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Home , Anubhava, Artha, Buddhi, Pratyaksha, Shravana (hearing)

BINA GUPTA RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY

The Place of Reason and Experience in Advaita : Some Reflections

BINA GUPTA

n order to reflect upon the place of if reason is intuitive, then it would be able to reason and experience in Advaita present its own object to intuition which Ithought, let us first ascertain whether would make reason an autonomous mode of there is any equivalent or counterpart of knowing. We can say that Plato, Descartes reason and thought in the Indian context. and Hegel ascribed to reason the ability to Although it may appear to be a digression, intuit its own object. Kant was the greatest all the same I will start with an exploration opponent of such a conception of intuitive of what ‘reason’ signifies in the Western reason. He denied the humans the power of context. It seems to me that a brief intellectual intuition and restricted intuition discussion on the meaning, significance and to the domain of sensuous data of objects usages of reason will help us determine and looked upon reason as entirely whether there is any concept in Advaita discursive and conceptual. He, however, Vedanta that is equivalent to what is mentions several distinctive fields within generally understood by ‘reason’ in the which reason operates, namely the field of Western context. political cognition, the field of practical There is a long history of the concept of dealing and the field of judgements of reason in Western thought. Although, on this beauty and purposiveness of . In all occasion, it is not essential to narrate that these fields reason is the source of universal history, it would still be useful to review and necessary principles. It serves to some of its essential features. The questions organize the sensible intuitions, inclinations that determine this history are: (1) Is reason and judgements of taste and raises them to itself a source of knowledge, or is its the level of scientific knowledge, conception functioning limited only to being critical of of moral laws and judgements of beauty such means of knowing as perception and respectively. It is important to remember that inference? (2) Is reason merely discursive, reason by itself does not yield any intuitions. that is to say, conceptual, or is it also at It only organizes or conceptualizes the some level intuitive? If it is simply intuitions available at the level of sensibility discursive, then it would be able to apply its and, in so doing, makes universal and conceptual abilities only to the data that necessary judgements possible. have been received through some other Kant called this level of reason means. In that case reason would be understanding intellect, in German verstand, dependent upon, or at least its functioning and distinguishes it from another level which would presuppose that some other mode of he calls reason or vernunft, the level that knowing is already there. On the other hand, breaks away from the limitations imposed by

6 Bulletin of the Mission Institute of Culture  August 2017 THE PLACE OF REASON AND EXPERIENCE IN : SOME REFLECTIONS sensible intuitions and aims at knowing the through Plato, Aristotle and the Neo- pure, unconditioned and supersensible Platonists. reality. But all this critical judgement on the The second use of reason in Western activity of reason and its limits is also done thought is closer to the Anglican linguistic by reason itself. In other words, in the convention according to which one gives Kantian view, reason sits on judgement upon reason for what one believes to be the case. itself. He does not realize that once reason This use is quite common in Anglo-Saxon determines its own limits in terms of what it philosophy. This brings me to the second can and cannot achieve, it also transcends part of my discourse. those limits. Hegel draws our attention to It is well known that there is no word in this point when he argues that Kantian which may be taken as equivalent to ‘Critique of Reason’ has no room for the reason and thought, although one comes kind of knowledge that we get from the across such terms as tarka, yukti, nyàya or Kantian philosophy itself so that his theory even and vicàra. The Indian of knowledge must transcend itself and understanding of these terms, as one finds in reason the possibility of knowing itself. This Shankara, does not appear to have the kind self-knowledge on the part of reason must be of grand metaphysical connotation that is intuitive. It must also be the goal of associated with the terms, logos and . metaphysics. Indian understanding seems to be closer to There is an additional question that the mundane activity of justifying one’s philosophy deals with in modern times, beliefs by giving reasons for them. As a namely the relation between reason and result many thinkers and commentators have language as understood in the tradition from wondered whether the concept of reason is Plato to Hegel. Is reason completely non- available outside the Greek heritage. linguistic as the tradition took it to be, or is it It is important to keep in as we necessarily tied to language? The fact is that proceed in our investigation that in Indian as rational beings we use language and this thought such concepts as vicàra, tarka and use of the language might suggest that the yukti involve rational consideration of a Aristotelian insight that human rationality is thesis. Whether one should take them to be best expressed in a social and political order rational or not may be a verbal question and must be considered more seriously than the would be contingent upon whether one Platonic tradition made it appear. allows the historical genesis of an idea to Regarding the use of reason in the pre-determine whether such an idea is Western philosophical tradition, one available without that genesis. Likewise one discerns two primary usages. First, the may also ask, whether in the absence of the metaphysical thesis connected with the concept of logos in the Indian tradition, one Greek terms, logos and nous [word and mind is at all entitled to talk about or intellect] meaning a cosmic reason, the and, if one can do so, it implies then that original unity of thought, language and some concept of reason expressed in certain being, which one comes across in kinds of intellectual activity must also be Parmenides and from which the conception embedded there. of reason as a faculty of human mind is Leaving aside vicàra, tarka, nyàya and derived. There is a long history of the yukti for the time being, in Indian evolution of this concept from Parmenides psychology, one finds manas (mind), and

