Verfassung Und Recht in Übersee (VRÜ) 42 (2009)

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C[diY^[dh[Y^j[Wajk[bb Verfassung und Recht in Übersee H[]_edWb[hC[diY^[dh[Y^jiiY^kjp VRÜ Å:eakc[dj[iWcj;_d\^hkd][dÅ Law and politics in Africa | Asia | Latin America J[_bXWdZ?%'!J[_bXWdZ?%( >[hWki][][X[dled e$Kd_l$#Fhe\$:::h$MWbZ[cWh>kcc[hkdZ e$Kd_l$#Fhe\$:h$Meb\hWcAWhb"BB$C$9WdjWX$ (&&/"(8dZ["'$(,-I$"XheiY^$"',."ÅÐ" ?I8D/-.#)#.)(/#*''-#. ;_dp[bXdZ[0 Herausgegeben von Aus dem Inhalt: 8WdZ?07bb][c[_d[hIY^kjpX[h[_Y^ Brun-Otto Bryde Abhandlungen J[_bXWdZ?%'0;khefW (&&/",+/I$"XheiY^$"/."ÅÐ" Philip Kunig Charles Majinge ?I8D/-.#)#.)(/#')&,#/ Karl-Andreas Hernekamp The International Criminal Court and the 8WdZ?07bb][c[_d[hIY^kjpX[h[_Y^ question of alternative justice system in Africa: a case of be careful of what you wish for? J[_bXWdZ?%(7c[h_aWÅ7\h_aWÅ?ibWc_iY^# durch die 7hWX_iY^[hHWkcÅ7i_Wj_iY^#FWp_ÓiY^[hHWkc Hamburger Gesellschaft Oliver C. Ruppel (&&/",&.I$"XheiY^$"/."ÅÐ" The Southern African Development Community ?I8D/-.#)#.)(/#')&-#, für Völkerrecht und (SADC) and its Tribunal: Reflexions on a Regional Auswärtige Politik e. V. Economic Communities‘ Potential Impact C_jZ_[i[haecc[dj_[hj[dJ[njiWccbkd]b_[]j[hijcWbi[_d[kc\Wii[dZ[:eakc[djWj_edZ[h of Human Rights Protection ]hkdZb[][dZ[dh[]_edWb[dC[diY^[dh[Y^jiiY^kjpaedl[dj_ed[d[_diY^b_[b_Y^Z[h`[m[_b_][d Eva Diehl L[h\W^h[dih[][bdleh$8WdZ?Å7bb][c[_d[hIY^kjpX[h[_Y^Å[dj^bj_d(J[_bXdZ[dicjb_Y^[ Can paralegals enhance access to justice? 7Xaecc[d"Z_[i_Y^c_jZ[cWbb][c[_d[dC[diY^[dh[Y^jiiY^kjpX[\Wii[d$ The example of Morogoro Paralegal Centre :[hJ[_bXWdZ?%'l[h[_djWbb[c[diY^[dh[Y^jih[b[lWdj[d:eakc[dj[WkiZ[c[khef_iY^[dHWkc$ in Tanzania :[hJ[_bXWdZ?%(kc\WiijC[diY^[dh[Y^jiiY^kjp_dijhkc[dj["Z_[_dDehZ#kdZIZWc[h_aW"_d 7\h_aWiem_[_cWhWX_iY^#_ibWc_iY^[dkdZWi_Wj_iY^#fWp_ÓiY^[dHWkcWki][X_bZ[jmkhZ[d$ Isiaka Alani Badmus :[h_dWXi[^XWh[hP[_j[hiY^[_d[dZ[8WdZ??ÅIf[p_[bb[IY^kjpX[h[_Y^[Åm_hZWbb[C[diY^[dh[Y^ji# Under Reconstruction: Ethnicity, Ethnic WXaecc[d[dj^Wbj[d"Z_[i_Y^X[iedZ[h[dIY^kjpeX`[aj[dm_[p$8$Z[cIY^kjpled[hWki][X[hi_dZdWc^W\j[Lba[hh[Y^ji[nf[hj[d$ in der südafrikanischen Verfassung? ISSN 0506-7286 VRÜ 2 8_jj[X[ij[bb[dI_[_c8kY^^WdZ[beZ[hl[hiWdZaeij[d\h[_kdj[h mmm$decei#i^ef$Z[ 09 www.verfassung-und-recht.de 2009 42. Jahrgang 2 Seite 145 – 314

BegründetVRÜ von Prof. Dr. Herbert Krüger (†) Herausgegeben von Prof. Dr. Brun-Otto Bryde, Justus-Liebig-Universität Gießen, Prof. Dr. Philip Kunig, Freie Universität Berlin, Dr. Karl-Andreas Hernekamp, Universität Hamburg im Institut für Internationale Angelegenheiten der Universität Hamburg durch die Hamburger Gesellschaft für Völkerrecht und Auswärtige Politik e.V. in Verbindung mit den Regional-Instituten des German Institute of Global and Aerea- Studies – GIGA – (Institut für Afrika-Studien, Institut für Asien-Studien, Institut für Latein amerika-Studien, Institut für Nahost-Studien), alle Hamburg Beirat: Prof. Dr. Costa R. Mahalu, Rom/Dar es Salaam, Prof. Dr. Peter Malanczuk, Hong- kong, Prof. Dr. Albrecht v. Gleich, Hamburg, sowie die Leitungen der beteiligten Hamburger Regionalinstitute des GIGA Schriftleitung: Dr. Karl-Andreas Hernekamp, E-mail: [email protected]

Inhalt

Abstracts ...... 147

Abhandlungen / Articles Charles Majinge The International Criminal Court and the question of alternative justice system in Africa: a case of be careful of what you wish for? �� .151

Oliver C. Ruppel The Southern African Development Community (SADC) and its Tribunal: Reflexions on a Regional Economic Communities‘ Potential Impact of Human Rights Protection �� 173

Eva Diehl Can paralegals enhance access to justice? The example of Morogoro Paralegal Centre in Tanzania�� 187

Isiaka Alani Badmus Under Reconstruction: Ethnicity, Ethnic Nationalism, and the Future of the Nigerian State �� 212

Jörg Kemmerzell Demokratische Transformation und Parteiverbote: Warum gibt es kein Parteiverbot in der südafrikanischen Verfassung? �� 240 Berichte / Reports Cornelia Glinz The High Court of Namibia: Günther Kessl v Ministry of Lands and Resettlement and 2 others. Case No. 27/2006 and 266/2006 – A test case for the Namibian land reform programme�� 263

Eva Diehl / Chadidscha Schuhmann Report on the conference „Regional Integration in Africa“, Gießen, Nov. 7 – 9, 2008�� 275

Buchbesprechungen / Book Reviews Ioannis N. Androulakis Die Globalisierung der Korruptionsbekämpfung (S. Wolf) �� 284

Obiora Chinedu Okafor The African Human Rights System. Activist Forces and International Institutions (A. Babington-Ashaye)�� 289

Blessings Chinsinga Democracy, Decentralisation and Poverty Reduction in Malawi (H. Meinhardt) �� 292

Antje Du Bois-Pedain Transitional Amnesty in South Africa (H. O. Yusuf) �� 295

Nico Horn / Anton Bösl (Eds.) The Independence of the Judiciary in Namibia (H. Thiedemann)�� 298

Wilhelm Röhl (Ed.) History of Law in Japan since 1868 (Ph. Kunig) �� 302

Bibliographie / Bibliography �� 305

ERRATUM In our volume 2009-1 on page 106 the correct information about the authors has to read as follows:

* Mauricio Foeth, Licenciado en Derecho (Mexico) and German lawyer (Hamburg), is an associate at Curtis, Mallet-Prevost, Colt and Mosle, S.C. in Mexico City. Dr. Javier Quijano Baz is name partner of Quijano Cortina y de la Torre, S.C. in Mexico-City.

147

ABSTRACTS

The International Criminal Court and the question of alternative justice system in Africa: a case of be careful of what you wish for?

By Charles Majinge, Dar-Es-Salaam / Heidelberg This article attempts to analyze the role of the international criminal court in prosecuting serious crimes in Africa vis a vis the whole concept of alternative justice or complementarity principle as enshrined in the Rome Statute. In this article it is argued that for Africa to move forward and realize its development potential then the work of the international criminal court will be critical in the fight against impunity to consolidate rule of law and democracy. It is further argued that the court should be cautious when determining whether alternative justice system used by countries to address past crimes meet the standards of justice espoused by the Rome Statute because countries have different understanding of justice as such it may create conflict between countries whose support the court cannot succeed without. It is argued that alternative justice mechanisms which do not condone impunity for crimes within the jurisdiction of the court should be accepted as long as the aim is to further justice and reconciliation. It is further argued that the court must balance between the legitimate desire of countries to achieve peace and justice after conflict through their domestic means with the international legal duty of countries especially parties to the Rome Statute to genuinely prosecute international crimes falling in the domain of the court. The success of the court will partly depend on how successful it manages to form and sustain strong partnership with important organizations like African Union, IGAD or SADC among others not only for these organizations to take proactive steps to encourage member states to address violations of serious crimes within their countries but also to garner their support in enforcing the court’s decisions. Further, the court should support domestic justice mechanisms by offering assistance to the national institutions such as judiciary and national human rights commissions in areas such as investigation techniques, ant impunity strategies, collection and storage of evidence and general knowledge sharing. This partnership can in a long term enhance the capability of these institutions to address serious crimes at a national level and in the process fostering peace and justice without involvement of ICC. Lastly, the article emphasizes the need of the state parties to take their obligations and commitments seriously by affording the court assistance it may need to fulfill its mandate and also avoiding signing peace agreements which they well know to be inconsistent with their obligations to the Rome Statute.

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The Southern African Development Community (SADC) and its Tribunal: Reflexions on a Regional Economic Communities’ Potential Impact on Human Rights Protection?

By Oliver C. Ruppel, Windhoek Human-rights-related matters play a vital role within Regional Economic Communities. The Southern African Development Community (SADC) is such a Regional Economic Community counting a total population of more than 245 million with 15 states among its members, namely Angola, Botswana, the DRC, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, the Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. At first glance it might appear that the promotion and protection of human rights are not SADC top priority as an organisation that furthers socio-economic cooperation and integration as well as political and security cooperation. However, the protection of human rights is essential for economic development as it has an impact on the investment climate, which in turn contributes to growth, productivity and employment creation, all being essential for sustainable reductions in poverty. A wide range of provisions and objectives within the SADC legal system offer human rights protection inter alia in the SADC Treaty and the various SADC Protocols. The SADC Tribunal is the regional judicial institution within SADC. It was established to protect the interests and rights of SADC member states and their citizens, and to develop community jurisprudence, also with regard to applicable treaties, general principles, and rules of public international law. Although the primary aim of the Tribunal was to resolve disputes arising from closer economic and political union, rather than human rights, a recent judgement by the Tribunal and some of the pending cases demonstrate that the Tribunal can also be called upon to consider human rights implications of economic policies and programmes.

Can paralegals enhance access to justice? The example of Morogoro Paralegal Centre in Tanzania

By Eva Diehl, Berlin This contribution analyses paralegal activities in Tanzania in the context of ongoing legal reforms aimed at improving access to justice. Paralegals are lay legal advisors trained by non-governmental organisations to engage in legal aid and legal education activities, with the aim of raising awareness about certain national laws as well as international human rights. Proponents of paralegals argue that their voluntary services do not only have advantages in terms of financial and geographical accessibility, but that paralegals can also practise forms of alternative dispute resolution which are culturally more accepted by the population than the procedures in court. Paralegals in Tanzania operate in a legally plural context where different conceptions of justice are at play. The present analysis is focused on a paralegal centre in Morogoro, which is shown to fulfil various functions: it facilitates

Abstracts 149

mediated settlements outside the courts, it accompanies and counsels clients in court cases, and it acts as a switch-point delegating clients to other institutions in a network of forums with partly overlapping jurisdictions. It is concluded that while paralegals are able to make some contributions towards improved access to justice in small cases and family disputes within and outside the courts, they are little powerful in the face of abounding corruption or cases involving powerful officials.

Under Reconstruction: Ethnicity, Ethnic Nationalism, and the Future of the Nigerian State

By Isiaka Alani Badmus, Lagos This article, using a diachronic approach, advances the argument that a genuine national cohesion and the future of the Nigerian state cannot be fully guaranteed in the clear absence of addressing the inherent structural defects of the country’s malfunctioning federalism. The Nigerian post-colony is, presently, confronted by the challenges pose by ethnicity/ ethnic nationalism with negative consequences of political ethnicity, ethnic conflicts, etc. It is argued that the entrenchment of plural democracy has the capacity to address the lopsided policies of the central state that are at the peril of the weak federating states and most importantly, the oil-bearing ethnic minorities of Nigeria’s Niger Delta. In addendum, the article argues and demonstrates that democracy in the real sense of has the potency of democratising the Nigerian nation-state; strengthening of mediatory and regulatory institutions; promoting intra-and inter- ethnic relations; etc. The agitations and activities of the oil-bearing ethnicities and various ethnic social movements of the Nigeria’s Fourth Repub- lic for autonomy and social justice were used to buttress this article’s basic augments and concludes with the government’s efforts in addressing Africa’s most popular country’s multilayered ethnic problems.

Transition to democracy and party bans, or: Why is there no party ban provision in the South African constitution?

By Jörg Kemmerzell, Darmstadt The introduction or re-introduction of multi party systems in Sub-Saharan Africa between 1989 and 1994 has been widely accompanied by the fear, that the new institutional order might promote or award the politicisation of particularistic identities. This might be one reason for the heavy de jure and de facto restrictions of the activities of political parties in many African countries. At least 40 of 48 states in the region provide for the legal possibility of party bans. South Africa remains one of the few African countries that abstained from the adoption of party ban provisions. This seems remarkable not only because of the countries history of violent ethnic conflict, but also of the Apartheid system representing a

150 Verfassung und Recht in Übersee (VRÜ) 42 (2009)

background as a historical and ubiquitous denounced unjust regime. I will give first a short introduction into the concept of party ban (section B). In section C possible reasons and justifications in favour of a restrictive regulation of party politics will be discussed, highlighting the course of South Africa’s transition to democracy (1990-1994). Section D puts the crucial legal norms in the body of South African constitutional and public law under investigation. After that I will develop and examine three hypotheses, which help to explain the abandonment of legal provisions for party bans in South Africa. The hypotheses refer first to the specific historical experience with bans on political organisations during Apart- heid rule, secondly the coordinated transition to democracy, promoting the value of inclu- siveness as one of its central pillars, and thirdly the commensurability of measures restrict- ing political liberties against a background of threats to the developing democratic order. This main section is based partially on interviews with experts on South African politics and constitutional law. The article concludes with an explanation of the issue, which exhibits motives from the literature on democratic transition, and a tentative comparative forecast.

151

ABHANDLUNGEN / ARTICLES

The International Criminal Court and the question of alternative justice system in Africa: a case of be careful of what you wish for?

By Charles Majinge, Dar-Es-Salaam / Heidelberg*

I. Introduction

Since the signing of the Rome Statute which created the International Criminal Court in 1998, the paradigm of international criminal justice has changed drastically. For the first time in history a permanent court was created to punish those who bear greatest responsibility for serious crimes against mankind such as war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. This unprecedented commitment by the international community to allow scru- tiny of its member’s actions by an independent international institution did not come without a price. Rather it stemmed from the horrors of the Second World War, relative success of the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials, aspirations for democratization and the new language of a human rights culture which constantly called for accountability by way of criminal prosecution of those who ordered and committed serious violation of human rights and humanitarian law1. Devastating conflicts like the Balkan crisis of early 1990s and the now permanent scar on the conscious of mankind emanating from the 1994 Rwanda Genocide which claimed close to a million lives and left thousands as refugees2 emboldened this quest to have a permanent avenue to punish those who bear responsibility for such horrific crimes. With clear intent and resolve to confront the checkered past the decision and commitment of the members of the international community to have Permanent International Criminal Court was bold and incisive3.

* Charles Majinge, LL.B., LLM., Senior Research Fellow Max-Planck-Institute for Public Interna- tional Law, Heidelberg, Germany. E-mail: [email protected] 1 Leila Nadya Sadat, The effect of amnesties before domestic and international tribunals: Morality, law and politics, in: Hughes/Thakur/Schabas (eds), Atrocities and International Accountability; Beyond Transitional Justice, 2007, 225-245, See also William A. Schabas, An Introduction to the International Criminal Court, Cambridge University Press, 3rd Ed. 2007. 2 To date exact number of those who perished in the Genocide has not been accurately established. But the government of Rwanda in its published report “Denombrement des Victimes du Geno- cide” estimates the number to be close to one million people. See final report published by the Ministry of Local Administration, Information and Social Affairs (2002), Kigali-Rwanda. 3 The preamble of the Rome Statute acknowledges this fact.

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To create the permanent International Criminal Court, though a novel and timely idea, was not an easy undertaking. Some states were against the idea of global international criminal court simply because it touched the nerve of the nation’s existence-sovereignty4. Mandating anybody accused of heinous crimes like genocide or war crimes irrespective of his or her position in the hierarchy of the nation to be tried by the court whose composition was of international character was rather a serious commitment which countries had to weigh strategically and carefully. It’s no wonder then that some powerful states are yet to join this unique institution while others have clearly shown hostility to its existence.5 It is partly because of the failure of some powerful countries to join the court that the argument for alternative justice has gained momentum. United States for example has increasingly argued that countries should be encouraged to pursue justice at home rather than abdicating responsibility to an international body. And where domestic legal institutions are lacking, but domestic will is present, the international community must be prepared to assist in creating the capacity to address the violations. The support may include political, financial, legal and logistical support. In case domestic will is non existent, the international community can intervene through the UN Security Council, consistent with the UN Charter such as establishing temporary tribunals and hybrid courts consisting international participants and the affected states participants6. The idea behind this suggestion seems to be that domestic trials will allow countries to address their past in accordance with their own laws while enhancing their capability of justice delivery. In this article it is argued that continued establishment of other international criminal tribunals to try crimes

4 See Lee A. Casey, The case against International Criminal Court, in: Fordham International Law Journal 25 (2005), Giovanni Conso, The basic reasons for the US hostility to the ICC in light of the negotiating history of the Rome Statute, Journal of the International Criminal Justice 3, (2005) 2, p. 314-322 5 For this discussion see J. Mayersfeld, “Who shall be judge? The United States, the International Criminal Court, and the Global Enforcement of Human Rights” Human Rights Quarterly 25 (2003), 91-129. Russia, China, India has yet to join the court. The United States withdrew its signature to the Rome Statute and categorically rejected the mandate of the court and has gone a step further to openly undermine the court by signing Bilateral Immunity Agreements with some state parties to the Rome Statute. The agreements purport to shield US personnel who may be accused of serious crimes in the jurisdiction of the ICC. US argues that establishing ad hoc tribunals will in the long run strengthen capabilities of some of these countries emerging from conflicts to address their own problems by building on the infrastructures left behind by these international tribunals at the end of their mandate, rather than have an international court situated far away from countries where crimes were committed. 6 See Lincoln P. Bloomfield, Jr., US Assistant Secretary for Political-Military Affairs remarks to the Parliamentarians for Global Action, Consultative Assembly of Parliamentarians for the Interna- tional Criminal Court and the Rule of Law, United Nations, New York, September 12, 2003 available at http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/rm/24137.htm. See also US position on ICC as explained by the US ambassador at large for War Crimes Issues Pierre-Richard Prosper in 2005: US pushes for African Court to Try Darfur War Crimes available at http://www.voanews.com/english/ archive/2005-03/2005-03-01-voa59.cfm. Last visit November 2008.

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already covered by the ICC will be counterproductive and will further marginalization and undermine the Court which was precisely set up to try such serious crimes. It is further argued that, international community would be expecting too much from countries emerging from conflicts or still in conflicts to prosecute crimes of such high magnitude on their own without international assistance. This is because such countries lack adequate facilities to conduct fair trials meeting international standards. Even when they have such institutions and laws still the authorities might not be willing to go after top officials accused of crimes within the jurisdiction of the court as already seen in Sudan7. The faulty with the Security Council initiative to address serious crimes by setting up temporary tribunals on ad hoc basis is that there are no predetermined criteria for establishing international tribunals or hybrid courts rather it depends on the willingness and interests of the Security Council members. It is because of the recognition that the court can not investigate and punish all perpetrators of crimes within its jurisdiction that it is argued in this paper that domestic mechanism of justice delivery should be strengthened and enhanced to ensure that alternative justice becomes a credible complement to the efforts of the international criminal court. This can be achieved by the court and the international community supporting domestic initiatives to punish mid level perpetrators while allowing the international criminal court to try those most responsible for serious crimes and who would otherwise not be tried in domestic courts because of the immunity they enjoy.

II. The Rome Statute and Alternative Justice System

The International Criminal Court was envisaged to be a court of last resort meant to intervene when and if the national judicial machinery has failed or is unwilling to punish the perpetrators of the serious crimes. It is not the court of first instance8. This is among the features which make ICC a “court of compromise”: its role is secondary while national courts have a primary obligation to try and punish the alleged criminals. The Preamble of the Rome Statute9 clearly states that the effective prosecution of crimes of international concern must be ensured by taking measures at the national level and by enhancing international cooperation while calling upon members to exercise their criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for commission of such crimes10. This notion is similar to the long-

7 For example Article 60 of the Sudanese National Interim Constitution grants immunity to the President and Vice President against any kind of legal proceedings while in office. Also article 31 and 33 of the National Security Forces Act of 1999 allows security personnel to detain people without judicial review while granting them immunity against prosecution for such actions. 8 For extensive discussion see Michael Scharf, The Case for Supporting the International Criminal Court in International Debate Series: should the United States ratify the treaty establishing the International Criminal Court? Vol. 1 (2002). 9 The Preamble of the Rome Statute of 17 July1998, U.N. Doc A/CONF. 183/9, 37 I.L.M, 1002, 2187, U.N.T.S 90. 10 Id.

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held principle in international law that a State should be given an opportunity to redress the alleged wrong within the framework of its own domestic legal system before its international responsibility can be called into question at the international level11. The requirement to exhaust local remedies reaffirms the notion of complementarity and subsidiarity between the international criminal justice and domestic justice system. Criminal prosecution in most cases is considered and regarded as an ideal mechanism of accountability for serious crimes, not only because it ensures accountability but also because it provides fair hearing chances to the victim and the accused and also because of the assumption that such process is premised and informed by internationally recognized principles of fair trial. But because of various reasons such as the need to complement the work of the prosecution machinery especially in countries emerging from conflicts with inadequate judicial capabilities or the need to involve the victims directly in the justice process, other means of punishment taking different forms ranging from reconciliation, commissions of inquiry, amnesties, lustration, reparations and civil sanctions and truth commissions may be adopted12. But these measures may not in all cases provide adequate punishment proportionate to the crimes in question, as such criminal accountability for serious crimes is still regarded as the better way to punish the perpetrators of serious crimes which is considered to enhance prospects for respect for human rights and human dignity especially after the period of conflict. Though in reality the mechanism of accountability that a society attempting to reckon with a legacy of mass atrocities ultimately opts for is determined by many factors13. This brings us to the question of the alternative justice system envisaged under article 17 of the Rome Statute which reaffirms complementarity nature of the court and gives primacy of jurisdiction on domestic trials. What constitutes the alternative justice system which the drafters of the Rome Statute had in mind? The Rome Statute was categorical that the court will be complementary to the national efforts of punishing the perpetrators of serious crimes14. The national courts and tribunals would consider and punish the crimes falling under the jurisdiction of the ICC using their own laws and statutes and the ICC would intervene only when there is reasonable ground to do so such as unwillingness or

11 See A.A Cancade Trindade, The Application of the Rule of Exhaustion of Local Remedies in International Law 1 (1983). 12 See Gerald Gahima, Alternatives to prosecution: The case of Rwanda, note 1, p. 159-181. 13 Jeremy Sarkin, The Tension between Justice and Reconciliation in Rwanda: Politics, Human Rights, Due Process and the Role of Gacaca in Dealing with the Genocide” Journal of African Law 45(2001), 143-172; see also Hildegard Lingnau, An alternative approach to justice – the Gacaca jurisdiction in Rwanda, Verfassung und Recht in Übersee (VRÜ) vol. 36 (2003), p. 582- 589. 14 Id supra note 13.

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inability by the state to punish the said crimes15. What if the mechanism at the national level do not meet the standards espoused by the Rome Statute itself? This is more true to most developing countries or countries emerging from conflicts whose abilities to conduct investigations and conduct trials for such massive and high profiled crimes like genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes still lack professional as well as infrastructural competency. The critical challenge facing the court is how to effectively exercise its jurisdiction over serious crimes without hindering or being seen to hinder peace initiatives undertaken to address the conflict. Article 17 of the Rome Statute recognizes the notion of alternative justice as long as it conforms to the internationally acceptable standards. For example as an alternative to criminal prosecution, state parties may grant amnesty or pardon for past crimes, but such amnesties (especially those covering war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide or rape) are not a bar to criminal prosecution in international criminal process as such the Court may declare such amnesties or pardon unlawful for the purpose of decision making16. Further there is a growing consensus on the unlawfulness of amnesties within the international community irrespective of the circumstances under which such amnesties may be awarded17. The United Nations has been at the fore to discourage and discard amnesties arguing that such undertaking indirectly promotes impunity18. Further the United Nations Commission of Human Rights issued Resolution to the effect that amnesties should not be given to those who violate international humanitarian law and human rights that constitutes serious crimes19. Indeed the United Nations has categorically refused to recognize the

15 Article 17 (1) (a) of the Rome Statute states that the court shall determine that a case is inadmis- sible where: The case is being investigated or prosecuted by a State which has jurisdiction over it, unless the State is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution. 16 The question of Amnesties by national authorities and its effect in international criminal prosecution was considered in the case of Prosecutor v Morris Kallon, Ebrima Kamara, Case No. SCSL- 2004-15-PT AND 2004-16-PT. 17 For example see the decision by ICTY, Prosecutor v Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T of December 1998, (1999) 39 ILM, paras 151-157 and Principle 7 of the Princeton Principles of Universal Jurisdiction provides: Amnesties are generally inconsistent with the obligation of states to provide accountability for serious crimes under international law including war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. Available at http://lapa.princeton.edu/hosteddocs/unive_jur.pdf. Last visit, September 2008. 18 For example article 6 of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon established under the auspices of the United Nations states that: An amnesty granted to any person for any crime falling within the jurisdiction of the Special Tribunal shall not be a bar to prosecution. 19 Resolutions adopted by the Human Rights Commission 2002/79 and 2005/81 on impunity by the UN Human Rights Commission. See also John Dugard, Is the Truth and Reconciliation Process compatible with International Law? An answered question, Azapo v President of Republic of South Africa, South Africa Journal of Human Rights 13, (1997), p. 258-268.

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efficacy of amnesties even when they were awarded for the sake of peace making efforts20 Arguments have been advanced to the effect that amnesties granted as part of the truth and reconciliation inquiry in which the recipient have been obliged to make full disclosure of his/her criminal culpability while proving that their acts were politically motivated ought to be accepted than those amnesties encompassing crimes outlawed by international practice such as genocide, war crimes or crimes against humanity21. Reading this paragraph it may be correctly argued that from the international stand point, there is a growing consensus that options for alternative justice which do not involve criminal prosecution for serious crimes are not acceptable internationally and as such can never be a hindrance for an effective international prosecution. In either way even the Rome Statute do not provide much help as to how the Court should address the question of amnesty which leaves this subject in the preserve of the Prosecutor and the Pre-Trial Chamber to determine22. Article 17 on complementarity clause in the Rome Statute was agreed upon as a compromise to respect sovereignty and to limit international interference in the domestic affairs of nations and this was accomplished by giving primacy to the national organs over international bodies such as ICC23. So alternative justice system as will be seen below clearly depends on how it is construed by the respective country in question and also how it is perceived by the international community. What constitutes alternative justice to a Euro- pean is not necessarily the same to an African or American this is because the traditions which inform their legal systems have and reflect different historical and cultural perspectives. It is also worthy noting that the Rome Statute grants powers to the court to determine jurisdiction and admissibility of the case brought before it or by sua moto the Court may determine the same24. The Court can make an independent determination on whether any form of alternative justice such as reconciliation, amnesties, lustration or reparations is compatible with the Rome Statute, bearing in mind the provision of Article 17, and com- petently rule on the unlawfulness or lawfulness of such means of justice. Under the Rome Statute it is entirely within the prerogatives of the Prosecutor on whether to proceed with investigations or not. This will depend on whether the prosecution

20 In 1999 the Representative of the United Nations Secretary General in Liberia Francis Okello appended a statement to the Lome Accord between RUF rebels and the government of Sierra Leone, to the effect that the United Nations shall not recognize amnesty for war crimes, crimes against humanity or genocide. 21 Max du Plessis, South Africa’s Implementation of the ICC Statute; an African Example, Journal of international criminal Justice 5, (2007), 460-479. 22 Id at p. 478. 23 See Darryl Robinson et al, Informal Expert Paper on the Principle of Complementarity in Practice, prepared for the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court in 2003. Available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/organs/otp/complementarity.pdf. Last visit November 2008. 24 Article 19(1) states; the Court shall satisfy itself that it has jurisdiction in any case brought before it. The court may, on its own motion, determine the admissibility of a case in accordance with Article 17.

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will further the interests of justice or not, in either case his or her decision is independent and depends on his evaluation of the situation. The role of the Pre Trial Chamber in case of the decision by the Prosecutor not to investigate or to investigate is advisory in nature and only binding in case he decides to do so when the request for evaluation has been submitted by the state party or the UN Security Council25. Though this is different when the Pre-Trial Chamber by its own initiative reviews the decision of the Prosecutor not to proceed, here the decision of the Prosecutor will be subject to the confirmation of the Pre-Trial Cham- ber26. From this provision, what amounts to the interests of justice can only be determined by the Prosecutor and the Pre-Trial Chamber and not the victims or national authorities who may have different views on how to deal with their past. The interest of victims is not just peace it also include other components such as security, reconciliation and compensation. In determination of interests of justice there are no clear set criteria which present another challenge to the Prosecutor when making a decision whether to proceed with the investigations or not27. Arguably the fact that the powers to determine interests of justice is vested in two independent bodies that is the Office of the Prosecutor and the Pre-Trial Chambers clearly shows how the drafters of the Rome Statute were aware of the delicacy involved in granting such enormous power in a single body. Furthermore, as clearly stated by the Prosecutor of the ICC28, there are myriad challenges which must be confronted when it comes to the decision as to whether to prosecute or not. For example in a country where alternative justice to the ICC like Uganda has a wide support the court is likely to encounter challenges from various quarters arguing it to give chance to the peace process by suspending its investigations or lifting up the indictments while in case the situation do not attract wide allay of support due to its intractability or because of less attention by the international community like Colombia the court is likely to face accusation of double standards of why not to prosecute29.

25 Article 53 (3)(a) At the request of the State making a referral under Article 14 or the Security Council under Article 13, paragraph (b), The Pre-Trial Chamber may review a decision of the Prosecutor under paragraph 1 or 2 not to proceed and may request the Prosecutor to reconsider that decision. 26 Article 53(3)(b) In addition, the Pre-Trial Chamber may, on its own initiative, review a decision of the Prosecutor not to proceed if it is based solely on paragraph 1(c) or 2(c). In such a case, the decision of the Prosecutor shall be effective only if confirmed by the Pre Trial Chamber. 27 See Key Note address, “Integrating the Work of the ICC into Local Justice Initiatives” by the ICC Chief Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo, reproduced in the AM. U. INT`L Law Review, 21 (2006), p. 497. 28 Id. 29 Supra note 27.

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III. The alternative justice system from/ in the African context

The question of alternative justice system is more complex when it comes to Africa whose people for many years have been victims of repressive and dictatorial regimes and majority believe that past wounds are best healed at home through national courts and truth commissions rather than international prosecution in foreign countries30. More so, is the fact that the continent has been plagued by endless conflicts whose solution lies equally between the perpetrators of these crimes and the governments in power. Some of the challenges facing justice system in most African countries arise when dealing with perpetrators who are persons often needed for the rebuilding and reconstruction of the war torn societies. At times some of these perpetrators posses knowledge and expertise or political support which is hard to do without, while others occupy important position in the government or transitional authorities and therefore not willing to appear before the court or the truth telling commission when available31. Further, there are other considerations which are not legally plausible, but equally can not be ignored; prosecution whether national or international is not so swift that an accused will be apprehended today and convicted tomorrow rather it is a long and tedious process which needs patience and understanding. For victims who have been tormented by decades of conflicts it would be a detachment from reality to assume that justice will be a panacea of their suffering, rather efforts to help them resettle and restart their new lives would constitute an immediate and better option to most of them. As argued by one scholar32, societies in transition are a messy place, in which delivering justice is a difficult, laborious and often frustrating process. Large numbers of perpetrators, overwhelmed institutions, poverty and weak social cohesion may make the process of bringing perpetrators to book extraordinarily difficult, even impossible, particularly in the countries where crimes were committed33. Thus by focusing less on the overreaching need for post conflict societies to build national political culture grounded on peacemaking and longer term peace building while insisting on the unquestionable duty to prosecute war criminals may in the process perpetuate existing social and political tensions and maintain a situation in which fundamental human rights continue to be denied and threatened at a massive scale34. Domestic criminal proceedings as an alternative to the ICC prosecution are clearly in line with the goal of complementarity as enshrined in the Rome Statute of the court playing

30 John Dugard, Dealing With Crimes of Past Regimes: Is an Amnesty Still an Option? Leiden Journal of International Law 12 (1999), p. 1001-1015. 31 Peter R. Baehr, How to come to terms with the past, in Hughes/Thakur/Schabas (eds), Atrocities and International Accountability; Beyond Transitional Justice note, Cambridge 2007, p.9. 32 Sadat, note 1, p. 239. 33 Id. 34 See Helena Cobban, Transitional justice and conflict termination; Mozambique, Rwanda and South Africa assessed, note 1, 42-64.

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a secondary role to the national efforts at domestic level in prosecution of serious crimes35. The ensuing challenge is to determine what kind of alternative justice in domestic arena will the court consider to constitute a genuine investigations and prosecution meeting the standards of international justice as espoused under the Rome Statute hence excluding its involvement. This is because the Rome Statute does not provide specific criteria which define the contours of acceptable national prosecution under complementarity doctrine and neither has the court provided legal framework of what should constitute acceptable domestic justice standards. Perhaps a question to ask oneself would be; does justice entail a specific duty to prosecute? The fact that the Rome Statute does not prohibit nor condone amnesty, may be argued to allow the court to take into account alternative justice mechanisms which maybe non prosecutorial in nature such as amnesty and truth commissions. It is argued that without strong domestic mechanism of justice delivery in Africa the work of the ICC will be inadequate to fight impunity. For example as of December 2008, ICC has three persons in its custody who are accused of serious crimes in Congo. It would be expected that the judiciary in Congo would exercise its primary jurisdiction over those responsible for crimes in the country especially those accused of lesser crimes before the intervention of the ICC. However, the reality suggest that the judiciary in Congo lacks basic infrastructure such as physical infrastructure, adequate prosecutors, magistrates and judges to conduct basic trials leave alone trials meeting international standards of justice36. Because of the court’s inability to prosecute all those accused of serious crimes, it would be in the broader interests of justice for the court and the international community at large to support alternative justice mechanism to the ICC`s prosecution which would enhance the capability of national courts and other institutions to deliver justice through prosecution and non prosecution means. In most African countries where ICC is involved and likely to be involved alternative justice is a combination of different elements such as domestic trials, amnesty or other forms of truth and reconciliation which may not necessarily satisfy international justice standards and due process as enshrined in the Rome Statute. Indeed when examining article 17 on complementarity and article 20 which prohibits double jeopardy in the Rome Statute it is evident that any alternative justice enough to bar ICC prosecution must involve certain kind of criminal trials which are consistent with due process and fair trial. Alternative justice system in the form of amnesty, truth telling commissions or forgiveness seem to be accommodated under article 53 of the Statute which allows the prosecutorial discretion not

35 William Burke-White, Proactive Complementarity: The International Criminal Court and National Courts in the Rome Statute, 49 Harvard International Law Journal 53, (2008). 36 For comprehensive account of challenges facing judiciary in Congo see the Report by the Interna- tional Crisis Group available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=3758. Last visit November 2008.

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to investigate if it is in the interests of justice37. Under article 53 the Prosecutor can decline to initiate an investigation in the interests of justice even if there is a reasonable basis in law or facts to do so. In another likely scenario the Prosecutor can also decline to prosecute after investigation if doing so would not be in the interests of justice. It is this provision which compels the Prosecutor to be careful when determining what constitutes interests of justice. This does not suggest that ICC should apply different forms or standards of justice in Africa rather it is the recognition that amnesty and other non prosecutorial means of justice more often play an important role in addressing the aftermath of conflicts. Recon- ciliation between international demand for prosecution of international crimes and a national appeal for a political compromise involving amnesty could best be achieved by drawing a distinction between permissible and impermissible amnesties and by limiting international recognition of the former38. Indeed the ICC Prosecutor has gone on record arguing that calls and suggestions to use his discretionary powers for short term political gains are inconsistent with the spirit of the Rome Statute39. As seen from Uganda situation where ICC is actively involved the government has argued that alternative justice in the form of amnesty, truth commission and prosecution in domestic court does not perpetuate impunity rather promotes enduring peace and reconciliation within the country.

IV. Alternative Justice Systems versus international prosecution by the ICC; some lessons from Uganda and Sudan

Arguably the question of alternative justice features high on the Court’s priorities in its current situations where it is investigating notably in Uganda. As seen in this article, ICC is a unique judicial institution in that it deals with ongoing crimes and conflicts. For example, in Northern Uganda the court is not privy to any peace initiative40 rather it is rightly interested to fulfill its mandate of dispensing justice for crimes committed41. But from what may be termed as an irony of unintended consequences, the court has found itself having to contend with realities of peace making. In most cases tyrants in power or armed opposition in the bush have been unwilling to end the conflict without safe passage and assurance that there will never be prosecution to follow them which effectively means immunity for their

37 See John Dugard, possible conflict of jurisdiction with Truth Commissions, in The Rome Statute of The International Criminal Court: A Commentary, 727 (in Antonia Cassese et al eds 2002). 38 Dugard, note 30, p. 1009. 39 Address by Louis Moreno-Ocampo, Nuremberg, 24th/25th June 2007, Building a future on Peace and Justice. 40 As of November 2008 there is a UN backed peace process addressing the Northern Uganda conflict led by the Vice President of Southern Sudan H.E Dr. Riek Machar and the former President of Mozambique Joachim Chissano as a special envoy of the United Nations Secretary General. 41 Id supra note 39.

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actions42. Yet the ICC was founded to deal with exactly this aspect, namely fight impunity in all its form irrespective of the position of the alleged criminal43. The cases of Uganda and Darfur can be illustrative of the challenges facing the court.

1. International prosecution vs. national prosecution in Uganda

Uganda has had a long and protracted civil conflict which has spanned two decades plus between the government and the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). The war has had profound effects on the people both socially and economically, it is estimated that around 85% of the population in Northern Uganda live in Internally Displaced Camps or protected camps while others are refugees in neighboring countries44. The government did try different means including granting amnesty to the rebels to assure them of comfortable reintegration without criminal accountability but with no success45. After efforts to negotiate and end the war peacefully between the government and the rebels bore no success, in Decem- ber 2003 the Ugandan government triggered the jurisdiction of the ICC by invoking Article 14 of the Rome Statute which allows state parties to make referrals to the court though it is the prerogative of the Prosecutor to accept or reject the referrals46. Using its criteria the court started investigations and later issued indictments for the top echelons of the LRA movement which included five commanders of the movement47. This move was greatly opposed by different sections both in Uganda and outside Uganda who argued that with ICC indictments the rebels can never come out to negotiate peace48. In

42 See Jack Synder and LeslieVinjamuri, Trials and Errors: Principle and Pragmatism in Strategies of International Justice, 28 International Security 5, (2003), p. 5. 43 Article 27 of the Rome Statute. 44 For extensive discussion of this conflict see Katherine Southwick, Investigating War in Northern Uganda: Dilemmas for the International Criminal Court 1Yale J. of INT`L AFF. 105 (2005), Frank Van Aker, Uganda and the Lord’s Resistance Army: A new order no one ordered, 103 Afri- can Affairs 335 (2004), and Human Rights Watch, Uprooted and Forgotten: Impunity and Human Rights Abuses in Uganda, 14-36 (2005). This report is available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/ 2003/uganda0703. Last visit November 2008. 45 See Amnesty Act part II, enacted into law by the Ugandan Parliament in 2000. The amnesty law grants immunity to the rebels against criminal liability in exchange for surrender with no requirement to participate in accountability process for the past crimes. 46 Article 14 of the Rome Statute state that; a State party may refer to the Prosecutor a situation in which one or more crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court appear to have been committed requesting the Prosecutor to investigate the situation for the purpose of determining whether one or more specific persons should be charged with commission of such crimes. 47 See: ICC, “Prosecutor of the ICC opens an Investigation into Northern Uganda” Press release 29th July 2004 and the case of The Prosecutor v Joseph Kony et. al available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/ cases/UGD.html. Last visit August 2008. 48 See Whose Justice? Perceptions of Uganda’s Amnesty Act 2000: The Potential for Conflict Reso- lution and Long Term Reconciliation (Refugee Law Project, Paper No. 15 2005)

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general the reaction to the intervention of the court in the ongoing conflict is mixed between those who see the court as a hindrance to the ultimate solution to the conflict and those who look at the court as a best alternative mechanism available to bring an end to the conflict. The latter argues that the conflict has been ongoing for more than 20 years and since government initiatives failed, then it is better to try another means like ICC49. Despite a mixed reaction of criticism and approval and having battled this group for close to twenty years without success, the government decided to chat this avenue in the hope that what the gun failed to achieve, perhaps could be achieved by indictments and subsequent international prosecution. It is after the issuance of indictments by the court that rebels came out to talk peace arguing that they are now ready to face the government and discuss available options to bring peace in the country50. The government agreed and the Juba Peace Process kicked off. Ironically, the indictments issued by the ICC were high on the agenda of this process, the rebels argued that unless the indictments are dropped they can never sign a peace deal. The government and the rebels agreed on the five agendas namely (i) cessation of hostilities (ii) comprehensive solutions (iii) accountability and reconciliation (iv) disarmament, demobilization and integration and (v) final cease fire51. The government assured the rebels that it will talk to the ICC to drop the indictments in favour of the domestic justice system. Indeed the President argued that since it is the government which asked ICC to come in then it will be the same government to ask the court to leave52. The president does not shun accountability rather he says the rebels will face a combination of traditional and formal justice at a domestic level rather than retributive justice which is the hallmark of the ICC. The proposed alternative justice mechanisms in Uganda apparently include truth commissions, traditional methods of reconciliation, reintegration of the rebels into the local community and criminal accountability in a special High Court division to be established to try those who bear most responsibility for the crimes committed53. The proposed means of accountability largely elevates forgiveness and reconciliation over criminal punishment for serious crimes which is inconsistent with the Rome Statute. The government of Uganda has further argued that the work of the special court is not meant to supplant the work of the

49 Id, p. 1-28. 50 Adam Branch, Uganda’s Civil War and the Politics of ICC intervention, 21 Ethics and Interna- tional Affairs, 179 (2007) and Refugee Law Project (RLP), Behind the Violence: Causes, Conse- quences and the Search for Solutions to the War in Northern Uganda (Working Paper No. 11, February 2004). 51 Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation between the Government of the Republic of Uganda and the Lord’s Resistance Army/Movement signed on 29th June 2007. 52 See Museveni Says Uganda Rebels Will Not Face International Criminal Court, available at http://www.voanews.com/english/2008-03-11-voa67.cfm. Last visit August 2008. 53 See letter from the Acting Solicitor General of Uganda to the Registrar of the International Crimi- nal Court on 27th March 2008.

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international criminal court rather all those individuals who were indicted by the court will be tried by the special division of the High Court54. While the rebels have consistently argued that the withdrawal of ICC indictments is a pre requisite for the final settlement of the conflict55. Strangely the rebels have not claimed immunity from criminal prosecution rather they argue that ICC should be excluded in all accountability options available. This prompts a question as to whether the court process can be triggered and suspended at the convenience of the parties. The position of the government of Uganda collides with that of the ICC. On the one hand the government claims that it has a right to do what it takes to bring to an end the conflict, while the court argues that it can dent its credibility56 if state parties are allowed to use the court as a bargaining chip to attain their political goals57. The international criminal court has categorically stated that there can be no amnesty for crimes under the jurisdiction of the court namely war crimes, crimes against humanity and Genocide58. The Court further argues that the Ugandan government as a state party is bound to respect the Rome Statute by arresting and surrendering the indicted persons. On a different note the Ugandan government has denied any attempt to condone impunity by offering amnesty to the rebel groups59. Rather the government says, it will try the indicted persons using laws and courts of Uganda relying on Article 17 of the Rome Statute which gives primacy of jurisdiction on domestic justice machinery. The differences between ICC and the Ugandan government are not on accountability rather it is the kind of accountability mechanism appropriate that is in contention. Further the court argues that if at all the government wishes to punish the perpetrators of serious crimes committed on its territory it can still do so by dealing with mid level commanders who are equally responsible for atrocities. The Prosecutor has gone further to accuse the rebels as people not interested in peace making rather they are buying time from the peace talks while regrouping to cause more harm to the civilians60. Despite the court being bold on its stand asking the government to honour its obligation, but still it looks

54 Ibid. 55 See The Security Council Up to date Report on Uganda, No. 1, of 11th April 2008. Available at, http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/site/c.glKWLeMTIsG/b.4018489/. Last visit November 2008. 56 See ICC Integrity sitting At the Crossroads available at http://allafrica.com/stories/200803180808 .html. Last visit August 2008. 57 See Uganda: West Angered by Museveni's Call for ICC to Pardon Kony Group, available at http:// allafrica.com/stories/200803171480.html. Last visit August 2008. 58 Supra note 39. 59 See statement by Francis Butagira, Permanent Representative of Uganda to the United Nations given to the Sixth Assembly of State Parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 3rd December 2007 in New York. 60 See the address by the ICC Prosecutor to the Assembly of the State parties 12 November 2008. Available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/organs/otp/speeches/2008-11-14_speech.pdf.

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upon on the same government to arrest and surrender the accused because the court has no police of its own to do so. This method leaves many questions unanswered such as what will be the role of the ICC in the process of accountability because it seems that this agreement excludes any involvement of the court in the accountability process. Recognizing the central role of the court as being one to deal with those who bear greatest responsibility for the crimes committed, perhaps the agreement would have left the top commanders in the jurisdiction of the ICC while the domestic initiatives invoked to punish the rank and file. Clearly the situation and current stand off between the ICC and Uganda reaffirms the continued problem of balancing a need to address justice requirement at a domestic level while honoring international treaty obligations like those arising from the ICC especially for countries in Africa which have been plagued by conflicts for many years. As seen from the arguments of Ugandan government, it’s not the rejection of accountability for perpetrators of mass crimes which is a sticking point rather the method and avenue of such accountability process. Again the change of mind by the Ugandan government raises a question as to why did the government refer the matter to the ICC in the first place. Was it interested to use the court as a bargaining chip in its negotiation with the rebels? Did it believe genuinely that the court in The Hague could bring peace and justice in Uganda? Because even before the government sought the intervention of the ICC, it was aware that the current options of prosecution in Uganda or traditional justice system did exist. After all ICC is the court of last resort. Further, the argument of Uganda that it can not arrest and surrender the indicted persons to the court because they are beyond territorial boarders of Uganda61, do not hold. Because in the first place if Uganda with its law enforcement machinery like the army and police could not arrest the rebels for more than twenty years, how did it expect the court with no police or army to do it? Clearly the government position hardly reflects on genuine efforts to work with ICC to address the conflict. To have the ICC already investigating the situation and only to change the rules of the game in the middle of it, it doesn’t help the court and it clearly shows that even the state parties to the Rome Statute must take their obligations seriously and responsibly. If the court acts in good faith to heed to the request of the state party seeking its intervention while behind the curtain the government is map- ping another motive of using the court as a bargaining chip to lure the protagonists to come to the negotiating table, this can greatly tarnish the credibility and effectiveness of the court. The court can not afford to be used as a bargaining chip or involve in politics of compromise or exigencies with state parties rest it deviates from its original founding mission of ending impunity62.

61 Supra note 59. 62 See arguments by Michael Reisman, who argues that ICC is a judicial body and not a political body as such it should do justice and not politics; Prospects for The Functioning International Criminal Court contained in: Mauro Politi / Giuseppe Nesi (eds), The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Challenge to Impunity ((2001), pp. 299-307.

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2. Addressing conflict while pursuing justice: A case of Sudan

The situation in Sudan is different from the one in Uganda, precisely because the situation in Darfur was referred to the Court after the recommendations made by the International Commission of Inquiry into the violations of human rights in Darfur – and not by the Sudanese government63. It was after this report that the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1593 to refer the matter to the court64. The complexities facing the court in Sudan are equally pressing as in Uganda. The government of Sudan has categorically rejected the jurisdiction of the court arguing that it has neither failed nor been unable in its duty to prosecute those responsible for alleged crimes in Darfur. In other words Sudan is invoking the complementarity doctrine. In fact after the referral of the situation to the Court, the government established the Special Criminal Court for Events in Darfur and Special Chambers in each of three states in Western Darfur meant to try alleged criminals in Darfur65. The Sudanese government also argues that it is not a party to the Rome Statute and thus outside of its jurisdiction. However, this argument does not hold simply because the referral was made by the United Nations Security Council66. Interestingly, the fundamental argument of Sudan on the rejection of ICC is not centered on the culpability of the alleged perpetrators rather it is founded on capability and willingness to try and punish the perpetrators if any and non ratification of the Rome Statute67. Sudan believes that its judicial system is capable to administer justice without recourse to international bodies like ICC. The court argues that its investigation focus is different from what Sudanese court’s are addressing68. To date the Court has issued two arrest warrants with a pending application for the arrest warrant of the President Mr. Omar Bashir69.

63 The Commission was established by the UN Security Council Resolution 1564/2004 adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. 64 Resolution 1593/2005. The Resolution was adopted by 11 countries in favour (Tanzania, Benin, Denmark, France, Greece, Japan, Philippines, Romania, Russia and United Kingdom) while four abstained (USA, China, Algeria and Brazil). 65 The court was established by the decree of the Chief Justice and the President of the Supreme Court in June 2005. 66 Article 13 (b) of the Rome Statute states: “The Court may exercise its jurisdiction with respect to a crime referred to in Article 5 in accordance with the provisions of this Statute if, a situation in which one or more of such crimes appears to have been committed is referred to the Prosecutor by the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.” 67 See statement by the Sudanese government: Sudan releases Darfur war crimes suspect wanted by the ICC available at http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article24036. Last visit August, 2008. 68 See Third Report of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court to the UN Security Council Pursuant to UNSCR 1593/2005, available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/cases/OTP_ ReportUNSC_3-Darfur_English.pdf. Last visit October 2008. 69 See ICC Prosecutor presents a case against Sudanese President Bashir for genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes in Darfur. Available at www.icc-cpi.int/pressrelease_details&id =406&l=en.html.

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The African Union and the Arab League have rallied behind the government asking the court to withdraw its case against the Sudanese President for fear that the indictment would jeopardize peace process in Darfur. In fact the African Union has gone extra mile by adopting a resolution calling for appointment of High Level Panel comprising of distin- guished Africans with integrity to explore possibility of establishing truth and reconciliation commissions and alternative courts to try those accused of crimes in Darfur within Africa70. African Union has stated that they are not against accountability for war criminals or condoning impunity rather the organization support justice in Sudan through Truth and Reconciliation Commissions, trials conducted by the national government or with assistance from the African Union71. Which effectively sidelines the court. Examining these efforts of the African Union to thwart the work of the court in Sudan one can convincingly argue that these efforts do not stem from a genuine belief that alternative mechanism to the court can achieve justice in Sudan or within Africa rather can be seen as a political move to shield the Sudanese President from international prosecution. This is because in its first case in Sudan when the court issued an arrest warrant for Harun and Kushayb72, no institution (including the AU) raised an objection to protest the move by the court to indict one of the senior government officials. Further these efforts by AU and Arab League do not address the pending arrest warrant issued by the court against two Sudanese persons rather they focus on the likely arrest warrant against the President. The arguments advanced by Sudan to oust the jurisdiction of the court on the basis of non ratification of the Rome Statute do not hold merit because the situation was referred to the court by the UN Security Council which renders moot the requirement of ratification. Further, in 2008 Sudan amended its Criminal Procedure Act of 1991 to include crimes within the jurisdiction of the court but nevertheless several laws including the Constitution still grants immunity to the President and other senior government officials which would virtually close any avenue of domestic accountability for these officials. Further Sudan did sign73 the Rome Statute, among the obligations accompanying its signature is to refrain from acts which would defeat the work of the court74. Considering such existing obligations binding Sudan, then the country has no sound legal basis for refusing to cooperate or obstruct the work of the court simply because the basis of the court’s jurisdiction in Sudan stems from the Security Council mandate. Unless Sudan emends its domestic laws to strip immunity granted to senior officials whom the court is focusing on such as the President

70 Communiqué PSC/MIN/Comm(CXLII) issued on 28th July 2008 by the Peace and Security Coun- cil of the African Union in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. 71 Id. 72 See case ICC-02/05-01/07, The Prosecutor v. Ahmad Muhammad Harun ("Ahmad Harun") and Ali Muhammad Ali Abd-Al-Rahman (Ali Kushayb). 73 Sudan signed the Rome Statute in September 2000. 74 Article 18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Entered into force on 27th January 1980.

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himself it can not claim to oust the jurisdiction of the court invoking the complementarity doctrine.

V. How should the International Community support the work of the International Criminal Court?

The International community has an important role to play to make the mission of the ICC a reality. This role among other things requires them to respect their obligations to the Rome Statute such as assisting the court in its investigations and collection of evidence when possible. International community can take various initiatives to support domestic justice mechanisms especially in transitional countries where the court is likely to focus by providing requisite funding and technical support to strengthen and enhance justice delivery. This will ensure that countries address serious crimes within their jurisdiction before the court intervenes. Indeed the importance of countries addressing crimes before the intervention of the court was reaffirmed by the ICC Prosecutor when he argued that “as a con- sequence of complementarity, the number of cases that reach the court should not be a measure of its efficiency. On the contrary, the absence of trials before this court, as a con- sequence of a regular functioning of national institutions would be a major success”75. The court has no police or any other enforcement mechanism for its decisions as such its success will greatly depend on the willingness of the international community to enforce the court’s decisions. But as seen in Uganda and Sudan when the authority is not willing to cooperate with the court by arresting and surrendering the perpetrators, the court can do little to address the situation. Further the presence of the court should not be the basis for inaction when action is required to stop atrocities as it is happening in Darfur. International community cannot ask the court to intervene in a conflict when it can not facilitate the work of the court by way of funding its activities, aiding the safety of the court’s personnel or arresting those wanted by the court. As put by one writer, when the international community through the United Nations fail to intervene to stop atrocities because of disagreement among its members, it is seen as a well prepared institution to protect perpetrators of crimes by ensuring their due process while affording their victims no protection76. Unfortunately the international support for the court is still lukewarm and divided between those who strongly believe in its mission and those who look at it as another tool of the Western hegemony to punish the weak especially in the global south with serious deficiency of democratic accountability for its judges and prosecutors77. Simply because many don’t believe that one day a person from the developed world will ever stand trial

75 Statement by Luis Moreno Ocampo when taking oath of office on 16th June 2003. 76 See Jeremy Rabkin, Global Criminal Justice: An Idea Whose Time Has Passed, 38 Cornell Int`l Law J, (2005), p. 763. 77 See Lee A. Casey, The Case Against the International Criminal Court, vol. 25 Fordham Interna- tional Law Journal (2002), pp. 840-872.

