly strong voice in the infamous Hamburg akhund (cell) that grounds for Arab and Afghan mujahidin Taliban shuras (councils) in Waziristan attacked the U.S. mainland on 9/11, al- during the 1980s jihad and they would and Quetta. If the rumors are true, it Qa`ida also had a fighting wing. This soon serve that role again. seems that al-Qa`ida is putting renewed branch was engaged in frontal combat, emphasis on galvanizing military often driving old Soviet-era tanks, Building a “Pyre for the Americans” resistance in a land that has tremendous utilizing light artillery and acting as While many in the West thought al- symbolism in jihadist circles as the shock troops for the Taliban in their Qa`ida was nearly finished in the original theater of action for the modern struggles with the Northern Alliance. aftermath of the toppling of the Taliban, jihad movement. Thousands of Arabs in Afghanistan the coalition had a difficult time killing actually fought under al-Qa`ida’s al- or capturing high-value targets such The following is a preliminary effort Raya (flag) in frontal combat from 1997- as Bin Ladin, Ayman al-Zawahiri to sift through these vague rumors and 2001. Arab fighters who were trained (who narrowly missed being killed reports in order to gain a clear picture in these camps bolstered the Taliban by a Hellfire missile strike in 2006) of al-Qa`ida’s actual role in a Taliban regime when it decided to confront the and a new generation of leaders who guerrilla war that has, to all outward U.S.-led coalition in the fall of 2001. were operating in the Pashtun tribal appearances, morphed into an Iraqi- In light of their well-known fervor, areas, such as charismatic commander style terrorist insurgency. it is not surprising that Arab fighters Abu Yahya al-Libi.2 The latter leader tenaciously held their positions in seemed to be most successful in running Precursors: Al-Qa`ida’s Field Army Taloqan, Kunduz, Kabul and Kandahar a media operation with al-Sahab In 1987, Usama bin Ladin proudly when the indigenous Taliban proved Media Production (The Clouds, which proclaimed that the somnolent Arab less inclined to fight to the death. refers to the cloud covered mountains youth living under the munafiq (apostate) of Afghanistan). It was this media governments of the Middle East could Yet, the technologically advanced operation that began to provide a unique come to his Ma`sada al-Ansar (Lion’s Americans were not the Soviets, and window into al-Qa`ida’s re-calibrated Den of the Companions, a tunnel base key al-Qa`ida military leaders Juma military operations in Afghanistan. built in the mountains of the Afghan Namangani (the military head of the 055 border province of Paktia) to fight International Brigade) and Muhammad While the media-savvy al-Qa`ida in Iraq for their honor and faith against the `Atif (al-Qa`ida’s military leader) leader Abu Mus`ab al-Zarqawi stole the “atheist infidels.” By all accounts, Bin were killed by precision-guided U.S. limelight from 2003-2005, by 2005 al- Ladin and his “Ansars” subsequently munitions in November 2001. With the Libi’s media service began to compete fought ferociously against Soviet Arab state-within-a-state in the Taliban with Iraqi insurgent webpages. Al-Libi Spetsnaz (Special Forces), defending Emirate of Afghanistan collapsing around them by December 2001, the 2 Although in December 2005 a senior operational plan- 1 Personal interviews, Pashtun tribal belt, April-May Arab Ansars withdrew from Kabul and ner, Abu Hamza Rabia, was killed in a Predator attack in 2007. Kandahar to the remote Shah-i-Kot North Waziristan. FEBRUARY 2008 . VOL 1 . ISSUE 3 began by posting a series of online videos 2007, they also featured images of Arab reports, al-Qa`ida is also running as that showed small numbers of Arabs fighters ambushing Pakistani soldiers many as 29 training camps in the region, carrying out attacks on “Christian kafirs in the mountains of Waziristan, and the albeit less elaborate than those found in (infidels) and puppet munafiq (apostate) Pakistani authorities began to suspect Afghanistan in the 1990s. Afghan army troops.” These included that Arabs were bolstering the Taliban such videos as “Pyre for the Americans insurgency in their country.7 The Arabs have also played a key role in in Afghanistan” and “The Winds of “al-Qa`idifying” the Taliban insurgency Paradise.”3 As in the previous jihad against the and importing the horror tactics of Soviets, the Arab fighters seemed much the Iraqi conflict to Afghanistan. Key Al-Libi’s propaganda films featured more concerned about photographing Taliban leaders, such as the recently combat footage of Arabs carrying out and filming themselves than their slain Mullah Dadullah, have claimed suicide bombings against U.S. soldiers, simple Afghan hosts, and this appears that they learned suicide bombing firing mortars at U.S. Forward Operating to be part of a calculated effort to recruit techniques from their Arab “brothers.”10 Bases (including one sequence that young men for the jihad in Afghanistan Al-Qa`ida has also distributed tutorial shows Arabs firing shells with the name and Pakistan. By 2007, jihadist jihadist videos throughout the Pashtun Zarqawi painted on them), using IEDs websites from Chechnya to Turkey regions that give instructions on how to against U.S. troops and ambushing U.S. to the Arab world began to feature build car bombs, IEDs and inspirational soldiers.4 According to the Arabic sub- recruitment ads calling on the “Lions “snuff film” images of U.S. troops being headings, these videos were filmed in of Islam” to come fight in Afghanistan. killed in Iraq. The first wave of suicide a series of Pashtun border provinces It appears that many heeded the call.8 bombings in Afghanistan seems to in Afghanistan ranging from Kunar This was especially true after the Anbar have been carried out by Arabs, and it Province in the north to Uruzgan and Awakening of anti-al-Qa`ida tribal appears clear that it was al-Qa`ida— Zabul in the south.5 In other words, leaders and General David Petraeus’ which has long had an emphasis on these were the very border provinces “surge strategy” made Iraq less istishhad (martyrdom) operations— where the first generation of Arab hospitable for foreign volunteers. that taught the local Taliban this Afghan volunteers (many of whom had alien tactic. Arabs such as Abu Yahya married local women, learned Pashtu Al-Qa`ida Adds an Edge to Taliban Insurgency al-Libi have also been influential in and settled in the region) had fought in Since 2002, one of al-Qa`ida’s main roles encouraging the technophobic Taliban the 1980s. has been diverting wealth from the Arab fundamentalists to create “Islamic Gulf States to funding the struggling Emirate of Afghanistan” online videos By 2006, a more developed al-Sahab Taliban.
Recommended publications
  • BOKO HARAM Emerging Threat to the U.S
    112TH CONGRESS COMMITTEE " COMMITTEE PRINT ! 1st Session PRINT 112–B BOKO HARAM Emerging Threat to the U.S. Homeland SUBCOMMITTEE ON COUNTERTERRORISM AND INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES December 2011 FIRST SESSION U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 71–725 PDF WASHINGTON : 2011 COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY PETER T. KING, New York, Chairman LAMAR SMITH, Texas BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California LORETTA SANCHEZ, California MIKE ROGERS, Alabama SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas HENRY CUELLAR, Texas GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia LAURA RICHARDSON, California CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois TIM WALBERG, Michigan BRIAN HIGGINS, New York CHIP CRAVAACK, Minnesota JACKIE SPEIER, California JOE WALSH, Illinois CEDRIC L. RICHMOND, Louisiana PATRICK MEEHAN, Pennsylvania HANSEN CLARKE, Michigan BEN QUAYLE, Arizona WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia KATHLEEN C. HOCHUL, New York BILLY LONG, Missouri VACANCY JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas MO BROOKS, Alabama MICHAEL J. RUSSELL, Staff Director & Chief Counsel KERRY ANN WATKINS, Senior Policy Director MICHAEL S. TWINCHEK, Chief Clerk I. LANIER AVANT, Minority Staff Director (II) C O N T E N T S BOKO HARAM EMERGING THREAT TO THE U.S. HOMELAND I. Introduction .......................................................................................................... 1 II. Findings ..............................................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • COIN in Afghanistan - Winning the Battles, Losing the War?
