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THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TRADITIONAL AND CONTEMPORARY ISLAMIST POLITICAL THOUGHT Sherko Kirmanj*

This article discusses links between the political theories and ideas of medieval and modern Islamists, showing how the latter is a continuation of the former’s writings. It also shows how episodes of Islamist thought have coincided with both external conflicts with non-Muslim powers and internal ones with local regimes.

Political Islamism has often, though not invention.”6 Samir Amin claims that Islamists always, been treated as a relatively new are not interested in theology and never refer phenomenon. By the same token, to the classical theologians, and in a similar examinations of Medieval Islamic political vein Bassam Tibi argues that notions of the thought, like those of Montgomery Watt and “Islamic state” and “God’s rule” are recent Ann Lambton, look at this factor in its own additions to Islamic thought.7 historical context.1 There are exceptions, of To evaluate these various interpretations, course, as with Hrair Dekmejian who studied this article reviews the writings of traditional the historical cyclic responses of radical Islamists and compares them with the concepts Islamism,2 while Antony Black has traced the and approaches used by twentieth-century broad history of Islamic political thought.3 Islamists. These are important issues. To What is both interesting and useful at present understand better the new phenomenon it is is to take a broader view of Islamist political necessary to unravel the historical roots of thinking over time and the relationship Islamism and extremism, a heritage which is between various waves of its development. very much connected to present-day ideas and Researchers identify very different movements. contributory factors, including a response to Economic factors (such as poverty) and economic crises or social dislocation; a sociopolitical factors (such as democracy and reaction to authoritarianism; national shame political legitimacy) have historically stemming from Arab military defeats; crises of contributed to the emergence of Islamism. national identity, quests for national This article argues, however, that perceived authenticity; the desire for legitimating military and cultural invasions have been the authority; and disillusionment with the failures primary causes of Islamism and extremism of Western-inspired government (whether both past and present. Evidence for this lies in liberal democratic or Soviet-influenced) to the coincidence of past waves of Islamism deal with their societies’ problems.4 with such events. It should be noted, of course, One scholar states that Islamism is a that such developments are common in product of “the failure of authoritarian regional history--and did not always produce nationalist governments, and the socio- this reaction--and thus these factors alone do economic divisions that have been exacerbated not explain the phenomenon but they are of by neo-liberal globalization.”5 Another view is great significance in its timing and shaping. propounded by Nazih Ayubi, who asserts that Listed chronologically, some of the most present-day Islamism does not represent a extreme Islamists included return to any situation that existed in the past (780-855), Taqi al-Din Ibn Taymiyya (1263- or to any former theories but, rather, “is a new 1328), Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya (1292- 1350),

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Muhammad Abd al-Wahhab (1703–1792), LINKS BETWEEN TRADITIONALIST Hassan al-Banna (1906-1949), Abul A’la AND CONTEMPORARY ISLAMISTS Mawdudi (1903-1979), and Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966). The element common to all of The link and/or parallel between these two these writers was their hostility to the military groups will be investigated on the basis of and/or cultural invasions of their time. such common concepts as salafiyya (return to For Ibn Hanbal, the Mu’tazila movement of predecessors); sovereignty; that period was a rationalist ideology comprehensiveness and universalism; forms of stemming from Greek philosophy, and as Islamic government, state and religion; jihad; such, he perceived it to be a serious challenge takfir (repentance); and the status of women to Muslim orthodoxy (see below for details). and non- in . The persecution Four centuries later the Mongol invasion that individual Islamists have experienced and prompted Ibn Taymiyya and his student, Ibn the sociopolitical issues that Islamists and Qayyim, to preach extreme ideas. Similarly, their communities have faced (such as cultural the primary concern for Mawdudi (leader of and military invasions) will also be explored the Jamaat-e-Islami organization) and al- to identify the development patterns of Islamic Banna (head of the Egyptian Muslim extremism. Similarities will be explored Brotherhood) was the desire to rid and regarding possible links and/or parallels of British domination.8 More recently, between their political theories. Muslim nations have experienced early twentieth-century colonization by European Salafiyya powers, the Palestine issue, the Soviet invasion of , and the U.S.-led Salafiyya is a call for “a return to true invasion of Afghanistan and ; in each of Islam” as practiced by the first generation of these cases the emergence of Islamism is quite Muslims in the seventh century. Advocates of evident. salafiyya believe that only by returning to the Invasions--whether military or cultural--are “true Islam” of the salaf (ancestors) can seen by Islamists as evil forces supplanting Muslims fight the immorality, foreign values true Muslim religious and cultural values. In and practices, and domination by others. Both addition to military and cultural invasions, it is types of Islamists argue that past solutions argued here that the harsh treatment of Muslim should be implemented to address ulama and activists at the hands of authorities contemporary problems, based on the has been yet another contributing factor in the authority of tradition, and they look to the production of extreme ideas and writings. As salaf’s practices and texts as being sacred and noted above, poverty, illiteracy, injustice, and equal to the main Islamic sources.9 the absence of democracy provide conditions Traditional Islamists: Abu Hamid al- which make extremist ideas more readily Ghazali (1058-1111) argues that a caliphate is acceptable to frustrated people. an indispensable institution of Muslim life and The word Islamism here includes any is “demanded by the ijmaa (consensus) of the attempt by Muslim individuals or movements community.”10 (1332-1406) to use Islam’s main sources, the Koran, the expressed the view that a caliphate was Sunna, and Islamic jurisprudence, as the necessary because Muhammad’s Companions foundations for political theories and and the second generation of Muslims saw it ideologies. The term Islamist is used here to to be necessary.11 By the same token, Ibn refer to Muslim activists in the political sphere Taymiyya insisted on the implementation of who seek a religiously based government and Shari’a (Islamic laws), and he called it the policies in governance. project of Islam. He believed that it had originally been achieved by the righteous caliphs and that it could be achieved again, though it would require other instruments.12

