GREEN IS THE NEW BLACK: HOW THE SHELL PETROLEUM DEVELOPMENT COMPANY COMMUNICATES SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY IN THE NIGER DELTA
By Andrew Brickfield
Submitted to the
Faculty of the College of Arts and Sciences
of American University
in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree of
Bachelor of Arts
in
Sociology
Honors Capstone Advisor: Andrea Brenner, Department of Sociology
General University Honors
Spring 2014
American University
Washington, D.C. 20016
! © COPYRIGHT
BY
ANDREW BRICKFIELD
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED
! DEDICATION
The research presented in this capstone is dedicated to the following:
My professors and advisors: Without you, none of this would make sense.
My friends and loved ones on campus and abroad: Without you, none of this would be fun.
My parents: Without you, none of this would be possible.
! GREEN IS THE NEW BLACK: HOW THE SHELL PETROLEUM DEVELOPMENT COMPANY COMMUNICATES SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY IN THE NIGER DELTA
BY
Andrew Brickfield
ABSTRACT
The Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC) first entered Nigeria in
1938, with a license to explore for oil granted by the territory’s British colonial administrators (Jedrzej et al 2000). In the years since, SPDC has developed a successful joint venture oil and petroleum exploration, production and distribution business owned by the Federal Government’s Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation
(NNPC) (55%); SPDC (30%); Total E&P Nigeria Limited (10%); and Nigerian Agip Oil
Company (5%) (Shell.com.ng 2014). The operations of the joint venture have been subject to intense outside criticism on the basis of environmental and social damages caused by oil spills in the Niger Delta (Livesey 2001; Okonta and Douglas 2001;
Wheeler et al 2001; Adunbi 2011; Amadi and Abdullah 2012; Allen 2012). This has caused SPDC to engage in a series of discursive battles with its critics (Livesey 2001).
This study aims to better understand how SPDC uses every day communications materials to protect and maintain the social legitimacy of its operations in the Niger
Delta. Research in this study employs Critical Discourse Analysis using Foucauldian techniques to analyze the discursive impact of these day-to-day communications from
SPDC. The analysis finds that the majority of SPDC’s day-to-day communications analyzed in this study contain discursive actions and tools associated with protecting the social legitimacy of an organization.
! TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION 1
LITERATURE REVIEW 4
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 25
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 32
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 38
COMPARATIVE DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 59
—
APPENDIX A 62
APPENDIX B 63
APPENDIX C 65
APPENDIX D 67
APPENDIX E 68
APPENDIX F 72
—
REFERENCES 76!
! Introduction: The Research and its Setting
In 1938, the British colonial administrators of Nigeria provided one of only two oil exploration licenses granted for the colony to Royal Dutch Shell PLC. This is perhaps one of the most pivotal events in the development of modern Nigeria, as Shell would use this first-mover advantage to establish corporate dominance in the growing nation
(Jedrzej et all 2000). Today, the Shell Petroleum Development Company operates a joint venture oil and petroleum exploration, production and distribution business owned by the Federal Government’s Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) (55%);
SPDC (30%); Total E&P Nigeria Limited (10%); and Nigerian Agip Oil Company (5%)
(Shell.com.ng 2014). This joint venture has contributed billions of dollars to the Nigerian federal government through profit sharing with NNPC, federal and state taxes, and both legally required and voluntary development initiatives (Jedrzej et al 2000; Okonta and
Douglas 2001; Ite 2004). SPDC exports oil and liquefied natural gas from Nigeria and is the only international oil company to distribute gas within Nigeria to industrial customers
(Shell.com.ng 2014). The oil company estimates that 95% of its after-costs revenue from producing one barrel of oil goes to the Nigerian Federal Government (Shell.com.ng
2014).
However, in contrast to all that SPDC contributes to Nigeria’s government and development, the firm also has many critics within and outside the nation. Outside organizations, such as Greenpeace, have boycotted and protested the actions of SPDC in Nigeria on the basis that these operations cause unaccounted for environmental damage in oil producing regions (Livesey 2001). Domestic groups such as the
Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) or the Movement for the
1! ! Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) have protested SPDC and its production sites both peacefully and violently. These groups argue that the indigenous people of the
Niger Delta face environmental and social costs as a result of years of oil production in the region, and are not receiving fair compensation for the damage done to their land and livelihoods in exchange for oil (Okonta and Douglas 2001; Ako 2011; Obi and
Rustad 2011).
This battle over oil production between a government-backed Western corporation and the indigenous people of the oil producing regions has come to a head multiple times, most notably in the mid 1990’s, with the rise and fall of MOSOP and the
1995 execution of nine Ogoni protest leaders by a military junta (Okonta and Douglas
2001; Ako 2011; Obi and Rustad 2011). These events caused an outpouring of negative media attention on SPDC and Royal Dutch Shell PLC. This reputational crisis, along with other noteworthy crises experienced by Royal Dutch Shell PLC in the late
1990’s, led to an internal revaluation by Royal Dutch Shell PLC and SPDC executives, to determine how the company can operate in more sustainable and responsible ways
(Livesey 2001; Ite 2004; Watts 2005). The need to operate more sustainably and responsibly subsequently produced the need to communicate sustainability and responsibility, so that SPDC can debunk its critics and ensure the social legitimacy of its business.
Not coincidentally, around the same time that Shell and other multinational corporations were learning from their reputational crises around the world, the idea of corporate social responsibility and sustainable enterprise began to take hold in the corporate dialogue (Livesey 2001; Laufer 2003; Munshi and Kurian 2005). Multinational
2! ! firms began to focus communications on sustainability, social responsibility and other buzzwords, in order to wage discursive battle against their critics, especially in times of crisis.
Scholarly analysis and a field of study have emerged around the communication of corporate sustainability. Sharon Livesey (2001) conducted research on crisis communications from SPDC to better understand the Language Games and discursive battles waged by SPDC and its critics. Scholars Anna Zalik (2011) and Omolade
Adunbi (2011) have conducted Critical Discourse Analysis on specific sustainability communications from SPDC and questioned whether these communications primarily serve to inform external audiences or to ensure the social legitimacy of SPDC.
Similarly, Mason and Mason (2012) conducted Critical Discourse Analysis of the environmental impact reports issued by one hundred Fortune 1000 companies to determine the discursive impact of these reports.
This study aims to contribute to the scholarship on how corporations use communications to ensure social legitimacy by analyzing communications materials released by SPDC on a day-to-day basis. Understanding the discursive impact of the day-to-day communications of SPDC will provide insights on how SPDC constructs the internal and external imagining of its operations in Nigeria when it is not facing immediate crises or critics. Through Critical Discourse Analysis employing Foucauldian techniques borrowed from Livesey (2001) and Fairclough (1992), this study hopes to improve understanding of the discursive impact of SPDC communications.
3! ! Literature Review
Introduction:
In response to the growing awareness among middle class consumers of the numerous environmental and human rights abuses committed by multinational corporations
(MNCs) in the developing world, the world of business communications has become publicly enamored with the concept of corporate social responsibility (CSR) and the necessity of “good” corporate citizenship over the past three decades (Munshi and
Kurian 2005; Mason and Mason 2012). This study seeks to analyze the communications activities associated with CSR of the Shell Petroleum Development
Company of Nigeria to determine how they help to frame and maintain SPDC’s mandate to extract oil from the Niger Delta following the international backlash the company received after the world learned of its efforts in the early 1990’s to destroy local opposition to oil extraction in the Niger Delta (Pegg 1999; Okonta and Douglas
2001). The need for such an analysis stems from the difficulty of determining whether
CSR activities and associated public relations materials are genuine, and truly contribute to the production of improved environmental and social outcomes (Laufer
2003; Munshi and Kurian 2005; Dahl 2010; Mason and Mason 2012). This literature review will examine: the history of SPDC in Niger Delta, the contemporary scholarly analysis of the firm’s actions in the region, and the relationship between MNCs, CSR and public relations.
4! ! The History of SPDC in Niger Delta:
A Monopoly in Nigeria
The Niger Delta is a strategically important region for both Nigeria and the international community (Ukiwo 2011). The region provides 10% of all U.S. oil imports and its oil exports have generated 90% of Nigeria’s external revenues and approximately $600 billion of wealth since the 1960’s (Ukiwo 2011). The Niger Delta has been the focal point of one civil war, numerous civilian deaths, and repeated armed conflict between indigenous populations and the Nigerian federal government (Allen
2012). Yet, despite its status as a major source of SPDC’s oil extraction revenues in
Nigeria, the region is dominated by poverty and a lack of development (Amadi and
Abdullah 2012). Presently, 30 million individuals call the Niger Delta home, and its recoverable oil reserves have an estimated worth of more than $3.1 trillion (Allen 2012).
Shell’s long and complex history in Nigeria began in 1938, when BP and Shell, both major British oil companies, were given permits to explore for oil in Nigeria by its colonial ruler, the British Empire (Jedrzej et al 2000). These firms maintained a monopoly over oil extraction in the region throughout the period of British colonial control, which ended in 1960 (Jedrzej et al 2000). Jederzj G. Jedrzej, Matthias P. Beck and Kamel Mellahi, in their analysis Maintaining corporate dominance after decolonization: the ‘first mover advantage’ of Shell-BP in Nigeria, argue that this monopoly provided to Shell and BP allowed the firms to establish a first mover advantage and maintain dominance in the region even after decolonization in 1960.
They find that despite efforts by the Nigerian government to diminish Shell’s market share through diversification and nationalization measures within the Nigerian oil
5! ! industry, the firm maintained dominance for more than four decades after decolonization. Jedrzej et al partially attribute this continued dominance in the Nigerian oil sector to early possession of extraction permits for strategically important and profitable geographic locations, as well as the ability to set up and maintain extraction operations in these important locations before competitors could enter the market, both consequences of Shell’s first mover advantage in Nigeria. However, Jedrzej et al conclude that first mover advantage alone is not significant in explaining Shell’s decades of dominance in Nigeria, and instead argue that “in the long term, the most important reason why Shell was able to maintain a dominant position was perhaps the inability of the Nigerian government to devise and execute effective diversification and nationalization programmes” (Jedrzej et al 2001: 423).
During these decades of dominance, measures such as the Land Use Act of
1978 and the Petroleum Act of 1969 took ownership of oil-producing lands from their indigenous populations and gave it to the Nigerian federal government to distribute to oil extraction companies (Adunbi 2011). The federal government would do so through the nationalized Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC), which engages in joint ventures with international firms to provide access to oil producing lands in exchange for economic rents derived from the firms’ extraction, refinement and sale of these resources (Ite 2004). The largest of these joint ventures is SPDC (Ite 2004). SPDC is responsible for 40% of Nigeria’s oil production and 53% of its hydrocarbon reserve base
(Ite 2004).
6! ! Conflict Arises: A Struggle for Control
A consequence of the creation of the NNPC and its numerous joint ventures is the enrichment of the Nigerian federal government and the elite political class that benefits primarily from the massive oil rents generated in the Niger Delta (Allen 2012).
As a result, the Nigerian federal government, and the individuals who populate it, consider any threat to oil production in the Niger Delta a threat to Nigerian national security (Allen 2012). However, the massive wealth generated by oil extraction in the
Niger Delta has not resulted in significant improvements to the livelihoods of those who call the Niger Delta home (Wheeler et al 2001; Adunbi 2011; Amadi and Abdullah 2012;
Allen 2012). In fact, for many long time residents of the Niger Delta, their quality of life has decreased since the discovery of oil in the region, a result of disappearing property rights and uncontrolled oil pollution leading to the destruction of the natural environment and the former thriving agrarian economy of the Niger Delta (Adunbi 2011).
Conflict between these two populations—those who benefit from oil extraction in the Niger Delta, and those who do not—has arisen often in Nigeria since the discovery of oil (Pegg 1999; Okonta and Douglas 2001). The bloodiest of these conflicts came early in Nigeria’s history. Ike Okonta and Oronto Douglas, authors of Where Vultures
Feast, a chronology of oil extraction in Nigeria, describe Nigeria’s civil war, which resulted in the death of an estimated 2 million Nigerians:
The civil war that raged between the breakaway Eastern Region [Biafra] and the rest of the country from July 1967 to January 1970 was not so much a war to maintain the unity and integrity of the country (fought with such catchy slogans as “To Keep Nigeria One is a Task that Must Be Done”) as a desperate gambit by the federal government to win back the oil fields of the Niger Delta from Biafra (Okonto and Douglas 2001: 21).
7! ! While this was the largest and bloodiest battle over control of the Niger Delta’s oil fields—it established the status quo in the region for decades to come—it was hardly the last battle between Nigeria’s federal government and the inhabitants of the Niger
Delta (Okonta and Douglas 2001).
