UNCLASSIFIED
Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review ofthe Detention ofEnemy Combatantsat US NavalBase GuantanamoBay, Cuba
8 June 2006
TO : GUL , CHAMAN
SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIEDSUMMARYOFEVIDENCEFOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEWBOARDINTHECASEOFGUL, CHAMAN
1. An Administrative Review Boardwill be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary .
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to : ( 1) release you to your home state ; ( 2 ) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention :
a . Commitment
1. Whenthe detaineewas a teenager, the RussiansinvadedAfghanistan, destroyedhis village, andforcedhimto flee to Pakistan, wherehe livedina refugeecamp. Whilelivingin the camp, hejoined an Islamicparty.
2. While the detaineewas inthe camp, the son of the leaderofthe Islamic party came to recruitmento fight the Russians. The detaineetraveledto Afghanistanandlearnedto shoot a five - roundbolt-actionrifle. After training, the detainee went intoHazra, Afghanistan, for one or two monthsat a time to fight.
3. Three groupsexistedduringthis time: the HarakatInqlab, the NejatMeli, and the MahazMeli. Together these groups formedthe ItihadSaygana. The detaineebelongedto the Mahaz Melibut occasionallyhelpedthe HarakatInqlab.
4. For the first few years of the fighting, the detainee was a simple soldier, but after a few years, he became a commanderof about fifteen fighters.
5. The detaineeclaims that his involvementwith the Hezb - E -IslamiGulbuddinstartedin mid- 1990 to early 1991. Hejoined the Hezb - E -IslamiGulbuddinfor six monthsas a commander. Duringthis periodthe Hezb - E - Islami Gulbuddinwas fighting the Northern Alliance.
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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIEDSUMMARYOF EVIDENCEFORADMINISTRATIVE REVIEWBOARDINTHE CASEOF GUL, CHAMAN
6. Hezb - E IslamiGulbuddinhas staged small attacks inits attempt to force United States troops to withdraw from Afghanistan, overthrow the AfghanTransitional Administration, and establisha fundamentaliststate.
7. The detainee was accepted into the Northern Alliance and instructed to remain in the Hezb - E - Islami Gulbuddin in order to report on their activities, movements , and operations.
8. The Hezb - E IslamiGulbuddinhadthree ofits members, the detaineeand two others, workingas intelligencecollectors. They were operatinginKabuland collectinginformation about the Afghangovernmentandpossibly United States forces. They usedvehicles withKabul Police Departmentlicenseplates for traveling.
9. The KabulChiefof Policehas strong ties withweapons and drug smugglingactivities. The detaineewas also a majorplayerintheseoperations.
10. The detaineeand two other Hezb - E - IslamiGulbuddinmembers were allwell-known associates that were heavily involved inthe drug trade and other illegal activity. One ofthese menis responsiblefor over 1,000murders as a Hezb- E - Islami Gulbuddinleader.
11. The detainee was a Hezb - E Islami Gulbuddin field general.
12. The detainee worked as an intelligenceinformant for the Afghanistan Information Ministry. He was offered a job collecting informationdue to hispersonalrelationshipswith Hezb - IslamiGulbuddin and Talibancommanders.
13. While employedwith the AfghanInformationMinistry, the detaineewas tasked with collecting informationabout Hezb - IslamiGulbuddincommanders invarious Afghandistricts. He receivedhis intelligence collectiontasks from a deputy ofthe AfghanInformationMinistry.
14. The detaineecommandeda unitofapproximately40 soldiersandheld the rankof brigadegeneralduringa three-monthcampaignfoughtagainstTaliban/ al Qaidaforces in Afghanistanduring the spring of 2002.
15. Al Qaida Hezb- Gulbuddin, and the Taliban held a meeting inPesh war, Pakistan during February 2003 to discuss future plans on how the three groups could regain power in Afghanistan. During the meeting, many anti-United States and anti-Karzai conversations took place.
16. The detainee was present at a meetingbetweenmembers ofal Qaida, the Taliban , and the Hezb - Islami Gulbuddinin Pesh war, Pakistan.
