DOCSLIB.ORG

When to Trust Authoritative Testimony: Generation and Transmission of Knowledge in Saadya Gaon, Al-Ghazālī and Thomas Aquinas

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
When to Trust Authoritative Testimony: Generation and Transmission of Knowledge in Saadya Gaon, Al-Ghazālī and Thomas Aquinas Marquette University e-Publications@Marquette Dissertations, Theses, and Professional Dissertations (1934 -) Projects When to Trust Authoritative Testimony: Generation and Transmission of Knowledge in Saadya Gaon, Al-Ghazālī and Thomas Aquinas Brett A. Yardley Marquette University Follow this and additional works at: https://epublications.marquette.edu/dissertations_mu Part of the Philosophy Commons Recommended Citation Yardley, Brett A., "When to Trust Authoritative Testimony: Generation and Transmission of Knowledge in Saadya Gaon, Al-Ghazālī and Thomas Aquinas" (2021). Dissertations (1934 -). 1075. https://epublications.marquette.edu/dissertations_mu/1075 WHEN TO TRUST AUTHORITATIVE TESTIMONY: GENERATION AND TRANSMISSION OF KNOWLEDGE IN SAADYA GAON, AL-GHAZĀLĪ, AND THOMAS AQUINAS By Brett A. Yardley A Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School, Marquette University & KULeuven in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy Milwaukee, Wisconsin United States of America & Leuven, Flanders, Belgium August 2021 2 ABSTRACT WHEN TO TRUST AUTHORITATIVE TESTIMONY: GENERATION AND TRANSMISSION OF KNOWLEDGE IN SAADYA GAON, AL-GHAZĀLĪ, AND THOMAS AQUINAS Brett A. Yardley Marquette University & KULeuven, 2021 People have become suspicious of authority, including epistemic authorities, i.e., knowledge experts, even on matters individuals are unqualified to adjudicate (e.g., climate change, vaccines, or the shape and age of the earth). This is problematic since most of our knowledge comes from trusting a speaker—whether scholars reading experts, students listening to teachers, children obeying their parents, or pedestrians inquiring of strangers— such that the knowledge transmitted is rarely personally verified. Despite the recent development of social epistemology and theories of testimony, this is not a new problem. Ancient and Medieval philosophers largely took it for granted that most human knowledge primarily comes from listening to a trustworthy speaker whose virtuous character serves to mitigate against the twin concerns of inaccuracy and dishonesty. Thus, unlike contemporary Social Epistemology, few testimonial theories were explicitly laid out despite the crucial role testimony plays throughout a wide range of topics and teachings. To date, the working theory of testimony underpinning the works of medieval philosophers are just now being codified. This is particularly relevant for the Abrahamic faiths since they originate with testimony from God himself. The goal of this dissertation is to explore how the generation and transmission of religious knowledge (i.e., testimonial theory) appears in an exemplary thinker from each faith: Saadya (Sa'adiah) Gaon of Judaism (882- 942), al-Ghazālī of Islam (1058-1111), and Thomas Aquinas of Christianity (1225-1274). While not contemporaries, these exemplars are theological philosophers who are like- minded in their desire to maintain an orthodox faith while possessing philosophical approaches to truth. Thus, they maintained sophisticated epistemological theories of generation and transmission within their own religious contexts (e.g., revelation, scripture, and prophecy). Cataloguing these medieval testimonial theories reveals a historical incongruity with the current contemporary concept of testimony and its frameworks. Based on the testimonial theories of these three thinkers, I argue for a "transhistorical" concept of testimony that does not presume an evidentialist framework to account for pre-modern theories of testimony which predominantly rely on virtue theoretic frameworks. To test the proposed