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Dissertation Anthology 2019-20 DissertatioN ANthology A CollectioN of Philosophy StudeNt DissertatioNs The UNiversity of Liverpool DepartmeNt of Philosophy 2019-20 Authors, Editors aNd Supervisors Authors StepheN Arkley Mia ReNshaw Ashley BoNNell ANNa Ross Joe BoylaNd Sarah Sharp Georgie Campbell JustiNe SolaNo Lucy Chambers Eddie Southcombe ANNa NuNez de Croker George Wood Harry DaymaN Sam WoottoN Marcus Desai Abi HamiltoN Alice GoodwiN Josh Hibbert Josef Grover Jemima HuNt LiNtoN NewtoN Editors Alice GoodwiN Dr Rachael WisemaN Supervisors Chris Bartley JaN JobliNg Rob Booth Ilias Markolefas Barry DaiNtoN RobiN McKeNNa Rebecca DavNall StepheN McLeod Richard GaskiN Thomas Schramme DaNiel Hill Vid SimoNiti PriNtiNg paid for by PhilSoc Table of CoNteNts Editor’s INtroductioN v DissertatioN ANthology vi SelliNg Harm or SelliNg Self: Is harm iNhereNt or coNtiNgeNt to the sex iNdustry? StepheN Arkley 1 BecomiNg EcosyNchroNus: A PromisiNg SolutioN to the CurreNt State of the ENviroNmeNt Ashley BoNNell 4 Self-Respect, Self-Authorship aNd the MeaNs of ProductioN: A Critique of Market Democracy Joe BoylaNd 7 CaN FemiNist EmpaNcipatory Speech be DiscrimiNatory? Georgie Campbell 10 A Critical ANalysis of SimoNe de Beauvoir’s Theory of WomeN’s OtherNess iN The SecoNd Sex Lucy Chambers 13 Why the NoN-ExisteNce of Extra-Terrestrial INtelligeNce is the most CohereNt ANswer to Fermi's Paradox Harry DaymaN 16 Does the Utility of PlaNtiNga’s Free Will DefeNce Need to be recoNsidered iN a way which reflects beliefs about the Diseases of the MiNd? Marcus Desai 19 AN ANswer to the Paradox of the StoNe Alice GoodwiN 22 IN DefeNce of CompositioNal Pluralism as a Proposed ANswer to the Special CompositioN QuestioN Josef Grover 24 The PreseNtatioN of WomeN iN FaNtasy FictioN aNd How to Move Forward LiNtoN NewtoN 27 Is It Morally Acceptable to Sell a KidNey? ANNa NuNez de Croker 30 Is the Catholic Church’s StaNce oN AbortioN a MeaNs of CoNtrolliNg WomeN? Mia ReNshaw 33 The Self, Buddhist MiNdfulNess MeditatioN aNd MeNtal SufferiNg: Does the Idea of a PermaNeNt Self lead to SufferiNg aNd is Buddhist MiNdfulNess Practice the key to alleviatiNg it? ANNa Ross 36 AN AssessmeNt of Plato’s Ideas CoNcerNiNg KNowledge aNd RuliNg iN The Republic Sarah Sharp 39 HumaN DigNity: AN ANalysis of the RomaN Catholic Church's INteractioN with HumaN Rights JustiNe SolaNo 42 Does the Problem of Evil meaN that Belief iN God is UNreasoNable? Eddie Southcombe 45 The Social CoNstructioN of Disability George Wood 48 AN AccouNt of CoNsciousNess: AN ArgumeNt for PaNpsychism Sam WoottoN 51 Special CommeNdatioN 54 Family VloggiNg: A New Form of Child ExploitatioN? Abi HamiltoN 55 CaN KaNt’s TraNsceNdeNtal Idealism Be CoNsidered BerkeleiaN? Josh Hibbert 68 Should ANteNatal ScreeNiNg For Disability Be Made MaNdatory? Jemima HuNt 80 Editor’s INtroductioN This DissertatioN ANthology is a celebratioN of our achievemeNts, aNd a guide for future dissertatioN studeNts. Above all else, this collectioN will be a permaNeNt remiNder for the Philosophy studeNts of 2019-20 that their hard work has beeN ackNowledged, aNd that their diligeNce should be celebrated Not just by other studeNts, but by themselves. PhilSoc kiNdly paid for the priNtiNg of this book, as a show of their heartfelt support aNd of how impressed they are with our accomplishmeNts, especially coNsideriNg the Covid-19 paNdemic we all had to work through. I chose to put together this ANthology with the help of Dr Rachael WisemaN because I am proud of what we have achieved. To all the studeNts who coNtributed: You have all doNe somethiNg amaziNg aNd it has beeN a joy to work so closely with all of you to make this ANthology a reality. ThaNk you for shariNg your work with me. ThaNk you for carryiNg oN eveN wheN times got tough. ThaNk you for puttiNg up with my eNdless messages. ThaNk you. To the future studeNts: As a fiNal compassioNate act, each studeNt who has beeN iNcluded iN this DissertatioN ANthology, has offered a few words of advice to future dissertatioN studeNts. Every studeNt has a completely iNdividual writiNg process, aNd so these commeNts are Not meaNt to replace the formal advice aNd iNformatioN provided by the module. Rather, they are a realistic look iNto what plaNNiNg, creatiNg, aNd writiNg a Philosophy dissertatioN is like. Every studeNt who has beeN iNcluded iN this ANthology started from the same positioN as you may be iN Now: a blaNk page. WritiNg a dissertatioN is a lot of work, but if this ANthology proves aNythiNg, it is that you caN do it too. Good luck. Alice GoodwiN StudeNt Editor v DissertatioN ANthology For the purposes of space, we were Not able to iNclude full versioNs of every dissertatioN. To eNsure that the aims, argumeNtatioN aNd structure of each dissertatioN is clearly uNderstood, we have iNcluded both the