In his articled titled, The struggle for resource control and violence in the Niger
Delta, Rhuks Ako describes the violent and nonviolent battles waged over resource control in the Niger Delta. Ako argues that the primary driver of the ongoing violence in the Niger Delta stems from the desire for resource control among Niger Delta inhabitants and the federal government. Beginning with the attempts by the Niger Delta
Volunteer Force to establish the Niger Delta Republic in 1966 (which would lead to the
1967 civil war), and ending with violence initiated since 2006 by the Movement for the
Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), Ako details a pattern of violence in the Niger
Delta. Ako writes that,
These organizations have defined resource control in socio-economic, political and human rights contexts that have appealed to sympathetic observers within and outside the country (Ikelegbe 2006b). Combining the intellectual expression of their agitation for resource control with the consistency of purpose; access to arms and ammunitions; and the dexterity and assiduous planning of their activities have resulted in unprecedented levels of petro-violence experienced in the Niger Delta (Ako 2011: 43).
Ako briefly mentions the failed nonviolent attempts at obtaining resource control led by the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) in the early 1990’s but argues that movement away from military rule to democratic governance in 1999 has lead to increased violence. He cites a Human Rights Watch report, arguing,
With the return to democratic governance in 1999, politicians have become primary drivers for government policies and activities. However, to gain access to political authority, politicians recognize the advantage in aligning with and arming youth organization that are no longer apolitical and have gained
8! ! prominence in their communities where they could influence the result of polls (Ako 2011: 47).
Upon assuming power, however, these new politicians have only seen continued rises in violence and corruption. Two governors of Niger Delta states who advocated for increased resource control for the region were found to have enriched themselves with the new oil wealth gained from the federal government’s attempts to quell desires for more resource control (Ako 2011). This only lead to increased violence as militarized supporters fought to prevent the arrest of these governors, although it is unclear whether these militarized supporters are “militant groups that support the agitation for resource control, political supporters or plain thugs hired by the ex-governor to protect himself” (Ako 2011: 49). Ultimately, Ako posits that the violent struggle for resource control, especially after 1999, “is driven by collective personal and opportunistic interests.” However, he writes:
These dimensions should not detract from the reality that the region has been seized by violence arising from the widespread feeling that its people have been severely short-changed with the context of Nigeria’s ‘unequal’ fiscal federalism. It is the feeling that injustice, exclusion and impunity cannot be effectively resisted by non-violent means, which has fueled the actions of various actors engaged in ‘petrolized violence’ (Ako 2011: 51).
This reality, defined by feelings of injustice and exclusion, is the result of years of resource control held by MNCs, such as SPDC, in the Niger Delta. As, Jedrzej et all
(2000) argue, the failure of the Nigerian government to nationalize or diversify its oil industry has led to decades of monopolistic dominance by SPDC in Nigeria. This monopolistic dominance has led to various environmental and human rights abuses against the indigenous people of the Niger Delta, primarily rooted in the withholding of oil wealth from Niger Delta inhabitants (Okonto and Douglas 2001). In response to
9! ! these abuses, many different nonviolent and violent organizations have actively resisted domination by SPDC and the federal government (Ako 2011). The following section will explore SPDC’s response to nonviolent and violent opposition in the Niger Delta, and will examine the scholarly analysis of these actions.
Scholarly Analysis of SPDC in the Niger Delta
Introduction
Where Vultures Feast, a chronology of the relationship between SPDC and the
Niger Delta, culminates with the failed effort by MOSOP to bring some level of justice and autonomy to the region. Its authors, Okonta and Douglas, begin their analysis with the creation of Nigeria “by British merchants and soldiers of fortune primarily to serve the mother country’s interests as 19th century capitalism entered the stage of imperialism, and desired even more sources of cheap raw materials and also new markets for its products” (10). They outline how successive governments, first of British elites, than Nigerian political and military elites, repeatedly embezzled personal fortunes of oil wealth through the federal government (Okonta and Douglas 2001; Ako 2011).
This lead to instability during the 1980’s as the government engaged in structural adjustment programs influenced by Western financial institutions that would cause mass poverty and suffering (Okonta and Douglas 2001). In the Niger Delta, this suffering was felt especially hard, and in combination with the lingering feelings of injustice, led to demonstrations in 1987 to protest oil exploration by Shell in the Niger Delta (Okonta and
Douglas 2001; Obi and Rustad 2011). The first of these demonstrations, organized by the people of the oil producing community of Iko, was met with violent suppression
(Okonta and Douglas 2001). So too was the second, organized by the people of
10! ! Umuechem, which ended when armed federal troops “killed and maimed them into submission” at the request of SPDC (Okonta and Douglas 2001: 138; Obi and Rustad
2011).
Shell looked to quell future unrest by pressuring Nigeria’s military government to establish the Oil Mineral Producing Areas Development Commission (OMPADEC) in
1992 (Okonta and Douglas 2001; Francis et al 2011). The creation of OMPADEC led to a 1.5 per cent increase in the amount of oil proceeds distributed to the Niger Delta (up to 3 per cent), which would be administered by OMPADEC officials (Okonta and
Douglas 2001; Francis et al 2011). The creation of the commission had a negligible impact on development in the region, though, as its commissioner was a “senior operative of the State Security Service (the notorious SSS) before he was “redeployed” to establish the commission’s headquarters in Port Harcourt” (Okonto and Douglas
2001: 136). A World Bank report in 1995 ultimately found that OMPADEC lacked appropriate personnel to achieve its goals, and put little emphasis on project assessment, long term planning, or sustainable development (Okonta and Douglas
2001; Francis et al 2011).
Had OMPADEC been more effective, some of it primary beneficiaries would have been the Ogoni people, a tribe that calls the Niger Delta home. The Ogoni have a long history with oil and Shell. This tribe has lived in the Niger Delta for millennia and once managed the region’s resources so effectively it was considered the food basket of the
Niger Delta (Okonta and Douglas 2001; Adunbi 2011). However this began to end when Shell arrived in 1958, and would eventually set up as many as 96 oil wells on land that previously belonged to the Ogoni (Okonta and Douglas 2001). These oil wells
11! ! would cause environmental devastation for the Ogoni, beginning in 1970 when oil spilled from SPDC pipelines into Ogoniland for three weeks (Okonta and Douglas
2001). Shell did little to clean up this, or future oil spills, because of a lack of outcry outside of the Ogoni (Okonta and Douglas 2001; Obi and Rustad 2011; Adunbi 2011).
Because SPDC’s pipelines in the Ogoni region are out of date, and not buried underground, as would be the case in developed countries, the area is prone to oil spills and has seen sustained environmental degradation (Okonta and Douglas 2001; Livesey
2001). Sixty per cent of these oil spills were characterized as the result of local sabotage by SPDC officials until 1995, when the company retreated and stated that seventy-five percent of Niger Delta oil spills are a result of old and degraded pipelines
(Okonta and Douglas 2001). This change of story is just one instance of how Shell seeks to frame debate around its oil operations in the Niger Delta.
MOSOP Rises to Power
As mentioned previously, in response to continued environmental degradation and unjust distribution of oil wealth in the region, Ogoni leaders established MOSOP to fight for justice in the Niger Delta (Okonta and Douglas 2001; Ako 2011; Obi and Rustad
2011; Soremekun 2011). Through the use of nonviolent tactics and international media attention, MOSOP forced Shell to leave Ogoniland in 1993 (Okonta and Douglas 2001;
Ako 2011; Obi and Rustad 2011; Soremekun 2011). MOSOP achieved this through publishing a thirty-day ultimatum requesting oil companies operating on Ogoniland to meet a list of demands or cease operation on Ogoniland (Okonta and Douglas 2001;
Obi and Rustad 2011). The demands included: six billion dollars in unpaid royalties, immediate stoppage of environmental degradation, burying of pipelines, four billion
12! ! dollars as reparations and compensation for environmental destruction, and dialogue between community representatives, Shell and the federal government (Okonta and
Douglas 2001). Shell and the federal government ignored this request, but during this time MOSOP, and its leader Ken Saro-Wiwa, gained organizational power, built support organizations, and motivated the Ogoni people to work together for a common goal
(Okonta and Douglas 2001). This culminated in a nonviolent protest involving 300,000
Ogoni that led the federal government to invite MOSOP leaders to a dialogue. This dialogue only served as a medium for the government and its security forces to threaten
MOSOP leaders and push them to end their campaign or see consequences (Okonta and Douglas 2001).
Shell’s senior managers also began to take note of MOSOP, and as leaked minutes from a 1993 strategy meeting in London indicate, Shell officials understood the goals and tactics of MOSOP and endeavored to more closely monitor the situation
(Okonta and Douglas 2001). The first contact between Shell and MOSOP would come shortly after, on April 30, 1993, when a U.S. pipeline contractor accompanied by
Nigerian federal troops was protested by Ogoni farmers who challenged the fact that the contractor lacked an environmental impact assessment (as required by law) and the farmers were paid no compensation for their land, which had been torn up (Okonta and
Douglas 2001). The troops accompanying the contractor shot at the protestors, killing one man, and injuring eleven others; an event which would lead to widespread protests against Shell around the Niger Delta (Okonta and Douglas 2001). In response, Shell ceased activities in the region, causing panic among the Nigerian political elite, who feared a new civil war with the now empowered Niger Delta region (Okonta and
13! ! Douglas 2001; Soremekun 2011). Nigerian military rulers held a meeting with MOSOP leaders and asked for a list of demands, which would eventually be ignored (Okonta and Douglas 2001).
In an effort to return to oil production on Ogoniland, Shell followed Ken Saro-
Wiwa and other MOSOP leaders closely, while the Nigerian military government also arrested these leaders on numerous occasions for their involvement in MOSOP (Okonta and Douglas 2001). In an effort to defeat MOSOP, Shell and the Nigerian government began to create discord among the various tribes in the Niger Delta (Okonta and
Douglas 2001; Ako 2011; Obi and Rustad 2011). Troops of armed, uniformed men attacked and killed Ogoni men and women on numerous occasions throughout 1993, resulting in hundreds of murdered Ogoni (Okonta and Douglas 2001; Ako 2011; Obi and
Rustad 2011). The regional governor, a former Shell executive, framed these conflicts as “communal clash[es]” between tribes, and he set up a panel to mediate peace between the Ogoni and neighboring tribes (Okonta and Douglas 2001: 124). However, the professor tapped to head this peace commission recognized there was in fact no conflict, and instead resolved to produce an investigation into the sophisticated weapons that were used to massacre Niger Delta inhabitants (Okonta and Douglas
2001). Nigerian soldiers interviewed after the fact admitted to killing Ogoni villagers, after receiving deliberately confusing and misleading instructions by military leaders.
Despite this, Shell created an accord for Saro-Wiwa to sign indicating that peace had been restored to the region; Saro-Wiwa and MOSOP rejected this accord, but Shell nevertheless resumed operations in the region (Okonta and Douglas 2001).
14! ! Throughout the rest of 1993 and 1994, MOSOP organized more nonviolent protests against the return of Shell, but this lead to the arrest of MOSOP leaders, and the creation of a new plan by the federal government to use security forces to control tensions in the Niger Delta (and ensure continued oil production, which was framed as an issue of national security) (Okonta and Douglas 2001; Allen 2012). Colonel Paul
Okuntimo was put in charge of this mission, and later admitted to receiving funding and compensation from Shell to continue his massacre of Ogoni villagers (Okonta and
Douglas 2001; Rowell and Lubbers 2010). At the same time that Okuntimo was raiding villages thought to harbor MOSOP support in order to protect Shell oil installations, four
Ogoni chiefs were murdered at meeting in Giokoo. Police and security forces were absent from this location even after being alerted to the actions as the murders were being committed by an angry, unidentified mob (Okonta and Douglas 2001). Nine
MOSOP leaders were arrested and charged for these murders. One of these leaders was Ken Saro-Wiwa, whose brother met with Shell officials to request the release of the
MOSOP leaders. Saro-Wiwa’s brother was told that only the end of the MOSOP international media campaign would result in freedom for MOSOP leaders. Saro-Wiwa rejected these terms and was found guilty of murder and hanged along with the other 8 leaders (Okonta and Douglas 2001). Shell would eventually return to oil production in the region (Okonta and Douglas 2001; Ako 2011; Obi and Rustad 2011; Soremekun
2011).
This story of MOSOP is just one example of the crushing force used by Shell and the Nigerian federal government to prevent any opposition to oil production in the Niger
Delta. Even as the world eventually discovered Shell’s true actions in the Niger Delta,
15! ! oil production in the region remains high (Allen 2012). In order to maintain this production, Shell has engaged in varied efforts, ranging from paying security forces and influencing government, to the use of framing and savvy public affairs techniques. This section will explore how these techniques have changed since 1995, and will examine the scholarly analysis of SPDC’s involvement in the Niger Delta.
The Promise of Development
One of the chief ways that SPDC maintains its mandate to extract oil is through the promise of development for the Niger Delta (Livesy 2001; Ite 2004; Adunbi 2011).
In the work Multinationals and Corporate Social Responsibility in Developing Countries:
A Case Study of Nigeria, Lancaster Unviersity professor Uwem E. Ite describes how following the struggle with MOSOP, Shell changed its development strategy from
“community assistance” to “community development” (Ite 2004: 5-6). The primary difference between the two being that assistance is comprised of one-time gifts, often used to bribe local officials, such as new schools, infrastructure, or money, while development implies coordinated programs to alleviate poverty in the region (Ite 2004).