    COIN in Afghanistan - Winning the Battles, Losing the War? MAGNUS NORELL FOI, Swedish Defence Research Agency, is a mainly assignment-funded agency under the Ministry of Defence. The core activities are research, method and technology development, as well as studies conducted in the interests of Swedish defence and the safety and security of society. The organisation employs approximately 1000 personnel of whom about 800 are scientists. This makes FOI Sweden’s largest research institute. FOI gives its customers access to leading-edge expertise in a large number of fields such as security policy studies, defence and security related analyses, the assessment of various types of threat, systems for control and management of crises, protection against and management of hazardous substances, IT security and the potential offered by new sensors. FOI Swedish Defence Research Agency Phone: +46 8 555 030 00 www.foi.se FOI Memo 3123 Memo Defence Analysis Defence Analysis Fax: +46 8 555 031 00 ISSN 1650-1942 March 2010 SE-164 90 Stockholm Magnus Norell COIN in Afghanistan - Winning the Battles, Losing the War? “If you don’t know where you’re going. Any road will take you there” (From a song by George Harrison) FOI Memo 3123 Title COIN in Afghanistan – Winning the Battles, Losing the War? Rapportnr/Report no FOI Memo 3123 Rapporttyp/Report Type FOI Memo Månad/Month Mars/March Utgivningsår/Year 2010 Antal sidor/Pages 41 p ISSN ISSN 1650-1942 Kund/Customer Försvarsdepartementet Projektnr/Project no A12004 Godkänd av/Approved by Eva Mittermaier FOI, Totalförsvarets Forskningsinstitut FOI, Swedish Defence Research Agency Avdelningen för Försvarsanalys Department of Defence Analysis 164 90 Stockholm SE-164 90 Stockholm FOI Memo 3123 Programme managers remarks The Asia Security Studies programme at the Swedish Defence Research Agency’s Department of Defence Analysis conducts research and policy relevant analysis on defence and security related issues.
    [Show full text]
  • Afghanistan State Structure and Security Forces
    European Asylum Support Office Afghanistan State Structure and Security Forces Country of Origin Information Report August 2020 SUPPORT IS OUR MISSION European Asylum Support Office Afghanistan State Structure and Security Forces Country of Origin Information Report August 2020 More information on the European Union is available on the Internet (http://europa.eu). ISBN: 978-92-9485-650-0 doi: 10.2847/115002 BZ-02-20-565-EN-N © European Asylum Support Office (EASO) 2020 Reproduction is authorised, provided the source is acknowledged, unless otherwise stated. For third-party materials reproduced in this publication, reference is made to the copyrights statements of the respective third parties. Cover photo: © Al Jazeera English, Helmand, Afghanistan 3 November 2012, url CC BY-SA 2.0 Taliban On the Doorstep: Afghan soldiers from 215 Corps take aim at Taliban insurgents. 4 — AFGHANISTAN: STATE STRUCTURE AND SECURITY FORCES - EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT Acknowledgements This report was drafted by the European Asylum Support Office COI Sector. The following national asylum and migration department contributed by reviewing this report: The Netherlands, Office for Country Information and Language Analysis, Ministry of Justice It must be noted that the review carried out by the mentioned departments, experts or organisations contributes to the overall quality of the report, it but does not necessarily imply their formal endorsement of the final report, which is the full responsibility of EASO. AFGHANISTAN: STATE STRUCTURE AND SECURITY
    [Show full text]
  • Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: a Political Perspective on Culture and Terrorism
    MAHMOOD MAMDANI Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: A Political Perspective on Culture and Terrorism ABSTRACT The link between Islam and terrorism became a central media concern following September 11, resulting in new rounds of "culture talk. This talk has turned religious experience into a political category, differentiating 'good Muslims" from "bad Mus- lims, rather than terrorists from civilians. The implication is undisguised: Whether in Afghanistan, Palestine, or Pakistan, Islam must be quarantined and the devil must be exorcized from it by a civil war between good Muslims and bad Muslims. This article suggests that we lift the quarantine and turn the cultural theory of politics on its head. Beyond the simple but radical suggestion that if there are good Muslims and bad Muslims, there must also be good Westerners and bad Westerners, I question the very tendency to read Islamist poli- tics as an effect of Islamic civilization—whether good or bad—and Western power as an effect of Western civilization. Both those poli- tics and that power are born of an encounter, and neither can be understood outside of the history of that encounter. Cultural explanations of political outcomes tend to avoid history and issues. Thinking of individuals from "traditional" cultures in authentic and original terms, culture talk dehistoricizes the construction of political identities. This article places the terror of September 11 in a his- torical and political context. Rather than a residue of a premodern culture in modern politics, terrorism is best understood as a modern construction. Even when it harnesses one or another aspect of tradition and culture, the result is a modern ensemble at the service of a modern project.