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Contemporary Islamists: Mawdudi, who writings are embellished with stories and could be considered the father of this group, narratives of the salaf. argues that no mujtahid (qualified person on theological matters in Islam) should ever lose Sovereignty and Authority sight of--or proceed independently of--the guidance given by the four Muslim jurists: Though the exact definition of sovereignty (699-767), (716-795), Shafi’i has varied across history, it has the core (767-820) and (780-855).13 Similarly, meaning of supreme authority within a Qutb suggests that Muslims will not be territory. A government is sovereign in that its masters of their own destiny unless they walk institutions have the power to set the laws and in the footsteps of the first generation of regulations in the territory it rules as it wishes, Muslims.14 Likewise, Yusuf al-Qaradawi within the context of previous state law. It is at (1926- ) stresses the same line and says that this point that the modern concept of individuals cannot interpret the Koran as they sovereignty clashes with notions of wish, but should apply principles and sovereignty as understood by Islamists. fundamentals compiled by previous religious Islamists such as Mawdudi, Qutb, Khomeini leaders.15 and Shari’ati have argued that “the basic In light of these and other views they have distinction between Western polity and held, it is clear that both traditional and Islamic polity is that while the former places contemporary Islamists regard the acts and sovereignty in either the state or in man practices of the four “rightly guided” caliphs through the notion of popular sovereignty, the (Abu Bakr, Umar, Uthman, and ) and the latter places it absolutely in God.”19 Modern- first and second generations of Muslims as day Islamists assert that all sovereignty stems another source of their political theories and from God, and the contemporary use of the view them as shining models of ideal Muslim concept of God’s sovereignty started after the rulers and believers. For example, the clash between the then Egyptian and Pakistani appointment of a caliph is regarded as an authorities and the representatives of the essential part of Islamist political theory and is Islamist movements, such as Jamaat-e-Islami based on what is called the ijmaa of in and the Muslim Brotherhood in Muhammad’s companions. This is evident in Egypt. al-Ghazali’s argument on the necessity of the However, the concept of the sovereignty of caliphate, for he believes that a caliphate is God is not something new in the Islamist necessary because “it is of advantage and lexicon and has been used by traditional keeps away damage in the world.” He stresses Islamists for centuries. that a caliphate “is an indispensable institution Traditional Islamists: Al-Ghazali stresses of Muslim life.”16 the concept of the absolute sovereignty of The ijmaa of Muhammad’s companions God, and he considers the sovereignty of God has similar significance for the two groups. to be even more important than God’s unity.20 Both al-Ghazali and al-Qaradawi argue that Yet he was not the only one to use the concept the appointment of a caliph for the salaf was of sovereignty, for after the collapse of the more important than the burial of in 1258, it was no longer Muhammad’s body.17 Both sides show possible for Islamists, like Ibn Taymiyya, to deference to tradition, this being important promulgate the fiction of the obligatory nature because, as pointed out by John Hawley, of a universal caliphate as his predecessors within all religions there are powerful had done. Therefore, Ibn Taymiyya sought a traditions which emphasize stories, narratives, new foundation for the state, starting from the personalities, and lives instead of codes, basis that absolute sovereignty belongs to precepts, and lectures.18 Both traditional and God. For Ibn Taymiyya, the only source of contemporary Islamists adopted this sovereignty and authority is God. According methodology to elaborate their ideas, and their to this doctrine, Muslims consider God to be

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the absolute leader because, as Ibn Taymiyya were using the slogan “la hukm illa li-llah” argues, the will of God was passed to (the judgment is God’s alone)--meaning that Muhammad through a revelation and so must all political decisions must be based on the be treated as a divine law. Thus, God is the words of God.32 sole bearer of sovereignty.21 In light of the above discussion, it is Contemporary Islamists: Mawdudi has apparent that the concept of God’s sovereignty stated the view that God is the sole sovereign was introduced and used by traditional over all creatures,22 and he has subsequently Islamists long before its use by contemporary been supported by Qutb who insists on “no Islamists and for an almost identical political sovereignty except God’s, no law except from purpose. God, and no authority of one man over another, as the authority in all respects belong Comprehensiveness and Universalism; the to God.”23 Furthermore, he suggests, Superiority of Islam “Without… the concept of a higher authority (God’s sovereignty), all values remain In the religious context, universalism is a unstable.”24 This approach to the concept of theological doctrine that all human beings sovereignty, by Sunni Islamists, is identical to eventually will be saved. For Islamists, that of the Shi’a, the Iranian Shi’a leaders, salvation will come only by Islam. Islamists even incorporating it into their national argue this because of their belief in Islam’s constitution, which states, “absolute comprehensive nature. The question to be sovereignty over the world and man belongs to considered in this section is not the claim of God.”25 The issue of sovereignty is very the comprehensive nature of Islam but to important to Muslim theologians. Ibn al- determine whether both groups of Islamists Muqaffa (724-759) insisted that if a have assumed that Islam incorporates the government does not implement the concepts of comprehensiveness and requirements revealed in the Koran and Sunna, universality.33 This will shed further light on it does not merit obedience.26 Indeed this the links between traditional and question has been of central significance since contemporary Islamist political theories. the establishment of the Islamic faith, for Traditional Islamists: Ibn Taymiyya argues instance during the turbulent debates between that Islam is superior to the other two revealed Mu’tazilis and Orthodoxies.27 It reached a religions (Judaism and Christianity) because critical point, with Ibn Hanbal asserting that the latter proclaim religion without striving to one “should only obey rulers who observe the achieve “the conditions necessary for its correct religious regulations.”28 Thereafter, existence: power, jihad, [and] material Ibn Khaldun argued on similar lines; he resources.”34 Furthermore, he believes that the stressed that if a religious state is not operating political organization of the Muslim according to the rule of the Shari’a then community “is superior to that of any state.”35 subjects are under no obligation to give their Ibn Khaldun, like Ibn Taymiyya, believes in allegiance to such a government.29 the superiority of Islam over other divinely After nearly seven hundred years, Mawdudi revealed religions, and in his well-known used exactly the same argument against book, The Muqaddimah, he states: political authorities in the Indian subcontinent when he called on Muslims to disobey any In the Muslim community, the holy laws that are not from God as He is the only war is a religious duty, because of the legislator.30 It has been argued that Mawdudi universalism of the Muslim mission and Qutb were the first to use the concept of and the obligation to convert everyone hakimiyya ilahiyya (God’s sovereignty), but to Islam either by persuasion or by this was clearly not the case, for as early as the force…. The other religious groups did reign of Ali (the fourth caliph, r. 656-661), the not have a universal mission, and the Khawarijis (literally “those who go out”)31 holy war was not a religious duty to