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(intellect), and in the pramàna and memory. Considering the division of the literature, anumàna (inference) and mental modes, the inner sense, although one, (word). These concepts have often been used receives different appellations such as mind, to designate reason. Finally, if we take into intellect, ego sense and memory. account the three stages of the Vedantic Accordingly, it has been said that the discipline namely , manana and internal instruments are manas, buddhi, nididhyàsana, one might regard manana as ahamkàra and citta and their contents equivalent to rational thinking or vicàra respectively are doubt, certitude, egoism and which includes giving reasons for the memory. These four functions, argue the acceptance of the Advaita thesis and refuting Vedantins, are involved in any and every all arguments which are meant to suggest external perception. When I see an object, that the Advaita position is impossible— say a table, I am aware of it as something. asambhàvanà buddhi niràkarana. That is deliberation; recall my past impressions, that is memory and identify it Reason in Advaita Vedanta as a table. Finally, certainty, which gives rise With this in mind let us proceed to to the knowledge that I know that this object determine what is that, if any, which is is a table. These modifications of the inner equivalent to reason in Advaita Vedanta. I sense caused by the forms of the external will do so keeping the following questions in objects arising with the senses accounts for mind: Is it manas or buddhi or both? What perception. Thus the activity of the manas is constitutes rational thinking in Advaita confined to sense perceptions. In other Vedanta? What is justifying beliefs by words, manas is a necessary but not a reasoning? Is reasoning the same as sufficient condition for the production of anumàna of Indian logic? Is rational knowledge. It is with buddhi possibly that thinking the same as manana or vicàra? we identify a cognitive activity higher than Finally, is reasoning in the Vedanta tradition the manas. It is not to be understood as a intuitive? sense organ or even as connected with the I will begin with the first question antahkarana. In his commentary on the whether reason is manas or buddhi or both. which takes buddhi to be Manas in Advaita Vedanta is one of the four superior to manas, Shankara points out that functions of the inner sense. âchàrya buddhi is more subtle than the manas. He Shankara points out that the inner sense reiterates the same point in his commentary which is a limiting adjunct of the Self is also on the Bhagavadgità. Buddhi is the faculty variously called as manas (mind), buddhi by which one forms concepts and moral (intellect), vijnàna (cognition) and citta judgements and strives for knowledge of the (memory). Mental modifications account for super-sensible reality. Thus it appears that these functional variations. At times it is buddhi of Advaita Vedanta includes both the called manas when it assumes a Kantian understanding and speculative modification in the form of doubting; reason. Buddhi is the faculty that forms both buddhi, when the modification assumes the empirical and non-empirical concepts. form of certainty and so on. Dharmaràja in Taken in this sense, buddhi is a more his Vedànta-paribhàshà reiterates the same comprehensive and appropriate designation point. There he notes that the mental modes for reason. Giving reasons for a belief or are of four kinds—doubt, certitude, egoism justifying one’s belief by reason is an