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before this court78. This argument is premised on the fact that most of the Western countries have relatively better legal and judicial structures capable to effectively exercise their permissive jurisdiction on a complementarity doctrine by addressing the crimes in the jurisdiction of the court before any intervention of the court is sought. Another problem facing international criminal justice at the international platform is the notion of selective justice and the failure of the powerful countries to accept to be bound by the same rules which they strongly prescribe for others. This is no more true than the Iraq Special Tribunal which was established under the US occupation in Iraq, among other things, this court was permitted to exercise jurisdiction over Saddam Hussein and his asso- ciates for violations of international humanitarian law and human rights, but it was deprived jurisdiction over US soldiers or civilians accused of mistreating Iraqis or Iraq detainees in Iraq prisons such as Abu Ghraib for committing more less the same crimes79. This has also been manifested even in the United Nations itself, as a price for international consensus the Security Council had had to exempt some people from the arm of the international criminal justice80. It is such kind of international politics that less powerful countries especially in the global south view the enterprise of international justice as project meant for the selected few-unfortunately the weak81. Further state members should not use the court as a convenient platform to address their political concerns when it best suits them. If a country believes that its domestic justice system is credible enough to try crimes within the jurisdiction of the court then it should not refer the matter to the court only to ask the court to withdraw when it no longer fits its political expediency. For example in 2004 the highest court in Central African Republic determined that domestic courts were incapable to try crimes which were committed in the country in the ongoing conflict as such the government decided to refer the situation to the ICC82. In 2008 the government requested the UN Security Council to defer the ICC work in the country because continued ICC investigation was seen as jeopardizing Peace Agreement between the government and the rebels. The main argument of the government is that its domestic courts are capable to try such crimes without involvement

78 Id. 79 Sadat, supra note 1, p. 228-238. 80 Para 6 of Resolution 1593 of 2005 which referred Darfur situation to the ICC exempts nationals of non state parties to the court from the jurisdiction of the Court, while aware that even Sudan itself was not a state part to the court. 81 For example, see the Statement by the President of the International Progress Organization titled, Double Standards in International Criminal Justice: The Case of Sudan, Vienna, 2nd April 2005, available at http://www.i-p-o.org/Koechler-Sudan-ICC.pdf. Last visit August 2008. 82 See the Prosecutor receives referral from Central African Republic available at http://www.icc- cpi.int/pressrelease_details&id=87&l=en.html. Last visit December 2008.

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of the court and continued investigations by the court can negatively affect peace process83. Here again one would ask what was the intention of the government making the referral to the ICC? Was it genuine or it was meant to scare off the rebels to come and negotiate peace? Either way the trend of making referrals only to retreat back and ask the court to suspend its work in the middle of the way is not helpful to the court.

VI. How should the ICC enhance and strengthen alternative justice in Africa?

Alternative justice is one of the most important mechanisms of complementing the work of the ICC because of the reality that the primary responsibility to prosecute massive crimes rest with the state concerned, nevertheless this obligation must be translated from commitment into a living reality. It would be worthy to acknowledge that most of these countries emerging from conflicts or still in conflicts (potential focus of the court) hardly have strong and credible judicial structures to cope with the enormous task of trying such massive crimes within their jurisdictions which leave the court as the main alternative available to deal with the perpetrators of serious crimes. The court has taken commendable efforts to disseminate its work on the continent through partnership with various NGOs and Civil Societies84. Nevertheless the court must be seen as a true partner in the administration of justice in the African context especially in the eyes of the rank and file citizens on the street who have endured a blunt of these conflicts. Because of the high stakes of its subject matter and the threat that its decision can pose to powerful national and international interests, the court can easily be branded as a political institution remote from both the rule of law and the places where the crimes it deals with occur85. Thus a Prudent decision on when to intervene will mostly be the key to its success. The court must be prepared to face serious challenges that will question its independence from political institutions, its legitimacy as an authentic interpreter of international norms, and its accountability to the states that created it and whose nationals face prosecution within its courtroom86. Otherwise it may find itself as it is now in conflict with peace initiatives and be seen as an obstacle to the full realization of peace which has constantly evaded the larger part of the continent for quite some time now.

83 Interview with Marie-Edith Douzima coordinator for the Central African coalition for the ICC. Available at http://www.iccnow.org/documents/AfricanNewsletter_Issue10_nov08_eng_final1 .pdf. Last Visit November 2008. 84 Most notable efforts to publicize the work of the court are those undertaken by the coalition of the NGOs in various parts of the world. For more details see www.iccnow.org. Also see outreach report for the activities of the court prepared for the Assembly of the State Parties. Available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/Outreach_report-2008-en-LR.pdf. Last visit November 2008. 85 See Allison M. Danner, Enhancing the Legitimacy and Accountability of Prosecutorial Discretion at the International Criminal Court, 97 AM. J of INT'L LAW, (2003) pp. 510-552. 86 Id.

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Further the court should take concrete steps to work with national authorities to enhance and strengthen alternative justice mechanisms especially in countries where it is involved. This factor not only signifies the understanding and need of the court to focus on those who bear greatest responsibility but it also reflects on the resolve of the court to support domestic justice mechanisms to address serious crimes and over all criminal justice delivery. Support by the court can range from sharing information with local courts and tribunals, training opportunities for investigators and prosecutors to enhance their skills in handling complex cases, preservation of evidence techniques and case filing and management. This kind of support can gradually enhance the capability of African countries to try crimes within their own countries before seeking intervention of the court. The court should strive to establish and improve ties with regional institutions such as SADC, ECOWAS, ACJ, and AU among others. This is to dispel the notion of “African defendants for Euro- pean Justice” a long held views by most of those opposed to the court87. For example, while abstaining from UN Security Council Resolution referral of Darfur situation to the court, Algeria argued that the role of accountability in Darfur would have been better performed by African Union or any other body with AU mandate which, could while undertaking accountability, also strengthen justice delivery capability on the continent than a court in The Hague88. As a permanent court, the ICC should consider opening regional offices within Africa to conduct its trials. This suggestion stems from the understanding that arresting alleged criminals and flying them to The Hague to face trial hardly helps the image of the court as a global institution. Conducting trials in Africa not only will it allow the victims to follow closely the court proceedings but it will also give an opportunity to African governments to appreciate the conduct of international criminal justice in their own backyard. It would also enable many officials from domestic justice institutions to learn from the court on techniques of handling high profiled cases involving serious crimes without necessarily going to The Hague. It is no wonder then that in the UN Security Council referral of the Darfur situation to ICC the resolutions authorized the court to conduct its hearing within the region where people can follow proceedings89.

VII. Conclusion

The question of alternative justice will continue to feature high in the administration of international criminal justice in Africa especially now that ICC is operational. This is so because of the devastating and long running conflicts on the continent which have

87 For example see David B. Rivkin Jr. and Lee A. Casey, “Darfur’s Last Hope,” The Washington Times, February 4, 2005, A19. 88 See Press Release, Security Council Refers situation in Darfur Sudan to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court U.N Doc SC/8351 (statement by the Algerian Representative to the UN). 89 Security Council Resolution 1593/2005.

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destroyed national judicial capabilities of many countries to try serious crimes. The creation of the ICC clearly reaffirms the fundamental belief by the international community that human suffering must be brought to an end irrespective of the entity committing the crimes. The existing differences between various legal systems should be seen as a catalyst rather than a hindrance to the administration of international criminal justice. For those who are keen to avoid the “long arm of the court” will likely advance the notion of alternative justice as a relative term whose operation must be informed by the traditional and customs of the respective society. This is problematic because, despite the fact that Rome Statute is an international agreement but still it can not afford to ignore these concerns. As seen in Uganda, one who killed and maimed hundreds and thousands of people will claim that in Africa restorative rather than retributive justice is a norm than exception. People will continue attempting to use the court as a bargaining chip to advance their concerns of discuss- ing peace while burying their criminal responsibility under the carpet. But more important is the fact that if at all the question of alternative justice is to make practical sense in its realization, then the international community must devote considerable resources to support the national efforts especially in transitional countries or countries emerging from conflicts to strengthen their domestic legal structures to enable alternative justice system to become a realistic means in complementing the work of the ICC in the administration of the international criminal justice. For it would be counterproductive to the whole notion of justice to concentrate on the few individuals who bear greatest responsibility for atrocity crimes leaving hundreds of those who presided over anarchy to be tried by non existent or weak domestic legal machinery. In other words the efforts and resources being devoted in the quest to have a strong ICC should be equally the amount devoted to support national legal structures in these countries. As seen in Sierra Leone, when international justice is domesticated within national jurisdiction that is, the trials and proceedings are conducted in the country where crimes were committed, the nation and its people tend to benefit immensely. The benefit is not only on the physical infrastructure left behind by the court, but also by the knowledge transfer between international personnel and the local cadre. In this regard ICC with support of state parties to the Rome Statute could explore possibilities of having regional presence in Africa and other regions of the world so that apart from taking its services closer to the presumptive beneficiaries but also it would enable personnel from local judici- aries from these war torn countries to attend proceedings of the court, gain additional investigatorial skills and acquaint themselves with the necessary knowledge and skills of dealing with such high profiled crimes like genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity. The engagement and support of ICC in this area is crucial and indispensable to build strong domestic legal machineries. Arguably the International Criminal Court will neither address all atrocities which have haunted and devastated mankind especially in Africa nor be a panacea to human rights and humanitarian law violations. But its presence will continue to symbolize international resolve against impunity and challenge the notion of selective justice for selective catego-

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ries of people, a badge much identified with ad hoc tribunals whose establishment have much depended on the would be powers of the day than the actual suffering. ICC is a court which can truly be said to embody common values of humanity and a reminder that international community have a common obligation and interests to fight impunity and address suffering of mankind anywhere in the world. But what is clear is that the dream of a strong and effective ICC will not be realized if the international community delegates its right and responsibility to be at the battle front in the war against impunity to the court. ICC can only succeed if state parties and the United Nations want it to succeed. For example, the Security Council can not expect the Court to bring peace and justice in an ongoing conflict like Darfur, when it has failed to fund the work of the court, to steam violence by sending strong peacekeeping force and arresting the suspected perpetrators already indicted by the court. For Africa, the court will continue to be a strong partner in its quest to address its dark past while forging ahead to its promising future, a goal which can not be realized if domestic efforts to establish strong legal administrative structures are not equally supported by the international community.

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The Southern African Development Community (SADC) and its Tribunal: Reflexions on a Regional Economic Communities’ Potential Impact on Human Rights Protection

By Oliver C. Ruppel, Windhoek*

I. Introduction

It was in the 1960s, when the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) encouraged African states to incorporate single economies into sub-regional systems with the ultimate objective of creating a single economic union on the African continent. In order to realise this aim, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU, predecessor of the Afri- can Union, AU) identified the need to enhance regional integration within the organisation, recognising that each country on its own would have little chance of, inter alia, attracting adequate financial transfers and the technology needed for increased economic development.1 Africa has, since then, taken various steps towards enhancing the process of economic and political integration on the continent.2 The road has been paved by several decisions and declarations relating to regional economic and political integration, especially by the Abuja Treaty, realising the establishment of the African Economic Commu- nity, the African Union’s economic and umbrella institution for Regional Economic Com- munities (RECs). The Abuja Treaty was adopted in June 1991, and came into force in 1994. Since then, 52 out of the 53 AU member states have signed the Treaty,3 while 49 have ratified it.4

* Oliver C. Ruppel, Dr. jur., LL.M. (Stellenbosch); Director, Human Rights and Documentation Centre, Windhoek and Senior Lecturer in Law, Faculty of Law, University of Namibia. Email: ruppel@ mweb.com.na, or: [email protected]. 1 For the process of regional integration within SADC, see D. Hansohm / R.. Shilimela, Progress in economic integration within SADC, in: A. Bösl, W. Breytenbach, T. Hartzenberg, C. McCarthy, K. Schade (eds.), Monitoring regional integration in southern Africa: Yearbook 6. Stellenbosch 2006, p. 7. 2 On various initiatives by African leaders to carry out the integration process in Africa, cf. R. N. Kouassi, The itinerary of the African integration process: An overview of the historical landmarks, African Integration Review 1 (2007), p. 2. 3 Eritrea has not yet signed the Abuja Treaty; cf. status list of countries regarding the Abuja Treaty, available at http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/Documents/Treaties/List/Treaty%20Establishing %20 the%20African%20Economic%20Community.pdf. 4 The countries which have signed but not yet ratified the Abuja Treaty are Djibouti, Madagascar and Somalia; cf. status list of countries regarding the Abuja Treaty, available at http://www.africa- union.org/root/au/Documents/Treaties/List/Treaty%20Establishing%20the%20African%20Econo mic%20Community.pdf.

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Meanwhile, several RECs have been established on the continent.5 At the seventh ordinary session of the AU’s Assembly of Heads of State and Government in Banjul, The Gambia, in July 2006, the AU officially recognised eight such communities:6 The Arab Maghreb Union (AMU); The Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD); The Com- mon Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA); The East African Community (EAC); The Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS); The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS); The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and The Southern African Development Community (SADC). Except for the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic7, all AU member states are affiliated to one or more of these RECs. Assuming that the responsibility for upholding human rights and fundamental freedoms rests primarily on the individual states themselves, the question may arise as to the role that RECs play when it comes to the protection of human rights, and whether or not – and if so, how – RECs can function as guardians of human rights. Although states might be primarily responsible for upholding human rights because they are answerable to their citizens, the international community, and the UN if they fail to respect human rights in their countries,8 the influence of RECs should not be underestimated. Taking the example of the Southern African Development Community and its Tribunal, this article highlights the special role of RECs for the protection of human rights.

5 The number of RECs varies depending on the definition of REC and on whether specific subgroups or monetary unions such as the Central African Economic and Monetary Community or certain free trade areas such as the Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area (with Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia, and states around the Mediterranean) are counted or not. Viljoen states that at least 14 sub-regional integration groupings exist in Africa. See F. Viljoen, International human rights law in Africa, Oxford 2007, p. 488. 6 See the decision relating to the recognition of RECs, namely (Assembly/AU/Dec.112 (VII) Doc. EX.CL/278 (IX)); text in French available at http://www.africa-union.org/Official_documents/ Assemblee%20fr/ASS06b.pdf; last accessed 22 December 2008. 7 Due to the controversies regarding the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic, Morocco withdrew from the OAU in protest in 1984 and, since South Africa's admittance in 1994, remains the only African nation not within what is now the African Union (AU). Although the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic was a full member of the OAU since 1984 and remains a member of the AU, the republic is not generally recognised as a sovereign state. While most African states have recognised the republic (e.g. Namibia and South Africa), several others have withdrawn their former recognition (e.g. Cape Verde, the Seychelles), and some have temporarily frozen diplo- matic relations (e.g. Costa Rica, Ghana), pending the outcome of a respective UN referendum which would allow the people of Western Sahara to decide the territory's future status. The republic has no representation at the United Nations. 8 Cf. European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the Euro- pean Parliament: The European Union’s role in promoting human rights and democratisation in third world countries. Brussels: EC, COM (2001), p. 252.

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II. Regional economic communities and the protection of human rights

At first glance it appears that the promotion and protection of human rights is not within the RECs’ focal range. However, human-rights-related matters play a vital role within the RECs’ legal framework as well as in their daily practice, as many have implemented certain provisions in their mandate that have an impact on human rights and good governance. RECs have, to some extent – be it explicitly or implied - incorporated human rights into their treaties. In most cases, a general tribute to recognising and protecting human rights can be found in the basic legal concepts underpinning RECs. Some even cover specific human rights issues, such as HIV and AIDS, equality and gender issues, humanitarian assistance and refugees, and children’s rights, to name but a few. The reasons for integrating human rights into the structure of RECs are manifold. One reason certainly is that states have committed themselves to respecting human rights by acceding to specific human rights treaties, conventions or declarations on the international, regional and sub-regional level, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; the International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and on Economic, Social and Cul- tural Rights; the Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination; or the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. The obligations and commitments resulting from such human-rights-related legal instruments are also reflected in the conceptualisation of RECs. The interrelationship between human rights and economic development has become closer over the past few years due to increasing discussions in the world community on the issue9 and can be seen as a two-way relationship insofar as economic development is obliged to respect human rights in a democratic society. Conversely, human rights can be given more effect through economic growth, as one outcome of economic growth is the increasing availability of resources, resulting in the reduction of poverty and a higher standard of living. Therefore, the promotion of human rights plays an important role in the process of regional integration, as envisaged by the Abuja Treaty as well as by REC constitutive legal instruments. However, the integration process faces many obstacles and challenges, which do also touch on human rights. The fear of losing State autonomy, the fear of losing identity, socio-economic disparity among members, historical disagreement, lack of vision, and unwillingness to share resources are some of the obstacles that present themselves when it comes to regional integration. Depending on how human rights are incorporated into the RECs legal framework, the sub-regional organisation has a number of options open in respect of enhancing the protec-

9 O.C. Ruppel, Third-generation human rights and the protection of the environment in Namibia, in: N. Horn / A. Bösl (eds.), Human rights and the rule of law in Namibia, Windhoek 2008, p. 116.

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tion of human rights.10 Considering that human rights do, to some extent, form part of the RECs community law, decision-making organs and regional community courts can unquestionably contribute towards the promotion and protection of human rights, provided that decisions by regional administrative and judicial institutions are properly enforced at a national level. RECs do therefore have a clear mandate to promote and protect human rights.

III. The Southern African Development Community – SADC

SADC was established in Windhoek in 1992 as the successor organisation to the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), which was founded in 1980. SADC was established by signature of its constitutive legal instrument, the SADC Treaty. 11 SADC envisages “… a common future, a future in a regional community that will ensure economic well-being, improvement of the standards of living and quality of life, freedom and social justice and peace and security for the peoples of Southern Africa. This shared vision is anchored on the common values and principles and the historical and cultural affinities that exist between the peoples of Southern Africa.” To this end, SADC’s objectives include the achievement of development and economic growth; the alleviation of poverty; the enhancement of the standard and quality of life; support of the socially disadvantaged through regional integration; the evolution of common political values, systems and institutions; the promotion and defence of peace and security; and achieving the sustainable utilisation of natural resources and effective protection of the environment.12 According to the UN Statistical Division,13 SADC counts a total population of more than 245 million, who inhabit a surface area of almost 10 million km2, and a total GDP of over US$ 432 billion. SADC’s headquarters are in Gaborone, Bot- swana, and the SADC working languages are English, French and Portuguese. The institutions of SADC, provided for in the SADC Treaty, are the Summit of Heads of State or Government; the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation; the Council of Ministers; the Integrated Committee of Ministers; the Standing Committee of Officials; the Secretariat; the Tribunal; and SADC National Committees. SADC currently counts 15 states among its members, namely Angola, Botswana, the DRC, Lesotho, Madagascar,

10 Four options have been outlined by F. Viljoen, The realisation of human rights through sub- regional institutions, African Yearbook of International Law, 7 (1999), p. 208 ff.Viljoen favours the third of the following options: (a) to ignore human rights issues, leaving it to the domestic or regional legal system to redress violations; (b) to use the limited human rights mandate in the relevant organisation’s treaty as a basis to cultivate a better human rights environment in the member states concerned; (c) to adopt own sub-regional charters on human rights; or (d) to fully incorporate the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights into the sub-regional treaty. 11 See SADC’s Vision, at http://www.sadc.int/. 12 These are some of the SADC objectives laid down in Article 5 of the SADC Treaty. 13 http://unstats.un.org/unsd/default.htm.

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Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, the Seychelles,14 South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. The Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP) approved by the SADC Summit in 2003, has defined the following targets for regional integration within SADC: • A Free Trade Area by 2008; • Completion of negotiations of the SADC Customs Union by 2010; • Completion of negotiations of the SADC Common Market by 2015; • SADC Monetary Union and SADC Central Bank by 2016, and • Launch of a regional currency by 2018. As a first step towards deeper regional integration, SADC launched the FTA in August 2008 in order to create a larger market, releasing potential for trade, economic development and employment creation.15 As various SADC member states are also parties to other RECs,16 the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the East Afri- can Community (EAC) and SADC have decided to accelerate economic integration of the continent, with the aim of achieving economic growth, reducing poverty and attaining sustainable economic development. To this end, it was resolved that the three RECs should –17 “… immediately start working towards a merger into a single REC with the objective of fast[-] tracking the attainment of the African Economic Community.” In the area of trade, customs and economic integration, it was approved that an FTA be established, encompassing the three RECs’ member states with the ultimate goal of establishing a single customs union.

14 The Seychelles was a member of SADC from 1997 to 2004; it rejoined SADC in 2008. 15 See Section 14, Final Communiqué of the 28th Summit of SADC Heads of State and Government held in Sandton, South Africa, from 16 to 17 August 2008. 16 SADC members that are simultaneously COMESA members are the DRC, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, the Seychelles, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda and Uganda are simultaneously members of EAC and COMESA, while Tanzania is a member of the EAC as well as of SADC. On the specific issue of overlapping memberships, O. C. Ruppel/ F.-X. Bangam- wabo, The SADC Tribunal: A Legal Analysis of its Mandate and Role in Regional Integration in: A. Bösl / W. Breytenbach, , Hartzenberg, T., McCarth, C. and Schade, K. (eds.), Monitoring regional integration in southern Africa: Yearbook 8. Stellenbosch [forthcoming]. 17 COMESA–EAC–SADC / Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa–East African Community–Southern African Development Community, Final Communiqué of the COMESA– EAC–SADC Tripartite Summit of Heads of State and Government, held in October 2008 in Kampala, Uganda: Towards a single market – Deepening COMESA–EAC–SADC integration, available at http://about .comesa.int/attachments/078_Final_Communique-Kampala_22_10_08 .pdf.

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IV. Human rights protection within SADC

It might appear that the promotion and protection of human rights are not SADC top priority as an organisation that furthers socio-economic cooperation and integration as well as political and security cooperation among its 15 southern African member states. However, the protection of human rights plays an essential role in economic development as it has an impact on the investment climate, which in turn contributes to growth, productivity and employment creation, all being essential for sustainable reductions in poverty. A ministerial workshop in 1994 called for the adoption of a SADC Human Rights Commission as well as for a SADC Bill of Rights. In 1996, a SADC Human Rights Charter was drafted, albeit by NGOs of several SADC member states. In the course of establishing the SADC Tribunal in 1997, a panel of legal experts considered the possibility of separate human rights instruments such as a Protocol of Human Rights or a separate Southern African Convention on Human Rights. None of these proposals was realised, however.18 Nonetheless, many human-rights-related provisions can be found within SADC’s legal framework. The SADC Treaty itself refers to regional integration and to human rights directly or indirectly at several stages. In its Preamble, the Treaty determines, inter alia, to ensure, through common action, the progress and well-being of the people of southern Africa, and recognises the need to involve the people of the SADC region centrally in the process of development and integration, particularly through guaranteeing democratic rights, and observing human rights and the rule of law. The Preamble’s contents are given effect within the subsequent provisions of the SADC Treaty. Chapter 3, for example, which deals with principles, objectives, the common agenda and general undertakings, provides that SADC and its member states are to act in accordance with the principles of human rights, democracy and the rule of law.19 Moreover, the objectives of SADC20 relate to human rights issues in one way or another. For instance, the objective of alleviating and eventually eradicating poverty contributes towards ensuring, inter alia, a decent standard of living, adequate nutrition, health care and education – all these being human rights.21 Other SADC objectives such as the maintenance of democracy, peace, security and stability refer to human rights, as do the sustainable utilisation of natural resources and effective protection of the environment – known as third-generation human rights.22

18 For more details on these historical developments, see Viljoen, above Fn. 10, pp. 185 –216. 19 Article 4(c), SADC Treaty. 20 Article 5, SADC Treaty. 21 UNDP/United Nations Development Programme, Human rights and development: Human Devel- opment Report, New York 2000. 22 O. C. Ruppel, Third-generation human rights and the protection of the environment in Namibia, in: N. Horn, and A. Bösl, (eds.), Human rights and the rule of law in Namibia, Windhoek 2008, p. 101 ff.

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Besides the aforementioned provisions and objectives, the SADC legal system offers human rights protection in many legal instruments other than the SADC Treaty. One category of legal documents constitutes the SADC Protocols. The Protocols are instruments by means of which the SADC Treaty is implemented; they have the same legal force as the Treaty itself. A Protocol comes into force after two thirds of SADC member states have ratified it. A Protocol legally binds its signatories after ratification. Most SADC Protocols are either directly or indirectly relevant to human rights. Of specific relevance in terms of human rights are the gender-related instruments within the SADC legal framework.23 For example, the Protocol on Gender and Development was signed during the 28th SADC Summit in August 2008.24 Recognising that the integration and mainstreaming of gender issues into the SADC legal framework is key to the sustainable development of the SADC region, and taking into account globalisation, human trafficking of women and children, the feminisation of poverty, and violence against women, amongst other things, the Protocol in its 25 Articles expressively address issues such as affirmative action, access to justice, marriage and family rights, gender-based violence, health, HIV and AIDS, and peace- building and conflict resolution. The Protocol provides that, by 2015, member states are obliged to enshrine gender equality in their respective constitutions, and that their constitutions state that the provisions enshrining gender equality take precedence over their customary, religious and other laws.25 The implementation of the Protocol’s provisions is the responsibility of the various SADC member states,26 and specific provisions as to monitoring and evaluation are laid down in the Protocol.27 The SADC Tribunal is the judicial body that has jurisdiction over disputes relating to this Protocol.28 Apart from the SADC Treaty and the SADC Protocols, the REC has other instruments at different levels. The latter are not binding, and do not require ratification by SADC members. With respect to their human rights relevance, such instruments include the Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections; the Charter of Fundamental and Social Rights in SADC; the Declaration on Agriculture and Food Security; and the Declaration on HIV and AIDS. The Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections29 are of specific importance for first-generation human rights, which comprise civil and political rights. The

23 W. Visser / K.G.V.E. Ruppel-Schlichting, Women and custom in Namibia – The legal setting, in: Ruppel, O.C. (ed.), Women and custom in Namibia: Cultural practice versus gender equality?, Windhoek 2008, p. 157. 24 See Section 16, Final Communiqué of the 28th Summit of SADC Heads of State and Government held in Sandton, South Africa, 16 to 17 August 2008. 25 Article 4, SADC Protocol on Gender and Development. 26 Article 14, SADC Protocol. 27 Article 17, SADC Protocol. 28 Article 18, SADC Protocol. 29 Referred to hereafter as the Guidelines.

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Guidelines focus on citizens’ participation in the decision-making processes and the consolidation of democratic practice and institutions. Besides the basic principles for conducting democratic elections, the Guidelines inter alia provide for SADC Electoral Observation Missions that member states can invite to observe their elections; guidelines on the observation of elections; a code of conduct for election observers; and the rights and duties of a member state holding elections. The 2003 Charter of Fundamental and Social Rights in SADC – although not legally binding – is an important human rights document that specifies the objectives laid down in Article 5 of the SADC Treaty for the employment and labour sector. Rights such as the right to freedom of association; the right to equality; the right to a safe and healthy environment; the right to remuneration; and the right to the protection of specific groups in society, such as children, the youth, the elderly, and persons with disabilities, are enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental and Social Rights in SADC. With the 2003 Declaration on Agriculture and Food Security, the Heads of State or Government have given substantial means to some specific objectives laid down in Article 5 of the SADC Treaty, namely the promotion of sustainable and equitable economic growth and socio-economic development to ensure poverty alleviation with the ultimate objective of its eradication; the achievement of sustainable utilisation of natural resources and effective protection of the environment; and mainstreaming of gender perspectives in the process of community and nation building. By this Declaration, SADC States have committed themselves to promote agriculture as a pillar in national and regional development strategies and programmes in order to attain our short, medium, and long-term objectives, on agriculture and food security. The Declaration of Agriculture and Food Security is of specific importance for the human right to food and covers a broad range of human rights relevant issues like the increase of production of crops, livestock and fisheries, the sustainable use and management of natural resources as well as the enhancement of gender equality and human health and the mitigation of chronic diseases such as AIDS. The 2003 Declaration on HIV and AIDS similarly strives to realise the objectives set forth in the SADC Treaty to promote sustainable and equitable economic growth and socio- economic development that will ensure poverty alleviation; to combat HIV and AIDS and other deadly and communicable diseases; and to mainstream gender in the process of community and nation-building. The Declaration describes specific areas as urgent priorities in terms of attention and action. These areas include prevention and social mobilisation; improving care, access to counselling and testing services, treatment and support; acceler- ating development and mitigating the impact of HIV and AIDS; intensifying resource mobilisation; and strengthening institutional, monitoring and evaluation mechanisms.

V. The SADC Tribunal and human rights protection

The SADC Tribunal is the judicial institution within SADC. The establishment of the Tribunal is a major event in SADC’s history as an organisation and in the development of

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its law and jurisprudence. The Tribunal was established in 1992 by Article 9 of the SADC Treaty as one of the institutions of SADC. The Summit of Heads of State or Government, which is the Supreme Policy Institution of SADC pursuant to Article 4(4) of the Protocol on the Tribunal, appointed the members of the Tribunal during its Summit in Gaborone, Botswana, on 18 August 2005. The inauguration of the Tribunal and the swearing in of its members took place on 18 November 2005 in Windhoek, Namibia, in which city Council also designated the Seat of the Tribunal to be. Article 22 of the Protocol on the Tribunal provides that for working languages of the Tribunal to be English, French and Portu- guese.30 The Tribunal began hearing cases in 2007, and has seen 17 cases filed with it to date. The SADC Protocol on the Tribunal and the Rules of Procedure thereof circumscribe the Tribunal’s jurisdiction. Article 16(1) of the SADC Treaty provides for the following primary mandate: “The Tribunal shall be constituted to ensure adherence to and the proper interpretation of the provisions of this Treaty and subsidiary instruments and to adjudicate upon such disputes as may be referred to it.” The SADC Tribunal was set up to protect the interests and rights of SADC member states and their citizens, and to develop community jurisprudence, also with regard to applicable treaties, general principles, and rules of public international law.31 Subject to the principle that local remedies first be exhausted before the Tribunal is approached, the Tribunal has the mandate to adjudicate disputes between states, and between natural and legal persons in SADC.32 Further, the Protocol states that the Tribunal has jurisdiction over all matters provided for in any other agreements that member states may conclude among themselves or within the community, and that confer jurisdiction to the Tribunal.33 In this context, the SADC Tribunal also has jurisdiction over any dispute arising from the interpretation or application of the Protocol on Gender and Development that cannot be settled amicably.34 The Tribunal was primarily set up to resolve disputes arising from closer economic and political union, rather than human rights.35 However, a recent judgement by the Tribunal

30 See http://www.sadc.int/tribunal/. 31 A..O.Chidi, Complementarity, competition or contradiction: The relationship between the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights and regional courts in eastern and southern Africa, unpublished paper presented at the Conference of East and Southern African States on the Protocol Establishing the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Gaborone, Botswana, 9– 10 December 2003. 32 Article 15(2), Protocol on the Tribunal and Rules of Procedure thereof. 33 G. Hugo, Assessing the SADC Tribunal, unpublished article for the Institute for Security Studies, Tshwane Pretoria 2007, http://www.iss.co.za/static/templates/tmpl_html.php?node_id=2895& slink_id=5324&slink_type=12&link_id=24. 34 Article 18, SADC Protocol on Gender and Development. 35 F. Viljoen, above Fn. 5, p. 503.

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commonly known as the Campbell case,36 impressively demonstrates that the Tribunal can also be called upon to consider human rights implications of economic policies and programmes. On 11 October 2007, Mike Campbell (PVT) Limited, a Zimbabwean-registered company, instituted a case with the Tribunal to challenge the expropriation of agricultural land in Zimbabwe by that country’s government. At the time, the matter was also pending in the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe.37 As a result, an application was brought in terms of Article 28 of the SADC Protocol for an interim measure to interdict the Zimbabwean Gov- ernment from evicting Mike Campbell (PVT) Limited and others from the land in question until the main case had been finalised. The claimant argued that the Zimbabwean land acquisition process was racist and illegal by virtue of Article 6 of the SADC Treaty and the African Union Charter, which both outlaw arbitrary and racially motivated government action. Article 4 of the SADC Treaty stipulates that SADC and its member states are obliged, inter alia, to act in accordance with the principles of human rights, democracy and the rule of law, as well as in line with the principles of equity, balance and mutual benefit, and the peaceful settlement of disputes. According to Article 6(2) of the Treaty, – “SADC and member states shall not discriminate against any person on grounds of gender, religion, political views, race, ethnic origin, culture or disability.” It was put forward that the constitutional amendments behind the farm seizures were contrary to SADC statutes, and that the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe had failed to rule on an application by Campbell and 74 other Zimbabwean white commercial farmers to have the race-based acquisition declared unlawful.38 The claimant alleged that he had suffered a series of invasions on his farm. The defendant state in turn argued that the land had to be given back to even out a colonial imbalance in land distribution, and that Campbell had not exhausted local remedies. The relationship between the legal regime of SADC on the one hand and Zimbabwe’s national law on the other is at the core of this case. Section 23 of the Constitution of the Republic of Zimbabwe states the following: “No law shall make any provision that is discriminatory either of itself or in its effect; and no person shall be treated in a discriminatory manner by any person acting by virtue of any written law or in the performance of the functions of any public office or any public authority.” In 2005, however, the Zimbabwean Constitution was amended. The Constitutional Amendment Act No. 17 of 2005 allows the Zimbabwean Government to seize or expropriate farmland without compensation, and bars courts from adjudicating over legal challenges filed by dispossessed and aggrieved white farmers. Section 2(2) of the Constitutional Amendment Act provides that –

36 Mike Campbell & Another (PVT) Limited v The Republic of Zimbabwe SADC (T) 2/2007. 37 See Mike Campbell (PVT) Ltd et al. v The Minister of National Security responsible for Land, Land Reform and Resettlement and the Attorney-General. Constitutional Application No. 124/06 (unreported case: Supreme Court of Zimbabwe). 38 Allgemeine Zeitung, 31 March 2008: Klägerschar vervielfacht – 74 simbabwische Farmer dürfen mit Campbell Enteignung anfechten.

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“… all agricultural land – [a description of such agricultural land identified by the Government is given here] … is acquired by and vested in the State with full title therein …; and … no compensation shall be payable for land referred to in paragraph (a) except for any improvements effected on such land before it was acquired.” The practical implications of the Constitutional Amendment Act resulted in farm seizures, where most of the approximately 4,000 white farmers were forcibly ejected from their properties with no compensation being paid for the land, since, according to Harare, it was stolen in the first place. The Zimbabwe Government has compensated some farmers only for developments on the land such as dams, farm buildings and other so-called improvements.39 After an interim order was issued by the Tribunal40 that Campbell should remain on his expropriated farm until the dispute in the main case had been resolved by it, the Zimbabwean Supreme Court41 (sitting as a Constitutional Court) dismissed the application by the white commercial farmers challenging the forcible seizure and expropriation of their lands without compensation. The Court ruled that –42 “… by a fundamental law, the legislature has unquestionably said that such an acquisition shall not be challenged in any court of law. There cannot be any clearer language by which the jurisdiction of the courts is excluded.” The main hearing before the SADC Tribunal was scheduled for 28 May 2008, but was postponed until 16 July 2008. In the meantime, Campbell and members of his family were brutally beaten up on their farm in Zimbabwe and allegedly forced to sign a paper declaring that they would withdraw the case from the SADC Tribunal.43 Subsequently, the applicants and other interveners in the Campbell case made an urgent application for non-compliance to the Tribunal, seeking a declaration to the effect that the respondent state was in breach and contempt of the Tribunal’s orders. After hearing the urgent application, the Tribunal found that the respondent state was indeed in contempt of its orders. Consequently, and in terms of Article 32(5) of the Protocol, the Tribunal decided to report the matter to the Summit for the latter to take appropriate action.44 The hearing of the Campbell case was finalised on 28 November 2008. In its final decision, the SADC Tribunal ruled in favour of the applicants Mike and William Campbell and 77 other white commercial farmers.45 In conclusion, the Tribunal held that the Repub-

39 Incidentally, these land reform measures have plunged Zimbabwe into severe food shortages. 40 On 13 December 2007. 41 On 22 January 2008. 42 See http://www.thezimbabwean.co.uk/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=13001: campbell-case-heads-of-argument-summary&catid=31:top%20zimbabwe%20stories&Itemid=66. 43 Allgemeine Zeitung, 1 July 2008: "Simbabwe: Brutaler Überfall auf Campbell – Schlägertrupps misshandeln Farmerfamilie schwer und erpressen Verzichtserklärung für Prozess am SADC Tribunal". 44 So far, no official measures have been taken by the SADC Summit in the Campbell case. 45 Mike Campbell (PVT) Limited & Another v The Republic of Zimbabwe SADC (T) 2/2007.

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lic of Zimbabwe was in breach of its obligations under Articles 4(c) and 6(2) of the SADC Treaty, and that –46 • the applicants had been denied access to the courts in Zimbabwe • the applicants had been discriminated against on the ground of race, and47 • fair compensation was payable to the applicants for their lands compulsorily acquired by the Republic of Zimbabwe. Furthermore, the Tribunal directed the Republic of Zimbabwe to take all necessary measures to protect the possession, occupation and ownership of the lands of applicants who had not yet been evicted from their lands, and to pay fair compensation to those three applicants who had already been evicted from their farms. The ruling is considered to be a landmark decision which will no doubt influence the legal landscape in the SADC region. Meanwhile, the Zimbabwean Government has announced that it will not accept the judge- ment48 and the farm of Michael Campbell, who won the case at the SADC Tribunal was invaded.49 This raises the question of how the SADC Tribunal’s judgements are to be enforced. The Tribunal’s decisions are final and binding.50 Sanctions for non-compliance may be imposed by the Summit according to Article 33 of the SADC Treaty, and are determined on a case-by-case basis. However, no specific sanction is outlined for non-compliance with judgements issued by the SADC Tribunal.51 The Tribunal itself can only refer cases of non-

46 Ibid, p. 57 f. 47 The issue of racial discrimination was decided by a majority of four to one. Judge Tshosa, in his dissenting opinion, concluded that “Amendment 17 does not discriminate against the applicants on the basis of race and therefore does not violate the respondent’s obligation under Article 6(2) of the Treaty”. He argued that “the target of Amendment 17 is agricultural land and not people of a particular racial group” and that – although few in number – not only white Zimbabweans had been affected by the amendment. See Mike Campbell (PVT) Limited & Another v The Republic of Zimbabwe SADC (T) 2/2007, dissenting opinion of Hon. Justice Dr Onkemetse B Tshosa. 48 On 28 February 2009, Zimbabwe’s President Robert Mugabe said that “[T]here is no going back on the land reforms” and that “[S]ome formers went to the SADC tribunal in Namibia but that’s nonsense, absolute nonsense, no one will follow that….We have courts here in this country, that can determine the rights of people. Our land issues are not subject to the SADC tribunal.” See The Namibian, Mugabe says Zim land grabs will continue, 2 March 2009. 49 On 25 February 2009, Michael Campbell and his wife had to leave the farm in fear of their safety after a group of two vehicles led by Peter Chamada, nephew of Cabinet Minister Nathan Shamuyarira, claiming to be from the lands office came to the farm and said that they did not care about the law or the police but were taking over now. See The Namibian, Campbell flees farm invasion in Zimbabwe, 27 February 2009. 50 Article 16 (5) of the SADC Treaty. 51 Interestingly, a draft SADC Human Rights Charter drawn up by NGOs of SADC member states in 1996 contained a provision according to which any state “which does not comply with an order of the Court interpreting this Charter shall be suspended from SADC for the duration of its non- compliance with such order”. This proposal, although it appears very effective, has, however, not been realised. See Viljoen, above Fn. 10, p. 201 f.

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compliance to the SADC Summit for the latter to take appropriate steps. Therefore, the future will show to what extent the Tribunal’s judgements are taken seriously by SADC member states and by SADC itself. Even if the Tribunal is unable to heal all domestic failures in human rights matters, since such matters are not in the focus of the institution or its mandate for regional integration, it remains to be seen whether SADC is politically and legally mature enough to apply the necessary lessons. Of significance is the fact that none of the cases heard by the Tribu- nal so far have dealt with disputes among member states, whereas 15 cases relate to disputes between natural/legal persons and member states, and 2 to disputes between SADC employees and SADC institutions. This interim balance shows that there is indeed a need for a supranational judicial body to decide on matters that relate to cases of imbalances between national law on the one hand and community law on the other. The Tribunal can, therefore, significantly contribute not only towards a deeper harmonisation of law and jurisprudence, but also towards a better protection of human rights at community level – provided that SADC and its institutions put the necessary emphasis on the enforcement of the Tribunal’s judgements.

VI. Concluding remarks

RECs have taken into account that human rights are important on the way to realise their main objectives, commonly defined to consist in deeper regional integration aimed at enhancing economic development. The harmonisation of laws and jurisprudence is considered to be one step towards deeper regional integration. To this end, one objective must be to develop a uniform human rights standard, applicable for all member States of the single REC. At this stage, it can be concluded, that altogether, human rights protection does indeed play a vital role at sub-regional level. SADC has integrated human rights into its respective legal frameworks and the SADC Tribunal is able to accept human-rights-related cases. One aspect that remains particularly problematic is that compliance with the SADC Tribunal’s decisions depends on the political will of the Summit. When a SADC member state fails to comply with a decision of the Tribunal, such failure can again be referred to the Tribunal. If the Tribunal confirms that such failure has occurred, it can report its finding to the Summit for the latter to take the appropriate action (Tribunal Protocol, Article 32). However, the general rule is that the Summit operates on a basis of consensus. This means that also a member that has not been able to conform to the decision of the Tribunal, has to condemn its own action, if the Summit is to make any official decision on the matter. Being a supranational institution in the region the SADC Tribunal is a part of a complex system of multi-level governance. The effectiveness of supranational action depends crucially on the strength of interdependence between the supranational and national

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levels.52 The very fact that the first cases before the SADC Tribunal deal with human rights issues and have been brought by private parties contains a particular message. This needs further exploration because it tells us other things, namely about the state of integration (or lack of it) in southern Africa, neglect of internal rule of law and the absence of more effective inter-state mechanisms for protecting human rights. Meanwhile Zimbabwean land reform is feared to affect its neighbouring countries, especially if SADC and its institutions fail to respond to member states protecting their national sovereignty. The recent ruling of the Tribunal making the Zimbabwean land reform subject of discussion as well as the increasing number of cases pending have shown that SADC, a regional economic community is not only growing towards regional integration, but also aims at protecting human rights in the region. On 28 February 2009, Zim- babwe’s President Robert Mugabe however said, that “land seizures from white farmers would continue and (…) that the SADC Tribunal had no right to rule on the land seizures”.53 The dispersion of power and the increase in integration activities leading to multiple levels of governance is, no doubt, a challenge being faced by SADC. With the Campbell case immediately the question arose how, within SADC, can state sovereignty be reconciled with the universal recognition of inalienable human rights deriving from respect for human dignity and popular sovereignty?54 How far can the universal recognition of human rights change the subjects, structures, general principles, interpretative methods and object and purpose of international law actually limit state sovereignty to renounce human rights treaties and to refuse domestic implementation of international obligations for the benefit of domestic citizens? It will be seen how the SADC Tribunal will deal with the issue of multilevel protection of individual rights and how SADC members will balance protecting their national sovereignty with their obligations towards the Regional Economic Commu- nity.

52 For comparative purposes see E. U. Petersmann, State Sovereignty, Popular Sovereignty and Individual Sovereignty: From Constitutional Nationalism to Multilevel Constitutionalism in International Economic Law? EUI LAW Working Paper No. 2006/45; http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ papers.cfm?abstract_id=964147. 53 See The Namibian, 2 March 2009: "Mugabe says Zim land grabs will continue". 54 Cf. O.C. Ruppel, Das SADC Tribunal: Eine juristische Zwischenbilanz, Allgemeine Zeitung, 5 February 2009. http://www.az.com.na/afrika/das-sadc-tribunal-eine-juristische-zwischenbilanz. 0234.php.

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Can paralegals enhance access to justice? The example of Morogoro Paralegal Centre in Tanzania

By Eva Diehl, Berlin*

“Paralegals have been instrumental in the realization of women and children rights and … curbing violence against the vulnerable social 1 group, especially in rural areas”

“Ignorance bars poor women and men in Tanzania from accessing their basic rights as enshrined in the constitution. Costs involved in the running of cases have been cited as major obstacles towards the poor' access to justice. Magistrates in rural primary courts have turned themselves into semi God, as they could dismiss a case or deny people their due rights, 2 capitalizing on their levels of poverty and ignorance.”

1. Introduction

In Tanzania, a major reform of the justice sector is currently under way, with the aim of establishing “a system of accessible and timely justice [for] all”3. One of the particular aims of this reform is “enhancing access to justice for the poor and the disadvantaged groups”.4 While the main focus of the justice reform is on the availability and quality of state justice institutions, so-called “paralegals” are active in conflict resolution not only within, but also outside the courts. These paralegals are usually lay legal advisors with some training in

* Eva Diehl holds an M.A. in Social Anthropology, Law and English from the Free University of Berlin and is currently a postgraduate student at the Berlin Centre for Advanced Training in Rural Development (SLE). She has studied Kiswahili at Humboldt-University of Berlin. E-mail: [email protected] 1 Francis Katemi, in: Judica Tarimo, Ignorance causes poor Tanzanian women to be deprived of their rights, Sunday Observer, Sept. 11, 2005. 2 Judica Tarimo, Ignorance causes poor Tanzanian women to be deprived of their rights, Sunday Observer, Sept. 11, 2005. 3 Chief Justice Barnabas A. Samatta, in: United Republic of Tanzania, Legal Sector Reform Pro- gramme Medium Term Strategy Fys 2005/06-2007/08, 2004, v., cf. also 7. According to the progress evaluation of 2008, the present reform is “the culmination of multiple efforts to reform the legal sector in Tanzania since independence.” Chris Maina Peter, Wachira Maina et al., Unblocking the road to timely justice for all: First annual review of the Legal Sector Reform Programme (LSRP) of the United Republic of Tanzania, Dar es Salaam, 2008, vii. 4 United Republic of Tanzania, Legal Sector Reform Programme Medium Term Strategy Fys 2005/06-2007/08, 2004, 23ff. This is in line with the national poverty reduction strategy, cf. United Republic of Tanzania, National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty, Dar es Salaam, 2005, 50, 35 and 53: “Rights of the poor and vulnerable groups are protected and promoted in the justice system – Ensure timely and appropriate justice for all especially the poor and vulnerable groups.”

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legal issues who offer free counselling services and engage in legal education. Proponents of paralegal activities in Tanzania underline the need for paralegals by referring to a number of problems and deficiencies in the state justice system which are said to inhibit access to justice, particularly for the poor and rural population: They argue that the courts are difficult to reach for most people living in the rural areas, that there is a lack of magistrates and advocates in the country, particularly in rural regions, and that court fees and fees for advocates are too high. For many people, these paralegal proponents say, access to justice is further inhibited by a lack of knowledge of their legal rights and the legal language, by the complicated and bureaucratic requirements of the courts, and by “cultural barriers”. Courts in general and the kind of justice practiced there are regarded as alien by these people, it is argued, with long durations of legal processes and widespread corruption among the police and the judiciary constituting additional barriers on the way to justice.5 Indeed, according to numbers given by the Tanganyika Law Society, in 2003 there were only 735 registered lawyers in mainland Tanzania for a total population of around 34,6 million, of whom eighty percent were working in Dar es Salaam.6 While the national language spoken by the majority of the population is Kiswahili, the language used in all courts higher than the Primary Courts is English, and some legislation is only available in English, as well. The justice sector is considered to be one of the most corrupt sections of the state

5 Cf. Jodie Hierlmeier, Legal aid provision in Tanzania: Improving access to justice, Dar es Salaam, 2004, 26; Chris Maina Peter, Access to justice – Creating a role for paralegals in the administration of justice in Africa, Recht in Afrika 1 (2008), 101f. 6 Cf. Jodie Hierlmeier, Legal aid provision in Tanzania: Improving access to justice, Dar es Salaam, 2004, 11. Numbers vary slightly and are given for different years: According to The Law Reform Commission of Tanzania (ed.), Discussion paper on the scheme for provision of legal services by paralegal. Paper to be discussed on the stakeholders' workshop on the 21st May 2004 at Dar es Salaam, Dar es Salaam, 2004, there were 668 advocates in 2003, the number given by Mathew Mwaimu, Legal Sector Reform Program and the position of paralegals in the judicial system. A paper presented in the National Paralegal Symposium at Movenpick Royal Palm Hotel, Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs, Dar es Salaam, 2005, is 793. Helen Kijo-Bisimba, Civil society experience: A justification for recognition of paralegal scheme in Tanzania. A paper presented to the Paralegal Symposium organized by the Women's Legal Aid Centre (WLAC) on 23rd August, 2005, Dar es Salaam, 2005, 2, has 730 in December 2004 of whom 641 are actively practising advocates. This is already a fourfold increase in comparison to 1994 with 153 practising lawyers out of 224 recorded as members of the Tanganyika Law Society (TLS), according to Fauz Twaib, Lawyers and the availability of legal services in Tanzania Mainland, Recht in Afrika 1 (1998), 66. Twaib explains that all advocates are obliged to enrol with the TLS, but deducts state attorneys and others not practising as private advocates from those registered with the TLC in order to get a more realistic number. According to The Tanganyika Law Society, Annual Report 2007, iv, the number of advocates enrolled with TLS reached more than 1000 in 2007, probably including state attorneys and non-practising members. – The population was 34,6 million according to the 2002 census and is currently estimated to be 38,43 million. Cf. United Republic of Tanzania, 2002 Population and Housing Census, http://www.tanzania.go.tz/census/, and The Tanzanian Population and Development Website, http://www.tanzania.go.tz/population, both accessed March 9, 2009.

Diehl, Can paralegals enhance access to justice? 189

administration.7 Another point of interest is who would consider taking a dispute to court at all, irrespective of financial resources and the availability of lawyers and legal support. Socio-legal research has drawn attention to the fact that considerably fewer cases are brought into the state courts in Tanzania than are settled outside the courts.8 Paralegals are said to improve access to justice not only due to their geographic accessibility and their free or inexpensive services, but also because of their “embeddedness”, i.e., their knowledge of the local language and the cultural context. “They talk the talk and walk the walk of the community”, the Tanzanian law professor Chris Maina Peter remarked during the National Paralegal Symposium which took place in Dar es Salaam on the 23rd and 24th of August 2005.9 Their conciliatory justice is said to be more readily acceptable than a court judgement dividing the disputants into winning and losing parties. In particular, this may apply in civil law cases involving people who are related to each other or otherwise closely linked by social bonds. Thus at the same symposium, several speakers observed that people in Tanzania were not normally comfortable to take matrimonial cases to court because they feared a disruption of family values. In contrast, paralegals would consider family values and human rights.10 Paralegals are thus also regarded as facilitators of alternative dispute resolution (ADR), a type of dispute settlement often favoured by development planners as a means to improve access to justice while taking the local culture of dispute settlement into account. Some paralegal centres are sponsored by non-governmental organisations which are in turn supported by international development agencies, and which are often well connected to other organisations in regional and international networks. These organisations create important linkages between the global and the local

7 Cf. United Republic of Tanzania, Legal Sector Reform Programme Medium Term Strategy Fys 2005/06-2007/08, 2004, 4f., which names corruption, low integrity within the legal system and inordinate delays as major challenges. Cf. also Community Information, Empowerment and Transparency (CIET) International, Service delivery survey, Corruption in the police, judiciary, revenue and land services, Summary Report SR-TZ-sds-96 (1996), 3; United Republic of Tanzania Prevention of Corruption Bureau, Petty Corruption, v; Global Advice Network, Tanzania Country Profile, 2006, 2; and Research on Poverty Alleviation (REPOA), Combating Corruption in Tanzania: Perception and Experience, Afrobarometer Briefing Paper 33 (2006), 4, for public perception of corruption: in a 2005 survey in Tanzania, 61 percent of the people questioned believed judges and magistrates to be corrupt, 72 percent thought the same of the police. 8 Cf. Ulrike Wanitzek, Legally unrepresented women petitioners in the lower courts of Tanzania: A case of justice denied? Journal of Legal Pluralism No. 30/31, 1990-1991, 263, and Harald Sippel / Ulrike Wanitzek, Local Land Law and Globalization. A comparative study of peri-urban areas in Benin, Ghana and Tanzania, 2004, 240. 9 Cf. also Chris Maina Peter, Access to justice – Creating a role for paralegals in the administration of justice in Africa, Recht in Afrika 1 (2008), 128. 10 Peter Chisi, National Paralegal Symposium, August 23-24, 2005, Dar es Salaam. Cf. Ulrike Wanitzek, Legally unrepresented women petitioners in the lower courts of Tanzania: A case of justice denied? Journal of Legal Pluralism No. 30/31 (1990-1991), 263, who similarly observes a “general reluctance of women to make a claim against their husbands in court“ in Tanzania.

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and national arenas. Paralegals are thus also brokers who provide knowledge and interpretation of human rights norms as well as corresponding national legal changes to the local population with a view to creating legal awareness and behavioural change. This paper examines paralegal activities in Tanzania and their potential role in improving access to justice, focusing on the example of Morogoro Paralegal Centre. The analysis is based on information gathered during a four months research stay in Tanzania from mid- July to mid-November 2005 and a short visit of the paralegal centre in October 2008. The 2005 research consisted of a three months stay in Dar es Salaam including interviews with legal experts and civil society activists and participation in different workshops involving paralegals, and a subsequent stay at Morogoro Paralegal Centre involving interviews and informal conversation with the paralegals and their legal aid clients, as well as a review of their case books and participant observation of their everyday counselling practices. The centre is engaged in three main activities: it facilitates mediated settlements, it supports clients in court cases, and it operates as a referral centre. These activities are discussed in the sections following the subsequent introduction to the legally plural context in Tanzania.

2. Access to justice in a legally plural system

The legal system in Tanzania, which is based on English common law, is characterised by a situation of legal pluralism in terms of norms, institutions and procedures.11 Legal pluralism is understood here to refer to pluralism within the formal legal system as well as to the pluralism constituted by the multiplicity of informal legal repertoires which do not form part of state law and legal institutions. In any case, it is not possible to differentiate strictly between the formal and informal legal spheres in this respect. For instance, Tanzanian state law includes the “customary law” of the different ethnic groups within the country. This customary law is understood to comprise codified norms12 as well as non-codified “living law”, which refers to the vital and changing norms of the different customary communities.13

11 On the concept of legal pluralism, cf. among many others John Griffiths, What is legal pluralism?, Journal of Legal Pluralism 24 (1986), 1-55, Franz von Benda-Beckmann, Who's afraid of legal pluralism?, Journal of Legal Pluralism 47 (2002), 37-82, and Sally Falk Moore, Certainties undone: Fifty turbulent years of legal anthropology, 1949-1999, The Journal of the Royal Anthro- pological Institute 7 (2001), 95-116 with further references. 12 For the patrilineal Bantu groups in Tanzania, the customary law has been codified in the 1963 Local Customary Law Declarations. Cf. Ulrike Wanitzek, The situation of unmarried mothers and their children in Tanzania – protective legislation and social reality, in: Franz von Benda- Beckmann (ed.), Between kinship and the state: social security and law in developing countries, Dordrecht, 1988, 321, and Ulrike Wanitzek, Kindschaftsrecht in Tansania unter besonderer Berücksichtigung des Rechts der Sukuma, 1986, 54 ff. 13 Cf. Gordon Woodman,Ulrike Wanitzek and Harald Sippel, Local land law and globalization. A comparative study of peri-urban areas in Benin, Ghana and Tanzania, Münster, 2004, 37ff, and Harald Sippel and Ulrike Wanitzek, The vitality of local land law – a “fatal vitality?” A case study

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Tanzanian law displays a plurality of norms especially in civil law matters like marriage, inheritance and land ownership.14 Apart from the ordinary courts and a parallel hierarchy of forums for land matters, the forums that people approach for dispute resolution include village elders, religious authorities, local government authorities, marriage reconciliation boards, and paralegals. While some of these forums have overlapping jurisdiction and not all of them are in a clear hierarchy, they differ in terms of the law they apply, in their procedures, their degree of formal recognition, and the type of justice they practise – for instance, mediation, arbitration or adjudication.15 The problems which are claimed to inhibit access to justice in Tanzania belong to different categories: some are predominantly formal obstacles, like infrastructure, the geographical accessibility of courts and court equipment, while others are substantial matters, like a lack of legal knowledge, the appropriateness of the justice spoken, and the population's understandable distrust in corrupt state institutions. Consequently, in the debate about legal reforms in Tanzania, it is not always quite clear if “access to justice” stands for “access to the justice system” in the sense of access to state courts and legal services, if it is more about “just procedures” in conflict settlement – within as well as outside the courts – or if, in addition to that, the “justice quality” of norms and legal decisions is also under discussion. Some of the legal and human rights organisations in Tanzania which are in favour of legal aid schemes criticise the focus on formal and procedural aspects of access to justice, rather than on “substantive access, which focuses on producing social outcomes that are more fair and equitable.”16 In a legally plural system, the question of access to justice also implies asking which kind of justice is meant. Correspondingly, this paper shall employ a wide understanding of access to justice like Galanter has formulated: “Just as health is not primarily to be found in hospitals or knowledge in schools, so justice is not primarily to be found in official justice- dispensing institutions. Ultimately, access to justice is not just a matter of bringing cases to a font of official justice, but of enhancing the justice quality of the relations and trans-

of peri-urban Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, in: Peter Probst and Gerd Spittler (eds.), Between resistance and expansion – explorations of local vitality in Africa, 2004, 231ff. The term “living law” is derived from Eugen Ehrlich, Grundlegung der Soziologie des Rechts, first published in 1913. Cf. John Griffiths, What is legal pluralism?, Journal of Legal Pluralism 24 (1986), 23f. 14 For instance, the Law recognises three types of marriage, namely marriages contracted in terms of custom, religious (Christian, Hindu and Islamic) and civil marriage. Cf. Law of Marriage Act 1971 Part II 10-11and Fareda Banda, Women, law and human rights. An African perspective, Oxford, 2005, 101f. Tanzanian land legislation recognises a granted right of occupancy as well as a certified customary right of occupancy, cf. The Land Act, 1999, and The Village Land Act, 1999. 15 Cf. Yusufu Lawi, Justice administration outside the ordinary courts of law in mainland Tanzania: The Case of Ward Tribunals in Babati District, African Studies Quarterly Vol. 1 No. 2 (1997), 8. 16 Jodie Hierlmeier, Legal aid provision in Tanzania: Improving access to justice, Dar es Salaam, 2004, 24.

