The Case of Ahmad Shah Massoud Casey G. Johnson

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The Case of Ahmad Shah Massoud Casey G. Johnson The Fletcher School Online Journal for issues related to Southwest Asia and Islamic Civilization Fall 2007 Charisma in Modern Islamic Revolutionary Movements: The Case of Ahmad Shah Massoud Casey G. Johnson Introduction: Thinking Outside The Chat Room interesting as biography, but of little value as a Security Studies is inundated with criterion upon which foreign policy decisions scholarship devoted to highlighting the ways in could be based. which technology (particularly the internet) is From an analysis standpoint, the vital defining terrorist organizations, militias, question is not only how do we identify a 1 revolutionary movements,and criminal networks. charismatic leader and their followers? But how Still, much as technology has altered our (and for what) do we use this information? This perspective of daily life, there is a danger of article begins by broadly re‐evaluating the becoming too narrowly focused on technology as modern typology of charismatic revolutionaries. a means of explaining emerging and evolving Next it examines charismatic leadership within an revolutionary movements. and not enough focus historical Islamic context. Finally, it explores on the charismatic leaders that continue to charisma in the context of Afghan society and, motivate, define, and drive revolutionary particularly, the case of mujahideen leader Ahmad movements It is far from certainthat the Internet Shah Massoud during the Soviet occupation and has deposed the charismatic leader of his or her Taliban take over of Afghanistan. These central role in rallying, organizing, and spurring sociological, religious and cultural layers provide revolutionary movements. Indeed, for every a definite context in which to ground the virtual cell and skillfully produced martyrdom amorphous idea of charismatic leadership, with video, there is a Moqtada al Sadr or a Sheik the overarching goal to differentiate the adroit Hassan Nassrallah. propagandist from the true charismatic. However, Despite the centrality of charismatic leaders identifying charismatic leaders alone is of limited today, and throughout history, attempts to utility. The real challenge—and the real foreign analyze the attributes of these leaders, and then to policy tool—is to identify not only which evaluate them empirically have been at dismissed generals, ideologues and revolutionaries possess as inherently subjective. Charismatic leadership is charisma, but which of these leaders are capable of transitioning from the role of an inspiring Casey Johnson, Fletcher MALD 2008, has worked as revolutionary to the role of a leader within an freelance reporter/photographer in Afghanistan, and established political system.? If we can identify as a correspondent for the United Nation’s news and which leaders possess the characteristics and analysis network, IRIN News, in the self‐declared abilities to make the transition from the battlefield Republic of Somaliland. to the statehouse without losing their charismatic hold upon the populace, then we may begin to © The Fletcher School – Al Nakhlah – Tufts University 160 Packard Avenue – Medford, MA 02155-7082 USA – Tel: +1.617.627.3700 2 Al Nakhlah understand with whom we should engage in and apply Weber’s theory to leaders as diverse as 6 dialogue, and what their triggers, needs and Gandhi, Hitler, Lenin, and Mandela. Others reject constraints are. the applicability of an inherently religious concept to a secular system, and denounce the way in Charisma Defined which the theory’s value‐free framework claims to The modern term ‘charisma’ is derived from compare the charisma of men like Gandhi and 7 the Greek, kharizesthai, translating literally as Hitler objectively. 2 “divine favor.” In ancient Greece the person In a speech on leadership in the twentieth possessing charisma was considered to be in good century, historian Arthur Schlesinger was blunt in favor with the gods. Charisma was not something his criticism of charisma as an analytic tool. “Most that could be won with hard work or the contemporary usage of the word charismatic is accumulation of knowledge, but was instead metaphorical,” Schlesinger said. “[T]he word has bestowed supernaturally upon the individual. In become a chic synonym for heroic or even just for 8 return for this gift of grace, the individual became popular.” Schlesinger was right to deride the a direct conduit for the divine messages of the modern metaphorical drift of the term charisma. 