    [Show full text]
  • The Opposition of a Leading Akhund to Shi'a and Sufi
    The Opposition of a Leading Akhund to Shi’a and Sufi Shaykhs in Mid-Nineteenth- Century China Wang Jianping, Shanghai Normal University Abstract This article traces the activities of Ma Dexin, a preeminent Hui Muslim scholar and grand imam (akhund) who played a leading role in the Muslim uprising in Yunnan (1856–1873). Ma harshly criticized Shi’ism and its followers, the shaykhs, in the Sufi orders in China. The intolerance of orthodox Sunnis toward Shi’ism can be explained in part by the marginalization of Hui Muslims in China and their attempts to unite and defend themselves in a society dominated by Han Chinese. An analysis of the Sunni opposition to Shi’ism that was led by Akhund Ma Dexin and the Shi’a sect’s influence among the Sufis in China help us understand the ways in which global debates in Islam were articulated on Chinese soil. Keywords: Ma Dexin, Shi’a, shaykh, Chinese Islam, Hui Muslims Most of the more than twenty-three million Muslims in China are Sunnis who follow Hanafi jurisprudence when applying Islamic law (shariʿa). Presently, only a very small percentage (less than 1 percent) of Chinese Muslims are Shi’a.1 The historian Raphael Israeli explicitly analyzes the profound impact of Persian Shi’ism on the Sufi orders in China based on the historical development and doctrinal teachings of Chinese Muslims (2002, 147–167). The question of Shi’a influence explored in this article concerns why Ma Dexin, a preeminent Chinese Muslim scholar, a great imam, and one of the key leaders of the Muslim uprising in the nineteenth century, so harshly criticized Shi’ism and its accomplices, the shaykhs, in certain Sufi orders in China, even though Shi’a Islam was nearly invisible at that time.
    [Show full text]
  • AFGHANISTAN - Base Map KYRGYZSTAN
    AFGHANISTAN - Base map KYRGYZSTAN CHINA ± UZBEKISTAN Darwaz !( !( Darwaz-e-balla Shaki !( Kof Ab !( Khwahan TAJIKISTAN !( Yangi Shighnan Khamyab Yawan!( !( !( Shor Khwaja Qala !( TURKMENISTAN Qarqin !( Chah Ab !( Kohestan !( Tepa Bahwddin!( !( !( Emam !( Shahr-e-buzorg Hayratan Darqad Yaftal-e-sufla!( !( !( !( Saheb Mingajik Mardyan Dawlat !( Dasht-e-archi!( Faiz Abad Andkhoy Kaldar !( !( Argo !( Qaram (1) (1) Abad Qala-e-zal Khwaja Ghar !( Rostaq !( Khash Aryan!( (1) (2)!( !( !( Fayz !( (1) !( !( !( Wakhan !( Khan-e-char Char !( Baharak (1) !( LEGEND Qol!( !( !( Jorm !( Bagh Khanaqa !( Abad Bulak Char Baharak Kishim!( !( Teer Qorghan !( Aqcha!( !( Taloqan !( Khwaja Balkh!( !( Mazar-e-sharif Darah !( BADAKHSHAN Garan Eshkashem )"" !( Kunduz!( !( Capital Do Koh Deh !(Dadi !( !( Baba Yadgar Khulm !( !( Kalafgan !( Shiberghan KUNDUZ Ali Khan Bangi Chal!( Zebak Marmol !( !( Farkhar Yamgan !( Admin 1 capital BALKH Hazrat-e-!( Abad (2) !( Abad (2) !( !( Shirin !( !( Dowlatabad !( Sholgareh!( Char Sultan !( !( TAKHAR Mir Kan Admin 2 capital Tagab !( Sar-e-pul Kent Samangan (aybak) Burka Khwaja!( Dahi Warsaj Tawakuli Keshendeh (1) Baghlan-e-jadid !( !( !( Koran Wa International boundary Sabzposh !( Sozma !( Yahya Mussa !( Sayad !( !( Nahrin !( Monjan !( !( Awlad Darah Khuram Wa Sarbagh !( !( Jammu Kashmir Almar Maymana Qala Zari !( Pul-e- Khumri !( Murad Shahr !( !( (darz !( Sang(san)charak!( !( !( Suf-e- (2) !( Dahana-e-ghory Khowst Wa Fereng !( !( Ab) Gosfandi Way Payin Deh Line of control Ghormach Bil Kohestanat BAGHLAN Bala !( Qaysar !( Balaq
    [Show full text]
  • The Afghanistan-Pakistan Wars, 2008–2009: Micro-Geographies, Conflict Diffusion, and Clusters of Violence