However, Ite identifies that even after making the move from assistance to development, Shell has seen little success at alleviating poverty. This is perhaps because development can, intentionally or unintentionally, harm the communities it is implemented to help (Ite 2004). Two specific efforts at community development that
Shell initiated after 1995 include the creation of a revolving credit facility to help small businesses in the region, and the publication of annual environmental and social reports by Royal Dutch Shell PLC (Ite 2004).
16! ! Corporate Communications and Development Strategy
Two authors question the validity of these development programs and propose that Shell’s efforts at community development may be more focused on control, appeasement and framing than true development. Omolade Adunbi, in his 2011 article
“Oil and the Production of Competing Subjectivities in Nigeria” examines how terms of development projects are used as new forms of governance by SPDC in the Niger
Delta. Similarly, Sharon M. Livesey, in her article Eco-Identity as Discursive Struggle:
Royal Dutch/Shell, Brent Spar, and Nigeria, examines the Language Games and discursive struggles that emerged between Shell and the Niger Delta inhabitants after the rise of the MOSOP in the early 1990’s.
Livesey uses Foucauldian discourse theory to analyze Shell’s post 1995 rhetoric.
She writes that “the Language Games between Shell and its critics” are “rooted in discursive struggle central to late 20th century society around what the proper relationship among corporations, communities, and nature should be” (Livesey 2001:
61). She finds that Shell’s communications were directly related to framing the problems associated with resource extraction in the Niger Delta. Livesey cites Meznar and Nigh, who argue that corporate communication is a means to defend an organization from, or connect with, external audiences. She expands on this, stating
Shell’s moves constitute meaning making, and define for the both internal and external audiences what Shell is and how it works. Livesey also cites enactment theory to describe how corporations create and negotiate specific realties, and these realities compose its relationship to the outside world. To Livesey this means that
“organizations, like other actors, must ceaselessly compete, in a process that is social
17! ! and political, to reproduce their discourses—that is, to sustain their stories and their definitions of, for instance, progress and development, or their notions of the boundaries and legitimate actions of the firm” (61). Thus corporate communication is a way for corporations to affect their environment and constantly reconfirm their validity in the world in the face of opposition (Livesey 2001). This is especially important in the environmental space, as activists and corporations constantly spar in an effort to make sense of environmental change in the world (Livesey 2001).
In the case of Shell, and other major corporations, this has resulted in debate over what exactly is sustainable development (Livesey 2001). Livesey finds that corporations often adopt a “discourse of care” to frame their actions as socially responsible (61). In the case of Shell in the Niger Delta, the death of Saro-Wiwa forced
Shell into a public relations battle with MOSOP (Livesey 2001). Initially, Shell responded with shock and sadness despite future revelations that the company played an active role in the deaths (Livesey 2001; Okonta and Douglas 2001). Shell continued to further itself from the devastation in the Niger Delta when it published The Brief in
1997. This publication uses reports from the World Health Organization that question the relationship between gas flaring and health to retain validity while insisting on a lack of evidence for Shell’s guilt in health issues associated with oil drilling (Livesey 2001).
In a similar strategy, Livesey finds that Shell equates the goals of economic growth with the goals of poverty reduction in order to frame oil extraction as a mechanism for creating good livelihoods for Nigerians. She derives this claim from a
1997 speech by Phil Watts, Shell Group Managing Director, in which he espouses the benefits of economic growth and the goal of sustainable development. In this speech,
18! ! Watts maintains Shell’s stance as apolitical, but embraced the concept that “the narrowly economic terms of the progress myth and the development paradigm were no longer adequate to demonstrate responsible corporate citizenship” (Livesey 2004: 76).
This effort maintains Shell’s legitimacy in the region, while allowing it to admit that its prior actions were not adequate to improve livelihoods (Livesey 2004).
In a similar discussion of the discursive impact of Shell’s communication and development strategies, Omolade Adunbi examines the terms of governance that are emerging in the Niger Delta. He explores classification of communities as either “oil bearing,” “host families” or “impacted” communities, and how these classifications define the way individuals relate to Shell and the federal government. These terms enable a form of ownership over the land that gives some level of satisfaction to the
Niger Delta inhabitant while retaining control for Shell (Adunbi 2011). Adunbi finds that this system of classification is particularly similar to British colonial control of Nigeria, because Shell’s terminology allows the Niger Delta inhabitants to distinguish a hierarchy among themselves and reap marginal rewards for the differences in hierarchy (Adunbe
2011). A villager may get increased oil profits or benefits as a member of a host family or oil bearing community, and thus would not find an incentive to help those in an impacted community rebel against Shell (Adunbe 2011). These communities are determined based on memorandums of understanding (MOU). Initially these MOU’s acted as contracts between each community and SPDC, but SPDC has adopted a new strategy of globally connecting all communities together through Global MOU’s that govern larger areas of land (Adunbe 2011). The impact of the MOU’s and GMOU’s is that a single community leader or group of leaders may negotiate for an entire region,
19! ! which has led to a small group of individuals receiving marginal benefits that incite them to maintain the status quo and legitimize Shell’s operations (Adunbe 2011). This form of development does not contribute to improved livelihoods, but instead to a continuation of Shell’s dominance in the Niger Delta (Adunbe 2011).
Anna Zalik also discusses how discursive struggle is occurring over who has the right to resource control in the Niger Delta. In her article, Labeling oil, contesting governance: Legaloil.com, the GMOU and profiteering in the Niger Delta, she examines the website Legaloil.com, and the use of the GMOU. Legaloil.com is a website that equates oil theft in the Niger Delta to blood diamonds in Sierra Leone (Zalik 2011). The website aims to prevent consumers from purchasing oil that has not been funneled through socially acceptable channels (Zalik 2011). In analyzing this website she references Charles Tilly’s “insight on the historically sociology of the state and its security apparatus as the institutionalization of organized crime” (187). The state has bullied its way into profitably extracting oil from the Niger Delta through violence and militarization, but when others use similar tactics to extract oil this is framed as illegal
(Zalik 2011).
Beyond framing oil theft as illegal, and framing all Niger Delta residents as militants, Legaloil.com has the impact of keeping the public focused on these militants and their actions against the state and oil MNCs, as opposed to the actions of the state and oil MNCs. Niger Delta inhabitants, through groups such as MEND and MOSOP, are framed as the exploiters and the drivers of militancy and violence in the region, in a manner similar to the proliferation of blood diamonds (Zalik 2011). This is in contrast to the history of the Niger Delta, which saw militarization as a consequence of the state
20! ! security apparatus around oil (Zalik 2011). Legaloil.com, therefore, produces powerful discursive messages about what is occurring in the Niger Delta to the rest of the less informed world. Shell is clearly engaged in a discursive struggle with the rest of the world to maintain its legitimacy (Zalik 2011; Adunbe 2011; Livesey 2004). The tools of this battle are complex public relations techniques and strategies; the following section will examine the scholarly analysis on the relationship between MNCs, CSR, and public relations.
MNCs, CSR and Public Relations:
William S. Laufer discusses the relationship between MNCs and CSR in his 2003 work Social Accountability and Corporate Greenwashing. Within this work, Laufer discusses the repeated instances of corporations using marketing and promotional tools to make traditional manufacturing and production processes seem greener and more sustainable than they really are. Laufer cites,
the growing body of social and environmental accounting research that finds corporate posturing and deception in the absence of external monitoring and verification, e.g., the structuring of corporate disclosures so as to maximize perceptions of legitimacy” (Laufer 2003: 253).
As such, Laufer finds that “relying on the integrity of corporate representations should seem increasingly naïve to those inside and outside the SRI community” (Laufer 2003:
254). Laufer argues that these actions are largely in order to maintain the legitimacy of the organization and have “little or nothing to do with perceived responsibilities or obligations” (Laufer 2003: 255).
Debashish Munshi and Priya Kurian’s article “Imperializing spin cycles: A postcolonial look at public relations, greenwashing, and the separation of publics” makes similar claims about the rationale for corporate environmental and social reports.
21! ! The authors find that terms and claims such as CSR and sustainable development are
“a continuation of the old colonial strategy of reputation management among elite publics at the expense of marginalized publics” (Munshi and Kurian 2005, p. 513). The principle argument from Munshi and Kurian is that in order to maintain their reputation among key publics in the developed world (global consumers, governments, shareholders), corporation’s realized they must adopt more responsible images and marketing. Munshi and Kurian write:
It is in the interest of the dominant organizational core that public relations “manages” the corporate image through an asymmetric hierarchy of publics: (1) the predominantly Western shareholders; (2) the Western consumer public/the global middle-class consumer; (3) the Western activist public; (4) the vast numbers of Third World workers who produce the goods for consumption by others; and (5) the even greater numbers of Third World citizens too poor to consume. The first is obsessive about profits and share values, the second consumes blindly, and the third provides resistance from within the West, while the last two fall below the corporate radar. Corporate PR efforts, therefore, focus on undercutting the protests of the third public to appease the second public and directly benefit the first public. Its agenda has no place for the colonized fourth and fifth publics (Munshi and Kurian 2005: 514).
It is therefore important that communications materials from corporations espousing green agendas and socially responsible ideologies be critically examined to determine the validity and impact of the statement made within these materials.
Marianne Mason and Robert D. Mason conducted a similar analysis in their 2012 study “Communicating a Green Corporate Perspective: Ideological Persuasion in the
Corporate Environmental Report.” Their study analyzed environmental impact reports from one-hundred Fortune 1000 companies to determine the discursive impact of these reports. The study found that corporations use these reports to strategically alter the opinions on environmental issues of both internal and external audiences. Corporations use strategic formatting, specific buzzwords, and a hierarchy of stakeholders to
22! ! successfully communicate their green ideologies through these reports, according to
Mason and Mason. The authors found that
Understanding how corporate environmental reports are structured and use language in this genre provides insight into how audience members are directed to evaluate and consume corporate green ideology” (Mason and Mason 2012: 499).
They also indicate that further research is necessary to determine year-on-year differences between environmental reports and other corporate communications about sustainability.
Filling the Gaps
My study of SPDC and its corporate communications will expand upon the work of Livesey and Mason and Mason. While there is extensive literature on the history of
SPDC in Nigeria, as well as on the ways that SPDC responded to immediate environmental and social crises in the Niger Delta, there is a dearth of information on how SPDC is mitigating risk and ensuring institutional legitimacy for the foreseeable future. This study aims to explore proactive communications activities that frame the understanding of resource extraction in the Niger Delta in a way that ensures institutional legitimacy for SPDC. This will expand upon Mason and Mason’s studies because it will examine a single company’s communication strategy over a two year time period, rather than examining multiple companies’ environmental reports exclusively. It will also expand upon Livesey’s research by focusing on the proactive actions of SPDC, rather than reactive actions.
In the following section, the theoretical framework for this analysis will be outlined, beginning with the classical understanding of discourse and knowledge, and
23! ! ending with Livesey’s contemporary research on Royal Dutch Shell PLC, CSR and corporate communications.
24! ! Theoretical Framework
The theoretical framework used in this study is rooted in the concept that an individual’s conception of truth and reality are the product of countless competing discourses and their resultant consensus on a given issue (Foucault 1969; Habermas
1981; Bourdieu 1991; Smircich and Stubbart 1988; Meznar and Nigh 1995; Hajer 1997;
Tsoukas 1999; Livesey 2001). This framework is employed to explore how discourses about oil extraction in the Niger Delta construct the dominant understanding of the practice. Specifically, this framework will be used to analyze the impact of communications materials released by the Shell Petroleum Development Company.
The application of this framework aims to determine how these materials contribute to the construction of the dominant understanding of the environmental and human rights issues associated with oil extraction in the Niger Delta by the Shell Petroleum
Development Company.
The Classical Foundation
Michele Foucault’s work The Archeology of Knowledge is used as the foundation of this theoretical framework. Foucault (1969) argues that traditional understandings of history are overly simplified and do not take into account the intricacies of discourses, or the motivations for those discourses, such as power, social standing, and social norms.
Taking statements, histories, or knowledge at face value ignores the complex messages that these forms of communications send, and the ways that these messages are crafted by existing power dynamics (Foucault 1969). Jurgen Habermas takes this idea further in his Theory of Communicative Action (1981). He argues that cultural and social knowledge about reality is transmitted through communicative action. By
25! ! achieving consensus on a given issue, individual actors establish and reinforce knowledge and reality. This knowledge and reality then defines individual and group identities, as well as perceptions about other actors and institutions within society
(Habermas 1981). Taken with Foucault’s arguments, this means that discursive actions—influenced by power dynamics and existing social knowledge—are the very foundations of knowledge, leading to the reproduction and renewal of existing cultural knowledge and social norms.
If discursive actions do play a significant role in determining knowledge and reproducing social norms, as Habermas and Foucault might argue, then the communications materials distributed by SPDC would play a significant role in determining knowledge and social norms about oil extraction in the Niger Delta. This is especially so considering the size of SPDC and the access to international media and sophisticated communications strategy that it receives as part of Royal Dutch Shell
PLC. Pierre Bourdieu provides theoretical support for the argument that large organizations with greater social capital may have greater influence on the construction of knowledge and social norms about a given issue.