3 gods. In many cases it has become a handy epithet Not surprisingly the belief that a bestowed upon romantically conceived supernatural leader would arise and inspire a revolutionaries by fawning journalists. Moreover, devoted following based upon preternatural charisma in the modern Islamic context is ability and divine gifts seemed subjective and increasingly exploited only after the death of the inapplicable to questions of social science, much leader in what appears to be an attempt to furnish less the study of warfare and living evidence of the modern revolutionary leaders. Indeed, the Ahmad Shah deceased’s martyrdom status. And so for two millennia Massoud leveling a steely, Indeed, the Ahmad Shah charisma—more as a belief than a Guevara-esque gaze from Massoud leveling a steely, theory—remained rooted in its two-story posters in Guevara‐esque gaze from religio‐mystic origins. In the early two‐story posters in 20th century, however, German downtown Kabul is the downtown Kabul is the result sociologist Max Weber attempted result of an Afghan of an Afghan government to transfer the theory of government desperately desperately seeking both a charismatic leadership from the seeking both a national national hero and a symbolic purely religious realm of hero and a symbolic rallying point in a period of prophets, seers, and mystics to the rallying point in a period of change and uncertainty. socio‐political world of However, by the time of his revolutionaries, demagogues, and change and uncertainty. death at the hands of two 4 civil rights leaders. According to Algerian suicide bombers Weber, a person possessing charisma has “a carrying stolen Belgian passports and posing as certain quality […] by virtue of which s/he is set journalists, Massoud was indeed the very figure apart from ordinary people and treated as around whom Afghans and the international endowed with supernatural, superhuman, or at community rallied in their effort to defeat the 9 least specifically exceptional powers or Taliban. 5 qualities.” Though still subjective in nature, An ethnic Tajik, Massoud earned the nom de charisma was, for Weber, a legitimate way in guerre The Lion of Panjshir after his successful which leaders obtained, consolidated, and defense of the Panjshir Valley (his birthplace and maintained authority. the home of Afghanistan’s Tajik community) from Throughout the 20th century, scholars the Soviet and Taliban campaigns. Massoud had debated the validity of Weber’s theory of become so vital to the resistance that the Afghan charismatic leadership. Dekmejian and United Front initiated a disinformation campaign Wyzsomirski, Spencer, and Schweitzer, interpret to prevent confirmation of his death until a week © The Fletcher School – Al Nakhlah – Tufts University Fall 2007 3 10 later. In less than a week, however, the events of documentaries, or even first‐hand, scholarly field September 11, 2001 would transform the Afghan research of the leaders themselves, we cannot United Front. This coalition of militias went from help but view the leader through a tinted lens. a cornered and increasingly desperate resistance, Simply, it is in the mind of the follower that a to the entry point for the United States’ bid to oust charismatic leader emerges and it is from these the Taliban and capture or kill Al Qaeda leader followers that the charismatic derives his and suspected 9/11 mastermind, Osama bin authority. Indeed, the central tenet of charisma is Laden. the effectual relationship between the leader and The nature of the attack on Massoud—a his followers. If we are asking, who is a suicide mission carried out with a bomb charismatic leader? One answer may simply be to concealed in a video camera—and the fact that it find the leader towards whom the sentiments of 14 was carried out just two days before the 9/11 awe and enthusiasm are directed. Dekmejian terrorist attacks, fueled allegations that the two and Wyszomirski offered the same starting point 11 events were directly linked. If this is the case, in their charismatic assessment of the Madhi of then bin Laden, it could be argued, recognized Sudan: Massoud as the lynchpin of the resistance and as a key U.S. ally in the event of American retaliation The ultimate judgment of the leader’s 12 on Taliban and Al Qaeda targets. The Central “goodness” or “badness” or “genuiness” Intelligence Agency (CIA) had also identified or “spuriousness” lies solely with his Massoud as an indispensable leader of the followers. The opinions of “outsiders” or mujahideen resistance to the Taliban. Though “noncommunicants” who have not both bin Laden and the CIA understood the succumbed to the leader’s charisma are centrality and charismatic power of Massoud’s irrelevant. Whatever the leader’s personal unquestioned leadership, it can easily be qualities or morality, the fact remains that conjectured that bin Laden may have acted on this these were acceptable to his followers and understanding in making the strategic decision to proved instrumental in convincing them 15 eliminate him. The CIA was forced to settle for of the truth of his message. whatever leader remained. After Massoud’s death, the battle‐hardened These Followers are essentially incapable of general, Mohammed Fahim stepped in to achieving order on their own, and their lack order continue the fight with the U.S. to push the is never more apparent or urgent than in times of Taliban back into the tribal areas along the crisis or upheaval. Thus they are awed by the Afghanistan‐Pakistan border. Even the most leader’s intellect and ability to put forward a brilliant commander, however, would not be able coherent vision of the (often incomprehensible) 16 to fill the void left by Massoud’s death.
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