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them, save only for the purpose of Similar arguments can be seen in the defence.… They [ and ] writings of leading Iranian Shi’a figure, are merely required to establish their Ayatollah Mutahhari, who sees Islam as religion among their own people.36 superior to other religions. He dismisses Christianity as comprising merely a few moral Furthermore, Ibn Khaldun places Muslim teachings while Islam is “a religion that sees religious laws above all other laws because he its duty and commitment to form an Islamic believes them to be more comprehensive, as state. Islam came to reform society and to they touch both worldly and spiritual affairs.37 form a nation and government. Its mandate is This notion of superiority was endorsed by the reform of the whole world.”43 For Abd al-Wahhab (who can be considered a Islamists, Islam is not only a religion, it is a bridge between traditional and contemporary comprehensive system to govern all public, Islamists) who asserted that the Islamic umma social, and political life. (nation) represented the pinnacle of excellence in comparison to other religions.38 The Necessity of Islamic Government Contemporary Islamists: According to Mawdudi, Islam has defined and established Before exploring the links between essential universal rights not only for Muslims traditional and contemporary Islamists in but for humanity as a whole. On this basis, regard to the necessity of an Islamic then, he encouraged “revivalists” to initiate a government and social order, several points universal movement. He pointed out that the need to be clarified. First, this is a very aim of such a movement is to enable Islam to important subject because it is one of the basic become a superpower and a cultural principles used by Islamists to politicize their hegemonic force to capture the moral and faith. Second, it is essential to note that the intellectual political leadership of mankind.39 terminology used by traditionalists and that In addition, neo-Islamists believe that Islamic used by contemporary Islamists is slightly principles and practices are capable of solving different. For example, traditional Islamists all of the problems of human life. They argue used caliphate or imamate as the main political that the Islamic system extends into all aspects and religious institutions in the Islamic state, of life; it discusses all minor and major affairs while contemporary Islamists have adopted of mankind; it provides order to human affairs; modern terms such as “state” and it is not only comprehensive and perfect, but “parliament.” also realistic and constructive.40 Traditional Islamists: Ali bin Muhammad This comparison of the views of al-Mawardi (974-1058) stated that “God… traditionalists and neo-Islamists demonstrates ordained the caliphate of the Prophet through a strong link between early and contemporary whom He protected the people; and He Islamists in their approach to the concepts of entrusted government to him, so that the universalism and comprehensiveness. The management of affairs should proceed [on the acceptance of the comprehensive and basis of] right religion… and affairs of universalistic nature of Islam led them to common interest were made stable.”44 believe in the superiority of their faith over all Regarding the necessity of government, Ibn others. For example, Qutb insists that “all Taymiyya (in his political treatise al-Siyyasa humanity is in need to us; to our beliefs; to our al-Shar’iyya) bases his argument on two principles; to our laws and our system.”41 He verses in the Koran. The first verse reads, states that it is the duty of Islam to annihilate “Surely Allah commands you to make over all other systems because they are not only trusts to their owners and that when you judge obstacles in the way of universal freedom, but between people you judge with justice; surely also other societies do not give Muslims any Allah admonishes you with what is excellent; opportunity to organize according to their own surely Allah is Seeing, Hearing.” The second methods.42 verse is: “Oh you who believe! Obey Allah

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and obey the Messenger and those in authority section this argument will be further from among you; then if you quarrel about illustrated. anything, refer it to Allah and the Messenger, if you believe in Allah and the last day; this is State and Religion: Politicization of Islam better and very good in the end.”45 For Ibn Taymiyya, governing the affairs of Both traditional and neo-Islamists believe the Muslim community is a religious in the inseparability of state and religion. In requirement, because religion--without control the following section this concept is not of government--cannot survive, and he debated, however, their respective notions of believes that the exercise of authority is a state and religion, and the conditions that have religious function.46 Enforcing Islamic law is been laid down for Islamic rule by both seen by Ibn Taymiyya to be another reason for traditional and contemporary Islamists, will be an Islamic form of government, and he bases examined for possible links. this on the belief that God ordered the Muslim Traditional Islamists: Al-Mawardi and Ibn community to “enjoin the good and forbid Taymiyya identified the duties of the caliph as evil.” He says, “People are in need of a book follows: to maintain the religion, to execute to guide them, and a victorious sword; the judgment between claimants, to protect the book represents justice and the sword house of Islam, to implement Shari’a, to guard represents force, and human life depends on the frontiers, to undertake jihad, to appoint both of them.”47 Another traditionalist, Ibn advisors, to collect taxes, to pay salaries, and Qayyim al-Jawziyya (1292- 1350) also argued to oversee community affairs personally, to that politics is part of religion, and government lead the Friday prayer, the performance of is founded on the justice of God and pilgrimage, and the celebration of religious Muhammad.48 festivals.51 Contemporary Islamists: Fear of waning It is obvious that for traditionalists the Islamic values and the need for Shari’a are caliph and the institution of the caliphate are seen by neo-Islamists as the main reasons for seen to be the bearers of all state duties-- having an Islamic state. Without a state, Qutb legislative, executive, and judicial. It is argues, all values are unstable, and similarly noteworthy that of all these duties only a few the morals based on those values remain are religious. Additionally, al-Ghazali adds as unstable.49 More significantly, in regard to the duties to be commander of the Muslim army links and similarities between contemporary and leader of all formal religious Islamist political theory and traditional observances.52 As regards the qualifications Islamist political ideas, al-Qaradawi and Abd for being appointed caliph, most traditionalists al-Karim Zedan, two leading contemporary have stressed that he should be a just person, Islamist theoreticians, have used the same possess religious knowledge, and be able to argument espoused by Ibn Taymiyya to justify make independent judgments on points of law; the establishment of Islamic government (see in other words, to be mujtahid. Also, he has to above).50 be a mature male and a Muslim.53 It is clear from the above passages that both In regard to the relationship between traditional and contemporary Islamists believe religion and state, in his major work on that the establishment of an Islamic state is politics, al-Ahkam al-Sultaniyya (The vital because, as they claim, the existence of Ordinances of Government), al-Mawardi religion and the world are both dependant on conceives of the caliphate as a form of the existence of a government, or more government that safeguards the ordinances of precisely, an Islamic order. This highlights the Shari’a and its implementation. Moreover, another parallel between the political theory of al-Ghazali also argued that religion and power traditional and neo-Islamists and is an were, from the beginning, “indissolubly indication that the process of politicization of interrelated.” In a similar vein, Ibn Taymiyya Islam is an old phenomenon. In the next insists that state and religion are inseparable,

