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Epistemic Justice and Epistemic Participation Kate C.S Washington University in St. Louis Washington University Open Scholarship Arts & Sciences Electronic Theses and Dissertations Arts & Sciences Spring 5-15-2019 Epistemic Justice and Epistemic Participation Kate C.S. Schmidt Washington University in St. Louis Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/art_sci_etds Part of the Epistemology Commons, and the Ethics and Political Philosophy Commons Recommended Citation Schmidt, Kate C.S., "Epistemic Justice and Epistemic Participation" (2019). Arts & Sciences Electronic Theses and Dissertations. 1787. https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/art_sci_etds/1787 This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Arts & Sciences at Washington University Open Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Arts & Sciences Electronic Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Washington University in St. Louis Department of Philosophy Program in Philosophy-Neuroscience-Psychology Dissertation Examination Committee: Julia Driver, Chair Anne Margaret Baxley Miranda Fricker Ron Mallon Kit Wellman Epistemic Justice and Epistemic Participation by Kathryn C.S. Schmidt A dissertation presented to The Graduate School of Washington University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy May 2019 Saint Louis, Missouri ©2019, Kathryn C.S. Schmidt Table of Contents Acknowledgments :::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: v Abstract :::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: vi Preface ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: ix 1 What's Unjust about \Testimonial Injustice"? :::::::::::::::: 1 1.0.1 Introduction . 1 1.0.2 Criteria . 3 1.1 The Phenomenon of Interest . 5 1.1.1 The Cases . 5 1.1.2 The Disagreement . 6 1.2 Epistemic Injustice as Distributive Injustice . 8 1.2.1 Assessing a Distributive Account . 11 1.2.2 Misrepresenting Credibility . 12 1.3 Epistemic Oppression as Restricted Epistemic Capacity . 16 1.3.1 Epistemic Oppression . 17 1.3.2 Epistemic Marginalization . 19 1.3.3 Fricker's Framework and Epistemic Marginalization . 21 1.3.4 Assessing this Approach . 23 1.3.5 Pursuing Justice . 26 1.3.6 New Insights . 28 1.4 Conclusion . 29 2 Credibility and Epistemic Standing: Two Failures of Respect in Epistemic Injustice :::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 30 2.1 Epistemic Injustice and Disrespect . 31 2.2 Two Kinds of Respect . 34 2.2.1 Credibility and Epistemic Appraisal . 36 2.3 Epistemic Standing . 37 2.3.1 Epistemic Standing and Recognition Respect . 40 2.4 The Target of Disrespect . 42 2.5 Implications . 44 2.5.1 Feeling Out of the Loop . 44 2.5.2 The Scope of Epistemic Injustice . 45 ii 2.6 Conclusion . 45 3 Knowledge and Participation: Giving a Participatory Account of Epis- temic Injustice :::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 47 3.1 Two Accounts of Epistemic Injustice . 48 3.1.1 Testimonial Account . 50 3.1.2 Non-Testimonial Account . 51 3.2 A Participatory Account of Epistemic Injustice . 54 3.2.1 Respecting The Capacity to Participate . 55 3.2.2 Failures of Epistemic Appraisal . 57 3.2.3 Failures of Epistemic Recognition . 58 3.2.4 Failures of Epistemic Access . 60 3.2.5 A Broader Account . 62 3.3 Assessing the Participatory Account . 63 3.3.1 Explaining New Cases of Epistemic Injustice . 64 3.3.2 A Potential Problem . 65 3.3.3 A Unified Account? . 68 3.4 Conclusion . 70 4 Inclusion: Addressing Epistemic Injustice with a Group Virtue ::::: 72 4.0.1 Introduction . 72 4.1 Inclusion and Epistemic Justice . 74 4.1.1 Worries about Individual Virtues . 78 4.2 Understanding Inclusion . 80 4.2.1 Definitional Inclusion: Inclusion vs Exclusion . 82 4.2.2 Functional Inclusion . 84 4.2.3 Aspirational Inclusion: Epistemic Flourishing . 87 4.3 Inclusion as a Group Virtue . 90 4.3.1 Inclusive Features of Groups . 92 4.3.2 Inclusion and Epistemic Injustice . 94 4.4 Cultivating the Virtue of Inclusion . 95 4.5 Conclusion . 99 5 The Pain of Being Overlooked: A Case Study on Fibromyalgia and Inter- sectional Epistemic Justice :::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 100 5.0.1 Introduction . 100 5.1 A Fibromyalgia Diagnosis . 103 5.1.1 Facing The Unknown: Diagnosis and Invalidation . 105 5.1.2 Existing Theories of Epistemic Injustice . 109 5.1.3 Improving on Previous Analysis . 109 5.2 Epistemic Vulnerability . 111 5.2.1 Illness and Discrimination . 111 iii 5.2.2 Varied Epistemic Vulnerabilities . 112 5.3 Intersectional Epistemic Justice . 119 5.3.1 Intersectional Feminism . 119 5.3.2 Intersectional Commitments in the Epistemic Domain . 121 5.3.3 Seeking Solutions . 129 5.4 Conclusion . 131 References . 