neutral framework, I offer a virtue epistemological account of testimony in which trust is not an intellectual virtue, but the intellectual aspect of the historic virtue of autonomy. I argue that intellectual autonomy and trust are inversely related in one's interactions with authority (both practical and theoretical). i ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Brett A. Yardley I dedicate this project to my family: First and foremost, my wife Beth who has supported and championed me in three cities, at two universities, and across one ocean; my three children, Jethro, Edessa, and Genevieve, who I hope surpass me in every way; my parents, Craig and Shauna, who taught me to value of hard work and education; and finally my sister Nicole, and my wonder aunts, uncles, cousins, in-laws, and friends who make our lives a joy. I would also like to thank the many people who have empowered me along the way. My mentors and co-advisors: Richard C. Taylor who has opened more doors for me intellectually and academically than space permits me to detail; and Andrea Robiglio who has guided and connected me with scholars and publishers internationally. I am also indebted to my other committee members: Michael J. Wreen, Owen Goldin, and Sarah Pessin whose commitment to scholarship and direction is a model for emulation. In addition, I would like to thank my many instructors at Marquette University, such as David Twetten, for their time and investment. For their guidance and assistance as the directors of Graduate studies, I would also like to specially thank Theresa Tobin and Sebastian Luft of Marquette and Stein De Cuyper of KULeuven for their daily help and special efforts to make this joint university dissertation a reality. Finally, I would like to thank all the administrators, friends, and colleagues of Marquette University, KULeuven, Keizersberg Abbey, and the Fulbright Commission of Belgium for making it possible for me to study at both institutions. ii TABLE OF CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS i CHAPTERS 1.0 INTRODUCTION: AUTHORITY, TRUST, AND THEIR RELATION 1.1 Trusted Authority and the Bootstrapping problem 1 1.2 What is Authority? 10 1.2.1 Practical vs. Epistemic Authority 10 1.2.2 Communal Epistemic Authority 15 1.3 Self-Trust, Blind-Trust, and Virtuous-Trust 20 1.3.1 Closed Rationalism & Self-Trust 21 1.3.2 Rational Fideism & Blind-Trust 26 1.3.3 Open Rationalism & Virtuous-Trust 29 1.3.3.1 Saadya Gaon 34 1.3.3.2 Al-Ghazālī 35 1.3.3.3 Thomas Aquinas 37 1.4 Conclusion: The Nature of Testimony and Revelation 38 2.0 THE INTERSECTION OF SOCIAL EPISTEMOLOGY AND MEDIEVAL TESTIMONIAL KNOWLEDGE 2.1 Introduction 42 2.2 Brief History of Social Epistemology 43 2.2.1 Standard Framework of Social Epistemology 45 2.2.1.1 Testimony: Transmission vs. Generation of Knowledge 45 2.2.1.2 Testimony: Justification 47 2.3 Historical Assessment of Testimony 50 2.3.1 Testimony in St. Augustine 53 2.3.1.1 C.A.J Coady. 1992: Testimony 53 2.3.1.2 Peter King and Nathan Ballantyne. 2009: "Augustine on Testimony" 54 2.3.1.3 Matthew Siebert. 2018: "Augustine’s Development on Testimonial Knowledge" 57 2.3.2 Testimony in Avicenna & Averroes 60 2.3.2.1 Deborah L. Black. 2013: "Certitude, Justification, and the Principles of Knowledge in Avicenna’s Epistemology" 60 2.3.2.2 Deborah L. Black. 2018. "Avicenna on Knowledge" 62 2.3.2.3 Deborah L. Black. 2018: "Constructing Averroes’ Epistemology" 63 2.3.3 Testimony in Thomas Aquinas 64 2.3.3.1 C.A.J. Coady. 1994: Testimony 64 iii 2.3.3.2 Eleonore Stump. 2014: "Faith, Wisdom, & the Transmission of Knowledge through Testimony" 65 2.3.3.3 Matthew Siebert. 2016: "Aquinas on Testimonial Justification: Faith and Opinion" 68 2.3.3.4 Richard Cross. 2018: "Testimony, Error, and Reasonable Belief in Medieval Religious Epistemology" 71 2.3.4 Testimony in William of Ockham 75 2.3.4.1 Robert Pasnau. 