    The Afghanistan-Pakistan Wars, 2008–2009: Micro-geographies, Conflict Diffusion, and Clusters of Violence John O’Loughlin, Frank D. W. Witmer, and Andrew M. Linke1 Abstract: A team of political geographers analyzes over 5,000 violent events collected from media reports for the Afghanistan and Pakistan conflicts during 2008 and 2009. The violent events are geocoded to precise locations and the authors employ an exploratory spatial data analysis approach to examine the recent dynamics of the wars. By mapping the violence and examining its temporal dimensions, the authors explain its diffusion from traditional foci along the border between the two countries. While violence is still overwhelmingly concentrated in the Pashtun regions in both countries, recent policy shifts by the American and Pakistani gov- ernments in the conduct of the war are reflected in a sizeable increase in overall violence and its geographic spread to key cities. The authors identify and map the clusters (hotspots) of con- flict where the violence is significantly higher than expected and examine their shifts over the two-year period. Special attention is paid to the targeting strategy of drone missile strikes and the increase in their number and geographic extent by the Obama administration. Journal of Economic Literature, Classification Numbers: H560, H770, O180. 15 figures, 1 table, 113 ref- erences. Key words: Afghanistan, Pakistan, Taliban, ­­Al- Qaeda, insurgency, Islamic terrorism, U.S. military, International Security Assistance Forces, Durand Line, Tribal Areas, Northwest Frontier Province, ACLED, NATO. merica’s “longest war” is now (August 2010) nearing its ninth anniversary. It was Alaunched in October 2001 as a “war of necessity” (Barack Obama, August 17, 2009) to remove the Taliban from power in Afghanistan, and thus remove the support of this regime for Al-Qaeda, the terrorist organization that carried out the September 2001 attacks in the United States.
    [Show full text]
  • Ba'ath Propaganda During the Iran-Iraq War Jennie Matuschak [email protected]
    Bucknell University Bucknell Digital Commons Honors Theses Student Theses Spring 2019 Nationalism and Multi-Dimensional Identities: Ba'ath Propaganda During the Iran-Iraq War Jennie Matuschak [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.bucknell.edu/honors_theses Part of the International Relations Commons, and the Near and Middle Eastern Studies Commons Recommended Citation Matuschak, Jennie, "Nationalism and Multi-Dimensional Identities: Ba'ath Propaganda During the Iran-Iraq War" (2019). Honors Theses. 486. https://digitalcommons.bucknell.edu/honors_theses/486 This Honors Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Theses at Bucknell Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Honors Theses by an authorized administrator of Bucknell Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. iii Acknowledgments My first thanks is to my advisor, Mehmet Döşemeci. Without taking your class my freshman year, I probably would not have become a history major, which has changed my outlook on the world. Time will tell whether this is good or bad, but for now I am appreciative of your guidance. Also, thank you to my second advisor, Beeta Baghoolizadeh, who dealt with draft after draft and provided my thesis with the critiques it needed to stand strongly on its own. Thank you to my friends for your support and loyalty over the past four years, which have pushed me to become the best version of myself. Most importantly, I value the distractions when I needed a break from hanging out with Saddam. Special shout-out to Andrew Raisner for painstakingly reading and editing everything I’ve written, starting from my proposal all the way to the final piece.