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because their separation eventually leads to observes Islamic rituals. In the view of that dissension.54 By the same token, Abd al- organization, the only solution for believers is Wahhab argues that Islam forbids “separating to flee the community and call for jihad the religion from any matters of life, including against it. politics and law.”55 Traditional Islamists: The concept of jihad Contemporary Islamists: Concerning the has been used since the earliest years of the question of state and religion, the only religion. Indeed, the use of jihad and takfir difference between contemporary Islamists precedes the appearance of jurists, ulama, and and traditionalists is that the former use the traditional Islamists. For example, shortly after term “Islamic state” instead of “caliphate”; but Muhammad’s death, the Khawarijis justified they, too, list the above-mentioned duties of their fight against Caliph Ali, whom they caliph, including the need to safeguard the considered to be an infidel because, they said, Muslim community and to implement he transgressed Islamic precepts. They Shari’a.56 Like the traditionalists, al-Qaradawi considered all non-Khawarijis (and even those and al-Banna both argue that a Muslim ruler Khawarijis who had not joined their camp) as must be a scholar in Shari’a, and his mushrikun (polytheists) and kuffar ().59 knowledge of Islamic regulations needs to be A similar argument was developed by Ibn equivalent to that of a mujtahid.57 Taymiyya against the Tatars, for although that Likewise, Mawdudi identifies the group had embraced Islam, he denounced qualifications for rulers and office bearers. He them as apostates because they failed to suggests that they have to possess those implement fully the Shari’a. Ibn Taymiyya’s qualities prescribed by Islam, such as to be a strict and literal interpretation of the Koran Muslim, male, adult, and a citizen of an established him as the pioneer of Islamic Islamic state.58 It is evident that the extremism. He was one of the first Islamists to qualifications identified by contemporary introduce the notion of migration from the Islamists are almost identical to those of House of Infidels to the House of Islam.60 He traditional Islamists. However, it is relevant to also believed that all lawful warfare was point out that when Mawdudi says those essentially jihad, and since its aim was to “qualities prescribed by Islam,” he refers to assert the supremacy of God’s word, those the ones prescribed by traditionalists, because who stood in the way of this aim must be neither the Koran nor the Sunna defined the fought.61 necessary qualities. One of Ibn Taymiyya’s students, Ibn Qayyim, meticulously followed his teacher’s Jihad and Takfir steps and, after the Khawarijis, was one of the first to introduce the concept of takfir and to Takfir, or repentance, is the practice of set out a procedure for jihad. In his book Zad declaring that an individual or a group al-Mi’ad, he argues that: previously considered Muslim(s) is/are in fact kufar (non-believers in God), and in some God Commanded the Prophet cases legalizing the shedding of their blood. Muhammad to migrate to Medina. Historically, takfir and hijra (migration) are After his arrival into Medina, he was terms that refer to when Muhammad given permission to fight. Then he was considered the people of Mecca to be infidels, instructed to fight against those who thus leaving the city and going to Medina fought him and to restrain himself instead. The recent use of these terms and from those who did not make war with concepts was introduced by an Egyptian him. Later he was commanded to fight radical organization, al-Takfir wal-Hijra the polytheists until God’s religion was (Repentance and Holy Flight), which accuses fully established.62 any society of being infidel if it does not follow the Shari’a--even if that society