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actions in which people are engaged.”17 While part of the paralegals' activities consists in practical legal aid, they do not usually see their task in simply delegating disputes to the courts; rather, their legal aid and awareness raising are aimed more generally at creating changes of situations perceived as injust.

3. Morogoro Paralegal Centre

In Tanzania, the term “paralegals” comprises quite a heterogeneous group of people with different educational and professional backgrounds18, among whom the Law Reform Com- mission (LRC) of Tanzania distinguishes two groups: paralegals educated by non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and those who have acquired legal knowledge in their profession.19 The Kiswahili name that is used for paralegals is “wanaharakati”, which could be translated as “activists”, or “wasaidizi wa sheria”, which refers to the provision of legal aid.20 Their mandate is not clearly defined: one aim of the symposium mentioned above was to discuss legislation on paralegals as well as unified training curricula. This paper focuses only on the NGO-educated paralegals, lay legal advisors who have participated in trainings of several days to several weeks in different legal fields. These trainings cover, for instance, Tanzanian marriage law, inheritance law or the new land legislation which became valid in 2001.21 They often have a human rights focus or more specifically a focus on women's rights, emphasising women's equal rights in marriage and to property in land.

17 Marc Galanter, Justice in many rooms, in: Mauro Cappelletti (ed.), Access to justice and the welfare state, Stuttgart, 1981, 161. 18 Different labels like “bush lawyer”, “public writer”, “legal assistant”, “barefoot lawyers”, “community justice facilitator”, “peer educator”, “legal animator” or “community based human rights and gender committee” reflect the differences in the focus of different organisations and possibly also differing opinions regarding the legitimacy and acceptance of a paralegal scheme. Cf. The Law Reform Commission of Tanzania (ed.), Discussion paper on the scheme for provision of legal services by paralegal. Paper to be discussed on the stakeholders' workshop on the 21st May 2004 at Dar es Salaam, Dar es Salaam, 2004, 10; Jane Magigita and Jane Salomo (eds.), Tanzania Paralegal Profile, Dar es Salaam, 2005, 1. 19 These may be former police officers, labour officers, court clerks and magistrates. Cf. The Law Reform Commission of Tanzania (ed.), Discussion paper on the scheme for provision of legal services by paralegal. Paper to be discussed on the stakeholders' workshop on the 21st May 2004 at Dar es Salaam, Dar es Salaam, 2004, 10. Magistrates are the primary court judges. They can take a course e.g. at the Institute of Judicial Administration in Lushoto, but do not normally have a university degree in law. Cf. Fauz Twaib, Lawyers and the availability of legal services in Tanzania Mainland, Recht in Afrika 1 (1998), 81, United Republic of Tanzania, Legal Sector Reform Programme Medium Term Strategy Fys 2005/06-2007/08, 2004, 41f., 44, 91f. 20 Literally “legal helpers” or “helpers of the law”. 21 The Land Act, 1999, and The Village Land Act,1999. Cf. Harald Sippel / Ulrike Wanitzek, The vitality of local land law – a “fatal vitality?” A case study of peri-urban Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, in: Peter Probst and Gerd Spittler (eds.), Between resistance and expansion – explorations of local vitality in Africa, Münster, 2004.

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Although some paralegal units were initiated by women's organisations, their activities are not exclusively focused on women. Morogoro Paralegal Centre (MPLC) was founded in 1993 and is one of 16 paralegal centres which have been created by the Women's Legal Aid Centre (WLAC) in Dar es Salaam since the beginning of the 1990s.22 It is registered as an NGO and functions as a coordinating unit for a number of smaller centres, so-called subunits, in different wards.23 The centre consists of two small office rooms in Morogoro, a university town with approximately 230 000 inhabitants24 located at some 200 kilometres south-west of Dar es Salaam. In 2005, there were four women offering pro-bono legal advice here on an everyday basis. Bibi Katungwe, a pensioner, and Mama Balaigwa, a widow and mother of adult children, usually arrive in the centre in the mornings to wait for clients. Flora Masoy, who has been the coordinator of the centre since its foundation in 1993, and Bertha, are both teachers and join the centre in the afternoons when their work at school was done. Masawe, another teacher, who also conducts legal trainings at the MPLC, sometimes joins the four women for counselling sessions. Although there are no fixed opening times, on weekdays there is usually someone in or near the office between 10 a.m. and 5 p.m, such that the centre offers full-time daily counselling. Three times a week Hakimu, a lawyer from Dar es Salaam, visited the centre for a couple of hours in order to confer with the paralegals and advise them and their clients in difficult cases. Like the paralegals, she worked on a voluntary basis. Furthermore, the centre has created a theatre group producing and performing

22 According to Helen Kijo-Bisimba, director of the Legal and Human Rights Centre, the need for paralegal services was first discovered during legal awareness raising in several districts in 1990 and 1991. Helen Kijo-Bisimba, Civil society experience: A justification for recognition of paralegal scheme in Tanzania. A paper presented to the Paralegal Symposium organized by the Women's Legal Aid Centre (WLAC) on 23rd August, 2005, Dar es Salaam, 2005, 6. WLAC had evolved out of a legal aid initiative by the women's economic corporation SUWATA (Shirika la Uchumi la Wanawake Tanzania), which, in turn, had been founded, among others, by Sophia Kawawa, the then chair of the UWT, “Umoja wa Wanawake Tanzania” or “Unity of women Tan- zania”, one of the mass organisations affiliated with the Tanzanian ruling party and, until 1992, only party in the one-party-system, the Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) or “Party of the Revolu- tion”. The SUWATA legal aid scheme offered free legal aid for women in Dar es Salaam since 1989. WLAC was one of the first organisations to start opening paralegal centres in the early 1990s. Cf. Nakazael Tenga / Chris Maina Peter, The right to organise as mother of all rights: the experience of women in Tanzania, Journal of Modern African Studies, No. 34 Vol. 1 (1996), 149; Chris Maina Peter, Human Rights in Tanzania: selected cases and materials, Köln, 1997, 345. 23 Personal conversation with Flora Masoy and leaflet “Morogoro Paralegal Centre”. A ward is a local administrative unit comprising several villages; several wards form a district. In 2005, there were seventeen subunits; the long term goal according to Mama Masoy is to establish one subunit in each ward of the region. 24 Cf. 2002 census information, http://www.tanzania.go.tz/2002census.PDF, retrieved March 15, 2005.

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plays for legal awareness raising. Most of the actors live in the rural areas of Morogoro region and only visit the centre occasionally for rehearsals.25

The paralegal casebook “Anna, 22, Christian, Masaai, living in Sokoine. Marriage problems: She has come to ask for advice, her husband chased her away three years ago, her siblings are forcing her to go back to him. Advice: The siblings shall be written a letter and be asked to come to the office on Monday. There is also their father's brother who is required to come, too, he will also be written a letter. ... Anna came with her mother and her older brother. After long discussions it was decided that they should go back and perform a customary procedure in order to separate them. They shall inform us.”26

The paralegals document each client's visit in a casebook, where they note the date of the visit, the client's name, age, place of residence, sometimes also level of education, religion and ethnic affiliation, a short summary of the problem, the advice given, and other relevant information, e.g. who has directed the client to the MPLC, or the date of a case hearing in court. During the research period in 2005, an average of three clients visited the centre every day.27 The actual number of cases can be estimated to be slightly lower because many clients visit the centre several times. They return in order to talk to the lawyer, to give notice of a court hearing scheduled for their case, for mediation with the other parties of the conflict, or simply to report on the progress of events. Thus in the August to October 2005 period, between one third and one fifth of the cases were marked as “returns”. The casebook reveals that a broad spectrum of people come to the centre – people from different ethnic groups, Muslims as well as Christians, men as well as women, although women constitute the greater number of clients. In this context, it is important to note that the paralegals are usually not members of the particular cultural group to which their individual clients belong. Morogoro today is a multi-ethnic region which has long attracted migrants from different parts of the country. Of the four women, only one originally comes from the Morogoro area, but of of course this also does not make her a cultural expert for all the groups present in the region. Accordingly, the feature often praised in the talk about

25 In 2008, Mama Balaigwa retired from the centre because of duties within her family. Hakimu had moved to Dar es Salaam and therefore was not visiting the centre anymore on such a regular basis. The other three women and Masawe kept up their counselling services. The centre is also supported since 2005 by a Danish development worker of DANIDA. 26 MPLC casebook entries of October 14, 17 and 21, 2005. Kiswahili “ndugu”could signify both “brothers” and “sisters” and is therefore translated as “siblings” in this sentence. However, it is likely that “brothers” are really meant here; the assumption would be supported by the fact that Anna's elder brother was one of the three persons finally taking part in the discussion. 27 During the author's stay at the centre, between one and four clients frequented the centre per day. The average of three clients per weekday is derived from the numbers in the casebook, which has 63 entries for August 2005, 69 for September, and 59 for October 2005.

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the “cultural embeddedness” of paralegals is true for them only to a degree: they may know particular customs by virtue of experience and information gained from former clients, or they may have in common with their clients some more widely shared cultural norms that are valid across different regions in Tanzania. Thus in the case presented at the beginning of this section, they probably would not have been familiar with traditional Masaai ways of dissolving a marriage if not from their counselling experience. All four women are Chris- tian, which means that in religious matters e.g. of Islamic law of divorce and inheritance, they can similarly only rely on acquired knowledge and experience, which does not always reflect their own values and beliefs. Yet Islamic as well as Christian men and women frequent the centre for counsel. Their position as semi-outsiders distinguishes the paralegals in MPLC from the paralegals in the subunits who are trained to offer legal advice within their village communities as members of those same communities. Most cases in the period of August to October 2005 were classified as matrimonial problems. Conflicts over inheritance and land ranked second and third respectively. Pro- bono lawyers working in the head organisations as well as WLAC statistics confirm that these are the most frequent problems of clients seeking counsel in legal aid centres.28 In some paralegal units, the number of child custody and maintenance cases is yet higher than that of land conflicts. Other problems of clients attending the centre included a whole range of issues reaching from personal debts or a damaged harvest to physical violence.29 The table below includes most of the case descriptions noted for August through October 2005 in order to give an overview of the range of problems of legal aid clients consulting the MPLC.

Problem August September October matrimonial 31 17 15 inheritance 12 21 9 land 1 8 6 debt 1 7 9 child maintenance 1 1 3 problems with the child 1 1 damage of property 1 to be driven out of the house 1 parents prohibiting child to go to school 1 problem with sibling 1 rape 1

28 Personal conversations with lawyesr from the Women's Legal Aid Centre and the Tanzania Women Lawyers Association, Women’s Legal Aid Centre, 2001 Annual Report, Dar es Salaam, 2001, 4, Women’s Legal Aid Centre, 2003 Annual report, Dar es Salaam, 2003: 11. 29 It is likely that a considerable number of matrimonial cases include domestic violence as well.

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The paralegals use a range of different strategies in order to deal with these diverse problems. One of their standard methods is to invite the people involved in a dispute, as well as others who could aid a settlement, in order to discuss the matter in the centre. They use semi-official looking pre-printed letter templates that are stamped and titled “Barua ya mwito”30 in order to invite the required persons to come to the centre on a certain day at a certain time. If an issue is already in court or if a client wants to file a law suit, they offer to accompany the clients, explain them procedural requirements and give them mainly what they call “moral support”, or they refer them to the professional lawyer to be counselled. In some cases, they can try to provide professional legal aid by finding a voluntary lawyer through one of the human rights NGOs in Dar es Salaam; however, in the primary courts, i.e. the first instance in the formal legal system and the institution relevant for most court cases that reach the MPLC, no lawyers are admitted. Finally, there are cases which the paralegals refer to other institutions directly. The description and discussion of paralegal activities in the following sections is structured according to these different ways of dealing with cases.

3.1 Paralegals as an alternative dispute settlement institution

One opinion put forward by various informants in Tanzania was that many people in the country regarded the courts as a place of punishment, not as a location of justice. Apart from being intimidated by the black suit of the lawyer, the unknown procedures and the alien environment of the courts, people did not accept a court judgement as a final settlement, they said. This uneasiness towards the courts also contains a criticism of the principles of adversary justice which have been taken over from the English common law system.31 In contrast, alternative dispute resolution is depicted perhaps a little idealistically as a consensual form of dispute resolution in which different sets of values can be reconciled.32 The argument that the formality of courts and their adherence to an adversary model are inappropriate for many kinds of interpersonal quarrels arising in ongoing social relationships has often been raised in the past in favour of mediation and other types of informal dispute settlement. In a cross-cultural ethnographic study, Merry characterises mediation as a “phenomenon of communities”, with ethnographic village studies from

30 “Letter of call”: “Barua”: letter; “mwito”: call. 31 These principles are “based on the assumption that truth will emerge from the confrontation of opposing versions by the parties”, and legal representation by an advocate is a central element of the adversary system. Ulrike Wanitzek, Legally unrepresented women petitioners in the lower courts of Tanzania: A case of justice denied? Journal of Legal Pluralism No. 30/31 (1990-1991), 256. 32 Cf. Chisi above at FN 10, National Paralegal Symposium, Dar es Salaam, August 23-24, 2005. Chris Maina Peter said that the acronym ADR for alternative dispute resolution was sometimes translated as “Actual Dispute Resolution”. University of Dar es Salaam, Interview on Sept. 19, 2005.

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different parts of the world showing that members of a village community are reluctant to sue each other in court in order not to jeopardise important bonds. She points out, however, that the process of mediation may have been misunderstood by focusing on its consensual and conciliatory qualities while ignoring the very important role that power and coercion play in mediated settlements.33 In this section, two cases are contrasted in order to illustrate the activities as well as the limitations of paralegals as facilitators of alternative dispute settlement, and the contrast between the MPLC and paralegals acting in village subunits.

The “lost” son This case involved a woman asking the paralegals for advice because she had not seen her son for nine years, and was not able to get in touch with him nor talk to the father. According to her story, years ago it had been agreed that the son should stay with his grandmother, the father's mother, in Mombasa and go to school there. However, now she did not have any news of him and did not even know if he was still alive or still living in Mombasa. She did not want to take the boy out of school, but simply be able to see him and keep in touch with him. The paralegals expressed their sympathy to the lady and tried to find out from her how contact could be established. When she told them that both the son's father and his grandfather – the father's father – lived close by, they agreed with her to invite the two men to the MPLC for the day after the next. Both men were sent an invitation letter. On the scheduled day, only the grandfather and the lady herself with her own mother showed up. After polite and elaborate greetings to the grandfather, the paralegals explained why they had invited him, recounting the lady's story. In the conversation, they stressed that the MPLC was not the police, nor the court, but that they were there simply to give advice, and to give advice to everybody. They repeatedly explained to the grandfather that they hoped he could help them to facilitate the contact, since the lady herself and her son's father were not able to talk to each other. The grandfather, who initially denied that he could be of any help and seemed irritated about the requests, after some time revealed that his grandson had visited Morogoro only two days ago and agreed to give the paralegals his son's telephone number as well as talk to him if they called him. When the paralegals tried to call him there and then, they were told that the man had travelled out of town. They then suggested to the grandfather that they should invite him again together with his son as soon as the latter returned from this travels. Thanking him for his coming, they emphasised once more how important they considered his assistance to be.

33 Cf. Sally Engle Merry, The social organisation of mediation in nonindustrial societies: Implica- tions of informal community justice in America, in: Richard Abel (ed.), The politics of informal justice, London/ New York, 1982, 17, 31 and 20, with further references.

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The forced marriage On the first of November, 2005, a paralegal from Mvomero, one of the districts in Morogoro region, asked the MPLC for advice because in his community, a 14-year-old girl had been married against her will and all her protests to a rich 50-year-old man who had arranged this marriage with the girl's parents and promised them bridewealth of eight cattle. The paralegal said that he had not been able to help the girl and asked the MPLC if they or the local government authorities could send a letter asking that the girl should return to her parents. When asked if he thought the girl's parents would consent to have the girl return home, he replied, “they will consent, because they fear the government.”34 In the first example, the paralegals of the MPLC fulfilled the typical function of a mediator by facilitating a conversation as noninvolved third party between two parties who apparently were not able to communicate otherwise. A similar procedure is reflected in the quote from their casebook at the beginning of this section. By inviting relatives of their clients – not only those family members immediately involved in the conflict, but also others who could help to enable a solution or whose agreement might be needed in order for the settlement to be realised – they also follow a custom of many people in Tanzania to debate family conflicts first of all in the extended family and/or within the clan.35 Since age hierarchies play an important role in Tanzania, elders are often accorded a special role in conflict settlement. In the first example, it is feasible that by their repeated requests for help the paralegals were appealing to a social norm according to which the grandfather's authority was needed and whereby it was his duty to assist in a matter regarding his son and grandson. The “barua mwito”-strategy of the paralegals can thus be understood as a kind of alternative dispute settlement which relies on certain strategies common for resolving conflicts in different ethnic groups of Tanzania. The frequency with which the MPLC is approached for such settlements as well as its clients' statements suggest that the centre has acquired somewhat of a reputation for handling certain types of disputes well. For instance, two clients who were involved in a property conflict with a relative reported that when they had already reached the court, in front of the court door someone had advised them to go to the MPLC, telling them that there they would receive better help. In contrast, in the example of the forced marriage, the respective paralegal was not able to capitalise on his local standing or act as mediator. Notably, it also was precisely not this paralegal's cultural embeddedness which seemed to be able to contribute to a solution of the conflict, but a threat with the official authorities and the enforcement of the law. As became clear in the course of the conversation, this paralegal was obviously not a respected authority in his community who could have exerted influence because of his high status. On the contrary, he explained that he was criticised for lack of respect, and that it was not easy

34 Nov. 1st, 2005, my fieldnotes. 35 As a participant commented in a discussion about matrimonial conflicts in one of the paralegal seminars in Morogoro, “the first judges are absolutely the parents”: “Mahakimu wa kwanza kabisa ni wazazi wawili”, October 25, 2005, author's fieldnotes.

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to be a paralegal and an activist – this was only possible, he said, if you had stripped your- self of the customs. Pointing out that he had “stripped himself of the bad customs” completely, he said that he was now reproached in Mvomero for not respecting his community's culture. The example illustrates that paralegals are not generally neutral mediators, but that they try to strengthen a certain set of norms which is not necessarily reconcilable with other norms. The case constitutes a conflict of norms between human rights law and Maasai customary law: the forced marriage stands in clear contradiction to the human right to freely choose a spouse36, while the normative system of the dominant Maasai culture is characterised by age-sets and gendered hierarchies which include the prerogative of parents to decide whom their children will marry.37 The conflict is characteristic of a situation of social change where a choice of different norms and life scripts becomes available and where people may start to use courts when the cohesion of village communities breaks down and reduces the felt need of maintaining amicable relationships.38 It also illustrates what socio-legal research has pointed out earlier on: the fact that mediation between unequals can easily be to the disadvantage of the weaker party of a dispute since it is characterised by the differences in bargaining power of the persons involved and tends to perpetuate status differences. Therefore, the weaker party may need courts or another type of coercion in order to assert its rights.39

36 This has been incorporated into Tanzanian national law. Cf. UDHR Art. 16 II; CEDAW Art. 16 I (b) on the “right freely to choose a spouse and to enter into marriage only with ... free and full consent” and Art. 16 II stating that “the betrothal and marriage of a child shall have no legal effect, and all necessary action, including legislation, shall be taken to specify a minimum age for marriage”; the Tanzanian Law of Marriage Act No 5, 1971 defines the minimum age for marriage as 15 for girls or 14 with the consent of the court but also states that in any case marriage must be a “voluntary union”, cf. sections 13 I-II and 16 I. 37 Cf. Dorothy Hodgson, My daughter … belongs to the government now: Marriage, Maasai, and the Tanzanian state, Canadian Journal of African Studies No. 30 Vol. 1 (1996), 106-123, for a similar case, and more generally Dorothy Hodgson, “Once intrepid warriors”: Modernity and the production of Maasai masculinities, in: Dorothy Hodgson (ed.), Gendered modernities. Ethno- graphic perspectives, New York, 2001, 105-145. 38 Cf. Sally Engle Merry, The social organisation I'm out of office till Monday, 27 April 2009. E- Mails won't be forwarded. of mediation in nonindustrial societies: Implications of informal community justice in America, in: Richard Abel (above Fn. 33), 31. 39 Cf. Sally Engle Merry, The social organisation of mediation in nonindustrial societies: Implica- tions of informal community justice in America, in: Richard Abel (above Fn. 33), 39, 32f.; also Ulrike Wanitzek, Legally unrepresented women petitioners in the lower courts of Tanzania: A case of justice denied? Journal of Legal Pluralism No. 30/31 (1990-1991) 263, who notes that the higher percentage of female litigants in the lower courts of Tanzania should not be attributed to a higher litigiousness of women (often, these women had tried a multiplicity of other options before without success), but that rather it can be explained by the fact that women need the courts more to assert their rights. Correspondingly, the Tanzanian Legal and Human Rights Centre states that “specifically ADR does not usually work in situations where women are suppressed or subject to domestic violence”. Jodie Hierlmeier, Legal aid provision in Tanzania: Improving access to justice, Dar es Salaam, 2004, 26.

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It is instructive in this respect to consider the differences between village paralegals and the position of the MPLC paralegals as semi-outsiders. Mediators are often respected and influential members of their community who attain their positions by virtue of expertise in moral issues. They are usually of higher status than the disputants and can exert social pressure on disputants to accept a settlement, often their own favoured solution. However, where disputes involve members of higher social strata, outsiders are often needed.40 The MPLC in some cases seems to take on a controlling function by having clients report about the realisation of an agreed settlement, the progress of things or, as in the case of the “lost son”, by affirming to continue attempting to solve the issue themselves.41 At the same time, their relation to the institutions of the state is ambivalent. On the one hand, the MPLC paralegals distance themselves from state organs in a confidence-creating way by stressing – as in their introduction to the grandfather – that they are neither the court, nor the police, on the other hand, there is lively cooperation with state institutions.42 Its official-looking letters and the fact that counselling takes place in an actual office room which displays linkages to Dar es Salaam-based organisations, e.g. through posters and leaflets, may serve to enhance the impression of power which clients may perceive. The importance of the letter became evident one time when a paralegal from one of the villages of the region came to the MPLC asking for a letter for the client accompanying him. He commented his plea saying “What she [the person in trouble] gets is some paper from an office.”43 His comment seemed to suggest that any somewhat official looking paper would be able to alarm its recipients enough to create a change of conduct. While it is not implausible that a letter from an unknown institution would be able to impress people who are little familiar with state institutions and might have had bad experiences with corrupt officials, such strategies could only work with people who do not know enough about the MPLC to be able to judge its outreach and jurisdiction. The paralegals' ability to facilitate mutually agreed settlements and to act as agents of social change is contingent upon their status and their relation to the

40 Cf. Sally Engle Merry, The social organisation of mediation in nonindustrial societies: Implications of informal community justice in America, in: Richard Abel (above Fn. 33), 30, 31f. 41 This control function can also be recognised when part of an agreed compensation is paid in the centre itself after settlement. A corresponding case can be found in the casebook in October 2005. A Maasai had herded another's cattle for nine years, the latter having promised that the former would be able to marry one of his daughters. Now he refused to give him this particular daughter and agreed to pay him four cattle in exchange for the work instead, as well as 15 000 TSh for travel expenses to the MPLC. The sum of 15 000 TSh was paid straight away in the centre. The fact that part of the agreed settlement was implemented in the paralegals' presence would indicate that the disputants accepted these outsiders' authority. MPLC casebook Sept. 29, Oct. 10 and 21, 2005, author's fieldnotes. Admittedly though, 15 000 TSh (approximately 13 US$ at the time) are a negligible sum compared to the worth of four heads of cattle. According to the estimations of a Maasai informant, one head of cattle could be worth up to 300 000 TSh (equivalent to approx. 263 US$ in October 2005). 42 Cf. section 3.3 below. 43 “Njia anayopata ni karatasi chochote ofisini.” Author's fieldnotes, October 27, 2005.

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disputing parties. However, the “awareness” of the law that they are trying to promote also needs to be accompanied by the experience that such law can be claimed and enforced if informal settlement should fail. The role that paralegals play in court cases and the problems which their clients face there are the subject of the next section.

3.2 Paralegals in court The housegirl On October 25, 2005, a 17-year old girl came to the paralegal centre to seek help in a case pending in court. She reported that she had worked as a housemaid for a married couple in Morogoro town and lived in their house, and that one night when she had been alone with her employer, the man had beaten and raped her despite all her efforts to fight him back. The next day, his wife had accused her under some false pretences, dismissed her and thrown her out of the house. A woman she knew had taken her to the hospital and later helped her to file charges. Since then, the date for the trial had been postponed several times. She explained that the police officer in charge of investigation had suggested to her to drop the case. He had told her that the accused had offered to give the police officer 300 000 Tsh44 which he could share half and half with the girl if she agreed not to pursue the case further. She had not accepted the money, but did not know what to do now. A radio journalist had advised her to go to the MPLC.

The paralegals expressed outrage and sympathy listening to this story and advised the girl to discuss this case with the lawyer Hakimu. The girl came back the next day to relate her story to the lawyer, who praised her for not having accepted the bribe and talked to her emphatically, encouraging her not to loose courage and to maintain the charges at any rate, promising that if necessary, they would go to a higher court in Dar es Salaam. Hakimu and Mama Masoy decided that they would try to find an advocate for the girl, and Hakimu said that she herself would defend the girl if necessary. She then requested her to enquire what the number of her case file and the date of the court hearing were, and to come back to the MPLC the next day to report this information. She also gave her some additional instructions, telling her that it was very important for her to say that she had been born in 1988, because this meant that she had been only 17 at the time of the offence. Under these circumstances, the offence was punishable in any case, no matter if the girl had acquiesced or not.45 After the girl had left, the paralegals commented on how much time had passed

44 Around 264 US$ or 218 Euro at the time. 45 Although the girl had said during the first conversation with the paralegals that she was 17, she had declared later on that she had been born in 1986, which would have meant that she was already 19. In that case, the lawyer explained, the accused could argue more easily that the girl had agreed to have intercourse with him and that he was innocent. According to the relevant Tanzanian criminal law, a man commits rape if he has sexual intercourse with a woman under the age of 18 – with or without her consent – except if the woman is his wife, over 15 years old, and

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since the charges had been filed, and Mama Masoy observed that she knew the magistrate of the court in question, saying that this magistrate had not impressed the MPLC so far. She prognosed that the magistrate's strategy probably was just to wait until three months, the designated time for investigations, had passed, and then to simply file the case with a note that no proof had been found. The paralegals' casebook entry reflected this interpretation. It read “She came to ask for help because they are just pushing her around, the case is being announced every day.”46

3.2.1 “Moral support” and legal representation The paralegals' reactions to Malika's story and especially Hakimu's recommendations concerning her age illustrate how the case touched their feelings of justice and how, consequently, they not only thought about possibilities to facilitate a fair trial, but gave substantial advice which might increase the likelihood of the accused being convicted. Access to justice here does not only refer to “access to court” or fair procedures, but also to a “just result” including notions of substantial justice. Interestingly, Mama Masoy explained that the MPLC normally did not take any action once a case was in court, but that in this case, the MPLC would try to help the girl since nobody else was helping her.47 It seemed rather exceptional for somebody to be provided with a professional lawyer in a court case through the help of the MPLC. However, the centre is regularly frequented by people wanting to know how they should proceed in court or who want to ask a paralegal to accompany them. The paralegals describe their help in such cases as mainly “moral support”. They explained that a paralegal could give a client courage if he or she were afraid to file a case in court or speak during the hearing; a paralegal could give clients explanations how to proceed, but paralegals themselves were not allowed to speak in court.48 The emphasis that the MPLC paralegals placed on the fact that paralegals could not speak in court is interesting in the light of reports about other paralegals who seem to take a more active role, to the point of being perceived as a nuisance and an interference with due process by professional jurists. In a 2004 study of paralegal activities, the Tanzanian Law Reform Commission on the one hand criticises the misconduct of some paralegals who

not living in separation from him. Cf. Sexual Offences Special Provisions Act, 1998, Part II, 5, 130 (2)e. 46 “Amekuja kuomba msaada maana anazungushwa tu kesi kila siku inatajwa.” MPLC casebook 2005. Author's translation. 47 Personal conversation, 25. 10. 2005. 48 This role of the paralegals in court cases is also reflected in official descriptions of their work, with a particular focus on support for women: “The paralegals support fellow women who have cases in court by escorting them to court and giving them moral support since many women despair mid way. Having a group of women by your side raises your morale and courage.” Helen Kijo-Bisimba, Civil society experience: A justification for recognition of paralegal scheme in Tanzania. A paper presented to the Paralegal Symposium organized by the Women's Legal Aid Centre (WLAC) on 23rd August, 2005, Dar es Salaam, 2005, 11.

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allegedly “mislead the public and disrupt the proceedings of the court” or even “tell litigants that they are friends to the Magistrates and pretentiously pose as middlemen in transactions involving corruption”, on the other hand, the Commission acknowledges that there are “conscientious and efficient persons serving as paralegals, who provide needed services to the public in various areas.”49 The Law Reform Commission observes that some paralegals draw pleadings or even represent their clients in Court by way of power of attorney, and describes this as a transgression of their competences and as violation of the Advocates Ordinance 1954.50 Nevertheless, it also diagnoses a need for legal aid, stating that “it is evident ... that there is a vacuum to be filled in the Primary Courts, as the above legislation [the Magistrates' Court Act 1984] reveals that there is no representation [by advocates] there.”51 In Tanzania, there is no specific legislation on paralegals52, and in particular, their legal status in court is not clearly regulated. Although no advocates are allowed to appear in primary courts, according to Section 33 (2) of the Magistrates' Court Act 1984, “a primary court may permit any relative or any member of the household of any party to any proceeding of a civil nature, upon the request of such a party, to appear and act for such party.”53 Yet even in a very broad definition of “relatives” and “members of household” most paralegals probably do not fall under this provision. However, Chris Maina Peter discusses the disputed right of lay persons to represent clients in court by virtue of power of attorney with reference to several Tanzanian High Court judgements and in conclusion confirms that lay people must be allowed to represent clients, arguing that otherwise the intention of the provision would not be fulfilled.54

49 The Law Reform Commission of Tanzania, Discussion paper on the scheme for provision of legal services by paralegal. Paper to be discussed on the stakeholders' workshop on the 21st May 2004, Dar es Salaam, 2004, 5, 33. 50 The Law Reform Commission of Tanzania, Discussion paper on the scheme for provision of legal services by paralegal. Paper to be discussed on the stakeholders' workshop on the 21st May 2004, Dar es Salaam, 2004, 10 and 6. The Tanzanian Legal and Human Rights Centre confirms that “some paralegals have gone as far as being given powers of attorney to stand on behalf of those who cannot stand in court for various reasons.” Helen Kijo-Bisimba, Civil society experience: A justification for recognition of paralegal scheme in Tanzania. A paper presented to the Paralegal Symposium organized by the Women's Legal Aid Centre (WLAC) on 23rd August, 2005, Dar es Salaam, 2005, 11. 51 The Law Reform Commission of Tanzania, Discussion paper on the scheme for provision of legal services by paralegal. Paper to be discussed on the stakeholders' workshop on the 21st May 2004, Dar es Salaam, 2004, 6. 52 Paralegal units can register under the Companies Ordinance. One of the aims of the Paralegal Symposium mentioned before was to lobby for legal acceptance of paralegals and to discuss drafts and exchange experiences about curricula prescribing the training paralegals have to undergo. 53 Cf. also Magistrates Court Act 1984 33 (1) and The Law Reform Commission of Tanzania, Discussion paper on the scheme for provision of legal services by paralegal. Paper to be discussed on the stakeholders' workshop on the 21st May 2004, Dar es Salaam, 2004, 6. 54 Chris Maina Peter, Human Rights in Tanzania: selected cases and materials, Köln, 1997, 340ff.

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Primary courts have a special position in the Tanzanian court system as less professional institutions. Because of their simplified procedural roles and the court language Kiswahili, the primary courts are in fact intended to be easily accessible to the parties and legal representation should be superfluous. Ulrike Wanitzek elaborates that the primary court magistrates are required to assist the parties to accomplish certain functions which in higher courts would be performed by advocates. It is their responsibility to assist parties during the proceedings, they make inquiries to the parties in order to establish the evidence, and can even take direct action to investigate the matter of the dispute further, for instance, by visiting the site of a disputed piece of land.55 However, Wanitzek concludes from studying the reality of primary court disputes that the courts often fail to fulfil their task to translate the petitioners simple language into legal terminology, and that they act instead in a manner which presupposes that parties are assisted by legal counsel by assuming the passive role of a judge in the adversary system or insisting on formal procedural requirements. “It is argued”, she concludes, “that by trying to behave like superior courts, Primary Courts actually perpetrate a certain injustice in the name of the law.”56 The need for legal counsel diagnosed by the Law Reform Commission as well as the MPLC can, therefore, also be explained by a failure of primary courts to conform to the role provided for them by the legislation, according to which neither procedural requirements nor specialised legal language should constitute any obstacle for the litigants. Even if paralegals are not allowed to act as advocates before the courts, what they call “moral support” certainly seems to be an important factor affecting access to justice. This became clear in the paralegals' conversations with the girl who had been raped. The paralegals were careful to consider not only legal details, but also social and financial aspects, asking the girl about her family and housing situation, and giving her some money for her bus ride home. From a psychological point of view, this kind of support – a conversation with trusted persons who listen, express their sympathy, encourage her, support her case and give her clear instructions what to do – was perhaps just as important for the girl as the actual legal support that she can get from the centre.

3.2.2 The customary laws of corruption Through their clients' stories, the paralegals get a vivid picture of the proceedings in court and the well-known problems in the justice sector. Casebook entries like the following mirror these problems: “Shukura K. Marriage problems over a long period of time. – Now the case is in court. – But the court does not deal with this issue adequately. – It can be seen that her husband has brotherly relations with

55 Ulrike Wanitzek, Legally unrepresented women petitioners in the lower courts of Tanzania: A case of justice denied? Journal of Legal Pluralism No. 30/31 (1990-1991), 256, 262; Primary Courts Manual of 1964, Section 3 (3): “Direct action by court.” 56 Ulrike Wanitzek, Legally unrepresented women petitioners in the lower courts of Tanzania: A case of justice denied? Journal of Legal Pluralism No. 30/31 (1990-1991), 264, 256.

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the judge. – The husband has a second wife, he has moved all things from their place and brought them to that woman. – She asks for advice.” Or, in another case: “1.8. Yusufu S. (repeated counsel): Child being beaten. – Came to inform us that the court does not believe the child's testimony. He was told to bring witnesses. The advice is when he comes out of the court he should come back again to tell us about the proceedings.” Already on July 22, there had been an entry regarding the same issue, saying “The hearing was postponed to July 27. The judge is out of town.”, and later, on August 15, “The 57 case will be heard again on August 26, when both witnesses will be present.”

The problem of corruption is openly debated in the MPLC, including the courts' procrasti- nation strategies and their “bureaucracy” – for example, if a person had no money, the paralegals said, the court personnel could always claim that this person's file or case record were not there. By way of explaining different aspects of paralegal support, one of the paralegals working at the centre also mentioned that they had sometimes helped their clients with small sums of money for court fees; and that she had sometimes even accommodated clients at her place who had come from far away to go to court. Reading these pieces of information together reveals another aspect of the paralegals' “embeddedness”: their knowledge of what could be called the “customary laws of corruption”. They are able to comment on and explain to their clients the corrupt strategies of the courts which are partly subsumed under “bureaucracy”. However, they are able to influence this only on a very limited scale. Asked if she thought that the mere fact that paralegals were observing and accompanying a case could sometimes deter the judiciary and the involved state officials from accepting briberies and influence them to handle cases differently, Bibi of the MPLC laughed and said, that no, for corruption it did not make a difference if paralegals were monitoring the case, this was not something that she as a paralegal could influence. The social field of the people involved in primary courts jurisdiction – including paralegals where they interact with it – has its own unwritten laws concerning the requirements to be fulfilled in order to speed up a process. Rather than being able to counter this, the statements and observations from the paralegals suggest that they are able to help their clients by explaining them how the courts' “bureaucracy” works, including the occasional extra fee for its officials that their clients may have to pay. In another region, paralegals were reported to perhaps have influenced a decision by visiting a magistrate at home in order to convince her not to accept a bribe but to “do justice and justice only” – a story which sur- prised even the head organisation which had not expected nor perhaps intended this kind of interference.58 Although the paralegal protagonists in the story perceived their action as

57 MPLC casebook 2005, entries on the respective dates. Translation from Kiswahili by the author. 58 Helen Kijo-Bisimba, Civil society experience: A justification for recognition of paralegal scheme in Tanzania. A paper presented to the Paralegal Symposium organized by the Women's Legal Aid Centre (WLAC) on 23rd August, 2005, Dar es Salaam, 2005, 13.

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having prevented an unfair, bribed judgement, such reports also make understandable the allegations of the Law Reform Commission's research that paralegals are sometimes involved in corrupt transactions. In Morogoro, the impression was that paralegals at the MPLC knew the limits of their scope of action and influence quite well. Precisely in order not to jeopardise the cooperation of the centre with other institutions or the state authorities' tolerance of their activities, the coordinator seemed to take great care that the MPLC's actions would be regarded as correct and within the official – and unofficial – boundaries ceded to them by the authorities. Therefore, they would most probably not try to influence the decision of a particular magistrate through private interlocutions. This, however, also means that the influence paralegals can have on the greater structural problems within the justice sector should not be overestimated and that in certain categories of cases they have no power whatsoever to interfere, as the next case shall demonstrate.

3.2.3 Claiming land from a “big man” On the 1st of November, 2005, a client asked the MPLC for advice in a land law case. She has had a plot of land since 1993, she says, but an important government official from the criminal investigation department claimed ownership of this same plot. She had been told that the plot had not been surveyed yet, but then the official's acquisition of the plot had apparently been dated back to 1992, and he now disposed of the land as his. The ward tribunal59 had ordered him to compensate the woman with TSh 200 000 for the loss of the land, but she had not seen any of the money yet. The municipal officer had already told the woman privately that she would not have a chance against this official to get the plot back, since the official who wanted this plot was an “important man.”60 The example makes very obvious that there is a big discrepancy between the ideals of equality and the rule of law which the paralegals are trying to promote, and the social reality of a law for sale ruling in accordance with the power hierarchies of the state bureaucracy. As Mama Masoy explained later, the woman had asked for a letter from the MPLC, but the MPLC could not do anything if the municipal officer had already told her that she had no chance to get the plot. Moreover, she explained that they generally tried not to interfere in such cases involving high officials: “We don't like usually to take cases dealing with the government. Like this one, it is a bit delicate, and if the manispaa officer already told her he can't do anything ... what can we do. They will say who are we ... We won't send a letter. They will say what authority do we have. We cannot really help her.”61 Asked if government officials sometimes regarded the MPLC as a rival, the coordinator explained

59 After the village land committee, the ward tribunal is the second lowest forum in the hierarchy of forums dealing with land conflicts. 60 November 1st, 2005, author's fieldnotes. “Mtu mkubwa” literally means “big man”. 61 Mama Masoy, personal conversation, November 1st, 2005. Author's fieldnotes.

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that no, they did not, and emphasised again her caution in cases involving officials. The MPLC's possibilities to do anything at all seemed to be circumscribed by a sensitive line keeping them within their realms of power without seriously affecting the interests of higher-ranking levels of the state administration. The fact that the MPLC paralegals refrain from getting involved into “delicate cases” would explain why they are not perceived so much as trouble-makers as the Law Reform Commission's report seemed to suggest for paralegals in other regions.62

3.3 The MPLC in a network of dispute resolution forums

Interestingly however, there is also a lot of cooperation between the MPLC and different state institutions. In many cases, the MPLC simply functions as a point of coordination delegating its clients to other institutions and forums where they can receive help. This category of cases includes a whole range of disputes – from damage of property over matrimonial conflicts to the case of a school-girl who had been thrown out of the house by her elder sister and was accompanied to the Social Welfare Office by the paralegals in order to be permitted to stay temporarily with the family of a friend from school.63 Examining the paralegal casebook entries in turn for information on how the clients found the MPLC, one can read, for instance, that one was sent by the court clerks of the Regional Court, another by the Social Welfare Office, a third by the District Office, and a fourth by a “balozi”64. Remarkably, the police, the social welfare, court clerks and legal personnel also refer clients to the MPLC, not just the other way round.65 The cases show that there is a multi- directional flow of persons between several institutions of social service and dispute resolution in Morogoro. This could mean on the one hand that the state institutions are not fulfilling or not able to fulfil their obligations in a satisfactory way, as has been suggested

62 Another indication of potential conflicts with local government authorities are the difficulties reported by the Women's Legal Aid Centre and the Legal and Human Rights Centre of some of their paralegal units to get registered – a process which could take years in some cases. Personal conversation with lawyers at the Legal and Human Rights Centre; cf. also Women's Legal Aid Centre, Report on evaluation of WLAC supported paralegal activities, Dar es Salaam, 2005, 14. 63 While the paralegals offered to invite the elder sister to the MPLC, too, they asked the girl to consult the Social Welfare Office since they themselves had no authority to decide questions of custody. Author's fieldnotes, Oct. 28, 2005. 64 On the lowest level of local government, the “balozi wa nyumba kumi”, i.e. “ten-cell leader”, is responsible for 10 households. 65 That even the police refer cases to the MPLC was affirmed by the centre's coordinator. Personal conversation with Mama Masoy, Nov. 1st, 2005. Kijo-Bisimba, too, stated that “Some [paralegals] ... have also been able to get recognition at their level to the extent that the government authorities refer people with needs to the paralegals. This is the case of the Tanga paralegal unit, Morogoro paralegal unit, Mwanza paralegal unit, Shinyanga, Dodoma, Kigoma, Kilimanjaro, Arusha, Iringa to name a few.” Helen Kijo-Bisimba, Civil society experience: A justification for recognition of paralegal scheme in Tanzania. A paper presented to the Paralegal Symposium organized by the Women's Legal Aid Centre (WLAC) on 23rd August, 2005, Dar es Salaam, 2005, 10f.

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above for the primary courts. On the other hand, the responsibilities of different institutions also overlap. For instance, the paralegals explained that the Social Welfare Office was responsible for family issues like marriage, childcare and custody. Yet these kinds of problems are also among the most frequent to be brought to the MPLC, and women with marriage problems are in fact also referred to the MPLC by the Social Welfare Office. The casebook entries and individual case histories reveal that clients of the MPLC have often tried to solve their problems by approaching other forums before they come to the paralegal centre, and often, in turn, the MPLC is not the last place they go to. In the plural legal setting, these disputants approach different institutions to the best of their knowledge by a trial and error procedure, until they find a solution that suits them – or get frustrated and do not continue the dispute – or resort to other means of solving their problems. Their behaviour reflects what Keebet von Benda-Beckmann has described as “forum shopping” for Minangkabau in West Sumatra: disputants have a choice between several institutions with overlapping fields of jurisdiction and “base their choice on what they hope the outcome of the dispute will be, however vague or ill-founded their expectations may be.”66 Benda-Beckmann moves on to explain that generally, the jurisdiction is determined by the kind of dispute in question, but since disputes usually have several aspects, jurisdiction can be established through the way the dispute is defined. Different people and institutions also follow their own interests by attempting to acquire jurisdiction over certain disputes. She calls these “shopping forums”.67 Although the MPLC does not deliberately try to acquire jurisdiction over certain cases, the paralegals also pursue the aim of creating awareness on certain norms and legal concepts that they and their supporting organisations wish to strengthen, e.g. gender equality and the right to property according to the Tanzanian marriage law and the land acts of 1999. By pursuing such aims that go beyond their clients demands and are partly external to their disputes, paralegals also behave like a “shopping forum”. Their actions are informed by their own feelings of justice as well as the legal norms and values conveyed in paralegal seminars. Thus in some cases their outlook immediately affects where they direct their clients – for instance, they would rather refer a woman suffering from domestic violence and wishing to be separated to the Social Welfare Office than to a Christian marriage conciliation board.68 On the one hand, therefore, the

66 Keebet von Benda-Beckmann, Forum shopping and shopping forums: Dispute processing in a Minangkabau Village in West Sumatra, Journal of Legal Pluralism No. 19 (1981), 117. 67 Ibid. 117f. 68 One example case involved a Christian woman who had been mistreated by her husband for several years and had been told again and again by the priest to forgive her husband. When she approached the MPLC, she was considering to get separated. However, the Christian marriage conciliation boards, which, like the Social Welfare Offices, are entitled to issue the “letter of divorce” needed in court, tend to discourage couples from divorcing. Author's fieldnotes, Oct. 27, 2005; cf. Bart Rwezaura, Gender justice and children's rights: A banner for family law reform in Tanzania, in: Andrew Bainham (ed.), The International Survey of Family Law, The Hague, 1997, 422.

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MPLC is one forum in a whole range of institutions to which clients may bring their disputes. Where the paralegals take cases and attempt to settle them themselves in the centre, the MPLC operates parallely to other forums like the Social Welfare Office, elected representatives in political institutions, religious authorities, or village and clan elders. On the other hand, the MPLC also functions as a point of coordination which, based on its knowledge of different forums, is able to direct clients to other institutions where they can be helped. Noticeable in all these cases are the paralegals' repeated offers to clients to come back to the centre if the respective other institution proved not to be helpful, and to counsel them again in that case. The fact that they can make their clients understand that they need not depend on the decision of a single institution as a final judgement, together with the reassurance through an offer of continued counselling, may be understood as part of what the paralegals call moral support. In many cases, it is questionable how far their help can go and if the dispute can be solved in the end. However, their ability to explain different options in combination with the information where a problem may be solved in a quick – and possibly: in the desired – way is an important aspect of access to justice.

4. Conclusion

The guiding question of this report has been if, and how, paralegals can improve access to justice, understood as a broad concept comprising substantial aspects beyond merely formal access to court. Case stories from the MPLC have illustrated some forms of assistance which paralegals can give, but also the limitations to their influence. On the one hand, paralegals at the MPLC seem to meet a need for legal counselling in cases pending in the lower courts, a need which appears to be partly caused by the primary courts' failure to apply the simplified procedures they are intended to use. Hence paralegals improve access to state legal institutions to some extent by providing assistance with formalities, a limited range of legal services including free counsel by a legal professional, and emotional support by offering the clients a place to voice their grievances and accompanying them to court. For the paralegals, this “moral support” is an important aspect of their work which is immediately linked to their aim of creating awareness for certain rights. Their support may also consist in counselling clients to bring a case to court in the first place, or to appeal against a first instance decision. However, although they may be able to help their clients in family conflicts and land- or inheritance cases of small value, cases involving the interests of powerful individuals and government officials emerge as a distinct boundary. On the other hand, paralegals also act as mediators in a form of conflict settlement involving negotiations on a set date after written invitations to the parties involved in a dispute. Under certain circumstances, this may be a more easily accessible as well as a more culturally accepted type of dispute resolution than the one practised in courts. It is plausible that conflicts can be solved through this method when the involved parties have an interest in amicable settlement and accept the authority of paralegals as mediators. In contrast to the common assumptions among ADR proponents that such mediators need to be members of

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the disputants' community, the MPLC paralegals' position as semi-outsiders appears to be no less conducive to settlements. On the contrary, it may be necessary in order to provide a counterweight to the different bargaining powers of highly unequal parties. Finally, an important aspect of the MPLC's work is their ability to direct their clients to certain institutions out of a range of forums that are not in a strict hierarchy and with whose particular jurisdiction the clients might be only partly familiar. The MPLC acts as a switch point of coordination, while at the same time, it is itself one of the newer forums of dispute resolution available to people in Morogoro. In the pluralistic range of shopping forums, it also functions as a low-threshold social service institution providing first advice or legal first aid. Legally, the paralegals' own mandate is not clearly defined. Rather, they operate com- plementarily and sometimes in competition with other institutions within distinct acquired and carefully balanced boundaries which are likely to differ from centre to centre. In any case, it cannot be assumed that the scope of the activities in the MPLC is representative of an average paralegal unit, or that it can be compared in any way to the rural subunits. The MPLC is one of the best established and active centres among the ones founded by WLAC. Moreover, this kind of urban based centre differs fundamentally from the subunits in villages which in 2005 generally could not be expected to have office rooms, often did not have fixed counselling times, and whose actual activities were frequently somewhat unclear even to the central, coordinating unit. It is also worth noting that the paralegal activities sponsored with external funds at the time of the research were almost exclusively activities related to the field of legal education – development organisations financed workshops, contributed daily allowances and travel expenses for seminars and theatre plays, and assisted the publication of legal brochures. Yet the far greater part of the paralegals' work at the MPLC consists in the daily counselling sessions. The manifest reason for their motivation to engage in such time-consuming voluntary work was real commitment. The fact that the MPLC has turned into a meeting place for the women where they like to spend time, especially taking into account that with an average three clients per day there are long shared waiting times, might also play a role. That Bibi and Mama Balaigwa, who are not in paid employment and have adult children, could allow to spend so much time at the centre seemed more immediately plausible than for Bertha and Mama Masoy, both of whom have full-time jobs working as teachers, in addition to their family obligations. One cannot actually expect anyone to be so active as a paralegal without payment on a permanent basis. Correspondingly, high drop-out rates were mentioned as a problem by several organisations who train paralegals and are confirmed by evaluations.69 It remains to be seen which future role paralegals will play in light

69 Cf. Women's Legal Aid Centre, Report on evaluation of WLAC supported paralegal activities, Dar es Salaam, 2005, 29f., 39. The estimation of the MPLC, too, was that the motivation of paralegals in many of the subunits was not very high because of the voluntary basis of the work. Personal conversation with Bibi and Mama Masoy, October 26, 2005, author's fieldnotes. – This lack of

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of the ongoing reforms. Paralegal activities have been ongoing for more than fifteen years in Tanzania, but there are considerable disjunctions between their “grassroots” activities and the national level of legal reform. In 2008, no legislation on paralegals had been passed as yet; however, the Legal Sector Reform Strategy proposes to establish a fund to provide grants for legal aid and literacy activities implemented by NGOs or voluntary associations.70 Alternative dispute resolution and legal aid by non-state actors sometimes coexist in an uneasy tension with the rule of law ideal pursued by the protagonists of international development support as well as the Tanzanian state. In some parts of the legal reform documents it is described as the main task of NGOs in general, including those who support paralegal services, to service poor and disadvantaged parts of the population and ensure that their interests are protected.71 Nevertheless, the present contribution has suggested that the influence of paralegals against major problems within the justice sector, such as abounding corruption or the appropriation of land by powerful officials, is very low, and in most cases would necessitate links to the more powerful organisations in the centre who are able to provide professional lawyers or pursue public interest litigation. Considering that “the poor” who are potential clients of paralegals constitute the majority of the Tanzanian population, it would therefore appear that no large-scale improvements in access to justice can be made if the responsibility to support these people's rights is left to NGOs alone.

motivation could, of course, also be caused by other factors like a lack of social standing within the respective community or uncertainties about what their actual role as paralegals should be. 70 United Republic of Tanzania, Legal Sector Reform Programme Medium Term Strategy Fys 2005/06-2007/08, 2004, 24. 71 Cf. United Republic of Tanzania, Legal Sector Reform Programme Medium Term Strategy Fys 2005/06-2007/08, 2004, 24, 107, and Chris Maina Peter, Wachira Maina et al., Unblocking the road to timely justice for all: First annual review of the Legal Sector Reform Programme (LSRP) of the United Republic of Tanzania, Dar es Salaam, 2008, xiii, on expanding the role of non-state actors in the legal reform programme.

212

Under Reconstruction: Ethnicity, Ethnic Nationalism, and the Future of the Nigerian State

By Isiaka Alani Badmus, Lagos*

Introduction: A Sketch of the Context

Nigeria transited from military authoritarianism to civil rule on 29 May, 1999. Since this date, the country has been bedevilled by all forms of protracted conflicts. Many innocent citizens have lost their lives and properties worth millions of dollars have equally been destroyed. These conflicts, that are now threatening the stability, national cohesion, and survival of the multiethnic Nigerian post-colony, have taken a definite pattern. They are now being championed by the various ethnic militant movements that are agitating for social justice, regional autonomy, and their own significant slice of the proceeds from the country’s resources1. Undoubtedly, Nigeria is blessed with stupendous human and material resources, but ironically, it has become the bastion of inequitable state policies, poverty- ridden, etc., where ethnicity has pervaded every facet of its life. In a nutshell, these conflicts are function of social frustrations of the disadvantaged ethnic groups arising from failed expectations of government to deliver their basic socio-economic needs. This research explores the primacy of ethnicity, ethnic nationalism, and enters into critical discussions on the activities of the various ethnic movements to examine their implications for Nigeria’s survival. First, what are the historical roles of ethnicity in Nige- ria? Second, what account for the upsurge in the activities of ethnic movements in the pre- and post-29 May, 1999 Nigeria? Third, what are the structural problems within the ‘defective’ Nigerian federation that are now compelling various ethnic minorities to violence with the aim of achieving their goals of de-marginalisation? Fourth, are the activities of the ethnic militias the bane to the corporate existence of Nigeria or contribute to the vibrancy of its democratic politics?

* Isiaka Alani Badmus, Independent Researcher based in Lagos, Nigeria. His educational background includes a Bachelor’s and Master’s degree in International Relations (Ile Ife) and a Bachelor’s degree in Law [LL.B (Hons. Ibadan). Post-Graduate Diploma in Democracy and Diversity and Diploma in Peace and Conflict Research (Abidjan, New York, Uppsala respectively). E-mail: [email protected] 1 For further readings on the interface of ethnicity, politics and conflicts see generally: Otite Onigu, Ethnic Pluralism, Ethnicity, and Ethnic Conflicts in Nigeria, 2000; Nnoli Okwudiba, Ethnicity and Development in Nigeria, 1995; Eghosa Osaghae, “The Ogoni Uprising: Oil Politics, Minority Agitation and the Future of the Federal State”, African Affairs, 94, 1995; Eghosa Osaghae, “Managing Multiple Minority Problems in Nigeria”, Journal of Modern African Studies, vol. 36, no. 1, 1998; Donald C. Williams, “Accommodation in the Midst of Crisis?: Assessing Govern- ance in Nigeria”, in Goran Hyden / Michael Bratton (eds), Governance and Politics in Africa, 1992; David Turton, War and Ethnicity: Global Connections and Local Violence, 1997.

Badmus, Under Reconstruction: Ethnicity, Ethnic Nationalism, and the Future of the Nigerian State 213

To fathom the import of ethnicity, and the impacts of ethnic nationalism/organisations on Nigeria and democratic processes, it is imperative to enter into discursions on the significance of ethnicity in Nigeria’s political history. This is fundamental for three reasons. First, by probing the historicity of ethnicity in politics, we stand on a better platform of discovering the historical abuse [or otherwise] of the concept from the inception of the country and how this is manifested in the subsequent transitions of power between the same group of autocrats – whether in civilian or military uniforms. Second, a firm grasp of the centrality of ethnicity in politics provides adequate basis for us to appreciate the issue of marginalisation as one of the antecedents to the collapse of the country’s socio-political order. It is apparent that in Nigeria the state is at the centre of these crises for its non-repre- sentativeness and non-responsive to all sections of the population2; implying that, the Nigerian government and popular interests are diametrically opposed. This is true considering the situation in the volatile Niger Delta [ND] region that has become one of the hot- beds of ethnic agitations in recent years. Third, the marginalisation of ethnic minorities is a function of the inherent lapses in Nigerian federation, thereby promoting ethnic consciousness in all facets of the state’s life3. Thus, ethnic movements serve the interests of de-marginalisation of different ethnic nationalities, as well as ethnic politicking in the context of democratisation.

1. Ethnicity: what is it?

Before I venture into elaborating the key arguments of this paper, it is necessary to do some exercise in concepts clarification. First, ethnicity, a social phenomenon, is a function of the existence of a multiplicity of ‘ethnic groups’ as it describes in-group/out-group relations. Hence, Osaghae4 defines ethnicity as “individual or group behaviours based on ethnic group differentiation, usually in a competitive situation.” To really understand ethnicity and its potency in Nigeria, we must, first of, all define ‘an ethnic group’ and find answers to the reasons why such identity/ethnic loyalty become fundamental bases of individual and group behaviours. Ethnic groups may be defined as categories of peoples characterised by cultural criteria of symbols including language, value system, and normative behaviour, and whose members are anchored in a particular part of the new state territory5. Other scholars6 gave

2 Isiaka Alani Badmus, “What Went Wrong With Africa?: On the Etiology of Sustaining Disarticu- lation of the African Nation-State”, VRÜ 39 (2006), p. 270. 3 See Isiaka Alani Badmus, “Retired Military Officers in Politics and the Future of Democracy in Nigeria”, Africa Insight, vol. 35, no. 3, 2005; Eghosa Osaghae, “Ethnic Minorities and Federal- ism in Nigeria”, African Affairs, vol. 90, no. 359, 1991; T. Rotimi Suberu, Ethnic Minority Con- flicts and Governance in Nigeria, 1996, p. xi-xiii. 4 Eghosa Osaghae, “Ethnicity in Africa or African Ethnicity: The Search for Contextual Under- standing”, in U. Himmelstrand et al (eds.), Development Themes in an African Perspective, p. 138. 5 See Otite, 2000 ( see fn 1), p. 10.