2010: "Medieval Social Epistemology: Scientia for Mere Mortals" 75 2.3.4.2 Jennifer Pelletier. 2018: "William Ockham on Testimonial Knowledge" 76 2.4 Virtue Epistemology’s Contribution to Testimony 77 2.5 Rethinking the Contemporary Categories of Testimony 82 2.5.1 Evaluating Social Epistemology’s relation to other Epistemological Fields 88 3.0 SAADYA GAON'S THEORY OF HUMAN AND DIVINE TESTIMONY 3.1 Introduction 91 3.2 Saadya Gaon and his Milieu 94 3.2.1 Medieval Jewish Communal Authority 94 3.2.2 Saadya’s Account of Knowledge 102 3.3 Testimony in Saadya Gaon 114 3.3.1 Human Testimony 122 3.3.2 Divine Testimony 133 3.4 Conclusion: Testimonial Assessment 143 3.4.1 Is Saadya Gaon an anti-reductionist? 144 3.4.2 Is Saadya Gaon a reductionist? 147 3.4.3 Saadya Gaon's Virtue-Theoretic Account of Testimony 151 4.0 AL-GHAZĀLĪ'S THEORY OF HUMAN AND DIVINE TESTIMONY 4.1 Introduction 156 4.2 al-Ghazālī and his Milieu 159 4.2.1 Medieval Islamic Communal Authority 159 4.2.2 al-Ghazālī’s Account of Knowledge 167 4.3 Testimony in al-Ghazālī 179 4.3.1 Human Testimony 185 4.3.2 Divine Testimony 207 4.4 Conclusion: Testimonial Assessment 218 4.4.1 Is al-Ghazālī an anti-reductionist? 219 4.4.2 Is al-Ghazālī a reductionist? 222 4.4.3 al-Ghazālī's Virtue-Theoretic of Testimony 224 iv 5.0 THOMAS AQUINAS'S THEORY OF HUMAN AND DIVINE TESTIMONY 5.1 Introduction 228 5.2 Thomas and his Milieu 232 5.2.1 Medieval Christian Communal Authority 232 5.2.2 Thomas's Account of Knowledge 241 5.3 Testimony in Thomas 251 5.3.1 Human Testimony 255 5.3.2 Divine Testimony 269 5.4 Conclusion: Testimonial Assessment 288 5.4.1 Is Thomas an anti-reductionist? 288 5.4.2 Is Thomas a reductionist? 291 5.4.3 Thomas's Virtue-Theoretic of Testimony 293 6.0 TOWARD A TRANSHISTORICAL CONCEPT OF TESTIMONY 6.1 Introduction 298 6.2 Testimony as evident vs. evidence 301 6.3 Towards a transhistorical testimonial framework 314 6.4 Accounting for a virtue-theoretic testimonial theory 319 6.4.1 Trust and the Virtue of Intellectual Autonomy 320 6.4.2 Insufficient Autonomy, Excessive Trust 326 6.4.3 Excessive Autonomy, Insufficient Trust 330
Load more

Recommended publications
  • School of Humanities and Social Sciences Al-Ghazali's Integral
    School of Humanities and Social Sciences Al-Ghazali’s Integral Epistemology: A Critical Analysis of The Jewels of the Quran A Thesis Submitted to The Department of Arab and Islamic Civilization in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts by Amani Elshimi 000-88-0001 under the supervision of Dr. Mohamed Serag Professor of Islamic Studies Thesis readers: Dr. Steffen Stelzer Professor of Philosophy, The American University in Cairo Dr. Aliaa Rafea Professor of Sociology, Ain Shams University; Founder of The Human Foundation NGO May 2017 Acknowledgements First and foremost, Alhamdulillah - my gratitude to God for the knowledge, love, light and faith. My deepest thanks go to my supervisor and readers, whose individual passions and critical guidance helped shape my research perspective, sustain my sanity and boost my confidence - Dr. Mohamed Serag, who first initiated me into the scholarship of al- Ghazali and engaged me in eye-opening theological debates, Dr. Steffen Stelzer, whose academic expertise and personal sufi practice inspired my curiosity and touched me in deep spiritual ways, and Dr. Aliaa Rafea, who, through her lectures and practices, emphasized how the depths of meaning in the Quran can contribute to human development in contemporary times. Throughout this adventure, my colleagues and friends have been equally supportive - Soha Helwa and Wafaa Wali, in particular, have joined me in bouncing ideas back and forth to refine perspective and sustain rigor. Sincere appreciation and love goes to my family - my dear husband and children, whose unswerving support all these years has helped me grow in ways I yearned for, and never dreamed possible; and my siblings who constantly engaged me in discussion and critical analysis.