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For traditionalists, jihad could be against were normally in opposition to the state, but infidels or believers. Both al-Mawardi and Ibn today the accused groups normally support the Taymiyya divided jihad into two categories: state--and sometimes are the state itself. jihad against unbelievers and jihad against This is the possible explanation for al- believers. The latter were further divided into Banna and Qutb both calling for jihad against apostates (or innovators), rebels, and authorities. Indeed, Qutb adopted the extreme brigands.63 In addition, he considered the view that the ceased to exist Shi’a and those who doubted their version of once Muslims submitted the governance of his Islam to be infidels. In a similar vein, Abd al- affairs to men. He argued that as long as a Wahhab argued that the Shi’a beliefs and society does not live by the Shari’a, it is in a worships were forms of infidelity. Indeed, in state of jahiliyya (ignorance), even if its terms of takfir, no Islamist is as extreme as members believe in God and observe the Abd al-Wahhab. In his major book Kitab al- rituals of worship.67 The influence of Ibn Tawhid, he asserts that only those who Taymiyya’s accusation against the Tatars subscribe to his version of religious orthodoxy provided Qutb with the ingredients to reject are the true and faithful believers, and he Egyptian society. Another similarity between dismisses almost everybody else--Muslims traditional and neo-Islamists is that both and non-Muslims alike--as infidels.64 From groups have specified the stages of jihad, the above remarks, it is clear that both jihad which they define as follows: first, an and takfir were central to Islamist political invitation to embrace Islam; second, if the arguments, and they were justified against invitation is rejected then jihad needs to be both believers and non-believers. The question undertaken without warning; and third, they now is how neo-Islamists approached these should be fought until they either convert to two concepts and how much they relied on Islam or accept to pay jizya (poll tax). traditional theories. Contemporary Islamists: Qutb’s The Status of Women and the Status of Non- understanding of jihad is a precise copy of Ibn Muslims Qayyim’s approach (see above). Qutb stated that the Muslims were first restrained from To identify links in the approaches and fighting, then they were permitted to fight; understandings of traditional and later they were instructed to fight against the contemporary Islamists in regard to women’s aggressors, and finally they were commanded rights is a difficult task, because traditionalists to fight against all polytheists.65 Furthermore, rarely mentioned this issue. Their silence on Qutb rejects any other understanding of the the subject may have been because it was not concept of jihad in Islam, describing those considered a matter worthy of comment or who say “jihad is a defensive war” as “narrow- because they took for granted a subordinate minded” and “treacherous Orientalists.” He status for women and did not feel any need to also believes that “striving through sayf justify it. Either way, this can be understood (sword) is to clear the way for striving through best if it is considered in its historical context, preaching.”66 for the world then was a man’s world only. In Justifying jihad against believers is considering this matter, the status of non- evidence that the concept of takfir, as used by Muslims will also be discussed to further contemporary Islamists, is not new. It apparent highlight similarities between both traditional from the above that al-Mawardi and Ibn and neo-Islamist standpoints. Taymiyya legitimized war against believers by Traditional Islamists: Al-Mawardi argues labelling them “innovators,” “rebels,” or that it is possible for a non-Muslim to hold “brigands.” The difference between high office (such as vizier, ) in an traditionalists and contemporary Islamists is Islamic state as long as his duties are of the presumably the accused group’s position tanfiz (executive) category.68 However, Ibn within the state. In early Islam, such groups Taymiyya had a different view; as a strict

76 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 12, No. 1 (March 2008) Sherko Kirmanj follower of salaf, he demanded the application women should be limited in number, and that of the regulations set by Umar (the second non-Muslims should be excluded from judicial caliph, r. 634-644), which barred non-Muslims matters.76 For contemporary Islamists, from any political or military positions.69 In women’s main responsibility is to bring up fact, most traditionalists, such as al-Ghazali children, as suggested by Qutb, and if a and Muhammad ibn Ibrahim Ibn Jama’a society permits women to work in a job (1241-1333), stressed that the requirements for outside the home then that community should being a caliph or imam are to be male and a be considered jahiliyya.77 Muslim.70 In other words, the caliph should Under the pressure of current changes in not be a female or a non-Muslim. This is as far the Islamic world regarding reform and as women’s status and rights were defined, democratization, al-Qaradawi approaches the however, as noted above, non-Muslims were role and the status of women in society more certainly not treated equally and were required diplomatically. He is aware that he cannot to pay jizya as the price for their protection by deny them basic rights, such as nomination to the Islamic government. For example, Abd al- public office and government, but he still Wahhab asserts that if non-Muslims refuse the marginalizes them and limits other rights so call of the Muslim Commander to Islam, he that they remain second-class citizens in must order them to pay the jizya or else fight society. Al-Qaradawi’s view is that women them.71 should be allowed to be elected to parliament, Contemporary Islamists: Mawdudi argues but their numbers should not exceed those of that Islam seeks to eliminate discrimination men; as long as men have the majority they based on color, race, nationality, blood, and need not worry about women overpowering lineage; but on the question of religion, he male authority.78 divides human beings into two parties: “the As stated above, it is difficult to discern party of God” who are Muslims, and “the similarities between traditional and other party” who are non-Muslims.72 In contemporary Islamists in regard to the status addition, he says that Islam prescribes two of women. However, contemporary Islamist types of citizenship: Muslims and denial of women’s rights could be linked to (non-Muslims), and only Muslims have the their disregard by traditionalists. Moreover, in right to hold “the post of the head of the relation to the status of non-Muslims, there are Islamic state,” to be a “member of clear links between the views of the two parliament,” or to occupy “key positions.”73 groups as examined above. Moreover, Mawdudi and Zedan name those The significance of identifying the who are not eligible to vote in an Islamic state, theoretical links and/or parallels between the and they include non-Muslims with children ideologies of past and present Islamists is in and the mentally ill.74 It is relevant to point showing to be incorrect the argument that out that Zedan uses the term “crazy” in place Islamism is a new phenomenon, as proposed of “mentally ill,” and in so doing he thus by Ayubi, Amin, and Tibi (see above), and categorizes non-Muslims with “crazy” people. that the process of politicization of Islam goes Al-Banna suggests that the authority of a back to the first centuries of Islam, especially Muslim state should not be entrusted to non- after the emergence of the first traditional Muslims, because this would enable them to extremists. gain general power.75 The Islamist view on non-Muslim EXTREMISM IN ISLAM: PAST AND participation in parliament is similar to the PRESENT view on women, whom they consider to be second-class citizens unworthy of holding any It is worth noting that not all Islamists leading political post, such as that of president (traditional or contemporary) hold extreme or prime minister. They insist that views. Following is an examination of this parliamentary seats for both non-Muslims and point, with particular focus on the most