Bourdieu builds his theoretical argument with his concepts of capital, field and habitus (Bourdieu 1991). In Language and Symbolic Power, Bourdieu (1991) explicitly proposes that language has inherent power, and that the different forms of language, such as dialect and accent, and especially the social location within which the language or discourse exists in, serve symbolic ends. Bourdieu argues that discourses and dispositions, or public expressions of opinion, constitute an individual’s habitus, and are determined based on that individual’s response to his social and physical surroundings
26! ! (Bourdieu 1991). An individual’s concept of reality, according to Bourdieu, is a result of the interplay of her habitus and the greater social field within which she exists. The social field is both a product and determinant of the individual habitus, thus while the habitus contributes to the construction of the social field, the social field transfers its ideologies, realities and knowledge to the individual through affecting her habitus
(Bourdieu 1991). Individuals, organizations, and institutions, all affect the construction of the field, and their level of influence on the field is determined by the amount of social capital they have accrued (Bourdieu 1991). As such, those with greater social capital can unequally influence the field, and therefore individuals’ habitus. Because of the first-mover advantage that SPDC has in Nigeria (Jedrzej et al 2000), the firm has considerable social capital to influence the way that individuals interpret and understand oil extraction in the Niger Delta. Moreover, this first-mover advantage allows SPDC to play a considerable role in not just the interpretation of these events, but also the construction of the social field they occur in.
Classical Theories Applied to Corporate Communication
While Foucault, Habermas and Bourdieu provide the classical foundation for the theoretical framework used in this study, Sharon M. Livesey, in her 2001 article, Eco-
Identity as Discursive Struggle: Royal Dutch/Shell, Brent Spar, and Nigeria, applies these ideas to the concept of corporate social responsibility and eco-identity in the 21st century. Livesey utilizes the theoretical framework that discourses build and affect the individual’s understanding of themselves and their environments to analyze how corporate communications affect the way individuals understand corporations and their relationship to the environment (Livesey 2001). In developing her own theoretical
27! ! framework specific to 21st century CSR, “Language Games,” Livesey cites numerous contemporary theories on the relationship between corporations, communications and the environment. She cites Linda Smircich and Charles Stubbart’s (1985) social reality of corporations; Haridimos Tsoukas’s (1999) theory of risk society; Martin B. Meznar and Douglas Nigh’s (1995) Buffer and Bridge theory of corporate communications; and
Maarten Hajer’s (1997) application of Critical Discourse Analysis to environmental problems.
Smircich and Stubbart’s theory of the social reality of corporations critiques the system of analysis that looks at “organization structure, standardization, and technology as if the concepts correspond to freestanding material entities” (Smircich and Stubbart
1985: 727). Instead, the authors propose a social reality of corporations in which the organization both creates itself for the outside world to understand, while also reacting internally to the created version of itself. Smircich and Stubbart argue that the strategic managers are responsible for producing this social reality of the firm through both external public relations and internal policies. This provides a theoretical rationale for analysis of corporate communications as a mechanism that seeks to create strategic meaning for the corporation, and seeks to preserve the social reality of the corporation in the eyes of those outside the firm.
Tsoukas furthers the research, arguing that not only do businesses consistently engage in a process of defining and constructing themselves both externally and internally, they must also compete with other actors in the discursive space in order to maintain legitimacy. Tsoukas writes, citing Bourdieu, that organizations are “engaged in two ‘fields of interaction’: the economic field and the symbolic field” (Tsoukas 1999:
28! ! 506). Within the symbolic field, corporations must wage discursive battles that have grown in significance as more and more actors enter the symbolic field because of new communication technology that works to decrease discursive gatekeepers (Tsoukas
1999).
Theories of Corporate Communication
In response to increasingly difficulty discursive battles, corporations engage in sophisticated and varied communications strategies (Meznar and Nigh 1995). Meznar and Nigh’s Buffer and Bridge theory of Corporate Communication attempts to classify these corporate communications into two categories: those that buffer and those that bridge. Buffering actions consist of those communications that serve to protect the organization or corporation from external criticism, while bridging actions serve to connect the corporation with the desired outcome of external critics and the greater population. The most important conclusion for this analysis from Meznar and Nigh’s study was that “buffering and bridging are not at opposite ends of a continuum.
Environmental uncertainty promoted an increase in both types of activities, and organizational power variables (size and resource importance) promoted an increase in buffering without affecting bridging behavior” (Meznar and Nigh 1995: 992). In performing Critical Discourse Analysis on the communications from the Shell Petroleum
Development Company, this study will seek to determine instances of both buffering and bridging, and explore whether these forms of protective corporate communication have increased in the years since SPDC faced crises in the Niger Delta.
At the same time, this study will test and build upon Livesey’s theory of Language
Games. Livesey borrows her use of Critical Discourse Analysis from Hajer, and uses
29! ! discourse analysis “to understand why a particular understanding of the environmental problem at some point gains dominance and is seen as authoritative, while others are discredited” (Hajer 1997: 44). When a discourse does gain dominance, Livesey writes that these dominant discourses “reflect and sustain social practices and institutional forms by helping to arrange the world in specific ways that then come to be accepted”
(Livesey 2001: 62/63).
Livesey builds her theory of Language Games through analysis of Royal Dutch
Shell PLC’s crisis communications during and after two major environmental and social incidents: The Brent Spar and the Ogoni incidents. She conducts Critical Discourse
Analysis of communication materials from Shell as well as from Shell’s discursive competitors such as the Human Rights Campaign and Greenpeace (Livesey 2001). In her analysis, Livesey applies “techniques of discourse analysis that operationalize
Foucauldian theory” (Livesey 2001: 66). She also borrows from Foucauldian techniques developed by Norman Fairclough in his 1992 study Discourse and Social
Change. In particular, her analysis identifies instances of what Fairclough describes as interdiscursivity. Livesey defines interdiscursivity as,
For instance, when discursive forms or conventions usually applied in one discursive order or domain may be carried over into another, as when business borrows from environmentalist discourse (e.g., business adoption of what I call a ‘discourse of care’ about nature) and vice versa (e.g., the business concepts of market-based environmentalism as applied to the notion of ecological sustainability) (Livesey 2001: 66).
Throughout her analysis, Livesey locates interdiscursivity, as well as buffering and bridging actions, in order to determine instances in which corporations “sanction and save—or, in the case of corporate critics, de-sanctify and change—the narrowly economic view of the appropriate relationship of business to its natural and social
30! ! settings” (Livesey 2001: 67). Her Language Games theory, then, is a theory of the discursive interaction between a corporation and its immediate critics during a time of crisis, and of the tools each organization has to use to defend its discursive space.
Livesey highlights the potential for further research in this subject area; she writes “The study of public corporate discourse in its various dimensions (crisis communication, issue advocacy, public relations, advertising) is rich in potential, for the problem of the natural environment illuminates where practices of the competitive market and democracy collide” (Livesey 2001: 82).
My study hopes to take advantage of that potential and build on Livesey’s theory of Language Games in addition to the previously mentioned works of Mason and
Mason. However, rather than analyzing a discursive battle between SPDC and one of its immediate critics as Livesey did, this study will analyze SPDC’s Proactive
Communications strategy. My study will test and build upon Livesey’s Language
Games theory by engaging in Critical Discourse Analysis of public communications materials distributed globally by SPDC to identify instances of buffering, bridging and interdiscursivity that preserve the strategic interests of the Shell Petroleum
Development Company. My research will critically analyze the communication techniques that SPDC uses to mitigate risk and avoid conflict years after the initial discursive battle of a major environmental crisis. This analysis will provide insights on how corporations adapt and change in the wake of major crises in order to retain social legitimacy and the mandate to continue operations that may be harmful to certain members of society.
31! ! Research Methodology
Introduction
The research methodology used in this study is borrowed largely from the work of Sharon Livesey (2001)—who herself borrows from Norman Fairclough (1992)—as well as from the work of Mason and Mason (2012). This study will employ Foucauldian
Critical Discourse Analysis techniques to conduct a content analysis of communications materials released by the Shell Petroleum Development Company. The following sections will outline the data set and the rationale for its selection, the variables to be tested and the method of analysis for testing them, as well as the strengths and shortcomings of the selected research methodology.
Sample Population
The data set for this study consists of communications materials released by the
Shell Petroleum Development Company in Nigeria between 2010 and 2014 that can be accessed via the SPDC website (shell.ng.com). There are 53 individual content samples in this data set, organized into four different categories based on their relationship to SPDC:
1. Royal Dutch Shell PLC Communication (SC): Any communications material released by Royal Dutch Shell PLC, which pertains to company wide issues not specific to SPDC in Nigeria. 2. Development Program (DP): Materials used primarily to describe a specific development program SPDC is engaged in. 3. SPDC Press Release (PR): Press releases from SPDC pertaining to SPDC specific issues and released via the SPDC website. 4. SPDC Briefing Notes (BN): Briefing notes about broad issues associated with SPDC, available via the SPDC website.
Separating the data set according to these distinctions will allow for more precise analysis of the data points. For example, analysis of press releases will focus on
32! ! frequencies and common themes across the reporting of different events, while analysis of briefing notes will focus on broad theme across different aspects of SPDC’s operations. Each category will be analyzed individually, and the results will be synthesized to draw broad conclusions about SPDC communications materials.
These content samples were also organized according to the type of media used to communicate their message:
1. Print: Materials distributed in print or as electronic PDF files (including press releases), separate from individual webpages. 2. Webpage: Individual webpages describing development programs, SPDC statements and opinions, or providing information about a specific aspect of SPDC business. 3. YouTube: Videos hosted on YouTube.com, posted by SPDC.
All materials included in the data set were released by SPDC or Royal Dutch Shell PLC between the years 2010 and 2014 and are presently accessibly on the SPDC website.
The rationale for this data set is based on a desire to contribute new insights into the discussion of oil extraction and corporate social responsibility in Nigeria. As previously mentioned, scholarship already exists that compares corporate communications on sustainability from different corporations (Mason and Mason 2012,
Munshi and Kurian 2005). This influenced the decision to focus chiefly on communications from SPDC, in order to better understand a single corporation’s communications strategy, objectives and impact surrounding sustainability. There is also scholarship (Livesey 2001) covering Royal Dutch Shell PLC’s and SPDC’s communication strategy when faced with crises regarding environmental sustainability and social responsibility. This influenced the decision to focus on communications materials released without a significant crisis catalyzing defensive or reactive communication. Instead, this data set was selected in order to build understanding of
33! ! the day-to-day communications strategy of the Shell Petroleum Development Company surrounding sustainability and corporate social responsibility. It is important to study this aspect of corporate communications because as Smircich and Stubbart (1985) and
Tsoukas (1999) point out, corporate communications plays a role in determining both the social reality of the corporation, as well as the internal and external construction of the legitimacy of the firm. Thus, this data set was selected in order to analyze how
SPDC communicates sustainability on a day-to-day basis to maintain the social legitimacy of the firm in an increasingly hostile discursive space.
At the same time, this data set was selected on the basis of accessibility and feasibility. All materials were retrieved from the SPDC website because this website is readily available to those with a computer and Internet connection. There is substantial difficulty and expense associated with traveling to Nigeria to collect samples of SPDC communication on the ground and aimed at Nigerians. Multiple attempts at contacting scholars and activists in Nigeria who may have access to these materials were also unsuccessful. Therefore, this data set only reflects communications materials accessible on the internet.
Variables and Method of Analysis
The method of analysis used in this study is content analysis, specifically Critical
Discourse Analysis. There are five variables, or indicators, tested in this study. These variables are:
1. Presence of interdiscursivity 2. Presence of buffering or bridging actions 3. Discussion of oil “theft” versus oil “spill” 4. Addressing of environmental issues, where present 5. Addressing of social issues, where present
34! ! A sample of the matrix used to collect and analyze the sample population according to these variables is available in Appendix A. These variables were selected based on previous scholarship on corporate communications regarding sustainability and social responsibility.
The chief concern of this study is to determine how communications released by
SPDC contribute to ensuring the social legitimacy of SPDC operations. The buffer or bridge and the interdiscursivity variables will test for the presence of communications techniques identified by Meznar and Nigh (1995) and Fairclough (1992) that are used to ensure social legitimacy for the corporation in the face of critics or crises. Operational definitions for these two indicators were developed based on their description by the authors who coined the terms. They are listed below:
1. Buffering Action: Words, phrases or images that serve to protect the organization or corporation from external criticism. (Meznar and Nigh 1995) 2. Bridging Action: Words, phrases or images that serve to connect the corporation with the desired outcome of external critics and the greater population. (Meznar and Nigh 1995) 3. Interdiscursivity: Instances when SPDC borrows external phrasing, framing, imaging, or certification from an independent organization or individual in order to align with that organization and borrow from its social legitimacy. (Fairclough 1992)
If the communications materials from SPDC contain a high frequency of either of these two indicators, this will show that even day-to-day communications about sustainability and social responsibility serve to protect the interests of the firm and maintain its social legitimacy. These first two indicators serve the purpose of testing whether communications materials from SPDC do in fact serve the purpose of proactively ensuring the social legitimacy of the corporation’s actions.