17. Dyncorp hiredthe detainee and his men to guard shipments of equipment between Herat, Afghanistan and Kabul, Afghanistan.
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SUBJECT : UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FORADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF GUL, CHAMAN
18. Site # 1 was the housing and office compound for the Karzai ProtectionDetail. Site #3 was the Afghanistan communications center.
19. The detaineeintendedto place a bomb at Site# 1 or Site#3 during the grandopening ceremonyfor the radio networkstationat CampSerenity. The maintargetfor this attackwas PresidentKarzai, the UnitedStatesambassadorto Afghanistan, and otherhigh-rankingAfghani officials.
20. On 16 February 2003 , an important Hezb - E Islami Gulbuddin member gave explosives and instructions for their use to the detainee and another Hezb - E Islami Gulbuddin member . The two planned to organize attacks on vehicles used by foreigners on the road from Kabul, Afghanistan , to Jalalabad , Afghanistan .
21. The detaineewas capturedon 10April2003.
b . Connections/ Associations
1. Hizb- IslamiGulbuddinwas foundedas a factionof the Hizb- Islamiparty in 1977. Hizb- IslamiGulbuddinhas long-establishedties with Usama binLaden. Inthe early 1990s Hizb- IslamiGulbuddin'sfounder ran severalterrorist trainingcamps in Afghanistan. He offeredto shelter UsamabinLadenafter the latterfled Sudanin 1996.
2. The Hezb - E IslamiGulbuddinfounder traveledto Iraqto meet with SaddamHussein. The two discussedissuesinvolving the planning ofHezb - E IslamiGulbuddinattacks against UnitedStates forces inAfghanistanand abroad.
3. The detainee was a personal friend of Hezb - E Islami Gulbuddin's founder.
4. The detaineeandthe Hezb- E IslamiGulbuddinfounder's friendship endedwhen the latterbecame Vice PresidentofAfghanistanandrefusedto allow the detainee to becomethe governorofLowgar Province, Afghanistan. As a resultthe detainee statedthat he secretlyjoined forces with the Alliancewhile stillmaintainingmembershipwithinthe Hezb- e Islami Gulbuddin.
5. The detainee was the assistant to the direct subordinate ofHezb Islami Gulbuddin's founder . The Afghan Minister of Defense indirectly gave money to the detainee in exchange for information on the Hezb Gulbuddin's founder . The direct subordinate of Hezb I Islami Gulbuddin's founder was not aware that the detainee was betraying the Hezb I Islami Gulbuddin .
6. The field commander for al Qaida terrorists located in Muzaffarabad (original document spelling: Mazaferabad ), Pakistan personally showed the detainee bombs devised by al Qaida terrorists that use a white powdered explosive packed into Pepsi cans. The detainee visited the field commander on numerous occasions .
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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF GUL , CHAMAN
7. Hezb - E Islami Gulbuddin and al Qaida were responsible for a suicide car bomb attack in Kabul, Afghanistan on 7 June 2003 against the United States Embassy, International Security Assistance Forces, the United Nations headquarters, and a shopping area used heavily by foreigners. The leader of the group involved was a Hezb - E Islami Gulbuddin commander.
8. This Hezb- E IslamiGulbuddincommanderwas the detainee'sassistant.
4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
a. The detainee stated that the Taliban and the Hizb - E IslamiGulbuddinfounder were his sworn enemies.
b . The detainee stated that he liked the United States and he fully supported the United States and Karzai government in Afghanistan .
. The detainee stated that hedidnot andwould nothelpthe Hezb- E - IslamiGulbuddin.
d . The detaineestatedthat the UnitedStates was the reasonwhy hemovedbackto Afghanistanafter20 years andhehopes the UnitedStates stays longenoughto stop the tribal
wars.
5. You willbeaffordeda meaningfulopportunitytobeheardandto present informationto the Board; this includesanopportunityto be physicallypresentat the proceeding. The Assisting MilitaryOfficer( AMO ) willassistyou inreviewingallrelevantand reasonablyavailable unclassifiedinformationregardingyour case. The AMOisnotan advocateforor against continueddetention, normaythe AMO forma confidentialrelationshipwithyouor represent youinany othermatter.
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