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an explicit definition that sees an ethnic group as “consists of people who conceive of themselves as being of a kind. They are united by emotional bonds and concerned with the preservation of their type. With very few exceptions, they speak the same language…and they have a common cultural heritage.” One thread that runs through the above definitions is that an ethnic group has both objective and subjective aspects. In objective terms, some scholars7 see an ethnic group as having a collective proper name; a myth of common ancestry; shared historical memories; one or more differentiating elements of a common culture; association with a specific homeland; etc. As sound as these elements are, it is important to note that, while they are necessary, they are not sufficient to define an ethnic group because, as Osaghae8 argued, it is basically behaviour-oriented and dynamic rather than static. In subjective terms, an ethnic group is said to exist when its members define and see themselves as such in their relation with ‘outsiders’ who also recognise the group of identity. Thus, the subjective sense of common identity is almost developed only in the context involving relationships among two or more ethnic groups. Apparently, the subjective nature of ethnic group signifies the imperative of ethnic consciousness in defining it, and suggests that, ‘to borrow the words of a class analysis, an ethnic group is one which has transformed from being an ethnic group in-itself to an ethnic group for-itself;9 or from ethnic ‘awareness’ to ethnic ‘consciousness’10 These definitions do not deny the existence of contextual differences in characterising ethnic groups in various societies. Osaghae11 utilises the definition offered by two Ameri- can sociologists to explain this scenario. An ethnic group is, according to Theodorson and Theodorson12, “a group with a common cultural tradition and a sense of identity which exist as a sub-group of a large society”. This definition unmasks the fact that in the Ameri- can context, an ethnic group is nothing more than a minority group. If that is the case, the poser then becomes: what are the defining elements of ethnicity in Africa? In Africa, scholars agreed on both the potency of language and the myth of common descent. Doubtless, these two instruments support the fact that many ethnic groups of the contemporary era are ‘new’ creations which owned a lot to the ‘ethnicising’ process of getting each of them together. Certainly, language and myths were the principal instruments utilised in the

6 T. Shibutani / K.M. Kwan, Ethnic Stratification: A Comparative Approach, 1965, p. 47. 7 Otite, 2000 (see fn 1); Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays, 1973, p. 263; Adele Jinadu, Confronting the ‘Gods’ of Ethnicity. Ibadan: CEPACS Occasional Paper, No. 1, 2003. 8 Osaghae (see fn 4). 9 Nnoli, 1978, Op-cit, p. 7, cited in Osaghae, Ibid. 10 A. Gidden,The Class Structure of the Advanced Societies, 1973, p. 111, cited in Osaghae (see fn 4). 11 Osaghae (see fn 4). 12 G.Theodorson/ A. Theodorson, A Modern Dictionary of Sociology, 1969.

Badmus, Under Reconstruction: Ethnicity, Ethnic Nationalism, and the Future of the Nigerian State 215

process. Furthermore, in a situation where language was insufficient to galvanise ethnic solidarities, it is usually combined with the myth of common descent. This myth was fundamental even before colonialism and was vital to the unity that existed among the pre- colonial groups. In a nutshell, in contextualising an ethnic group in Africa, all-encompassing definitions should recognise the specific nature of ethnicity which is not a static, all- pervading, ever-present phenomenon. Instead, it is dynamic and intermittent, and its sali- ence is often situational. Expectedly, delving into the situational character of ethnicity raises the issue of ethnogenesis; meaning the etiology of ethnicity and enquires into its whys and hows. Since several scholars subscribe to different schools of thought on the issue of ethnogenesis, at the risk of banality, we shall broadly analyse their works under two perspectives: the Involuntary/Non-rational, and the Voluntary-Instrumentalist perspectives

1.1. The involuntary / non-rational Perspective

13 See Clifford Geertz, (ed.), Old Societies and New States: The Quest for Modernity on Asia and Africa, 1963, p. 110. 14 M.R Doornbos, “Some Conceptual Problems Confronting Ethnicity Integration Analysis”, Civili- zation, vol. 22, no. 2, 1972; P.Gutkind, “Preface: The Passing of Tribal Man in Africa”, Journal of Asian and African Studies, vol. 5, nos. 1 and 2, 1970 15 R. Melson./ H. Wolpe, “Modernisation and the Politics of Communalism: A Theoretical Perspec- tive”, American Political Science Review, vol. 64, no. 4, 1970; A.. Cohen (ed.), Urban Ethnicity, 1974. 16 E. Shils, “Colour, the Universal Intellectual Community and the Afro-Asian Intellectual”, Daeda- lus, vol. XCVI, 1967.

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and account adequately for its potency in one society and irrelevancy in other situation. Second, it overromanticised its naturalness thesis to the extent of overlooking the socio- economic and political environments of ethnicity. This mistake is costly in that it dimin- ishes its academic soundness because ethnicity depends on social forces and impulses. Third, while credit must be given to scholars that follow this approach on their recognition that ethnicity is a permanent form of moral obligation to one’s fellow ethnic, Osaghae cautions that “it overlooks the fact that many individuals have a relatively weak and diffused loyalty that imposes no particular obligation to help one’s kin.” All the same, the perspective is useful because it sees ethnicity as an adaptive mechanism in the alienating milieu which attends the process of social change.

1.2. The voluntary-instrumentalist Perspective

This is the natural thesis that sees ethnicity in psychologically reductionist prismatic lenses. Central to this approach is the position that ethnic identity is natural and not something that individual rationally decides to assume. Thus, individual is choiceless in matter relating to it because it is an unchanging legacy of one’s birth. In this respect, Geertz17 sees ethnicity as one of the ‘givens’ of life, which flows “more from a sense of natural – some would say spiritual – affinity than from social interaction.” In the non-rational perspective, two vari- ants are extant. First, some pundits18 see ethnicity as the natural state of an underdeveloped society which modernisation is capable of withering away consequent on the incorpora- tion/inclusion into a national culture, and replaced by more ‘rational’ identities like class. Melson and Wolpe and other scholars19, in contrast to the first variant argue that, rather than quitting, modernisation oftentimes heightens ethnicity/ethnic conflict. Thus, ethnicity, rather than being a sign of underdevelopment, is a natural, no-choice identity that is ever- lasting and permanent to each and every one and which his biological existence bestows as a resource in his interaction with other people20. Involuntary/Non-rational approach has been flawed on three grounds. First, its emphasis on the naturalness of ethnicity is misleading, because it fails to recognise its dynamism and account adequately for its potency in one society and irrelevancy in other situation. Second, it overromanticised its naturalness thesis to the extent of overlooking the socio- economic and political environments of ethnicity. This mistake is costly in that it dimin- ishes its academic soundness because ethnicity depends on social forces and impulses. Third, while credit must be given to scholars that follow this approach on their recognition that ethnicity is a permanent form of moral obligation to one’s fellow ethnic, Osaghae cautions that “it overlooks the fact that many individuals have a relatively weak and

17 See C. Geertz,(above fn 13), p. 110. 18 M.R. Doornbos (see fn 14); P. Gutkind (see fn 14). 19 R. Melson, / H. Wolpe (see fn 15). 20 E. Shils (see fn 16).

Badmus, Under Reconstruction: Ethnicity, Ethnic Nationalism, and the Future of the Nigerian State 217

diffused loyalty that imposes no particular obligation to help one’s kin.” All the same, the perspective is useful because it sees ethnicity as an adaptive mechanism in the alienating milieu which attends the process of social change.

2. The historical context of the problems of ethnicity in colonial and post- independence Nigeria

2.1. The Pre-Independence Period, 1914 – 1959

Most African states are multi-ethnolinguistic societies where both the ‘major’ and ‘minor’ ethnicities are locked-up in a protracted competition for the control of state power, larger access to scarce resources at the expense of others. In this kind of society, inter-ethnic showdowns are expected especially from the deprived ethnic nationalities, and if not properly checked, the Hobbesian state of nature will definitely ensue. Nigeria is one of the countries that typify the picture painted above. The potency of ethnicity in Nigeria can only be meaningfully understood within the context of interrogating the entrance of ethnic consciousness in the society and the country’s attempt at independence. Nigeria was and still is a project rather than a reality. This project eventually became one entity in 1914 due to the amalgamation of the then Northern and Southern protectorates by the British colonialists. Certainly, the amalgamation impacted, either positively or negatively, on the country’s future because the colonial administrators relied heavily on force to subdue the local populace in furthering their interests. Consequent on the threatening image of the colonial state, the indigenous people were compelled to look for assistance in the traditional solidarity groups, ethnic/national groups; that ultimately became the nucleus of resistance to colonialism. Furthermore, the urban centres that are supposed to be the melting-pot of parochial identities failed to achieve this objective because colonial rule was recreating traditional solidarity groups and ethnocentricism21. Thus, the colonial rule was self-centred at the expense of their hosts while the political economy of the state was purely designed to serve the interests of the metropolis for little/no attention was paid to the indigenous people’s social welfare. The insensitivity to the people’s welfare was evidenced in the rapidity at which urban associations of people from the same rural background was spawned in the colonial cities. Because most of these associations provided rudimentary forms of social welfare system to their members, these associations overrode the state as the primary focus of political allegiance. Expectedly, this self-centredness revived ethnic consciousness in the indigenous people which, by extension, survived colonial rule. The colonial state’s failure to command the much needed allegiance of their host exposed the system to chaos. Resultantly, ethnic consciousness metamorphosed into political consciousness, because ethnic/urban associations were able to provide the required leadership to the rural dwellers and above all, political enlightenment. The point is that the arbitrary nature of colonial rule brought forth

21 Claude Ake, The Feasibility of Democracy in Africa, 2000, p. 98.

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nation-wide solidarity among the indigenous people to confront oppression and its machinery. Interestingly, these associations provided the platform for nationalist activities in the country as the first nationalist movement to oppose colonialism was a product of ethnic associations/mass organisations. In spite of the plural character of the Nigerian society, the Nigeria National Council [NNC] which was at the vanguard of resistance to colonialism was seen as Nigerian voice since it drew its supporters across the country. But, despite the potency of the NNC as obstacle to colonialism, it failed to withstand the British pressure. This is because the glue that held the nationalists together was eventually fractured with the adoption of the Lyletton Constitution of 1954 that officially laid the foundation of ‘federalism’ in Nigeria’s political history. Thus, Nigeria became a federation of three regions- North, West, and East-with North bigger than the remaining two regions combined. According to Suberu22, the “obvious and increasingly vociferous victims of this regional arrangement were the diverse minority groups which comprised roughly about 1/3 of the population of each of the three regions … Fearing or alleging political domination and socio-economic discrimination under the tripartite regional system, these minority groups embarked on a vigorous campaign for new regions or states in which their minority status could be substantially ameliorated, or completely eliminated.” With this ‘federalist’ constitution, residual power was vested in the regional government under leadership of regional Premier, who was the leader of the majority party in the regional legislature. Con- sequently, ethnicity became politicised because the then nationalist leaders – Alhaji Ahmadu Bello, the leader of Northern People’s Congress [NPC], Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe of the National Council of Nigerian Citizens [NCNC], and Chief Obafemi Awolowo, leader of the Action Group [AG] – saw, considered, and paraded themselves as regional leaders to champion ethnic causes and opted for power in the region instead of remaining in the central government which was still under British colonialism. In the ensuing election, the ethnicisation of politics became apparent with the three political parties winning decisively in their respective regions. The foregoing developments contextualised the upsurge of ethnonationalism as a prelude to Nigeria’s independence in 1960. Adumbratedly, the 1954 constitution puts in place arrangement that is very adversative to a federal system of government in the real sense of it. Why? This is because the Northern region was bigger than the other two regions combined. Worse still, within each region, there were ethnic minorities that contested the arrangement because, despite the fact that the constitution expanded the scope of electoral politics and the gradual transfer of powers, the dominant political parties represented dominant ethnic interests within the federating regions, and that those outside these ethnic blocs, but subject nonetheless to the regional governments, would be at a serious political and economic disadvantage23. Thus, minorities within each region saw themselves wallowing in

22 Suberu (see fn 3), p. 17. 23 Mustapha Abdul Raufu, “Transformation of Minority Identities in Post-Colonial Nigeria”, in Jega Attahiru (Eds.), Identity Transformation and Identity Politics under Structural Adjustment in

Badmus, Under Reconstruction: Ethnicity, Ethnic Nationalism, and the Future of the Nigerian State 219

the problem of, and akin to a majoritarian dictatorship whereby majority interests held sway, and minorities had no say. This situation must have prompted Mustapha’s conclusion that minority identity developed, not necessarily as a question of number or cultural differences, but as recognition of their ‘powerlessness’ in the face of ethnicised electoral poli- tics24. This development compelled the Secretary of State for the Colonies to set up Henry Willinck Commission of Inquiry in 1956 to establish the genuineness of minorities’ fears. Though, the Commission ascertained the fear of ethnic minorities, confirmed the back- wardness of the region concerned, their neglect, and the genuineness of their agitations, the Commission was convinced that the problems’ solutions lie in the political process rather than states creation. On state creation, the Commission opined that the new states would not eliminate the minority problems, instead would put heavy administrative and financial cost on the emerging federation and would perpetuate separatist sentiments that ‘might otherwise disappear’25. Instead, it recommended 10 years of human and industrial developments. Also, it recommended, “the constitutional entrenchment of bill of rights and the creation of a special Commission to address the peculiar environment problems of the Niger Delta minorities, and hoped that the emergence of national political parties after independence would help to allay the fears of the minorities”26. Furthermore, it proposed the establishment of minority areas in Benin and Calabar provinces; the protection of non- Muslim minorities in the North via the implementation of legal reform; the creation of a national nay regionalised police force, etc. Although, most of the minority groups demanded for a more balanced federation by securing their rights, increased access to political participation and power, and their demand for local autonomy, they still supported the continuation of the Nigerian federation. The agitation and activities of the minorities contributed to the vibrancy of democracy in Nigeria for increased in the level of political consciousness that resulted in the formation of political parties that started challenging the majority political parties in their respective regions. The multiplicity of political parties, laudable as it was, became not only problematic but also, a curse on the country as Nigeria became polarised along ethno-cultural cleavages. Political leaders were locked up in protracted struggles that, ultimately, exposed the concealed structural weaknesses of the country’s federalism. These leaders were much more interested in protecting their respective power bases instead of finding solutions to the inherent structural deficiencies within the federation so as to rise above particularistic interests. The failure of finding solution to the lingering Nigeria’s political crisis graduated to the 1959 federal elections that were expected to usher Nigeria to independence.

Nigeria. Uppsala and Kano: NAI and the CRD, 2000, p. 87 24 Kalu, A. Kelechi, “Constitutionalism in Nigeria: A Conceptual Analysis of Ethnicity and Poli- tics”, West Africa Review, Issue 6, 2004, p. 9. Emphasis in the original. 25 Ibid, p. 58. 26 Eghosa Osaghae, Crippled Giant: Nigeria since Independence, 2002, p. 10.

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The elections were marred by the problem of ethnicity because no single party was able to have majority vote to rule the country. The results were: NPC 134, NCNC 89, AG 73, while the remaining 16 seats went to the independent candidates27. These results confirmed the assertion that these parties were regionally based; thereby relying on ethnic supports from their respective region. At this point, ethnicity was seen by the elite as the basis of their electoral support, while the electorates themselves favoured politicians from their ethnic stock. What became pathetic was that since no party was strong enough to form the government at the centre; hence the federal government was formed by the NPC/NCNC coalition, while the AG became the opposition party. Under the Westminster Parliamentary democracy, Dr. Azikwe, the leader of the NCNC became the President, while Alhaji Tafawa Balewa, the deputy leader of the NPC, was the head of government and Prime Minister. Sooner or later, the NPC/NCNC coalition government collapsed due to a plethora of ethnically loaded issues, and the lust for power that saw the frictions between the two parties on the one hand, and between the federal government and the opposition party. In a nutshell, the crisis that followed the 1959 Federal elections prepared the breeding ground for conflict in the post-independence Nigeria.

2.2. The Post-Independence Period, 1960 – 1999

As already noted, politics in the Nigeria’s pre-independence period was hindered by the negative utilisation of ethnicity. Politics became an elite game and luxury to the masses. These ‘illiterate’ masses became pawns in the elite game of politics. The major test for the federal government was the crisis that hit the opposition AG, the party that has been a torn in the flesh of the NPC/NCNC coalition since 1959 elections. The Western regional crisis provided the much awaited opportunity for the federal government to finally deal with the party. The AG crisis centred on the different political views, and personality conflict between the party leader, Chief Awolowo and his deputy, Chief Samuel Akintola. The crisis’ root can be located within the context of the mode of coexistence of the AG with other parties, that is, on what strategy the AG should adopt to maintain itself and possibly expand its influence. While Awolowo wanted to spread the party’s tentacles across the federation, Akintola’s thought was on the contrary. In Akintola’s opinion, it would be advantageous for the AG to limit its operations and consolidate on its regional base, without attempting to challenge its rivals in their own zones of influence because this would guarantee the AG a home base from which it could work out an acceptable modus ope- randi. These opposing ideologies were later ‘exported’ to the Regional House of Assembly where pandemonium ensued. Unsurprisingly, the State of Emergency was declared with the suspension of the Western regional government and the appointment of a Sole Adminis- trator with unlimited powers; while the party leadership including Awolowo were arrested, charged for felony, and finally jailed. Consequently, the machinery for the dismemberment

27 Billy Dudley, An Introduction to Nigerian Government and Politics, 1982, p. 61.

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of its political domain through the creation of a new state was quickly set in motion. In the face of this persecution, members of the embattled party defected en masse; its strength in the Federal House of Representatives fell rapidly from 73 to 13. Evidently, the implications of the Regional crisis on Nigerian politics were that after ruthlessly routing the AG and gaining seven additional seats at the House of Representatives, (thus earning an absolute majority in the legislature), the NPC grew in confidence. However, this crisis and the growing confidence of the NPC precipitated a great deal of tension between the coalition partners that portents the inevitability of confrontation. The Western regional crisis led to the split of the AG. Akintola and his supporters decamped and formed the United People’s Party [UPP] which eventually aligned with the NCNC and became the regional Premier. The implication of this was that, the AG became the opposition party in its own base and became a shadow of itself with the carving out of the Mid-West region from the Western Region in 1963. This political situation was too severe for the party. Beyond the Western regional crisis, the years between 1962 and 1966 were so tensed in Nigerian politics for the succession of crises that centred on ethnicity. The population census of 1962-1963 boiled the polity. It should be recalled that the basis for the Northern dominations of Nigeria was the census. Understandably, the figures were vital for resource distribution to the regions and revenue allocation. Thus, it became a political weapon and subjected to manipulations. The crisis ensued when the South rejected the results for alleged manipulations. The census figures released in July 1962 gave the North a “30% population increase from 17.3 million to 22.5 million; that of the East increased by 71% and that of the Western region by 70%”28. The fury that greeted the census from the South necessitated another census in 1963, the results of which were not much different from the previous one. Expectedly, the new results were equally rejected by the South as Southern- ers believed it would reinforce northern domination. The crisis was the 1964 General Elec- tions. Ethnicity was brought to the fore during the campaign as the whole exercise was reduced to anarchy. Consequent on the crisis that marred the elections, animosity ensued between the leadership of the NPC and the NCNC. Consequently, Azikiwe refused Balewa to form the government. In the deadlock, going by Ake’s words, “ethnic antipathies grew to alarming proportions, and civil war and political disintegration looked increasingly likely.” This charged atmosphere, coupled with the 1965 Western House of Assembly elections crisis dealt a final blow to Nigeria’s First Republic as the country experienced its first military coup on 15 January 1966 with Major General Aguiyi Ironsi as the new Head of State.29

28 S.A. Aluko, “How Many Nigerians?: An Analysis of Nigeria’s Census Problems, 1901-63”, Jour- nal of Modern African Studies, vol. 3, no. 3, 1965. 29 On the 1965 election crisis in the West, see: Dudley, Instability and Political Order: Politics and Crisis in Nigeria, 1973; Larry Diamond, Class, Ethnicity and Democracy in Nigeria: The Failure of the First Republic, 1988; Ikime Obaro, The Fall of Nigeria, 1977; A.H.M. Kirk-Greene, Crisis and Conflict in Nigeria, 2 volumes, 1971.

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Military intervention compounded the already charged ethnic politics of the epoch, because the coup was believed to be ethnically inspired by the North for the loss of officers it suffered. This led to a counter coup in July of the same year. The July coup was perceived as ethnocide against Igbo residents in the North, a mass exodus of Igbo from the North to the South began in earnest, signaling the disintegration of Nigeria. The two coups apparently put Nigeria on the bushpath to self destruction that, ultimately, culminated in civil war in 1967. One important area of focus on the 13 years of the military rule [1966- 1979] is how the military leadership were able to manage political ethnicity. Undeniably, the military era, especially the post July 1966 period witnessed a new military-bureaucratic partnership and healthy majority-minority relations that eventually saw ethnic minority groups in important positions in government. The General Yakubu Gowon military government30 catered for minorities’ interests of which he himself was a member. It is to Gowon’s credit that he replaced the regionalised Nigerian federation with a 12 state system in 1967 comprising 6 states each in the Northern and Southern regions of Nigeria. The state creation solved two problems, albeit tentatively. The first, being the division of Northern Nigeria into several states. The military satisfied some ethnic minorities of Northern region’s demands for their own state and secondly, the alleged Southern anxiety about the disproportionate size of the North. Furthermore, In order to sustain the commitment of the minority communities in the Eastern Region to federal unity on the one hand, and to undermine support for the Igbo-led secessionist bid, the creation of Rivers and South East states was a strategic move. Hence, the primary rationale for the state creation exercise was to liberate the minorities from the regional stranglehold of the ethnic majority groups, it also satisfied sub-ethnic agitations for statehood status within the majority groups. The succeeding military regime of Generals Murtala Muhammed and Olusegun Obasanjo intensified efforts on the federal territorial evolution and reorganisations with the creation of additional 7 states in 1976. Thus, Nigeria became a federation of 19 states in 1976 divided into 12 ethnic majority states against only 7 minority states. Despite these achievements, the nature of military rule became its achilles heel since it was characterised by authoritarianism, with established command structure. The concentration of power coupled with the absence of legitimacy of military rule called into question the position of the minorities. The lack of accountability on the part of the military further widened ethnic cleavage. Thus, emphasis was place on power as the minority groups worked for the reversal of the status quo. This was the situation during the 1976 state creation as the Murtala/Obasanjo regime turned a deaf ear to Ayo Irikefe recommendations for further division of the Southeastern state into two. Instead, the Yoruba small states of Lagos and Ogun continued to exist as two separate states contrary to Irikefe’s recommen- dations31. Though military doused ethnic tensions, but it failed to suppress ethnic con-

30 See J. Isawa Elaigwu, Gowon: The Bibliography of a Soldier – Statesman. Ibadan, 1986. 31 Federal Republic of Nigeria, Federal Military Government Views on the Report of the Panel on Creation of States, 1976.

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sciousness among the populace. Ake opines that the military failed to halt ethnic consciousness partly because of its blockage to democracy. Contrarily due to the coercive ecumenism of military rule and its arbitrary power people were generally alienated from the state and cleave to traditional solidarities. Due to its organisation, the military was unable to employ negotiated consensus, nor could it mediate pluralism. Rather it accentuated the divisive potentials of social pluralism32. Military rule did not succeed in transcending the Nigeria beyond political ethnicity, which became the hallmark of the Second Republic [1979-1983]. Ethnic consciousness/solidarity fed into partisan politics as the five political parties were ethnic-based. The scenario foreshadowed the rebirth of the First Republic parties. The National Party of Nigeria [NPN] was the offshoot of the NPC; the Unity Party of Nigeria [UPN]-a product of the AG- became the Yoruba party in the West; the Nigerian People’s Party [NPP] had Igbo as the majority. The two other parties were the Great Nigerian People’s Party [GNPP] and the People’s Redemption Party [PRP]. Noteworthy is the fact that the GNPP was the amalgamation of the various ethnic minorities in the North, Middle Belt and East, while the PRP was the reincarnation of the old NEPU of the First Republic. Apart from the country’s ethnic problem, corruption among government officials, general poverty, and opposition to the administration thereby finally signalled the collapse of the Shehu Shagari led government through a coup. Thus, the Second Republic is generally categorised as an unmitigated failure. Not only did military rule fail to stem ethnic consciousness/solidarity, its authoritarian nature provided the much awaited opportunities for the populace to oppose it which, eventually, provided the nucleus around which oppositions were mounted. I submit that, the impact of military rule on Nigeria’s politics is a double-edge sword as it failed the post colonial state in the curbing political ethnicity as well as offering Nigerians the opportunity to see beyond various forms of identities in politics. Ake33, contends that, the main contribution that the military made to the political development of Nigeria could well be said to be their addiction to, and their poor performance while in power. This precipitated strong antipathies for military rule and strong demand for democracy. Consequently, Nigerians shifted their attention from religious, nationalist/ethnic solidarity and focused on ending military rule. The above situation can be better explained within the context of the June 12, 1993 presidential elections that marred the ill-fated Third Republic [1987-1993]. For the first time Nigerians, irrespective of their background, rose above parochialism in politics because of two fundamental reasons. First, the two parties put forward by the federal military government [FMG], the Social Democratic Party [SDP] and the National Republican Convention [NRC] were not only established by, but equally financed by the FMG. The

32 Ake (see fn 21), p. 105; David Jemibewon, A Combatant in Government, 1978, pp. 11-17. 33 Ake (see fn 21).

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rationales behind the creation of these grassroots’ parties were to provide a turn around for Nigerians and to transcend the old lines of cleavages. Moreover, the limitation of the number of party to two actually paid off since it curtailed the primacy of ethnicity in politics, especially during the transition period. This is because Nigerians rose above sentiments, and voted for candidates based on merit, programmes, credibility, and abilities. Second, apart from the fact that the two parties presented Muslims as their presidential candidates, the SDP moved a little bit ahead to have a Muslim-Muslim coalition/ticket where both the presidential candidate [Chief Moshood Abiola] and his vice [Baba Gana Kingibe] were all Muslims. Political life became de-ethnicised as the majority of the North rallied round the SDP by voting massively for Abiola, a Yoruba Muslim from South-West Nigeria. The story was the same in the East where the populations are Christians. Interestingly, for the first time in Nigeria, Christians voted massively not only for Muslim but for a party that had Muslims as presidential candidate and vice. This appears incredible since by conventional expectations and political behaviour, it would have been unthinkable to have a Muslim – Muslim ticket because in a country in which religion differences are highly politically charged, it would be courting certain defeat. Despite the normalcy that went with the elections, the General Babangida led FMG annulled the election that was widely believed to have been won by Abiola34. With this annulment, the FMG repealed the Transition to Civil Rule Decree No. 13, and suspended the National Electoral Commission [NEC]. The annulment was widely interpreted as a calculated attempt to sideline the Southerners from the corridor of power by the Hausa/Fulani ethnic groups. This has serious implications, not only for democracy but also for future regional and ethnic relations. The ‘alleged’ Southern marginalisation by the North relapsed Nigeria into the ‘son of the soil’ syndrome. In this situation, popular rage was so bitter, while widespread civil unrests became a way of life in the Southwest. Thus, political ethnicity fanned the fire of hatred, and the already existing cleavages widened. The transfer of power by Babangida to the Interim National Government [ING] led by Chief Ernest Shonekan, a Yoruba, did absolutely nothing to avert the danger posed by political ethnicity. The ING’s inability to win the loyalty of the populace provided a fertile ground for General Sani Abacha who was the Secretary for Defence in the ING to take over in a bloodless coup of 17 November, 1993. Copying Babangida, Abacha manipulated the political space in different ways. First, he abolished all democratic institutions and fundamental rights were curtailed. Second, from co-opting some members of the democracy movements to the idea of Constitutional Conference [CC] as against the Sovereign National Conference [SNC] of all ethnic nationalities with the intention of remedying the structural defects of the country’s federalism via the production of a new constitution, opposition to military rule skyrocketed . This is because the idea of CC was interpreted an attempt for prolongation of military rule. Resis-

34 See Julius Ihonbvere, “The Military and Nigerian Society: The Abacha Coup and the Crisis of Democratisation in Nigeria”, in: Eboe Hutchful Abdoulaye Bathily (eds.), The Military and Mili- tarism in Africa, 1998.

Badmus, Under Reconstruction: Ethnicity, Ethnic Nationalism, and the Future of the Nigerian State 225

tance to Authoritarianism served as unifying factor for various ethnicities at the epoch because the junta became repressive and eventually re-militarised the space. The political situation became dissatisfying to elites, civil society groups, etc which apparently sealed Nigerians hope of de-annulment of Abiola’s mandate. The military were able to contain oppositions by the application of force: assassinations, arrest of political opponents, etc that reached its zenith with the arrest and subsequent detention of Abiola on charge of treason when he declared himself President. Abacha’s scheme for self-succession suffered severe blow from democracy movements that made the country ungovernable for the junta. Amid this situation, on 8 June, 1998 Abacha suddenly died while the mantle of the country’s leadership fell on Abdulsalami Abubakar, a General of northern extraction. The new regime was quick enough to realise the mistakes of the past military regimes and its grave consequences on Nigeria. The first step to resolve the political gridlock was to launch a ‘sincere’ transition programme of which the most fascinating aspect was its ethnic dimensions. The presidential candidates of the three political parties, the People’s Democ- ratic Party [PDP], the All People’s Party [APP] and the Alliance for Democracy [AD] were all Yoruba. The PDP, widely regarded as the party of the military had a retired General and former head of state, Obasanjo as its candidate, while APP/AD coalition fielded a consensus candidate, Chief Olu Falae, erstwhile Secretary to the FMG. This arrangement was widely believed to pacify the Yoruba who suffered humiliation brought about by the June 12 crisis and the death of Abiola in detention. The PDP’s vctory saw the emergence of Obasanjo as the new president of Nigeria’s Fourth Republic which was inaugurated on 29 May, 1999.

3. The Nigerian post-colony, ethnic nationalism, and the crisis of governance

From our discussions, it is apparent that the Nigerian post-colony is characterised by all forms of fissiparous tendencies. The overall implications of these have been unmitigated inter-ethnic rivalries, animosities and hostilities among the federating regions that are detrimental to the proper functioning of Nigeria35. The basic problems of Nigeria are multilayered in nature. From the time when it was proclaimed a federation, the country has been wallowing in the problematic of what can be apparently described as ‘malfunctioning federalism’. Ever since this period, according to Omeje,36 “all subsequent post-independent (sic!) constitutions have in their preliminary and substantive provisions reiterated the principle of federalism as a core principle of state structure. Successive regimes, both military and civilian, have all reaffirmed this commitment including its defining parameters of equitable sharing power and resources between the centre and the relatively autonomous,

35 E. Anugwon, “The Military Ethnicity and Democracy in Nigeria”, Journal of Social Development, vol. 16, no. 2, 2001, p. 94. 36 Kenneth Omeje, “The State, Conflict and Evolving Politics in the Niger Delta, Nigeria”, Review of African Political Economy, 2004, p. 425.

226 Verfassung und Recht in Übersee VRÜ 42 (2009)

federating, sub-national governments. But in reality, the post-colonial centre has progres- sively sequestrated, disempowered and de-authorised the sub-national space, creating a centripetal structure based on a top-bottom dikat and tokenism.” Omeje’s analysis aptly captures the basis of Nigeria’s dialectical contradiction that often repeats proclivity towards conflicts; that is the issue of marginalisation37. This contradiction in the Nigerian federalism provided the breeding grounds for ethnic identity politics to thrive, thus challenging its survival. At the heart of this crisis is fiscal federalism that defined how different ethnicities have access to the country’s wealth. The disenchantment of the ethnic minorities with the centralised federal state over the national question is deep-seated. National question has essentially been adjudged as having to do with ordering the relations between the different ethno-linguistic groupings. To the intent that each group may have same rights and privi- leges, access to power and equitable share of national resources. Consequently, access to national wealth and the quest for justice in the distribution of resources trigger a crisis of ‘confidence and thrust’ between the ‘major’ ethnicities and the ‘minority’ ethnic formations with high degree of intensity in the oil-producing ND. This is evidenced in the flare-points of the ND people which include, but not limited to, access to oil revenues and adequate compensation for damages to their ecosystem and environmental despoliation, and a halt to federal hegemony of ‘oil power’ and alleged domination by the major ethnicities. Certainly, successive governments have been trying to address the issue of marginalisation so as to assuage the fear of minorities. The government responses to the ethnic minorities’ problems ranged from redistributive, reorganisation and/or regulative or repressive in nature. In his analysis, Suberu38 identified three official responses to the agitations of ethnic minority. These are: Redistributive Policies. This involve minor adjustments in federal revenue sharing meant to take care of the ‘the strident claims of oil-producing communities to a significant proportion of economic resources obtained from their localities; Reorganisation Poli- cies. Involving creation of new units of constituent, federally-funded, state and local authorities. This in response to demands for autonomy participation and decentralisation. Regulatory/Repressive Policies. In response to the failure of the initial policies, the Nige- rian state has come to employ more and more regulatory or repressive measures. These include: banning of ethnic minority associations; detention, arbitrary conviction and/or imprisonment of outspoken elite, violent suppression of protests/demonstrations by ethnic minority agitations for autonomy; as a seditious or treasonable offence punishable with death penalty. These approaches merely compound a profound crisis of state legitimacy and governance in Nigeria. Suberu’s analysis of the state responses and their consequences on ethnic situations and the country’s governance can be better appreciated by looking in extenso at the plight of the small homogenous Ogoni people of the ND and their agitation

37 Ajayi Ade, “The National Question in Historical Perspective” Text of the Fifth Guardian News- paper Lecture delivered at NIIA, Lagos, November 4, 1992. 38 Suberu (see fn 3), p. xii.

Badmus, Under Reconstruction: Ethnicity, Ethnic Nationalism, and the Future of the Nigerian State 227

through their popular social movement: the Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People [MOSOP]. MOSOP forms an interesting case of ethnic organisation that is fighting perceived marginalisation.

3.1. Fiscal Federalism, Ethnic Minorities Agitations and the Deepening Crisis of Governance: The Ogoni Uprising

3.1.1. Prologue to a Conflict: Oil, Poverty, and Governance in the Niger Delta The Nigeria’s ND covers an area of 70,000 square kilometres, half of which is wetland. The wetland area, often regarded as Africa’s largest, is made up of 36,000 square kilometres of marshland, creeks, lagoons, etc and rich in fauna and fluvial resources with high biodiver- sity. Harbouring Nigeria’s crude oil reserves to the tune of 33 billion barrels and 160 tril- lion cu.ft. of natural gas reserves [2003 figures], the ND is the heart of Nigeria’s oil industry. This fact also makes it the driving force behind the country’s economy. The Nigeria’s oil industry commenced with the discovery of oil deposits by the Anglo-Dutch group, Shell D’Archy, in commercial quantities near the small ND community of Oloibiri in 1956. From those humble beginnings, oil production has grown to dominate Nigeria’s economy and the fiscal basis of the state. The dominance of oil sector of Nigeria’s economy was strengthened by global increases in the oil price during the 1970s. Thus, from $250 million in 1970, Nigeria’s oil production was increased to $11.2 billion in 197439. It is estimated that from oil production alone, Nigeria generated about $300 billion between 1970 and 2000. This apparently amounts to 96% of the country’s foreign earnings40. While other sectors have withered away to ‘comparative irrelevance’, Nigeria’s net oil revenues stood at $45.1 billion in 2005 and were predict to rise to $52.7 billion in 2006. The foregoing statistics portray a better scenario for the Nigerian state and its people. While many observers believe that Nigeria would ranks among richest countries in the world, ironically, it is among the world’s poorest countries. The statistics for July 2006 show that over 70% Nigerians lived in abject poverty, surviving on $1 or even less on daily basis. This is because most of the country’s population has gotten remarkable little in return for all the wealth Nigeria has produced. Much of this wealth have either been squandered or stolen by those in government. The situation in the ND is even more appalling. In this respect, Human Rights Watch reported that ‘the grinding poverty that afflict the populations of Nigeria’s main oil – producing states throws Nigeria’s fundamental inequities and its failure to realise the basic human rights of Nigerians into a sharp relief.’ ND is one of Nigeria’s least developed. With the highest infant mortality rate, the 2006 UNDP Report stated that the ND was unlikely to

39 International Crisis Group, “Nigeria: Want in the Midst of Plenty”, Africa Report No. 113, July 19, 2006, p. 7. 40 Charles Soludo / Okonjo-Iweala Ngozi / Muhtar Mansur, The Debt Trap in Nigeria: Towards a Sustainable Debt Strategy, Africa World Press, 2003, p. 1.

228 Verfassung und Recht in Übersee VRÜ 42 (2009)

meet any of the Millennium Development Goal targets, other than school enrolment, by 2015 ‘or anytime soon after.’ The region is now entangled in deepening crisis of environmental apocalypse, conditioned by the impacts of a poorly regulated oil industry/production. The network of pipelines that interlace the ND’s maze of creeks and swampy terrain records hundreds of oil spills that often destroy the ND’s environment. Oil spillage and gas flaring are the two greatest environmental problems connected with oil exploitation in Nigeria. Flaring gas has produced one of the best-known symbols of the Delta’s problems in the controlled infernos that light up the night sky for miles around them. Oil production has negatively affected the cultural and socio-economic activities of these people. It has affected the delicate balance between man, land, and water. Presently, the region is occu- pied by 9 States, Rivers, Abia, Ondo, Bayelsa, Cross River, Edo, Imo, Akwa-Ibom, and Delta, and many ethnic formations such as the Ogoni, Ijaw, Kalabari, Urhobo, Itsekiri, etc form its sociological configuration with various organisations agitating for self determination.

3.1.2. A Rising Tide of Discontent of the Ogoni Ethnic Nationality The Nigeria’s ND covers an area of 70,000 square kilometres, half of which is wetland. The wetland area, often regarded as Africa’s largest, is made up of 36,000 square kilometres of marshland, creeks, lagoons, etc and rich in fauna and fluvial resources with high biodiver- sity. Harbouring Nigeria’s crude oil reserves to the tune of 33 billion barrels and 160 tril- lion cu.ft. of natural gas reserves [2003 figures], the ND is the heart of Nigeria’s oil industry. This fact also makes it the driving force behind the country’s economy. The Nigeria’s oil industry commenced with the discovery of oil deposits by the Anglo-Dutch group, Shell D’Archy, in commercial quantities near the small ND community of Oloibiri in 1956. From those humble beginnings, oil production has grown to dominate Nigeria’s economy and the fiscal basis of the state. The dominance of oil sector of Nigeria’s economy was strengthened by global increases in the oil price during the 1970s. Thus, from $250 million in 1970, Nigeria’s oil production was increased to $11.2 billion in 197441. It is estimated that from oil production alone, Nigeria generated about $300 billion between 1970 and 2000. This apparently amounts to 96% of the country’s foreign earnings42. While other sectors have withered away to ‘comparative irrelevance’, Nigeria’s net oil revenues stood at $45.1 billion in 2005 and were predict to rise to $52.7 billion in 2006. The foregoing statistics portray a better scenario for the Nigerian state and its people. While many observers believe that Nigeria would ranks among richest countries in the world, ironically, it is among the world’s poorest countries. The statistics for July 2006 show that over 70% Nigerians lived in abject poverty, surviving on $1 or even less on daily basis. This is because most of the country’s population has gotten remarkable little in return

41 International Crisis Group, (see fn 39), p. 7. 42 Charles Soludo pp., (see fn. 40)., p. 1.

Badmus, Under Reconstruction: Ethnicity, Ethnic Nationalism, and the Future of the Nigerian State 229

for all the wealth Nigeria has produced. Much of this wealth have either been squandered or stolen by those in government. The situation in the ND is even more appalling. In this respect, Human Rights Watch reported that ‘the grinding poverty that afflict the populations of Nigeria’s main oil – producing states throws Nigeria’s fundamental inequities and its failure to realise the basic human rights of Nigerians into a sharp relief.’ ND is one of Nigeria’s least developed. With the highest infant mortality rate, the 2006 UNDP Report stated that the ND was unlikely to meet any of the Millennium Development Goal targets, other than school enrolment, by 2015 ‘or anytime soon after.’ The region is now entangled in deepening crisis of environmental apocalypse, conditioned by the impacts of a poorly regulated oil industry/production. The network of pipelines that interlace the ND’s maze of creeks and swampy terrain records hundreds of oil spills that often destroy the ND’s environment. Oil spillage and gas flaring are the two greatest environmental problems connected with oil exploitation in Nigeria. Flaring gas has produced one of the best-known symbols of the Delta’s problems in the controlled infernos that light up the night sky for miles around them. Oil production has negatively affected the cultural and socio-economic activities of these people. It has affected the delicate balance between man, land, and water. Presently, the region is occu- pied by 9 States, Rivers, Abia, Ondo, Bayelsa, Cross River, Edo, Imo, Akwa-Ibom, and Delta, and many ethnic formations such as the Ogoni, Ijaw, Kalabari, Urhobo, Itsekiri, etc form its sociological configuration with various organisations agitating for self determination.

3.2. Ethnicity, ethnic nationalism and the Nigeria's fourth republic

With the return of democracy in May 1999, ethnicity has become a recurring factor in Nigeria’s politicking and serves as a major threat to state survival. This is true considering the alarming dimensions that ethnic militias’ agitations for either self-determination or fair treatment by the central state are taking. One needs to appreciate the fact that ethnic animosity, as I discussed above, predated the Nigerian state but the intensity of identity politics and spasmodic ethnic conflicts in post-transition Nigeria made some scholars to suggest that the reappearance of ethnicity is the effect of democracy creating a ‘vent’ for the previously contained dissatisfaction accumulated under military rule by different ethnic nationalities. While this line of thinking is logical, however, relying on this argument in totality is problematic because linking ethnic confrontation so closely to the ‘vent’ created by democracy obscures the fact that many of these conflicts predate the democratisation process especially as some of the post-military ethnic conflicts are simple continuations of confrontations that had become manifest even under the military43. Mustapha’s argument is

43 Mustapha Abdul Raufu, “Ethnicity and the Politics of Democratisation in Nigeria: Structures, Transformations and Processes.” Paper presented at the Workshop on: Ethnicity and Democracy in Africa held at Queen’s University, Kingston, Ontario, Canada, 2000.

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rational because of the nature and dynamics of the various ethnic movements and vigilante groups of the Fouth Republic of which the O’odua People’s Congress [OPC], the Niger Delta People Volunteers Force [NDPVF], Arewa People’s Congress [APC], the Movement for the Actualisation of the Sovereign State of Biafra [MASSOB], the Ijaw Youth Move- ment [IYM], Egbesu Boys of Africa [EBA], the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta [MEND], are prominent. It is germane to state that some of these organisations fit more as vigilante groups. Finally, a brief review of the origins, philosophies, and activities of the most prominent movements will help our understanding of their existence in Nigeria. The OPC, the ethnic movement that caters for the Yoruba people’s interests, represents their (Yoruba’s) disenchantment with the military and perceived Hausa/Fulani hegemony. Its emergence was a response to the annulled 1993 elections. This annulment was regarded as affront on the ‘Yoruba nation’ by the identity constructed around Hausa/Fulani and relying on its demographic advantage in the armed forces. In the words of its leader, Federick Fasehun, the OPC is, “agitating the marginalisation of the Yoruba, to defend, to protect and to promote their socio-cultural aspect, and also fight for justice for all.”44 The emergence of the movement became imperative after it has been ascertained by the Yoruba political elites and the radical youths that “military rule was not sufficient to help the Yoruba nation develop its full capacity in all the areas of national life. By its nature, military rule was not sufficiently representative of the diverse interests and needs of the people. The argument is that, almost always, the sentiments of geography, tribe and religion will connive to make it difficult for all the different people to have equal access to the offices and wealth of the nation.”45 Though the OPC was not, prima facie, conceptualised to be ethnic militant group rather it was intended to serve as a rallying point for the Yoruba in a nationalistic revival for self-protection and growth. It, thus, emerged to vehemently resist the systematic stultification of the Yoruba. Since the inauguration of the Fourth Republic, the organisation has purely redefined its roles in the polity by relaxing its political role and concentrates more on maintenance of law and order (vigilante duties), since one of their own (Obasanjo) is the President of the country. However, the ‘alleged’ persecution of perceived enemies by the OPC members is poisoning the relationship between the group and security agents. The Southeastern part Nigeria is not left out of ethnic militancy where MASSOB has been clamouring for the de-marginalisation of the Igbo and to achieve regional autonomy. MASSOB, a socio-political group represents the Igbo nation’s secessionist ambitions. Its leader Ralph Uwazuruike has vowed to actualise the Biafra dream that failed during the Nigerian civil war [1967-1970]. Biafra, contends Uwazuruike, “failed because of our violent approach, but this time around, we do not want any casualty, yet we are more deter-

44 Africa Today, vol. 6, no. 2, February 2000. 45 The Guardian, (Lagos), Sunday, 6 November, 2005.

Badmus, Under Reconstruction: Ethnicity, Ethnic Nationalism, and the Future of the Nigerian State 231

mined than ever to have our independent Biafra.”46 Contrastingly, MASSOB approach has been confrontational in nature. Its activities are regarded as threats to Nigeria’s existence; this has led to frequent clashes between its members and the Nigeria Police Force with negative consequences. Attempt to launch the Biafra state in Aba, a town in South-East Nigeria in May 2000, resulted in bloody clashes between the police and MASSOB leading to destruction of properties and death, and arrest of the MASSOB leaders, who are unde- terred from continuing with their separatist agitation. To underscore MASSOB’s resolute desire to actualise its dream, it now has a national Igbo holiday, while Biafra national currency was in circulation for a while. EBA is the militant wing of the Ijaw nation in the South-South geopolitical zone. Open neglect, continual exploitation of their oil wealth by the oil companies, deprivation and environmental/ecological degradation of their area led to its formation. Since then, EBA has been engaging the federal government and oil companies in violent exchanges in the difficult terrain of multi-channeled creeks and swamps in the ND. This was the situation before the federal government deployed troops (in operation HAKURI II) to erase Odi from the face of the earth on 8 November 1999 – when Egbesu Boys allegedly killed several policemen. At the end of the two days operation, over 2000 lay dead, while thousands were forced to flee their homes47. The Odi massacre reveals the growing tendency of oilification of extra-oil conflict in the ND. This is because official justification for ‘Operation HAKURI II’ was to safeguard against threat to oil by the Odi gang. The ‘Operation HAKURI II’, according to the former Defence Minister, General Danjuma, was initiated with the mandate of protecting lives and property – particularly oil platforms, flow stations, operation rig terminals and pipeline, refineries and power installations.48. Contrastingly, it is contends in many quarters that the Odi incident is episodic of the larger ethnic Ijaw-State confrontation. However, in spite of the state military intervention, the Ijaws have continued to aspire to regional autonomy from the inequitable Nigerian federalism as they resist government suppressions. Presently, the former leader of EBA, Asari Dokubo, is now leading the NDPVF to promote and protect the interests of the Ijaws. The group’s major demand is the actualisation of the famous KAIAMA Declaration which sought to establish Ijaw’s sovereignty over its natural resources. The NDPVF regards the Obasanjo administration as Ijaw’s enemy for the president’s insensitivity to the marginalisation met on Ijaw’s nation. The group is notorious for conducting periodic raids on oil installations. This has brought constant showdown between the State, and Dokubo and his paladins. In addendum, NDVPF had demanded for the convocation of SNC where the contentious issues of self determination and resource control would be discussed. Also, NDVPF has

46 Akintunde Muyiwa, “Can the Centre Hold?” Africa Today, vol. 6, no.2, February 2000 47 Environmental Rights Action, A Blanket of Silence: Images of the Odi Genocide. Benin/Lagos/ Port Harcourt, Environmental Rights Action, 2002, p. 7. 48 I.O. Albert, The Odi Massacre of 1999 in the Context of the Graffiti left by the Invading Nigerian Army. Ibadan, PEFS Monograph, New Series, no. 1, 2003.

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insisted on the abrogation of all laws that deprive people the right to their resources and an end to the oil companies’ environmental degradation of the ND. The emergence of the APC was widely believed to have been spurred by the formation and activities of the OPC. Thus, in operation, it acts as a counterforce against what it regarded as the Yoruba’s irredentism/expansionism. The APC has youth of northern extraction, which are easily recruitable among the Almajiris, the underprivileged, that are easily amenable to manipulation by unscrupulous political elite. The youth dimension of this organisation is true because poverty and unemployment, especially amongst the youth, are significant factors in causing and facilitating violent conflicts. Such harsh economic conditions breed frustration and aggression. Since both the rural and urban areas of Nigeria abound with youth under such conditions, little motivation and mobilisation is needed to engage them in riots, and reprisal attacks, especially, when these usually go with the ‘opportunity’ to loot. The defence of various ethnic interests has, on many occasions, brought the OPC and the APC into open confrontations with negative consequences. Another thrilling aspect of the APC is its agitation for the Islamic legal system (Sharia) in the North. Apart from the inter-ethnic conflicts, the advent of democracy also witnesses the upsurge in intra-communal conflicts apparently aided by ethnic movements of which the clashes between the Yoruba of Ife and Modakeke; between Jukun and Takun; among the Urhobos, Ijaws and the Itsekiri; the Aguleri/Umuleri are prominent. From the analysis, it is frightening that the activities of the various ethnic social movements have increased the vibrancy of democratic politics in Nigeria because it has forced the demands of the various ethnic nationalities [especially minorities] on the national agenda. Though, it is plausible to argue that while their activities have increased the vibrancy of politics, it has equally been threats to the survival of Nigeria. One needs to add, in passing, that the incessant conflicts and agitations especially under the Fourth Republic suggest that minority demands/interests have not been properly put on national agenda of democratisation even though the present government has not been lacking in this respect. Then steps by the Obasanjo administration to cater for different ethnic demands constitute our major task in the next section.

4. Reconstructing the Nigerian post-colony: the Obasanjo administration’s roadmap to a conflict free Nigeria

Since May 1999, the present Obasanjo has embarked on several measures to address the issue of ethnic agitations for a ‘conflict-free’ Nigerian state. These measures are multilayered but I will discuss some of them and their shortcomings.

4.1. The Oil-Bearing Ethnic Nationalities and the Niger Delta Quagmire

Prior to the Nigeria’s Fourth Republic, previous governments had responded to the ND’s volatile situation. Paradoxically, the management regime, institutional and policy measures

Badmus, Under Reconstruction: Ethnicity, Ethnic Nationalism, and the Future of the Nigerian State 233

adopted especially under military rule, were ‘perceived’ collaborations with the forces of transterritorial extraction, to destroy the delta basin ecosystem. First, with the dumping of toxic waste of Italian origin at Koko in Delta state, the Babangida-led government quickly responded by establishing the Federal Environmental Protection Agency [FEPA] by Decree 88 of 1988. FEPA was empowered to, amongst others, establish and prescribe national guidelines and standards for environmental management, and to control the movement of hazardous substances, and supervise and enforce compliance with environmental laws so that pollution can be prevented and con- trolled49. Laudable as these goals are, it is contended that its terms of reference appeared too broad, hence, did little in modulating the ND’s conflict dynamic. FEPA was to later mid-wife the establishment of a National Policy on Environment [NPE] in 1988 to enhance human environment, preserve the ecosystem and its biosphere, etc. However, for numerous reasons, all these measures failed to succeed in ameliorating the environmental-conflict nexus, thereby prompting the military government to announce the establishment, by Decree 23, of the Oil Minerals Producing Areas Development Commission [OMPADEC] on 10 July, 199250. OMPADEC was under the direct supervision of the presidency, its members were appointed by, and accountable to the presidency, while its came directly from the 3% derivation fund controlled by the federal government. Since OMPADEC members were government appointees, they were not truly representatives of the oil-bearing communities, thereby serving the federal bourgeoisies interests and its oil minority allies. Furthermore, corruption was brought forth with the embezzlement of contracts’ fund, politicisation in contracts’ awards, and above all, the Deltans were not part of the decision- making process of OMPADEC. All these made the Commission’s effectiveness and impacts on the conditions of the ND hardly noticeable. Since May 1999, there have been determined efforts by the Obasanjo’s administration in resolving the festering conflicts of the delta. Immediately after his inauguration; Obasanjo visited the area to assess the situation and how to address the repression and exploitation that had driven the oil-bearing communities to the wall. Consequently, the Niger Delta Development Commission [NDDC] Bill was proposed and its passage led to its establishment. The NDDC is mandated to oversee the implementation of a comprehensive master plan for the development of the Delta region. The Commission is an ad hoc structure which is to facilitate development of the region by identifying and addressing the people’s urgent needs as a complement to the states efforts and the Corporate Social Responsibility contributions of the oil companies. Interestingly, the NDDC has been able to record some successes compared to its predecessor. In terms of social infrastructural developments but all these, in the eyes of the oil-bearing minorities, are minute considering the

49 A.A. Falomo, “Government’s Action in Environmental Protection in Nigeria”, in Akinjide Osuntokun (ed.), Dimensions of Environmental Problems in Nigeria, 1997, p. 103. 50 Federal Environmental Protection Agency, Transition to Sustainable Development in Nigeria. Lagos, 1992, p. 24.

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amount of oil that has been exploited from the area since 1956. Beside, the NDDC is plagued with difficulties. First, it is under-funded. Considering its huge assignments that spans 9 states and over 300 communities, lack of fund greatly limit its capacity. Some of the problem crippling the NDDC, include the placement of partisan politics before development agend; oil companies’ inadequate commitment to funding the NDDC; the state governments’ inability to justify the money received in the last six years by making tangible impacts in their states. But for the aforementioned Odi and other episodes of spasmodic violence, the Obasanjo’s led administration could have been credited with better performance experiences compared to its predecessors.

4.2. The Human Rights Violations Investigation Commission

One fundamental step taken by the Obasanjo’s administration at its inception is the setting up, on 4 June 1999, of the Human Rights Violations Investigation Commission [HRVIC] popularly known as the Oputa Panel. The Commission was established to reconcile all ethnic nationalities consequent on the large scale human rights violations suffered between January 1966 and May 1999 in order to move the country forward. In spite of the good rationale behind its establishment, the reconciliatory process failed to achieve the stated goals for many reasons. First, most influential Nigerians, especially those who perpetrated human rights abuses, refused to appear before the Commission. Classic examples are Generals Babaginda and Abdulsalami Abubabakar. Second, many Nigerians, especially relatives of those that lost their lives during military authoritarianism, were very skeptical about the fairness and credibility of the Panel because it was believed that nothing tangible will come out of it51. This attitude apparently shows the degree of bitterness of these people towards Nigeria. Furthermore, the death of Abiola is a deep wound in the minds of his Yoruba ethnic group that any gesture by the present civilian administration will find difficult to heal. Up till this moment and despite the fact that Chief Obasanjo is from their ethnic group, most Yoruba do not believe in the continued existence of Nigeria because of the humiliations suffered under the Babangida and Abacha regimes.

4.3. The National Conference and Ethnic Militant Movements Question n order to damp down ethnic fires and make the centre hold, the Obasanjo administration inaugurated the National Political Reform Conference [NPRC] where the impact(s) of ethnic movements on Nigeria became a contentious issue. Since these movements ‘allege’ marginalisation of their ethnic nationalities by the central state, two thorny issues became fundamental to resolve the dangers posed by their actions: Resource Control/Derivation, and Rotational Presidency. Concerning the first, ethnic minorities of the South-South geo- political zone demanded an increase from the present 13% to 25% of the derivation fund. Additionally, they demanded an agreement that another 25% can be added instalmentally at

51 J. Rowell et al, The Next Gulf?: London, Washington, and the Oil Conflict in Nigeria, 2005, p. 25.

Badmus, Under Reconstruction: Ethnicity, Ethnic Nationalism, and the Future of the Nigerian State 235

the rate of 5% every year for the next 5 years, making the total 50%. This stiff oppositions, especially from the northern delegates who opposed what they regarded as the ‘over ambi- tion’ of the South-South. At last the conference, having considered the environmental despoliation of oil exploration in the ND, recommended the following: 1. A clear affirmation of inherent rights of the people of the mineral producing area not to be mere spectators but to be involved by having assured places in the Federal Govern- ment mechanism for mining and marketing the resources; 2. There is a need to set up an expert Commission to study the issues involved in resource management, including revenue allocation and report within six months. The report would include how mineral resources can be best managed in the interest of the people and the country. 3. The Committee recommends an increase in derivation to 17% from the present 13%, with the 4% increase coming from the Federal Government allocation, and finally; 4. There should be a massive and urgent programme of development of resources of the ND by the Federal Government52. Sadly, these recommendations were rejected by the South-South delegates, thus stalemating the conference. The second thorny issue centred on the nature of both the President and Governors. The conference failed to reach consensus on the six-year single term for these officials. The agitation for six-year single term is widely believed to consent to the prolongation of Obasanjo presidency. While this agitation met stiff opposition from the majority of the delegates from all geo-political zones, the conference was, on this issue, successful for it espoused the position of the 1999 constitution that provides a term of four years for the President and Governors, including a possible re-election of an incumbent for another term of four years. On the issue of Rotational presidency, the conference recommended that the office of the president should rotate among the six geo-political zones. This should, however, be alternated between the North and the South. Furthermore, it was suggested that this provision, due to its emotive nature, should not be included in the constitution but should enjoy legal backing below the constitution. This provision shall also be extended to both state and local government levels. From the foregoing discussions, it is apparent that the NPRC has been counter-productive for further widening the rifts between the regions and ethnicities of the Nigerian federation.