8 Bulletin of the Ramakrishna Mission Institute of Culture  August 2017 THE PLACE OF REASON AND EXPERIENCE IN ADVAITA VEDANTA : SOME REFLECTIONS activity that is more comprehensive than support of an empirical belief. It is important simply justifying one’s beliefs with the help to note in this context that arthàpatti is not of an inference. the Kantian vernunft. Kantian vernunft Here one should be aware of several makes use of a principle of verstand such as mistakes in interpretation. Satchidananda the principle of causality and extends its Murthy, for example, takes anumiti jnàna or application beyond the limits of experience inferential knowledge to be the same as to reach the unconditioned. In this, vernunft Kantian verstand. He also takes arthàpatti of goes wrong and fails to yield knowledge. It Advaita Vedanta to be the equivalent of only yields illusions. But the application of Kantian vernunft or speculative reason. With arthàpatti can lead us from a given regard to anumiti it is easy to show that its experienced datum to another experiential function is very different from Kantian fact such as Devadutta’s eating at night. verstand. The Kantian verstand is not a When applied to establish the falsity of faculty of inference. It is rather a faculty of the world and the identity of the âtman and judgement. , arthàpatti starts from the Secondly, verstand with its categorical unquestioned validity of the Shruti texts. framework makes the systematic This reasoning is very different from the organization of sense representations into causal argument. Nevertheless, arthàpatti is the objects of nature possible and, in this quite closer to the Kantian transcendental sense, constitutes the phenomenal world. argument. Take for example, the argument Anumiti does not have any ontological that geometry is synthetic a priori, ie the function. It is a knowledge that follows subject matter of geometry is space. perception and justifies the belief, for Therefore space must be a priori intuitions. example, that there is a fire on that This is a new kind of reasoning mountain, by appealing to an already characterizing Kant’s philosophical determined relation between smoke and fire arguments and so does not fit either the and applying it to the particular case under verstand or the vernunft. consideration. Beliefs can also be justified in Similarly, one who knows Brahman many other ways than inference. Whereas becomes Brahman and that the world is false both empirical and non-empirical beliefs, are beliefs which can be justified by the just as belief in God, can be justified by argument that one has to postulate their truth anumàna, empirical belief can also be in order for some sentences of the Shruti to justified by perceptual evidence. Both kinds be true. of beliefs, empirical and non-empirical, may I have given some examples to show also be justified by appealing to shabda— how an Advaitin might give reason for the the former by laukik shabda such as the belief, and using any or all of them would testimony of a truthful person, and the latter constitute rational thinking. In general, by appealing to the texts of Shruti. therefore, I would suggest that while buddhi Another means of justifying an seems to be the faculty of reason, the activity empirical or non-empirical belief is by using of rational thinking may be characterized as the method of arthàpatti or postulation. The pramànam parikshanam, ie an case of Devadutta must be eating at night examination of the subject matter with the because he does not eat during the day and help of pramàna. It is the entire system of yet grows fatter involves postulation in the pramànas that encapsulates rational