    [Show full text]
  • Reliabilism Without Epistemic Consequentialism
    Reliabilism without Epistemic Consequentialism Abstract This paper argues that reliabilism can plausibly live without epistemic consequentialism, either as part of a non-consequentialist normative theory or as a non-normative account of knowledge on a par with certain accounts of the metaphysics of perception and action. It argues moreover that reliabilism should not be defended as a consequentialist theory. Its most plausible versions are not aptly dubbed ‘consequentialist’ in any sense that genuinely parallels the dominant sense in ethics. Indeed, there is no strong reason to believe reliabil- ism was ever seriously intended as a form of epistemic consequentialism. At the heart of its original motivation was a concern about the necessity of non-accidentality for knowledge, a concern quite at home in a non-consequentialist or non-normative setting. Reliabilism’s connection to epistemic consequentialism was an accretion of the ’80s, and a feature of only one of its formulations in that decade. 1 Introduction Recent literature conveys the impression that epistemic consequentialism has long been a domi- nant view about justified belief.1 One source of this impression is the prominence of reliabilism in the post-Gettier history of epistemology. While reliabilism has had many critics, it retains many adherents and remains a dominant perspective on the nature of justified belief and knowl- edge; indeed, it is arguably the leading form of externalism. Accordingly, if reliabilism were a form of epistemic consequentialism, one could reasonably conclude that the latter has been a major force in traditional epistemology since the late ’60s and early ’70s. But such thinking would be misguided.
    [Show full text]
  • The Value Problem of Knowledge. Against a Reliabilist Solution
    The Value Problem of Knowledge. Against a Reliabilist Solution Anne Meylan* * University of Neuchâtel, Switzerland: [email protected] Abstract. A satisfying theory of knowledge has to explain why knowledge seems to be better than mere true belief. In this paper, I try to show that the best reliabilist explanation (ERA+) is still not able to solve this problem. According to an already elaborated answer (ERA), it is better to possess knowledge that p because this makes likely that one’s future belief of a similar kind will also be true. I begin with a metaphysical comment which gives birth to ERA +, a better formulation of ERA. Then, I raise two objections against ERA+. The first objection shows that the truth of the reliabilist answer requires the conception of a specific theory of instrumental value. In the second objection, I present an example in order to show that ERA+ actually fails to explain why it is better to possess knowledge than a mere true belief. 1 Introduction: the Value Problem of Knowleddge Why is it better to know that p than to possess a mere true belief that p?1 The prob- lem of the value of knowledge constitutes one of the main issue in contemporary epistemology. The intuition2 that it is better to possess knowledge than mere true belief has an important historical precedent. It arouses Socrates’ astonishment in Plato’s Meno. As Plato notices, it is not possible to account for this intuition merely by appealing to its distinctive utility. Indeed, a true belief about the way to go to Larissa is as useful as a piece of knowledge about the way to go to Larissa.
    [Show full text]
  • Presidential Address
    Empowering Philosophy Christia Mercer COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY Presidential Address delivered at the one hundred sixteenth Eastern Division meeting of the American Philosophical Association in Philadelphia, PA, on January 10, 2020. The main goal of my presidential address in January 2020 was to show that philosophy’s past offers a means to empower its present. I hoped to encourage colleagues to make the philosophy we teach and practice more inclusive (both textually and topically) and to adopt a more public- facing engagement with our discipline. As I add these introductory remarks to my January lecture, it is June 2020 and the need to empower philosophy has never seemed more urgent. We’ve witnessed both the tragic death of George Floyd and the popular uprising of a diverse group of Americans in response to the ongoing violence against Black lives. Many white Americans—and many philosophers—have begun to realize that their inattentiveness to matters of diversity and inclusivity must now be seen as more than mere negligence. Recent demonstrations frequently contain signs that make the point succinctly: “Silence is violence.” A central claim of my January lecture was that philosophy’s status quo is no longer tenable. Even before the pandemic slashed university budgets and staff, our employers were cutting philosophy programs, enrollments were shrinking, and jobs were increasingly hard to find. Despite energetic attempts on the part of many of our colleagues to promote a more inclusive approach to our research and teaching, the depressing truth remains:
    [Show full text]
  • Al-Ghazali's Integral Epistemology: a Critical Analysis of the Jewels of the Quran
    American University in Cairo AUC Knowledge Fountain Theses and Dissertations 6-1-2017 Al-Ghazali's integral epistemology: A critical analysis of the jewels of the Quran Amani Mohamed Elshimi Follow this and additional works at: https://fount.aucegypt.edu/etds Recommended Citation APA Citation Elshimi, A. (2017).Al-Ghazali's integral epistemology: A critical analysis of the jewels of the Quran [Master’s thesis, the American University in Cairo]. AUC Knowledge Fountain. https://fount.aucegypt.edu/etds/618 MLA Citation Elshimi, Amani Mohamed. Al-Ghazali's integral epistemology: A critical analysis of the jewels of the Quran. 2017. American University in Cairo, Master's thesis. AUC Knowledge Fountain. https://fount.aucegypt.edu/etds/618 This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by AUC Knowledge Fountain. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of AUC Knowledge Fountain. For more information, please contact [email protected]. School of Humanities and Social Sciences Al-Ghazali’s Integral Epistemology: A Critical Analysis of The Jewels of the Quran A Thesis Submitted to The Department of Arab and Islamic Civilization in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts by Amani Elshimi 000-88-0001 under the supervision of Dr. Mohamed Serag Professor of Islamic Studies Thesis readers: Dr. Steffen Stelzer Professor of Philosophy, The American University in Cairo Dr. Aliaa Rafea Professor of Sociology, Ain Shams University; Founder of The Human Foundation NGO May 2017 Acknowledgements First and foremost, Alhamdulillah - my gratitude to God for the knowledge, love, light and faith.