4.4. Ethnic Minorities, North-South Divide, and the Leadership Question

Based on ethnicity, Nigeria is polarised along North-South divide. The race towards the 2007 presidential elections has become an issue that will first be tackled at the ethno-geographic level. Ethnic groups are at daggers drawn in their quest to produce the next presi-

52 See Sunday Vanguard (Lagos) 18 June, 2005, p. 11.

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dent. The plural character of Nigeria is a ready ferment of ethnic conflicts. Ethnicity remains an asset in alliance formation, winning elections, and the control of state apparatuses. The countdown to the forthcoming general elections has again revealed the potency of ethnicity in politics. First, the Hausa/Fulani of the North, who are ensnared into squab- bling over their inability to field a consensus candidate, are claiming it is their turn to rule. This position, which is allegedly based on a gentleman agreement on North/South rotation of the presidency of 1999, is now controversial. The North has threatened to go its own way if the presidency is not conceded to it. The quest for ruling at the Centre by the ND ethnic groups is more pronounced than never. The chorus of marginalisation has become a rallying point and reveals the centrality of oil and the relevance of the ND. The South- eastern part claim to the presidency is rather uncoordinated and timid as intermittent trend to oppose power shift to the Southeast is apparently its only agenda. The South-West is for the moment out of the race since it would have ruled for eight consecutive years by 2007. The minority question remains largely unresolved and avoiding the issue will surely be counterproductive in the long run. This quagmire is convoluted by the presence and influence of a coterie of wealthy retired military officers. The Obasanjo led administration through the party in power, PDP, is attempting to douse this tension by making Jonathan Goodluck, a minority from the South-South the vice presidential candidate. Though the PDP Presidential Candidate, Umar Musa Yar’Ardua is of the northern Hausa/Fulani origin, the position of vice president given the ethnic minorities is a positive step to heal the wound of marginalisation. If things work well for the PDP in the General elections, an ethnic minority from that zone will occupy, for the first time, the second position in Nige- ria’s political hierarchy. This may however not translate to an automatic representation of the party by Goodluck after Yar’Ardua that is, if the aftermath of the Obasanjo-Atiku [the current vice president] personality clashes is anything to go by.

5. Conclusion and policy considerations

This study has discussed the imperatives of ethnicity, ethnic nationalism/ethnic movements, hence the emphasis on the impacts of ethnic militancy on the survival of Nigeria and the sustenance of its new democracy. Consequently, it did not fail to look at the effects of ethnicity on the political developments in historical context. The effects of ethnic politics, agitations, and conflicts on the post May 1999 Nigeria and government policies in assuag- ing the dissatisfying groups were also discussed. From the foregoing analysis, it is observed that ethnicity is not a bane to democracy, but rather contributes to its vibrancy. Ethnicity becomes problematic when it is being used to achieve particularistic interests that are detrimental to state’s interests. Undoubtedly, Nigeria is infected with the virus of political ethnicity accompanied with all the inauspicious and abhorrent outcomes that make its future looks ‘uncertain’. To surmount ethnic problems and secure the future of Africa’s largest democracy, Nigeria’s ‘defective’ federalism has to be ‘reinvented’ to guarantee greater harmonious intra- and inter ethnic rela-

Badmus, Under Reconstruction: Ethnicity, Ethnic Nationalism, and the Future of the Nigerian State 237

tions, social justice, and stability. Thus, the following measures/policy options need careful (re)considerations in order to achieve an integrative nation-state project, where all the restive ethnic nationalities will be pacified.

5.1. Overconcentration of Power and Extreme Centralisation

Quite obviously, both in structure and praxis, Nigerian federalism is wanton. One of its misleading features is the overconcentration of power and economic resources in the centre at the expense of the federating units. The overconcentration of power, over-reliance on oil revenues and absence of the practice of democratic decentralisation, has resulted in sapping the truly federalist institutions and values. The extreme centralisation of economic powers has equally led to the destructive competition for the control of power at the centre. For all intents and purposes, this misleading feature is detrimental to ethnic minorities because it has led to such “inauspicious and obnoxious outcomes as the erosion of the autonomy and security that genuinely federalists arrangements assure for minorities, the inordinate appropriation by the centre of the resources of the oil-rich Delta minority communities, and the direct and often counter-productive intervention of central authorities in those local and regional issues… that are best left to subnational authorities or communities.”53 It is argued by some pundits that ethnic minorities thrive well and their rights best protected in a centralised federal structure, because a strong centralised state apparatuses often empower the federal government to intervene decisively in enforcing, or even pre- venting abuses of, minority rights at the subnational level. This view is based on Nigeria’s experiences with the jettison of the centrifugal regional system by the Gowon military regime that helped to secure the autonomy of the country’s ethnic minorities. But, it should be noted that excessive concentration of powers in the Centre can be counterproductive. In a nutshell, minority rights are best guaranteed and protected under a decentralised structure of federalism rather than under the hegemonic central state apparatuses.

5.2. Politico-Economic Decentralisation

In addendum, there is the need for the politico-economic decentralisation of Nigerian federal system in order to ensure that all the federating units have the opportunities and resources required for self-governance, and greater share of the resources exploited in their regions. Politico-economic decentralisation does not imply a call for any secessionist arrangement and other forms of fissiparous and divisive centrifugal tendencies. Instead, the de-concentration of powers in the central state/government would definitely translate to politico-economic empowerment of the weak federating units. The relaxation of the central state’s tight control over oil revenues will definitely achieve this goal. Complementing this, mineral rents, should accrue directly to the oil producing communities involved, rather than to the central government. Furthermore, revenue sharing arrangements should not only

53 Suberu (see fn 3), p. 67.

238 Verfassung und Recht in Übersee VRÜ 42 (2009)

devolve greater resources to the sub-national authorities, but give greater weight to the principles of internal revenue generation effort and derivation in sharing revenues among these authorities. It is believed that this arrangement will ameliorate the friction between oil producing states/ethnic minorities and the federal government.

5.3. Accommodative / Power-Sharing Strategies

To promote ethnic justice, there is the need to devise ‘appropriate/effective’ power-sharing mechanisms and accommodative strategies. Although, attempts have not been lacking in this area as Nigeria is famous in the use of these mechanisms to enhance inter-ethnic inclu- siveness in decision making processes. Policies such as ‘Federal Character’ principle’, the ‘Zoning’ system that encourage the allocations or even rotation of political party posts among geo-political [ethnic] zones, etc are some of the strategies institutionalised by Nige- ria to promote inter-ethnic representation in the composition of public agencies. Undoubt- edly, the rationales behind these strategies are laudable since they often discourage sec- tional imbalance and bias in policy-making process. But, it is disheartening that the person- alistic interests of the ‘majority’ ethnicities always work against the realisation of the stated objectives. For instance, the ‘federal character’ principle has always been relegated to the background in the distribution of resources and opportunities in favour of majority nationalities to the harm of ethnic minorities. In the same vein, the ‘zoning’ arrangement also suffered similar setback for it is often used to reproduce and even further the hegemonic ambitions of the majority nationalities. While one is not discarding these strategies as vehicles of promoting inter-ethnic inclusive- ness and harmonious relations, it is important to emphasise that their effectiveness need to be enhanced, while the tendencies of manipulation by the major nationalities be discour- aged.

5.4. The Imperatives of Mediatory Institutions and Adequate Compensation of the Minorities

To stem ethnic violence/conflicts, minority groups’ rights need to be guaranteed. One of the several regulatory institutions that can guarantee these rights is an independent judiciary. During military rule, the judiciary was a toothless dog as the state itself became the perpe- trator of human rights abuses while the judiciary was unable to enforce human rights. The same went for the Press and the Police. Under Abacha, the roles of these mediatory institutions were severely circumscribed by inordinate political pressures or partisan obstruction or manipulation. In a truly democratic setting, an independent judiciary is a sine qua non for minority rights and federal democratic process protection. Furthermore, a stronger/ independent judiciary will require a greater political commitment to the supremacy of the regular courts’ system. Similarly, an efficient and reliable Police forces coupled with free Press are instrumental to the enforcement of the rule of law and deter arbitrary and unjust assaults on the rights of vulnerable social groups. Furthermore, adequate compensation of

Badmus, Under Reconstruction: Ethnicity, Ethnic Nationalism, and the Future of the Nigerian State 239

the embittered ethnic nationalities is central to ethnic conflict resolutions. The FG needs to recognise of mineral-bearing ethnicities to control/utilise a ‘significant’ proportion of the wealth derived from their territories. And, the Deltans should be allowed to participate in the decision-making process that impacted on the oil companies activities operating in the delta basin.

Postscript: may/june 2008

At the time of completing this paper, INEC had conducted the General elections and finally announced Umar Musa Yar’Ardua of the PDP as the winner of the Presidential election. The elections were very historic in Nigeria’s political history because it was the first time that it experienced the transfer of power from an elected civilian administration to another. Paradoxically, the elections turned to be a disgrace to Nigeria as the exercises were marred by irregularities and condemned by Observer groups as fraudulent. Expectedly, the results announcement heated up the polity as violence ensued in different parts of the country. After a period of tension in which many people lost their lives, the Presidential candidates of the Action Congress [AC] and the All Nigerian People’s Party [ANPP], Atiku Abubakar and Muhammadu Buhari respectively, agreed to challenge the results at the Election Peti- tion Tribunal. Though, the Tribunal had upheld Yar’Ardua’s victory, the case is still in the Supreme court for hearing while Nigerians are eagerly waiting for the outcome of the exercise. Concerning the issue of ethnicity and ethnic violence, President Yar’Ardua has started addressing this very seriously. The first sign of good things to come is the release of Asari Dokubo from detention. Also the president has summoned a conference on Niger Delta purposely to douse ethnic tensions and youth militancy. It is too early to assess the performance of the Yar’Ardua’s administration, but one thing is apparent: Nigerians are watching.

240

Demokratische Transformation und Parteiverbote: Warum gibt es kein Parteiverbot in der südafrikanischen Verfassung?

Von Jörg Kemmerzell, Darmstadt*

A. Einleitung1

Das subsaharische Afrika wurde, ähnlich wie Osteuropa oder Teile Asiens, zwischen 1989 und 1994 von einer Welle der Demokratisierung ehemaliger Einparteienstaaten und Mili- tärdiktaturen erfasst.2 Die Einführung bzw. Wiedereinführung von Mehrparteiensystemen war in vielen Staaten allerdings von Befürchtungen begleitet, dass die neue institutionelle Ordnung die Politisierung partikularer Identitäten möglicherweise prämiert und so zu einer Verschärfung gesellschaftlicher Konflikte führen könnte. Wenigstens 40 der 48 Staaten in der Region haben seit Beginn der neunziger Jahre gleichermaßen die rechtliche Möglich- keit von Parteiverboten geschaffen.3 29 Staaten erwähnen Parteiverbote explizit in der Verfassung, in den übrigen Fällen sind sie Gegenstand wenigstens der einfachen Gesetzge- bung zum Parteien- oder Wahlrecht. Die meisten Verbotsnormen wollen einer Politisierung ethnischer und kultureller Identitäten (Ethnizität, Sprache, Abstammung, Religion) vorbeu- gen. Besonders deutlich wird dies am ruandischen Beispiel, wo mehrere Parteien unter dem Vorwurf, „divisionnisme“ zu schüren, verboten wurden.4 Zwar kann die Geltung rechts- staatlicher Prinzipien unter dem derzeitigen ruandischen Regime sowie dessen demokratischer Charakter durchaus angezweifelt werden5, aber auch in Verfassungen vergleichsweise

* Jörg Kemmerzell, wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter am Institut für Politikwissenschaft und im Exzellenzcluster „Die Herausbildung normativer Ordnungen“ an der Technischen Universität Darmstadt. E-mail: [email protected] 1 Die Untersuchung beruht auf dem von der Fritz Thyssen Stiftung geförderten Forschungsprojekt „Managing Ethnic Conflict through Institutional Engineering. Ethnic Party Bans in Africa“. Die Fritz Thyssen Stiftung ermöglichte auch die Feldforschung in Südafrika. 2 Siehe Michael Bratton / Nicolas van de Walle, Democratic Experiments in Africa. Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective, 1997. 3 Anika Becher, Gesellschaftliche Konfliktlinien und politische Gewalt – Zum Verbot ethnischer Parteien im subsaharischen Afrika, in: Karsten Grabow, / Patrick Köllner (Hrsg.): Parteien und ihre Wähler. Gesellschaftliche Konfliktlinien und Wählermobilisierung im internationalen Ver- gleich, 2007, S. 83-102. 4 Peter Niesen, Demokratieerhalt durch Parteiverbot? Das Fallbeispiel Ruanda, Zeitschrift für Menschenrechte 1 (2008), S. 64-90. Für eine systematische Analyse solcher anti-partikularisti- scher Parteiverbote, mit den Schwerpunkten Türkei und Israel, siehe Nancy Rosenblum, Banning Parties: Religious and Ethnic Partisanship in Multicultural Democracies, Journal of Law and Ethics of Human Rights 1 (2007), S. 17-75. 5 Philip Reyntiens, Rwanda, Ten Years on. From Genocide to Dictatorship, African Affairs 103 (2004), S. 177-210.

Kemmerzell, Demokratische Transformation und Parteiverbote 241

demokratischer Staaten wie Ghana oder Benin findet sich das Instrument des Parteiverbo- tes. Es fällt zudem auf, dass die Parteiverbotsnormen offenbar nicht zum institutionellen Erbe des autoritären post-kolonialen Staates gehören, sondern eine neue Erscheinung in Transformationsverfassungen darstellen.6 Südafrika ist eines der wenigen afrikanischen Länder, die auf Parteiverbotsmöglichkei- ten verzichtet haben. Dies ist nicht nur im Vergleich zur zumeist anders gearteten regionalen Praxis erklärungsbedürftig sondern auch, weil sich eine Reihe möglicher Gründe für die Wahl dieser verhältnismäßig „repressiven“ Institution finden lassen. Zu nennen sind dabei die Erfahrung eines auf ethnischer Diskriminierung aufbauenden autoritären Regimes, die Spaltung der Gesellschaft entlang ethnischer Konfliktlinien zwischen „schwarz“ und „weiß“, aber auch innerhalb der schwarzen Mehrheitsbevölkerung, sowie die deutliche Präsenz „extremistischer“ Kräfte. Trotz dieser Faktoren mündete die Transition in Süd- afrika aber in eine ausgesprochen liberale, stark auf Grundrechten basierende Verfassung. Nach einer Einführung in das Konzept des Parteiverbots in Abschnitt B fragt Abschnitt C, ob im Zeitraum der demokratischen Transformation (1990 bis 1994) bestimmte Gründe eine „militante“ Verfassungskonzeption7 in Südafrika hätten rechtfertigen können. Hierzu wird die politische Situation während dieses Transformationsprozesses beleuchtet. Ab- schnitt D widmet sich einschlägigen Verfassungsnormen, wie insbesondere „Freedom of Association“ (Art. 18), „Political Rights“ (Art. 19) und „Limitation of Rights“ (Art. 36). Abschnitt E skizziert einen mehrdimensionalen Erklärungsansatz für den Verzicht auf eine Parteiverbotsnorm. Den Abschluss bilden eine transformationstheoretische Erklärung des Sachverhaltes und ein Ausblick in komparatistischer Absicht.

B. Das Konzept des Parteiverbotes

In den Kategorien von Gregory Fox und Georg Nolte, den Verfassern der maßgeblichen Studie zum Verbot politischer Parteien, kann die südafrikanische Demokratie dem Typ der „tolerant substantive democracy“ zugeordnet werden.8 „Substantive“, weil der Verfassung eine Reihe von „founding provisions“ sowie ein ausgeprägter Katalog von Grundrechten zugrunde liegen; „tolerant“, weil sie außer einer allgemeinen Grundrechts-Einschränkungs- klausel keinen militanten Republikschutz vorsieht. Fox und Nolte behandeln unter dem Titel „Intolerant Democracies“ sowohl nationale Traditionen der militanten Demokratie als auch internationale Rechtsnormen, die den Um- gang mit antidemokratischen Akteuren, darunter insbesondere Parteien, betreffen. Ausge-

6 Matthias Basedau / Matthijs Bogaards / Christof Hartmann / Peter Niesen, (Hrsg), Ethnic Party Bans in Africa: A Research Agenda, German Law Journal 8 (2007). 7 Der Begriff „militant democracy“ wurde von Karl Loewenstein (1937) geprägt, der angesichts der faschistischen Herausforderung im Europa der dreißiger Jahre einen militanten Standpunkt der Demokratien gegenüber ihren Feinden einforderte. Verbote faschistischer Parteien bilden ein Kernelement dieses Ansatzes. 8 Gregory H. Fox / Georg Nolte, Intolerant Democracies, Harvard Law Journal 36 (1995), S. 27.

242 Verfassung und Recht in Übersee VRÜ 42 (2009)

hend von einem liberal begründeten „Selbstabschaffungsverbot“ für Demokratien postulie- ren sie nicht nur ein „Rückfallverbot“ in vordemokratische Zustände, sondern plausibilisie- ren auch eine Verpflichtung, Maßnahmen des aktiven Demokratieschutzes zu ergreifen. Das Bekenntnis zur „Allgemeinen Erklärung der Menschenrechte“ oder der Beitritt zum „Internationalen Pakt über bürgerliche und politische Rechte“ verpflichtet Demokratien demnach zu Maßnahmen des Selbstschutzes, die auch bestimmte Wahlentscheidungen suspendieren können. Fox/Nolte erläutern das aktive Selbstschutzgebot im Vergleich zu einem schlichten Rückfallverbot anhand des Verbots der algerischen FIS im Jahr 1991: Nachdem die offen antidemokratische FIS die absolute Mehrheit bei den Parlamentswahlen gewonnen hatte, wurde sie von der noch amtierenden Regierung verboten. Eine passive Auslegung des Rückfallverbots hätte lediglich eine spätere FIS-Regierung verpflichtet, die demokratischen Institutionen aufrecht zu erhalten. Das Verbot der FIS sehen Fox/Nolte in Übereinstimmung mit dem von ihnen befürworteten aktiven Schutzgebot. Wenn die Regie- rungsübernahme durch eine bestimmte Partei absehbar zur dauerhaften Suspendierung bürgerlicher und politischer Rechte führt, ist das Verbot dieser Partei gerechtfertigt, auch wenn auf kurze Sicht politische Rechte dadurch verletzt werden. „Protecting future voting majorities“ wird zu einer auch völkerrechtlich verpflichtenden Aufgabe, derer sich eine Gesellschaft auch durch die Ausübung der Volkssouveränität nicht entledigen darf: „(...) there are certain things a society cannot choose to do to itself“.9 Die Überlegungen Fox und Noltes beziehen sich explizit auf stabile Demokratien.10 Auf sie angewendet, entspricht ihr Modell des Demokratieschutzes in etwa der „wehrhaften Demokratie“, wie sie das Bundesverfassungsgericht in den Parteiverbotsurteilen gegen SRP und KPD in den 1950er Jahren entwickelt hat: Eine Partei kann verboten werden, wenn sie aktiv die freiheitlich demokratische Ordnung des Grundgesetzes bekämpft. Unerheblich ist hingegen, mit welchen Mitteln sie diese bekämpft und ob von ihr eine akute Gefahr aus- geht. Peter Niesen definiert eine solche Konzeption von Parteiverboten als „anti-extremis- tisch“.11 Charakteristisch für den Antiextremismus ist seine abstrakte Fassung, die nicht des Rückbezuges auf konkret erfahrenes Unrecht bedarf. Über stabile Demokratien hinausge- hend erwähnen Fox und Nolte das besondere Risiko junger Demokratien, in vordemokratische Verhältnisse zurückzufallen. Die Einschränkung anti-demokratischer Parteien er-

9 Fox / Nolte, oben Fn. 8, S. 60. 10 In der Auswahl Algeriens, wenn auch nur zur Illustration, liegt indes eine Schwäche ihrer Analyse, da sicher in Frage steht, inwiefern Algerien 1991 wenigstens als formale Demokratie betrachtet werden kann. Es liegt die Vermutung nahe, dass es Fox und Nolte weniger um den Bestand demokratischer Prozeduren als um die Chance zur Verwirklichung von Menschenrechten geht. 11 Peter Niesen, Zwischen Pfadabhängigkeit und Kommensuration: Verbote politischer Parteien in Europa, in: Christian Joerges / Matthias Mahlmann / Ulrich K. Preuß (Hrsg.), „Schmerzliche Erfahrungen“ der Vergangenheit und der Prozess der Konstitutionalisierung Europas, Wiesbaden 2008, S. 258-273.

Kemmerzell, Demokratische Transformation und Parteiverbote 243

scheint in ihnen als ein Komplement des „right of revolution against undemocratic regimes (which) is at the core of traditional democratic theory“.12 Dieses Argument leitet über zu dem von Niesen so bezeichneten „negativ-republikanischen“ Paradigma, in dem Parteiverbote als „Rückfallsperre“ und symbolische Abgrenzung gegenüber einem undemokratischen Vorgängerregime konzeptualisiert werden.13 Der negative Republikanismus gewinnt seine Relevanz nur als konkrete Negation eines historischen Regimes, als Vorbild dient das Verbot der Faschistischen Partei in der italienischen Verfas- sung von 1947.

C. Mögliche Begründungen für Parteiverbote in Südafrika

Die südafrikanische Verfassung kennt keine Verbotsnorm, obwohl während der Transfor- mation bzw. in der Phase der Verfassungsgebung Gründe für beide Typen von Parteiver- boten bestanden hätten: Parteiverbote können erstens als eine Form von Vergangenheits- aufarbeitung verstanden werden, die auf eine symbolische und faktische Abgrenzung vom alten (Unrechts-)Regime zielt. Ruti Teitel erwähnt das Parteiverbot am Beispiel der jungen Bundesrepublik im breiteren Kontext von „transitional justice“.14 Eine explizite Abgren- zung vom Vorgängerregime findet sich neben der italienischen auch in der portugiesischen Verfassung. Diese verbietet faschistische Organisationen mit der Begründung, die Republik beruhe auf der Überwindung des faschistischen Regimes. Auf Südafrika übertragen hätte dies nahegelegt, Parteien zu verbieten, die sich positiv zum Apartheidsystem stellen und dessen Wiedereinführung fordern. Die „Constitutional Guidelines“, die der African Nation- al Congress noch 1988 für eine Post-Apartheid-Ordnung formuliert hatte, betonten auch tatsächlich die Bindung der politischen Akteure an das offensiv formulierte Ziel, Diskrimi- nierung auf Basis rassischer Zugehörigkeit entschlossen zu bekämpfen.15 Die „Guidelines“ des ANC sahen im Einzelnen die Möglichkeit vor, „to outlaw the advocacy and practice of racism, fascism, nazism or tribalism, or the incitement of ethnic or regional exclusiveness or hatred“ (Guideline k). Zudem wurde der Staat verpflichtet „to eradicate apartheid in all its forms“ (Guideline i) und auf ein militantes Demokratieverständnis festgelegt: „All organs of government (…) shall be (…) dedicated to defending the principles of the constitution“ (Guideline d). Zweitens lässt sich Parteiverboten durch den Ausschluss historischen Unrechts eine freiheitsverbürgende Funktion zuschreiben. Hier kann auf die Forderung nach „liberatory intolerance“ als politischem Leitbild eines neuen Südafrika verwiesen werden, das vom

12 Fox / Nolte, oben Fn. 8, S. 68. 13 Niesen, oben Fn. 11, S. 260. 14 Ruti Teitel, Transitional Justice, Oxford 2000, S. 178. 15 African National Congress (ANC), Constitutional Guidelines for a Democratic South Africa, 1988 (http://www.disa.ukzn.ac.za/index.php?option=com_displaydc&recordID=pam19890000.026.021 .000).

244 Verfassung und Recht in Übersee VRÜ 42 (2009)

späteren Minister Pallo Jordan 1988 propagiert wurde. „Liberatory intolerance“ stellt in dieser Perspektive eine Antwort auf einen „radically evil enemy“ dar: „Pallo Jordan noted 1988: ‘apartheid is a doctrine that is radically evil’; therefore Jordan called for ‘liberatory intolerance’. Through this theory, the liberal notion of tolerance is rejected since apartheid could not be viewed as just another competitor in the marketplace of ideas”.16 Die obigen Leitlinien des ANC, die einen Ausschluss von rassische oder ethnische Konfliktlinien mobilisierenden Parteien nahe legen könnten, finden in diesen Ausführungen ihre theoretische Grundlegung. Im Rahmen der antiextremistischen Konzeption bewegen sich hingegen stabilitätsorien- tierte Argumente. Die „unsicheren“ politischen Verhältnisse während der Liberalisierungs- phase (1990-1994), die manche Autoren gar von einem „low-intensity civil war“17 begleitet sehen, stellten den Erfolg der Transformation in Frage.18 In diesem Zusammenhang ist zum Beispiel an Giovanni Sartoris Betonung der stabilisierenden Wirkung der Parteiverbote für die junge Demokratie der Bundesrepublik zu erinnern. So hätte nicht in erster Linie die Fünf-Prozent-Sperrklausel eine Konzentration und De-Polarisierung des Parteiensystems bewirkt, sondern vor allem die Parteiverbote des Bundesverfassungsgerichts: „The reduction to just three of the parties of the Bonn Republic has instead a great deal to do with the fact that the Constitutional Court outlawed as anti-democratic, and therefore as unconstitu- tional, both the Communist and the Neo-Nazi parties“.19 Für den südafrikanischen Fall müssen in diesem Kontext die „COSAG Parties“ (Con- cerned South African Group) erwähnt werden, ein Zusammenschluss politischer Akteure, die im Juni 1993 die Teilnahme am „Multi Party Negotiation Process“ (MPNP) aufkün- digten mit der Perspektive, weder die neue Verfassung zu akzeptieren, noch an den für 1994 geplanten Wahlen teilzunehmen.20 Diese sehr heterogene Gruppe21 wurde im Wesentlichen dadurch zusammengeführt, dass die Beteiligten in der engen Zusammenarbeit von Regierung (gestellt von der National Party) und African National Congress die Gefahr ihrer Marginalisierung sahen.22 Grundlage dieser Befürchtung war insbesondere der

16 James L. Gibson, Does truth lead to reconciliation? Testing the causal assumptions of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Process, 2002 (http://www.utexas.edu/law/news/colloquium/ papers/UTVersio.pdf). 17 Hennie Kotzé / Pierre du Toit, Historical Contexts, in: Ursula J. van Beek (ed.), Democracy under Construction. Patterns from four Continents, 2005, S. 264, besprochen in VRÜ 41 (2008), S. 587. 18 Timothy D. Sisk, Democratization in South Africa. The Elusive Social Contract, Princeton 1995. 19 Giovanni Sartori, Comparative Constitutional Engineering, New York 1994, S. 19. 20 Richard Spitz / Matthew Chaskalson, The Politics of Transition. A hidden History of South Africa’s negotiated Settlemet, Oxford, S. 212. 21 Bestehend aus IFP (Inkatha Freedom Party), CP (Conservative Party), AVU (Afrikaner Volks- unie), KwaZulu Government, Homeland Governments Of Bophuthatswana and Ciskei. 22 Eine tiefergehende Darstellung des Transformationsprozesses ist an dieser Stelle leider nicht möglich. Detaillierte Analysen der demokratischen Transformation Südafrikas und ihrer Vorge- schichte, denen auch dieser Text unerlässliche Basisinformationen verdankt, finden sich unter

Kemmerzell, Demokratische Transformation und Parteiverbote 245

„Record of Understanding“, in dem die Regierung und der ANC eine enge Zusammenarbeit im Verfassungsgebungsprozess vereinbart und bereits eine Reihe inhaltlicher Festlegungen getroffen hatten.23 Die COSAG Parteien lehnten die politische und institutionelle Ausrich- tung des Verhandlungsprozesses im Ganzen ab. Insbesondere befürchteten sie eine zu starke Unitarisierung des zukünftigen Staates, eine Unterminierung des Gewohnheitsrechts („traditional law“) und eine dauerhafte Majorisierung der Weißen durch die schwarze Mehrheit. Zusammengefasst können folgende Kernanliegen der COSAG Parteien, die sich im Oktober 1993 als „Freedom Alliance“24 eine gemeinsame organisatorische Plattform gaben, identifiziert werden: 1. In Opposition gegen einen Einheitsstaat befürworteten sie eine föderale Staatsordnung, die explizit auf einem Bekenntnis zur regionalen Autonomie („acceptance of regionalism“) beruht. 2. Die Anerkennung der regionalen Ebene als Träger staatlicher Macht. 3. Die Ablehnung des von der Regierung einseitig geführten Verhandlungs- und Friedens- prozesses. Zur problematischen Komposition dieser Allianz merken Richard Spitz und Matthew Chaskalson allerdings an25: „In practice, each party had its own interests. The Status of KwaZulu Natal, an Afrikaner Volk- staat, and the opposition of the Bophuthatswana and Ciskei homeland administrations in the new dispensation mattered at most to two COSAG parties at a given time. But substantive differences were counterbalanced by a common hatred of ANC-government bilateralism, as epitomised by sufficient consensus in decision-making, and by the hope that a united front of malcontents would compel the ANC and the government to reconsider the way forward”. Während sich die COSAG/Freedom Alliance Akteure offiziell zu einem friedlichen Prozess bekannten, verfolgten sie tatsächlich doch eine Doppelstrategie: „Proposals for the negotiating table were backed up by the threat of resistance if they were not accepted“.26 Dass Gewalt im Umkreis der COSAG Parteien auch aktiv angewendet wurde, zeigen zwei Ereig- nisse: Einmal die bürgerkriegsähnlichen Auseinandersetzungen zwischen Inkatha und ANC-Anhängern zwischen 1990 und 1994, die bis zu 15000 Menschenleben gekostet haben27; zum anderen die Versuche weißer Extremisten, mit Gewalt den Regimewechsel

anderem bei Steven Friedman, The small Miracle. South Africa’s negotiated Settlement, Johan- nesburg 1994, Timothy D. Sisk, oben Fn. 18, Allister Sparks, Morgen ist ein anderes Land, Berlin 1995 sowie Richard Spitz / Matthew Chaskalson, oben Fn. 20. 23 Hassen Ebrahim, The Soul of a Nation. Constitution-making in South Africa, Cape Town 1988, S. 588 ff.. 24 Ebrahim, oben Fn. 23, S. 230. 25 Spitz / Chaskalson, oben Fn. 20, S. 213. 26 Spitz / Chaskalson, oben Fn. 20, S. 232. 27 Es wäre historisch allerdings verfehlt, die Verantwortung für diese Ereignisse nur einer Seite zuzuschieben. Die Gewalt ging gleichermaßen von Inkatha und dem ANC aus und wurde zudem durch Provokationen des Geheimdienstes („third force“) geschürt, wie der damalige Präsident de

246 Verfassung und Recht in Übersee VRÜ 42 (2009)

aufzuhalten und/oder wenigstens einen unabhängigen „Volksstaat“ zu errichten, in dem die Regeln der Apartheid weiter bestehen sollten. Hier ist zum einen der Überfall von AWB- Anhängern auf die Kempton-Park-Verhandlungen (Juni 1993) zu nennen, zum anderen der gescheiterte Staatsstreich im Homeland Bophuthatswana (April 1994), der ebenfalls aus Reihen des AWB lanciert wurde.28 Zu betonen ist die ideologische, personelle und organisatorische Nähe des AWB zu den rechten Afrikaner-Parteien CP und AVU und deren Dachorganisation AVF.29 Der gescheiterte Coup entfernte ironischerweise die letzten Hindernisse auf dem Weg zur ersten demokratischen Wahl: Er führte zur Spaltung der weißen Rechten in einen legalistischen Flügel, die Freedom Front, und die verbliebenen Militanten der AWB. Bis dahin gefährdete die CP durch überraschende Erfolge in Nach- wahlen zunehmend die Position der NP, deren Mehrheit im Parlament zusehends kleiner wurde. Für ein antiextremistisches Parteiverbot hätte in der Phase der Verhandlungen über eine neue politische Ordnung (1991-1994) durchaus Anlass bestanden. Die COSAG Parteien besetzten zwar keine effektiven Veto-Positionen im Prozess, hatten jedoch ein erhebliches „Spoiling-Potential“.30 Neben den bereits genannten Akteuren ist mindestens noch der Pan Africanist Congress zu nennen.31 Dieser stand bis 1993 ebenfalls außerhalb des prä-konsti- tutionellen Bogens, da er eine Reform des Systems durch Verhandlungen ablehnte: „Slaves have nothing to gain from negotiating with their masters (…) We do not need reform. We need a complete overhaul of the entire economic and political system”.32 Auch wenn CP, PAC, AVU und phasenweise IFP als extremistische Parteien eingeord- net werden können, von denen signifikante Risiken für den Transformationsprozess ausge- gangen sind, so war ihr Verbot aber nicht praktikabel und legitimierbar im Licht der Ziel- setzung des Verhandlungsprozesses. Die Gründe, von einem Verbot dieser Gruppen im Transformationsprozess abzusehen, werden in Kapitel 4 betrachtet. An dieser Stelle kann zusammenfassend nur so viel festgestellt werden, dass objektive Grundlagen sowohl eines

Klerk später auch zugeben musste. Vgl. Richard A. Wilson, Justice and Legitimacy in the South African Transition, in: Alexandra Barahona de Brito / Carmen Gonzales-Enriquez/ Paloma Agui- lar (eds.), The Politics of Memory. Transitional Justice in Democratizing Societies, 2001, S. 196. 28 Spitz / Chaskalson, oben Fn. 20, 244 ff. 29 CP: Conservative Party; AVU: Afrikaner Volksunie, AVF: Afrikaner Volksfront; AWB: Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging. 30 Ein „Spoiler“ oder „Störenfried“ zeichnet sich wesentlich durch sein negatives Blockade- oder Sabotagepotential aus. Dadurch wird er in die Lage versetzt Verhandlungslösungen zu verhindern, ohne jedoch selbst Perspektiven jenseits des Status Quo aufzeigen zu können. Im Negativfall führt das Handeln von Spoilern sogar zu einem Rückfall hinter den Status Quo. Vgl. dazu Stephen John Stedman, Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes, International Security 22 (1997), S. 5-53 und Ulrich Schneckener, Warum manche den Frieden nicht wollen. Eine Soziologie der „Stören- friede“, SWP Forschungsgruppe Globale Fragen-Diskussionspapier 1/2003. 31 Prof. Robert Mattes verweist auf die destruktive Haltung des PAC in weiten Phasen des. Verhand- lungsprozesses (Interview, Cape Town, 03.06.2008). 32 Zitiert nach Ebrahim, oben Fn. 23, S. 43.

Kemmerzell, Demokratische Transformation und Parteiverbote 247

anti-extremistischen als auch eines negativ republikanischen Parteiverbots durchaus bestanden. Auf der „weißen“ Rechten gab es Bestrebungen, den Demokratisierungsprozess zu verhindern und das Apartheidsystem zumindest territorial begrenzt aufrecht zu erhalten. Die „schwarze“ ANC-Opposition zeigte ebenso mannigfache Bestrebungen, den Transfor- mationsprozess zu unterlaufen. Ihr konservativ-ethnisch orientierter Teil wollte eine zu starke Machtballung im Zentrum verhindern und seine unter dem Apartheidregime bezoge- nen Machtpositionen nicht verlieren. IFP beispielsweise stellte mit der Forderung nach einer Sonderrolle KwaZulu Natals möglicherweise die territoriale Integrität des Landes in Frage. Ihre Forderung nach Gleichstellung des „Traditional law“ in der Rechtshierarchie forderte zudem den unbedingten Geltungsanspruch des Demokratie- und Rechtsstaatsprin- zips heraus. Die afrikanistische Linke stand einer Zusammenarbeit mit der alten Regierung überhaupt kritisch oder gar feindlich gegenüber und griff den ANC aufgrund dessen Kon- sensorientierung an. Ein negativ republikanisches Parteiverbot hätte sich auf die konkrete Negativfolie der Apartheid beziehen und diese systematisch ausschließen können. Da negativer Republikanismus eine bestimmte Form der Vergangenheitspolitik darstellt, ist erstens zu prüfen, inwiefern Südafrika auf alternative Formen zurückgegriffen hat und zweitens, warum bestimmte Varianten der Vergangenheitspolitik gewählt und andere ver- worfen wurden. Da die Institutionenwahl in verhandlungsgesteuerten Transitionsprozessen durch die Interaktion der „alten“ und „neuen“ Eliten maßgeblich geprägt wird, verdient dieses Verhältnis in der Analyse besondere Beachtung.

D. Die Demokratiekonzeption der Südafrikanischen Verfassung

Die südafrikanische Verfassung verbindet zwei grundlegende Prinzipien. Das erste Prinzip kommt in den „Founding Provisions“ der Verfassung zum Ausdruck, als „Supremacy of the Constitution and the Rule of Law “ und in der „Bill of Rights“, jeweils gewährleistet durch das unabhängige Verfassungsgericht. Die Unveränderlichkeit dieses Rechtsstaatsprinzips und die kategoriale Bindung allen positiven Rechts daran zeichnet die Verfassung als „substantive democracy“ aus. Das zweite Prinzip besteht in dem durchweg liberalen Verständ- nis der Rechte, welches bürgerlichen und politischen Rechten unbedingte Geltung zuer- kennt. Art. 18 der Verfassung bekennt schlicht: „Every person has the right to freedom of association“. Art. 19 (“Political Rights”) gewährleistet das Recht: (a) to form a political party; (b) to participate in the activities of, or recruit members for, a political party; (c) to campaign for a political party or cause”. Darüber hinaus gewährleistet Art. 19 das uneingeschränkte aktive und passive Wahlrecht. Diskriminierung hinsichtlich rassischer oder ethnischer Abstammung sowie der Ge- schlechtszugehörigkeit verbietet Art. 9 („Equality“). Auf diskriminierende Praktiken haben sowohl der Staat als auch Privatpersonen zu verzichten. Die Einschränkung von Rechten („Limitation of Rights“) wird in Art. 36 an enge Krite- rien gebunden. Dennoch erscheinen die Formulierungen der „limitation-clause“ auf den

248 Verfassung und Recht in Übersee VRÜ 42 (2009)

ersten Blick Ansätze für mögliche Einschränkungen politischer Assoziationsfreiheit zu bieten. Die Interim Constitution erlaubte in Art. 33 (1) die Einschränkung von Rechten unter der Bedingung, dass diese Einschränkung „reasonable“ und „justifiable“ „in an open and democratic society“ sei. Für die Einschränkung einiger Rechte, unter anderem die in unserem Fall relevanten „Freedom of Association“ und die „Political Rights“ gilt außerdem das Kriterium „necessary“, welches besonderes hohe Hürden gegenüber einer Einschrän- kung nahelegt. Hierzu merkt Stuart Woolman im Verfassungskommentar an: „Rights which receive ‚reasonable and necessary’ protection should receive the greatest judicial solici- tude”.33 In der Limitation Clause der Final Constitution (Art. 36) wurde das Kriterium der Notwendigkeit gestrichen, was Woolman zufolge zu einer Enthierarchisierung verfas- sungsmäßiger Rechte führte. Die Tendenz der Interim Constitution „to privilege liberal and procedural rights over more egalitarian guarantees“34 sei dadurch entfallen. Gemäß dem Verständnis der analog formulierten Rechte im „Internationalen Pakt über bürgerliche und politische Rechte“ könnte dies auf eine Erleichterung der Einschränkung verfassungsmäßi- ger Rechte hinweisen.35 Diese Interpretation lehnen jedoch sowohl Woolman als auch Currie und de Waal ab.36 Die Neufassung wird hingegen als terminologische Straffung im Sinne eines „non-preferential treatment of all rights under the limitation clause“37 bewertet. Inwiefern eröffnet die Interpretation der einschlägigen Art. zur Assoziationsfreiheit und zu den politischen Rechten die Möglichkeit von Parteiverboten? Stuart Woolman grenzt im Kommentar zu Art. 18 die Konzeption der Assoziationsfreiheit scharf von der südafrikani- schen Tradition der Assoziationsverbote ab. Die repressive Vorgeschichte wird in An- spruch dafür genommen, dass „great caution should be exercised before resort is had to the banning of any political entity”.38 Assoziationsverbote werden streng an das Handeln von Organisationen gebunden. Bestimmte Willensbekundungen, die demokratische Ordnung stürzen zu wollen, reichen nicht als Rechtfertigung aus. Mögliche Verbote beziehen sich somit nicht auf militante Demokratiegegner, sondern auf solche Akteure, die über reale Machtmittel zur Herbeifüh- rung eines Umsturzes verfügen, und diese Intention durch Gewaltanwendung auch belegen: „This rule draws a distinction between associations which merely advocate the government’s overthrow – which deserve at least prima facie protection – and associations which demonstrate through military preparation and action that they are bent on non-peaceable

33 Stuart Woolman, Section 12: Limitation, in: Matthew Chaskalson (ed.), Constitutional Law of South Africa, Cape Town 1999, S. 37. 34 Woolman, oben Fn. 33, S. 13. 35 In diesem Sinne Fox / Nolte, oben Fn. 8. 36 Siehe Woolman, oben Fn. 33 und Iain Currie / Johan de Wall, The Bill of Rights Handbook, Cape Town 2005 (5th edition). 37 Woolman, oben Fn. 33, S. 14. 38 Stuart Woolman, Section 22: Freedom of Asociation, in: Matthew Chaskalson (ed.), Constitu- tional Law of South Africa, Cape Town 1999, S. 3.

Kemmerzell, Demokratische Transformation und Parteiverbote 249

governmental change“.39 Es müssen also konkrete Gewalthandlungen massiven Ausmaßes vorliegen, um Organisationen zu verbieten, die militante Ablehnung der demokratischen Ordnung durch diese reicht hingegen nicht aus. Damit fallen Parteien als Ziele von Assozi- ationsverboten weitgehend weg, zumindest falls sie nicht als Träger paramilitärischer Gewalt in Erscheinung treten.40 Allerdings muss das Recht der Assoziationsfreiheit im Kontext der möglichen Ein- schränkungen der „Freedom of Expression“ interpretiert werden. Die Meinungsfreiheit erfährt in Art. 16 (2) eine Einschränkung in drei Fällen: (a) Propaganda for war; (b) Incitement of imminent violence; (c) Advocacy of hatred that is based on race, ethnicity, gender or religion, and that constitutes incitement to cause harm. Können aus diesen Einschränkungen der Äußerungsfreiheit auch Einschränkungen der Organisationsfreiheit abgeleitet werden? Der Verzicht, in Art. 18 („Freedom of Associa- tion“) eine zur Äußerungsfreiheit analoge Formulierung zu wählen und Einschränkungs- gründe zu enumerieren, spricht dagegen, der Normen zur Äußerungsfreiheit auf die Assozi- ationsfreiheit zu übertragen. Können zudem Parteien überhaupt für Äußerungen ihrer Mit- glieder („vicarious liability“) verantwortlich gemacht werden? Die südafrikanische Verfas- sungsrechtslehre interpretiert mehrheitlich die Grundrechte eher individualisierend, was eine Übertragbarkeit auf Organisationen nicht nahe legt.41 „Political Rights“ (Art. 19) bilden „in the light of the historical context (…) a central pillar of a representative democracy“.42 Auch hier soll die geschichtliche Erfahrung ein besonders tolerantes Rechtsverständnis begründen. Neben dieser partikularen Erfahrung wird auch auf die universelle Dimension eines „emerging right to democratic governance“ verwiesen. Das Recht, politische Parteien zu gründen, in ihnen mitzuarbeiten und für sie zu werben, hebt Art. 19 hervor. Parteien werden somit gegenüber der „normalen“ Assozia- tionsfreiheit besonders ausgezeichnet, ohne Anlegung besonders strenger Maßstäbe an ihre innere und äußere Gestalt. Die Interpretation von Art. 19 im Kontext der Art. 9 („Equality“) und 16 („Freedom of Expression“) ermöglicht jedoch bestimmte Zugangs-Regularien zur Teilnahme an Wahlen als der Kerninstitution der repräsentativen Demokratie und darüber auch zur öffentlichen Parteienfinanzierung, die ihrerseits Verfassungsrang genießt (Art. 52). Das Recht zur Parteibildung unterliegt keinen Einschränkungen, auch nicht durch die einschlägige Gesetzgebung des Electoral Act (EA) und des Electoral Commission Act (ECA). Das gilt nicht für das „right to campaign“. Art. 99 des Electoral Act normiert die Zustimmung jeder sich an einer Wahl beteiligenden Partei zum Electoral Code. Der Electo-

39 Woolman, oben Fn. 38, S. 7. 40 Currie / de Waal, oben Fn. 36, 427. 41 Johan de Waal, Section 23: Political Rights, in: Matthew Chaskalson (ed.), Constitutional Law of South Africa, Cape Town 1999, S. 6. 42 De Waal, oben Fn. 41, S. 2.

250 Verfassung und Recht in Übersee VRÜ 42 (2009)

ral Code ist dem Electoral Act als Ergänzung beigefügt und beschränkt die Äußerungsfrei- heit von Parteien analog zu Art. 16. Bei Verstößen gegen diesen „Code of Conduct“ sieht Art. 96 EA Sanktionen vor, die bis zur Nichtregistrierung von Parteien reichen können (Art. 96 (2) (i)).43 Die „Independent Electoral Commission (IEC)“ dokumentiert zwölf Fälle von verweigerter Registrierung auf nationaler und Provinz-Ebene bis Juni 2008.44 Bislang sind keine Fälle bekannt, in denen Parteien aufgrund von Wahlkampfäußerungen wegen ethnischer Diskriminierung, ausgeschlossen worden wären. Verweigert wurden Registrierungen bislang bei Nichterfüllung der in Art. 15 ECA normierten formalen Anfor- derungen oder Verstößen gegen prozedurale Bestimmungen des Art.s 16 (1) a (i) ECA (s.u.).45 Der Electoral Commission Act ermöglicht dem Chief Electoral Officer (Geschäftsführer der IEC) prinzipiell, Parteien nicht zu registrieren, die bestimmten Anforderungen nicht genügen. Auch hier wird auf die Terminologie von Art. 9 und Art. 16 der Verfassung zurückgegriffen: Sec 16. Electoral Commission Act (1) The chief electoral officer may not register a party in terms of section 15, if: (a) a proposed name, abbreviated name, distinguishing mark or symbol mentioned in the application: (i) resembles the name, abbreviated name, distinguishing mark or symbol, as the case may be, of any other registered party to such extent, that it may deceive or confuse voters ; or (ii) contains anything which portrays the propagation or incitement of violence or hatred or which may cause serious offence to any section of the population on the grounds of race, gender, sex, ethnic origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture or language. Zusammengefasst kennt die Verfassung der Republik Südafrika kein Parteiverbot, das auf eine Auflösung von Parteien hinauslaufen würde. Begründet durch die Interpretation von Art. 19 (1), kann Parteien allerdings ihre Registrierung zu Wahlen verweigert werden. Das hat insbesondere den Wegfall öffentlicher Parteienfinanzierung zur Folge.46 Statt von einem Verbot lässt sich daher nur von einer Suspendierung sprechen.

E. Warum gibt es kein Parteiverbot in der südafrikanischen Verfassung?

Die Südafrikanische Verfassung bekennt sich zu einer liberal-toleranten Demokratiekon- zeption, trotz der in Kapitel 2 diskutierten historischen Gründe, die durchaus in der verfas-

43 Eine schwere Sanktion, da die mandatsgebundene öffentliche Parteienfinanzierung wegfiele. 44 Vgl. die Homepage der Independent Electoral Commission (http://www.elections.org.za/ Registered_Parties/Selection_Party.asp). 45 Diese Informationen beruhen auf Angaben der Independent Electoral Commission sowie Exper- teninterviews mit Hugh Corder, Robert Mattes und Richard Calland an der University of Cape Town. Betroffen von der Nichtregistrierung war beispielsweise eine Labour-Party, deren Registrierung aufgrund der Existenz einer anderen Labour Party nicht angenommen wurde. 46 De Waal, oben Fn. 41, S. 7.

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sungsgebenden Situation für die Einführung von Parteiverboten hätten geltend gemacht werden können. Im folgenden sind zunächst, basierend auf einer im April und Mai 2007 durchgeführten Expertenbefragung47, drei Hypothesen zu entwickeln, die den Verzicht auf das Instrument Parteiverbot erklären können. Unter Einbezug der Expertenbefragung, von Sekundärliteratur und im Mai/Juni 2008 generierten Interviewdaten48 sind die Hypothesen dann zu überprüfen.

I. Hypothesen

Die Transformation folgte in Südafrika trotz aller Hindernisse einem konsensorientierten oder koordinierten Modell, das der Einbeziehung möglichst vieler und heterogener Akteure eine wichtige Rolle zuwies. Analysen dieses Modells verweisen gleichermaßen auf die Bedeutung von Akteursüberzeugungen49, auf das rationale Kalkül der Beteiligten50 und auf die Mechanismen der Transformation, die einen bestimmten „constitutional choice“ als Ergebnis nahe legen. Die wichtigsten theoretischen und empirischen Alternativen zum Konsensmodell stellen die Reform von oben und der Zusammenbruch des alten Regimes dar, der sowohl durch eine Revolution als auch durch äußere Intervention bewirkt werden kann.51 Die politische Konstellation in Südafrika ermöglichte allerdings eine koordinierte Transition. Die Einführung von Parteiverboten, respektive der Verzicht darauf, kann nur im allgemeinen Kontext der Verfassungsgebung erklärt werden, da sich im geschriebenen Verfas- sungstext gleichermaßen historische Erfahrungen, die Überzeugungen der handelnden Akteure und der Einfluss konkurrierender sozialer Kräfte widerspiegeln. Dieses Verfas-

47 Im März/April 2007 wurde eine Befragung südafrikanischer Experten durchgeführt, an der sich folgende Personen beteiligten: Prof. Heribert Adam (Simon Fraser University, Ontario/Kanada), Prof. Kogila Adam-Moodley (University of British Columbia, Kanada), Prof. David Dyzenhaus (Faculty of Law, University of Toronto), Prof. Pierre du Toit (Department of Political Science, University of Stellenbosch), Prof. Hermann Giliomee (University of Stellenbosch), Prof. Courtney Jung (New School of Social Research, New York), Prof. Heinz Klug (Law School, University of Wisconsin), Prof. Robert Mattes (Department of Political Studies, University of Cape Town). 48 Während eines Forschungsaufenthaltes in Südafrika im Mai/Juni 2008 konnten Experteninter- views mit den folgenden Personen geführt werden: Dr. Werner Böhler (Repräsentant der Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, Johannesburg), Hendrik Bussiek (Journalist/Politikberater, Kapstadt), Prof. Hugh Corder (Faculty of Law, University of Cape Town), Prof. Richard Calland (Faculty of Law, University of Cape Town), Prof. Robert Mattes (Department of Political Studies, University of Cape Town), Ursula Scheidegger (Department of Political Studies, University of the Witwaters- rand, Johannesburg/EISA, Johannesburg). 49 Sparks, oben Fn. 22. 50 Sisk, oben Fn. 18. 51 Für eine überzeugende theoretische Herleitung und empirische Anwendung dieser Kategorien vgl. János Kis, Between Reform and Revolution, Eastern European Politics and Societies 12 (1998), S. 300-383 und daran anschließend Andrew Arato, The Occupation of Iraq and the difficult Tran- sition from Dictatorship, Constellations 10 (2003), S. 408-424..

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sungsverständnis, in welchem das Staatsrecht als Ausdruck sozialer Konstellationen zu verstehen ist52, legt eine Untersuchung nahe, die eine bestimmte institutionelle Wahlhand- lung (Verzicht auf eine Parteiverbotsnorm) nicht isoliert, sondern in ihrem historischen Kontext betrachtet. Experten des südafrikanischen Transformationsprozess erhielten einen offenen Frage- bogen zum Thema „Parteiverbot“. Gefragt wurde zum ersten, ob im Rahmen des Demokra- tisierungsprozesses über die Einführung von Parteiverboten in eine neue Verfassung disku- tiert wurde, von wem solche Vorschläge gemacht wurden, auf welchen Typ von Parteien sie sich bezogen und welche Gründe geltend gemacht wurden. Fehlte eine solche Parteiver- botsdebatte, wurde zweitens nach möglichen Gründen für deren Ausbleiben gefragt. Die dritte Frage bezog sich darauf, ob das Thema seit Inkraftsetzung der endgültigen Verfas- sung in der verfassungspolitischen Debatte aufgeworfen wurde. Basierend auf den Antwor- ten konnten drei Hypothesen formuliert werden: 1. Vergangenheitspolitisch wurde auf Parteiverbote verzichtet, weil Partei- und Organisa- tionsverbote wichtige Repressionsinstrumente im Apartheidsystem darstellten. Der ein- schränkungsfreien Partizipation in politischen Parteien und deren Rolle im politischen System wurde daher ein hohes Maß an Legitimität zugebilligt. 2. Der südafrikanische Weg zur Demokratie folgte dem Modell der „coordinated transition“. Inklusivität und breiter Konsens sind wichtige strukturelle Bestandteile dieses Modells. Parteiverbote wären hier ein systemfremdes Element. 3. Der politische Extremismus bedrohte trotz Präsenz entsprechender Akteure (vgl. Kapi- tel 2) die neu entstehende Demokratie nicht ernstlich. Der Nutzen eines Parteiverbots stünde außer Verhältnis zu seinen Kosten für die liberale Verfassungskonzeption.

II. Analyse

Die Analyse für die Gründe des Verzichts auf eine Parteiverbotsnorm wird erstens darauf eingehen, warum ein negativ-republikanisches Parteiverbot in vergangenheitspolitischer Perspektive keine Option darstellte. Hier spielen insbesondere die Überzeugungen der handelnden Akteure eine bedeutsame Rolle. Zweitens sollen zentrale Strukturen des Transformationsprozesses untersucht werden. Schließlich wird geprüft, warum trotz der offensichtlichen Bedrohung des Demokratisierungsprozesses durch eine Vielzahl von Organisationen auch die anti-extremistische Variante eines Parteiverbots nicht zum Zuge kam. Diese Analyse betont die Akteurkonstellation im Verfassungsgebungsprozess sowie die Akteurinteressen und wird abschließend flankiert durch eine machtstrategische Zusatz- überlegung, die auf die im Transformationsprozess bereits absehbare Struktur des südafri- kanischen Parteiensystems nach 1994 abhebt.

52 So z. B. Otto Kirchheimer, Funktionen des Staates und der Verfassung. 10 Analysen, Frankfurt 1972.

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Analytisch kann die Erklärung für den Verzicht auf Instrumente der „militant democracy“ auf drei Ebenen verortet werden. Auf der strukturellen Ebene können die „Eigenge- setzlichkeiten“ des südafrikanischen Transformationstyps herangezogen werden. Auf der Ebene der Akteurskonstellation und Akteursinteressen steht das rationale Kalkül der Akteure im Transformationsprozess im Mittelpunkt. Die Akteursüberzeugungen bilden schließlich tieferliegende Wert- und Weltvorstellungen auf Seiten der handelnden Eliten ab. Während die Hypothesen 1 und 2 weitgehend bestätigt werden können, bedarf Hypo- these 3 zumindest einer Modifikation. Während die entstehende Demokratie im Zeitraum zwischen der Aufnahme offizieller Gespräche zwischen der NP-Regierung und dem ANC (1990) und der Wahl der Verfassungsgebenden Versammlung (1994) unter erheblichem Druck „extremistischer“ Akteure stand, schwächte sich dieser nach 1994 ab durch Einbin- dung oder Marginalisierung.