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thinking and not simply one single pramàna. the special context of Indian thought have One does not simply use the pramànas to focused on such ideas as tarka, yukti and justify one’s beliefs but also uses them to nyàya, each of which has different meanings critically analyse and refute the beliefs of and usages. It is indeed true that in a famous other philosophers which also fall within the paragraph of his Brahmasutrabhàshya, purview of rational thinking. Rational Shankara points out the inability of reason to thinking is as much concerned with come to a definite conclusion. But we know svapaksha sthàpana (justification of one’s that tarka in the logical literature, that is to own standpoint) as with say, in discussions on inference, has a parapakshaniràkarana (refutation of the specific meaning. It stands for arguments opponent’s viewpoint). One uses the from a counter-factual premise, such as if pramànas to justify one’s own position as fire were not the cause of smoke. Shankara, well as to refute the opponent’s position in however, uses any kind of tarka for any kind which case one shows, for example, that the of reasoning. opponent’s position involves fallacious In Advaita yukti may either mean inference and hetvàbhàsa and possibly also inference or postulation or tarka. Any of goes against the Shruti text. One must also these may be taken to mean modes of point out that in refuting the opponent’s reasoning and, so by extension, reason. The position one goes beyond the pramànas. distinction between tarka, yukti and Shruti is One may use tarka, that is to say, a not the same as that between reason and counter-factual reasoning, but tarka is not a revelation. I need not here spend much time pramàna. One may also show that the arguing for my thesis that Shruti is not opponent’s position involves self- revelation. What is the role of revelation contradiction. Thus a vicious circle goes on here? One needs to ask such questions as ad infinitum. Such arguments go beyond the ‘Who revealed the to whom?’ or pramànas in the strict sense. ‘When’, etc? Can the idea of revelation be detached from the idea of God? Did God Two aspects of rational thinking reveal the Vedas? Which God? Which The point that I am trying to make is devatà? Did Brahman-âtman reveal the this: Rational thinking has two aspects— ? Brahman-âtman is not a kartà, positive and negative. It is not only an a doer. It is only cit-svarupa, of the nature of application of the pramànas but also a Consciousness. So the idea of revelation critique of the other positions and such a does not quite fit in. critique goes beyond the pramànas by The theistic commentators like Madhva showing how the position of the others have tried to maintain that the Vedas are the involves unacceptable consequences, some breath of God. That only suggests that the of which are purely logical fallacies and Vedas flow spontaneously from the being of other such non-logical fallacies as the deity. We do not again have revelation anirmokshaprasamga. On this here. In order that Shruti imparts to us that interpretation, while buddhi is the faculty of knowledge we must ascertain its meaning reason, the activity of reasoning consists in and, for that purpose, we must interpret the applying the whole battery of the pramànas words. This is a highly discursive rational and other critical apparatus. activity as the procedure of Mimàmsà Discussions of reason and revelation in demonstrates. One, again, is not interpreting

10 Bulletin of the Ramakrishna Mission Institute of Culture  August 2017 THE PLACE OF REASON AND EXPERIENCE IN ADVAITA VEDANTA : SOME REFLECTIONS experiences but rather words. Neither does pramàna is not supported by our Hindu the apaurusheyatva of Shruti mean that it religious traditions. But the status of the was revealed by a divine author. It rather Shruti as a pramàna is painstakingly means that words being eternal, the Shruti established by Mimàmsa and other schools has no beginning. We hardly mean to of through a series of ascertain who composed the Vedas and with rational arguments. After it is established what intention. To regard the Shruti as a rationally as a pramàna and its strength vis- revealed text is to go beyond the mere idea à-vis other pramànas, we come to realize of the heard text and to add to it some new that the Shruti, as a pramàna, no longer ideas derived from other religious traditions. violates reason. Establishing one’s position One generally says that the Shrutis are by appealing to the Shruti then becomes as the records of spiritual experiences of the much rational as an appeal to inference. One ancient seers. I do not wish to deny that the is then not submitting reason to a higher seers or, whoever were the authors, had their criticism using a suprarational authority spiritual experiences. Sometimes it does which is how many Indian thinkers have seem that an author is in fact talking about considered the appeal to the Shruti ought to her/his own experiences. But most of the be. But it is using the pramànas according to texts of the Vedas are not such. They are not the internal strength and weaknesses of the in the first person. They talk about the different pramànas in relation to others. deities, about nature, about the world at For example, an inference is only a large. They are heard texts, heard from pseudo-pramàna if it contradicts perception, teachers who heard from still others which but so also if it contradicts the Shruti. There accounts for their being called Shruti. If are situations in which anumàna will be experiences of some sort occasioned them, stronger than perception; just as with regard they still are texts which need to be heard to and adharma the Shruti becomes now, read and interpreted with the help of a stronger pramàna than the others. In this the rules of interpretation, grammar, sense, the Indian philosophical thinking is a etymology, context and so on. The sentences supremely rational activity. The different do not express experiences. They rather levels of rational thinking correspond to the express thought. No sentence expresses an different kinds of the application of the experience. A sentence expresses a thought. pramànas. At the initial level, one only The Shruti defines the tradition on which applies perception. So at the next level one Hindu thinkers have to take their stand. We applies perception aided by inference. One are free only to interpret it, not to deny it. It may proceed to apply the Shruti and also the is the basis of all our theoretical projects. It method of postulation as a kind of is the basis of reason itself. transcendental argument. The conventional way of accepting My contention here is precisely that the Shruti as ‘revelation’ or ‘authority’ is totally modes of reasoning are the various mistaken, as it is not a revelation, either by pramànas which include shabda as well. word meaning, or by any implication of its What could reason be besides the modes of meaning. Construing the Shruti as a reasoning? The point is, though Indian revelation is imparting a semantic thinkers do not thematize reason itself, a theological concept into the Vedic tradition. conception of reason is nevertheless there. At the same time, taking the Shruti as a Reason includes all the pramànas, all means