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prominent writers. The emphasis will be on authorities, though later released under three well-known traditional Islamists, Ibn pressure from his supporters.81 Hanbal, Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn Qayyim. Of Another prominent traditionalist was Ibn contemporary Islamists, the focus will be on Taymiyya. Born in Harran in 1263, he lived the ideas of Qutb, by far the most extreme. through one of the most turbulent periods in The attention will be on two interesting Muslim history. At the age of six his father influences on their extreme ideas, as a took refuge in after the community response to personal persecutions and was displaced by Mongols. However, they invasions. were under constant threat, and internal dissent was destabilizing their religion. Persecution of Islamic Thinkers and Repeatedly imprisoned because of his stance Extremism in Islam against invasion, he spent his last two years in jail, where he was actively involved in writing Throughout history the relations between until deprived of pens and papers by his Islamic rulers and ulama and jurists (including jailers.82 Islamists) have generally been good. The More importantly, Ibn Taymiyya and most Islamists’ main political role has been to extremist Islamists were born into justify and legitimize the ruler’s authority.79 sociopolitical situations where Muslims in However, there have been exceptions, and general, and Islamists in particular, suffered some Islamists have paid a heavy price for greatly. Ibn Taymiyya was born when the their beliefs and their political and theological Abbasid Caliphate had just been defeated by standpoints, several suffering imprisonment, Mongol invaders. At that time, the Muslim persecution, and torture. Such experiences community suffered defeat and humiliation seem to have had profound impacts on their (see next section), and jurists and ulama were views. subjected to torture and imprisonment, Traditional Islamists: In 833, the Abbasid especially those who called for the end of Caliph, Abdallah al-Ma’mun ibn Harun (786- invasion--among them the leading figures Ibn 833), officially supported the theological Taymiyya and Ibn Qayyim. doctrine of the creation of the Koran. The Contemporary Islamists: In relation to debate as to whether the Koran was eternal or jihad, in Nahwa Mujtama Islami (Towards an temporal and created had led to fierce disputes Islamic Society), Qutb argues that “it is not the and to the persecution of adherents of the ambition of Muslims to oblige others to follow opposing positions.80 The Mu’tazila, a Muslim Islam, but its object is that Muslims should be theological influenced by the rationalist free to preach Islam and let others have the methods of Hellenistic philosophy, taught that freedom of belief.” In the same book, penned God was an absolute unity admitting of no prior to his imprisonment and torture, he wrote parts. This rationale was brought to bear on that “the aim of jihad is to push away hostility the problem of God’s word, the Koran, without aggression.” He concludes that the because the word is God and not a part of general principle is “no war” and war is only Him; that is, the Koran, as a written expression “with attackers.” Furthermore, he stresses that and thus a material thing removed from God, Islam will not fight, boycott, or set itself had to be created by God in order to be against “polytheists.”83 accessible to man. In contrast to this view, However, In Ma’alim fi al-Tariq traditionalists, such as Ibn Hanbal, held that (Milestones), he branded those who the Koran was uncreated and external, that it understood jihad as a “defensive war” as had existed along with God since the “narrow-minded” and “treacherous beginning of time. The debate led to the Orientalists.”84 It is clear from these lines that persecution of Ibn Hanbal and his followers. he had moved from a position of moderation Hanbal was beaten and imprisoned by Abbasid to one of extreme intolerance and belligerence, especially regarding jihad. It is quite possible

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that Qutb wrote Nahwa Mujtama Islami before life to ending the Mongol occupation, and so his imprisonment and subsequent torture, obsessed was he that he declared jihad to be because the language, tone, and approach to one of the pillars of Islam and more important the concept of jihad is so profoundly bellicose than pilgrimage.88 As a cultural example, the in the later work. As a member of the Muslim Mu’tazila trend in early Islam was considered Brotherhood in the 1960s, Qutb suffered at the by Islamists to be a symptom of undesirable hands of the Egyptian authorities. Various foreign influences on Islamic values and witnesses reported the barbarism of the camp culture. guards. Gilles Kepel writes, “It was then that Contemporary Islamists: Based on Ibn he [Qutb] lost his last remaining illusion as to Taymiyya’s approach, al-Banna argues that the Muslim character of Nasser’s [the “Muslims are under the yoke of foreigners and Egyptian president] regime.”85 are subjugated by infidels” and “in such The suppression brought far-reaching circumstances it becomes the duty of each and changes to Qutb’s ideology and in the means every Muslim to wage jihad.”89 It is adopted by the Muslim Brotherhood in their significant to point out that leading struggle with the Egyptian government. The contemporary Islamists, such as Mawdudi, al- example cited here is only one instance of the Banna and Qutb, lived in an era where most of changes in tone and language in Qutb’s the Islamic and world was dominated writings, and many others can be found by by Western powers. On the cultural front, a comparing his early and post-imprisonment wide variety of examples can be cited, ranging works. from secular-oriented trends and movements Both traditional and contemporary Islamists (in some ways even Arab nationalism falls might have been pushed further because of into this category) to Western films, books, what they experienced at the hands of and ideas about women’s rights. Perhaps, that authoritarian rulers. Many are drawn to is why al-Qaradawi says “social and cultural political violence, as Dr. Jerrold Post, a invasion is more dangerous and even worse political psychologist pointed out, “not purely than political and military invasion, because it from ideological consideration but also flays the nation from itself.”90 through personal and psychological factors.”86 CONCLUSION Cultural and Military Invasion and Extremism in Islam Islamism is seen by some scholars as a reaction to modernism, Westernization, and In Muslim history there are many examples industrialization, and therefore they argue that of Islamist resurgence, whether by Islamism is a new phenomenon. By examining communities or individuals. Individuals and the views of Islamists from centuries ago-- nations respond differently to cultural and something contemporary Islamist thinkers military invasion, but in Muslims it has have certainly done--we see, however, that this engendered waves of extremism. movement is a new wave in an old continuum. Traditional Islamists: As a result of Thus, contemporary Islamism is not a new Mongol invasion and the collapse of the phenomenon but one that has deep roots in the Abbasid Caliphate in 1258, religious writings of traditional Islamists and in the institutions were destroyed and many jurists experiences that both traditionalists and and ulama were either killed or dispersed.87 Muslim communities have encountered Extremist Islamists view the destruction of the throughout history. Abbasid dynasty as an important turning point There are also, some significant in Muslim affairs. The significance of militant differences. The point of departure between Islamic political thought which emerged in the traditional Islamists and new Islamists is that wake of the Mongol invasion cannot be the former often called for total obedience to underestimated. Ibn Taymiyya dedicated his authority in order to avoid fitna (strife).