II.1 Vergangenheitspolitik und Akteursüberzeugungen In vergangenheitspolitischer Hinsicht betonen mehrere Interviewpartner, dass der Verzicht auf Assoziationsverbote in der Verfassung eine bewusste Abkehr von der Vergangenheit darstellte. Robert Mattes erwähnt zum Konzept der „liberatory intolerance“: „This idea never got very far at all, mostly because it smacked too much of what had gone on before“.53 Mit der Weichenstellung für einen ausgehandelten Regimewechsel entfielen die notwendigen Voraussetzungen einer Leitbildfunktion der „liberatory intolerance“, denn das Konzept basierte auf der Annahme eines von unten erzwungenen Regimewechsels oder eines Regimezusammenbruchs. In der südafrikanischen Transformation erfolgte hingegen eine „Läuterung“ des wichtigsten Trägers der alten Ordnung, der NP, durch deren maßgeb- liche Mitwirkung an der Schaffung einer neuen Ordnung. Intoleranz erfuhr zudem eine gänzliche Umkodierung. Intoleranz galt bereits im Transformationsprozess als ein zu über- windendes Übel und mögliches Hindernis für eine erfolgreiche Demokratisierung.54 Gibson führt zum Konzept der “liberatory intolerance” aus: „Theories such as this divided supporters of apartheid and those struggling against it into categories of enemies and friends, evil and good, and lent a certain justification (if not imperative) to intolerance“.55 Herman Giliomee sieht die negative Erfahrung mit Parteiverboten als den wichtigsten Grund dafür, dass deren neuerliche Einführung nicht erwogen wurde. “Inclusion of all political actors became the overriding goal of constitutionmaking“, in Abgrenzung zur Apartheid als „exclusionary system“.56 Da die Anti-Apartheid Opposition in großer Mehrheit sich für eine „culture of inclusion“ ausgesprochen hatte, hätte eine „policy of prohibition“ die

53 Interview mit Robert Mattes (Cape Town, 03.06.2008). 54 Siehe Institute for a Democratic Alternative for South African, Preparing for Democracy, Die Suid-Afrikaan 43 (1993). 55 Gibson, oben Fn. 16, S. 26. 56 Fragebogen von Herman Giliomee.

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Glaubwürdigkeit der zentralen Akteure in Frage gestellt.57 Tatsächlich hatte das Apartheid- Regime extensiv auf das Instrument des Organisationsverbots zurückgegriffen. Als erste Anti-Apartheid-Partei nach der Machtübernahme der „Afrikaner-Nationalisten“ wurde 1950 die SACP (South African Communist Party) durch den „Suppression of Communism Act“ verboten.58 1960 folgten Verbote des ANC und des PAC, 1977 des BCM (Black Consciousness Movement) und 1988, noch in der Spätphase der Apartheid, der UDF (United Democratic Front). Die UDF war eine Dachorganisation von Apartheidgegnern unterschiedlicher Herkunft und warb explizit für ein multiethnisches Südafrika. Die hohe symbolische Bedeutung der Organisationsverbote wird daran deutlich, dass sie als zentrale Herrschaftsinstrumente des alten Systems interpretiert werden. So bezeichnet Nelson Man- dela in seiner Autobiographie59 den „Suppression of Communism Act“ als einen der drei Grundpfeiler der Apartheid, neben dem „Population Registration Act“ und dem „Group Areas Act“ (Mandela 2006, 160).60 Daran wird die immense symbolische Aufladung des Verbots-Instrumentes deutlich. Daher hätte die Verhängung von Organisationsverboten wie eine Fortschreibung des alten Systems gewirkt und der Reputation und Legitimation der Transformationsakteure schweren Schaden zugefügt. Die NP-Regierung hatte 1990 die noch bestehenden Organisationsverbote (ANC, PAC, SACP) aufgehoben. Neuerliche Verbote wären vor diesem Hintergrund schwer zu rechtfertigen gewesen und hätten sich höchstwahrscheinlich noch konfliktfördernd ausgewirkt. Sowohl auf Seiten der „weißen“ (rechten, pro Apartheid) als auch der „schwarzen“ (entwe- der ethnisch-konservativen oder links-afrikanistischen) Opposition im Verhandlungspro- zess wären Gewalt und Sezession in noch stärkerem Maße propagiert worden, als dies sowieso schon der Fall war. Hier wird das Legitimitätsargument durch ein Nützlichkeits- argument ergänzt. Parteiverbote hätten dem gemeinsamen Ziel der dominanten Akteure, der friedlichen Demokratisierung des Apartheidsystems im Rahmen der bestehenden legalen Ordnung, geschadet. So stand die NP beispielsweise unter dem Druck der CP, die in den Wahlen der achtziger Jahre zunehmend ihren Stimmenanteil ausbauen konnte und nach 1990 alle Nachwahlen gewann. Repressive Maßnahmen gegenüber dieser entschiedenen Pro-Apartheid-Partei hätten die Wahrscheinlichkeit des Scheitern des Verhandlungsprozes- ses signifikant erhöht. Gleiches gilt für die Verhandlungsgegner auf der anderen Seite. Deren etwaige Ausschaltung durch die NP-Regierung hätte auf Seiten des ANC zu erheblichen Legitimationsproblemen geführt, da dieser unweigerlich in den Verdacht des „Ver- rats“ gekommen wäre. Zu beachten ist auch die organisatorische Einbindung eines großen

57 Fragebogen von Heribert Adam. 58 Ebrahim, oben Fn. 23, S. 13. 59 Nelson Mandela, Der lange Weg zur Freiheit, Hamburg 2006, S. 160. 60 Der „Population Registration Act” legte die Rassenzugehörigkeit jedes Südafrikaners fest, der „Group Areas Act“ wies den jeweiligen Gruppen feste Wohngebiete zu, wodurch die Segregation der ethnischen Gruppen zementiert wurde.

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Teils der radikalen Linken in den ANC unter dem Dach der tripartistischen Allianz.61 Die SACP fiel somit als möglicher „Spoiler“ weg. Ein wichtiges Element stellen sicherlich auch gewisse Übereinstimmungen der Trans- formationseliten hinsichtlich theoretischer und konstitutioneller Überzeugungen dar. Die prinzipielle Orientierung am britischen Konstitutionalismus bedingte die Legitimität eines „political party model of democracy“ und des normativen Ideals des „limited government under the rule of law“.62 Diese Beobachtung gilt insbesondere für die Akteure in den bedeutsamen Technical Committees im Multi Party Negotiation Process. Nach Aussage eines Mitglieds des „Technical Committee on the Bill of Rights“ seien Parteiverbote dort niemals debattiert worden.63 Ihre Basis finden diese Überzeugungen in einer im afrikanischen Vergleich einzigartigen parteipolitischen Tradition, in der die ersten Parteien bereits um 1900 gegründet und erste Wahlen bereits 1910 abgehalten wurden. Diese Tradition liefert auch eine Erklärung für die liberale Form der Parteienregulierung in funktionaler Hinsicht.64 Schließlich ist in vergangenheitspolitischer Perspektive noch die Frage zu stellen, inwiefern funktionale Äquivalente zu einem negativ-republikanischen Parteiverbot zu finden sind. Ruti Teitel unterscheidet verschiedene Typen von „transitional justice“, wobei sie „militant democray“ als eine Form von „administrative justice“ verortet.65 Die südafri- kanische Wahrheits- und Versöhnungskommission66, deren Resultate sehr kontrovers beurteilt werden, stellt ein Instrument zur Generierung historischer Gerechtigkeit („historical justice“) dar. An dieser Stelle kann nicht die Diskussion über die TRC rekonstruiert werden, allerdings scheint es interessant die Frage aufzuwerfen, ob Wahrheitskommissio- nen eine Form des Transformationsmanagements darstellen, die „robustere“ Instrumente wie Parteiverbote ausschließen bzw. ersetzen. Hugh Corder beschreibt „Lustration“ und Organisationsverbote auf der einen und „Wahrheits- und Versöhnungskommissionen“ auf der anderen Seite als distinkte Modelle zur Herstellung von „transitional justice“, die in der südafrikanischen Debatte durchaus als Alternativen wahrgenommen wurden, wobei sich schließlich das Kommissionsmodell durchgesetzt habe.67

61 Diese besteht aus der ANC Kernorganisation, der SACP und dem Gewerkschaftsverband COSATU. 62 Interview mit Hugh Corder (Cape Town, 04.06.2008). 63 Ebd. 64 Für die konkrete Verfassungsgebung waren indes andere Modelle als das britische relevanter. Insbesondere das Deutsche Grundgesetz und die Kanadische Verfassung, aufgrund der ausdiffe- renzierten Grundrechtskapitel, der institutionellen Gewaltenteilung und der zentralen Rolle der Verfassungsgerichte, hatten eine Vorbildfunktion für die Südafrikanischen Verfassung. 65 Teitel, oben Fn. 14. 66 TRC: South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission. 67 Interview mit Hugh Corder (Cape Town, 04.06.2008).

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II.2 Strukturen der Transformation Aus der Perspektive der Transformationsforschung gerät an dieser Stelle der Charakter des südafrikanischen Systemwechsels in den Blick. Dieser entspricht einer ausgehandelten oder koordinierten Transformation68 mit folgenden Merkmalen: Die Ursachen des Wandels liegen in der inneren Krise des Apartheidsystems begründet, das zunehmend auch innerhalb der bevorzugten Bevölkerungsgruppe an Legitimität verlor. Das Ende des Kalten Krieges und die Sanktionen gegen das Regime können darüber hinaus als ein Wegfall externer Unterstützung gewertet werden.69 Die „attidudes of the outgoing elite toward democracy“ waren überwiegend positiv oder zumindest von einer mehr oder weniger gleichgültigen Akzeptanz geprägt.70 Ein weiterer Faktor war die Existenz legitimer Verhandlungspartner seitens der „Herausforderer“, namentlich des ANC und seiner Verbündeten in der tripartistischen Allianz. Diese Verhandlungspartner hatten zudem bereits lange vor Beginn der Transformation begonnen Kontakte zu knüpfen, die zwischen 1985 und 1989 sukzessive ausgeweitet wurden.71 Dabei entwickelte sich ein Vertrauensverhältnis, das in der „heißen Phase“ des Systemwechsels auch die Überwindung von Krisen ermöglichte. Die Überein- stimmung in Grundfragen zwischen der ANC-Führung und dem Afrikaner-Establishment kommt in diversen Dokumenten zum Ausdruck, angefangen vom „Groote Schuur Accord“ (4. Mai 1990), über die „Declaration Of Intent“ der ersten „Convention for a Democratic South Africa“ CODESA I (21. Dezember 1991) bis zum „Agreement To Resume Bilateral Negotiations“ (25. November 1992) zwischen der Regierung und dem ANC.72 Nach Andrew Arato stellt die koordinierte Transition den vorzugswürdigen Demokrati- sierungspfad dar.73 Sie führt idealtypisch zum Wechsel der sozialen Legitimitätsbasis einer politischen Ordnung bei gleichzeitiger Kontinuität der formalen Legalität des überwunde- nen Systems. Im südafrikanischen Fall blieb die „Legalität“ dadurch erhalten, dass nur die weiße Bevölkerung in einem Referendum im März 1992 die Regierung ermächtigte, Ver- handlungen mit dem Ziel der Schaffung einer demokratischen Verfassung für Südafrika zu führen. Die Interimsverfassung, der die endgültige Verfassung im Wesentlichen folgt, wurde 1993 von der Mehrheitsfraktion des „weißen“ Parlamentes ratifiziert. Auf ihrer Basis

68 Wolfgang Merkel / Peter Thiery, Systemwechsel, in: Hans-Joachim Lauth (Hrsg.), Vergleichende Regierungslehre, Wiesbaden 2006, S. 168. 69 Vgl. John Hoffman, Legitimate Intervention and Illegitimate States. Sanctions against South Africa, in: Ian Forbes / Mark Hoffman (eds.): Political Theory, International Relations, and the Ethics of Intervention, S. 157-166. 70 Jorge Heine, Institutional Engineering in New Democracies, in: Ursula J. van Beek (ed.) Democ- racy under Construction. Patterns from four Continents, Bloomfield Hills / Opladen 2005, S. 71. 71 Siehe Sparks, oben Fn. 22, S. 39 ff. und Ebrahim, oben Fn. 23, S. 19 ff.. 72 Ein Abdruck der wichtigsten Dokumente findet sich bei Ebrahim, oben Fn. 23. 73 Arato, oben Fn. 51, S. 412.

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wurde die „Constitutional Assembly“ gewählt, die im Mai 1996 die von ihr ausgearbeitete endgültige Verfassung annahm.74 Ein solcher Transitionstyp ist allerdings an vergleichsweise anspruchsvolle Vorausset- zungen gebunden, vor allem an „social forces capable of negotiation“. Da in Südafrika im wesentlichen die beiden ältesten afrikanischen Parteien75 die Transformation aushandelten, kommt Heine zu dem Urteil: „South Africa would potentially be in the best position to consolidate its democratic institutions as its transition was very much a negotiated one (in which the rules of the previous regime were not broken) and the attitude of the outgoing elite was in favor of democracy.” 76 Die neue Regierung konnte nach 1994 also auch auf eine funktionierende und weitgehend loyale Administration zurückgreifen. Lustration wurde als vergangenheitspolitisches Modell nicht oder nur in sehr eingeschränktem Rah- men angewendet. Die Justiz blieb weitgehend in Amt und Würden und auch in den „senior civil service ranks” gab es nur vereinzelt vorgezogene Pensionierungen oder den „golden handshake”. Ein unmittelbar erzwungener Elitenaustausch erfolgte nicht.77 78 Der inklusive Charakter der Verhandlungen baute sehr stark auf den Konsens aller Beteiligten, auch derjenigen, die zeitweilig aus dem Prozess ausstiegen, d.h. die COSAG Parties.79 Damit folgten die Akteure dem Leitbild der Offenheit und Inklusivität, das etwa in der „Declaration Of Intent“ zu CODESA I formuliert wird: „We agree that the present and future participants shall be entitled to put forward freely to the Convention any pro-

74 Diese konnte wiederum erst nach einer Revision des Verfassungstextes durch das Verfassungsge- richt in Kraft treten. 75 Zum Stammbaum der NP vgl. Hennie Kotzé, A Consummation devoutly to be wished? The Democratic Alliance and its potential Constituencies, in: Roger Southall (ed.), Opposition and Democracy in South Africa, London 2001, S. 118 f.; zum ANC vgl. Tom Lodge, The ANC and the Development of Party Politics in modern South Africa, Journal of Modern African Studies 42 (2004), S. 189-219. 76 Vgl. oben Fn. 70. 77 Interview mit Hugh Corder (Cape Town, 04.06.2008). 78 Allerdings soll an dieser Stelle dem möglichen Missverständnis vorgebeugt werden, in Südafrika habe kein struktureller und personeller Wandel des öffentlichen Sektors stattgefunden. Der „racial redress“ soll jedoch in erster Linie durch „affirmative action“ erreicht werden. Diese findet ihre rechtliche Grundlage in der Selbstverpflichtung der Interimsverfassung, „the public service shall be broadley representative of the South African community“ und im Employment Equity Act von 1998, so Mcebisi Ndletyana, Affirmative Action and the Public Service, in: Adam Habib / Kris- tina Bentley (eds.), Racial Redress and Citizenship in South Africa, Cape Town 2008, S. 77-98. Politisch basiert „racial redress“ auf der vom ANC propagierten „transformation“ der Gesamtge- sellschaft, welche auch den „Anspruch“ der Partei auf die Kontrolle des Staatsapparates beinhal- tet. Vgl. hierzu Nicola De Jager, The ANC government, Co-optive Power and the Perpetuation of Party Dominance, in: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung South Africa (ed.): Challenges to Democracy by One-Party Dominance. A Comparative Assessment, Johannesburg 2006, S. 15-30. 79 Spitz / Chaskalson, oben Fn. 20, S. 228 ff..

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posal consistent with democracy“.80 An dieser Stelle mag insbesondere die Überzeugung handlungsleitend gewesen sein, die Offenheit des politischen Wettbewerbs auch für die Zukunft zu sichern. Gerade angesichts der fragilen und zerklüfteten politischen Landschaft wurde durch den Verzicht auf Parteiverbots-Vorkehrungen die zukünftige Handhabe eines andere Akteure ausschließenden Vorgehens glaubhaft versperrt.

II.3 Politischer Extremismus Im Hinblick auf ein mögliches anti-extremistisches Parteiverbot wurde in Kapitel 2 zumindest für die Liberalisierungs- und beginnende Demokratisierungsphase das Bestehen einer „objektiven Gefährdung“ festgestellt. Nur unter solchen Bedingungen der „objektiven Gefährdung“, darüber besteht Konsens, können Parteiverbote breite Legitimität beanspruchen. Insofern gehorchen sie einer Logik der Verhältnismäßigkeit. Die Ausgangslage der Verhandlungen wird von einem Befragten als „stalemate were neither side could defeat the other“ beschrieben. „Therefore neither side could impose on the other a provisison of excluding parties potentially useful or biased towards their side“.81 Auf die Gefährdung von Rechts- und Linksaußen reagierten die zentralen Akteure nicht mit Repression, sondern mit Inklusionsbemühungen. Eine militante Abgrenzung von den jeweiligen Radikalen des eigenen Lagers hätte zwischen 1990 und 1994 die Legitimität dieser Akteure beschädigt und die Gegner des friedlichen Übergangs in ihren Überzeugungen bestärkt, die Heribert Adam folgendermaßen umreißt: „There were great doubts on the extreme right as well on the extreme left whether to join the political process at all and give up a romanticized ‘armed struggle’. The racist AWB and their allies espoused the slogan ‘bullets instead of ballots’. On the other side, many in the SACP and MK argued that you cannot win at the negotiating table what you have not won at the battlefield”.82 Mit dem Inkrafttreten der Interims-Verfassung und den ersten freien Wahlen 1994 änderte sich die „Gefährdungslage“ insofern, als die wichtigsten COSAG/FA Kräfte sich doch noch an den Wahlen beteiligten. Auf der weißen Rechten ging die „Freedom Front“ als legalistische Partei vor allem aus der gemäßigten Fraktion der AVF hervor.83 Auch Inkatha erklärte im letzten Moment ihre Beteiligung an den Wahlen und anerkannte damit die Legitimität des Verhandlungsprozesses. Ab 1994 kann damit die Einschätzung Klugs geteilt werden, dass die verbliebenen extremen Gruppen keine wirkliche Gefährdung der demokratischen Ordnung mehr darstellten, da sich erstens Militär und Administration in Krisenmomenten wie dem versuchten Staatsstreich in Bophuthatswana als loyal erwiesen hatten: „The more extreme groups of all political persuasions were not considered a serious political or security threat to the new state. When these minor threats were compared to the

80 Zitiert in Ebrahim, oben Fn. 23, S. 530. 81 Fragebogen von Heribert Adam. 82 Ebd. 83 Spitz / Chaskalson, oben Fn. 20, S. 245.

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costs of undermining the broad rights-based stand of the new Constitution it would have been considered unduly costly to restrict these parties“.84 Zweitens muss das schwache Abschneiden fast aller Kritiker des neuen Systems in Betracht gezogen werden. So blieb die Freedom Front, der legalistische Zeig der Afrikaner-Rechten, mit wenig mehr als 2% Wählerstimmen deutlich hinter den eigenen Hoffnungen zurück und musste die Pläne für einen „Volkstaat“ (oder „Afrikaner-Homeland“) zurückstellen.85 Während für die NP- Regierung bis 1994 Parteiverbote „not practical“ gewesen sind, war die ANC-Regierung nach 1994 „simply not in any position to do this given the country’s past and the experience of being banned themselves“.86 Ergänzt sei diese Überlegung allerdings durch ein machtstrategisches Argument: „Since the ANC command a huge majority anyway, it never felt threatened by smaller parties as potential targets of banning“.87 Dank seiner Dominanz im Parteiensystem und im Parlament seit 1994 wäre der ANC derzeit die einzige politische Kraft, die ernsthaft die Einführung von Parteiverboten initiieren könnte. Durch Wahlen scheint die absolute Mehrheit des ANC zumindest mittelfristig nicht gefährdet88, so dass offene Repression gegen kleinere politische Gegner die Kritik an der „dominant party rule“ stärken würde.89 Die Öffentlichkeit zeigt sich durchaus sensibel für Fehlentwicklungen und die Ein-Parteien-Dominanz wird als potenzielle Gefahr für die demokratische Verfassung wahrgenommen.90 Die einseitige Propagierung einer „militant democracy“ von Seiten des ANC würde demnach sofort den Verdacht des Machtmissbrauchs aufkommen lassen. Diese Überlegung kann gleichermaßen auf die Akteurskonstellation während des Transforma- tionsprozesses ausgeweitet werden. Da das Argument, Parteiverbote hätten gegen das Gebot der Verhältnismäßigkeit verstoßen, für den Zeitraum von der Liberalisierung des politischen Systems bis zu den ersten Wahlen kaum Geltung beanspruchen kann, sollen an dieser Stelle kurz die konkreten Akteursinteressen jenseits von Überzeugungen angespro- chen werden. Sowohl der ANC als auch die NP hatten in den jeweiligen Lagern ein primä- res Interesse an Aufrechterhaltung ihrer Reputation. Der „broad church approach“ des ANC zielte auf den Einbezug möglichst vieler Strömungen ab, natürlich auch vor dem Hinter- grund der Sicherung der sich frühzeitig abzeichnenden dominanten Position in einem frei gewählten Parlament. Die NP, ebenso wie später ihre Nachfolgeorganisation New National

84 Fragebogen von Heinz Klug. 85 Der spätere Präsident Nelson Mandela hatte der Afrikaner-Rechte Verhandlungen über die Ein- richtung eines „Volksstaats“ zugesagt, falls ein gutes Wahlergebnis dies nahegelegt hätte (Inter- view mit Hendrik Bussiek (Cape Town, 05.06.2008)). 86 Interview mit Robert Mattes (Cape Town, 03.06.2008). 87 Fragebogen von Heribert Adam. 88 Tom Lodge, The Future of South Africa’s Party System, Journal of Democracy 17 (2006), S. 164. 89 Siehe Hermann Giliomee / James Myburg / Lawrence Schlemmer, Dominant Party Rule, Opposi- tion Parties and Minorities in South Africa, in: Rogar Southall (ed.): Opposition and Democracy in South Africa, London 2001, S. 161-182. 90 De Jager, oben Fn. 78.

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Party, verfolgte eine ähnliche Strategie, in dem sie danach trachtete ihre Position als wich- tigste „nicht schwarze“ Partei aufrecht zu erhalten.91 Deswegen musste auch sie den Ein- druck vermeiden, auf gerade erst überwundene und allgemein als illegitim empfundene repressive Instrumente zurück zu greifen.

F. Ergebnis und vergleichende Perspektiven

Dass die Südafrikanische Verfassung im Gegensatz zu den meisten anderen afrikanischen Transformationsverfassungen auf das Instrument des Parteiverbots verzichtet, erscheint in zweierlei Hinsicht bemerkenswert. Erstens, obwohl sich die Verfassungsgebung vor dem Hintergrund eines historischen und universell verurteilten Unrechtsregimes vollzog, rea- gierte sie nicht mit dem prospektiven Verbot politischer Akteure, die eine Wiederherstel- lung der diskreditierten Herrschaftsordnung anstrebten. Zweitens entstand die neue Demo- kratie aus gewalttätigen Konflikten und hält dennoch keine Instrumente vor, mit denen sie sich legaler antidemokratischer Mobilisierung erwehren kann. Diese auf den ersten Blick erstaunliche Sachlage hängt zunächst mit der vergangenheitspolitischen Deutung der Asso- ziationsverbote des Apartheidregimes zusammen. Während in anderen Kontexten Assozia- tionsverbote durchaus eine freiheitsverbürgende Funktion beanspruchen können, etwa die Parteiverbote in den anti-faschistischen Verfassungen Italiens und Portugals, konnte diese Sichtweise im südafrikanischen Transformationsdiskurs nicht Fuß fassen. Aufgrund der Identifikation solcher Verbote als Repressionsinstrumente grenzt auch die Verfassungs- rechtslehre die Demokratiekonzeption der Südafrikanischen Verfassung deutlich vom Modell der „militant democracy“ ab.92 Das Integrationsmodell der Verfassung betont dagegen viel stärker positive Werte, was insbesondere im allgemeinen Gleichheitsgebot in Art. 9 zum Ausdruck kommt.93 In struktureller Hinsicht geraten insbesondere die Faktoren des Transformationsprozesses in den Blick. Für die koordinierte Transition Südafrikas konnten drei zentrale Merkmale herausgearbeitet werden: die konstruktive Beteiligung der alten Eliten am Prozess, die Inklusivität des Prozesses und die Konsensorientierung der prospektiven neuen Eliten. Da mit der NP der maßgebliche Träger der Apartheid am Verhand- lungstisch saß, musste die Abgrenzung vom Apartheidregime in der neuen Verfassung in allgemeinen Formulierungen verbleiben und konnte nicht auf konkrete Organisationen oder Parteien bezogen werden. Der angestrebten Inklusivität wäre durch ein Parteiverbot Scha- den zugefügt worden, indem die transformations-kritischen Kräfte zusätzliche Legitimität erhalten hätten, besonders im Lichte der oben angestellten vergangenheitspolitischen

91 Während die Strategie für den ANC aufging, scheiterte die NNP auf ganzer Linie. Nach erheblichen Verlusten und einer gescheiterten Kooperation mit der DP löste sich die NNP nach der Wahl 2004 auf. Vor allem viele Parlamentarier der NNP traten dem ANC bei. Vgl. hierzu Roger South- all, South Africa, in: The KAS Democracy Report, Bonn 2007. 92 Siehe für viele Woolman, oben Fn. 38, S. 3. 93 Nikolaus Holzer, Integration durch Verfassung. Das Beispiel der Verfassungsgebung in der Republik Südafrika, Diss Mainz 1999.

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Überlegungen. Der ANC als zukünftige Dominanzpartei verfolgte zudem das Interesse, möglichst viele Strömungen einzubinden und natürlich auch einen möglichst wohlgeord- neten Staat zu übernehmen. Deshalb wollte er alles vermeiden, was die Konflikte über die zukünftige Ordnung verschärft hätte. Zugespitzt: Im „Grand Design“ der Transformation und der Verfassungsgebung wären Parteiverbote letztlich ein systemfremdes Element. Der Vorteil einer transformationsbezogenen Betrachtung liegt schließlich in der Eröff- nung komparatistischer Anschlussperspektiven, die vom in sich scheinbar schlüssigen Einzelfall abstrahieren. In Andrew Aratos Transitionstypologie, die sich in ähnlicher Be- grifflichkeit natürlich auch bei anderen Autoren findet94, konnte die südafrikanische Tran- sition dem Typ der „coordinated transition“ zugeordnet werden, die aufgrund der Inklusi- vität des Prozesses offenbar zu liberalen Verfassungsinstitutionen tendiert. In den anderen Transformationstypen, der von oben gelenkten Reform, bzw. „managed transition“, und der Revolution oder des Regimezusammenbruchs, sollte die Einführung von Parteiverboten wahrscheinlicher sein.95 Beim ersten Typ deshalb, weil Einschränkungen politischer Frei- heiten als Steuerungsinstrument in einem von oben kontrollierten Prozess angesehen werden können. Als Beispiele dafür können die Türkei gelten oder auch afrikanische Län- der wie Nigeria und Tansania, in denen die schrittweise Demokratisierung von der Mög- lichkeit, Parteien zu verbieten und tatsächlichen Parteiverboten begleitet wird. Regime- zusammenbrüche gehen oft mit einer vollständigen Diskreditierung der alten Ordnung einher, die mit deren Negierung in neuen demokratischen Verfassungen bestätigt wird. Beispiele sind das nach-faschistische Italien, Portugal und auch die Bundesrepublik der fünfziger Jahre, wo das Verbot der neo-nazistischen SRP explizit auch mit den verheeren- den Erfahrungen des Dritten Reiches begründet wurde. Als Kontrastfall innerhalb der Kategorie der „coordinated transition“ könnte allerdings Polen gelten, wo der Systemwech- sel ebenso am Runden Tisch zwischen den alten Eliten und ihren Herausforderern ausge- handelt wurde.96 Die Verfassung von 1997 sieht in Art. 13 aber ein Verbot nazistischer und kommunistischer Parteien vor. Diese Klausel kannten weder die revidierte Verfassung von 1989 noch die Übergangsverfassung von 1992 („Kleine Verfassung“). Vergleichbar werden die Fälle Südafrika und Polen dann, wenn der gestufte Verfassungsgebungsprozess, mit der „Kleinen Verfassung“ von 1992 und der „Interim Constitution“ von 1993 als erster sowie der „Großen Verfassung“ von 1997 und der „Final Constitution“ von 1996 als zweiter Stufe, als Parallele angesehen wird. Besonders bemerkenswert daran ist, dass sich in Polen im Zeitraum „zwischen“ den beiden Verfassungen offensichtlich eine Position herausbilden konnte, die gleichermaßen die Relevanz des restriktiven Demokratieschutzes betonte sowie dessen Stoßrichtung festlegte. In Südafrika hingegen besaß „militant democracy“ nach Inkrafttreten der Übergangsverfassung keinerlei Relevanz in der öffentlichen und verfas-

94 Vgl. Merkel / Thiery, oben Fn. 68, S. 167 f.. 95 Ein weiterer Typ, derjenige des „self coup“ bzw. „autogolpe“, bleibt an dieser Stelle außen vor. Vgl. hierzu Arato, oben Fn. 51, S. 411 ff.. 96 Olivia Jazwinski, Unrechtsaufarbeitung nach einem Regimewechsel, Baden-Baden 2007.

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sungspolitischen Debatte.97 Dennoch lanciert, wäre sie eher als Angriff auf die junge Demokratie denn als ein Instrument zu deren Stützung interpretiert worden.98 Zumindest zwei Erklärungen bieten sich für diesen signifikanten Unterschied zwischen Südafrika und Polen an. Durch die Abgrenzung von Nazismus und Kommunismus wird in Polen eine symmetrische Externalisierung der Vergangenheit angestrebt, in dem die totali- tären Herrschaftssysteme als von außen oktroyiert konzipiert werden.99 Diese Form der Externalisierung hätte indes für Südafrika nicht den intendierten „befreienden“ Effekt besessen wie für Polen: Die Apartheid mitsamt Administratoren und Opfern, galt unzwei- felhaft als genuin südafrikanisches Phänomen. Zum anderen kann die Stabilität des politischen und insbesondere des Parteiensystems angeführt werden. Das polnische Parteiensys- tem der neunziger Jahre (und auch darüber hinaus) zeichnet sich im Gegensatz zum süd- afrikanischen durch ein hohes Maß an Fluidität aus.100 Während Südafrika seit 1994, bislang bedingt durch die Prädominanz des ANC, stabile Regierungen hervorbrachte, waren die polnischen Kabinette der Post-Transitionsphase durch häufige Wechsel der beteiligten Partner gekennzeichnet Hier kommt sowohl Sartoris Argument von Parteiverboten als stabilitätsverbürgenden Instrumenten als auch das Motiv der Rückfallsperre ins Spiel. Das Verbot „extremistischer“ Parteien (denn Art. 13 der Polnischen Verfassung bezieht sich nicht nur historisch auf nazistische und kommunistische Parteien, sondern auch konkret auf Praktiken des Rassen- und Nationalitätenhasses sowie der Gewalt), ist also gleichsam zu verstehen als Schutz gegen eine Beschädigung der neuen Demokratie oder sogar gegen einen „Rückfall“ in vordemokratische Verhältnisse. Angesichts der Instabilität des polnischen Parteiensystems Mitte der neunziger Jahre war diese Gefahr dort möglicherweise virulenter als in Südafrika.

97 So der übergreifende Tenor der in Südafrika interviewten Experten. 98 Zudem stand die „Final Constitution“ unter dem Prüfungsvorbehalt des Verfassungsgerichtes. Gemäß der dominierenden Verfassungsinterpretation hätte dieses Parteiverbotsklauseln nach deut- schem oder auch polnischem Muster wohl zurückweisen müssen. 99 Zum polnischen Streit um den Umgang mit der kommunistischen Geschichte vgl. Krzysztof Ruchniewicz, Der Umgang mit der Vergangenheit in postkommunistischen Gesellschaften. Polen nach 1989, in: Alfons Kenkmann / Hasko Zimmer (Hrsg.), Nach Kriegen und Diktaturen. Um- gang mit Vergangenheit als internationales Problem – Bilanzen und Perspektiven für das 21. Jahr- hundert, 2006, S. 69-80. 100 James Toole, Government Formation and Party System Stabilization in East Central Europe, Party Politics 6 (2000), S. 441-461.

263

BERICHTE / REPORTS

The High Court of Namibia: Günther Kessl v Ministry of Lands and Resettlement and 2 others. Case No 27/2006 and 266/2006 – A test case for the Namibian land reform programme

By Cornelia Glinz, Heidelberg*

A. Introduction

The judgment in Günther Kessl v Ministry of Lands and Resettlement and 2 others, Case No 27/2006 and 266/2006 (hereinafter Kessl) rendered by the High Court of Namibia on 6 March 2008 concluded the first case in which the procedure of expropriations of commercial farms was challenged. Expropriations are part of the Namibian land reform process that started after the country's independence in 1990.1 Land reform is one of the key questions in Namibia still awaiting a solution that satisfies the majority of the population.2 In this context the decision is a “test case” as the Court itself acknowledged in its judgment and was extensively debated and discussed by the media and civil society.3 The case sets an example in strengthening the rule of law for further expropriation procedures and in the whole ongoing land reform process. Thus the case is highly significant for the future of land reform in Namibia. The case has also to be seen in the light of land reform processes in neighboring countries such as South Africa and Zimbabwe.4 Consequently, it has significance for the whole Southern African region. An interesting additional fact given the history of Namibia as a German colony is that the expropriated farmers were all of German nationality. The case comment is structured in 2 parts. Firstly the history and legal background of the Namibian land reform process is given, whilst also commenting on some of the problems facing the process. In the second part the judgment itself will be presented

* Cornelia Glinz, Ass. iur., Research Fellow Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law, Heidelberg. E-mail:[email protected] 1 Agricultural (Commercial) Land Reform Act, 1995, Part IV Section 19 ff on the “compulsory acquisition of agricultural land”. 2 Wolfgang Werner/Bertus Kruger, Redistributive Land Reform and Poverty Reduction in Namibia, 03.2007, p. 4, http://www.lalr.org.za/namibia/namibia_final-draftv2_wernerkruger.pdf/view (checked 28.02.2009). 3 Kessl, para 1; see for example: Farm-Enteignung. Deutsche vor Gericht erfolgreich, Allgemeine Zeitung http://www.az.com.na/politik/farm-enteignung.66225.php (checked 28.02.2009); Cathe- rine Sasman, Court Rules Expropriation ‚invalid’, New Era 11.03.2008, http://www.newera .com.na/article.php?db=oldarchive&articleid=19848 (checked 28.02.2009). 4 Kessl, para 10.

264 Verfassung und Recht in Übersee VRÜ 42 (2009)

with the final section containing some conclusions concerning the implications of the judgment.

B. Background

I. History of land reform in Namibia

Firstly, to give a background to the case, it has to be seen in the context of the history of land reform in Namibia. The Court itself starts by outlining the history of land ownership to provide a better understanding of the complexity of the issue.5 The territory that is today called Namibia was firstly colonised by the Germans and remained a German colony from 1884 to 1915.6 In the aftermath of World War I the League of Nations granted South Africa a mandate over the territory.7 Before Namibia gained its independence from the South African mandate in 1990, it was governed by colonial apartheid rule extended from South Africa as an occupying country.8 These apartheid rules led to a parallel agricultural system: firstly, communal lands for blacks were created and secondly, large commercial farms were established almost exclusively for the white population.9 An apartheid-era land law had blocked the access of black people to these commercial farms.10 Accordingly, when the country gained its independence, roughly 52 per cent of the agriculturally usable land was held by about 3500 white land owners, while 48 per cent fell within the communal areas where nearly a million blacks live.11 Today, 85 per cent of the commercial farm land is still owned by whites.12 This situation reflects the racial division of the country but in order to understand the importance of this fact, one has to know that agriculture plays a major role within the Namibian population.13 Upon

5 Kessl, para 7. 6 Geraldine Mwanza Geraldo/Isabella Skeffers, Researching Namibian Law and the Namibian Legal System, GlobaLex 12.2007, http://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/Namibia.htm (checked 28.02.09). 7 The Covenant of the League of Nations, 28.06.1919, Article 22. 8 Note 7. 9 Stefan Kreutzberger, Schlüssel für die Landreform, akzente 4.04, p. 29. 10 Willem Odendaal, The SADC Land and Agrarian Reform Initiative. The case of Namibia, NEPRU Working Paper No. 111, 12.2006, p. 6. 11 Sidney L. Harring/Willem Odendaal, No resettlement available. An assessment of the expropriation principle and its impact on land reform in Namibia, Windhoek 2007, p. 2; Werner/ Kruger, note 2, p. 5. 12 Werner/Kruger, note 2, p. 5; however, German citizens own only a very small percentage of all the farms in Namibia. 13 The mining sector contributes most to the country’s economy, but about 70% of the population depend on agricultural activities and they are a major source of income and employment for the bulk of the population: IIASA Country Briefs: Namibia 02.2001 http://www.iiasa.ac.at/Research/ POP/pde/briefs/na-econ.html (checked 28.02.2009).

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independence, land reform was a major promise of the new Namibian government,14 and the 1990 Constitution of the Republic of Namibia provides for the legal basis of the land reform project. Article 16 of the Constitution guarantees, in paragraph 1, the protection of property rights while authorising, in its next paragraph, expropriation as a limitation to the above mentioned right. The competence for the ambitious land reform programme of the new government was given to the Ministry of Lands and Resettlement that was specially created for this purpose.15 In July 1991, a National Conference on Land Reform and the Land Question took place with the participation of dozens of Namibian organizations.16 Based on that consultation, the Agricultural (Commercial) Land Reform Act of 1995 was implemented as a statutory basis for the land reform process, providing for different instruments through which the process can proceed. For the following 14 years, the Ministry of Lands and Resettlement operated on the basis of “willing buyer, willing seller”,17 a principle pursued through free market forces that focuses on farmers who decide voluntarily to sell their land.18 In this case the Act vests the State with a preferential right to purchase such land.19 But the chosen approach has faced two main problems: it did not work fast enough and did not deliver enough land of sufficient quality to ensure a politically sustainable land reform process.20 Consequently, the government was pressurised by different interest groups such as the Namibian Farm Workers Union, which demanded a speeding up of the process of redistribution, being influenced by the example of expropriations in Zimbabwe.21 Accordingly, in 2004, the government announced as a next step the beginning of the land expropriation process.22 The first legal expropriations took place in 2005 but these have not been challenged in court.23 The presented case is the first one that

14 Harring/Odendaal, note 11, p. 3; Werner/ Kruger, note 2, p. 6. 15 Until 2005 it was named „Ministry of Lands, Resettlement and Rehabilitation”. 16 Justine Hunter, Who should own the land? An introduction, in: Justin Hunter (ed.), Who should own the land? Analyses and Views on Land Reform and the Land Question in Namibia and Southern Africa, Windhoek 2004, p. 3. 17 Ben Fuller, A Namibian path for land reform, in: note 16, p. 83. 18 Part II Agricultural (Commercial) Land Reform Act, 1995. 19 Part III Agricultural (Commercial) Land Reform Act, 1995. 20 Clemens H. Kashuupulwa, Namibia, Land Reform – Prospects and Challenges, New Era 18.07.2008, http://allafrica.com/stories/200807180708.html (checked 28.02.2009); Werner/ Kruger, note 2, p. 26. 21 Kreutzberger, note 9, p.29. 22 Theo-Ben Gurirab, Statement on the acceleration of land reform in the Republic of Namibia, Windhoek 25.02. 2004, http://www.sarpn.org.za/documents/d0000745/P826-Namibia_land_ reform_Gurirab.pdf (checked 28.02.2009). 23 Initially the expropriation of the Ongombo West farm in 2005 was uncontested. In the case of the Okorusu and Marburg farms (expropriated in 2006) only the amount offered in compensation was challenged in court - the administrative process remained unchallenged.

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reviews the procedure of an expropriation before the High Court of Namibia. It is a “test case“. The commercial farmers of Namibia, who are represented in the Namibia Agricul- tural Union, had been developing this legal attack on the entire land reform process for some time, preparing for a test case that was sure to arrive at some point.24

II. Legal Background

1. The Namibian law After outlining the historical background of the process, the legal background of land reform in Namibia will be discussed. As mentioned earlier, the principle of land expropriation is grounded in Article 16 of the Constitution: (1) All persons shall have the right in any part of Namibia to acquire, own and dispose of all forms of immovable and movable property individually or in association with others and to bequeath their property to their heirs or legatees: provided that Parliament may by legislation prohibit or regulate as it deems expedient the right to acquire property by persons who are not Namibian citizens. (2) The State or a competent body or organ authorised by law may expropriate property in the public interest subject to the payment of just compensation, in accordance with requirements and procedures to be determined by Act of Parliament. Thus the constitutional requirements on expropriation are that a just compensation is given; that it is in the public interest; and finally, that the statutory requirements are fulfilled as imposed by the applicable Act of Parliament, i.e. the Agricultural (Commercial) Land Reform Act of 1995 (ACLRA). It provides for the acquisition of agricultural land by the State for the purpose of land reform by vesting the State with the preferential right to purchase agricultural land.25 The ACLRA also regulates the expropriation of certain agricultural land if negotiations on a sale by mutual agreement fail and gives the Minister of Lands and Resettlement the competence to decide over expropriations and confers on him great discretionary power on the redistribution of land.26 Before the Minister comes to the decision to either buy or to expropriate land after the Act, he/she must consult the Land Reform Advisory Commission. The establishment of this Commission is also contained in the ACLRA and it has, in general, the function of making recommendations or giving advice to the Minister when he is carrying out his duties under the ACLRA.27 For this

24 Sidney L. Harring/Willem Odendaal, Kessl: A New Jurisprudence of Land Reform in Namibia, Windhoek 2008, p. 10. 25 Part II and III ACLRA. 26 Part IV Section 20 ACLRA. 27 Part I ACLRA; after Section 4 (1) the Commission consists of government and non-governmental representatives: two officers of the Ministry of Lands and Resettlement, two officers of the Minis- try of Agriculture, two persons nominated by each of such associations involved in agricultural affairs, one person nominated by the Agricultural Bank of Namibia, 5 persons who are not

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purpose the Commission can undertake investigations and can authorise inspections of any agricultural land.28 Furthermore, the constitutional requirement of the payment of a just compensation is regulated in the ACLRA.29 As a basic principle, the amount for compensation that is determined by the Minister upon recommendation of the Commission, is the open market value on the date of the expropriation notice.30 The ACLRA stipulates that as a rule, a small additional amount will be paid, notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the Act.31 However, there can be specific circumstances in which a smaller amount than the open market value can be fixed as compensation. Some examples are given by the ACLRA.32 The other important provision of the Constitution relevant to this case is Article 18 that gives a right to Administrative Justice. Article 18 reads: Administrative bodies and administrative officials shall act fairly and reasonably and comply with the requirements imposed upon such bodies and officials by common law and any relevant legislation, and persons aggrieved by the exercise of such acts and decisions shall have the right to seek redress before a competent Court or Tribunal. Administrative law in Namibia has been greatly influenced by English common law.33 There is, at present, no Act of Parliament that provides any legal source for administrative procedural law. Thus Article 18 of the Constitution is the only basis and is interpreted in the context of the major principles of common law by the Namibian Superior Courts.34 One of these principles that administrative bodies have to respect is natural justice that comprises most notably the audi alteram partem rule,35 which is the right of an aggrieved person to receive a hearing.36 Administrative bodies have to meet these procedural standards when they take an administrative decision such as expropriation which is an administrative action under Article 18.37

employed in the public service. The members are appointed by the Minister, the last five only with the approval of the National Assembly; Section 3 ACLRA on the functions of the Commission. 28 Section 15 ACLRA. 29 Section 23 ff ACLRA. 30 Section 25 (1) (a) (i) ACLRA. 31 After Section 25 (2) ACLRA an amount equal to 10%, but not more than N$ 10 000 is added to the total amount. 32 Section 25 (5) ACLRA. 33 Collins Parker, The “Administrative Justice” provision of the constitution of the Republic of Namibia: a constitutional protection of judicial review and tribunal adjudication under administrative law, XXIV CILSA, 1991, 84, p. 89. 34 Parker, note 33, p. 89 35 Viljoen and Another v Inspector-General of the Namibian Police, 2004 NR 225. 36 Parker, note 33, p. 92 ff; Kessl, para 47. 37 Kessl, para 47 ff.

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2. References to international law A final remark needs to be made to complete the legal background: because the concerned farm owners are not of Namibian nationality, the International Investment Agreements may play an important role. Namibia has ratified “Reciprocal Investment Promotion and Protec- tion Treaties” with several countries, notably with Germany38. Under this Treaty, movable and immovable property are considered “investments” and therefore are to be treated in accordance with certain investment protection standards in the State party’s territory.39 For example, discriminatory and arbitrary measures are illegitimate.40 Also, investments shall not be expropriated except for public benefit and with full compensation. The legality of such expropriation shall be subject to judicial review by due process of law.41 If a dispute arises between a State and a foreign investor from the other State party, international arbitration can be requested by one of the parties to the dispute.42 Thus, in addition to the review of the proceeding before the Namibian Courts, the German farmers have the possibility of seeking to resolve the dispute by way of international arbitration. In order to complete the picture, another international body - this time in the Southern African region - should be mentioned: the SACD-Tribunal, which is the regional justice Tribunal of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) located in Wind- hoek.43 After the exhaustion of local remedies, the case could fall under the jurisdiction of the Tribunal since under the SADC Protocol on Tribunal, it is competent to decide disputes between natural persons and States.44 As this provision does not request nor exclude persons from certain nationalities, it gives the German farmers the possibility to file an application. However, like the recent case of Zimbabwean farmers taking legal action against expropriations in the Zimbabwean land reform process shows,45 the SADC-Tribunal has only a weak position. In the latter case, the Zimbabwean government declared it would ignore the judgment rendered in favour of the aggrieved farmers because it considered itself

38 Treaty between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Republic of Namibia concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, 21.01.1994 (signed), 21.12.1997 (entered into force), Bundesgesetzblatt 1997 Teil II Nr. 4, 28 January 1997. 39 Note 38, Article 1, 1 and 2 ff. 40 Note 38, Article 2, 2. 41 Note 38, Article 4 (2). 42 Note 38, Article 11. 43 Article 16 of the Treaty of the Southern African Development Community, 32 I.L.M. 120 (1993), 17.08.1992 (signed), 13.09.1993 (entered into force), amended by SADC treaty-amendment (2001), 14 member States (checked 28.02.2009). 44 Article 15 of the SADC Protocol on Tribunal. 45 Mike Campbell and Others v Republic of Zimbabwe, Case No. 2/2007.

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not to be bound by the Tribunal’s decision.46 So far the protest of the other SADC member States remained reluctant. Considering this deficit on the enforcement side, the competence of the Tribunal exerts a rather theoretical influence and thus has only a minor significance for this case.

III. Problems of the Land Reform process

The land reform process, with the aim of poverty alleviation, is a highly complex process that faces many different challenges and problems of a legal, sociological, economical and environmental nature. One aspect, that had become a political issue, was the dispossession of farm workers by the land reform process.47 About 30 000 black farm workers live with their families on white-owned farms, amounting to about 200 000 people in total. These are among the lowest-paid workers in Namibia and there is little possibility of their finding other employment.48 No provision was made in the land reform process for farm workers who are displaced as a result of land redistribution so they lose their jobs without compensation.49 However, their interests have to be considered before an expropriation takes place.50 Another problem is choosing the beneficiaries of the new distributed land.51 Under the Act, land reform aims to resettle Namibian citizens who have no or no adequate land and who have been disadvantaged in the past.52 The Ministry of Lands and Resettlement provides a figure of 240 000 people, who are the poorest of the Namibian population, that need

46 See Michel Djimgou Djomeni, Décision du Tribunal de la SADC en faveur de 78 fermiers zim- babwéens: un contrôle de conventionalité de la mise en oeuvre de la réforme agraire, sentinelle 14.12.2008, http://wwwsfdi.org/actualites/a2008/Sentinelle%20170.htm#sadc (checked 28.02. 2009). 47 Sharon LaFraniere, Tensions simmer as Namibia Divides its farmland, The New York Times 25.12.2004: The farm workers who are organized in the Namibian Farm Workers Union pressurised the government to recognize their interests. 48 Harring/Odendaal, note 24, p. 5; Werner/Kruger, note 2, p. 24. 49 Wolfgang Werner, Recent Developments in Land Issues in Namibia, Windhoek 02.2003, p. 6, http://www.lalr.org.za/further-resources/werner-on-recent-developments-in-land-issues-in- namibia.pdf/view (checked 28.02.2009). 50 Section 20 (6) ACLRA. Despite this provision, in the second and third expropriation cases (concerning the Okorusu and Marburg farms), the Ministry of Lands and Resettlement failed to consider the interests of the farm workers in the expropriation process. 51 The allotment of land for resettlement is determined in Part V of the ACLRA. 52 Article 14 (1) ACLRA.

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to be resettled but does not provide a list of the names of these people.53 Thus there is no transparency in the process of selecting the potential beneficiaries.54 After the termination of the resettlement, the poor people who moved to those projects need adequate support to fulfill their new job as farmers. They must be provided with the necessary financial resources that are required to effectively run the farm. They also need some agricultural know-how and skills about financial management for commercial farming because they have no experience in this field. So far there has been a lack of support to the resettled people, another reason why the past resettlement projects were a failure.55 Finally a restriction on the realization of land reform is finance:56 huge amounts must be spent over the coming years to run the programme. Funds will be needed, for example, to pay the compensations demanded by the Act, to sustainably support the beneficiaries, to give opportunities to the displaced farm workers and to produce effective planning and administration of land reform.

C. The Judgment

The decision was taken by the High Court of Namibia. Under the Constitution, the judiciary in Namibia consists of three levels: the Lower Courts, the High Court and the Supreme Court at the top.57 The case was decided by a two-judge panel of the High Court, one a white permanent judge and the other a black acting judge. Rule 53 of the High Court Rules vests in the Court the original jurisdiction to review administrative action but the decision of the High Court can be appealed in the Supreme Court of Namibia.58

I. The facts

The facts of the case are as follows: There are three applicants; the first being Mr. Kessl after whom the case is named. They are the owners of four farms in Namibia that have been expropriated by the Ministry of Lands and Resettlement. All three are German citizens and

53 Theo-Ben Gurirab, note 22. 54 Werner, note 49, p. 9: It was revealed that beneficiaries included at least one Permanent Secretary, a Regional Governor and several people who were employed either in the civil service or elsewhere; Oliver Horsthemke, Land reform in Namibia: Opportunity or opportunism? in: note 16, p. 88; Shadrack Tjiramba, Transparency in Land Administration – a closer look, Legal Assistance Centre 20.06.2008, http://www.lac.org.na/news/pressreleases/pressr-landadminist.html (checked 28.02.2009). 55 See the expropriation of the Ongombo West farm that was once a very profitable farm and was recently in a bad condition: Dirk Heinrich, Viele Familien, kein Einkommen, Allgemeine Zeitung, 23.12.2008, http://www.az.com.na/lokales/viele-familien-kein-einkommen.78378.php (checked 28.02.2009); Werner/Kruger note 2, pp. 6, 28. 56 Hunter, note 16, p. 2. 57 Article 78 of the Constitution of the Republic of Namibia. 58 Section 14 (1) of the Supreme Court Act of 1990.

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residents of Germany, but have owned their farms in Namibia for many years, visiting them two or three times annually. On the farms live several farm workers and their dependents. In March 2004, the then Minister of Lands and Resettlement, Mr. Pohamba (who is now the Namibian President) consulted the Land Reform Advisory Commission at an extraordinary meeting regarding the expropriation of farms. Expressing urgency on the matter he handed a list of farms to the Chairman of the Commission for consideration but in this meeting the Commissioners had no opportunity to deal with any substantive issues regarding the selection of farms for expropriation because they had no information about any of the potential farms. An inspection of the farms only took place more than one year later in July 2005. That is why, at the end of the meeting, the Commissioners could not arrive at a decision and no resolution was taken. The Minister himself was not present for most of the meeting and, therefore, did not discuss the issues with the Commissioners. An interesting point is the fact that a letter was served to Mr. Kessl on the same day of the meeting, informing him of the decision that his farm had been chosen as appropriate for acquisition whilst the issue was still in discussion in the Commission. When an official of the Ministry served the letter on Mr. Kessl, he was accompanied by several heavily armed members of the Namibian police force and the special field force. Only seven months later, in October 2004, did the Minister give Mr. Kessl an opportunity to make representations about the case. Mr. Kessl responded by seeking documents and information from the authorities so that he could make such representations but he never received any. An expropriation notice was finally issued in September 2005 signed by the Minister, offering a certain amount as compensation. The farmers addressed their applications against the Ministry of Lands and Resettle- ment before the High Court. They asked the Court to review and to set aside the decision and notice of the Ministry to expropriate the farms. The applicants concede that the Government of Namibia has the right to expropriate farms but, in so doing, it must respect Namibian law. There are two main issues that the parties agreed need to be decided by the Court: firstly, whether the audi alteram partem principle is relevant in expropriation cases and secondly, whether the procedure that was followed in all these three cases is in confor- mity with the law. Besides the violations of the Namibian Constitution and land law, the applicants argued that the Ministry breached the protections offered under the bilateral Investment Treaty between Germany and Namibia.

II. The decision

In its decision the Court treats the three cases as analytically identical, referring only to the first application of Mr. Günther Kessl and his two farms. The Court starts with the focus on the two crucial submissions. Firstly, the question is whether Article 18 of the Constitution on Administrative Justice is applicable in expropriation cases. This would mean that the common law principles on natural justice and consequently the audi alteram partem rule would apply. The respondent

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argued that the only requirements for expropriation by the State are contained in Article 16 of the Constitution itself and no other statutory provision is applicable. The Court decided on the issue that the requirements of both Articles 16 and 18 must be adhered to. Article 16, which provides for the right to property, is part of the fundamental rights of the Namibian Constitution and accordingly, there should be strict compliance with procedural requirements when limitations to this right to property are realized such as in the case of expropriation. This result brings the Court to the next important point: the question of whether the constitutional right to be heard was granted to the applicant. The Minister had invited the applicant in his letter to make representations but this letter did not give any information as to the basis of these ministerial decisions. When the applicant asked for more detailed information he received no reply. The Court states that the right to be heard was violated by the Ministry as its duty was to answer the applicant and to give him the required information about the expropriation process so that he could make representations on the basis of this information. The next point discussed by the Court was whether the expropriation was in the public interest as required by Article 16 of the Constitution. The meaning of public interest is clarified by a provision of the ACLRA: it is the resettlement of Namibian citizens who either have no or no adequate use of agricultural land, especially those who have been disadvantaged by past discriminatory practices. Accordingly, to comply with the public interest condition, the particular farm must be suitable for resettlement of this specific category of people and the Minister must be satisfied by these conditions. Consequently, he must be in possession of enough information regarding the suitability of the specific farm. For this purpose he has the support of the Land Reform Advisory Commission that can carry out investigations and make recommendations to him. The Minister is even obliged under the Act to consult the Commission before he makes a decision regarding the farm. The Court judges that the Minister did not comply with these standards. The Minister had no adequate data concerning the farms available when he took the decision. It is unknown on what grounds he decided the question of suitability. Inspectors were only sent to investigate the farms more than a year after the first decision was taken. Additionally, for the decision of the Minister regarding the public interest requirement, it is necessary under the Act that the Commission considers the interest of any person employed and lawfully residing on the land and their families residing with them. Once the Commission has considered the interest of those persons it may recommend to the Minister what he may do in that regard. In this respect the Court comes to the conclusion that the Commission disre- garded this obligation. The Minister was not provided with any recommendation in respect of the employees and their families. As the Minister had no such information at his disposal he could not decide whether it would be in the public interest to displace all those persons. Besides, the Court considers over several pages each requirement of the ACLRA step by step and illustrates where the conditions in terms of the Act had either not been or fully complied with. The Court expressly criticises the former Minister of Lands and Resettle-

Glinz, The High Court of Namibia 273

ment Mr. Pohamba who took the first decisions in the process, concluding that he failed to deal with the requirements and duties he was empowered to perform. After that, the Court considers the question of whether the expropriation against the farmers of German nationality is a discrimination against foreign nationals. Deriving from the Constitution the Court states that Article 16 (1) protects the property of “all persons” but contains a specific provision in respect of foreigners with the effect that Parliament may pass a law which constrains the acquisition of property by foreigners. However the ACLRA did not include any provision to restrict the acquisition of land in Namibia by foreigners,59 so consequently, the Court concludes that the reference to a land-owner as a foreigner can never be a criterion for acquisition, nor for expropriation of the land of that person. Like- wise, from the fact that the farmers live in Germany and that they can therefore be seen as “absentee landlords” provides no legal basis for expropriation under the Act. Concerning the Investment Treaty between Germany and Namibia, the Court states that the applicants – as German citizens – are entitled to the same treatment as Namibian citizens and that the Minister was obliged to consider this Treaty before taking a decision against the German owners of the farms, albeit without going so far as to rule on the alleged breach of the Treaty by the government. Finally the Court produces some concrete guidelines on the procedure to be followed for each expropriation case under the Act, as a summary of all the procedural violations revealed in the judgment. The Court comes to the conclusion that the cumulative effect of all the failures of the Minister to comply with the provisions of the Constitution and the Act clearly indicate that the fundamental rights of the three applicants were infringed by the action of the Minister. Thus the Court sees no option but to declare such decisions by the Minister to expropriate the farms as invalid and it makes the orders to set aside the decisions and notices of expropriation. With regard to the enforcement of the expropriations during the process, the applicants were granted an interim relief meaning that the Ministry did not proceed with the expropriations of the farms until a decision was taken by the Court. The enforcement of the expropriations was finally completely stopped by the judgment. The respondent exercised its right to appeal to the Supreme Court and the decision is still pending – neither has a date for the beginning of the procedure been determined yet. It is hard to speculate on the result of this appeal but the decision of the High Court is so well-reasoned that it is likely that the Supreme Court will follow it. So far the government did not proceed with further expropriations and indicated to wait for the outstanding decision. However, even if the case is upheld on appeal, the Ministry could expropriate the farms again, this time in line with the process set out in the ACLRA.60 In such case the farmers can reconsider international arbitration under the Investment Treaty.