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of validating beliefs, such as perception and experience—both perceptual and higher shabda. To contrast reason with revelation experience—to expound reality as it is the as between meditate and immediate highest rational cognition of that reality. The cognition is totally mistaken. Perceptual conflict between reason and experience is justification is as much rational, though set up by the narrow reasoners or tàrkikas immediate, as it is inferential which is who emphasize that is a false mediate. Shabda as a pramàna may go opposition. through various phases culminating in an immediate awareness. When all this is Appreciating the totality understood with the Vedantic thesis of Having said all this, I must also add that pramànasamplava one is led to recognize a full appreciation of the nature of reason that the function of reason in all its different requires that we transcend the mere logical modes is to enable buddhi to cognize reality interest in the modes of reasoning right to as it is in the long run. It is vastutantra and the level of appreciating their totality. We not purushatantra. Perception is the only should at the same time recognize that the pramàna which by itself presents its objects pramàna theory defends the claims of each to immediate scene. After one leaves the to be sui generis and irreducible. The Indian domain of perception, one enters the domain epistemologists do it with such an admirable of meditation. Even the rational use of the harmony and grade them in the order of Shruti as a pramàna is a mediate activity, strength which may now be regarded as but mediated by the rules of interpreting the reason’s own reflection upon itself. The Vedic vàkyas as the Shruti talks about. But reason justifies its mode of validating beliefs Vedanta also keeps the path open for all this about objects. The secondary level of aiming conceptual thinking and understanding to at a unified cognition of reality as a whole is culminate in an intuitive experience of through the composition of different reality. This is brought about by what is pramànas by pramàna samplava and the called in Vedanta shavdajanya tertiary level of critical self-reflection as aparokshànubhuti. It is final, or carama in manifested in philosophy as pramàna theory the sense that, as it destroys the original on the part of reason. The mere reasoner or ignorance, it also destroys itself. The the mere logician who revels in the theory pramànas then lead to an intuitive of inference has not yet grasped the true experience only at a point where they have nature of reason. He must grasp the completely fulfilled their role and thereby interconnection among the pramànas, ie the cease to be. This is the only point where one way they depend upon each other, and also could speak of transcending reason not by he must comprehend their relative grades. revelation but by an intuitive experience Thus reason is a structured whole whose last which is the goal of all rational thinking. basis is on consciousness as the witness. One consequence of the conception of I have already noted that in my reason that I am proposing is that reason is conception of reason in Advaita Vedanta attuned to the nature of reality, that the two, is one of the pramànas that the rational and the real, are fully involves reason. In my conception, reason coordinated with one another. Furthermore, being the system of pramànas in their reason as cognition of the real includes interconnection includes perception. The within its modus operandi what is called distinction between reason and experience in