    [Show full text]
  • ARABIC THOUGHT and ISLAMIC SOCIETIES This Page Intentionally Left Blank ARABIC THOUGHT and ISLAMIC SOCIETIES
    ROUTLEDGE LIBRARY EDITIONS: POLITICS OF ISLAM ARABIC THOUGHT AND ISLAMIC SOCIETIES This page intentionally left blank ARABIC THOUGHT AND ISLAMIC SOCIETIES AZIZ AL-AZMEH Volume 1 First published in 1986 This edition first published in 2013 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon, OX14 4RN Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 1986 Aziz Al-Azmeh All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library ISBN: 978-0-415-64437-2 (Set) eISBN: 978-0-203-07906-5 (Set) ISBN: 978-0-415-83072-0 (Volume 1) eISBN: 978-0-203-38146-5 (Volume 1) Publisher’s Note The publisher has gone to great lengths to ensure the quality of this reprint but points out that some imperfections in the original copies may be apparent. Disclaimer The publisher has made every effort to trace copyright holders and would welcome correspondence from those they have been unable to trace. Arabic Thought and Islamic Societies EXETER ARABIC AND ISLAMIC SERIES Arabic Thought and Islamic Societies Aziz Al-Azmeh ARABIC THOUGHT and ISLAMIC SOCIETICS AZIZ AL-AZMEH CROOM HELM London Sydney Dover, New Hampshire @ 1986 Aziz Al-Azmeh Croom Helm Ltd, Provident House, Burrell Row, Beckenham, Kent BR3 I AT Croom Helm Australia Pty Ltd, Suite 4, 6th Floor, 64-76 Kippax Street, Surry Hills, NSW 2010, Australia British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Al-Azmeh, Aziz Arabic thought and Islamic societies.
    [Show full text]
  • The Revelation of God, East and West: Contrasting Special Revelation in Western Modernity with the Ancient Christian East
    Open Theology 2017; 3: 565–589 Analytic Perspectives on Method and Authority in Theology Nathan A. Jacobs* The Revelation of God, East and West: Contrasting Special Revelation in Western Modernity with the Ancient Christian East https://doi.org/10.1515/opth-2017-0043 Received August 11, 2017; accepted September 11, 2017 Abstract: The questions of whether God reveals himself; if so, how we can know a purported revelation is authentic; and how such revelations relate to the insights of reason are discussed by John Locke, Thomas Hobbes, René Descartes, G. W. Leibniz, and Immanuel Kant, to name a few. Yet, what these philosophers say with such consistency about revelation stands in stark contrast with the claims of the Christian East, which are equally consistent from the second century through the fourteenth century. In this essay, I will compare the modern discussion of special revelation from Thomas Hobbes through Johann Fichte with the Eastern Christian discussion from Irenaeus through Gregory Palamas. As we will see, there are noteworthy differences between the two trajectories, differences I will suggest merit careful consideration from philosophers of religion. Keywords: Religious Epistemology; Revelation; Divine Vision; Theosis; Eastern Orthodox; Locke; Hobbes; Lessing; Kant; Fichte; Irenaeus; Cappadocians; Cyril of Alexandria; Gregory Palamas The idea that God speaks to humanity, revealing things hidden or making his will known, comes under careful scrutiny in modern philosophy. The questions of whether God does reveal himself; if so, how we can know a purported revelation is authentic; and how such revelations relate to the insights of reason are discussed by John Locke, Thomas Hobbes, René Descartes, G.