59 Except for Sections 58 and 59 which determine the requirement of the permission of the Minister for the acquisition of agricultural land by foreign nationals. 60 Luke Eric Peterson (ed.), Investment Arbitration Reporter Volume 1 No. 4, 01.07.2008, http:// www.iareporter.com/Archive/IAR-07-01-08.pdf (checked 28.02.2009).

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D. Conclusions

In expressly applying Article 18 of the Constitution to an expropriation procedure, the judgment strengthens the role of Administrative Justice as a fundamental right. It is a well- reasoned judgment that scrutinises in detail all the relevant provisions of the ACLRA in a highly political issue. Therefore it can be seen as a victory for the rule of law in Namibia. But, on the other hand, the statements of the Court make apparent that there are deep administrative problems in practice within the Ministry of Lands and Resettlement and there is an immense lack of transparency in the whole land reform process. These problems are so serious that it is unclear if the Ministry is able and has the capacity to meet the constitutional requirements on Administrative Justice. Consequently, it is a huge task to improve the expropriation procedure in practice. This could be done, for example, by training officials to provide them with the necessary knowledge of the legal requirements. Therefore the Ministry needs the financial resources to fulfill its tasks so that significant efforts can be made to achieve an effective land reform process with full respect of the rule of law.

275

Report on the conference “Regional Integration in Africa”, Gießen, Nov. 7 – 9, 2008

By Eva Diehl, Berlin and Chadidscha Schuhmann, Gießen*

Since the early years of independence, African leaders were convinced that Africa’s strength was rooted in Pan-African cooperation. But while the intentions behind these early efforts to promote regional integration may have been genuine, the impact of Africa’s first regional economic communities was limited. The optimism, which had accompanied the waves of democratisation spreading over the continent in the early 1990s, however, brought about a resurgence of regionalisation, starting 1991 with the Abuja Treaty. Facing the opportunities and challenges of the new paradigm “global economy,“ nations were moving to combine their economies into sub-regional markets that would ultimately form one Africa-wide economic union and enhance the continent’s competitiveness, thereby setting the stage for unlocking Sub-Saharan Africa's growth potential. Despite the gains made so far, there are still a number of challenges facing the integration process. Starting with a reflection on the achievements, problems and perspectives, the papers presented at the conference on “Regional Integration in Africa” in Gießen, dealt with crucial questions of integration concerning such aspects as regional security, human rights and the possibilities and limits of the harmonisation of laws. 1

I. Introduction: General Issues

In the first block of the conference, Prof. Dr. Helmut Asche of the University of Leipzig and Prof. Dr. Thilo Marauhn of the Justus-Liebig-University of Gießen each gave an intro- ductory speech and assessment of regional integration in Africa, covering economic and legal aspects, respectively. This was followed by a panel discussion about the question if, and in what ways, regional integration could provide solutions for domestic problems in Africa. In the first presentation, Prof. Dr. Helmut Asche pointed out that regional economic

* Eva Diehl, holds an M.A. in Social Anthropology, Law and English from the Free University of Berlin and is currently a postgraduate student at the Berlin Centre for Advanced Training in Rural Development (SLE). She has studied Kiswahili at Humboldt-University of Berlin. E-mail: [email protected]. Chadidscha Schuhmann, M.J.I., PhD student and research assistant, Chair of Public Law and Political Science Justus-Liebig-University, Gießen, since 2008 member of Section IV of the Cen- ter for international Development and Environmental Research (ZEU), E-Mail: [email protected] 1 From November 7 to 9, 2008, the conference “Regional Integration in Africa”, a joint conference of the African Law Association, the Franz von Liszt Institute for International and Comparative Law and the Centre for International Development and Environmental Research, was held at Justus-Liebig-University, Gießen, Germany.

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communities (RECs) were mushrooming in Africa, every African state being a member of four RECs on the average, of a total of approximately 200 regional organisms on the continent. Proponents of a positive view, he said, perceived a “New Regionalism” in Africa especially after 1989 and understood regional integration as a precursor of multilateralism. Regional integration in Africa, he explained, was a major focus for international development aid, nurtured by a positive continental European stereotype that “they should do as we did.” While there were high hopes and some successes in non-economic fields like security, human rights, democracy and environmental issues, he observed that intra-regional trade was generally low, often accounting for less than ten percent of a regional bloc’s total merchandise exports. Focusing on the example of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), he concluded that in light of the many bilateral trade preference agreements between member countries, as well as cases of autonomous liberalisation, it was difficult to attribute economic liberalisation policies to SADC. A lack of effective compensation mechanisms (like the EU regional funds) for small and poor economies, as well as inefficient trade diversion and the small market size of even the biggest RECs, were reasons to be sceptical of present ways to undertake economic integration, Prof. Asche said. He characterised the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) between African regions and the EU, which strive to deepen and fast-track integration, as essentially forced trade liberalisation with little in return. Their effect on African regionalism was hotly debated, he said, and trade integration with the EU could actually slow down African initiatives. In his view, the positive misreading of “New Regionalism” after 1989 was partly due to a “legal illusion” of measures formally taken, but not materialised on the ground. Nevertheless, in spite of currently shallow economic integration, Prof. Asche ascertained that RECs were economically needed in Africa, and in conclusion pleaded clearly in favour of regional integration, for reasons of dynamic efficiency. In the next presentation, Prof. Dr. Thilo Marauhn considered the legal side of African regional integration, asking in particular how regional integration could contribute to the development of municipal and international law. He pointed out that while international law constitutes the framework for regional integration (for example, WTO law and UN security law), from a bottom-up perspective, regional developments are also integral building blocks of international law. The traditional perspective, he said perceived modern international law to be rooted in Europe, with some contributions of individual African states, as well as continental, pan-African contributions. However, this perspective should be revised so as to take Africa as the starting point. Such a new perspective should try to understand the history of international relations between African entities as well as local and customary rules in Africa, taking the relativity of statehood seriously. Prof. Marauhn stressed that Europe was not a model for regional integration in Africa, since the success of European integration did not reflect the success of a particular economic or political theory. Instead, European integration could be explained by particular historical circumstances, one of them being a long history of rule-based societies in Europe. Whenever politics had failed to promote integration in Europe, Prof. Marauhn observed, the courts had been pro-

Diehl / Schuhmann, Report on the conference “Regional Integration in Africa” 277

gressive and pushed integration further. In contrast, he suggested that African integration was perhaps simply better understood by seeing that it was not so much rule-based integration. Analysing continental as well as sub-regional integration in Africa and Europe, he stated that while the African Union was more or less a continental organisation, the EU had always been a sub-regional one, to which the AU could not be compared. Furthermore, he noted that a multitude of overlapping regional organisations was no African peculiarity, but existed in Europe, too. He concluded that fruitful functional and regional splits were needed, and that the debate should focus on the historical contingencies of regional integration, instead of abstract models. Regarding the question of regional developments as precursors of public international law, he said that more research was needed, for instance on predecessors of humanitarian rules in Africa. The initial issue of the panel discussion was an assessment of “regional integration as a fact.” The panel found that the level of integration is highly dependent on the respective areas, and is, therefore, divergent. The discussion then focused on the relation between nation building, statehood and regional integration in the African context, considering whether regional integration could compensate the weakness of national states or if rather nation building had to come first. Another point of debate was the corollary question of the adequate scope and time for external development support to integration.

II. Regional Security and Integration

The second block of the conference addressed the question of regional security through integration, with a focus on the East African Community (EAC) and the AU, as well as comparisons to SADC. Wilman Kapenjama of the Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, gave a talk on “Promoting Security by Cooperation: Experiences from the East African Community.” Employing a broad understanding of security as human security which includes economic, social and environmental aspects, he pointed out that maintaining peace and security was one of the main objectives of the new EAC. In his view, major security threats in the region were a risk of ethnic conflicts, for instance, in Kenya, Ruanda and Burundi, the proliferation of small arms, organised crime, and a lack of good governance, as well as the abject poverty among the majority of EAC citizens. Arguing that the new EAC was still in an infant stage, he drew a comparison with SADC which he said had been successful in dealing with security threats. Positive examples he named here were the existence of the SADC Inter-State Defense and Security Committee (ISDSC) as an important confidence building vehicle, the intervention of SADC forces in internal conflicts, for instance in the Democratic Republic of Congo, SADC operations against small arms and light weapons proliferation, and SADC intervention in Lesotho in 1998 to resolve election related unrest. In contrast, he diagnosed shortcomings in the role of the EAC as an election observer, pointing out that it had not offered a clear position on the results of the disputed 2007 elections in Kenya, and that despite irregularities and a lack of transparency, the EAC had called the Zanzibar elections in 2005 free and fair. He also

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diagnosed a lack of political will towards regional integration among leaders in the EAC, mistrust between governments, and fears of land conflicts resulting from open borders, as well as fears of adverse effects of economic openness. He noted that rather than regional security cooperation, there was bilateral cooperation, for example, between the Kenyan and the Tanzanian police. Asking how political will for integration could be built, Kapenjama suggested that efforts for good personal rapport between leaders could help to build confidence, as well as good military relations between EAC countries, including joint military exercises. He concluded that an effective interplay between foreign and security policy was indispensable for regional integration, protecting national security interests while setting the agenda for regional cooperation. Prof. Dr. Ademola Abass from Brunel University, West London took the question of regional security through integration further by presenting the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) focusing on the relationship between the AU and the RECs. Starting with the beginnings of the AU and its post-colonial objectives and pan-African ideals, he briefly reviewed the evolution of the AU into a security actor. He started from the early stages of ECOWAS2’actions in response to Liberia in the early 1990s as the first interventions of regional security, mentioned previous collective interventions, for instance in Zaire in 1963, in the Nigerian Biafran-war 1967-1970 and in Chad in 1981 to then highlight how the 1993 Cairo African summit had led to the APSA envisaged by the constitutive act of the AU and the protocol relating to the establishment of the Peace and Security Council (PSC). He pointed out that the African Union had set itself ambitious aims to develop a ground-breaking continental security superstructure and that nothing of the sort existed in any other region. Besides other components, APSA comprises the African Stand-by Force (ASF) based on five regional brigades to be maintained by each of the sub-regional organisations (ECOWAS, SADC, IGAD3, ECCAS4, and UMA5). Since the most important elements of APSA were thus the AU and the RECs, Prof. Abass spelled out the nature of the relationship between the AU und the RECs within APSA. He presented a recently adopted Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) concerning this matter. Introducing some important provisions of the MoU, he illustrated that it contained many innovative ideas that clearly distinguish it from other regional collective security systems, as well as the UN, concerning, for example, mechanisms of information exchange. However, he said that questions would arise as to the feasibility of their operationalisation. By analysing general principles as the adherence to the principles of subsidiarity, complementarity and comparative advantage in Art IV par (iv) MoU, Prof. Abass considered, for example, whether the AU has the competence to authorise RECs to intervene in conflicts in general, or authorise

2 Economic Community of West African States. 3 The Intergovernmental Authority on Development. 4 The Economic Community of Central African States. 5 Union du Maghreb Arabe/Arab Maghreb Union (AMU).

Diehl / Schuhmann, Report on the conference “Regional Integration in Africa” 279

RECs from one region to intervene in conflicts occurring in another region. He concluded by stating that within APSA many questions as to the competency and jurisdiction over conflicts have not yet been clarified.

III. Legal Integration

The following sequence of presentations looked at legal aspects of integration, in particular at the harmonisation of laws within OHADA and SADC. Dr. Irene Asanga, University of Douala, Cameroon considered to what extent the objectives of the AU have been attained within the context of economic and legal integration by examining the contribution of the Organisation for the Harmonisation of Business Law in Africa, commonly known by its French acronym OHADA. Dr. Asanga initially stressed the importance of a secure legal and commercial environment to protect private property and a strong independent judicial system to ensure proper application of laws and efficient settlement of disputes. After having presented OHADA organs and procedures, she assessed the scope of harmonisation of business law carried out so far by presenting several Uniform Acts, for example, the Uniform Act relating to insolvency and bankruptcy. She then approached shortcomings and challenges of the organisation, looking in particular at the predominating difficulty of harmonisation of the anglophone and francophone systems. Article 53 of the OHADA Constitutive Act presents the treaty as “open to membership of any member state of the OAU that is not a signatory to the Treaty” and even “to any non-member state of the OAU invited to accede by agreement of all the States Parties.” However, the majority of OHADA member states are currently francophone states, thus the organisation is de facto restricted to the Franc CFA Zone. Accordingly, OHADA began with French as its sole working language. Furthermore, all member states have a civil law tradition, the only exception being the English-speaking provinces of Cameroon, where the common law legal system is adopted. To conclude Dr. Asanga reflected on the efficiency of OHADA in performing its role as a harmonisation project. She pointed out that so far OHADA is working for the Franc CFA Zone, yet the matter of language is intimately linked to its harmonisation objectives, since the Treaty refers to the member states’ determination to reach out to other regions. Given the strong influence of the civil law system, a continent wide perspective of OHADA is mostly viewed with scepticism even though talks now include four official working languages for OHADA, Dr. Asanga explained. However, the experience of Cameroon with its dual judicial system might serve as a precursor for new member states with a different linguistic or legal background. Dr. Oliver Ruppel, University of Namibia, gave a presentation on the SADC Tribunal and its role in regional integration. In a general introduction to the Tribunal, which only became operational in 2005, Dr. Ruppel explained its organisational structure as well as the applicable law and its jurisdiction, pointing out that the Tribunal could handle disputes between states as well as disputes between natural or legal persons, and highlighted that human rights, democracy and the rule of law were fundamental principles of Art. 4 of the SADC Treaty. He then discussed the Tribunal’s first

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cases, focusing in particular on the case of Mike Campbell (Pvt) Limited and Another v Republic of Zimbabwe6. The main issue of this case was the acquisition of agricultural land in Zimbabwe according to the Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No. 17) Act, 2005, which allowed the Government of Zimbabwe to seize farmland without compensation, and barred courts from hearing appeals from dispossessed white farmers. Campbell, a farmer threatened by eviction, argued that the Zimbabwean land acquisition process was “racist and illegal” by virtue of the SADC treaty and the African Union Charter. While the Tribu- nal had ruled in December 2007 that Campbell should remain on his expropriated farm pending the determination of the main case, the Zimbabwean government had affirmed in January 2008 that it would seize the farm, and Campbell and members of his family were brutally beaten before the scheduled case hearing at the SADC Tribunal.7 In Dr. Ruppel’s view, the fact that the first cases before the SADC Tribunal dealt with human rights issues contained a particular message. It pointed to a neglect of internal rule of law in particular in SADC member states and the absence of more effective inter-state mechanisms for protecting human rights. He stated that ad hoc the SADC Tribunal would not be able to heal domestic failures in human rights matters, because such matters were not the general aim of the institution. However, he concluded that the Tribunal had the potential of becoming a regional motor of integration if it showed sharp teeth and acquired regional credibility. Issues for further discussion, he said, were inter alia pertaining to national sovereignty, the lack of a higher instance of appeal within SADC, the problem of concurrent jurisdictions in the case of overlapping memberships in different regional bodies, enforcement and the lack of coercive measures in the case of non-compliance with the Tribunal’s rulings. Prof. Dr. Werner Scholtz, Northwest University South Africa looked at legal integration in the context of reconciling conflicting interests of trade and the protection of the environment. Introductorily, he pointed out that in regard to the “competition of systems” paradigm harmonisation of environmental standards is viewed as one of the appropriate responses to concerns about market access and competitiveness. However, harmonisation between states with different levels of economic development, with a general trend to har- monise upwards, would bear great challenges, he explained. Poorer states would not have the capacity, technical and financial resources to participate in the development and implementation of standards, so they were encumbered with an uneven burden. The problem of asymmetry between unequal states that Prof. Scholtz identified could even be perceived as a form of imperialism and/or protectionism, he said. Prof. Scholtz used the example of SADC to illustrate the problem of asymmetry, since SADC comprises some of the poorest states in the world with South Africa overshadowing the other member states due to its

6 SADC Tribunal, case no. SADCT 2/07, interim order granted, 13 December 2007. 7 The case was still pending at the time of the conference. On November 28, 2008, Campbell together with 78 other claimants won their case before the SADC Tribunal. Cf. Oliver Ruppel, Das SADC-Tribunal: Eine juristische Zwischenbilanz, Allgemeine Zeitung Windhoek, Namibia, 05.02.2009.

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higher degree of development. He briefly introduced SADC and its history and then reflected on the issue of environmental harmonisation between SADC member states. To do so he considered references related to the aim of harmonising environmental legislation and policies in the SADC region, which can be found in various provisions regarding SADC objectives, the areas of cooperation and focus as well as the organisation's strategies and instruments. Drawing attention to the fact that South Africa's pre-eminence within SADC could impair harmonisation, Prof. Scholtz sought to generate proposals in order to address the problems. In reshaping the pursuit of self-interest and connecting it with the principle of solidarity incorporated in Art 4 (b) of the SADC treaty he found a possible answer to facilitate change. In his view, given the interdependence in ecological matters, the realisation that interests are entwined should result in convergence of interest. Thus, states still pursued self-interest, but this was defined by regional interests. Furthermore, differential treatment in how to meet obligations could be regarded as the practical application of solidarity, Prof. Scholtz expounded. In conclusion, he looked at SADC solutions, in particular the idea of developmental integration as promoted by the SADC predecessor (SADCC8) that conceives of regional interdependence as an instrument for regional equality. The strategy that he proposed consisted of a multi-tier and differential approach to harmonisation on the basis of solidarity. In theory this could enhance domestic and regional welfare pursuant to sustainable southern African development, Prof. Scholtz concluded, bearing in mind the barriers that could in reality impair the harmonisation process.

IV. Integration and Human Rights

The final block of the conference looked at the process of regional integration from a human rights perspective. Dr. Faustin Z. Ntoubandi, Justus-Liebig University, Gießen opened the final block of the conference with his presentation on the African Court of Justice and Human Rights (ACJHR). He explained that the newly established ACJHR was the outcome of an extraordinary experience that had started at the Lagos conference on the Rule of Law in 1961, where the idea of creating a continental human rights tribunal was first debated. Characteristic for integration processes, the path towards establishing such a tribunal had been punctuated with a series of normative and institutional moves that witnessed, successively, the adoption and creation of various organs and instruments, Dr. Ntoubandi stated. He therefore presented the genesis of the Court, listing such milestones as the African Charter, the African Commission and the African Court on Human and People’s Rights (ACHR), the establishment of the AU and the African Court of Justice (ACJ) and finally the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights in July 2008, merging the ACHR with the ACJ. Explaining that this merger had established a new single entity, the ACJHR, as the main judicial organ of the AU with a contentious as well as an advisory jurisdiction, he further assessed the outstanding features

8 Southern African Development Coordination Conference.

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of the Court. Dr. Ntoubandi introduced the two sections the Court comprises, a “General Section” and a “Human Rights Section,” the Court’s organs as well as procedures and then discussed the terms of access to the Court. States, international organizations, non-governmental organisations and individuals could submit a case before it, he explained. Dr. Ntou- bandi pointed out that the statute of the Court had corrected many deficiencies inherent to the previous African system of human rights protection. However, he ascertained that some issues such as the free access to court by individual victims of human rights violations would still need to be addressed. Finishing his presentation he asked if the Court could fulfil its drafter’s expectations of efficiency and effectiveness in the fulfilment of its mandate. He found that it actually could, if the court is made the central organ for the protection of human and people’s rights with individual access and if there is a clear distinction between the court and other relevant organs of the AU. In Dr. Ntoubandi’s view it will last but surely not least depend on the African governments to be ready to embrace the culture of human rights and the precepts of the rule of law. Prof. Dr. Frans Viljoen, University of Pretoria, South Africa assessed the evolution of human rights in the process of regional integration in Africa. Initially he gave an overview of human rights at the African regional (continental) level. Prof. Viljoen illustrated that due to the post-colonial context, the promotion and protection of human rights as an objective or imperative was not yet mentioned in the OAU Charter, but was only found in international cooperation. He listed the 1969 Convention on the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, of course the 1981 African Charter on Human and People’s Rights (the African Charter) as the first document including justiciable socio-economic rights and the right to development, the 2001 AU Constitutive Act, NEPAD9 and APRM10. He then focused on human rights at the sub-regional level. At first, he explained that RECs were not human rights bodies, but had rather come about as a result of the failure of the AU to achieve economic development and advance regional integration. He pointed out, however, that human rights were increasingly recognised explicitly as an integral part of the RECs' objectives. The African Charter had become accepted as a common human rights standard within REC treaties, and REC courts adjudicated the application and interpretation of REC treaty law. Allowing for individual access, the RECs' courts could serve as a vehicle to indirectly enforce human rights law, Prof. Viljoen highlighted. He then discussed three important human rights cases of REC courts, starting with the Essien v The Gambia and Another11 case, in which he analysed the ECOWAS court's explicit human rights mandate sui generis. By subsequently presenting the case Katabazi and Others v Secretary General of the EAC and Another12 as well as Mike Campbell (Pvt) Limited and Another v Republic

9 New Partnership for Africa's Development. 10 African Peer Review Mechanism. 11 ECOWAS Community Court of Justice, suit ECW/ CCJ/APP/05/05, 14 March 2007. 12 East African Court of Justice, reference 1 of 2007, 1 November 2007.

Diehl / Schuhmann, Report on the conference “Regional Integration in Africa” 283

of Zimbabwe,13 he illustrated how the EAC and the SADC court, without an explicit human rights mandate, have interpreted the principle of the rule of law expansively as part and parcel of the respective community's law. Prof. Viljoen then assessed various issues arising, such as the courts' relationship with national courts and with other REC courts, their relationship with the African Commission/ the ACHR, and the enforcement of court orders. He then had a final look at human rights at the national level. Concluding his presentation, Prof. Viljoen considered the REC courts as “building blocs” of the strengthened regional human rights systems and expressed hope that, even if not overnight, the increasing number of courts creating a judicial density at various levels, would lead to the realisation of implications, one of which is that binding decisions given on human rights need to be enforced. The final discussion observed that many important issues had been raised during the three days in Gießen, and that with respect to the current state of regional integration in Africa, one could not decide if the glass was “half full or half empty.” It was concluded that in any case, a long-term perspective was needed, and that positive, maybe unintended, side effects as seen, for example, in the presentations on human rights gave hope that regional integration could enhance domestic and regional welfare and in the long run foster sustainable African development.

13 The case had been mentioned earlier by Dr. Oliver Ruppel, see above note 5.

284

BUCHBESPRECHUNGEN / BOOK REVIEWS

Ioannis N. Androulakis Die Globalisierung der Korruptionsbekämpfung. Eine Untersuchung zur Entstehung, zum Inhalt und zu den Auswirkungen des internationalen Korruptionsstrafrechts unter Berücksichtigung der sozialökonomischen Hintergründe Schriftenreihe zum deutschen, europäischen und internationalen Wirtschaftsstrafrecht Bd. 5 Baden-Baden, Nomos Verlagsges., 2007, 581 S., 98,00 EUR; ISBN 978-3-8329-2396-9

Der Wissenschaft wird gelegentlich vorgehalten, sie beschäftige sich zu spät oder gar nicht mit wichtigen gesellschaftlichen Problemen. Umso erfreulicher ist, dass im Nomos-Verlag nun nahezu zeitgleich zwei rechtswissenschaftliche Dissertationen zur internationalen Korruptionsbekämpfung erschienen sind, die von der durch den Siemens-Korruptionsskan- dal sensibilisierten Umwelt dankbar aufgenommen werden sollten. Jahrelang ist dieses Thema kaum beachtet worden, trotz des (Anti-) Korruptionsbooms der 1990er Jahre. Simone Nagels Buch „Entwicklung und Effektivität internationaler Maßnahmen zur Kor- ruptionsbekämpfung“ wurde kürzlich an dieser Stelle besprochen.1 Die folgende Rezension beschäftigt sich mit einem deutlich ambitionierteren und umfangreicheren Werk, was Nagels Verdienste jedoch in keiner Weise schmälern soll. Ioannis Androulakis beginnt seine Studie mit der zutreffenden Feststellung, der korrup- tionsinteressierte Außenbetrachter fühle „sich in einem Wald von (oft problematischen) Gesetzen, völkerrechtlichen Verträgen, Forschungsprogrammen, Resolutionen und Akti- onsplänen verloren“ (S. 30). Das Ziel seiner Arbeit ist eine „klärende Gesamtbetrachtung“ unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der internationalen Antikorruptionsinitiativen. Ein hervorragender Start ist vor diesem Hintergrund eine Annäherung an den Korruptions- begriff aus der Perspektive verschiedener Wissenschaftsdisziplinen (S. 33/34). Man muss dem Autor nicht in seiner Einschätzung folgen, Bestechung sei der Begriffskern von Kor- ruption (S. 37 ff.). Auch seine Musterbestechungsdefinition (S. 39) birgt sicherlich Diskus- sionsstoff (etwa das Element „Vertrauensverlust in das politische oder wirtschaftliche System“). All dies ist für die weitere Arbeit aber nicht von Bedeutung. Viele wichtige Hintergrundinformationen liefert das Kapitel „Phänomenologie der Korruption“. Androulakis formuliert treffend, dass es nicht möglich sei, „das Korruptions- problem in eine feste Beziehung zu bestimmten individuellen Charaktertypen oder zu spe- zifischen sozialen, politischen oder ökonomischen Systemen zu setzen. Statt dessen gibt es eine Reihe korruptionsbegünstigender ‚kriminogener’ Faktoren, deren individueller Wir- kungsgrad je nach dem Einzelfall fluktuiert und stark von länderspezifischen und tempora- len Umständen abhängig ist“ (S. 44/45). Informativ ist auch die Übersicht über Grundfor-

1 Verfassung und Recht in Übersee 41 (2008), S. 269.

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men der Korruption (S. 48 ff.). Hier ist zu begrüßen, dass der Autor sich unter anderem ausführlich mit dem Problem der Erpressungszuwendungen beschäftigt, die häufig ver- nachlässigt werden. Es wird wohl zurecht darauf hingewiesen, dass internationale Korrup- tion „unverhältnismäßig oft das Resultat erpresserischer Anforderungen“ ist (S. 62) und sich häufig durch subtilere Zuwendungsmodalitäten sowie die systematische Benutzung einheimischer Mittelsmänner seitens der Vorteilsgeber auszeichnet (S. 63). Der zweite Teil des Buchs widmet sich der alten Rechtslage bei der Behandlung von Korruptionspraktiken durch die nationalen Rechtsordnungen. Er zeichnet sich – wie die ganze Studie – durch eine ausgezeichnete Darstellung der (rechts-) geschichtlichen Hinter- gründe aus. Zunächst wird (teilweise aus rechtsvergleichender Perspektive) auf das Straf- recht zur Bestechungsbekämpfung im öffentlichen Sektor eingegangen (S. 65 ff.), anschlie- ßend auf das modernere Strafrecht zur Pönalisierung korruptiver Handlungen im privaten Bereich (S. 97 ff.). Hier ist dem Autor für die systematische Gegenüberstellung des „angel- sächsischen“ Geschäftsherrenmodells und des „deutschen“ Wettbewerbsmodells zu danken. Das Zwischenfazit stellt eine relative Heterogenität der nationalen Antikorruptionsbestim- mungen bis Ende des vorigen Jahrhunderts fest. Auch habe sich die damalige Lage in allen Ländern durch „unverhohlene Ethnozentrität“ (S. 115) ausgezeichnet: Auslandsbestechung sei praktisch nirgendwo verboten gewesen, häufig sogar (etwa in Deutschland) steuerlich gefördert worden. Mit dem langen Weg vom nationalen zum internationalen Korruptionsstrafrecht be- schäftigt sich der dritte Teil der Arbeit. Das sechste Kapitel analysiert die erste Phase des Internationalisierungsprozesses in Form des unilateralen Ansatzes der USA. 20 Jahre lang waren die Vereinigten Staaten mit dem Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) der einzige Staat, der die Bestechung ausländischer Amtsträger im internationalen Geschäftsverkehr unter Strafe stellte. Androulakis schildert sehr ausführlich, wie es zu diesem Gesetz kam, was seine wesentlichen Inhalte (und Schwächen) sind und wie sich die USA auf bilateraler und internationaler Ebene vergeblich bemühten, andere Staaten ebenfalls zur Pönalisierung der Auslandsbestechung zu bewegen. Bemerkenswert ist die theoretische Auseinanderset- zung mit den Merkmalen der Einseitigkeit und Extraterritorialität. Hier sind insbesondere die Abschnitte zu nennen, die sich mit den Vorwürfen des juristischen und moralischen Imperialismus auseinandersetzen (S. 168 ff.). Ein kleiner Höhepunkt sind auch Zitate aus einem zivilrechtlichen BGH-Urteil aus den 80er Jahren; dort wird Auslandsbestechung einerseits als sittenwidrig bezeichnet (S. 215), andererseits als notwendig zur Erlangung von Geschäften in bestimmten Märkten gerechtfertigt (S. 217 f.). Das siebte Kapitel zeichnet im Detail die Entstehung der internationalen Antikorrup- tionsregimes in den 90er Jahren nach. Die ersten Abschnitte befassen sich mit der veränder- ten Weltlage und der Neudefinierung des Korruptionsproblems (S. 219 ff.), mit der Globa- lisierung der Korruptionsbekämpfung (S. 230 ff.), mit einschlägigen Organisationen des privaten Sektors (S. 240 ff.) sowie mit internationalen Organisationen ohne strafrechtlichen Ansatz (S. 244 ff.). Im Anschluss werden in chronologischer Folge die einzelnen internationalen Organisationen mit strafrechtlichem Ansatz akribisch analysiert. Hier wird zu-

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nächst die Organisation Amerikanischer Staaten behandelt, die mit der Interamerikanischen Konvention gegen die Korruption das erste Antikorruptionsübereinkommen überhaupt verabschiedete (S. 252 ff.). Daraufhin steht das OECD-Antikorruptionsregime im Zentrum der Untersuchung (S. 259 ff.). Hierbei handelt es sich um das bisher erfolgreichste ein- schlägige Regime, doch Androulakis’ Kritik am OECD-Bestechungsübereinkommen (S. 275 ff.) erscheint durchaus berechtigt. Allerdings muss der Behauptung widersprochen werden, nur „Major Player“ könnten Vertragsparteien und Mitglieder der OECD Working Group on Bribery werden (S. 276) – Bei Staaten wie Estland oder dem kürzlich beigetrete- nen Südafrika handelt es sich offensichtlich nicht um besonders wirtschaftsstarke Staaten. Das OECD-Regime scheint im Gegensatz zu Androulakis’ Folgerung gut geeignet, um die Verbreitung der Kriminalisierung der Auslandsbestechung voranzutreiben. Anschließend geht der Autor auf die einschlägigen Antikorruptionsinstrumente der EU ein (S. 282 ff.). Auch hier ist seine Detailkenntnis beeindruckend. Freilich muss man nicht jede Prognose teilen. So ist etwa nicht ersichtlich, warum der vom Rat blockierte Entwurf einer umfassenden Richtlinie zum Schutz der finanziellen Interessen der EG durch die jüngsten Entwicklungen überflüssig werden sollte (S. 301). Die Fortschrittsberichte der Kommission zu Umsetzung der im Rahmen der „dritten Säule“ verabschiedeten Instru- mente zur Betrugs- und Bestechungsbekämpfung zeigen mannigfaltige Implementations- defizite auf, die erst bei einem Transfer der Regelungen in den „ersten Pfeiler“ vor dem EuGH angegriffen werden könnten. Die nachfolgenden Ausführungen zum „Corpus Juris“- Projekt (S. 303 ff.) hätten durchaus auch kürzer ausfallen können. Völlig überraschend wird daraufhin „der allgemeine Eindruck“ geäußert, bei den EU-Organen handele es sich um einen „riesigen, unpersonellen bürokratischen“ Apparat, „der sich berufsmäßig mit der Produzierung von weitschweifenden, teils entbehrlichen oder unbrauchbaren juristischen Texten beschäftigt“ (S. 310).2 Glücklicherweise bleibt diese unsachliche und kaum begrün- dete Behauptung in dem umfangreichen Werk die einzige undifferenzierte Entgleisung ihrer Art. Es folgt eine sorgfältige Analyse der Antikorruptionsinstrumente des Europarats (S. 316 ff.). Im Anschluss wird auch auf entsprechende zwischenstaatliche Initiativen in Afrika eingegangen (S. 337 ff.), ein von der Forschung stiefmütterlich behandeltes Thema. Das Protokoll der Southern African Development Community gegen Korruption (S. 337 f.) dürfte bisher nur Afrikaexperten bekannt gewesen sein. Androulakis geht nicht auf regionale Korruptionsbekämpfungsmaßnahmen in Asien ein. Die dortigen Initiativen halten sich allerdings auch bislang sehr in Grenzen, insbesondere fehlt es im Unterschied zu den anderen Weltregionen an einem völkerrechtlich verbindlichen Antikorruptionsübereinkommen. Schließlich wird in gewohnt detaillierter Form auf die Antikorruptionsinstrumente der Vereinten Nationen eingegangen (S. 341 ff.). Hier erstaunt angesichts der sonstigen Sorg- falt des Autors, dass das Inkrafttreten der VN-Konvention gegen Korruption Ende 2005 nicht berücksichtigt wurde (S. 352). In seinem Zwischenfazit zur zweiten Phase der Inter-

2 Hervorhebung im Original.

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nationalisierung spricht Androulakis zu Recht die gewandelten Argumentationstopoi an: „Als nur moralisch unwürdiges Verhalten hatten Korruptionshandlungen mit internationa- lem Einschlag seit jeher nur begrenzt die nationalen Rechtssysteme interessiert. Als Wett- bewerbs- und Entwicklungshindernisse hingegen […] haben sie sehr schnell alle Aufmerk- samkeit sowohl auf der Seite der Geber- als auch auf derjenigen von Nehmerländern auf sich gezogen“ (S. 353). Der Autor wendet sich gegen undifferenzierte Vorwürfe einer Amerikanisierung des internationalen Strafrechts. Zutreffend beschreibt er, dass Internatio- nalisierung, „gleichgültig ob sie in Form einer ‚Amerikanisierung’ oder einer ‚Europäisie- rung’ auftritt“, ein Demokratiedefizit mit sich bringe, weil der Einfluss nationaler Volks- vertretungen stark reduziert wird (S. 356). Der vierte und letzte Teil beschäftigt sich vor allem mit den Auswirkungen der internationalen Antikorruptionsnormen auf die nationalen Rechtsordnungen. Androulakis beklagt, dass es auf zwischenstaatlicher Ebene „zu einer außerordentlichen Verschwendung von Ressourcen und zu verwirrenden Mehrfacharbeiten kam“ (S. 366). Natürlich ist es nicht optimal, dass sich Deutschland und die anderen EU-Mitgliedstaaten den Ergebnissen von nicht weniger als vier internationalen Initiativen (EU, Europarat, OECD, VN) anpassen müssen. Aber ohne die regionalen Übereinkommen wäre es vielleicht niemals zur VN- Konvention gegen Korruption gekommen. Diese droht ohnehin – im Gegensatz zu den Regimes des Europarats und der OECD – mangels eines Monitoringverfahrens zu einem zahnlosen Tiger zu verkommen. Mit den verschiedenen Evaluierungsmechanismen be- schäftigt sich der Autor leider nur am Rande. Zurecht bemängelt er hingegen, dass sich die deutsche Rechtslehre bislang zuwenig mit konkreten Empfehlungen zur Umsetzung der internationalen Vorgaben beschäftigt hat (S. 373). Der „Rechtsgütersalat“ der internationalen Normen wird scharf kritisiert (S. 374 ff.). Die Bemerkung, „das Funktionieren eines beliebigen ausländischen öffentlichen Dienstes“ überwiege „die Überlebensinteressen z. B. eines wichtigen inländischen Unternehmens nicht ohne weiteres“ (S. 381) wirkt zynisch und in der Tradition der Auslandsbestechung fördernden alten deutschen Außenwirt- schaftspolitik. Dabei geht es Androulakis eigentlich nur darum, aus guten Gründen auf das Problem von Schmiergeld- und Erpressungszuwendungen für pflichtgemäße Diensthand- lungen ausländischer Amtsträger hinzuweisen. Der Autor gibt im Folgenden eine systematische Übersicht über die einzelnen international geforderten Kriminalisierungselemente (S. 382 ff.) und geht hier bereits – wie beispielsweise bei der Pönalisierung der Abgeordnetenbestechung (S. 412) – auf verschiedene Anpassungserfordernisse im deutschen Recht ein. Anschließend wird ein Überblick über die Kriminalisierung der internationalen Korruption in außereuropäischen OECD-Ländern (S. 414 ff.) und einigen europäischen Staaten (S. 434 ff.) gegeben. So gut diese rechtsvergleichende Analyse ist, so hätte man sich doch eine Begründung für die Länderauswahl gewünscht. Von besonderem rechtspolitischem Wert ist das Unterkapitel „Die Harmonisie- rung der nationalen Korruption“ (S. 449 ff.). Hervorragend ist hier etwa der Abschnitt über Einflusshandel (S. 454 ff.), eine in Deutschland weitgehend vernachlässigte Vorfelder- scheinung der Korruption. Der Autor macht konkrete Formulierungsvorschläge für die

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Neufassung der Straftatbestände der Abgeordnetenbestechung (S. 461) und der Angestell- tenbestechung (S. 468). Sehr hilfreich – auch für das bereits laufende Gesetzgebungsver- fahren (BT-Drs. 16/6558) – ist die Zusammenfassung der Änderungen, die aufgrund der internationalen Vorgaben noch vorgenommen werden müssen (S. 472 ff.). Hier zeigt sich allerdings etwa am Beispiel der Kriminalisierung der Angestelltenbestechung (S. 475), dass die internationalen Instrumente doch einigen Interpretationsspielraum zulassen und die Mindeständerungserfordernisse folglich nur begrenzt eindeutig sind. Am Ende des Buchs stehen aus guten Gründen einige Gedanken zum Thema „symboli- sches Strafrecht“ (S. 479 ff.). Damit die internationalen Antikorruptionsinitiativen nicht zu bloßer Rhetorik verkommen, bedarf es nach Ansicht des Autors vor allem politischen Wil- lens, einer Überwindung der erheblichen Nachweisprobleme und eines hohen Maßes an staatenübergreifender Kooperation. Nachdenklich stimmt die Randbemerkung zur Un- gleichheit der zwischenstaatlichen Machtverhältnisse, etwa des machtvollen Einflusses der US-Regierung. Kritiker der internationalen Antikorruptionsregimes bemängeln dann: „Wie soll man in solchen Fällen das Gleichgewicht wieder herstellen und trotz des ungleichen Ausgangspunkts eine faire Wettbewerbschance bekommen, wenn nicht durch gezielte Subventionierung von Bestechungszuwendungen?“ (S. 481). Das Buch endet verhalten optimistisch. Zwar habe sich in den ersten Jahren nach der Verabschiedung des OECD- Übereinkommens und der nationalen Umsetzungsvorschriften wenig bewegt. Doch auch der FCPA habe eine Weile gebraucht, bis es zu einer signifikanten Anzahl an Strafverfol- gungen und einem Managementwandel in den Unternehmen kam (S. 484). Auch dürften „die Erträge aus der Globalisierung der Korruptionsbekämpfung […] nicht einfach an der Anzahl von Strafverfahren gemessen werden“ (S. 486). Insgesamt stünden „die Aussichten auf eine graduelle Verbesserung der Situation nicht schlecht. Zu diesem Zweck hofft auch die vorliegende Studie einen Beitrag zu leisten“ (S. 487). Dieses Ziel wurde sicher voll erfüllt. Androulakis hat ein beeindruckend umfangreiches, detailliertes, aufwendig recher- chiertes und gut geschriebenes Werk mit interdisziplinären Exkursen vorgelegt, das mehr an eine Habilitationsschrift als an eine Dissertation erinnert. Wer sich schnell einen Über- blick über die internationale Korruptionsbekämpfung verschaffen möchte, sei auf Simone Nagels Buch verwiesen. Alle diejenigen jedoch, die sich vertieft mit dem Gegenstand be- schäftigen wollen, werden in den nächsten Jahren um Ioannis Androulakis’ Meisterwerk nicht herumkommen. Sebastian Wolf, Konstanz

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Obiora Chinedu Okafor The African Human Rights System Activist Forces and International Institutions. New York, Cambridge University Press, 2007, 336 pp., £58.00. ISBN 9780521869065

In 1981, the African human rights system was created with the entry into force of the Afri- can Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the establishment of the African Commis- sion mandated to promote and protect human rights. Since then, this system has grown to include Protocols on the Rights of Women in Africa and the Rights of the Child and the African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights (the African Court) which came into being in April 2004. Since its creation, the African human rights system has been the most heavily criticized of the three regional convention based human rights systems; the other systems being the European Convention on Human Rights and the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights. According to one commentator the African Commission has “hardly made a dent in the African human rights scene.” Others simply consider the system as a whole as ineffective and weak mainly because of its limited impact on state compliance. It is in the midst of such negative perceptions of the African human rights system that Chinedu Obiora Okafor is a welcomed dissenting voice through his book, The African Human Rights System Activist Forces and International Institutions. An Associate Professor at Osgoode Hall Law School, York University in Canada, Okafor has authored and co-edited five other books and published numerous articles on diverse aspects of international law. There are two main objectives the author is concerned with achieving while addressing the root of the negativity associated with the African human rights system. These objectives are laid out in pages 3 and 4 of Chapter 1 which serves as a detailed introduction to the book. According to Okafor the primary objective of this book is to demonstrate that the African system “can (under certain identifiable conditions) achieve domestic impact by significantly affecting the thinking processes and actions of state institutions.” The secondary objective is to contend for an extension of the measurement tool by which the effectiveness of the African system, and other similar international human rights institutions (IHIs), has been measured. Through his book he offers an enhanced method of assessing IHIs which would demonstrate some positive impacts made by the African human rights system. Okafor commences his arduous task by addressing, in the second chapter of his book, the basis of measurement or the lenses through which IHIs are evaluated. The most applied yardstick is the state compliance measure, the focus and depths of which are well laid out by Okafor in this chapter. The two conventional streams of the state compliance measure can be summarized as: 1) that the IHI should be able to compel compliance; and 2) states voluntarily comply with decisions. In both streams of thought, overemphasis has been placed on the role of states in assessing the effectiveness of IHIs. As Okafor points out, under this optic, an IHI is viewed as successful based on the level of state compliance either

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with its constituting convention or its decisions. It is on this basis that the African Charter, also known as the Banjul Charter, and its institutions have been criticized as weak. Many states were unresponsive to the African Commission’s requests for state visits during its early years and a number of its decisions were also ignored. Okafor astutely contends that this compliance measure is restrictive and ultimately projects the wrong depiction of the success of an IHI, particularly the African human rights system. Respectfully differing with seasoned academics and observers of IHIs, Okafor does not offer a new measurement tool. Rather, he recommends an extension to the compliance measure for IHIs which would reflect the impact IHIs have made on civil society actors (CSAs), and the indirect impacts on executive, legislative and judicial action. Okafor demonstrates in Chapter 3 that even with the compliance yardstick the African human rights system is not as weak and ineffectual as depicted; a theme he continues with detailed illustrations in Chapters 4 and 5. The bulk of Chapter 3 however is devoted to an overview of the African human rights system, what it entails and the general conceptions of the system as weak and ineffectual. Okafor uses case studies on Nigeria and South Africa in chapters 4 and 5 respectively to analyze the positive, albeit limited, impact by the African human rights system has had on domestic legislative, executive and judicial action. In these chapters he applies the ‘extended yardstick’ and assesses the impact the African human rights system has had on activist forces, CSAs and the three branches of government. Several positive impacts include the work of the South African Human Rights Commission to integrate the norms of the African human rights system into its domestic setting. Additionally, the efforts applied by the South African Government to secure a seat on the African Commission and the African Court demonstrate its willingness to be involved in the development of the regional human rights system. Often ignored is the fact that one of the African Commission’s most appreciable influ- ences occurred during a time of military rule in Nigeria. In Chapter 4 Okafor discusses the 1987 Nigerian Civil Disturbances (Special Tribunal) Act which provided for the establishment of a special tribunal to conduct the trial of persons charged with communal or civil offenses. The composition of the tribunal included a serving member of the Armed Forces, and those convicted were denied a right of appeal to another judicial body. The decree and ensuing decisions of the tribunal were decried by CSAs and the African Commission, which labeled the decree as “Charter illegal” and expressed concerns about its compatibility with the African Charter. In 1996 following vast criticism, the Nigerian military regime promulgated a decree removing the armed forces member of the tribunal and providing for the right of appeal to a special appeal tribunal. Staunch advocates of the state compliance measure may not see what Okafor saw in this illustration; namely the indirect compliance with the Commission’s decisions on the ille- gality of the Civil Disturbances Act. Aside from these two African giants, limited success has also been recorded in Ghana, Algeria and Mali which Okafor discusses in Chapter 6.

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Fortunately, Okafor does not attempt to paint a rosy picture of the influence of the African human rights system. While demonstrating the positive impacts, Okafor is not blind to some negative developments, including the limited impact the African human rights system has had in the majority of the countries on the continent. Part of Chapter 6 is dedicated to an honest assessment of the varying factors which undermine the potential of the human rights system in Africa as well as the conditions necessary for optimizing the domestic impact of this system. Paramount in negativity is the low-level of awareness and utilization of the African system among CSAs. Okafor’s observation is that what binds countries like Nigeria and South Africa in terms of successful domestic impact of the Afri- can human rights system are the activist forces which work hard to put the regional system on the domestic platform. Woven through the majority of his chapters, is the theme that success of the human rights system in Africa has been through both a direct and indirect alliance with local civil society organizations. The African Commission has forged a direct alliance through the increased grants of observer status to more CSAs across the continent. The indirect alliance arises where these activist forces and CSAs have acted as transmission lines between the African system and domestic governmental institutions. Another area which Okafor briefly explores in chapter 7 is the ongoing call for reform of the provisions of the African Charter. Critics of the African human rights system have condemned some of its restrictive textual provisions and limited institutional capacity. For many years the African human rights system was perceived as unsuccessful because it lacked a Court which would reflect domestic institutions. With the Court now in place, criticism of the African human rights system still abounds. Okafor contends the placement of hope on textual and institutional reform, arguing that critics should focus on the impact of the African Commission decisions on activist forces in Africa. Okafor does not disagree that institutional reform may be beneficial; however, he argues for less focus on the textual provisions in the instrument that establishes an IHI and or its institutional capacity. It remains his core position that the presence of a strong activist movement has tended to correlate to a reasonable degree with the capacity of the African system to exert influence within a given state, regardless of its textual shortcomings. Okafor’s style and ease of analysis of technically academic issues efficiently bring to light possibilities that would enhance pre-existing approaches to the study of IHIs. Although focusing on the African human rights system, this book offers important insights into the shortcomings of the state compliance measure, and the need to re-evaluate the dependence placed on IHIs to be or become a panacea for the serious human rights problems occurring around the world. It has also become apparent through a reading of the African Human Rights System, Activist Forces and International Institutions that the Afri- can Commission needs to improve publicity of the strides that it has made and obstacles overcome over the years. The Commission has a good advocate in Okafor. Unfortunately the audience for Okafor’s book is indeed limited to academics and researchers. Therefore, those CSAs in African countries who need encouragement to believe in and utilize the African human rights system are unlikely to come across this well written book. For those

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interested in an analysis of the African Human Rights System and a fresh voice in the IHI discourse, this book serves as useful background information as well as an excellent example of unconventional thinking. Adejoke Babington-Ashaye, The Hague

Blessings Chinsinga Democracy, Decentralisation and Poverty Reduction in Malawi Mainzer Beiträge zur Afrikaforschung Band 15 Köln, Rüdiger Köppe Verlag, 2007, 260 S., 29,80 EUR; ISBN 9783896458155

Der malawische Politikwissenschaftler Blessings Chinsinga, der an der University of Malawi lehrt, hat sich in seiner von Thomas Bierschenk an der Universität Mainz betreuten Dissertation mit einem ebenso spannenden wie empirisch wenig erforschten Thema be- schäftigt: Der Dezentralisierung und ihre Auswirkungen auf Armutsbekämpfung und demokratische Konsolidierung am Beispiel Malawis. Demokratische Dezentralisierung wird seit einigen Jahren vor allem von westlichen Gebern als wichtige Voraussetzung für die Konsolidierung junger, fragiler demokratischer Systeme und armutsorientierte Entwicklung gefördert. Die in westlichen Entwicklungs- hilfeministerien gehegten Erwartungen an die Dezentralisierung haben sich vor allem in Afrika bisher nur selten erfüllt. Malawi ist ein Beispiel für ein weitgehendes Scheitern. Chinsinga hat dankenswerter Weise eine detailreiche empirische Studie vorgelegt, in der er die wesentlichen Schwächen des Dezentralisierungsansatzes aufzeigt. Der größte Schwachpunkt der Dezentralisierungspolitik liegt im bis heute fehlenden politischen Willen der demokratisch gewählten Zentralregierung. Diese hat keine Absicht, ihre Machtposition zu schwächen, indem sie Kompetenzen an Kommunalräte abtritt. Somit ging nicht nur die Initiative zur Dezentralisierung von den Gebern aus. Diese mussten den Prozess auch größtenteils finanzieren und organisieren. Die gesetzliche Grundlage, die zudem noch deutliche technische Schwächen aufweist, wurde maßgeblich von den Gebern im Rahmen der technischen Hilfe vorbereitet. Eine signifikante Finanzautonomie der Distrikte konnte politisch nicht durchgesetzt werden. Erst nach mehrjährigen Verzögerun- gen wurden im November 2000 die bisher einzigen Kommunalwahlen durchgeführt. Lediglich 14% der Wahlberechtigten beteiligten sich daran (S. 105). Bei den Präsident- schafts- und Parlamentswahlen waren noch fast 94% Wahlbeteiligung zu verzeichnen. Diese Zahlen verdeutlichen das fehlende Interesse der Wähler an den dezentralen Institu- tionen. Das lag einerseits an der fehlenden oder allenfalls halbherzigen Mobilisierung durch die großen Parteien und andererseits an fehlender Kenntnis und Information bei den Wahlberechtigten. Somit ist die Dezentralisierung eine von außen initiierte, oktroyierte und von den Gebern maßgeblich am Leben gehaltene Intervention, die bisher nicht Fuß fassen konnte. Nach Ablauf der Wahlperiode Ende 2005 wurden die Kommunalräte aufgelöst.

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Seitdem wurden die Kommunalwahlen permanent von der Regierung verschoben. Wie schon im Vorfeld der Wahlen von 2000 wurden finanzielle Gründe dafür angeführt, was in Hinblick auf entsprechende Zusagen der Geber wenig überzeugt. Auch die Forderung der wichtigsten Oppositionsparteien United Democratic Front (UDF) und Malawi Congress Party (MCP) im Jahr 2007, die Wahlen abzuhalten, sind eher einem nationalpolitischen Kalkül geschuldet als einem echten Interesse an der Dezentralisierung. Ob die Kommunal- wahlen gemeinsam mit den nächsten Präsidentschafts- und Parlamentswahlen durchgeführt werden, ist indes fraglich, da der politische Wille dafür bei fast allen nationalen politischen Akteuren nicht besonders ausgeprägt zu sein scheint. Eine weitere Schwäche des Dezentralisierungsansatzes haben die Geber mitzuverantworten. Chinsinga zeigt, dass viele Kommunalräte das Interesse an ihrem Mandat verloren hatten, nachdem sie entgegen ihren Erwartungen lediglich eine unerhebliche Aufwandsent- schädigung erhielten. Sitzungen wurden nur besucht, wenn es Sitzungsgelder und/oder zumindest Verpflegung gab (S. 139). Für Veranstaltungen in ihren Kommunen standen keine Mittel zur Verfügung. Schon die Fahrt in die Dörfer gestaltete sich logistisch schwie- rig und war mit Kosten verbunden. Es sollte auch nicht übersehen werden, dass ein Kom- munalrat, der zu Fuß vor seine Wähler tritt, der malawischen Tradition entsprechend nicht ernst genommen wird. Das führte zu einer verbreiteten Passivität der Kommunalräte (S. 167-168). Zudem wurde die Korruption von der nationalen auf die lokale Ebene transpor- tiert und damit erhöht (S. 150). Warum die Geber nicht für eine adäquate Vergütung und Ausbildung der Mandatsträger gesorgt haben, ist kaum verständlich. Man hat damit einen Erfolg der Dezentralisierung von vorn herein verhindert. Es wäre glaubwürdiger gewesen, diese Strategie ganz aufzugeben, wenn man sie unter den ungünstigen politischen Rahmen- bedingungen schon nicht konsequent fördert. Der Autor identifiziert fehlende sachliche Kompetenz der Kommunalräte als ein weiteres Defizit. Viele seien nicht in der Lage, die fast ausschließlich englischsprachigen Ge- setze, Verordnungen und Strategiepapiere zu verstehen und aktiv darüber zu diskutieren. Sie nähmen insofern gezwungenermaßen eine eher passive Rolle gegenüber der Exekutive ein (S. 141). Die suboptimale Kompetenz der Räte ist indes nicht verwunderlich. Malawi leidet an einem chronischen Mangel an Fachkräften. In einer solchen Konstellation werden sich gut ausgebildete Professionals nicht für kommunale Ämter interessieren, zumal diese faktisch auch nicht vergütet werden. Wenn jemand die Wahl zwischen dem angenehmeren Leben in der Stadt in einem überdurchschnittlich dotierten Job und einer beinahe ehren- amtlichen Tätigkeit in einer ländlichen Siedlung mit unzureichender Infrastruktur hat, liegt die Entscheidung auf der Hand. Die Anbindung der Dezentralisierung an die Armutsbekämpfungspolitik, die sich die Studie zur Aufgabe gemacht hat, ist kaum überzeugend zu leisten. Der Autor zeigt die verschiedenen Strategien der Regierung von Bakili Muluzi auf und kommt zu dem zutreffenden Schluss, dass es keine institutionalisierten Systeme zur Erfolgskontrolle der Maß- nahmen gäbe. Zudem seien viele Projekte gebergesteuert und würden außerhalb der dezentralen politischen Strukturen realisiert (S. 118). Das zeigt die inkonsequente Politik der

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Geber, die einerseits die Dezentralisierung fördern, andererseits aber für ihre eigenen armutsorientierten Projekte diese umgehen. Dadurch kommt es zu unnötigen Duplizierun- gen und Koordinierungsproblemen (S. 135). Die Studie enthält leider einige vermeidbare handwerkliche Fehler. So wurden für die Abgeordnetendiäten und Aufwandsentschädigungen veraltete Zahlen ohne Quellennennung angeführt. Diese Beträge wurden unter Anwendung eines bei der Niederschrift der Arbeit gültigen Wechselkurses in Euro umgerechnet und nicht zum Wechselkurs während der Gültigkeit der Entschädigungen (S. 199f.). Dadurch wurden die umgerechneten Beträge in Relation zum Außenwertverlust der Landeswährung Kwacha signifikant verzerrt. Ebenfalls problematisch sind einige Schlussfolgerungen aus der Feldforschungsarbeit. So wird im Kapitel über den Konflikt zwischen den traditionellen Autoritäten und den politischen Mandatsträgern suggeriert, dass fast alle Interviewpartner des Autors traditionelle Autori- täten „as being outdated and as having outlived their usefulness“ (S. 189) bewerteten. Das ist hingegen kein Wunder, wenn alle angeführten Befragten direkt aus dem Arbeitsbereich der Dezentralisierungsinstitutionen stammen. Die Rolle der traditionellen, erblich legitimierten Chiefs und Village Headmen, die in ihren Chieftaincies bzw. Dörfern zwar konsensual aber letztendlich autoritär herrschen, steht ohne Zweifel einer demokratischen Dezentralisierung diametral entgegen. Dennoch sollte nicht übersehen werden, dass sie wichtige staatliche Aufgaben wahrnehmen. Sie verwalten nicht nur das traditionelle Ackerland, sondern sind auch für Rechtsstreitigkeiten und für die Initiierung von kommunalen Selbsthilfe- und Entwicklungsprojekten zuständig. Der Staat besitzt weder personelle noch materielle Ressourcen, um diese Aufgaben selbst zu übernehmen. Eine Abschaffung der traditionellen Autoritäten würde zum Zusammen- bruch der staatlichen Ordnung auf Dorfebene führen. Die Grenzen der Dezentralisierung werden somit auch von den unzureichenden staatlichen institutionellen Strukturen termi- niert. Die Degradierung der einflussreichen traditionellen Autoritäten zu stimmrechtslosen ex officio-Mitgliedern der Kommunalräte mag demokratietheoretischen Erfordernissen entsprechen, ist aber für die malawische Realität nicht förderlich. Die traditionellen Führer stehen der Dezentralisierung skeptisch bis ablehnend gegenüber. Sie sollten in den Prozess besser integriert werden und mehr formalen Einfluss erhalten. Der Autor stellt fest, dass traditionelle Autoritäten über eine höhere Legitimation in der Landbevölkerung verfügen als die demokratisch gewählten Mandatsträger (S. 207). Insgesamt hat Chinsinga eine interessante, detaillierte und kritische Studie über die bisher weitgehend fehlgeschlagene Dezentralisierungspolitik in Malawi vorgelegt, die von den westlichen Gebern zur Kenntnis genommen werden sollte. Das Scheitern des Ansatzes ist von diesen mitzuverantworten. Es sollte aber – in Erweiterung der vorliegenden Studie – der Sinn und Zweck von Dezentralisierung kritisch hinterfragt werden. Sonst wird man am Ende – wie die Arbeit zeigt, ohne es so klar zu sagen – zu dem Schluss kommen: Außer Spesen nichts gewesen. Heiko Meinhardt, Hamburg

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Antje Du Bois-Pedain Transitional Amnesty in South-Africa New York, Cambridge University Press, 2007, 418 pp; US$ 120.00 / £ 60.00; ISBN 9780-521-878-296

The amnesty scheme of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South-Africa has attracted more scholarly attention than any other instance of amnesty in contemporary times. Did the amnesty scheme in South Africa work? Is the grant of amnesty in exchange for full disclosure by perpetrators of acts of gross violations of human rights ethically defensible? The initiators of the South Africa Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) certainly thought so. What should be the proper approach to a dispassionate evaluation of these thorny questions? Antje Du Bois-Pedain offers a commendably robust approach that has been largely missing in the literature. This book will of special interest to advanced students and scholars of transitional justice, human rights, sociology of law, international law as well as legal and political theory. Amnesty remains an emotive issue. For, how can amnesia, the act of ‘forgetting,’ be imposed? How can those who have suffered untold, sometimes indescribable pain and loss be required or told to accept that the acts of their persecutors have been consigned to oblivion? Writers have wondered whether suffering can be legitimately extinguished through a proclamation, almost invariably made by those not directly affected by it. It has generally been treated with suspicion by most writers. Given that emotions like pain, suffering and forgetting that partly underlie objections to the practice of amnesty are themselves contentious and relative at best, it is surprising that the literature on the issue has remained essentially normative in outlook. Few have adopted the empirical approach. It is logical to expect that more productive analyses can be achieved through a robust approach that combines normative considerations with victim perspectives of the issue within specific contexts. In engaging the foregoing questions, du Bois-Pedain, argues that the proper approach to analyses of the amnesty process in South Africa (and presumably elsewhere) is one that combines empirical and normative analysis of the amnesty process. This approach, rather than the topic, sets the book apart in the transitional justice literature on the forever expanding volumes on the TRC. The book evaluates the results of the work of the Amnesty Committee (one of three specialised committees) of the TRC, against the declared aims of the initiators of the process. It engages the issue whether the amnesty process in South Africa can be regarded as a ‘model’ for achieving the designed objective of securing accountability for gross violations of human rights. Can granting amnesties for full disclosure of participation in violent crimes of a political nature ‘contribute to, and in fact, be crucial for, the moral and political reconstruction of society’? Du Bois-Pedain answers this question in the positive. The volume is set out in eight chapters. Chapter 1 presents the background to the TRC and the amnesty process but the thrust of the author’s arguments are articulated in chapters 2-6 of the book.