12 Bulletin of the Ramakrishna Mission Institute of Culture  August 2017 THE PLACE OF REASON AND EXPERIENCE IN ADVAITA VEDANTA : SOME REFLECTIONS that case is a distinction within reason, as one cognitive process without making use namely between the whole system and one of the Kantian idea of bringing data under of the pramànas. It is important to bring out concepts. It is this unitary cognitive process the implications of this thesis. The familiar which in one aspect is purely sensuous and kind of experience identifies experience with accordingly may be called empirical, yet in the way of sensation as in the Buddhist another aspect involves identification with conception of pure perception or nirvikalpa the object and may be called rational. That perception. It suggests that experience is that explains why I prefer to say that the which reason is not. According to this perception as a whole involves reason. No conception, experience is a mere reception pramàna that involves justifying a belief can of what is barely given without any activity be a mere passive reflection. of the knowing mind. When Advaita By bringing experience itself under the Vedanta includes pratyaksha as a pramàna scope of reason, a familiar opposition among other pramànas, I believe perception between experience and reason or between then cannot be a passive reception of an empiricism and rationalism is being called impression, but must involve an active role into question. Reason, being by its very of the knowing mind. We know this is nature attuned to reality, any knowledge of precisely the case. We know that in the reality of whatever kind is a rational activity. Advaita theory of perception the knowing In a certain sense this notion of reason and mind actually goes out and achieves an its relation to experience comes close to the identity with the object. It is not the result of Hegelian idea that perception is not opposed the causal action of the object upon the to reason, rather the beginning of rational mind. The activity of going out of course is thinking. What begins with perception is mediated by the sense organ involved which confirmed by inference and substantiated by makes it perceptual. But the fact that there is shabda. Knowledge from shabda involves an activity of the mind leading to the an interpretation of the meaning, specially in manifestation of the object only shows that the case of lakshanà, where the direct even perception involves an activity of the meaning does not work as in the case of mind and it is not simply a causal product. understanding the mahàvàkyas of the In order to highlight the exact nature of Upanishads. Further reflection on the the Advaita theory of perception, I would meaning of these vàkyas would lead to like to contrast it with another theory of anubhuti called Brahmànubhava. perception according to which perception is not a mere experience but also involves Culmination of reasoning reason. This is the Kantian variety of the Again, in this case one should resist the theory in which perception involves both a immediate temptation to set up an opposition passive reception of data and an active between this anubhava as a pure experience conceptualization of those data. Without the and all rational activity of thought and latter they would be only sensation but no reflection. On the other hand, this perception. Brahmànubhava may be regarded as the The Advaita theory does not amount to culminating achievement of reason very dividing perception into two components, much like the Hegelian knowledge of the but rather asserts that perception involves absolute. Thus reason is a developing the activity of identification with the object process that begins with sensory perception

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and develops through anumàna and all other and, accordingly, implies a distinction pramànas and eventually passing through between the subject and the object, ie one shravana, manana and nididhyàsana to who experiences and that which is Brahmànubhava. Thought would then experienced. In the Advaita view, this achieve its fundamental identity with reality. distinction certainly does not characterize In including the Shruti as a component the highest experience—Brahmànubhava. Is of the total structure of a reason, I am in fact it then an Erlebnis? opposing an understanding that the Shruti Those of us, who are familiar with the opposes reasoning in that it is a revelation or Advaita concept of perception, however, a suprarational authority. I believe this know that consciousness is limited by the conventional understanding of English inner sense and seeing the form of the object writers of Indian philosophy is mistaken. It is called a vritti. The function of a vritti is to blocks a deeper understanding of the nature reveal the object by removing the veil of of philosophical activity in Indian thought. ignorance. A vritti that is directed toward an What we learn from this is that those who object is manifested by the witness oppose thought and reality, reason and Consciousness or Sàkshi Chaitanya. One experience, start with a narrowly defined might argue that both the vritti and the conception of both. What I have suggested is sàkshi of Advaita are Erlebnis. As I perceive that Advaita Vedanta does not have this the yonder tree, the perception is an narrowly defined concepts. Rather we have Erfahrung, but the act of so perceiving is an account of the cognitive process which directly manifested to me by my witness begins with the conjecture and culminates in Consciousness and my witness Brahmànubhava and the whole process may Consciousness itself is also self-manifesting. be called reason at both ends. Thus the Erlebnis is attached to an In what sense Brahmànubhava can be Erfahrung. In the absence of a vritti, there is called an experience? Since the word no Erlebnis. Pure Consciousness or anubhava is there, it might appear Shuddhacaitanya of Advaita Vedanta which unquestionable that it is an experience. An is of the nature of âtman or Brahman experience of Brahman, or perhaps better functions as a witness Consciousness only in still, of the identity of âtman and Brahman. the context of an Erfahrung. Thus we begin To answer this question I will make use of a to find out that the two forms of experience, distinction which modern German Erfahrung and Erlebnis, depend on each philosophers have made between Erfahrung other. Without Erlebnis, there would be no and Erlebnis. Though both mean experience, Erfahrung, without Erfahrung there would there lies a very important difference. Hence be no Erlebnis. If this is true, it implies that the question—is Brahmànubhava an Brahmànubhava is not an Erlebnis either Erfahrung or Erlebnis? Erfahrung of an because that experience by definition object, it is intentional. When I perceive the involves the dissolution of the subject-object St. Louis arch on the river from my hotel distinction. window, I have an Erfahrung of it. But in as In what sense then Brahmànubhava is much as perceiving is something I live an experience? There is not much that one through and is a part of the flow of my can say about it. Nevertheless, I will try to consciousness, the perceiving itself is an draw attention to several features of it. In the Erlebnis. Thus Erfahrung is of an object first place, with the dissolution of the sense