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However, for the latter, authority is often perceived to be un-Islamic and so they view Present (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University disobedience as a justifiable form of struggle Press, 2001). against tyranny, despite the possible resulting 4. John Esposito, Islam the Straight Path strife. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. For traditional Islamists, religio-political 160. affiliation was often within the framework of 5. Bryan S. Turner, “Class, Generation and existing units of the schools of law, but for Islamism: Towards a Global Sociology of contemporary Islamists affiliation was often Political Islam,” British Journal of Sociology, with organized political parties. Traditional Vol. 54, No. 1, (2003), p. 140. Islamist movements were not sophisticated in 6. Nazih Ayubi, Political Islam: Religion and terms of organization, however, contemporary Politics in the Arab World (London: Islamist movements are well-organized, Routledge, 1991), p. 3. sometimes clandestine, and usually better 7. Samir Amin, “Political Islam,” Covert equipped both ideologically and logistically. Action Quarterly, No. 71 (2001), pp. 3-6; This is the result of modern technology and Bassam Tibi, The Challenge of methods--the internet being one key example-- : Political Islam and the New which contemporary Islamists are quite World Order (Berkeley: University of willing to use. California Press, 2002). Further research would be quite useful to 8. Ziad W. Munson, “Islamic Mobilization: explore and identify differences between Social Movement Theory and the Egyptian traditional Islamists and Islamists. Muslim Brotherhood,” The Sociological Quarterly, Vol. 42, No. 4 (2001), pp. 487-510. * Sherko Kirmanj is a Ph.D. candidate and a 9. Nasr Abu Zaid, Naqid al-Khitab al-Dini tutor at the School of International Studies. He (: Seena lil-Nashir, 1992), p. 53. is the author of Politicisation of Islam: The 10. Abu Hamid al-Ghazali, Fada’ih al- Phenomenon of Islamism (Silemani, Iraq: wa fada’il al-Mutazhiriyya (Cairo: Sardam House for Publishing and Printing, al-Dar al-Qawmiyya lil-Tabi wal-Nashir, 2005), in Kurdish, as well as “The Clash of 1964), p. 171; see also Erwin I. J. Rosenthal, Identities in Iraq,” in Amatzia Baram and Political Thought in Medieval Islam: An Ronen Zeidel (eds.), Iraq Past and Present, Introductory Outline (Cambridge: Cambridge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, University Press, 1962), p. 39. 2008), and “Islam Politics and Government,” 11. Ibn Khaldun, The Muqaddimah: An in Totalitarian Movements and Political Introduction to History (Princeton: Princeton Religions, Vol. 9, No. 1 (2008). University Press, 1989), p. 156. 12. See Black, The History, p. 155. NOTES 13. Sayyid Abul A’la Mawdudi, A Short History of the Revivalist Movement in Islam (Kuala Lumpur: The Other Press, 2002), p. 43. 1. Montgomery Watt, Islamic Political 14. Qutb, Milestones, (New Delhi: Islamic Thought: The Basic Concepts (Edinburgh: Book Services, 1998), p. 22. Edinburgh University Press, 1968); Ann K. S. 15. Al-Qaradawi, al-Sahwa al-Islamiyya: wa Lambton, State and Government in Medieval Hmum al-Watan al-Arabi wal Islami, (the Islam (New York: Oxford University Press, place of publishing and the publisher are not 1981). stated, 1988), p. 90. 2. Hrair Dekmejian, Islam in Revolution: 16. See Rosenthal, Political, p. 39. Fundamentalism in the Arab World (Syracuse: 17. Al-Ghazali, Fada’ih, p. 171; Yusuf al- Syracuse University Press, 1995). Qaradawi, Min al-Dawla fi al-Islam 3. Antony Black, The History of Islamic (Cairo: Dar al-Shuruq, 1996), p. 17. Political Thought from the Prophet to the