296 Verfassung und Recht in Übersee VRÜ 42 (2009)

As a prelude to the discussion of the key argument of the book, the author rightly notes that a critical measure of the success or otherwise of any process is the response of the targeted audience. Thus, chapter 2 of Transitional Amnesty provides empirical data on the work of the Amnesty Committee of the TRC (the Committee). This empirical data on the practice of the Committee stands out as a superior feature of the book in the way it grounds the normative perspectives canvassed by the author in the experiential account of the amnesty scheme. The author’s presentation of facts and figures on the amount and outcome of the applications registered by the Committee, clearly demonstrates there was a remarkable acceptance of the offer of amnesty among the targeted constituency. Most of those who applied for amnesty were the ‘foot-soldiers’ on all sides of the conflict in the years of apartheid in South-Africa. The offer of amnesty was in fact largely ignored, rebuffed even, by the leadership on both sides of the struggle. The most obvious reason for this according to the author appears to be the larger number of the former than the latter in the common run of things. But the notable gap may also be a direct result of the technicalities of linking specific acts of gross human rights violations to particular direc- tives given by politicians, generals and other leaders on both sides of the divide. Perhaps surprisingly though, leaders who submitted to the process had the highest rate of success 94.5% compared to their followers’ 88.0%. Crucially the analysis also disclose that the nature of the gross violations of human rights involved did not play a significant part in the high success rate (88.3%) of the amnesty applications. The central argument of the book, that amnesty was a ‘pragmatic’ option in the South Africa transition experience is well developed and set out in Chapters 3 and 4 of the book. They present a thorough analysis of the Committee’s interpretation of the key elements of Section 20 of the TRC Act, on what constitutes a ‘political offence’ and ‘full disclosure’ respectively to merit amnesty. The author navigates several decisions of on amnesty to identify a largely consistent howbeit not flawless conceptualisation of the two key requirements by the Committee. The reader is presented a systematised picture of the sometimes surprisingly intricate process that was the work of the Committee. Contrary to general practice, the Committee adopted a practical rather than normative approach to what constitutes a political offence. This approach is an important factor in its ‘generous’ grant of amnesty to applicants. In endorsing the approach, the author argues that a restrictive normative approach to the political question would have failed to meet with ‘public expectations’ of the process and was, in any event, inevitable outcome in view of the origin of the TRC itself; product of a negotiated transition. The position that full disclosure of acts of gross human rights violations by perpetrators, ‘truth-for-forgiveness,’ serves as a substantial measure of accountability and presumably ethical validation of the amnesty scheme, has attracted some criticism. But as du Bois-Pedain points out (like others), it is a proposition that receives substantial validation in the South Africa Constitutional Court’s decision in Azanian People’s Organisation (AZAPO) and others v. President of the Republic of South

Buchbesprechungen / Book Reviews 297

Africa and others.1 Whether the position of the court is in retrospect normatively sound in international law has remained (and probably will remain) highly debatable. Though upholding validity of the Committee’s approach to the amnesty scheme, the author maintains a critical stance on it by scrutinising the justificatory arguments of the TRC in general and the Committee’s work in particular. These are best reflected in the evaluation of truth recovery and victim empowerment in chapters 5and 6 respectively. In chapter 5, taking the reader through the process of the amnesty hearings, du Bois-Pedain observes that getting at the ‘whole truth’ or obtaining a complete historical record was not in fact, the practice of the Committee. Rather, it concerned itself with the more restricted objective of investigating factual cases brought before it in order to enable it decide the applications for amnesty. In the process, important evidence with obvious potential of generally shedding light on aspects of the conduct of key players in the conflict period were sometimes shut out. While conceding that the Committees’ findings fall short of historical truth, the author nonetheless stoutly defends the approach as being ‘communicatively more accurate’ and superior to the forensic truth of the courts. Similarly in chapter 6, through an account of some notable amnesty hearings, the author advances the position that on the whole the needs of victims are better served by the amnesty scheme than could criminal trials. In particular, du Bois-Pedain contends that the critical need for closure by victims of crimes is one that strongly commends the amnesty scheme over trials. Here, it is apt to take issue with the author’s proposition that the willingness of many victims of crimes of the apartheid conflict is an indicator of its value. This may well be so. But it is also logical to question whether this willingness to engage in the scheme is not driven purely by the need for closure and desire for justice which the TRC process was presented as the solution rather than one in a number of possibilities? At the least, the strong disapproval of the attitude of some applicants for amnesty by their victims suggests the latter may well have proceeded to explore other options like insistence on criminal trials in complete disregard of or despite the amnesty scheme. The contribution of this book to the field of transitional justice lies in how the author strikes a remarkable balance between empirical evidence and normative principles in analysing a decidedly emotive topic. There is much to be said for the critical but practical approach that scrutinises the process of amnesty in the context of the realities of the society in transition. It is important after all (no matter our ethical preferences) that prime attention ought to be accorded to the experience and perceptions of those directly affected by the amnesty scheme in assessing its legitimacy. Du Bois Pedain’s thorough analysis of the contentious issue of transitional amnesty in South Africa points scholarly discourse of amnesty in a new direction, highlighting the need for transformation of the nature of the discourse. Analysis of the propriety (or otherwise) of transitional amnesty ought to be embedded in specific experiential accounts. In the light of this book it may now be insufficient to address the issue through a univocal

1 1996 (4) SA 671 (CC). Naturally, the author refers to this case in several parts of the book.

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approach, entrenched in either purist (ethical) theoretical arguments or purported victim- based perspectives. For this, Transitional Amnesty in South Africa commends itself as a must-read on the topical issue of amnesty practice in transitional societies. Hakeem O. Yusuf, Glasgow

Nico Horn / Anton Bösl (Eds.) The Independence of the Judiciary in Namibia Konrad Adenauer Foundation, Macmillan Education, Windhoek 2008, 325 pp., EUR 38,00; ISBN 978-99916-0-807-5.

Fast 20 Jahre nach der Unabhängigkeit Namibias und dem Inkrafttreten der namibianischen Verfassung bietet dieses Buch einen Überblick über aktuelle Fragestellungen und Heraus- forderungen der richterlichen Unabhängigkeit in Namibia. Das Buch enthält Beiträge von Wissenschaftlern und Praktikern, welche im Rahmen eines Forschungsprojekts der Konrad- Adenauer Stiftung in Zusammenarbeit mit der Universität Windhoek entstanden sind. Unterteilt in die sieben Themenschwerpunkte, vermittelt das Werk die Strukturen des namibianischen Justizsystems und untersucht die Verankerung des Prinzips unabhängiger Rechtsprechung sowie Mechanismen zu seiner Sicherung in der neuen verfassungsrechtli- chen Ordnung Namibias. Die Beiträge beschreiben das Verfassungsprinzip der richterlichen Unabhängigkeit im afrikanischen Kontext sowie vor dem Hintergrund der historischen Ereignisse, welche zur Unabhängigkeit Namibias im Jahre 1990 geführt haben. Ein Schwerpunkt der Untersu- chung liegt auf den Sicherungsmechanismen, die Gesetz und Rechtsprechung zur Vermei- dung unsachgemäßer Einflüsse auf die Rechtsprechung vorsehen. Weitere thematische Schwerpunkte bilden die Unabhängigkeit der Magistrates Courts gegenüber den oberen Gerichten (High Court und Supreme Court), die Eingliederung der traditionellen afrikanischen Stammesgerichte in das staatliche Gerichtssystem und die Praxis der Ernennung von sog. Acting Judges. In die Untersuchung einbezogen werden auch nichtrichterliche am Rechtsprechungsprozess Beteiligte wie der namibianische Prosecutor General als unabhän- gige Strafverfolgungsinstanz, der Ombudsmann sowie die Anwaltschaft. Die Beitrags- sammlung schließt mit einem kritischen Blick auf die juristische Ausbildung in Namibia. In seinem einleitenden Beitrag "The paradigm of an independent judiciary: Its history, implications and limitations in Africa" stellt Joseph B. Diescho das Prinzip einer unabhän- gigen Judikative im Kontext afrikanischer Traditionen vor, welche die Umsetzung und Akzeptanz der ursprünglich in Europa entstandenen Idee der Gewaltenteilung vor eine besondere, „afrikanische“ Herausforderung stellen. Daran anschließend zeichnet Nico Horn in seinem Beitrag "The independence of the judiciary in pre-independent Namibia: Legal challenges under the pre-independence Bill of Rights (1985-1990)" die Loslösung der namibianischen Rechtsprechung von der südafrika-

Buchbesprechungen / Book Reviews 299

nischen Dominanz nach. Als ursprüngliches Mandatsgebiet Südwestafrika stand das heutige Namibia seit dem ersten Weltkrieg bis zu seiner Unabhängigkeit im Jahre 1990 unter der strengen Ägide der südafrikanischen Apartheidsverwaltung. Der Autor zeigt die Weg- bereitung für den grundlegenden Paradigmenwechsel Namibias von der Parlamentssouve- ränität zum Verfassungsvorrang durch die liberale und grundrechtsorientierte Rechtspre- chungstendenz des Supreme Court of South West Africa auf, die dieser auch gegenüber der rigiden Haltung des instanzlich übergeordneten Appellate Division des südafrikanischen Supreme Court verfolgte. Sam Amoo gibt in seinem Beitrag "The structure of the Namibian judicial system and its relevance for an independent judiciary" sodann einen Überblick über die heutige, in drei Ebenen unterteilte Gerichtsstruktur Namibias. Der Autor zeigt, dass namentlich die oberen Gerichte (High Court und Supreme Court) durch die Ausstattung mit einer Prüfungskom- petenz von Gesetzen und Verwaltungshandeln gegenüber der Legislative und der Exekutive eine wesentliche Stärkung erfahren haben. Im Gegensatz zu Südafrika hat sich Namibia jedoch gegen die Einrichtung eines separaten Verfassungsgerichts ausgesprochen. Lovisa Indongo und Nico Horn setzen sich in ihren Beiträgen "The uniqueness of the Namibian Procecutor-General" und "The independence of the prosecutorial authority of South Africa and Namibia: A comparative study" jeweils rechtsvergleichend mit der Frage der Unabhängigkeit des Prosecutor-General als Strafverfolgungsinstanz in Namibia ausein- ander. Die Frage, inwieweit diesem ein Verfolgungs- und Anklageermessen zusteht, erlangt insbesondere im Hinblick auf die Praxis der Strafverfolgung während der Apartheid in Namibia besondere Bedeutung, als die Strafverfolgung als Mittel zur Eindämmung liberaler Tendenzen genutzt wurde. In ihrer Filterfunktion kann die Anklageentscheidung Ansatz- punkt für eine politische Steuerung der gerichtlichen Verfolgung von Straftaten sein. Beide Autoren sehen die Unabhängigkeit des Prosecutor General als Vorabbedingung für ein unabhängiges Strafverfahren. Vor diesem Hintergrund zeigen die Autoren den Ansatz der Rechtsprechung auf, welche dem Prinzip einer klaren Trennung der Strafverfolgung von der Exekutive folgt und dem Prosecutor-General eine quasi-richterliche Funktion beimisst. Kaijata Kangueehi untersucht in seinem Beitrag "The Magistrates Act of Namibia and the independence of magistrates" die Unabhängigkeit der an den unteren Gerichten tätigen Magistrates. Nicht ganz deutlich distanziert er sich von der Linie des Supreme Court, der Magistrates’ Courts unter Zugrundelegung des Van Rooyen-Urteils des südafrikanischen Verfassungsgerichts im Hinblick auf ihre begrenzte Rechtsprechungskompetenz gegenüber den oberen Gerichten einen geringeren Grad an Unabhängigkeit zubilligt. Eine solche Abstufung hinsichtlich der Unabhängigkeit zwischen den unteren und den höheren Ge- richten ist vor dem Hintergrund der traditionellen Untergliederung der Richterschaft in Judges und Magistrates in Common Law-Jurisdiktionen zu sehen. Unterschiedliche Grade richterlicher Unabhängigkeit lassen sich jedoch angesichts der Anforderungen des Verfas-

300 Verfassung und Recht in Übersee VRÜ 42 (2009)

sungsprinzips einer unabhängigen Rechtsprechung nicht rechtfertigen1. Auch Kangueehi tendiert im Ergebnis zu einer weiteren Loslösung der Magistrates von der Exekutive. Manfred Hinz widmet sich in seinem Beitrag "Traditional courts in Namibia – part of the judiciary? Jurisprudential challenges of traditional justice" daraufhin der Stellung der traditionellen Stammesgerichte in Namibia, deren Existenz die Verfassung auf der Ebene der unteren Gerichte ausdrücklich anerkennt und garantiert. Der Autor zeigt, dass sich die sog. traditional courts oder community courts, welche oft gleichzeitig die rechtsprechende, die gesetzgebende und die exekutive Funktion in der Person eines Stammesvorsitzenden ausüben, nur bedingt an den für die staatlichen Gerichte herausgebildeten Kriterien der richterlichen Unabhängigkeit messen lassen. Wesentliche Spannungspunkte im Verhältnis der traditionellen Gerichte zu den staatlichen Gerichten bleiben in der gegenwärtigen Ord- nung ungeklärt – dies betrifft insbesondere die Eingliederung der Stammesgerichte in das staatliche Gerichtssystem Namibias. Einen praktischen Ansatz verfolgt Peter Von Doepp in seinem Artikel "Politics and judicial decision-making in Namibia: Separate or connected realms?", indem er mittels einer statistischen Auswertung von ca. 250 Gerichtsentscheidungen anhand vorab ent- wickelter Kriterien den Einfluss politischer und anderer äußerer Faktoren auf die Recht- sprechung nachzuweisen sucht. Die Studie kommt zu dem Ergebnis, dass die namibianischen Gerichte offenbar ihre Entscheidungen nicht an den Erwartungen der Exekutive ausrichten. Lediglich Richter ausländischer Herkunft mit begrenzter Amtszeit wiesen danach eine gewisse Neigung auf, im Sinne der jeweiligen Regierung zu entscheiden. Mögen sich anhand der Vorgehensweise des Autors auch gewisse Tendenzen der Recht- sprechung abzeichnen, so bleibt für den Leser doch fraglich, inwieweit sich konkrete Ein- flüsse auf den Ausgang einer Entscheidung im Einzelfall auf diese Weise tatsächlich nach- vollziehen lassen. Der Autor ist sich auch der Vorprägung seiner statistischen Auswertung aufgrund seiner Auswahl der Untersuchungskriterien durchaus bewusst. Die Herausbildung der Kriterien und Fallgruppen ist jedoch zumindest geeignet, potentielle Anfälligkeiten der Rechtsprechung für äußere Einflüsse aufzuzeigen. Oliver Ruppel befasst sich in seinem Beitrag "The role of the executive in safeguarding the independence of the judiciary in Namibia" mit möglichen Einfallstoren exekutiver Einflussnahme auf die Rechtsprechung, insbesondere der Ernennung von Richtern, ihrer Bezahlung sowie der sachlichen und finanziellen Ausstattung der Gerichte oder der Aus- übung öffentlichen Drucks auf die Richter nach missliebigen Entscheidungen. Ruppel zeigt gut nachvollziehbar verschiedene Faktoren auf, welche ein unabhängiges Funktionieren der Justiz in einem demokratischen Staat bedingen. Als wesentliches Moment zur Stärkung der Judikative gegenüber den anderen Staatsgewalten sieht er die Prüfungskompetenz exekutiver und legislativer Akte durch die Gerichte. Die namibianische Verfassung sieht zudem

1 Vgl. hierzu auch Thiedemann, Judicial Independence – Eine rechtsvergleichende Untersuchung der Sicherung unabhängiger Rechtsprechung in Südafrika und Deutschland, Baden-Baden (2007), S. 383 ff.

Buchbesprechungen / Book Reviews 301

eine positive Verpflichtung der Exekutive und Legislative vor, die Unabhängigkeit der Gerichte aktiv zu wahren. Nicht zuletzt seien die Gerichte aber auf Akzeptanz und Ver- trauen durch die anderen Staatsgewalten und die Öffentlichkeit angewiesen. In dem Beitrag "Appointing acting judges to the Namibian bench: A useful system or a threat to the independence of the judiary?" behandelt Norman Tjombe sodann ein typisches Dilemma sogenannter Transformationsstaaten, wie es neben Namibia z. B. auch in Süd- afrika zu beobachten ist. Angesichts des Mangels an geeigneten Kandidaten für das Rich- teramt als Nachwirkung der Apartheidspolitik bedienen sich die Gerichte häufig sog. Acting Judges zur vorübergehenden Ausfüllung von Vakanzen oder zur Entscheidung bestimmter Fälle. An den oberen Gerichten Namibias überwiegt die Zahl der Acting Judges die der fest angestellten Richter sogar deutlich. Die gerade der Flexibilität von ad hoc-Ernennungen innewohnende Gefahr exekutiver Einflussnahme auf die Rechtsprechung wird in Namibia dadurch gemindert, dass Acting Judges – wie die übrigen Richter – unter Beteiligung der Judicial Service Commission ernannt werden2. Dies gilt jedoch nicht für die Verlängerung ihrer Amtszeit. Der Autor sucht die Gefahr einer Beeinflussung der Rechtsprechung zudem anhand konkreter Beispiele einer Verlängerung der Amtszeit von Acting Judges nach politisch umstrittenen Entscheidungen zu entkräften. Francois-Xaxier Bangamwabo behandelt in seinem Beitrag "The right to an independent and impartial tribunal: A comparative study of the Namibian judiciary and international judges" sodann die Bedeutung der Unparteilichkeit des Richters und eine gesetzliche bestimmte Gerichtsverfassung für die Unabhängigkeit der Rechtsprechung. Zur Konkreti- sierung der Begrifflichkeiten zieht er die Rechtsprechung ausländischer Jurisdiktionen sowie zwischenstaatlicher Gerichte und des Europäischen Gerichtshofs für Menschenrechte heran, ohne indessen die Unterschiede zwischen staatlicher und zwischenstaatlicher Ge- richtsbarkeit im Hinblick auf ihre Aufgabenbereiche und Legitimation deutlich herauszuar- beiten. Zwei weitere Beiträge dieses Bandes befassen sich schließlich mit der Unabhängigkeit weiterer an der Rechtspflege beteiligter Akteure: Katharina Ruppel-Schlichting stellt in ihrem Beitrag "The independence of the Ombudsman in Namibia" das Amt des namibianischen Ombudsmannes vor, dessen verfassungsrechtlicher Auftrag es ist, als unabhängige Kontrollinstanz die Rechte des Einzelnen gegenüber der Verwaltung und anderen staatlichen Organen oder privaten Institutionen zu wahren. Clive Kavendjii und Nico Horn be- leuchten in ihrem Beitrag "The independence of the legal profession in Namibia" schließ- lich die Unabhängigkeit der Anwaltschaft Namibias, welche seit 1995 nicht mehr der in Common Law Jurisdiktionen üblichen Unterteilung in Advocates und Attorneys folgt, sondern in eine einheitliche Anwaltschaft überführt wurde, um einen gleichen Zugang zu der Anwaltschaft für farbige Kandidaten zu ermöglichen.

2 Dies ist ein Vorteil gegenüber der in Südafrika praktizierten Ernennung durch die Exekutive ohne Beteiligung einer Judicial Service Commission. Vgl. zur Problematik der Acting Judges in Süd- afrika Thiedemann, (ibid), S.168 f., 299 ff.

302 Verfassung und Recht in Übersee VRÜ 42 (2009)

Die Beitragssammlung schließt mit dem Artikel "Legal education and academic freedom in Namibia" von Isabella Skeffers ab, die kritisch hinterfragt, ob das derzeitige juristische Ausbildungssystem Namibias darauf ausgelegt ist, kritisch denkende, in ihrer Ent- scheidungsfindung unabhängige Juristen hervorzubringen. In mangelnder Praxiserfahrung während der Ausbildung sieht sie einen entscheidenden Nachteil zum Beispiel gegenüber dem deutschen juristischen Ausbildungssystem. Obgleich die Konzeption als Beitragssammlung bisweilen zu thematischen Überschnei- dungen und Wiederholungen führt und einige Beiträge etwas oberflächlich und unstruktu- riert bleiben, liefert dieses Buch einen wichtigen Beitrag für die wissenschaftliche Diskus- sion des Verfassungsprinzips der richterlichen Unabhängigkeit in Namibia. Insbesondere mag dieses Buch das Bewusstsein aller am Rechtsprechungsprozess Beteiligter in Namibia stärken, um die noch junge Kultur einer unabhängigen Rechtsprechung weiter herauszubil- den und zu verfestigen. Auch für andere Transformationsstaaten, gerade im Süden Afrikas, sind die Beiträge von Interesse, zumal dieses Thema dort bisher kaum wissenschaftliche Beachtung gefunden hat. Bisweilen vermisst der Leser noch eine prononciertere Meinungs- bildung der Autoren. Aus deutscher Sicht wäre es überdies wünschenswert gewesen, wenn auch die Problematik des gesetzlichen Richters Eingang in die Diskussion gefunden hätte3. Insgesamt aber handelt es sich um ein empfehlenswertes Sammelwerk für alle, die sich mit dem Thema der richterlichen Unabhängigkeit – auch aus rechtsvergleichender Sicht – beschäftigen. Hilke Thiedemann, Hamburg

Wilhelm Röhl (Ed.) History of Law in Japan since 1868 Handbook of Oriental Studies / Handbuch der Orientalistik, Section five: Japan, ed. by M. Blum, R. Kersten, M.F. Low, Volume 12 Leyden / Boston, Brill, 2005, 848 pp., EUR 325.95, ISBN 90-04-13164-7

Das Handbuch der Orientalistik erscheint (im Verlag Brill seit 1952) in verschiedenen Abteilungen und Untergliederungen, die nicht leicht zu überblicken sind. Es behandelt – gemäß der Tradition von Oriental Studies – aus dem Blickwinkel unterschiedlicher Dis- ziplinen „den Orient“, den Nahen und Mittleren Osten, Indien, Zentralasien und Ostasien einschließlich seines Südens. Zahlreiche Standardwerke stehen unter den über 250 Bänden, so „Die Mongolenzeit“ (1948) aus der Feder des Hamburger Orientalisten Bertold Spuler, der unter den ersten Mitherausgebern der Gesamtreihe war, die „Turkologie“ (1963) von

3 Siehe zu Reformvorschlägen für Südafrika in dieser Hinsicht Thiedemann, The „Lawful Judge“ – A Comparative Survey on the Allocation of Cases to Judges in South Africa and Germany, in: Verfassung und Recht in Übersee 36 (2003), S. 228 ff.

Buchbesprechungen / Book Reviews 303

Annemarie von Gabain, viele Werke philologischen Zuschnitts, solche zu Kunst, Archäo- logie, Geistesgeschichte und Philosophie, aber etwa auch die „Chinesische Rechtsge- schichte“ von Oskar Weggel (1980). Der Hamburger Senatsdirektor a.D. Dr. Dr. Wilhelm Röhl, erster Präsident der 1988 gegründeten Deutsch-Japanischen Juristenvereinigung (eine der erfolgreichsten der vielen bilateralen Juristenvereinigungen in Deutschland, Trägerin der weit über Deutschland hinaus bedeutsamen Zeitschrift für Japanisches Recht, die am Hamburger Max-Planck- Institut gestaltet wird), hat durch zahlreiche eigene Veröffentlichungen zum deutsch-japanischen rechtswissenschaftlichen Dialog beigetragen und ihn auch im Übrigen nachhaltig inspiriert. Im Jahre 1959 erschien in den Schriften des Instituts für Asienkunde in Hamburg sein Werk über „Fremde Einflüsse im modernen japanischen Recht“ und auch zu dem Institut, aus dem VRÜ hervorging, und zu Herbert Krüger bestand ein Arbeitszusammen- hang, dokumentiert etwa durch den Band „Die japanische Verfassung“, den Röhl 1963 für die damalige Reihe „Die Staatsverfassungen der Welt in Einzelausgaben“ gestaltet hat. Der vorliegende gewichtige Band ist in Teilen von Wilhelm Röhl selbst verfasst, vor allem das Öffentliche Recht, das Sozialrecht und das Zivilprozessrecht betreffend, auch die Juristenausbildung in Japan. Die weiteren Autoren entstammen dem deutschsprachigen Raum (mit der Ausnahme des am Abschnitt „Commercial and Corporate Law“ beteiligten Eiji Takahashi), viele sind (vorwiegend) Praktiker, aber auch die vielfältig und erstrangig zum japanischen Recht publizierenden Harald Baum und Hans-Peter Marutschke sind unter ihnen. Das Buch ist in verständlichem Englisch geschrieben, gelegentlich mit gewis- sen Zügen eines German English. „Seit 1868“: In jenem Jahr begann die Regentschaft des Tennos Mutsuhito, die sog. Meiji-Zeit, in welcher Japan vom durch die Tokugawa-Shogune geprägten Feudalstaat zu einem modernen Imperium wurde, aus dem dann seine heutige Gestalt erwuchs. Auch die Formen und Inhalte derzeitiger japanischer Demokratie und Rechtsstaatlichkeit, hier verstanden als Gesamtbild des Rechtssystems, wurzeln in jener Zeit. Die Geschicke und Ver- änderungen des Rechts in Japan seit Meiji bis heute behandelt das Buch in der Breite des Rechts und macht dabei zum Motto eine in den Analekten überlieferte Bemerkung des Konfuzius, welcher, etwa gleichsinnig dem Thukydides gesagt haben soll, dass die Erfor- schung der Vergangenheit uns hülfe, die Zukunft zu verstehen. Zwischen Vergangenheit und Zukunft liegt die Gegenwart. Sie, also die aktuellen Rechtslagen, stehen nicht in Zent- rum dieses Buches, sondern in erster Linie die Wege, die zu ihnen geführt haben. Es geht also vor allem um Geschichte als „Vorgeschichte“ des Heutigen, nicht so sehr um das Heutige im Einzelnen oder gar damit verbundene Zukunftsperspektiven. Es werden Gesetz- gebungsakte in ihrer Abfolge beschrieben und reich dokumentiert, mit ihnen verbundene rechtspolitische Kontroversen erklärt, politischen Strömungen und Akteuren zugeordnet, Gründe für Abfolgen besprochen, namentlich die ausländischen Einflüsse auf die japanischen Entwicklungen nachgezeichnet. Schlägt man nach, wie es zu heute geltendem Recht kam und was ihm voranging, so wird man immer fündig. Will man wissen, was heute gilt, so bleibt der Ertrag oft schmal. Etwa Aufschluss über die Bedeutung der Grundrechte im

304 Verfassung und Recht in Übersee VRÜ 42 (2009)

heutigen Japan und die über die Funktionen der Grundrechte und ihre Bedeutung für das Fachrecht geführten Diskussionen findet man wenig, auch nicht über den Stellenwert des Völkerrechts für das japanische Recht oder den theoretisch wie praktisch gerade für Japan so interessanten Fragenkreis des Verfassungswandels angesichts eines seit 1946 zemen- tierten Verfassungstexts. Reinhard Neumann hatte dazu schon 1982 eine von Herbert Krü- ger betreute hochinteressante Dissertation vorgelegt1. Die einzelnen Abschnitte des Buches sind in unterschiedlichem Ausmaß in Auseinandersetzung mit dem japanischen Schrifttum und unter Berücksichtigung der Judikatur erarbeitet und weisen auch den Weg zu einschlä- gigem Schrifttum in westlichen Sprachen. Sie thematisieren alle Hauptgebiete des Rechts, gesondert und umfänglich auch Fragen des geistigen Eigentums, das Arbeits- und Sozial- recht, getrennt vom materiellen Recht schließlich das Prozessrecht. Ein Werk also, das sich nicht als „Einführung in das japanische Recht“ lesen lässt, auch nicht eigentlich als Einführung in seine (moderne) Geschichte, das aber Hinführung ist zu allen wesentlichen Teilgebieten des positiven Rechts in Japan und dies dann mit enzyklo- pädischem Anspruch. Diesen Anspruch mit einem Kollektiv deutschsprachiger Sachkenner in englischer Sprache erfüllt zu haben und damit der Einzelforschung eine Fülle von Mate- rial bereitzustellen, ist ein weiteres großes Verdienst Wilhelm Röhls. Philip Kunig, Berlin

1 „Änderung und Wandlung der japanischen Verfassung“; auf aktuellem Stande dazu ergiebig sind mehrere Beiträge in Wahl (Hrsg.), Verfassungsänderung, Verfassungswandel, Verfassungsinter- pretation, Vorträge bei deutsch-japanischen Symposien 2004 und 2005, erschienen 2008, etwa von Hisao Kuriki und Koji Tonami.

305

BIBLIOGRAPHIE / BIBLIOGRAPHY

Die nachfolgende Literaturauswahl ist erstellt in Zusammenarbeit mit dem Informations- zentrum des Leibniz-Instituts für Globale und Regionale Studien – GIGA – (bis 2005: Deutsches Übersee-Institut – DÜI) Hamburg.*

The following selected bibliography has been compiled in cooperation with the information centre of the German Institute of Global and Area Studies – GIGA – (former German Over- seas Institute – DÜI) Hamburg.**

RECHT UND ENTWICKLUNG ALLGEMEIN / LAW AND DEVELOPMENT IN GENERAL

Faust, Jörg / Messner, Dirk, Entwicklungspolitik als Global Governance-Arena: Governance-Heraus- forderungen und internationale Reformagenda, aus: Sektorale Weltordnungspolitik / Breitmeier, Helmut u.a. (Hrsg.): - Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsges., 2009 - (Eine Welt: Bd. 22), S. 213-233. -ISBN 978-3-8329-4139-0. Kim, Jong Bum / Kim, Joongi, RTAs for development: utilizing territoriality principle exemptions under preferential rules of origin, in: Journal of World Trade (London). 43 (February 2009) 1, S. 153-172. Regionaler Menschenrechtsschutz: Dokumente samt Einführung / Waldemar Hummer u.a. (Hrsg.).- Baden-Baden u.a.: Nomos u.a. , 2009, 1223 S. - ISBN 978-3-8329-1306-9. Senona, Joseph, Negotiating special and differential treatment from Doha to post-Hong Kong: can poor people still benefit?, in: Journal of World Trade (London). 42 (December 2008) 6, S. 1041- 1064.

AFRIKA / AFRICA

Beck, Linda J., Brokering democracy in Africa: the rise of clientelist democracy in Senegal.- New York/N.Y. u.a.: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008, XIII, 280 S. - ISBN 0-230-60283-5. Branch, Daniel / Cheeseman, Nic, Democratization, sequencing, and state failure in Africa: lessons from Kenya, in: African Affairs (Oxford). 108 (January 2009) 430, S. 1-26. Bucyalimwe Mararo, Stanislas, Kivu, RD Congo: les institutions postélectorales face aux multiples pièges de la transition, aus: L'Afrique des Grands Lacs: annuaire 2007-2008 / Centre d'Etude de la

* Diese Bibliographie dient ausschließlich der Information. Die angegebenen Titel können von VRÜ und GIGA nicht geliefert werden. ** This Bibliography serves information purposes only. Neither VRÜ nor GIGA can supply any of the titles listed.

306 Verfassung und Recht in Übersee VRÜ 42 (2009)

Région des Grands Lacs d'Afrique, Université d'Anvers. - 12. - Paris: Harmattan, 2008, S. 197- 219. -ISBN 978-2-296-05320-5. Carbone, Giovanni M., No-party democracy?: Ugandan politics in comparative perspective.- Boul- der/Colo. u.a.: Rienner, 2008, XI, 259 S. - ISBN 978-1-58826-630-9. Drame, Mamadou Alioune, La Cour Suprême de Guinée.- Paris: L'Harmattan, 2008, 100 S. -ISBN 978-2-296-05952-8. Edwards, Tryna, Cooperative governance in South Africa, with specific reference to the challenges of intergovernmental relations, in: Politeia (Pretoria). 27 (2008) 1, S. 65-85. Elischer, Sebastian, Do African parties contribute to democracy?: Some findings from Kenya, Ghana and Nigeria, in: Afrika Spectrum (Hamburg). 43 (2008) 2, S. 175-201. Evangelical Christianity and democracy in Africa / ed. by Terence O. Ranger.- Oxford u.a.: Oxford Univ. Press, 2008, XXX, 267 S. - ISBN 978-0-19-530802-0. Haile, Dadimos, Rwanda's experiment in people's courts (gacaca) and the tragedy of unexamined humanitarianism: a normative/ethical perspective.- Antwerpen: Institute of Development Policy and Management, 2008, 55 S. Human rights in African prisons / ed. by Jeremy Sarkin. Human Sciences Research Council.- Cape Town: HSRC Press, 2008, X, 254 S. - ISBN 978-0-7969-2206-9. Mutua, Makau, Human Rights in Africa: the limited promise of liberalism, in: The African Studies Review (New Brunswick/N.J.). 51 (April 2008) 1, S. 17-39. Niehaus, Inga, Muslime Südafrikas im Spannungsfeld zwischen politischer Beteiligung und Ausgren- zung: Partizipation einer religiösen Minderheit im Demokratisierungsprozess.- Münster u.a.: Waxmann, 2008, 369 S. - ISBN 978-3-8309-1993-3. Nigeria's stumbling democracy and its implications for Africa's democratic movement / ed. by Victor Oguejiofor Okafor. Foreword by Toyin Falola.- Westport/Conn. u.a.: Praeger Security Inter- national, 2008, XVI,190 S. - ISBN 0-313-35586-X. Ramphele, Mamphela, Laying ghosts to rest: dilemmas of the transformation in South Africa.- Cape Town: Tafelberg, 2008, 341 S. - ISBN 978-0-624-04579-3. Refugee rights: ethics, advocacy, and Africa / David Hollenbach, ed.- Washington/D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2008, VII, 264 S. - ISBN 978-1-58901-202-8. Rettig, Max, Gacaca: truth, justice, and reconciliation in postconflict Rwanda?, in: The African Studies Review (New Brunswick/N.J.). 51 (December 2008) 3, S. 25-50. Ruvebana, Etienne, Who is legally responsible for the omission to prevent and/or suppress the genocide of Tutsi (1994) in Rwanda and therefore liable for the reparation for its victims?: An international legal analysis.- [Kigali]: Editions Rwandaises, 2008, VI,115 S. Sebudubudu, David / Molutsi, Partick, Botswana's democracy: explanations for success?, in: Politeia (Pretoria). 27 (2008) 1, S. 47-64. Silva-Leander, Sebastian, On the danger and necessitiy of democratisation: trade-offs between short- term stability and long-term peace in post-genocide Rwanda, in: Third World Quarterly (Basing- stoke). 29 (2008) 8, S. 1601-1620.

Bibliographie / Bibliography 307

Towards the consolidation of Malawi's democracy: papers in honour of the work of Albert Gisy, German Ambassador in Malawi (February 2005 - June 2008) / papers in honour of the work of Albert Gisy u.a. Published by: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung.- Lilongwe: KAS, 2008, IX,102 S.

ASIEN / ASIA

Ahl, Björn, Normative oder semantische Verfassung?: Der Diskurs in der Volksrepublik China um die Vereinbarkeit des Sachenrechtsgesetzes mit der Verfassung, in: Verfassung und Recht in Übersee (Baden-Baden). 41 (2008) 4, S. 477-509. Aswicahyono, Haryo / Bird, Kelly / Hill, Hal, Making economic policy in weak, democratic, post- crisis states: an Indonesian case study, in: World Development (Oxford). 37 (February 2009) 2, S. 354-370. Baum, Harald / Schwittek, Eva, Tradierte Moderne?: Zur Entwicklung, Begrifflichkeit und Bedeutung von Schlichtung und Mediation in Japan, in: Zeitschrift für japanisches Recht (Hamburg). 13 (Herbst 2008) 26, S. 5-31. Butt, Simon / Lindsey, Tim, Economic reform when the consitution matters: Indonesia's constitutional court and article 33, in: Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies (Canberra). 44 (August 2008) 2, S. 239-261. Desposato, Scott W. / Scheiner, Ethan, Governmental centralization and party affiliation: legislator strategies in Brazil and Japan, in: American Political Science Review (New York/N.Y.). 102 (November 2008) 4, S. 509-524. East-Asian democracy and political changes in China: a new goose flying? / Zhengxu Wang u.a. (eds).- Singapore: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, 2008, III, 256 S. - ISBN 978-981-08-1141-9. Fujita, Tokiyasu, Der Stellenwert des Obersten Gerichtshofes in der japanischen Verfassung: was erwartet die Gesellschaft: höchste Fachkenntnisse oder sozialen „Common Sense“?, in: Zeitschrift für japanisches Recht (Hamburg). 13 (Herbst 2008) 26, S. 181-189. Haacke, Jürgen, ASEAN and political change in Myanmar: towards a regional initiative?, in: Con- temporary Southeast Asia (Singapore). 30 (December 2008) 3, S. 351-378. Hafeez, Mahwish, Constituent assembly elections in Nepal, in: Strategic Studies (Islamabad). 28 (Summer-Autumn 2008) 2-3, S. 155-166. He, Kai / Feng, Huiyun, A path to democracy: in search of China's democratization model, in: Asian Perspective (Seoul). 32 (2008) 3, S. 139-169. He, Zengke, Institutional barriers to the development of civil society in China, aus: China's opening society: the non-state sector and governance / ed. by Zheng Yongnian u.a. - London u.a.: Routledge, 2008. - (China Policy Series; 2), S. 161-173. -ISBN 978-0-415-45176-5. Heuser, Robert, Einheitlichkeit oder Pluralismus des Rechts?: Zur „Wiederentdeckung“ des Gewohn- heitsrechts in der VR China, in: China aktuell (Hamburg). 37 (2008) 4, S. 165-182. Holliday, Ian, Voting and violence in Myanmar: nation building for a transition to democracy, in: Asian Survey (Berkeley/Cal.). 48 (November-December 2008) 6, S. 1038-1058. Holmes, James R., A Clausewitzian appraisal of Cross-Strait relations, in: Issues and Studies (Taipei). 44 (December 2008) 4, S. 29-70.

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Howell, Jude A., All-China federation of trades unions beyond reform?: The slow march of direct elections, in: The China Quarterly (London). (December 2008) 196, S. 845-863. Jacka, Tamara, Increasing women's participation in village government in China: is it worth it?, in: Critical Asian Studies (Cedar/Mich.). 40 (December 2008) 4, S. 499-529. Jansen, David, Relations among security and law enforcement institutions in Indonesia, in: Contem- porary Southeast Asia (Singapore). 30 (December 2008) 3, S. 429-454. Jun, Bong-geun, Scenarios for power change in North Korea, in: Korea Focus (Seoul). 16 (Winter 2008) 4, S. 95-106. Junge, Johannes Fabian, Verpasste Chancen, unerfüllte Versprechen: der ad hoc-Menschengerichts- hof zu den Verbrechen in Tanjung Priok 1984.- Berlin u.a.: Watch Indonesia! u.a. , 2008, 46 S. Kim, Kap-shik, Suryong's direct rule and the political regime in North Korea under Kim Jong Il, in: Asian Perspective (Seoul). 32 (2008) 3, S. 87-109. Krishnamurthy, Vivek, Colonial cousins: explaining India and Canada's unwritten constitutional principles, in: The Yale Journal of International Law (New Haven/Conn.). 34 (Winter 2009) 1, S. 207-239. Lu, Yiyi, NGOs in China: development dynamics and challenges, aus: China's opening society: the non-state sector and governance / ed. by Zheng Yongnian u.a. - London u.a.: Routledge, 2008. - (China Policy Series; 2), S. 89-105. -ISBN 978-0-415-45176-5. Matsumoto, Kazuhiko, Grundrechtlicher Umweltschutz in Japan, in: Verfassung und Recht in Übersee (Baden-Baden). 41 (2008) 4, S. 467-476. Menzel, Jörg, Domestizierung des Leviathan?: Südostasiens Verfassungen und ASEAN's neues Homogenitätskriterium demokratischer Verfassungsstaatlichkeit, in: Verfassung und Recht in Übersee (Baden-Baden). 41 (2008) 4, S. 534-559. Michelutti, Lucia, The vernacularisation of democracy: politics, caste and religion in India.- London u.a.: Routledge, 2008, XXI, 253 S. - ISBN 978-0-415-46732-2. Mitra, Subrata K., When area meets theory: dominance, dissent, and democracy in India, in: Interna- tional Political Science Review (London). 29 (November 2008) 5, S. 557-578. Munro, Neil, Democracy postponed: Chinese learning from the Soviet collapse, in: China aktuell (Hamburg). 37 (2008) 4, S. 31-61. Naumann, Kolja, Korean constitutional law confronted with the possibility of reunification, in: Ver- fassung und Recht in Übersee (Baden-Baden). 41 (2008) 4, S. 510-533. Neighbors, Jennifer M., The long arm of Qing law?: Qing dynasty homicide rulings in Republican courts, in: Modern China (Newbury Park/Cal.). 35 (January 2009) 1, S. 3-37. Ngo Tak-wing / Chen, Yi-chi, The genesis of responsible government under authoritarian conditions: Taiwan during martial law, in: China Review (Hong Kong). 8 (Fall 2008) 2, S. 15-48. Ocko, Jonathan K., State, sovereignty, and the people: a comparison of the “Rule of Law” in China and India, in: The Journal of Asian Studies (Ann Arbor/Mich.). 68 (February 2009) 1, S. 55-100. Okuda, Yasuhiro / Nasu, Hitoshi, Constitutionality of the Japanese Nationality Act: a commentary on the supreme court’s decision on 4 June 2008, in: Zeitschrift für japanisches Recht (Hamburg). 13 (Herbst 2008) 26, S. 101-116.

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Olberg, Susanne, Die japanische Notstandsgesetzgebung, in: Zeitschrift für japanisches Recht (Ham- burg). 13 (Herbst 2008) 26, S. 117-138. Pedersen, Morten B., Promoting human rights in Burma: a critique of Western sanctions policy.- Lanham/Md. u.a.: Rowman & Littlefield Publ., 2008, XIII, 296 S. - ISBN 0-7425-5559-3. Rise of the plebeians?: The changing face of Indian legislative assemblies / eds. Christophe Jaffrelot u.a. .- London u.a.: Routledge, 2009, XXXVI, 494 S. - ISBN 978-0-415-46092-7. Schucher, Günter, Harmonisierung per Gesetz: Arbeitskonflikte in China und das neue Arbeitskon- fliktgesetz, in: China aktuell (Hamburg). 37 (2008) 4, S. 63-109. Shambaugh, David, Training China's political elite: the party school system, in: The China Quarterly (London). (December 2008) 196, S. 827-844. Stares, Paul B. / Wit, Joel S., Preparing for sudden change in North Korea.- New York/N.Y.: Council on Foreign Relations, 2009, XIV, 52 S. - ISBN 978-0-87609-426-6. Suzuki, Hidemi, Rundfunk- und Presserecht in Japan: aktuelle Probleme, in: Verfassung und Recht in Übersee (Baden-Baden). 41 (2008) 4, S. 450-466.

NAHER UND MITTLERER OSTEN / NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST

Abghari, Adineh, Introduction to the Iran legal system and the protection of human rights in Iran.- London: British Institute of International and Comparative Law, 2008, 286 S. - ISBN 978-1- 905221-37-0. Abiad, Nisrine, Sharia, Muslim states and international human rights treaty obligations: a comparative study.- London: British Institute of International and Comparative Law, 2008, XXII, 240 S. - ISBN 978-1-905221-41-7. Caught in crossfire: civilians in conflicts in the Middle East / ed. by P. R. Kumaraswamy.- Reading: Ithaca Press, 2008, XXIX, 242 S. - ISBN 978-0-86372-334-6. Coufoudakis, Van, International aggression and violations of human rights: the case of Turkey in Cyprus.- Minnesota/Minn.: Univ. of Minnesota, 2008, X, 139 S. - ISBN 978-0-9791218-2-1. Domestic and international perspectives on Kyrgyzstan's 'Tulip Revolution': motives, mobilization and meanings / guest ed.: Sally N. Cummings, in: Central Asian Survey (Abingdon). 27 (September- December 2008) 3-4, Special Issue, S. 221-378. Ergasev, Bachodyr, Parliamentary opposition in Central Asia: progress, problems and prospects, in: Central Asia and the Caucasus (Lulea). (2008) 5/53, S. 29-39. [The ICC prosecutor's request for an arrest warrant against Sudanese President Al Bashir] / Andrew T. Cayley u.a. , in: Journal of International Criminal Justice (Oxford). 6 (November 2008) 5, S. 829- 897. Joffé, George, Democracy in the Muslim world, aus: The international politics of democratization: comparative perspectives / Nuno Severiano Teixeira (ed.). - Abingdon: Routledge, 2008. - ISBN 978-0-415-45303-5 . (Routledge research in comparative politics; 21), S. 167-178. -ISBN 978-0- 415-45303-5. Karmazina, Lydia, Institutionalization of the party system in Kazakhstan and Russia: a comparative analysis, in: Central Asia and the Caucasus (Lulea). (2008) 6/54, S. 141-154.

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Khanin, Vladimir, Israel's "Russian" parties, aus: Contemporary Israel: domestic policy, foreign policy, and the security challenges / ed. by Robert O. Freedman. - Boulder/Colo.: Westview Press, 2009, S. 97-114. -ISBN 978-0-8133-4385-3. Koch, Cordelia, Verfassung im Kraftfeld von Krieg und Frieden: von der konkurrenz- zur konkor- danzdemokratischen Verfassung im Libanon.- Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsges., 2009, 347 S. - ISBN 978-3-8329-3646-4. Lahav, Pnina, Israel's Supreme Court, aus: Contemporary Israel: domestic policy, foreign policy, and the security challenges / ed. by Robert O. Freedman. - Boulder/Colo.: Westview Press, 2009, S. 135-158. -ISBN 978-0-8133-4385-3. Liverani, Andrea, Civil society in Algeria: the political functions of associational life.- London u.a.: Routledge, 2008, XVI, 224 S. - ISBN 978-0-415-77583-0. Milton-Edwards, Beverley, The ascendance of political Islam: Hamas and consolidation in the Gaza Strip, in: Third World Quarterly (Basingstoke). 29 (2008) 8, S. 1585-1599. Moroni, Ferminia, Le costituzioni della Repubblica Islamica dell'Iran, in: Oriente moderno (Roma). N.S. 88 (2008) 1, S. 109-136. Ouaissa, Rachid, Der Aufstieg islamistischer Parteien, in: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte (Bonn). (17. November 2008) 47, S. 40-45. Perthes, Volker, Is the Arab world immune to democracy?, in: Survival (Abingdon). 50 (December 2008-January 2009) 6, S. 151-160. Rohe, Mathias, Das islamische Recht: Geschichte und Gegenwart.- München: Beck, 2009, XV,606 S. - ISBN 978-3-406-57955-4. Sabra, Martina, On the way to improved legal reality: strategies and instruments used to tackle discrimination against women in the Arab world.- Eschborn: Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit, 2008, 55 S. Sandler, Shmuel / Kampinsky, Aaron, Israel's religious parties, aus: Contemporary Israel: domestic policy, foreign policy, and the security challenges / ed. by Robert O. Freedman. - Boulder/Colo.: Westview Press, 2009, S. 77-95. -ISBN 978-0-8133-4385-3. Schimmelfennig, Frank / Scholtz, Hanno, EU democracy promotion in the European neighbourhood: political conditionality, economic development and transnational exchange, in: European Union Politics (London). 9 (2008) 2, S. 187-215. Sheikh, Nusrat, Die Richterbewegung in Pakistan: wieviel gewonnen - wieviel verloren?, in: INAMO (Berlin). 14 (Winter 2008) 56, S. 16-17. Sick, Gary, The Republic and the Rahbar, in: The National Interest (Washington/D.C.). (January- February 2009) 99, S. 10-20. Suhrke, Astri, Democratizing a dependent state: the case of Afghanistan, aus: War and democratization: legality, legitimacy and effectiveness / ed. by Wolfgang Merkel u.a. - London u.a.: Routledge, 2009, S. 174-192. -ISBN 978-0-415-48087-1. Tolipov, Farchod Fazilovič, Uzbekistan: Soviet syndrome in the state, society, and ideology, in: Central Asia and the Caucasus (Lulea). (2008) 6/54, S. 127-141. Water as a human right for the Middle East and North Africa / ed. by Asit K. Biswas u.a. .- London u.a.: Routledge u.a. , 2008, IX,191 S. - ISBN 0-415-44584-1.

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LATEINAMERIKA / LATIN AMERICA

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Call for Papers

»Verfassung und Recht in Übersee« ist eine Vierteljahresschrift für Fragen der Verfassungs- und Rechtsentwicklung der Staaten Asiens, Afrikas und Lateinamerikas. In ihr werden ebenfalls die internationalen, insbesondere regionalen Beziehungen dieser Staaten behandelt. Die Zeitschrift lädt alle, die an der Entwicklung dieser Kontinente interessiert sind, besonders die Wissenschaftler aus diesen Regionen, ein, sich an der Diskussion zu beteiligen. »Verfassung und Recht in Übersee« is a Quarterly concerned with the various aspects of consti tutional and legal development in the Asian, African and Latin American countries. It also deals with the international and particularly the regional relations of these countries. Everyone interested in the development of these continents, particularly scholars from these regions, are invited to take part in the discussion. »Verfassung und Recht in Übersee« est une revue trimestrielle consacrée aux questions de l’évolution constitutionnelle et juridique des pays d’Asie, d’Afrique et d’Amérique Latine. Dans cette revue on étudiera également les rapports internationaux, surtout les rapports régionaux, de ces Etats. La revue invite tous ceux qui s’intéressent au développement de ces continents, notamment les spécialistes des régions en question, à participer à la discussion. »Verfassung und Recht in Übersee« es una revista trimestral consagrada al estudio de cuestiones sobre el desarrollo constitucional y jurídico en Asia, Africa y Latinoamérica, dedicando asimismo su atención a las relaciones internacionales y, especialmente, regionales de cada área. La revista invita a todos los que se interesen por cuestiones relativas al desarrollo en estos continentes, y en especial a los investigadores de cada área, a participar en las discusiones.

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Zitiervorschlag: VRÜ 42 (2009) S. 80 Impressum

VERFASSUNG UND RECHT IN ÜBERSEE A Quarterly on Law and Politics in Africa, Asia, Latin America www.verfassung-und-recht.de Redaktion: Dr. Karl-Andreas Hernekamp (Verantwortlich i.S.d.P.); Dr. Philipp Dann; Dr. Sigrid Boysen; Carola Hausotter; Prof. Dr. Palamagamba Kabudi; Wolfgang Keßler; Dr. Andrea Kramer; Dr. Julia Lehmann; Ulf Marzik; Anna Chadidscha Schuhmann. E-mail: [email protected] Sekretariat: Traute Kroesche, Universität Hamburg, Institut f. Internat. Angelegen heiten, Schlüterstr. 28, 20146 Hamburg. Tel. (00 49) 40 / 4 28 38 – 46 01; Fax: – 62 62; E-mail: [email protected] Satz: Scribus Textverarbeitung Susanne Elpel, Hamburg. Druck und Verlag: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG, Waldseestraße 3-5, D-76530 Baden-Baden, Telefon (00 49) 72 21 / 21 04 - 0, Fax (00 49) 72 21 / 21 04 - 27 Anzeigen: sales friendly Verlagsdienstleistungen, Siegburger Str. 123, 53229 Bonn, Telefon (00 49) 2 28 / 97 89 80, Fax (00 49) 2 28 / 9 78 98 20, E-mail: [email protected] Die Zeitschrift sowie alle Texte und Abbildungen sind urheberrechtlich geschützt. Jede nicht ausdrücklich vom Urheberrechtsgesetz zugelassene Verwertung bedarf der vorherigen Zustimmung der Herausgeber bzw. des Verlages. Namentlich gekennzeichnete Artikel müssen nicht die Meinung der Herausgeber/ Redaktion wiedergeben. Unverlangt eingesandte Manuskripte – für die keine Haftung übernommen wird – gelten als Veröffentlichungsvorschlag zu den Bedingungen der Herausgeber. Es werden nur unveröffentlichte Originalarbeiten angenommen. Nicht sinnentstellende redaktionelle Bearbeitung bleibt vorbehalten. Erscheinungsweise: viermal jährlich Bezugspreis 2009: Jahresabonnement 89,– €, für Studierende (gegen Studien bescheinigung) und Referendare 59,– €; Einzelheft: 25,– €. In unregelmäßiger Folge erscheinen Beihefte zu VRÜ, auf deren Einzelpreis VRÜ-Abonnenten Preisnach- lässe erhalten. Alle Preise inkl. MwSt., zzgl. Vertriebs-/Direktbeorderungsgebühren. Bestellungen nehmen der Buchhandel und der Verlag entgegen. Abbestellungen mit Drei-Monats-Frist zum Ende des Kalenderjahres. Zahlungen jeweils im Voraus an: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Postbank Karlsruhe, Konto 73636-751 (BLZ 660 100 75) oder Stadtsparkasse Baden-Baden, Konto 5-002266 (BLZ 662 500 30).