Technological Salvation or Orwellian Panopticon? A Case Study on Social Labelling, Governance, and Social Control in China's Social Credit System

Author: Fredrik Ragnell Supervisor: Chris High Examiner: Manuela Nilsson Växjö 2020-05-20 Course code: 2FU33E Subject: Peace and Development studies

Abstract

The international governance discourse has seen radical changes in both trends and understandings in recent years, from the global dominance of liberal democracy after the Cold War, to the current movement towards authoritarianism. The modern autocracy has progressed its reach by the use of new applications in technology, which has resulted in a digital authoritarianism, also known as E-governance. In China, a system known as the “Social Credit System” represents these changes in modern governance. It aims to improve civic governance by incorporating the social contract into a digital platform. The system has been described as both a technological salvation and Orwellian Panopticon, with approximately 900 million individual records whilst assigning each user with a social credit score depending on how well they perform on different areas, such as education, prosocial behavior, financial services and much more. “Trustworthy” users are given opportunities in life such as improved; welfare, housing, social status, employment, and mobility in society. Meanwhile, “trust breakers” are placed on a blacklist and face a variety of sanctions and restrictions.

This qualitative case study analyzes the overall functioning of the system in terms of social control, in order to open up the (currently) rather dualistic debate on the system in current academic literature since the system is usually presented rather simplistically as either a threat or a benefit. The thesis, furthermore, analyses the domestic governance implications of the Social Credit System and the changes it suggests to how social control might be operationalised by other societies in the future. Lastly, the study will investigate the effect of social labelling in the “Blacklist” component and discuss the consequences for minority groups, polarization, governance advances, legal improvements, and rule of law.

Key words: Social Control, China, Social Crediting System, Deviance, Punishment and Reward, Labeling, Blacklist

Acknowledgments

I would first of all like to send gratitude to my wonderful professors Chris High, Manuela Nilsson, and Heiko Fritz for believing in me and guiding me both personally and academically to where I am today. I would also like to thank my friends that have supported me through my mental breakdowns writing this essay and for always giving me a smile on my face in the darkest hours. Lastly, I would like to thank my family who have shaped me into the man I am today, and especially I want to showcase my gratitude to my grandfather who lost his life due to medical reasons on the 31th of may 2019. My role model and hero Hans Ragnell was the strongest person i have ever met and his presence, warmth, and inspiration will always inspire and follow me throughout my life.

List of Abbreviations

Chinese Communist Party (CCP)

Memorandums of Understanding (MoU)

National Credit Information Sharing Platform (NCISP)

National Association of State Energy Officials (NASEO)

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)

Social Credit System (SCS)

Strategic Multilayer Assessment (SMA) Report

Table of Content

1. Introduction 1 1.2 Research Problem 3 1.3 Objective and Research Questions 3 1.4 Relevance 4 1.5 Disposition 7 2. Literature Review 8 3. Theoretical Framework 10 3.1 Labelling Theory 10 3.2 Conceptual Framework 13 4. Methodology 15 4.1 Case Study 16 4.2 Material 18 4.3 Limitation and Delimitation 18 4.4 Ethical Considerations 19 5. Analytical Framework 19 6. Findings 20 (6.1) Introducing the Case of the Social Credit System 21 (6.1.1) The Social Credit System - How does the SCS function? 21 6.1.2 Social Credit Score, Redlist and Blacklist 23 Social Credit Score 23 Blacklist & Redlist 25 6.2 How does the SCS influence domestic governance and changes in social control? 28 7 Analysis 34 7.1 What are the effects of social labelling in the SCS? 35 8. Conclusion 40 9. Bibliography 43

1. Introduction

The origin of governments is connected to the idea of a social contract, an implicit agreement among the members of society to cooperate for social developments and benefits. An agreement that justifies sacrificing individual freedom for the protection of the state. The obligations for the subjects of society fall under many categories such as, laws, rules, culture, moral virtues, and many more. On the contrary, the obligations for the rulers are based on outcomes, food protection, safety, financial stability, job creation, and social harmony (Rousseau, 2003, Hobbes, 2011). The balance between society and government is a complicated process and when imbalance in one of the two reaches a tipping point of dissatisfaction, the result tends to be massive uprisings and potential conflicts. The peaceful interaction between the two central components of society are dependent on social control, also known as “the rules and standards of society that circumscribe individual action through the inculcation of conventional sanctions and the imposition of formalized mechanisms” (Marriam-Webster Dictionary, n.d). It is a concept in society that punishes the subjects operating outside the social contract, but equally important, sets the norms for those operating within. Social control has its cultural alternatives (religion, geography, infrastructure) but the overall blueprint has been the cause for most of the wars and developments the world has witnessed during our short time on this planet. According to social contract theory, the subjects of society are permitted to withdraw or change government if the agreements of the contract are insufficiently fulfilled. A phenomenon that has been visualized in the historical shifts of democracy and autocracy in the last decades.

Renowned academics argued that the social control of the future was based on the blueprint of Western liberal democracy in the aftermath of the Cold War and the fall of the Berlin wall was seen as the last building block for the emergence of Liberalism. Francis Fukuyama (1989) stated in his article “The End of History?” that humanity has reached "not just ... the passing of a particular period of post-war history, but the end of history as such: That is, the end-point of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government.” However, the end of our history has not yet arrived, and neither is it stable. The 2008 financial crisis, the rapid decline of democratic institutions, the

1 spread of populism in the West, and the rise of authoritarianism in the East have all pointed to an uncertainty in the governance of our sociocultural evolution (Repucci, 2020).

However, the fastest growing nation in the world, China, has already taken on market liberalism but not social liberalism, which have enhanced a demand for a new path to solve governance issues and enhance social harmony. When speaking of Chinese governance, it is important to highlight the fundamental principle of “Chinese characteristics”, which means that every ruler of China shall adapt its practices to the concrete reality of its historical setting (Choi, 2011). In 2012, the concrete reality of technology resulted in a practice (system) developed to strengthen the rule-of-law and the role of institutions through a virtual platform known as the Social Credit System (SCS).

The Strategic Multilayer Assessment (SMA) publication in December 2018 that combines some of USA's most prominent experts in technology, social science, economic, and development highlighted that China's new Social Credit System is one of the potential systems that could drastically change the outlook of domestic political structures. One of the authors Regina Joseph described the dynamics of the system as “aside from its efforts to coerce conformity within its own populace, China’s future planning in AI plays an important role in directing future governance conditions in the US and other countries” (Joseph, 2018:p.188).

The Chinese SCS assigns a trustworthiness score to citizens depending on their behavior and distributes rewards and punishments through immediate feedback on the platform. The social credit score is based on one's social network, consumption, debt, legal issues, travel, public behavior, bill payments, marriage, internet activities and much more, the trustworthy are given luxurious privileges in society, whilst the trust breakers will be punished by a limited choice architecture (Creemers, 2018, Joseph, 2018, Chorzempa et al., 2018). According to Freedomhouse (Shahbaz, 2018), the new wave in the global order is considered to be digital authoritarianism and it is time to investigate the system in pole position. A system with over 900 million users that have been collecting 10.7 billion data points (Chorzempa et al., 2018) and been described by the U.S. Vice President Mike Pence as a “Orwellian system” (Whitehouse, 2018) and by Zhang Zheng (2016:p.58), the general advisor of the system as “There are two kinds of people in this world: good people and bad people. Now imagine a world where the good ones are rewarded, and the bad ones are punished”. The transformation from wise old men, to wise old

2 books have led to wise new computers, the question that have arrived is, what is the new social control?

1.2 Research Problem

The magnitude and potentials of the SCS is hard to imagine since the output of the system is unique in comparison to other governance systems in the world, however, at this moment there is still surprisingly little written on the topic and predominantly limited to internal oversight in academia (Creemers, 2018). Furthermore, increasing demand for international coverage on the SCS. The research on the SCS has mainly focused on the perspective of system capacity, surveillance aspect, or comparative studies to western democracies (Sithigh & Seems, 2019, Dai, 2018, Schaefer, 2018). Yet, the perspective of social labelling in the system and its effect on the social spheres in China has been an underexplored topic in regard to the governance discourse on the Social Credit System. A gap unable to provide insight on what the effect of public shame and humiliation but also social popularity has on the public's willingness to conform to a new governance strategy. Therefore, this paper aims to include a perspective of new governance capabilities into the governance discourse through a case study on the Social Credit Systems governance and social control implications whilst including the effects of social labelling.