    [Show full text]
  • Dissertation Anthology 2019-20
    DissertatioN ANthology A CollectioN of Philosophy StudeNt DissertatioNs The UNiversity of Liverpool DepartmeNt of Philosophy 2019-20 Authors, Editors aNd Supervisors Authors StepheN Arkley Mia ReNshaw Ashley BoNNell ANNa Ross Joe BoylaNd Sarah Sharp Georgie Campbell JustiNe SolaNo Lucy Chambers Eddie Southcombe ANNa NuNez de Croker George Wood Harry DaymaN Sam WoottoN Marcus Desai Abi HamiltoN Alice GoodwiN Josh Hibbert Josef Grover Jemima HuNt LiNtoN NewtoN Editors Alice GoodwiN Dr Rachael WisemaN Supervisors Chris Bartley JaN JobliNg Rob Booth Ilias Markolefas Barry DaiNtoN RobiN McKeNNa Rebecca DavNall StepheN McLeod Richard GaskiN Thomas Schramme DaNiel Hill Vid SimoNiti PriNtiNg paid for by PhilSoc Table of CoNteNts Editor’s INtroductioN v DissertatioN ANthology vi SelliNg Harm or SelliNg Self: Is harm iNhereNt or coNtiNgeNt to the sex iNdustry? StepheN Arkley 1 BecomiNg EcosyNchroNus: A PromisiNg SolutioN to the CurreNt State of the ENviroNmeNt Ashley BoNNell 4 Self-Respect, Self-Authorship aNd the MeaNs of ProductioN: A Critique of Market Democracy Joe BoylaNd 7 CaN FemiNist EmpaNcipatory Speech be DiscrimiNatory? Georgie Campbell 10 A Critical ANalysis of SimoNe de Beauvoir’s Theory of WomeN’s OtherNess iN The SecoNd Sex Lucy Chambers 13 Why the NoN-ExisteNce of Extra-Terrestrial INtelligeNce is the most CohereNt ANswer to Fermi's Paradox Harry DaymaN 16 Does the Utility of PlaNtiNga’s Free Will DefeNce Need to be recoNsidered iN a way which reflects beliefs about the Diseases of the MiNd? Marcus Desai 19 AN ANswer to the Paradox
    [Show full text]
  • The Arsenite Schism and the Babai Rebellion: Two Case Studies
    THE ARSENITE SCHISM AND THE BABAI REBELLION: TWO CASE STUDIES IN CENTER-PERIPHERY RELATIONS by Hüsamettin ŞİMŞİR Submitted to the Institute of Social Sciences in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in History Sabancı University June 2018 © Hüsamettin Şimşir 2018 All Rights Reserved ABSTRACT THE ARSENITE SCHISM AND THE BABAI REBELLION: TWO CASE STUDIES IN CENTER-PERIPHERY RELATIONS Hüsamettin Şimşir M.A Thesis, June 2018 Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Fac. Member Ferenc Péter Csirkés This thesis aims to present an analysis of the interaction between Christians and Muslims in the west of Asia Minor at the end of the 13th and the beginning of the 14th centuries after two religious-social movements in the Byzantine and the Rum Seljuk Empires, the Arsenite Schism and the Babai Rebellion. After the unsuccessful rebellion of the Babais, antinomian dervishes who had migrated to the west of Asia Minor because of a heavy oppression as well as inquisition by the state and had a different religious belief apart from the mainstream religious understanding of the center initiated missionary activities in the regions along the Byzantine border. Accordingly, these dervishes had joined the military activities of the Turcoman chieftains against the Byzantines and interacted with the local Christian population and religious figures. As a result of this religious interaction, messianic and ascetic beliefs were increasingly present among the Greek-speaking population as well as spiritual leaders of western Anatolia. Since such interfaith and cross- cultural interaction had a considerable impact on the course of all these events, this thesis focuses on them to create a better understanding of the appearance of the Hesychasm in the Byzantine spiritual environment in the later period.