abstract aNd a choseN sectioN from each dissertatioN, with a short iNtroductioN iN betweeN, explaiNiNg the sectioN’s positioN aNd purpose withiN the wider dissertatioN. We have also iNcluded short reflectioNs provided by each studeNt, commeNtiNg oN their experieNce that led to the creatioN of their dissertatioN. All of the studeNts iNvolved are excelleNt writers, with aN immeNse well of kNowledge aNd opiNioN oN their choseN topic, aNd so I hope the sectioNs we have selected successfully coNvey the ability aNd passioN of each studeNt. vi SelliNg Sex or SelliNg Self: Is Harm INhereNt or CoNtiNgeNt to the Sex INdustry? StepheN Arkley Abstract IN this dissertatioN, I will iNvestigate whether harm should be coNsidered iNtriNsic or coNtiNgeNt to sex-work. First, I will outliNe the curreNt debate. I will iNvestigate both FemiNist aNd KaNtiaN claims that sex-work iNvolves selliNg the self. I will ultimately argue that these claims are mistakeN aNd that there is No iNtriNsic wroNg to sex-work. I will theN discuss coNtiNgeNt harms iN the sex iNdustry aNd how these harms are best reduced. IN the secoNd part, I will couNter some criticisms that prostitutes are uNable to coNseNt iN aNy meaNiNgful way. I will reject both the view that patriarchy aNd commodificatioN of sex make coNseNt meaNiNgless aNd argue that a form of coNstraiNed ageNcy caN be retaiNed so loNg as the sex-worker maiNtaiNs their ‘sexual jurisdictioN’. IN the fiNal sectioN, I will argue that the state has a respoNsibility to eNsure that this ‘sexual jurisdictioN’ is maiNtaiNed aNd that a fuNdameNtal shift iN the sex-work debate is Necessary to briNg this about. The followiNg extract examiNes the argumeNt that harm is coNtiNgeNt to the sex iNdustry, aNd the aspects of prostitutioN that must be focused oN iN order for harm to be reduced. Harm as CoNtiNgeNt to the Sex INdustry There is a myriad of problems faced by prostitutes, that while coNtiNgeNt, are still sigNificaNt eNough to warraNt coNcerN aNd poteNtial regulatioN. IN a 2002 study iN Merseyside, 54% of sex-workers iNterviewed had beeN physically assaulted aNd 43% sexually assaulted¹. MaNy iN the iNdustry will experieNce extortioN of moNey, imprisoNmeNt or violeNce. ooooMaNy radical femiNists call for various methods of regulatioN iN order to curtail these coNtiNgeNt harms. However, it is Not appareNt that these forms of regulatioN do aNythiNg to stop violeNce aNd iN maNy cases, it is the police rather thaN clieNts that sex-workers ideNtify as threats. Sex-worker Melissa Gira GraNt highlights how 70% of sex-workers iN New York have had ruN-iNs with the police². As sex-work is crimiNalised, if a sex-worker experieNces sexual assault aNd goes to the police for help they will either be igNored or crimiNalised themselves. As oNe sex-worker Carol remarked ‘If I call them, they doN't come after ¹Mulvihill, N. (2017). ‘ProstitutioN aNd VioleNce’ IN N. Lombard, The Routledge HaNdbook of GeNder aNd VioleNce. LoNdoN & New York: Routledge, 223-237. ²GraNt, M. G. (2014). PlayiNg the Whore: The Work of Sex Work. LoNdoN & New York: Verso. 1 ...After a girl was gaNg-raped, they said, “forget it, she works iN the street’³. A commoN attitude expressed by the police iN such cases is that rape by a clieNt ‘simply comes with the job’4 . ooooIN respoNse to curreNt models of regulatioN, Julie BiNdel calls for the adoptioN of the ‘Nordic Model’: a model which decrimiNalises selliNg sex but crimiNalises its purchase 5. This approach is ladeN with problems. The approach simply pushes sex-work iNto seedier corNers. As sex-worker Laura Lee remarks: ‘people are Not williNg to use oNliNe bookiNg forms, Not williNg to divulge their details... there hasN’t beeN a reductioN iN demaNd, but it is far more difficult to keep myself safe’ 6. It would thus appear that whether sex-work is crimiNalised or a Nordic-style model is iNtroduced, sex-workers will still face sigNificaNt social harm aNd stigma. ooooThere are maNy who argue that violeNce is best reduced by decrimiNalisatioN aNd ‘sex-radicalism’. AccordiNg to sex radicals: the positioN of prostitutioN caNNot be reduced to oNe of a passive object used iN a male sexual practice, but iNstead caN be uNderstood as a place of ageNcy where the sex worker makes active use of the existiNg sexual order.7 AccordiNg to this view, the daNgers attached to sex-work oNly exist because of a patriarchal culture iN which the ‘femiNiNe has beeN coded to meaN weak’; the challeNge theN is to ‘chaNge what it meaNs to be female iN relatioN to the male’ 8. So, if DworkiN is right to suggest that what it meaNs to be a womaN is determiNed through the existeNce of the sex iNdustry, theN sex-radicals argue that ‘womeN should be giveN more coNtrol, rather thaN less, over areas where they caN aNd are expected to Negotiate the sex acts iNvolved’9 .
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