1.3 Objective and Research Questions

The thesis contributes to the academic debate on the Social Credit System and its impact on social control and consequently governance by analyzing the effects of social labelling in the systems punishment and reward mechanism. This paper seeks to investigate how the Social Credit System contributes to social control and social norms but also what the consequences of virtual governance has on the social spheres in China. The two descriptive parts of the essay will

3 include the function, output, historical preconditions, scoring system, punishment and reward but also governance and social control in order to introduce the system and its ongoing process. Meanwhile, the last part will analyze the effect of social labelling, which includes perspectives such as; minority groups, polarization, conflict, western similarities, legal and moral implications, and public approval. This paper will contribute to a nuanced perspective of the changes in China’s governance mechanisms including the effects of labelling that occurs in the SCS. This will be discussed through different concepts and theories such as the Labelling theory and social control. The research questions relevant for the objective of this case study are the following:

● How does the Social Credit System function? ● How does the Social Credit System influence domestic governance and changes in social control in China? ● What are the effects of social labelling in the SCS?

1.4 Relevance

Social control is a foundation for social order in society and it is an element of social sciences that has its focus on the factors and processes responsible for the conformity, solidarity, and continuity of societies (Janowitz, 1975, Brearely, 1965). It is a topic that has generally been dominated in criminology and sociology because it highlights the cooperative mechanisms for majority groups whilst simultaneously analysing the unequal structures disadvantaging minority groups. However, social control is also critical in governance, especially in the formation of institutions and its adaptation to new societal developments. Svetlana Kirdina (2014:p.220) argues that “ensuring the correct institutional balance and cautious institutional change is one of the main tasks of social control at the macro-level. An understanding of the institutional nature of

4 society is crucial for conscious social control”. Kirdina argues that for a nation's development to maintain a cultural status quo the dominant and historically stable institutions need to balance with new complementary institutions required to meet new demands in society caused by shifts in the social order.

The SCS is the first social control tool for comprehending law, governance, and behavior into a digital platform making it a unique alternative development in governance mechanisms. In the Strategic Multilayer Assessment report of 2018 they further this and describe digital authoritarianism as the new future of socio-technological governance and that the SCS ”enables predictive control of potential dissenters purely by extrapolating from an individual’s data signature: making control more targeted and so cost-effectively reducing the economic burden of an authoritarian apparatus” (p.21). Xin Dai (2018) who wrote the first systematic descriptive and analytical study on the SCS in English described it as ”although Western governments have also explored using reputation technologies and mechanisms in governance and social control contexts, China’s SCS, as a comprehensive, singularly framed, and actively implemented policy project, knows no equivalent elsewhere in the world”.

China has grown to be one of the countries in pole position in regards to being the next ”superpower” in the world and with their remarkable economic development and increasing regional influence in Asia, it is crucial to highlight how the country is adapting to new technological advances in their social development. A never before seen platform that allows a country with a long and troublesome history of judicial enforcement issues to incorporate a system inheriting traditional Chinese characteristics with a new legislative frame. The topic of social control is highly relevant in terms of understanding how societies ensure conformity to new social norms. For example, how the aftermath of abolishing the usage of slaves in North America became structuralized in society and in politics.

In China's attempt to become the leader in technology, environmental development, and in economic models it makes social labelling a critical perspective to investigate in our attempts to understand how governance can conform citizens to new lifestyle habits. A central element in this paper is therefore social labelling, which is used in the sustainability discourse but also in criminology, governance, and social psychology (Krook & Eklund, 2010, Rohracher, 2009, Gueguen, 2001, Becker, 1963) The process of social labelling has historically resulted in

5 structural violence and state propaganda (Gellately et al., 2003), but also in ensuring alternatives to decrease criminal recidivism (Braithwaite, 1989) and improve social integration (Goldman et al., 1984). The use of social labelling is becoming a growing tool in both politics and the private market. The rise of “identity politics” in which political positions based on the interest of social groups has become normalized in both autocracies and democracies. For example, the “Black Lives Matter” movement in USA, the global #MeToo movement, but also the Hindu nationalist and right-wing homogenising party BJP in India. The position of social groups in development has become a fundamental concept (Fukuyama, 2018) and understanding the effect social labels have on social groups, norm-activations, and governance is crucial in the future development discourse. In the private market, popular applications such as Uber, Reddit, and Tripadvisor all use social labelling by asserting scores on the users depending on their services. These social labels have profound effects for someone's income, social status, and opinion within the applications. The vast difference in the SCS is that the social labels embedded in the system completely limits “trust breakers” mobility in everyday life choices and is publicly displayed in all corners of the society. Yet, little attention has been made on social labelling in governance and less in the perspective of the Social Credit System. The aim of including this concept is to contribute to a nuanced and rather unexplored area of the current academic discussion on the system.

The Social Credit System is a unique feature of technologically inspired governance that includes behavior and morality, a topic fundamental for understanding the mechanisms for conflicts and peace to occur in E-governance. In addition, to comprehend new social developments in China it is a topic relevant for students in economics, social science, philosophy, and engineering but also for policy-advisors, international organizations, and curious individuals to grasp new processes in governance, social labelling, and social control. The result of this study will contribute to a new perspective of the Social Credit System but more importantly what the role technology could have for the future social contract.

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1.5 Disposition

The first chapter includes an introduction on this thesis background and more specifically the discussion on the SCS and the concept social control. Thereafter, follows an explanation of the purpose and research problem formulation that highlights the current research gap on the subject. The last section of the first chapter describes the research questions this essay will answer in order to meet its objective, which provides the reader an overview of the structure of this study.

The second chapter presents an extensive literature review on social control as a concept and in China, in addition to the Social Credit System. This chapter aims to introduce the reader to the ongoing academic discussion on the subject and is relevant in order to understand the complexity of the Chinese culture and the misconceptions regarding the system.

The third chapter presents the theoretical framework that will be used in order to interpret the collected data later on in the study. The Labeling theory will be discussed in great detail and include the important factors relevant for preventing deviant or non-conforming behavior.

The fourth chapter presents the methodology, which includes the resources and method this study will use. In combination with the limitations and delimitations, and ethical considerations that have been reflected upon throughout this paper.

Following is the analytical framework that is used in this essay aims to guide and facilitate an understanding through logical thinking in a systematic manner. The sixth chapter is the analysis, which will investigate the collected data in response to the research questions and objective. The first section will highlight the overall function and then followed up by analysing its effect on social control and domestic governance in China. Lastly, analyzing the effect of social labelling in the system through the Labelling theory. The last chapter is a conclusion and recommendations for future studies on the Social Credit System.

7 2. Literature Review

Social governance “relates to a system of values and beliefs that are necessary for social behaviors to happen and for public decision to be taken” (U.N, 2007:p. 2) and one of the growing forms of social governance is through E-governance, a cost-efficient mean for distributing information and that shortens the bridge between state and citizens (ibid, 2007). The need for new alternative means for governance has brought attention towards China's Social Credit System (SCS) that has according to Xin Dai (2018) been inadequately explored in the governance discourse for its potentials in “optimal approach to enforcement, intragovernmental agency control, and government expansion and efficiency”.

The Eurocentric view of governance has forced the interpretation of Capitalism, Communism, or Liberalism to dominate the governance discourse but the E-governance in China has offered potentials to drastically change the governance mechanisms in political structures (SMA report, 2018). Yet, the SCS is a confusing topic in the ongoing academic discussion, it is portrayed as either a tool for enforcing an Orwellian Panopticon, or as a mechanism for improving the rule-of- law and for moral virtues to be spread in the Chinese society. Kendra Schaefer writes in Trivium China´s report (2019:p.4) on SCS that ”Many have voiced concern about the system’s potential to evolve into an Orwellian panopticon of social control. While that’s a valid worry, it’s also a skewed and incomplete picture of what the SCS is designed to do.” Meanwhile, Liu et al (2018:p 36), writes that ”we caution that the Chinese government is preparing a much more sophisticated, sweeping version of the SCS that will likely be reinforced by artificial intelligence tools such as facial-recognition and predictive policing. Those developments will further empower the government to enhance surveillance and perpetuate authoritarianism.” Meanwhile, one part of the literature debate on the system is rather divided, there is also an extensive support of SCS effect on legal reforms.

The most profound writer on the SCS is Rogier Creemers who is a professor on Law and Governance of China for the University of Leiden. In his paper “China's Social Crediting System: An evolving practice of control” in 2018, he describes the purpose of the system as “the objective is responding to social unrest and preventing materialization of potentially destabilizing risks” (p. 2). The system is composed of advanced levels of large-scale data collection through “Big Data” and monitors civilian behavior through sophisticated CCTV

8 cameras, mobile devices number plate recognition, and facial recognition. According to Creemers (2018, p. 1-2), the emergence of the SCS is mainly due to problems in effective legal and regulatory implementation, in combination with enforcement and compliance difficulties to China's legal reform efforts over the past decades. The pressing concerns in the legal reforms has been referred to as “enforcement in difficult” (zhixing nan) (ibid, p. 2).