    [Show full text]
  • Making Sense of Daesh in Afghanistan: a Social Movement Perspective
    \ WORKING PAPER 6\ 2017 Making sense of Daesh in Afghanistan: A social movement perspective Katja Mielke \ BICC Nick Miszak \ TLO Joint publication by \ WORKING PAPER 6 \ 2017 MAKING SENSE OF DAESH IN AFGHANISTAN: A SOCIAL MOVEMENT PERSPECTIVE \ K. MIELKE & N. MISZAK SUMMARY So-called Islamic State (IS or Daesh) in Iraq and Syria is widely interpreted as a terrorist phenomenon. The proclamation in late January 2015 of a Wilayat Kho- rasan, which includes Afghanistan and Pakistan, as an IS branch is commonly interpreted as a manifestation of Daesh's global ambition to erect an Islamic caliphate. Its expansion implies hierarchical order, command structures and financial flows as well as a transnational mobility of fighters, arms and recruits between Syria and Iraq, on the one hand, and Afghanistan–Pakistan, on the other. In this Working Paper, we take a (new) social movement perspective to investigate the processes and underlying dynamics of Daesh’s emergence in different parts of the country. By employing social movement concepts, such as opportunity structures, coalition-building, resource mobilization and framing, we disentangle the different types of resource mobilization and long-term conflicts that have merged into the phenomenon of Daesh in Afghanistan. In dialogue with other approaches to terrorism studies as well as peace, civil war and security studies, our analysis focuses on relations and interactions among various actors in the Afghan-Pakistan region and their translocal networks. The insight builds on a ten-month fieldwork-based research project conducted in four regions—east, west, north-east and north Afghanistan—during 2016. We find that Daesh in Afghanistan is a context-specific phenomenon that manifests differently in the various regions across the country and is embedded in a long- term transformation of the religious, cultural and political landscape in the cross-border region of Afghanistan–Pakistan.
    [Show full text]
  • TAKHAR, V1, English Chapar Khvajeh ! Pahlavan !
    525000 530000 535000 540000 545000 550000 555000 69°17'30"E 69°20'0"E 69°22'30"E 69°25'0"E 69°27'30"E 69°30'0"E 69°32'30"E 69°35'0"E 69°37'30"E GLIDE number: EQ-2015-000147-AFG Activation ID: EMSR145 Product N.: 02TAKHAR, v1, English Chapar Khvajeh ! Pahlavan ! N Takhar - AFGHANISTAN " 0 ' N 0 " 5 0 ° ' Choqur 6 0 Earthquake - 26/10/2015 3 5 ° 6 3 Qeshlaq Reference Map K ! v a j e h Uzbekistan Kyrgyzstan g h China a Panj Tajikistan r - T 0 0 Turkmenistan a 0 0 l 0 e 0 Khatlon 5 q 5 7 a 7 0 0 Kabul n 4 4 -B r o ^ R a Afghanistan d Fayzabad Wochareq Iran ! !( Pakistan Takhar India Badakhshan Kondoz Kunduz Taloqan !( !( N " 0 3 N Tarmeh ' " 7 0 4 3 ° ' 6 7 3 4 Bay ° ! 6 3 Baghlan Badaleh ! !( R Cartographic Information - B 0 K 0 v 0 a 0 Full color ISO A1, high resolution (300 dpi) 0 je 0 1:50000 0 h 0 7 g 7 0 h 0 a 4 r 4 -T r 0 1 2 4 a le Baghak q ! km a ! n ro ad Grid: WGS 1984 UTM Zone 42N map coordinate system Khvajeh Tick marks: WGS 84 geographical coordinate system ± Sabz Push Badaleh ! ! Legend Qarandu "£ General Information Point of Interest ! Area of Interest ^ Religious N " 0 ' N 5 Settlements Transportation " 4 r 0 ° ' 6 5 3 4 ! ° Populated Place Aerodrome 6 K 3 han ! ab £ ad- Talo q £ Residential Bridge an r " oad " Hydrology £ Primary Road " River Secondary Road !Taloqan River Local Road 0 ^ £ 0 0 0 0 0 5 " 5 6 Chin 6 0 0 4 4 Za'i £ ! " Khanabad-Taloqan road N " 0 3 N ' " 2 0 4 3 ° ' 6 2 ^ 3 4 ° Qowl ^ 6 3 Braq R ! -B T a lo r q a e n - v K i e Burkah s Map Information ! h R i m A major earthquake hit Afghanistan, northern Pakistan and parts of India.