    [Show full text]
  • PHILOSOPHY of RELIGION Philosophy 185 Spring 2016
    PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION Philosophy 185 Spring 2016 Dana Kay Nelkin Office: HSS 8004 Office Hours: Monday 11-12, Friday 11-12, and by appointment Phone: (858) 822-0472 E-mail: [email protected] Web site: www.danakaynelkin.com Course Description: We will explore five related and hotly debated topics in the philosophy of religion, and, in doing so, address the following questions: (i) What makes something a religion? (ii) Is it rational to hold religious beliefs? Should we care about rationality when it comes to religious belief? (iii) Could different religions be different paths to the same ultimate reality, or is only one, at most, a “way to God”? (iv) What is the relationship between science and religion? (v) What is the relationship between morality and religion? Must religious beliefs be true in order for morality to exist? As we will see, the philosophy of religion leads naturally into just about every other area of philosophy, including epistemology, metaphysics, ethics, and the history of philosophy, and into particular central philosophical debates such as the debate over the nature of free will. This means that you will gain insight into many fundamental philosophical issues in this course. At the same time, the subject matter can be difficult. To do well in the course and to benefit from it, you must be willing to work hard and to subject your own views (whatever they may be) to critical evaluation. Evaluating our conception of ourselves and of the world is one of the distinguishing features of philosophy. Requirements: Short reading responses/formulations of questions (150-200 words for each class meeting; 20 out of 28 required) 30% 1 paper in two drafts (about 2200 words) o first draft 10% (Due May 13) o second draft, revised after comments 25% (Due May 23) 1 take-home final exam (35%) (Due June 4, 11 am) up to 5% extra credit for participation in class group assignments and discussion.
    [Show full text]
  • Towards an Expanded Conception of Philosophy of Religion
    View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by Springer - Publisher Connector Int J Philos Relig DOI 10.1007/s11153-016-9597-7 ARTICLE Thickening description: towards an expanded conception of philosophy of religion Mikel Burley1 Received: 30 March 2016 / Accepted: 29 November 2016 © The Author(s) 2016. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com Abstract An increasingly common complaint about philosophy of religion— especially, though not exclusively, as it is pursued in the “analytic tradition”—is that its preoccupation with questions of rationality and justification in relation to “theism” has deflected attention from the diversity of forms that religious life takes. Among measures proposed for ameliorating this condition has been the deployment of “thick description” that facilitates more richly contextualized understandings of religious phenomena. Endorsing and elaborating this proposal, I provide an over- view of different but related notions of thick description before turning to two specific examples, which illustrate the potential for engagement with ethnography to contribute to an expanded conception of philosophy of religion. Keywords Thick description · Expanding philosophy of religion · Radical pluralism · Ethnography · Interdisciplinarity · Animal sacrifice · Buddhism [I]f one wants to philosophize about religion, then one needs to understand religion in all its messy cultural-historical diversity. Insofar as one considers only a limited set of traditions or reasons, one’s philosophy of religion is limited. (Knepper 2013, p. 76) What’s ragged should be left ragged. (Wittgenstein 1998, p. 51) A common and thoroughly understandable complaint about much contemporary philosophy of religion is that its scope remains abysmally restricted.
    [Show full text]
  • Downloaded File
    See discussions, stats, and author profiles for this publication at: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/329572822 Interpretation in Muslim Philosophy Book · January 2012 CITATIONS READS 0 323 1 author: Abduljaleel Alwali United Arab Emirates University 3 PUBLICATIONS 0 CITATIONS SEE PROFILE All content following this page was uploaded by Abduljaleel Alwali on 11 December 2018. The user has requested enhancement of the downloaded file. Interpretation in Muslim Philosophy By Prof. Abdul Jaleel Kadhim Al Wali Philosophy Department Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences United Arab Emirates University Al Ain Abu Dhabi UAE Phone: +971-50-663-6703 [email protected] Abstract Muslim philosophers had been preoccupied with the question of interpretation since the Islamic Philosophy was first developed by its founder Al Kindi till its interpretative maturity by Ibn Rushd who represents the maturity of rationalism in Islamic Arab philosophy. Rational option was the most suitable for Arab Muslim civilization as it expresses the vitality of civilization and its ability to interact with other contemporary civilizations and trends. Islamic philosophy interpretation themes are various as they adopted the following terms: 1. Interpreting the approval of the Greek philosophy in Muslim culture. 2. Interpreting the relationship between religion and philosophy. 3. Interpreting the relationship between Mind and Mind ( Plato and Aristotle ) 4. Interpreting the relationship between nature and Metaphysics. The goals of interpretation for Muslim philosophers are different as Al Kind pointed that they are oriented towards the Greek philosophy in general and towards religion and philosophy in particular while Al Farabi pointed that they are oriented towards the Greek philosophy in general and towards Plato and Aristotle.
    [Show full text]