According to Martin Chorzempa policy brief “China’s Social Credit System: A Mark of Progress or a Threat to Privacy?” (Chorzempa et al., 2018), he furthers the idea of the SCS as supplementing flaws in the current financial crediting system but overall describes the system as two-sided. On one side, he argues that the government have been lacking technological innovations in the private sector such as “from where to assign police officers to who is eligible for government benefits” (ibid, p. 2). However, there is also a large risk of collecting personal and public data of individuals to upon standards of appropriate conduct since there is both a potential threat of hacking causing sensitive information being used in wrong purposes or manipulated towards state agendas (ibid, p. 3).

Domestic sources on SCS is in line with Chorzempa and Creemers in regards to supplementing legal flaws in the system. According to Xi Zhou article “The Reasons of Integrity Deficiency of Social Insurance in China” (2017, p. 99-101) describes the necessity of the SCS for improving social development in the country. He argues that China is undergoing an integrity crisis, which is due to a perceived moral risk aggravating contradiction between supply and demand of social insurance funds, increases financial burden for the government, and raises the cost of enterprises. This is also supported by Liu (2006,p. 47) who argues that it is normal for moral decay in social insurances since a lot of people misabuse the social security system in order to receive personal benefits and favores to relatives. He describes it as “some companies and individuals colluded. They used the fake identity cards and files to deceive the retirement approval agencies. Some relatives of retired workers who have been dead defraud pension insurance”. There is an overwhelming perspective of China needing fiercer governance enforcement to increase compliance to the new legal reforms. This is also supported in recent regional surveys in China from Genia Kostka (2018) on public opinion regarding the SCS, which pointed out a surprisingly high approval rate across respondent groups for the system and that socially advantaged citizens is the group showing the highest support.

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Other prominent literature on the SCS brings in topic such as public opinion, Confucianism, system capacity, historical perspectives, rule-of-law initiatives, and comparatives with Western credit systems, and implications for sustainable behavior (Schaefer, 2019, Blomberg, 2018, Sithigh & Siems, 2019, Dai, 2018, Small, 2019). The contribution made by these aithors have made it possible to gain insight on the system from an English speaking perspective, however, a tremendous focus on the literature is on the function of the system and not the actual impact (besides from a legal standpoint) in economic, social, environmental, and cultural spheres.

There are many research gaps in the field due to the system being in its initial phase (the system was initatied in 2014 and is suspected to be released nationwide at the end of 2020), insufficient field studies, lack of international coverage, but also areas such as human rights, regional dimensions, social exclusion, governance implications, and much more has not been written in detail. This paper will include the perspective of social cohesion and exclusion by analyzing the effect of social labelling in the system´s Blacklist mechanism, whilst also including the concepts of governance and social control in order to increase the perspective of governance implications. Other topics such as minority rights, rewards and punishments, compliance, participation, and the overall function of the system will also be included. No reports, yet, have analyzed the SCS as a case study with social control and its effect on governance and social labelling as their core element.

3. Theoretical Framework

3.1 Labelling Theory

The use of labelling in governance has shown a positive correlation in environmental behavior and positive outcomes in energy conservation, sustainable consumption, and waste management (NASEO, 2014, Krook & Eklund, 2010, Rohracher, 2009) but also in crime prevention and norm-activation/compliance (Gueguen, 2001, Becker, 1963, Lemert, 1967). This was proven in

10 NASEO´s home energy conservation project in 2014, in which neighborhoods could compare household energy consumption with their neighbors. The project resulted in a 4% decrease in energy consumption by asserting labels to sustainable and non-sustainable households.

Labelling a person as either positive or negative has its heritage in reputation states that have based the assertion of label to confirm one's compliance to social norms in a given society. Labels are not permanent, for example, the war veterans returning to the USA from World War 2 were labeled as heroes whilst the returning soldiers of the Vietnam war were given a label as “villains” (Ciampaglia, 2019). Labelling has an important function in governance in its attempt to create social cohesion and minimizing the risk of violence or enforcing social sanctions. A label in regard to social governance focuses on the consequences of being labeled as norm- breaking, for example, if a person avoids paying taxes and is given a negative label as a response, will the label increase or decrease the person's motivation to pay taxes?

According to the wide research on labeling the answer is two-folded. According to Lemert (1967) & Becker (1963) the consequences in being labeled a ”criminal” depend on the primary and secondary deviance. A primary deviance is situational or transient, it could be driving over the speeding limit or jumping the metro. This form of deviance would not result in an individual being labeled as a criminal or a danger to the society, nor from themselves in ordinary instances. When an individual is, however, confronted with stigmatization and is repeatedly portrayed as a “deviant” due to committing primary deviance he/she tends to fall into the role of the label. Therefore, the Secondary deviance is explicitly a response to a societal reaction to deviance, which includes major implications for the individual's status, relationship, or future behavior in society.

This form of deviance occurs when the negative response from society (i.e stigmatization, punishment, segregation) to the initial (primary) deviance causes fundamental changes in the offenders’ social roles, self-identity, and personality. In return, the probability for recurrence of future secondary deviance acts increases (ibid, p. 40). Lemert (1967, p. 41) describes it as “secondary deviants’ life and identity are organized around the facts of deviance”. This means that the individual tends to seek belonging in “outsiders” and conform to deviance as a controlling identity. For example, if a young man is sent to jail for a minor crime - such as stealing groceries at an supermarket, there is a great chance that the young man will conform to

11 the behavior of other prisoners and hence increase his criminal network and pursue a career in illegal activities. Research have shown that labelling in regards to racial profiling in the U.S.A police force is a rather common feature and studies have confirmed that the U.S police kill black people at an extensively higher rate than white people, even during events of being both unarmed and innocent to any crimes. (Sirry et al., 2017)

An alternative to reduce the possibility of integrating into criminal activities is to enforce judicial shame penalties, such as public apology and exposure. The shame penalty aims to reaffirm normative standards and deter future recurrences in crime by exposing the offender to shame, which threatens the social status of the offender whilst including family and friends to take action earlier (Chen, 2002).

Labelling has also shown promising results in compliance studies, a study in 1975 (Steele) pointed out that a negative social label increases motivation to restore one's social status. The study included an initial phone contact that insinuated that the subject was unwilling to participate in the community and were selfish. Two days after the initial labelling another experimenter offered the subject the possibility to provide services or resources in the given community and the compliance rate was a staggering 93% in the experimental condition against 46% in a control group. Two other experiments of Goldman et al (1982) and Gueguen (2001) have proven that a negative label only has its effect when the subject restores its self-esteem through the opportunity of adopting a behavior that directly contradicts the negative label (Gueguen, 2001:p. 745). For example, if someone is labelled as a “bad friend” a request aiming to be helpful to your friend will be accepted more easily than a request without connection to the label, such as pollution or the protection of animals.

A report from Allcott & Rogers (2014) supported that social comparison-based home energy reports with labels of energy consumption in residential areas has lowered energy usage with 2% on average. The report highlighted that when households compare their behavior with other community members they tend to adjust their energy usage in an attempt to conform to socially and environmentally acceptable labels. The use of labels has a clear connection between social cohesion and societal demands

The use of labels is effective in enforcing compliance in people when the label is linked to a request to restore the self-esteem of the subject and is preferable in short notice whilst if the

12 request is not connected to the label there is no effect of a social label (Gueguen, 2001). If a person is labelled as a delinquent or outsider in society and is met with repeated stigmatization, segregation or punishment the risk is for the individual to embrace his/her role and repeat violations in the future. The literature on labelling supports public exposure or apology in the form of judicial shame penalties in order to re-connect to the society and endanger the social status of the subject. If a social comparison of labels is publicly available, evidence shows that individuals tend to adjust to the normative standard in order to conform to the societal expectations.

3.2 Conceptual Framework

The literature on social control has a tendency to be misconceived as a concept belonging in criminology or deviance related studies (Chen, 2002). It can easily be confused as manipulative power structure but in fact it is the phenomenon that contributes to the elastic band holding societies together. According to Jason Carmichael (2014), “social control is the study of the mechanisms, in the form of patterns of pressure, through which society maintains social order and cohesion”. The phenomenon of social control being inherited in society has been a hot topic for some of our times most profound leaders in social theories (Marx & Engels,1978; Hobbes, 2011; Rousseau, 2003).

The founder of sociology Emile Durkheim was intrigued by what binds a society together and as a result he wrote in his famous work “Division of Labor” (1933) that societies are based on two forms of solidarity, mechanical (pre-modern) and organic (modern). During the pre-industrial period most of the people in a society based on a large-scale collective conscience, meaning that the shared norms and beliefs in a society are interconnected through similar social and economic activities and maintained through proper institutions. However, with the establishment of the organic solidarity, the members of society beholds vast differences in experiences, ethnicities, language, and culture but what interconnects us today is the interdependence of each actor (for food, security, development, health care), we still have a collective conscience but with growing variety of individual differences.