    [Show full text]
  • Fi Zilal Al-Qur'an
    International Journal of Humanities and Social Science Vol. 1 No. 8; July 2011 From Religious Realism to Social Criticism: Sayyid Qutb’s Approach in Fi Zilal al Qur’an Nooraihan Ali (Corresponding author) Faculty of Islamic Contemporary Studies Universiti Sultan Zainal Abidin E-mail: [email protected] Asyraf Hj. Ab. Rahman Faculty of Social Development Universiti Malaysia Terengganu E-mail: [email protected] Wan Ibrahim Wan Ahmad UUM College of Arts and Sciences Universiti Utara Malaysia E-mail: [email protected] Mohd Yusoff Mohamad Faculty of Social Development Universiti Malaysia Terengganu, Malaysia E-mail:: [email protected] Abstract This paper deals with Qutb’s approaches which are in some ways differ from other Mufassirun’s way of the Quranic interpretation, thus making his Zilal so relevant to the modern and contemporary society as it attempts to give consistent answers to the social and political problems facing Muslims. In Qutb’s view, the establishment of a society in which Islamic teachings could be properly applied, was inevitable. Some distinctive characteristics that made Zilal so special are also discussed. Keywords: Muslim society, Qur‟an, Modern Tafsir 1. Introduction This paper deals with Sayyid Qutb‟s approaches in Zilal and how they resulted in conflicting opinions between the author and other Mufassirun on certain issues mentioned in the Qur‟an. Qutb‟s interpretation of the Qur‟an began with the conviction that the Qur‟an was the true guidance for all human beings and thus the only valid source to direct their affairs. This belief emerged only after his progress through several stages of his career coupled with the strong influence of the current environment surrounding the Egyptian society of his time.
    [Show full text]
  • Leveraging the Taliban's Quest for International Recognition
    Leveraging the Taliban’s Quest for International Recognition Afghan Peace Process Issues Paper March 2021 By Barnett R. Rubin Summary: As the United States tries to orchestrate a political settlement in conjunction with its eventual military withdrawal from Afghanistan, it has overestimated the role of military pressure or presence and underestimated the leverage that the Taliban’s quest for sanctions relief, recognition and international assistance provides. As the U.S. government decides on how and when to withdraw its troops, it and other international powers retain control over some of the Taliban’s main objectives — the removal of both bilateral and United Nations Security Council sanctions and, eventually, recognition of and assistance to an Afghan government that includes the Taliban. Making the most of this leverage will require coordination with the Security Council and with Afghanistan’s key neighbors, including Security Council members China, Russia and India, as well as Pakistan and Iran. In April 2017, in a meeting with an interagency team on board a military aircraft en route to Afghanistan, U.S. President Donald J. Trump’s new national security advisor, retired Army Lt. Gen. H.R. McMaster, dismissed the ongoing effort to negotiate a settlement with the Taliban: “The first step, the national security adviser said, was to turn around the trajectory of the conflict. The United States had to stop the Taliban’s advance on the battlefield and force them to agree to concessions in the process .... US talks with the Taliban would only succeed when the United States returned to a position of strength on the battlefield and was ‘winning’ against the insurgency.”1 1 Donati, Jessica.
    [Show full text]