35! ! Conversely, the other three indicators will provide qualitative information about how SPDC communicates about sustainability, and how these efforts may work to ensure the institutional validity of the firm. The third indicator— discussion of oil “theft” versus oil “spill”—is used to identify instances when SPDC communicates about crude oil displacement in order to determine what common descriptions surround the classification as spill or theft. Crude oil displacement is a significant cause of environmental issues in the Niger Delta such as water pollution and soil destruction, and there are significant costs associated with assigning blame as to who is responsible for the devastating effects of crude oil displacement (Wheeler et al 2001; Ite 2004; Adunbi
2011). Classifying an oil spill as “oil theft” can consequently help SPDC avoid added costs, as well as social responsibility, for an instance of crude oil displacement. Content analysis of SPDC communications about the relationship between oil spills and oil theft will provide insights on how SPDC frames and constructs the reality of the high incidence of crude oil displacement in the Niger Delta. The final two indicators—whether
SPDC addresses environmental and social issues, where present—will display how often SPDC chooses to frame these issues and what common factors result in the decision to do so. These indicators will help identify whether SPDC selectively addresses social and environmental issues in its communications materials. This will provide more descriptive data on how SPDC frames its operations in the Niger Delta for its key publics in the West.
Methodological Strengths and Shortcomings
As mentioned previously, the research methodology used in this study is not perfect. Chiefly, the data set lacks samples from within Nigeria. There are both positive
36! ! and negative aspects to this data set. This data set will not include communications material aimed primarily at Nigerians or Niger Delta inhabitants, instead it will include materials aimed at stakeholders who posses computers and internet access. These stakeholders are largely Western consumers, shareholders and activists who constitute the publics that Munshi and Kurian (2005) argue are the most important to major
Western corporations. Accordingly, the data set will lack insights on how SPDC communicates to impoverished inhabitants of the Niger Delta, but will provide robust data on the messages SPDC hopes to send to its key publics in the developed West.
The data set also lacks contrasting opinions on the issues described within
SPDC communications. If each communications material from SPDC could be paired with an independent description of the same issue, it would be much easier to determine when framing and reputation management is occurring, as opposed to honest business communication. However, some SPDC statements and materials can be challenged based on scholarship contained in the literature review and theoretical framework.
Additionally, the method of analysis is also imperfect. This is because content analysis relies on subjective determinations of whether or not buffering or bridging actions and interdiscursivity are occurring. Operational definitions for these indicators are provided within in the research methodology, but no definition can definitively determine whether or not an action is truly in service of maintaining the social legitimacy of an organization. While this methodology is in fact imperfect, it will certainly provide insights on the ways that SPDC constructs the external and internal reality of its operations in the Niger Delta.
37! ! Results and Analysis
The results and analysis presented in this section are broken down according to category of communications material. Each category of the content samples will be analyzed independently; the section is followed by comparative discussion of the entire data set.
Royal Dutch Shell PLC Communications (SC):
There are four content samples in the SC category: the 2011 and 2012 Royal
Dutch Shell PLC Sustainability Reports, and two videos posted to YouTube by Royal
Dutch Shell PLC that discuss oil theft and illegal oil refining in the Niger Delta. Sample sections of the content in this category are provided in Appendix B. The content samples in this category are distinguished from the other categories because Royal
Dutch Shell PLC, as opposed to SPDC, distributes them globally. Analysis for this section is conducted first of the Sustainability Reports, then of the YouTube videos.
The Sustainability Reports
Both the 2011 and 2012 Sustainability Reports contain clear examples of interdiscursivity, the first indicator. Interdiscursivity is prevalent throughout the two reports, as outside organizations and individuals are often used to vouch for the credibility of reporting schemes or the impact of sustainability programs. For example, the 2012 report prominently features testimonial from Dr. Uzo Egbuche, the Chair of the
IUCN Independent Advisory Panel on Remediation and Rehabilitation of Biodiversity and Habitats of Oil Spill Sites, Niger Delta, Nigeria. The full quote used in the 2012 report is included below:
In interacting with SPDC, I have observed a keen desire to see change. However, there are challenges. The key to success is strengthening the oil-spill
38! ! remediation strategy so that it will ensure the affected sites are not only cleaned up and clean drinking water sources restored, but that biodiversity – such as fish, crabs, and shrimp on which communities depend and the mangroves where these species breed – thrives again. The IUCN- Niger Delta Panel will endeavor to provide practical recommendations that will improve this situation. The Panel hopes that SPDC will support these recommendations and make the necessary changes that will have a positive impact in the field. (Shell Sustainability Report 2012: 23)
This statement provides no factual or empirical data on the efficacy of SPDC sustainability programs, or the level of sustainability achieved by SPDC. However, it does provide SPDC with the institutional legitimacy that comes with association with the
International Union for Conservation of Nature. By including this prominently featured testimonial from a member of the IUCN, SPDC borrows from the field of international conservation and displays its willingness to partner with appropriate authorities to achieve sustainability. This statement, however, does not provide any proof or validation of SPDC as a sustainable organization. Additionally, this quote serves as a bridging action (second indicator). SPDC is attaching itself to the desired outcomes of
IUCN by including this testimonial, and demonstrating its shared interests and desires with its external critics. Similar examples of interdiscursivity, and buffering and bridging actions are found in both the 2011 and 2012 reports.
Included in the 2011 and 2012 Sustainability Report sections on Nigeria are discussions of the United Nations Environment Program’s (UNEP) report on oil spills in
Ogoniland. The 2011 Sustainability Report section on Nigeria addresses the fact that the UNEP report is critical of SPDC’s efforts to remediate spill sites. The section includes the following:
The report questioned SPDC’s clean-up and remediation technique and performance, and recommended improvements. As a result, SPDC conducted a review of its practices. It is confident that remediating oil spill sites using a
39! ! process that allows natural microbes to break down the hydrocarbons remains a proven and internationally recognized method. It is widely used in many countries.
However, the review showed that in some cases in Ogoniland, SPDC did not go physically deep enough when assessing spills, making remediation less effective. Based on this finding, SPDC is revisiting a number of other sites in the Delta to confirm that remediation has been carried out properly, and will remediate further if needed. (Shell Sustainability Report 2011: 20)
This text serve to both buffer and bridge, as it defends SPDC’s use of “natural microbes” to remediate oil spill sites (buffering), while acknowledging the need to revisit spill sites and confirm that remediation is effective (bridging). However, the 2012
Sustainability Report contains a markedly different discussion of the UNEP report and the SPDC response:
In 2012, the Nigerian government set up the Hydrocarbon Pollution Restoration Project (HYPREP) to lead and co-ordinate the activities needed to implement the recommendations of a United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) report on oil contamination in Ogoniland. This is an area of the Niger Delta from which SPDC withdrew in 1993 following many years of attacks on staff and facilities. The setting up of HYPREP is an essential first step, which SPDC has welcomed and pledged to support. While awaiting government leadership on the UNEP report, in 2012 SPDC undertook a range of activities related to the report in Ogoniland, where it was able to do so. These included helping to fund the provision of emergency water supplies and installing permanent water facilities in one affected area, launching a programme across Ogoniland that delivered primary health-care services to more than 50,000 people, and cleaning up a number of sites where SPDC was granted access. But as the UNEP report described, before clean-up activities can be effective, it is crucial to put an end to the widespread theft and illegal refining of crude oil, which continues to cause environmental damage in Ogoniland and the wider Niger Delta (see letter, page 22). (Shell Sustainability Report 2012: 24)
This discussion of the UNEP report does not mention any SPDC involvement in creating oil spills, and only briefly mentions that SPDC left Ogoniland in 1993, the height of
MOSOP demonstrations against oil production in the region. Further, this brief discussion of the UNEP report places responsibility for environmental damage in
40! ! Ogoniland squarely on oil theft, as opposed to operational oil spills, and implies that further remediation is being blocked by oil theft and illegal refining. These statements buffer SPDC from responsibility for continued environmental damage in the region.
Thus, both interdiscursivity and buffering and bridging actions were found within the
2011 and 2012 Royal Dutch Shell PLC Sustainability Reports, specifically in the sections that cover operations in Nigeria. The presence of both the first and second indicators in these reports shows the strategic value of global communications about sustainability for Royal Dutch Shell PLC and SPDC. Concerning the final three indicators—whether the reports discussed oil theft, environmental issues, or social issues—both reports discussed all three topics.
Both the 2011 and 2012 Sustainability Reports discussed oil spills versus oil theft. The 2011 Sustainability Report addressed oil theft, stating:
The number of spills from sabotage and theft increased in 2011 as SPDC put more pipelines back into service. Although not caused by SPDC, such spills are a reality of operating in the Delta. SPDC cleans up all spills, whatever their cause, and recognizes it must do what it can to help reduce them. In August 2011, it shut down production of around 25,000 barrels of oil a day from one field in the Imo River area after repeated attacks on pipelines. It also held meetings with community leaders, regulatory authorities and social organizations to discuss these issues and SPDC oil spill management practices. Breaking the entrenched cycle of the oil-spill economy–where people see oil spills, theft and illegal refining as their only viable source of income–will be the key to making progress. (Shell Sustainability Report 2011: 19-20)
This statement acknowledges the “oil spill economy” as a cause of the rise in oil theft, although it does not implicate SPDC or Royal Dutch Shell PLC in the construction of such an economy. The excerpt also addresses that SPDC has acted to prevent oil theft, through production shut downs and community meetings. The Sustainability Report, again, buffers SPDC from responsibility for oil spills and their effects in the Niger Delta.
41! ! The Sustainability Reports contain similar discursive actions about environmental and social issues in the Niger Delta. For example, the 2011 Sustainability Report contains a prominent subsection on “Health in Motion” in the Niger Delta. The section describes health programs aimed at financing community health insurance schemes, providing healthcare to remote villages, and preventing HIV/AIDS and malaria in the
Niger Delta. While these are certainly laudable programs, and are likely improving lives in the Niger Delta, their inclusion in a sustainability report also bridges SPDC’s concerns with those of its critics, without addressing any of the critical business practices.
Based on this analysis, it is clear that the Sustainability Reports released in 2011 and 2012 by Royal Dutch Shell PLC serve numerous purposes. My analysis focuses exclusively on the Nigeria sections of these reports and finds that while ostensibly these reports are produced to inform interested citizens of the sustainability of SPDC programs, they also serve to ensure the social legitimacy of SPDC actions. Numerous instances of interdiscursivity, and buffering and bridging actions were identified within the Nigeria sections of the reports. These discursive actions protect the social legitimacy of SPDC by borrowing institutional validity from outside organizations or individuals, avoiding and misdirecting blame, or displaying common interests with
SPDC’s critics. It was also found that these reports discuss key topics, such as oil theft and social an environmental issues, in a manner that both informs and persuades. It is true that these Sustainability Reports provide information critical of SPDC actions, such as the UNEP report, but they also frame and construct this external criticism to ensure the social legitimacy for SPDC.
42! ! The YouTube Videos
Two YouTube videos posted by Royal Dutch Shell PLC are featured prominently on the SPDC website and discuss issues associated with SPDC operations. These videos are titled "Shell companies in Nigeria: oil theft and spills" and "Shell film about illegal oil refining in the Niger Delta". The first video is two minutes and forty-one seconds long and features commentary from an unnamed “SPDC Team Leader” from the “Oil Spill Response and Remediation” team. The man speaks in English with a thick
Nigerian accent. While standing in front of an oil theft site near a railroad he states:
It is fair to say that this is being run by highly organized criminal gangs, not just an individual because you require money to buy barges, to hire trains, to get tankers, and even to buy influences to move the stolen crude oil along the high way or whatever, this is not what you want in Nigeria!” (Shell companies in Nigeria: oil thefts and spills 2010).
He then goes on to say “Some unscrupulous person decides to get rich destroying our environment, which we should be leaving for our future children.” These statements are both buffering and bridging actions. They buffer by pointing the blame for environmental damage at organized gangs, and “unscrupulous” individuals, although no expert opinion or scholarly evidence is provided except the testimony from an unnamed
SPDC employee. They bridge by using a Nigerian employee to deliver these statements, and imply that he and SPDC also have a stake in ensuring environmental sustainability for “our future children.”
The second video is four minutes and forty-one seconds long, it includes testimony from Mutiu Sunmonu, the Managing Director of SPDC, and narration from an unnamed male voice. The short video also contains clips from a CNN report on illegal oil refining in the Niger Delta. The video begins with dramatic aerial shots of what are
43! ! assumed to be oil theft and illegal refining sites. The unnamed narrator explains that more than 70% of oil spills in the region over the last five years were caused by oil theft.