14 Bulletin of the Ramakrishna Mission Institute of Culture  August 2017 THE PLACE OF REASON AND EXPERIENCE IN ADVAITA VEDANTA : SOME REFLECTIONS of ‘I’ Brahmànubhava cannot have the assertion of identity must be an linguistic form that I am experiencing accomplishment of reason rather than being Brahman. It is not meant to be a subjective a consequence of the thing manifesting cognition of an objective reality. When the itself. cognition of Brahman or of the identity of A rational examination by the various âtman-Brahman arises, it is still a vritti and pramànas including the may lead one this vritti leads to the dissolution of primal to the negation of seeming differences notions after which Brahman manifests between âtman and Brahman and establish Itself. Brahmànubhava then, at its an identity between what seemed to be culmination, is not a person’s cognition of different at first. Compare the case of the Brahman but Brahman fully unconcealed. morning star and the evening star. But this To call it an experience is to introduce into recovery of identity first of all requires a that phenomenon a tinge of subjectivity rational examination by the pramànas or the which has already been dissolved. But the activity of the reasoning, and secondly, it point that I am trying to make here has been does not totally eliminate all appearances of very powerfully made by Heidegger when he difference. Some sense of difference still warned against taking being as an persists. The star perceived in the morning experience. However much one refines the and the star perceived in the evening are still term ‘experience’, it unavoidably has that different phenomena. Devadutta seen in tinge of subjectivity. That nevertheless Pataliputra ten years ago and Devadutta seen means a paradox that an Advaitin must face. here now in in spite of their Brahmànubhava must be of someone. If it is identity now discovered, still present of one maharshi, then it is not mine. When a undesirable phenomenal differences. The wise person attains or realizes question, then, that must be asked is if Brahman, his ignorance is dissolved, but not Brahmànubhava is an anubhava of that the ignorance of others. With the total identity of âtman and Brahman, can this dissolution of mundaneness an Advaitin has identity be asserted after the complete great difficulty in explaining his/her dissolution of the phenomenal differences? experience to others. In a very strong way The point that I am trying to make is as Brahmànubhava is an Erlebnis of someone. follows: In this concept of experiencing an If Brahmànubhava is construed as an identity, there is inevitably already a trace of experience of the identity of âtman and the already superceded experience of Brahman, then we encounter another aspect difference and the rational critique of that of the problem. The problem concerns the difference. It cannot be a case of pure nature of identity and, also the question, experience of identity. Again, we confront a under what circumstances one asserts an problem in a different way, following a identity or even an experience of identity. different route that the Advaitic experience The attendant problems are well known in and reason mutually implicate each other. Western philosophy. Can we assert that two Both the terms ‘experience’ and ‘reason’ are different things are identical? Or is it the unavoidably tinged with subjectivity. case that the same thing is identical with To sum up, I emphasize that Advaita itself? In so far as a statement of identity Vedanta is a supremely rational discourse. presupposes the prior appearance of This rationality is not exhausted by the difference which is now being negated, that (Continued to page 23)

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