133 iv Acknowledgments I have immense gratitude for the many people who have supported my academic research. I am indebted to the Washington University in St. Louis philosophy department for providing the financial support that made this project possible. Thank you to my advisor Julia Driver, and my committee, for lending your time and expertise. I am also indebted to my colleagues for helping me to develop my work, especially to Cameron Evans, Jordan Shaw, and Chris- tiane Merritt. Thanks also to Gillian Russell, Fay Edwards, Charlie Kurth, Lizzie Scheckter, Julia Staffel, and Brian Talbot for their support and encouragement. I am grateful to Jeff Kasser and Elizabeth Tropman for supporting my philosophy interests while at Colorado State University. I especially want to thank my husband Mike Schmidt, and my close academic colleagues Caroline Stone and Katie Rapier, for going on this journey with me. I am thankful to my extended family for their love, support, and inspiration. Thank you also to Kevin Brich and Elyse Thorpe for supporting me. Kathryn C.S. Schmidt Washington University in Saint Louis May 2019 v ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION Epistemic Justice and Epistemic Participation by Kathryn C.S. Schmidt Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy-Neuroscience-Psychology Washington University in St. Louis, May 2019 Professor Julia Driver, Chair I advance a new theory of epistemic injustice, with important implications for pursuing epistemic justice. This project develops a positive account of epistemic justice, broadens the scope of the phenomenon, and motivates new interventions. This dissertations works towards a better understanding of what it means to be an epistemic subject and to be treated as such. I argue that epistemic injustice can be understood through a lens of participation in inquiry, rather than using the received view that focuses on testimony. On my account, victims are marginalized when disrespected and devalued as potential participants in inquiry due to prejudice. This account broadens the domain of epistemic injustice, incorporating dif- ferent instances of epistemic exclusion that do not involve testimony. This participatory account can better explain the core features of epistemic injustice and identifies mechanisms in subtypes of epistemic injustice. Preventing and remedying epistemic injustice requires creating inclusive communities that respect and foster participation in inquiry. I argue that the virtuous elements of inclusion are embodied in groups rather than individuals, and can vi successfully address the wrong of epistemic injustice. Successfully fostering inclusion will require an intersectional approach in order to address varied forms of epistemic injustice. My dissertation is a collection of five inter-related articles expanding the notion of epistemic injustice. In the first chapter, the article \What's unjust about testimonial injustice?" ex- plores underlying notions of \justice" within the phenomenon of epistemic injustice. I argue that different philosophers rely upon different notions of justice (specifically David Coady and Miranda Fricker). In contrast to both of their views, I argue that epistemic injustice should be understood as a form of oppression. Next, I argue that there are at least two dif- ferent ways to disrespect victims of epistemic injustice: by denying them recognition respect (their epistemic standing) or appraisal respect (their credibility). The article \Credibility and Recognition: Two Failures of Respect in Epistemic Injustice" makes up the second chapter. Chapter three, \Knowledge and Participation: Giving a Participatory Account of Epistemic Injustice" argues that epistemic subjects are wronged when de-valued as potential participants (by denying access, recognition, or appraisal). This participatory framework is better able to analyze the category of epistemic injustice compared to other approaches. I propose cultivating the virtue of inclusion (as a virtue of social groups) in the next chapter: \Inclusion: Addressing Epistemic Injustice with a Group Virtue". Inclusion (rather than open-mindedness, testimonial injustice, or trust) is the virtue that is best able to prevent and remedy instances of epistemic injustice. Using a case study of patients with fibromyalgia, I show that different types of epistemic injustice impact and reinforce one another. Those who experience epistemic injustice encounter it while also ex- periencing other overlapping oppressions. As a result, I argue we must pursue intersectional vii epistemic justice. The fifth and final chapter addresses this topic, in: \The Pain of Being Overlooked: A Case Study on Fibromyalgia and Intersectional Epistemic Justice". The existing literature on epistemic injustice has been overly narrow in focus, missing signif- icant instances of epistemic wrongs. My project can help both ethicists and epistemologists formulate
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