The narrator discusses the dangers associated with illegal refining, over shots of open flames and shirtless Nigerians transporting flammable crude oil in makeshift barrels and canoes. He then attempts to explain why young men risk their lives to illegally refine oil, stating:
Why does this lethal activity continue? These men do it to survive. But they don’t earn much. Poverty in the Niger Delta is widespread. The real winners are the organized criminal gangs who orchestrate a massive illegal business stealing and selling oil in huge quantities. It is theft on an industrial scale. According to some estimates, hundreds of thousands of barrels of oil a day. (Shell film about illegal oil refining in the Niger Delta 2010)
The video then switches to the same footage of the SPDC employee from the previous video explaining why it is fair to say that criminal gangs run illegal oil refining in the
Niger Delta. This video also contains buffering and bridging actions. It buffers through assigning organized crime as the cause of environmental destruction in the Niger Delta, although again providing no evidence of this claim except testimony from an unnamed
SPDC employee. It bridges by showing the impoverished men risking their lives refining oil to survive, and arguing for an end to illegal oil refining to improve their lives.
However, the video makes no mention of the causes of poverty in the Niger Delta.
Therefore, similar to the Sustainability Reports, these YouTube videos serve multiple purposes for SPDC and Royal Dutch Shell PLC. While interdiscursivity was not prevalent in either video, each video contains buffering and bridging actions. These actions protect SPDC from criticism over environmental damage in the region.
Moreover, these videos attempt to construct an understanding of the causes of illegal oil refining in a way that ensures the social legitimacy of SPDC. The videos used
44! ! unsubstantiated claims about organized gangs operating massive oil theft operations to construct an understanding of illegal oil refining that results in the least responsibility for
SPDC.
Development Programs (DP):
There are sixteen content samples in this category. Each content sample is a webpage describing a specific SPDC funded development program or initiative. Sample screenshots from this category are included in Appendix C. The analysis for this section is broken down by the presence of each indicator.
Indicator 1: Interdiscursivity
Of the sixteen contents samples, ten contained an example of interdiscursivity.
One example of interdiscursivity was identified on the webpage describing the Global
Memorandum of Understanding initiative. This initiative is designed to allow SPDC to create community agreements with large blocs of tribes and villages, as opposed to an individual agreement with each group. The webpage describes the program as
The GMoUs or agreements represent an important shift in approach, placing emphasis on more transparent and accountable processes, regular communication with the grassroots, sustainability and conflict prevention" (GMoU – Agreements 2014).
The use of terms such as transparent, grassroots, sustainability and conflict prevention are all instances of interdiscursivity, in which SPDC borrows terminology from social movements and political organizing. These claims are also challenged by Omolade
Adunbi (2011) and Anna Zalik (2011), who argue that the GMoU system instead allows
SPDC to create agreements with a small group of beneficiaries, who do not truly represent the bloc of villages. They argue the GMoU’s do not create transparency, grassroots organization or sustainability. Adunbi writes that the GMoU allows SPDC to
45! ! “produce forms of power that are both visible and invisible within communities rich in natural resources” and that “This form of power rekindles colonial tradition within communities rich in natural resources” (Adunbi 2011: 117). This is a clear example of the use of language borrowed from another field to add legitimacy to the actions of
SPDC.
Another example of interdiscursivity was identified on the SkooolNg program page. This page describe the SkooolNg program, which is an interactive website designed to help Nigerian school children better understand the math and science curriculum. The program description from the website is below:
The website contains Mathematics and science modules, a curriculum-based content for Universal Basic Education (UBE) 7, 8 and 9. The content was developed by Intel Corporation under the joint sponsorship of Intel, SPDC and Education Trust Fund (ETF). The skooolNigeria website maintains an interactive learning platform for both students and teachers of primary, junior and senior secondary schools. SPDC’s goal is to hand over content ownership to the Federal Ministry of Education, in the hope that it will be eventually adopted and deployed to all Nigerian schools. (Schooling on the Web - skooolNigeria.com 2014)
This description borrows language from the education field, such as ”curriculum-based content” and “Universal Basic Education.” It also cites the Intel Corporation and the
Federal Ministry of Education, which provide validity to the program. This program helps bridge the concerns of SPDC with the concerns of the Nigeria population by focusing on basic education.
Indicator 2: Buffer and Bridge
Thirteen of the sixteen content samples in this section contained either buffering or bridging actions. The high presence of these actions is likely associated with the reality that most development programs will serve to bridge the concerns of SPDC and
46! ! its critics, as these programs are aimed at improving the livelihoods of Nigerians. There were many examples of buffering and bridging actions throughout the descriptions of
SPDC’s various development programs. These include the following statement from a webpage about the Shell Eco-Marathon:
The students and faculty members, inspired by the relentless search for solutions and passion for excellence shown by the Shell scientists, are keen to emulate the same ethos as they prepare to design, build and race fuel efficient cars at the maiden Middle East/Africa edition of Shell Eco-marathon in Doha, Qatar. (Shell Eco-Marathon 2014)
Here SPDC is clearly bridging by displaying its internal concerns for sustainability and its efforts to determine sustainable solutions. SPDC also engages in bridging actions in its descriptions of its healthcare programs.
SPDC has five separate webpages dedicated to describing its various healthcare programs. These include one webpage that describes the SPDC response to
HIV/AIDS; one webpage describing how SPDC is fighting malaria; another webpage describing SPDC’s fight against other communicable diseases; and two pages describing healthcare services in general. None of these webpages address the health concerns associated with flaring or with environmental damage in the Niger Delta.
These webpages bridge by showing SPDC’s commitment to the continued health of
Niger Delta inhabitants, but they also buffer by pointing the focus on health issues that are not associated with oil production or SPDC. These pages maintain the social legitimacy of the firm by portraying its efforts to improve lives in the Niger Delta, without addressing any of the negative externalities associated with the firm’s operations in the region.
47! ! Indicators 3-4: Oil Theft and Environmental Issues
None of the webpages describing SPDC’s development programs discussed or referenced oil spills, oil theft or environmental issues. This is a notable absence. It is possible that this absence plays a role in constructing SPDC operations in the Niger
Delta as unassociated with the development problems in the region. By excluding oil spills and theft from discussion of development issues in the Niger Delta, SPDC is able to maintain a social reality in which SPDC is not responsible for any of the problems its development programs intend to alleviate. Instead, these problems are framed as inherent to the Niger Delta. However, oil spills, oil theft and environmental issues are mentioned often in other communications materials, so these issues certainly do not go unaddressed on the SPDC website.
Indicator 5: Social Issues
Only five of the sixteen webpages included in this category addressed social issues associated with oil production in the Niger Delta. Those that did mention social issues were predominantly the webpages that discussed health programs. Webpages describing SPDC education programs and skill development initiatives discussed the impact and scale of the development programs, but did not address the conditions that catalyze these programs or provide any statistics describing the scale of these social issues. Conversely, the health programs did occasionally describe the condition of social issues. On the “Health in Motion” program webpage, SPDC describes the condition of some Niger Delta inhabitants: "Some villagers believed Becky was possessed by spirits. Her husband and in-laws deserted her and the children. Finally
Becky’s aunt took her to the hospital where she stayed for several months" (Health in
48! ! Motion 2014). While this statement does describe a social issue in the Niger Delta, it portrays Niger Delta inhabitants as backwards, and in need of help from SPDC and its healthcare programs. This also buffers SPDC from responsibility for health issues in the region by portraying Niger Delta inhabitants as unable to be responsible for their own health or make legitimate claims about health issues.
SPDC Press Releases (PR):
There are twenty content samples in this category. All content samples are press releases available on the SPDC website between January 1, 2013 and November
25, 2013. Samples of the content in this section are included in Appendix D. The analysis for this section is broken down by the presence of each indicator.
Indicator 1: Interdiscursivity
There are twelve press releases in this category that contain interdiscursivity.
These include references to the Hague international court and use of language from its decision on a case related to SPDC in the press release titled “Dutch court dismisses
FoE claims on oil spills.” SPDC also distributed a press release titled “SPDC Joint
Venture conducts asset inventory in Ogoniland” that references the recent UNEP report on Ogoniland and states SPDC actions are “in line with the recommendations of the
UNEP report.” Another press releases, titled “Investigation underway into fire on TNP” references the National Coalition on Gas Flaring and Oil Spill in the Niger Delta, and
SPDC’s voluntary cooperation with the coalition. SPDC also released a press release titled “Shell Companies in Nigeria win award for education support” that extensively discusses its performance at the Social Enterprise Report and Awards Ceremony.
Each of these examples indicates how SPDC uses the press release to inform and
49! ! persuade its audience. More than half of the press releases analyzed in this survey had some level of interdiscursivity. This interdiscursivity validates the social legitimacy of
SPDC operations based on the legitimacy of its partnerships and interaction with the specific external organizations mentioned in the press releases.
Indicator 2: Buffer and Bridge
All twenty of the press releases analyzed in this study contained either buffering or bridging action. This is not a surprising outcome given the nature of the press release as a tool used by organizations to construct their organizational meaning to outside audiences. One notable example of buffering was identified in the press release titled “SPDC lifts force majeure on Bonny Light exports.” In this press release,
SPDC writes, "While the spill at B-Dere came from a hole drilled by unknown persons, it was confirmed that pipeline failure was responsible for the incident at Nonwa-Tai." This statement tacitly buffers SPDC from responsibility for the spill, by noting that an unknown person had drilled a hole in the pipeline, despite later acknowledging that preexisting pipeline failure was the cause of the oil spill. Multiple other press releases also addressed this incident, but this release, the most recent of the series, is the only release to definitively describe the cause of the spill as pipeline failure, while the other releases focus on the discovery of a hole drilled in the pipeline. The presence of buffering and bridging action in all press releases from SPDC analyzed in the study shows the strategic value of press releases to SPDC. It is clear that SPDC uses press releases to construct the social reality of its operations in the Niger Delta.
50! ! Indicator 3: Oil Theft
Fourteen of the twenty content samples in this category addressed oil spills or oil theft in the Niger Delta. This was expected, considering the high incidence of oil spills in the region. Of these fourteen press releases, eight address the Trans Nigeria
Pipeline (TNP) and SPDC’s decision to close the pipeline due to what it describes on multiple occasions as a high number of crude theft points. SPDC does not provide any information indicating that there is in fact a greater occurrence of oil theft in 2013, however in all eight press releases discussing the closure of the TNP, it cites oil theft as the reason for this closure. In one press release, titled “SPDC JV debunks false claims on TNP oil spill and fire” SPDC quotes its Managing Director, who states:
Shutting down the pipeline as has been suggested is not the answer. Our ability and competence to safely operate the pipeline has never been in doubt. The only way to ensure the TNP operates optimally without being shutdown regularly for repairs is to stop the thriving crude theft activities on both the 24” and 28” streams.
In this press release, responsibility for continued spills and shutdowns is blamed on crude oil theft. This is despite the fact that SPDC would later admit in a future press release that one spill on the TNP, although amplified by a whole drilled in the pipeline, was caused by pipeline failure (SPDC lifts force majeure on Bonny Light exports 2013).
It is notable that this is the only press release in the data set in which SPDC takes direct responsibility for an oil spill.
Indicator 4: Environmental Issues
Eight of the twenty press releases analyzed in this study contain references to environmental issues present in the Niger Delta. Of these eight press releases, one discusses SPDC’s victory in the Hague international court against Friends of the Earth,
51! ! an NGO claiming SPDC did not properly clean oil spill sites (Dutch court dismisses FoE claims on oil spills 2013). A press release titled, "SPDC tests five gas wells in Gbaran-
Ubie project" discusses a new initiative to reduce operational gas flaring in the Niger
Delta. The other six press releases that address environmental issues all do so in the context that crude oil theft is causing increased environmental damage. In a press release titled, "Afam VI Power Plant shut down as crude theft leaks on TNP disrupt gas supply" SPDC writes:
SPDC is deeply concerned about the negative impact of incessant crude theft activities on lives and environment in the Niger Delta, and also the loss of electricity to businesses and households across the country. The total daily loss from the TNP shutdown alone comes to about $15 million (N2.4 billion).
In another press release, titled "SPDC sets out its future intent for Nigeria" SPDC writes:
The design of the TNPL includes improvements which make the pipeline better protected against crude oil theft and sabotage, which should help to reduce pollution related to criminal activity which was a key aspect of a 2011 United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) report on Ogoniland.
Each of these statements assigns blame for environmental damage in the region to crude oil theft and illegal refining, while address how SPDC is working to alleviate the issue. Both statements are buffering actions, and help maintain the social legitimacy of
SPDC in the face of environmental damage caused by oil spills.
Indicator 5: Social Issues
Six of the twenty press releases analyzed in this study contained references to social issues in the Niger Delta. One press release, “SPDC lifts force majeure on
Bonny Light exports” discussed the arrangements being made to compensate those who’s property was damaged by a recent oil spill (as previously mentioned, this press release was also the only release to acknowledge SPDC culpability in an oil spill). All
52! ! other mentions of social issues revolved around the impact that oil theft and illegal refining has on life in the Niger Delta.
Similar to the press releases that discussed environmental issues, the press releases that discuss social issues do so in the context of oil theft as the main driver of social issues in the region. In the press release titled, "SPDC JV debunks false claims on TNP oil spill and fire" SPDC Managing Director Nutiu Sunmonu is quoted as saying:
As we have stated previously, crude theft has severe consequences lasting far beyond our lifetime. I have a personal stake in this tragedy having spent nearly all my adult and working life in the Niger Delta. The trend of crude theft will result in long-lasting damage to the wellbeing of present and future generations. All stakeholders who are genuinely interested in seeing this problem curtailed should join hands and stop this crime against the people and the environment of the Niger Delta.