13 Durkheim's work has much on its emphasis on domestic social control but in regards to the trends in the international social order most societies today possess traits of the capitalistic market and the implementation of human rights in society but for approximately 45 years the Cold War was the battle for the social order. The social control in Western liberal democracy came out on top and was characterised by elections between multiple political parties, market economy including private property, decentralized power distribution, and the rule-of-law. Francis Fukuyama (1989) referred it to as the end of history meaning that the sociocultural evolutions causing shifting ideologies for centuries have reached its end. The views of Fukuyama have for long been questioned in the academic world (See Huntington, 1996) and in 2008 the doubt was apparent in a total economic meltdown worldwide. The obvious answer of liberal democracy being the definition of “good governance” was no longer as obvious. The “freedom” given in liberal democracy was challenged by the problems of social cohesion, global labour markets, increased competitiveness and diversity, and the technological revolution. The two biggest liberal democracies in the world (USA and India) have highlighted this shift by increasingly pursuing populist agendas on the expense of institutional safeguards and human rights (Repucci, 2020). Today, the governance trend is not towards liberal democracy but instead a line of authoritarianism with 2019 being the 13th consecutive year of declining “freedom in the world” (Repucci, 2020).

The contemporary problem with collective conscience in the West is that the basic identification of labour markets in nation-states is insufficient to compete with global labour markets, forcing individuals and groups to conform in a sense of belonging based on something different than labour market participation (Eizaguirre et al., 2012). Furthermore, political rights have faced difficulties in addressing the inequality of denizens and citizens sharing urban spaces, which according to Eizaguirre et al (2012:p.2000) has caused “challenges to the notion of social citizenship being based on national contracts and redistributive policies”. The idea of “good governance” is to promote social cohesion in the aim of reaching social harmony, but equally important it is a progress for innovations in the structure of governance that combines bottom-up initiatives/practices with top-down policies (Eizaguirre et al., 2012). The OECD (2006, pp. 144– 145) pointed out that new approaches to policy-making are in demand in order to overcome the problem of “social exclusion and loss of social cohesion that follow the creation of socially segregated zones of poor people, often immigrants and within minorities in cities”. According to

14 Eizaguirre et al (2012) is the importance of future governance based on incorporating local and regional actors with citizens participation and national planning, also known as multilevel governance.

4. Methodology

The research performed in this thesis is based on a qualitative research strategy approach concluding that the importance is on the subject in the form of words. In contrast, a quantitative research strategy emphasizes numbers and statistics. In qualitative research studies, it is common to use an abductive approach since it correlates the theory and findings by answering the selected research questions. Meanwhile, it can help produce new insights in a given phenomenon on the basis of new and existing material (Bryman, 2016: p. 375-79). The subject is a matter of social sciences, and therefore the focus is on people and their social world. The case study of the Social Crediting System in China is chosen since it embraces an alternative development for solving social problems and it is a heavily under explored phenomenon in regards to social control studies. The uniqueness of the system benefits research aiming to highlight innovative solutions but just as important damaging consequences for online social control and labelling.

The thesis has benefited from using a systematic literature search and text analysis of social control, governance, and labelling along with the SCS. This will contribute to a wide perspective of the phenomenon, drawing from recent findings on the chosen subject. The research is operationalized through a desk study that collects information through qualitative text analysis rather than data, which means interviews and questionnaires will not be performed. A benefit of desk studies is that it allows the author(s) to work independently of the geographical location that is of interest in the research objective. However, the advantages of a field study is the benefit of first-hand interaction with the community/individuals of interest, which could increase a subjective understanding of changes. In this research a desk study was considered more

15 beneficial due to the research objective and especially since China does not allow free speech nor independent media, which can complicate the trustworthiness of both surveys and interviews.

Furthermore, the reliability of this essay is determined by the fact that if another researcher would repeat the same study with the same data they will receive the same results. According to Creswell (2009:p.190), ”Qualitative validity means that the researcher checks for the accuracy of the findings by employing certain procedures, while qualitative reliability indicates that the researcher's approach is consistent across different researchers and different projects”. The presentation of the research outlining and how the collection of data have been performed will result in an enhanced reliability. However, taking into account different researchers might inherit different interpretations or pre-understandings. Furthermore, the validity of this essay has been enhanced by source triangulation, which allows different perspectives from different authors on the subject

4.1 Case Study

This paper is a case study of the Social Credit System´s impact on social control, governance, and social labelling in China. Case studies are used in order to describe a phenomenon within a given context (country, village, company) and then interprets the phenomena´s effect for the actors involved. Case studies are considered one of the best research designs in sociological studies (Bryman, 2016). The benefit of using a qualitative research strategy is that it suits for using a case study since there is a need for a detailed text analysis to understand the particularity of the phenomena in the given context. One of the most prominent experts on case study research Robert K Yin (2003, p. 2) describes the method as “the distinctive need for case studies arise out of the desire to understand complex social phenomena” since “the case study method allows investigators to retain the holistic and meaningful characteristics of real-life events”.

16 The SCS is a complex social phenomena which furthers the benefit of using case study as the chosen method because it suits a complex behavior such as social control and consequently accounting and reviewing each relevant factor subsequently. The structure of the thesis interconnects material, theory, research questions to the findings and analysis, this is known as a logical structure (Yin, 2003:p. 20). Furthermore, the research design is based on SCS as a case study through an idiographic approach. This means that the focus of the case study is to highlight the unique features of the case and how it can be interpreted in different contexts, unlike a cross- sectional design that generates statements regardless of time and place (Bryman, 2016: p. 61). Case studies are also considered the preferred strategy when “how or why” questions are being used, when the core of the research is on a contemporary phenomenon within some real-life context, and when the investigator has little control over the event (Yin, 2003:p. 5-10). Furthermore, when focusing on “how and why” as in this research the case study is known as an explanatory study.

One of the most common criticism case studies experiences is that it provides a little basis for scientific generalization (Iwodu, 2016). Yin´s (2003) answer to this is:

"case studies […] are generalizable to theoretical propositions and not to populations or universes. In this sense, the case study […] does not represent a 'sample', and in doing a case study, your goal will be to generalize theories (analytical generalization) and not to enumerate frequencies (statistical generalization)" (p.10).

The result of comparing many cases in a case study are used to either compare many cases under the same phenomenon to find an axis of either difference or similarity, known as structural focused comparisons. This method has shown great potential for drawing more concrete conclusions but since SCS is a unique unit for social control that so far only exists in China a single case study was preferred.

17

4.2 Material

To answer the research questions, the material being used derives from academic articles, government documents, newspaper articles, and books on the relevant topic. The information was mainly acquired through Google Scholar, Social Science Research Network, Linnaeus University OneSearch, and ResearchGate. The vast majority of the collected material is based on secondary sources since there is a language barrier in regard to understanding Mandarin. However, a few reports have the Chinese government translated in English and are available on the Google scholar for reviewing and surveys, interviews, and international reports will be used as primary sources. Most of the literature is written from Chinese authors and a small minority is based on western researchers, this is also the reason for more research to be done on the subject from an outside perspective, which has also been highlighted by researchers on the SCS (Creemers, 2018, Schaefer, 2019, Small, 2019, Chorzempa et al., 2018). Genia Kostka´s regional cross-surveys on public opinion regarding SCS will be used to increase subjective understanding of the system. A Chinese-American tech company that is based in Beijing, known as Trivium China, have also performed field studies including interviews which will also be of great use but also their translated material on the actual SCS application. In combination, with regional SCS applications that are translated in English such as Hangzhou.

4.3 Limitation and Delimitation

One of the biggest limitations in this research is the lack of Mandarin knowledge which has forced the collected information to be based on translated materials, which could at times question the independence of information and whether state agendas have been involved in shaping the objective. However, all materials used on the SCS are available online and are frequently updated to improve its accuracy in translation, and consequently constantly peer reviewed. Another limitation is the fact that the SCS system is still in progress which makes the available research rather narrow and confined, but this is also a research opportunity. There is also the limitation of performing a desk study on a research on social control, which is the lack of first-hand experience of the perceived changes by users of SCS.

18 The delimitations for this research are many since the SCS is not a unanimous national system yet but instead it is separated between different provinces, this means that the reward/punishment system is not the same throughout the whole country. Instead, the focus is on the capabilities of the system as a whole. Delimiting has also been done in regard to environmental outcomes, financial market, LGBTQ rights, and comparative studies with Western social control units. This is because the system affects all spheres of the Chinese society and for this research social control was considered a both unexplored but also interesting perspective. However, some of the above mentioned factors will be mentioned but not in close detail.

4.4 Ethical Considerations

Since this essay is performed through a desk study no specific ethical considerations have been considered.