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18. Nimrod Hurvitz, “From Scholarly Circles to 34. Black, The History, p. 155. Mass Movement: The Formation of Legal 35. Rosenthal, Political, p. 55. Communities in Islamic Societies,” American 36. Ibn Khaldun, The Muqaddimah, p. 183. Historical Review, Vol. 108, No. 4 (2003), p. 37. Ibid, p. 155. 990. 38. Muhammad Abd al-Wahhab, Fadhl al- 19. Muqtedar Khan, “Sovereignty in Islam as Islam (Riyadh: University of Imam Human Agency,” Ijtihad: A Return to Muhammad bin Sa’ud, 1791), pp. 207-10. Enlightenment, Vol. 1, No. 10 (December 30, 39. Sayyid Abul A’la Mawdudi, “Essential 1999). Features of the Islamic Political System,” 20. Lambton, State, p. 109. Uhttp://www.islam101.com/politics/politicals 21. Ibid, p. 145. ystem.htmU (last accessed August 5, 2007); 22. Sayyid Abul A’la Mawdudi, The Islamic Mawdudi, A Short, p. 31. Law and Constitution, (Lahore: Islamic 40. Mawdudi, A Short, p. 16; Qutb, Milestones, Publications, 1969), p. 204. p. 32; al-Qaradawi, al-Sahwa, p. 68. 23. Qutb, Milestones, p. 26. 41. Sayyid Qutb, Nahwa Mujtama Islami, (Dar 24. Ibid, p. 29. al-Shruq, undated), p. 12. 25. See Constitution of Islamic Republic of 42. Qutb, Milestones, p. 75. , Article 56, 43. Ayatullah Morteza Mutahhari, “Jihad: The Uhttp://www.iranonline.com/iran/iran- Holy War of Islam and Its Legitimacy in the info/Government/constitution-5.htmlU (last ,” Uhttp://www.al- accessed August 13, 2007). islam.org/short/jihad/U (last accessed July 15, 26. Lambton, State, p. 53. 2007). 27. The Mu’tazila was a rationalist school 44. Lambton, State, p. 85. founded in Basra and Baghdad, which 45. Koran (4: 58-59). attempted to interpret religious texts in the 46. Rosenthal, Political, pp. 53-54. light of human reason. They also advocated 47. Black, The History, p. 155. the doctrine of free will. However, the 48. Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, al-Turuq al- Orthodoxies believed in a literal interpretation Hukmiya fi al-Siyyasa al-Shar’iyya (Beirut: of texts, their main disagreement with Dar al-Arqam bin Abi al-Arqam, 1999), pp. Mu’tazilis was regarding the notion of the 39-40. created and uncreated of Koran. 49. Qutb, Milestones, pp. 29-30. 28. Black, The History, p. 37. 50. Abdul Karim Zedan, al-Fard wal-Dawla fi 29. Ibn Khaldun, The Muqaddimah, pp. 154-60. al-Shari’a al-Islamiyya (Beirut: Mua’sasat al- 30. Sayyid Abul A’la Mawdudi, “Political Risalah, 1990), pp. 8-9; al-Qaradawi, al- Theory of Islam,” in Mansoor Moaddel and Sahwa, p. 82; al-Qaradawi, Min Fiqh, p. 18. Kamran Talattof (eds.), Contemporary 51. Lambton, State, pp. 91-92, 147; Rosenthal, Debates in Islam: An Anthology of Modernist Political, p. 29. and Fundamentalist Thought (NY: St. 52. Lambton, State, p. 111. Martin’s Press, 2000), pp. 270-71. 53 Al-Ghazali, Fada’ih al-Batiniyya, pp.180- 31. Khawarijis is a term used to describe those 81; Ali bin Muhammad al-Mawardi, al-Ahkam Muslims who initially supported the caliphate al-Sultaniyya (Dar al-Kutub al-Ilmiyya, of the fourth Caliph Ali, but later rejected him. undated), p. 7. They first emerged in the late seventh century. 54. Lambton, State, pp. 127, 145. 32. Watt, Islamic, p. 54. 55. Muhammad Abd al-Wahhab, Kitab al- 33. For the debate on comprehensiveness nature Tawhid, of Islam see Sherko Kirmanj, “Islam, Politics Uhttp://www.islamicweb.com/beliefs/creed/ab and Government”, Totalitarian Movements dulwahab/U (last accessed January 5, 2008), and Political Religions, Vol. 9, No. 1 (2008), Chapter 37. p. 48.

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56. Mawdudi, The Islamic Law; Mawdudi, 78. Al-Qaradawi, Min Fiqh, p. 165. “Political Theory of Islam”; al-Qaradawi, Min 79. See Sa’d Khalaf al-Hinitti, al-Faqih wal- Fiqh al-Dawla. (Amman: Dar al-Bayariq, 1999). 57. Hasan al-Banna, Selected Writings of Hasan 80. Nasr H. Abu Zaid, “The Modernization of al-Banna Shaheed (New Delhi: Millat Book Islam or the Islamization of Modernity,” in Centre, 1999), p. 134; al-Qaradawi, Min Fiqh Roel Meijer (ed.), Cosmopolitanism, Identity al-Dawla, p. 31. and Authenticity in the Middle East (England: 58. Mawdudi, The Islamic, pp. 232-33. Curzon Press, 1999), pp. 71-86. 59. See Farhad Daftary, “Diversity in Islam: 81. Lambton, State, p. 41. Communities of Interpretation,” in Azim A. 82. Ibid, pp. 143, 154. Nanji (ed.), The Muslim Almanac (Detroit, MI: 83. Qutb, Nahwa, pp. 101-20. Gale Research, 1996), pp. 161-73. 84. Qutb, Milestones, pp. 53-76. 60. Taqi al-Din Ibn Taymiyya, Siyyasati Shar’i 85. Gilles Kepel, Muslim Extremism in Egypt: bo Salihbooni Sarkirda w jundi (in Kurdish), The Prophet and (Los Angeles: (Silemani: 2003), p. 98. University of California Press, 1993), p. 28. 61. See Rudolph Peters, Jihad in Classical and 86. Benjamin Orbach, “Usama bin Ladin and Modern Islam (Princeton: Markus Wiener al-Qa’ida: Origins and Doctrines,” Middle Publishers, 1996), pp. 47-49; Ayubi, Political, East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 5, p. 15. No. 4 (2001), p. 55. 62. Muhammad Abd al-Wahhab, Mukhtasar 87. Black, The History, p. 140. Zad al-Mi’ad li Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, 88. Ibn Taymiyya, Siyyasati, p. 13. (Riyadh: University of Imam Muhammad bin 89. Al-Banna, Selected Writings, pp. 47-48. Sa’ud, 1791), pp. 223-24; italics by author. 90. Al-Qaradawi, al-Sahwa, p. 12. 63. Al-Mawardi, al-Ahkam, p. 70; Lambton, State, pp. 211-12. 64. Muhammad Abd al-Wahhab, Risala fi al- Rad ala al-Rafidha, (Riyadh: University of Imam Muhammad bin Sa’ud, 1791), p. 29; Abd al-Wahhab, Kitaab At-Tawhid, Chapters 1-64. 65. Qutb, Milestones, p. 53. 66. Ibid, pp. 63-65. 67. Mohamed Selim el-Awwa, “A Return to the Centre,” al-Ahram Weekly, No. 459 (1999). 68. Al-Mawardi, al-Ahkam, pp. 28-29. 69. Lambton, State, p. 206. 70. Al-Ghazali, Fada’ih al-Batiniyya, p. 180; Rosenthal, Political Thought, p. 44. 71. Abd al-Wahhab, Kitab al-Tawhid, Chapter 60. 72. Sayyid Abu A’la Mawdudi, al-Islam wal- Jahiliyya (Beirut: Mu’asasat al-Risala, 1975), pp. 40-41. 73. Mawdudi, The Islamic, pp. 235-36. 74. Zedan, al-Fard, p. 30; Mawdudi, “Essential Features.” 75. Al-Banna, Selected Writings, p. 9. 76. Al-Qaradawi, Min Fiqh, pp. 194-95. 77. Qutb, Milestones, p. 98.

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