The Managing Director was quoted again, in the press release titled "SPDC shuts down
NCTL to remove oil theft points" in which he says, “Crude theft continues to affect people, the environment and the economy, and urgent action is needed by all stakeholders to tackle the problem.” These statement, as with the statements on environmental issues, frame oil theft as the key social issue in the Niger Delta. Oil thieves are constructed as those responsible for the problems of development in the
Niger Delta, and nowhere in these press releases is there a discussion of the conditions that result in oil theft. For example, the question of why oil theft occurs so often in the
Niger Delta, but not in other areas of oil production around the world, is never addressed. As with the other indicators, the emphasis on oil theft as the cause of social issues in the Niger Delta helps ensure the social legitimacy of SPDC, and prevent criticism of its operations.
53! ! SPDC Briefing Notes (BN):
There are thirteen content samples in this category. These content samples are
PDF briefing notes accessed on the SPDC website. Briefing notes address areas of
SPDC business in Nigeria and provide basic information on SPDC’s operations in
Nigeria. Samples from this category are located in Appendix E. The analysis for this section is broken down by the presence of each indicator.
Indicator 1: Interdiscursivity
Interdiscursivity is present in eight of the thirteen content samples in this category. Within these briefing notes, interdiscursivity is often used to provide outside validity for a specific aspect of SPDC’s business. For example, in the briefing note titled
“The Operating Environment” SPDC writes that “Shell Companies in Nigeria (SCiN) are active supporters of the Voluntary Principles on Security and human rights (VPShr), a set of guidelines developed in 2000 by various governments, extractive industry companies and human rights organizations.” Citing these guidelines allows SPDC to borrow validity from the VPShr. Similarly, in the briefing note titled “Gas Flaring” SPDC cites both the Nigerian Ministry of Petroleum and a 1995 report from the World Bank, when describing the legitimacy of its oil flaring operations. The Ministry of Petroleum and the World Bank are both outside organizations that provide legitimacy to SPDC’s actions. The instances of interdiscursivity in the remaining briefing notes are less pronounced. These include citing indigenous Nigerian companies that have benefited from working with SPDC, as well as citing partner organizations for development projects, such as multiple Nigerian banks that are partnered with SPDC.
54! ! Indicator 2: Buffer and Bridge
Twelve of the thirteen content samples in this category contained buffering or bridging actions. Buffering actions are often associated with oil spills and oil theft. In the briefing notes titled “The Operating Environment” SPDC states:
Criminality has expressed itself in many forms over the years – attacks on facilities, kidnapping, militancy and, most worrisome in recent years, crude oil theft and illegal refining. In 2012, there were over 80 reported incidents of crude oil theft from the facilities of the Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria limited (SPDC), several accompanied by vandalism, spills and fire.
The same briefing note also quotes the SPDC Managing Director, who writes:
As a Nigerian, and one who has spent a great deal of my career in the Niger Delta, my greatest immediate concern is the issue of crude oil theft, which is an increasingly dangerous menace. The volume currently being stolen is the highest in the last three years, with over 60,000 barrels per day from SPDC facilities alone. This is a huge loss, and the effects of this industrial scale theft are devastating for both the people and the environment. Most of the stolen crude makes its way to the international market and a smaller percentage is refined locally, with thick smoke from illegal refineries lining the shore in many parts of the Delta. The land, shorelines and water are heavily polluted with oil as a result of these activities. This is a crisis situation because the solution is beyond the capacity of any individual company. Our concern is that, if these activities continue at this rate, the effects would be devastating, not only to the social and environmental structure of many areas of the Niger Delta, but also to Nigeria’s economy.
Both buffering and bridging is occurring in these statements. Bridging occurs throughout the note, with the shared concern for the environment between SPDC, its
Managing Director and the residents of the Niger Delta. Buffering occurs through statements such as “This is a crisis situation because the solution is beyond the capacity of any individual company.” The emphasis on oil theft as the “greatest immediate concern” also buffers SPDC from responsibility for the environmental damage in the region.
55! ! SPDC also bridges without discussing oil theft or environmental issues. In the briefing note titled “Domestic Gas” SPDC engages in bridging actions by discussing the need for natural gas in Nigeria’s industrial sector, and SPDC’s ability to deliver that natural gas. This is a bridging action because it indicates to the reader SPDC’s shared commitment to the prosperity of Nigeria. Similarly, the briefing note titled "Shell Nigeria
Gas - Helping to Drive Nigeria's Economic Growth" exclusively discusses SPDC’s massive contribution to the Nigerian economy, and highlights the “all Nigerian staff” of certain SPDC operations.
Indicator 3: Oil Theft
As previously discussed, the primary briefing note that addresses oil theft is the note titled “The Operating Environment.” Only one other briefing note addresses oil spills or oil theft. As shown above, discussion of oil spills revolves around oil theft and the role of illegal refining in driving the Niger Delta’s social and environmental problems.
Indicator 4: Environmental Issues
Only three briefing notes address environmental issues in the Niger Delta. The first is “The Operating Environment” which does not address environmental issues so much as it discusses oil theft as the cause of environmental issues. The primary briefing note discussing environmental issues is titled “The UNEP Report.” In this briefing note SPDC writes:
The report highlighted significant environmental impacts from oil pollution in parts of Ogoniland and called on government, industry and communities to take action to put an end to all forms of oil contamination (including crude oil theft and illegal refining) and begin a comprehensive clean up. SPDC has welcomed the UNEP report and is advocating more concerted efforts by all stakeholders in the hopes that the report will drive real change in Ogoniland and the wider Niger Delta.
56! ! This briefing note is a bridging action, as it shows SPDC’s commitment to ensuring an end to oil contamination. The note also mentions the role of crude oil theft and illegal refining in creating environmental issues in the Niger Delta, which buffers SPDC from responsibility.
Indicator 5: Social Issues
Four of the thirteen briefing notes address social issues. Two briefing notes address the social costs associated with oil theft, and the effort of SPDC to produce programs, such as providing free drinking water, to mitigate these costs. A third briefing note addresses the Global Memorandum of Understand program, and contains similar language to the webpage describing the GMoU program, which was discussed previously in this study. Finally, the fourth briefing note “Our Economic Contribution” discussed SPDC’s efforts to eradicate poverty in the Niger Delta. In this note, SPDC states, “The four major oil producing states - Bayelsa, Delta, rivers and Akwa ibom - with around 10% of the country’s population, receive about a third of the total oil revenue that the Federal government allocates to Nigeria’s 36 states.” SPDC also writes, “There is a perception that corruption has been one of the barriers to turning oil revenues into benefits for the people of Nigeria.” This is the only mention of corruption located in this analysis. SPDC concludes its section on its economic contribution with the statement, “However, even if well spent, Nigeria’s oil revenues do not go far in
Africa’s most populous country. The total revenue from oil and gas divided among the over 160 million population amounts to less than one dollar per person per day.” These statements display the SPDC contribution to the Nigeria economy while avoiding any responsibility for the persistent poverty in the Niger Delta. Thus, the discussion of social
57! ! issues among the briefing notes mirrors the discussion of social issues in the development program webpages and press releases: any mention of social issues does not implicate SPDC in the construction of these issues.
58! ! Comparative Discussion and Conclusion
Table 1. Comparative Results
Presence of Indicator 1 Indicator 2 Indicator 3 Indicator 4 Indicator 5 Indicator SC 2/4 4/ 4 4/ 4 4/4 4/ 4 DP 10/16 13/16 0/16 0/16 5/16 PR 12/20 20/20 14/20 8/20 6/20 BN 8/13 12/13 2/13 3/13 4/13 TOTAL 32/53 49/53 20/53 15/53 19/53
Based on the results of this content analysis, it is clear that communications materials released by SPDC can have a large discursive impact. Of the 53 content samples analyzed, more than half contained interdiscursivity and only four did not contain instances of buffering or bridging. This is a meaningful finding. As previously discussed, interdiscursivity and buffering and bridging are discursive tools used to help an organization ensure its social legitimacy in the face of crisis. The finding that a majority of the communications materials released by SPDC and analyzed in my study contain discursive tools indicates the strategic value of day-to-day communications from
SPDC. These communications are used to construct the social reality of the firm and its actions in the Niger Delta. This is especially so when considering the firm’s communication about oil theft and social and environmental issues. The firm consistently frames oil theft as the primary cause of environmental and social problems in the Niger Delta (with the exception of one press release). Social and environmental issues are also downplayed, except where necessary to explain the value of a SPDC development program, and the overarching conditions surrounding these issues is rarely discussed.
59! ! When considering the analysis of indicators three, four and five, the quantitative data is not particularly meaningful, because the data set is not all inclusive of SPDC communications. What is noticeable is the ways SPDC discusses oil theft, and social and environmental issues. Nowhere in my study did I locate text discussing the causes of oil theft or of any environmental issues. I found unsubstantiated claims of the organized criminal gangs that are supposedly driving illegal oil refining, and brief mentions of widespread poverty in the Niger Delta. However there was no discussion of why oil theft is so prevalent in the Niger Delta, but nowhere else in the world. Likewise, there was no discussion on why poverty is so widespread in the Niger Delta, a region clearly endowed with significant natural resources like oil. Constructing this reality of the Niger Delta allows SPDC to develop programs and communications that may address issues raised by SPDC critics, without assigning any responsibility for these problems to SPDC.
Moving forward, the results from this study indicate the necessity for further scholarship on communications from major corporations and other institutions with high levels of influence and impact. The results from this study are not at all surprising, and it is not unreasonable to expect a corporation to use its communications to protect the interests of the firm at the expense of holistically informing the public. As such, there is room for continuing scholarship on the validity of claims made in corporate communications, as well as on the impact of corporate communications on the average citizen’s perspective of that organization. Through day-to-day communications, SPDC constructs a reality about its operations in the Niger Delta that reflects this interests of
Royal Dutch Shell PLC, thus there is a need for scholars to better understand this
60! ! reality. This is especially so in the Niger Delta where SPDC has significant influence due to its first-mover advantage, and where those affected by SPDC have little power to challenge the SPDC-oriented reality.
For the individual, the results from this study indicate the need to consider the social position of an institution before determining the validity of its communications materials. It is evident from my study that where possible, a corporation will use its influence to construct a reality that benefits the firm. It is not possible to determine whether a corporation’s construction of the world is inherently good or bad, but it is important to understand the motives for this construction and the methods by which the social reality of a firm is constructed. If individuals do not understand the motives and tools of corporate communication, they may accept these communications as pure fact and consider the reality constructed by such corporations as truth.
61! ! Appendix A: Sample Research Matrix
A sample section from the research matrix used to analyze and organize the content analysis presented in this section. This matrix was produced using Microsoft Excel.
62! ! Appendix B: Royal Dutch Shell PLC global communications (SC)
Below is an excerpt from the 2011 Royal Dutch Shell PLC Sustainability Report that was used in this analysis.
63! !
Below is an excerpt from the 2012 Royal Dutch Shell PLC Sustainability Report that was used in this analysis.
64! ! Appendix C: Development Programs (DP)
Below is a screenshot from a DP webpage describing the skooolNigeria.com program, which was used in this analysis.
65! !
Below is a screenshot from a DP webpage that describes the GMoU program, which was used in this analysis.
66! ! Appendix D: Shell Petroleum Development Company Press Releases
Below are press releases available on the SPDC website that were used in this analysis.
67! ! Appendix E: Shell Petroleum Development Company Briefing Notes
Below are briefing notes available on the SPDC website that were used in this analysis.
68! !