5. Analytical Framework

In this paper the theoretical framework, in combination, with the research questions will compose the analytical framework in order to reassure reliability and validity. According to Esaiasson et al, argues that it is of high value and importance to construct operational indicators grounded in the theoretical framework (Esaiasson, et al, 2017:p. 22). The benefit of using the purpose and theoretical framework is the clear “red thread”, which sets a guideline for the research. The main purpose is to investigate the Social Credit System and interpret its potential function as a tool for social control and domestic governance. In addition, investigating the effects of social labelling in the SCS, which have not been written about in detail in the governance discourse on the SCS. The analysis will be following the research question in order to narrow the scope of the study, meanwhile, the research will be benefiting from the literature review on the subject but including a new interpretation.

The first section of the analysis is focusing on a rather open-ended question - how does the SCS function? This section is crucial, in order, to analyze the structure and diversity of the system and will be an important foundation for understanding the phenomenon and its usage. The second

19 section is connected to the question - how does the SCS influence domestic governance and social control? The concepts discussed in the literature review will be instrumental in the investigation of social control within the system and will contribute to a broad perspective on how the system is operationalizing a regulated behavior among its users. The definitions by Durkheim, and Carmichael and more will help the research from a historical lens of social control while ensuring reliability. The second section of the analysis will include the intervention strategies the system puts forward in order to assure participation, rewards, punishments, interdependence, and restrictions.

The last question and section of the analysis - What are the effects of social labelling in the SCS? This section of the analysis aims to use the theoretical lens on the data collection in the purpose of ensuring validity but also to establish clear evidence of the potential negative or positive effects the social labelling has in the SCS. Either one of these three questions could function as the guideline for the theory, however, the benefit of using multiple questions is that they complement each other and offer a narrow scope of a widely interpreted subject. Meanwhile, contributing to a solid ground of theoretical framework based on previous research. In combination, these research questions define, contextualize, and highlight a modern social control unit in China and answers the what, how, and why is the system being a controversial topic in the governance discourse. Consequently, the theoretical framework and questions, highlights many aspects of a phenomenon and increases understanding of how modern and technological strategies are being used in assuring social control in China.

6. Findings

The findings will be structured into two sections. First, an introduction to the SCS case in China: the function, system, diversity, purpose, and usage. This section will be the foundation to understanding the following sections. The second section will be focusing on the SCS as a tool for social control and domestic governance and will be using the concepts and factors discussed in the literature review.

20 (6.1) Introducing the Case of the Social Credit System

(6.1.1) The Social Credit System - How does the SCS function?

Before we start to unravel the function of the SCS it is important to understand the demand for its existence and to clarify its purpose. In 2014, China's State Council announced the landmark policy of a national social credit system that is supposed to be released nationwide at the end of 2020, a system designed to “promote the traditional value of integrity”, in combination to, increasing the severity of punishment towards dishonest behavior. (Schaefer, 2019a). According to Kendra Schaefer (Schaefer et al., 2020b), is the foundation of the system based on a paper, outlining the USA financial credit system under Chinese characteristics from a research team belonging to the Chinese academy of social science in 1999. According to the paper, the financial credit system in China needed more data than simply financial records but also behavioural components such as trustworthiness and willingness to be a good citizen. The paper highlighted that when incorporating behavioural components it would be easier to track down bad actors within the financial market that are not obeying the domestic regulations or adhering to domestic policies. The Chinese government supported the paper (especially considering the triangle debt crisis in 1990) and later on refined the paper in 2003 before introducing it in the State Council. Consequently, in 2003 the social credit system was first mentioned during the Third Plenum of the 16th Central Committee by General Jiang Zemin as “We must strengthen society’s credit awareness and constitute a social credit system with morality as its support, property rights as its foundation, and law as its guarantor”. (Chorzempa et al., 2018). The 2014 landmark policy has three main targets in its work to increase morality, which is citizens, businesses, and the government itself. The fundamental core of the SCS is connected to the current and insufficient governance tools and methods available to solve some of China's greatest concerns. The overall concern can be defined as a two-sided trust issue. On one side, environmental disaster, years of Ponzi schemes (fraudulent investment scams, similar to a

21 pyramid scheme), food scarcity, and state corruption have sparked a lack of trust in the integrity of government actions among the Chinese citizens (ibid, 2018). On the other side, the State Council believes the lack of Confucian moral virtues in the society have resulted in a growing problem of untrustworthiness and integrity, which is visible in the increasing rate of: tax evasions, factory accidents, food and drug safety scares, fraud, academic dishonesty, and counterfeiting of goods (State Council, 2014). Furthermore, the emergence of SCS is connected to the demand of the Chinese state for a tool capable of controlling corporate, individual, and institutional behavior and the system is made up of three interconnected components: (1) a master database, (2) blacklisting system, (3) punishment and reward system (Schaefer, 2019a).

Financial and social interventions are two of the most important reasons for the formation of the SCS but also to improve the collection and sharing of data. This collection is what Schaefer refers to as the master database. The role of the central government in regard to the SCS is in the form of record keeping instead of an active participation of assigning scores. In fact, there is to this day no national rating system, at this point there is only national platforms collecting and evaluating the social credit score from city and municipality level. The classification of one's personal score is referred to as “trust breaking” or “trust keeping” behavior and will put individuals/companies performing poorly under the “Blacklist”, and positive in the “Redlist”. The Redlist and Blacklist along with credit information are all available on the publicly accessible master database. The credit information in this regard includes criminal record, compliance with 20 government regulations, tax obligations and welfare, and general data on the subjects. In addition to the general data there is also information on government projects, annual reports, product safety, environmental protection, unfair business practices, registered capital, and corporation´s investment activities (Creemers, 2018). The master database is separated into five central data platforms, including Credit China, National Credit Information Sharing Platform (NCISP), 19 Credit Reference Center, National Enterprise Credit Information Publicity System (NECIPS), and the List of Dishonest Persons Subject to Enforcement, which all evaluate and store credit related data from regulatory bodies, various agencies, and judicial system. Each of these five platforms contains heterogeneous components to share and exchange data which is the foundation of a centralized infrastructure system supporting the SCS (Chen & Cheung 2017). The data available are commonly used by local and regional social credit score applications, such

22 as Alibabas “Sesame Credit”, “Chengxin Chunyun”, “LaoLai Checker” and many more. For example, Alibaba have reported that approximately 80% of their data is collected from government data platforms, meanwhile, only 20% of the remaining data comes from Alibaba itself (Small, 2019). It is also important to mention that the local credit score will not affect your national credit score but instead its the other way around, the national credit score will affect your local. The central database is, however, accessible for everyone in the general public, industry associations, state agencies, banks, or city governments to review. Approximately 75% of all data collected is publicly accessible, meanwhile, 25% is classified as limited sharing or intergovernmental sharing (Meissner, 2017). In 2018 had the Chinese central government collected more than 10.7 billion data points on individuals, corporations, and government affairs, which is approximately 990 million people and 25.91 million enterprises (Cheng & Tay, 2019). The infrastructural system of the data platform is combined with an extensive surveillance system and citizens reporting, which is critical for classifying subjects but also in the government's ability to manage, monitor, predict, and govern the political, economic, and social domains (Liang et al., 2018).

6.1.2 Social Credit Score, Redlist and Blacklist

Social Credit Score

Once again, it is important to clarify that since the system is not based on a national rating system, the outlining could include various differences on the punishable and rewarding behavior depending on the geographical location of the subject. However, the plan of the central government is to enforce the SCS in all corners of the country; it is still in its initial phase. One of the first steps of the social credit score is the identification of all users and company´s by assigning a “social credit unified code” (SC Unicode). It is a 18-digit code on the identity card including personal data, such as; age, sex, location, income, tax, and consumption (Meissner & Wubekke, 2016). The individual SC Unicode is then the digit one enters into the master database to review your own or others credit information. The scoring scale of the system is different

23 depending on where the SCS is enforced. Some cities have decided on 0-200 scoring scale, others to 0-1000 scale (See Trivium China report on all cities rating systems, 2019:p.23).