69! ! 70! ! 71! ! Appendix F: List of all content samples in data set
Content Sample Date Source 2011 Annual http://reports.shell.com/sustainability- Sustainability Report 2011 report/2011/servicepages/welcome.html
2012 Annual http://reports.shell.com/sustainability- Sustainability Report 2012 report/2012/servicepages/welcome.html http://www.shell.com.ng/environment-society/shell-in-the- Shell Eco-Marathon 2014 society/education-programmes/education-support/sem.html http://www.shell.com.ng/environment-society/shell-in-the- Professors in Shell society/education-programmes/education-support/professorial- Chairs 2014 chairs.html http://www.shell.com.ng/environment-society/shell-in-the- society/education-programmes/education-support/research- SPDC R&D Projects 2014 programmes.html "SPDC JV shuts down Obigbo gas plant over encroachment on the right-of-way http://www.shell.com.ng/aboutshell/media-centre/news-and-media- of gas pipelines" 25/11/13 releases/2013-releases/spdc-jv--shuts-down-Obigbo-gas-plant.html
"SPDC honours Olympic and world http://www.shell.com.ng/aboutshell/media-centre/news-and-media- athletics medalist releases/2013-releases/shell-honours-olympic-and-world-athletics- Blessing Okagbare" 28/10/13 medalist-blessing-okag.html
"SPDC lifts force http://www.shell.com.ng/aboutshell/media-centre/news-and-media- majeure on Bonny releases/2013-releases/spdc-lifts-force-majeure-on-bonny-light- Light exports" 18/10/13 exports.html
"TNP reopens after http://www.shell.com.ng/aboutshell/media-centre/news-and-media- crude theft fire" 16/10/13 releases/2013-releases/tnp-reopens-after-crude-theft-fire.html "Fire reported on TNP right of way as SPDC http://www.shell.com.ng/aboutshell/media-centre/news-and-media- tackles oil spills" 14/10/13 releases/2013-releases/fire-reported-on-tnp-right-of-way.html "SPDC raises alarm http://www.shell.com.ng/aboutshell/media-centre/news-and-media- over increased crude releases/2013-releases/spdc-raises-alarm-over-increased-crude-oil- oil theft" 11/10/13 theft.html "Shell Companies in Nigeria win award for http://www.shell.com.ng/aboutshell/media-centre/news-and-media- education support" 26/09/13 releases/2013-releases/scin-wins-award.html
"SPDC declares force majeure as crude oil theft forces shutdown http://www.shell.com.ng/aboutshell/media-centre/news-and-media- of TNP" 23/09/13 releases/2013-releases/spdc-declares-tnp-forcemajeure.html
72! ! "Shell Companies in Nigeria set safety http://www.shell.com.ng/aboutshell/media-centre/news-and-media- record" 9/9/13 releases/2013-releases/safety-record.html "Afam VI Power Plant shut down as crude theft leaks on TNP http://www.shell.com.ng/aboutshell/media-centre/news-and-media- disrupt gas supply" 16/07/13 releases/2013-releases/afam-shutdown.html "SPDC to rehabilitate 45,000-barrel per day Ogbotobo Flowstation in http://www.shell.com.ng/aboutshell/media-centre/news-and-media- Western Niger Delta" 15/07/13 releases/2013-releases/rehabilitate-ogbotobo-flowstation.html "SPDC JV debunks false claims on TNP http://www.shell.com.ng/aboutshell/media-centre/news-and-media- oil spill and fire" 5/7/13 releases/2013-releases/spdc-debunks.html "SPDC raises alarm over rising crude oil theft spills in http://www.shell.com.ng/aboutshell/media-centre/news-and-media- Adibawa field" 2/7/13 releases/2013-releases/adibawa-spill.html
"Investigation underway into fire on http://www.shell.com.ng/aboutshell/media-centre/news-and-media- TNP" 24/06/13 releases/2013-releases/TNP-fire.html "SPDC sets out its future intent for http://www.shell.com.ng/aboutshell/media-centre/news-and-media- Nigeria" 21/06/13 releases/2013-releases/spdc-sets-out-future-intent-for-nigeria.html
"SPDC shuts TNP due to fire at crude theft http://www.shell.com.ng/aboutshell/media-centre/news-and-media- point" 20/06/13 releases/2013-releases/spdc-shuts-tnp.html "SPDC tests five gas wells in Gbaran-Ubie http://www.shell.com.ng/aboutshell/media-centre/news-and-media- project" 9/5/13 releases/2013-releases/gbaran-gastest.html
"SPDC shuts down NCTL to remove oil http://www.shell.com.ng/aboutshell/media-centre/news-and-media- theft points" 17/04/13 releases/2013-releases/nctl-shutdown.html "SPDC Joint Venture conducts asset inventory in http://www.shell.com.ng/aboutshell/media-centre/news-and-media- Ogoniland" 10/4/13 releases/2013-releases/asset-inventory.html "SPDC declares force majeure on Bonny http://www.shell.com.ng/aboutshell/media-centre/news-and-media- Light" 5/3/13 releases/2013-releases/Bonny-forcemajeure.html "Dutch court dismisses FoE claims http://www.shell.com.ng/aboutshell/media-centre/news-and-media- on oil spills" 30/01/13 releases/2013-releases/dutch-court-case.html "Shell companies in Nigeria: oil theft and spills" 7/4/10 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kyuxatWvWGk "Shell film about illegal oil refining in 6/10/10 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jXeTw11fVpU
73! ! the Niger Delta"
http://s05.static-shell.com/content/dam/shell- "Shell Interests in new/local/country/nga/downloads/pdf/2013bnotes/nigeria_interests. Nigeria" Apr-13 pdf http://s07.static-shell.com/content/dam/shell- "The Operating new/local/country/nga/downloads/pdf/2013bnotes/operating- Environment" Apr-13 environment.pdf
http://s05.static-shell.com/content/dam/shell- "The UNEP Report" Apr-13 new/local/country/nga/downloads/pdf/2013bnotes/unep.pdf http://s01.static-shell.com/content/dam/shell- new/local/country/nga/downloads/pdf/2013bnotes/nigerian- "Nigerian Content" Apr-13 content.pdf http://s00.static-shell.com/content/dam/shell- "Community new/local/country/nga/downloads/pdf/2013bnotes/community- Content" Apr-13 content.pdf
http://s02.static-shell.com/content/dam/shell- "Domestic Gas" Apr-13 new/local/country/nga/downloads/pdf/2013bnotes/domestic-gas.pdf
http://s00.static-shell.com/content/dam/shell- "Improving Lives in new/local/country/nga/downloads/pdf/2013bnotes/improving- the Niger Delta" Apr-13 lives.pdf
"Shell Nigeria Gas - Helping to Drive http://s01.static-shell.com/content/dam/shell- Nigeria's Economic new/local/country/nga/downloads/pdf/2013bnotes/shell-nigeria- Growth" Apr-13 gas.pdf
http://s02.static-shell.com/content/dam/shell- "Gas Flaring" Apr-13 new/local/country/nga/downloads/pdf/2013bnotes/gas-flaring.pdf
"Global Memorandum http://s08.static-shell.com/content/dam/shell- of Understanding" Apr-13 new/local/country/nga/downloads/pdf/2013bnotes/gmou.pdf
"Deepwater Nigeria - http://s05.static-shell.com/content/dam/shell- Bonga Development" Apr-13 new/local/country/nga/downloads/pdf/2013bnotes/deepwater.pdf
"Environmental http://s01.static-shell.com/content/dam/shell- Performance - Oil new/local/country/nga/downloads/pdf/2013bnotes/env_performance Spills" Apr-13 .pdf
74! ! http://s08.static-shell.com/content/dam/shell- "Our Economic new/local/country/nga/downloads/pdf/2013bnotes/economic- Contribution" Apr-13 contribution.pdf
http://www.shell.com.ng/environment-society/shell-in-the- Micro Credit Program n/a society/business-development/micro-credit.html
http://www.shell.com.ng/environment-society/shell-in-the- LiveWIRE Nigeria n/a society/business-development/livewire/objectives.html
Schooling on the http://www.shell.com.ng/environment-society/shell-in-the- Web - society/education-programmes/education- skooolNigeria.com n/a support/skooolnigeria.html
Shell Guest http://www.shell.com.ng/environment-society/shell-in-the- Lectureship and society/education-programmes/education-support/guest-lectureship- Summer Schools n/a summer-school.html
Postgraduate http://www.shell.com.ng/environment-society/shell-in-the- Students Internships n/a society/education-programmes/students/internship.html
http://www.shell.com.ng/environment-society/shell-in-the- GMoU - Agreements n/a society/gmou.html
http://www.shell.com.ng/environment-society/shell-in-the- Health in Motion n/a society/health/health-in-motion.html
http://www.shell.com.ng/environment-society/shell-in-the- Health Care n/a society/health/basic-health-care.html The Niger Delta AIDS Response (NiDAR) http://www.shell.com.ng/environment-society/shell-in-the- project n/a society/health/hiv-aids.html
Immunising against http://www.shell.com.ng/environment-society/shell-in-the- killer diseases n/a society/health/immunisation.html
http://www.shell.com.ng/environment-society/shell-in-the- Taming Malaria n/a society/health/malaria-control.html
75! ! References
Adunbi, Omolade. 2011. “Oil and the Production of Competeing Subjectivities in Nigeria:
‘Platforms of Possibilities’ and ‘Pipelines of Conflict.’” African Studies Review 54
(3): 101-120.
Ako, Rhuks. 2011. “The struggle for resource control and violence in the Niger Delta.”
Pp. 42-54 in Oil and Insurgency in the Niger Delta edited by Cyril Obi and Siri
Aas Rustad. London: Zed Books Ltd.
Allen, Fidelis. 2012 “The Enemy Within: Oil in the Niger Delta.” World Policy Journal 29:
46-53.
Amadi, Bede Obinna and Haslinda Abdullah. 2012. “Poverty Alleviate through
Corporate Social Responsibility in Niger Delta, Nigeria.” Asian Social Sciences 8
(4): 57-67.
Fairclough, Norman. 1992. Discourse and Social Change. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.
Francis, Paul, Deirdre Lapin and Paula Rossiasco. 2011. “Development and Peace in
the Niger Delta: A Social and Conflict Analysis for Change.” Woodrow Wilson
International Center for Scholars Africa Program and Project on leadership and
Building State Capacity: 1-157.
Hajer, Maarten. 1997. The politics of environmental discourse: Ecological modernization
and the policy process. Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press.
Ite, Uwem E. 2004. “Multinationals and Corporate Social Responsibility in Developing
Countries: A Case Study of Nigeria.” Corporate Social Responsibility and
Management 11 (1): 1-11.
Jedrzej, George Fryans, Matthias Beck and Kamel Mellahi. 2000. “Maintaining
76! ! corporate dominance after decolonization: the ‘first mover advantage’ of Shell-BP
in Nigeria.” Review of African Political Economy 27 (85): 407-425.
Laufer, William S. 2003. “Social Accountability and Corporate Greenwashing.” Journal
of Business Ethics 43 (3): 253-261.
Livesey, Sharon. 2001. “Eco-Identity as Discursive Struggle: Royal Dutch/Shell, Brent
Spar, and Nigeria.” The Journal of Business Communication 38 (1): 58-91.
Mason, Marianne and Robert D. Mason. 2012. “Communicating a Green Corporate
Perspective: Ideological Persuasion in the Corporate Environmental Report.”
Journal of Business and Technical Communication 26 (4): 479-506.
Meznar, Martin B. and Douglas Nigh. 1995. “Buffer or bridge? Environmental and
organizational determinants of public affairs activities in American firms.”
Academy of Management Journal 38 (4): 975-996.
Munshi, Debashish and Priya Kurian. 2005. “Imperializing spin cycles: A postcolonial
look at public relations, greenwashing, and the separation of publics.” Public
Relations Review 31 (4): 513-520.
Obi, Cyril and Siri Aas Rustad. 2011. “Introduction: Petro-violence in the Niger Delta –
the complex politics of an insurgency.” Pp. 1-16 in Oil and Insurgency in the
Niger Delta edited by Cyril Obi and Siri Aas Rustad. London: Zed Books Ltd.
Okonta, Ike and Douglas Oronto. 2001. Where Vultures Feast. New York: Random
House Inc.
Pegg, Scott. 1999. “The Cost of Doing Business: Transnational Corporations and
Violence in Nigeria.” Security Dialouge 30 (4): 473-484.
77! ! Rowell, Andy and Eveline Lubbers. 2010. “Ken Saro-Wiwa was framed, secret evidence
shows.” The Independent December 5.
Shell.com.ng, 2014 "Our business - Nigeria". Retrieved April, 2014 Available:
http://www.shell.com.ng/aboutshell/our-business.html
Smircich, Laura and Charles Stubbart. 1985. “Strategic Management in Enacted World.”
Academy of Management Review 10: 724-736.
Soremekun, Kayode. 2011. “Nigeria’s oil diplomacy and the management of the Niger
Delta crisis.” Pp. 115-124 in Oil and Insurgency in the Niger Delta edited by Cyril
Obi and Siri Aas Rustad. London: Zed Books Ltd.
Tsoukas, Haridimous. 1999. “David and Goliath in the risk society: Making sense of the
conflict between Shell and Greenpeace in the North Sea.” Organization 6 (3);
499-528.
Ukiwo, Ukoha. 2011. “The Nigerian state, oil and the Niger Delta crisis.” Pp. 17-27 in Oil
and Insurgency in the Niger Delta edited by Cyril Obi and Siri Aas Rustad.
London: Zed Books Ltd.
Watts, Michael J. 2005. “Righteous Oil? Human Rights, the Oil Complex, and Corporate
Social Responsibility.” Annual Review of Environment and Resources 30: 373-
407.
Wheeler, David, Rene Rechtman, Heike Fabig and Richard Boele. 2001. “Shell, Nigeria
and the Ogoni. A Study in Unsustainable Development: III. Analysis and
Implications of Royal Dutch/Shell Group Strategy.” Sustainable Development 9:
177-196.
Zalik, Anna. 2011. “Labeling oil, contesting governance: Legaloil.com, the GMoU and
78! ! profiteering in the Niger Delta.” Pp. 184-199 in Oil and Insurgency in the Niger
Delta edited by Cyril Obi and Siri Aas Rustad. London: Zed Books Ltd.
79! !