In the city of Huangzhou is the personal score system (in the name of Qianjiang score) unlike the popular Sesame score (main focus is on financial credit information) by focusing their rating on public services and welfare. According to Director Fan, their system highlights “compliance with laws and regulations, and truly reflecting the full range of citizens credibility in urban life.” (Wah, 2018). The Qianjiang score uses a scale of 0-1000 and divides people in five divisions depending on their personal credit score (see diagram 1) and is based on five dimensions known as “Qian Jiangfen”. (1) the first dimension is basic information, including personal hukou (household registration), education, employment, and social security provident fund. (2) Compliance with laws and regulations, reflects performance of due obligations, observing public order and good customs - including information on tax payments and public inspection laws, information on administrative penalties, and payment of water, electricity, and gas. (3) Commercial credit includes the performance of individuals in daily life activities, such as; shopping, gambling, alcohol consumption, credit behaviors in job search and recruitment, financial credit, contract fulfillment, and other fields. (4) Social credit, used by individuals in public services and social activities, such as public utility payment, medical credit payment, letter of rent and other applications. (5) Pro-social behavior (urban contribution), reflects social behaviors such as mutual assistance, cooperation, shared dedication to social interaction, participating in volunteer activities and donating blood (Wah, 2018). The performance of each user within these five dimensions can result in either punishment or rewards depending on the trust-keeping or trust breaking behavior. In Huangzhou punishable offenses include: records of dishonesty, refusal of military service, bribery, unpaid subway usage, court dishonesty, jaywalking, illegal crimes and more. If an individual is below 550 points the punishment includes major restrictions in social and economic opportunities. On the contrary, if performing above 700 points, “trustworthy” citizens will be rewarded with deposit-free public rental housing, subway privileges, fitness venue reservations, parking reservations, online registration of museums and other activities, full-service mobile and offline services, and much more (Wah, 2018). In the case of the city Fuzhou, the subtraction and addition of points are incorporated in an extensive list including everything from education to military service (see Trivium China report for punishment and reward criteria in Fuzhou, 2019:p.25-30)

24 The layout of all the cities social credit rank have inherited most of its criterias based on the behavioral list of the 2014 SCS plan. Accordingly, is the behavior labeled as trust-breaking mostly linked to laws and regulation, for example, corruption, scamming, professional misconduct, or spreading fake news or rumours online etc (Liu, 2018). Furthermore, it exist other trust-breaking behavior that is not considered illegal such as, over consumption of alcohol, gambiling habits, extensive internet usage etc. (Sithigh & Siems, 2019). However, the State Council also listed “serious trust-breaking behavior” in certain priority areas such as, (1) “behaviour that seriously damages people’s health, lives and security;” (2) “behaviour that seriously damages the market order of fair competition and normal order in society;” (3) “refusal to fulfil legal obligations, thereby seriously affecting the credibility of judicial and administrative organs;” and (4) “refusal to fulfil national defence obligations” (State Council, 2016). If a person or company violates the serious trust-breaking behavior the violator is placed on a “Blacklist” and will face a “joint sanctioning”, or to the contrary, performed outstanding behavior he/she is placed on a “Redlist” (Creemers, 2018).

Blacklist & Redlist

The placement on the Blacklist will include serious limitations on an individual's opportunities and mobilities in society. An individual facing the punishment of blacklisting will be on the list from six months to five years depending on the severity of the violence and most cities will put the credit information (name, photo, personal data, and offense) on the individual visible for everyone in the community with the aim of stigmatization and shame. The blacklisted credit information is published on billboards, television shows, LED screens in train stations, and in other apps (one app shows a radar tracking blacklisted people in close proximity) (Creemers, 2018, Schaefer, 2019a). Some local courts have collaborated with telecom carriers to unlílaterally change the cell phone ringtone of blacklisters into public service announcements, the idea is that when the blacklister receives a phone call the surrounding will know he/she is blacklisted (Dai, 2018). Blacklisted individuals can, however, argue for removal or subtraction of their blacklisting by arguing their case in court. Yet, the punishment received for being labeled a blacklister (besides the public shaming) is through “joint sanctioning” that follows the principle

25 of “trust-breaking here, restrictions anywhere” (Chen & Cheung, 2017). If an individual, for example, fails to comply with a court decision it will result in multiple punishments from areas that weren't connected to the violation. Being labeled as a blacklist would lead to comprehensive restrictions in government procurement, bid tendering, administrative approvals, government support, financing credit, market access and determination of qualifications. In addition, violation in one area can also result in sanctions in the following categories: intensified government supervision and inspections, prevention/suspension of government approvals/subsidies/loans/biddings and other projects, restriction from; working as civil servants or in high-level positions in the private sectors (managers, board members etc), obtaining professional qualifications and licenses (such as lawyers, doctors, social worker etc), “high consumption behavior unnecessary to the maintenance of life and work” (acquiring real estate, buying cars, vacations, highly rated hotels, flying abroad) (Chen & Cheung, 2017, Creemers, 2018). If being labeled blacklist it can also result in your children not being able to apply for certain private schools offering better education. The blacklist is operationalized by institutionalized coordination among government agencies and Chinese Communist Party (CCP) organizations, in particular memorandums of understanding (MoU) are signed by members to coordinate joint sanctions. The MoUs target dishonest behavior in a multitude of fields - environmental protection, real estate, customs, to marriage registration, whilst each field has their own MoU that is endorsed by the relevant government agency/Communist Party organization responsible for enforcing the joint sanction. The blacklisting is heavily dependent on facial recognition through extensive surveillance, in combination with civilian reporting, in its goals to punish violators (Dai, 2018). The first data-driven review of the Credit China blacklisting by Engelsmann et al (2018) highlighted that a majority of the entries in the blacklist was by corporations but also a rather big minority of individuals. The individual on the blacklist is described by the trust-breaking behavior and consequent sanction. However, meanwhile the violators have a clear description of their offence, the subjects on the Redlist have no explanations of their praise nor their reason for accessing special privileges. The problem according to the paper is that subjects have no ability to contest the decision-making process since there is only a small possibility for people to understand when the SCS is rewarding or sanctioning specific behavior, besides financial offences. Kendra Schaefer (2019a, p. 22) also highlights this dilemma as “there are a lot of ways for anyone to lose points, but not as many

26 ways for anyone to gain them. That's because most of the ways to increase points are things over which people have very little control. Particularly those in low-income brackets.”

On the contrary, if an individual has showcased “trust-keeping” behavior a certain amount of improved opportunities and potentials exist in society. However, it is a lot more difficult to be enlisted in the redlist than the blacklist and it is connected to the previous mentioned statement highlighting that the list of “trust-worthy” behavior is very limited. Rewarding behavior includes, polite manners on the internet, punctual with financial obligations, providing important clues in criminal cases, technological entrepreneurship awards, innovation awards, literary awards, doing volunteer work, donating blood or bone marrow, or giving charitable donations (Creemers, 2018, Zhang, 2016, Schaefer, 2019a). The problem regarding collecting “good” deeds is that it is a lot more difficult to track good over bad behavior. If somebody drives over the speeding limit it is easy through the advanced surveillance system to distribute punishments, however, if an individual returns a lost handbag it is close to impossible to record. This is also why civilian participation plays an important role in the ranking. In a Vice News Documentary in 2018 (Ye & Chor) they feature a retired woman in Rongcheng who works as an “information collector”, who is responsible for reporting good and bad deeds in her community to the local credit bureau. In the interview she talks about reporting a neighbor for being publicly intoxicated on the street. The citizens on the Redlist are proudly displayed in local news, billboards in rural and urban residencies, and LED screens on train stations. If a person is labeled as “trust-keeping” the rewards are prioritized access to health care, education, housing, and easier access to Visa applications, VIP lounges at hotels and airports, cash loans up to USD 6500. Furthermore, being placed on the Redlist is considered an honorary title, which is considered an important criterion in dating apps (Botsman, 2017). A public opinion survey on 2200 participants in the SCS by Genia Kostka (2018) highlighted that the SCS is most favoured by socially advantaged citizens (high income, better-educated, urban residents) and that 80% of the respondents believed the rewards can improve their life-quality.

27 6.2 How does the SCS influence domestic governance and changes in social control?

The problems involving social control for the central government have been the lack of sufficient tools to implement legal reforms and to uphold a rule-of-law among its citizens and institutions. The contemporary problem is the lack of repercussions for not conforming to the normative order in areas, such as judicial, social, and economic spheres (Creemers, 2018). A phenomenon causing the current Xi Jingping regime to drastically tighten its governance. The lack of trust from both the society and the government is connected to some of the latest scandals within China, such as the 2008 melamine scandal (resulted in 300.000 babies being hospitalized by 22 dairy companies), which led to major backlashes to the Chinese judicial system and have to this day still created a high demand in foreign brands of baby formula (Huang, 2018). The deficit of social control has also been highlighted in the recent and harsh implementations from the state, for example, the persecution of Muslim ethnic minority groups, internet censorship of activists and blogs, crackdown on the independent civil society, restrictions to religious practices such as Buddhism and Islam, and the academic censorship to critical references on the central government by professors and students (FreedomHouse, 2019). The mass protests in Hong Kong due to the new guidelines of the Xi Jingping regime was considered a major backlash to Xi´s leadership and the SCS is therefore considered a crucial component in restoring social control. The system's ability to regulate its citizens behavior and meanwhile creating a phenomenon previously invisible - visible, will have enormous influences on pressuring society towards social cohesion.

One of the two factors showcasing changes that occurs in social control is by analyzing formal and informal institutions and processes (Chen, 2002). This is because when major changes in social control happens it is initially visualized in institutional and cultural/social reforms. The major process for formal institutions in implementing social control is performed by formulating clear boundaries of the acceptable and unacceptable behavior in the normative order by implementing laws. However, for its success there is a need for a formal rule-of-law mechanism. This is a regulator that rewards appropriate behavior according to the social contract and more importantly, punishes the non-conformance. This process is typically confined by the physical

28 organizations (laws, court systems, police, etc) but in China the formal processes in social control have been lacking enforcement mechanisms and mostly relied on community participation and informal systems in crime prevention and justice systems. A process that has previously functioned in China but with the attempt of changing their market economy for domestic investments, increased legal reforms and the increased social issues, the government requires a stricter rule of law to maintain social control (Dai, 2018). In Danielle Raulli´s (2008:p.78-84) paper “Why is the Rule of Law in China unsuccessful?”, he describes the rule of law as inefficient due to three main reasons:

(1) the judicial system, only 40% of judges holds a university degree and a majority is drawn from the ranks of the retired military, which have resulted in court processes relying on pre-trial confessions and perfunctory court proceedings instead of extensive legal reviews. A result of this have been a high amount of wrongful accusations and uninformed court decisions paving the way for personal benefits of local governments instead of following the rule of law, ultimately, making the judicial system a formality more than a regulator.

(2) The legal profession, according to the Congressional-Executive Commission on China (CECC) by the U.S. Congress, it is estimated that there is roughly one lawyer for every ten thousand individuals in China and the amount of government lawyers remains inadequate to fulfill the domestic demand. Another problem is the amount of corruption and unqualification among the legal profession, which is due to many factors, for example, there are no requirements for a law degree and most lawyers include royalties, payment of introduction fees, and kickbacks. In addition, most lawyers base their clientele on social connections referred to as “guanxi”, which means that protecting friends, colleagues, family is above the law and have resulted in corruption networks. According to Peerenboom (2002, p.256) the main contributor for this problem is due to poor quality of legislation, he describes it as not only is “power dispersed, but the lines of authority for law-making are not clear. In many instances, it is difficult if not impossible to state whether an entity was acting within its authority”.

(3) Cultural barriers, the popular culture/religion of Confucianism in China have always alienated legalism since the belief in justice through social connections instead of formal

29 punishments have for long determined judicial justice in society. It is common for bribery, or kickbacks, to achieve outcomes and refusing to pay fines or attending court dates have been a long-standing issue. The cultural belief in social justification have had promising effect locally but caused big loops in the judicial system as a whole. However, the central government has rejected westernized forms of rule of law due to the fear of damaging the political structure, which have led to “Beijing's government must find a way to institute widespread respect for constitutional law without compromising its own power and legitimacy” (Rauilli, 2008:p. 83).

The new SCS have managed to incorporate a widespread respect for constitutional law and without the loss of the government's power or legitimacy, instead increased its influence. One of the main categories in the SCS is the judicial reform that has been labeled the ”judicial credibility” component, the objective is to improve the overall public image and most importantly, the credibility of the judicial system (Dai, 2018). In the glimpse of extreme internet censorship of influential bloggers and activists but also everyday citizens have questioned the reputation/credit of the state (Dai, 2018). The judicial credibility program is one out of many components in the government honesty campaign, which includes expanding use of public hearing and consultation procedures, regulating medical professionals with ethical rules, and restraining academics from plagiarism (Dai, 2018).

The previous problems of the informal systems capabilities to rely on social connections had resulted in accepted cracks in the system. The implementation of the SCS is a solution to the deficits in the physical organizations governance process by connecting the judicial system to the behavioural guidelines of the system. The SCS enforces a rule of law that is available to all users and creates a sense of trust in the judicial system by keeping the list of blacklisted/redlisted individuals transparent to the general public. This has also been proven in the high amount of approvals by both people who have been advantaged and disadvantaged by the system but also in the high amount of approval by people who believe it keeps individuals and companies more abide to regulations (Kostka, 2018). This is also supported by a report from Ohlberg et al (2017) on domestic media coverage, which demonstrated that there is a high level of trust for the SCS and that private tech companies are the cause for privacy violations and not the government. One of the core elements of the trust in the SCS is that corporations and public officials are equally punished in the system to regular people. The Blacklist will halter investment possibilities,

30 ranking in the political system, and daily fines are distributed to trust breaking companies every day until they have made amends. Yet, according to Engelsmann et al (2018) statistical analysis on the central platform, the transparency could be argued to favor prioritized individuals and companies since there is no information on how one is placed on the Redlist in the central database.

The judicial system has expanded the scope of behavior under government control within the existing legal system but also beyond, the SCS have also managed to fulfil the Communist Party’s ambition to use new governance tools to reinvent social governance (Liu, 2018). The trust-breaking offences are at times connected to the legal framework but frequently it is behavior breaching social and moral norms that have artificially been imposed by the party. For example, spreading rumors online or rejecting university admission are subjectively punished and is not socially agreed upon. These new social/moral norm violations further the social control of the government by blurring the line between legal and social norms. Therefore, losing credits in the system is both an offence legally but also culturally (in Confucianism's virtues). In addition, the rule of law is then confined to the artificial guidelines of a state agenda instead of constitutional laws supported by the general public. Furthermore, illegal behavior such as” picking quarrels and provoking trouble” or” gathering a crowd to disturb public order in a public space” (Liu, 2018) adds another layer of punishment in the system through its blacklisting and limitations in individual’s choice architecture. It enables the dismantling of activists, dissidents, and protestors from spreading anti-government influences. Han-Wei Liu (2018: p.29) describes it as” this new authority to impose a complex web of sanctions through the use of the SCS further empowers the Chinese government to punish those who are deemed in non-conformance with its rules”.

The due process in restoring reduced credits or removing oneself from the Blacklist is another example of how the government has managed to increase its social control through SCS. Most on the Blacklist will have to make a public apology for its behavior, which automatically confirms the trust breaking activity even though it might potentially be forced upon. The second option is to apply to the original court sentencing blacklisting and then appeal to a higher court for a wrongful result. The problem is there is no public hearing that allows personal statements and no outside scrutiny, for a process asking the court to correct its original error. Meanwhile, during this process the individual/company is still placed on the Blacklist that is severely limiting their

31 possibilities in social and economic opportunities (Liu, 2018). Human Rights Watch have also confirmed this being a serious threat to individual freedom and a tool manipulated by the government (Wang, 2017). The former problem stated by Rauilli (2008) concerning the difficulty of acting within their given authority is minimised due to the wide scope of consequences and range of the system through the Joint Sanctioning System, that makes one violation punishable in all spheres.

The informal perspective of the SCS influences on social control is a matter of norms, education, beliefs, and values. The phenomenon of social control can not only be grounded in laws and institutions but also in the socialisation of everyday people. As mentioned, is the SCS largely supported in the general public (Kostka, 2018, Ohlberg et al., 2017) and the report on domestic media coverage also highlighted that a bottom-up resistance is highly unlikely to occur since many Chinese citizens agree that greater accountability and trust is needed (Ohlberg et al., 2017:p.13). The same report also concludes that news coverage on the system is overwhelmingly supportive and neither official nor private media questions the need for the system.

Besides the physical limitations of the punishment there are also major social implications for being put on the Blacklist. It is important to mention that the word credit in China is defined differently than in the West. In China, credit is considered to be connected to personal ethics and reputation and in the Confucian moral virtues’ reputation is viewed as an umbrella term for a collective society/group/family. If one possesses bad credit, the society tends to shun them out in hopes of regaining credit in the collective name (Chen, 2002). On popular dating apps many men/women who have found themselves on the publicly displayed list are met with refusals and lost potential love interest. The shaming through Blacklist also results in children not being able to attend certain schools, ringtones showcasing your blacklisted in public, the general information of the person being displayed in public spheres (trains, billboards, news programs),and the withdrawal of communication from friends, colleagues, and family (Creemers, 2018, Ohlberg et al., 2017, Chen & Cheung, 2017). Karen Ye and Laurel Chor (2018) highlights the social impacts of the open shaming in their interviews with subjects of the SCS in Rongcheng, the privilege of being rewarded in the Redlist is seen as a big honor to the family name and being seen as a low scoring member can result in outcasting and exclusion from

32 families and friendships. Therefore, people who have low scores on the SCS desperately try to increase their points by donating money, blood, or volunteering.

Social norms are considered the unwritten code of conduct but the SCS have managed to make norms written and regulates participation through surveillance, facial recognition, and public” information collectors”. The system facilitates most of the critical factors for conforming to social norms, such as self-expectation and group knowledge. The credit scores send out a message in the form of rewards and punishment that the individual can achieve if changing their behavior and is confirmed by the approval of other members in society both socially and through formal institutions (travel, housing, etc.). The SCS signals the behavior, which is appropriate for different interactions, for example, how to conduct yourself on public spaces, internet, financially, and in the workplace. According to Bicchieri (2006) is the norm existence and compliance best understood in the behavioural rules that apply to scenarios of social interactions. A social norm needs to be supported by empirical expectations, which means a sufficient number of people adheres to the behavioural rule and the normative expectation, in return enforcing expectations for other people to follow the behavioural rule as well. In the SCS is the public display of trustworthy and trust-breaking citizens always present both physically and online, which highlights the expectations for everyone in society.

The system has carefully squared into a mix of Confucianism and the government's legal reforms and therefore fills a gap that has been apparent since the end of Maoism. The system highlights the 1.3 billion (90% of population) Han ethnicity who follow the virtues of Confucianism from an early age while excluding the 10% of the population belonging to other ethnicity groups (Mistreanu, 2018). The problem for minority groups is that many are heavily affected by institutional discrimination hence not allowing licenses, farmland, or loans, which is also some of the most punishable offences in the system when operating businesses. If groups tend to mobilize or openly discuss wrongful acts from the government, it is also punishable in the system. The surveillance aspect of the system is argued to be specifically focus on Muslim minorities in some parts of the country and resulting in internment camp for praying in public or speaking to relatives (Mistreanu, 2019). The SCS is a tool for conforming social control to the majority, meanwhile, a strong tool for limiting minority groups' influence in society. It creates a sense of belonging for the Han ethnicity within the system and is confirmed by news programmes, billboards, and local governments that the rightful citizens are rewarded and the

33 people who can't discipline themselves, are disciplined by society (Ye & Chor, 2018). It is the foundation of a national consciousness and it defines the outsiders and insiders depending on how well individuals fit into the social order of a binding behavioural guideline, the “screen capitalism” furthers this idea in the sense of displaying good and bad citizens.

The new intervention possibilities the SCS imposes have become apparent during the ongoing Covid-19 pandemic. The main difficulty in the legal reforms for China have been due to weak enforcement, however, the SCS offers a possibility to punish discouraging behavior immediately and have resulted in rapid guidelines for social distancing and lockdown rules but also giving incentives for supportive behavior. According to Koty (2020), are untrustworthy firms dealing in products and services relating to epidemic prevention and control given fast-track credit restoration and in Shanghai individuals and firms are contributing to research and development in epidemic prevention put on Redlist and given preferential treatment in project funding.

Meanwhile, in Yinchuan and Rongcheng individuals are donating money for support to epidemic alleviation given improved credit scores. Beijing and Shanghai enterprises are receiving credit score reductions for dealing with price gouging in the sale of medical products and similar for the sale of counterfeit medical products that do not meet regulatory standards. Individuals who hide travel or medical history (Koty, 2020), spreading rumours, or hoarding products can be put on the Blacklist. In addition, since the outbreak is theorized to stem from livestock markets the government made consumption of dogs, snakes, bats, and turtles punishable in the credit scores of individuals and restaurants. The SC Unicode further limits people from entering public spaces and individuals who break rules are given punishment in the credit score and companies are required to adhere to the new regulations in order to not be placed on the Blacklist (Louvel, 2020).

7 Analysis

This section will be combining the findings and the theoretical framework of the Labelling theory in order to analyze if the systems coping mechanisms regarding labels can be effective in

34 producing a social harmony or if it can result in a drawback and negative consequences on the social sphere in China.

7.1 What are the effects of social labelling in the SCS?

One of the official reasons for the introduction of the SCS is to “promote the traditional value of integrity” (Schaefer, 2019) and the State Council in China described it as to ”allow the trustworthy to roam everywhere under heaven while making it hard for the discredited to take a single step” (The Social Credit System’s Construction Plan Outline 2014-2020). The previous chapters have described how the system functions and its role in shaping the current social control and its implications for domestic governance, but the question then is, what are the consequences of labeling?

Before analysing the potential governance implications from the SCS it is crucial to review the labeling that occurs throughout the system. The consequences of being placed on the Blacklist involve disadvantages in employment, professional qualification, social mobility, restrictions from working as a public servant including work in medicine or food sectors. Physical mobility is restricted from public transportation and air travel, booking vacations, and leaving the country (Creemers, 2018, Liu, 2018, Chorzempa et al., 2018, Sithigh & Siems, 2019). The social implications involve romantic disability, loss of honorary titles, withdrawal of communication from friends and family, public humiliation, shame, and a reduced social position in society, which negatively affects the perceived social role (Ohlberg et al., 2017, Dai, 2018, Liu. 2018, Wang, 2017).

The labelling in the SCS is dualistic in its effect, one of the perspectives shows a great potential in enforcing conformity and compliance in moral and legal conduct. The other side highlights the potential abuse for stigmatizing minority groups in combination with excluding dissidents, activists, or minority groups from society. From the first perspective, of compliance and conformity, recent reports by Engelsmann et al (2019) has proven that recidivism into trust- breaking behavior is astonishingly low among individuals close to blacklisting. The study included 700 individuals that could potentially be placed on the Blacklist and concluded that the fear of public humiliation and shame resulted in immediate compliance of corrective behavior in

35 40% of the participants. In comparison, 83% of all released prisoners are arrested again within 5- 9 years in the USA and more than 77% of drug-related offenders were arrested of a non-drug crime in the same period (U.S Department of Justice, 2018). The SCS have also proven to show great success in the settlement on court decisions, since the end of 2017 have 2.2 million out of 9.59 million subjects (Chen & Cheung, 2017). According to the Labelling theory provided by Nicholas Gueguen (2001) is a negative social label and a future request to redeem the individuals social status closely connected, which is very visible in the case of SCS. The success of the negative label in the system is connected to the immediate request for self-restoration through donation to charity or donating blood, or pro-social behavior. If a person receives reduced credit for educational purposes the student can redeem themselves in the same sector, which according to the studies by Goldman et al (1982) is proven to be the most effective way in enforcing compliance.

In the reportage by Karen Ye and Laurel Chor (2018) the willingness to restore the social credit is seemed to be crucial for the social status and people are seen queuing early mornings to donate money to charity. The label has strict limitations as its punishment but also a clear effect on social norms and compliance, the label connects both a negative label and a positive redemption (request) but equally important it highlights a social comparison of what the normative expectations is within a given community. A social credit score is available on a central database which is available for everyone to review, in combination with the public display (news, LED screens, billboards, etc) of redlisted and blacklisted subjects fulfills a sense of social comparison. The implementation of the punishment and reward system is dependent on the installation of an never before witnessed surveillance system including facial recognition, public reporting, and data tracking (Chorzempa et al., 2018). This might be one of the reasons for the success of the SCS in conforming citizens to the new social norms in society hence minimising deviant behavior. Michael Foucault referred to it as the” disciplinary society” (2007), meaning that when all subjects of a system are under constant surveillance they will internalise control, morals, and values. Consequently, discipline will be transformed into power. This power is distributed in the form of conformity in various parts of society and ultimately the discipline results in the establishment of norms of behavior.

According to Ben Warner (2015) is good governance and citizen engagement the two principles in a well-functioned nation, the labelling in the system could potentially improve both of those

36 concepts. The citizens have the potential to file complaints about poorly structured companies and keep public officials accountable for violations. The engagement keeps citizens to adhere to the social contract but more importantly the massive amounts of data collected through the Blacklist and Redlist makes it possible for people to re-adjust negative habits and behavior by social comparison and compliance. The data collection makes the government's decision more focused on outcomes and transparently open to the public. For example, if the largest agricultural industries in China are being placed on the Blacklist, the daily fines and restrictions forces the company to change their business model into a socially acceptable one and increases awareness for the state that critical problems exist in the agricultural sector. According to Warner (2015), good governance is a mechanism for optimal outcomes and when the state can restrict sectors damaged by corruption it drastically changes the spectrum of intervention possibilities.

One of the main advantages in the SCS in comparison to labelling in Western societies is that agents of social control (police, military, security guards) don't interact in the punishment for primary deviance and instead highlight self-governance. When a person is arrested, detained, handcuffed, and sentenced in the public eye from control agents (police, court, etc) the” justified” reaction from neighbours, family members, colleagues, and (social) media tends to enable a degradation ceremony (Chen, 2002). A ceremony that triggers the offenders stigmatisation and shame. The punishment in the SCS is private (until reaching a Blacklist) and will not meet a societal reaction. This is connected to Braithwaite's reintegrative shame theory (1989), the shame is mainly dealt within the family and close community whilst the deviant can still progress by making good deeds and therefore continue conventional activities without possessing a label. The offender will know from an early stage that he/she has committed deviance since the choice architecture will be limited and simultaneously know if he/she have done good since exclusive privileges in the choice architecture is being presented.

The punishment for a person on the Blacklist is connected to reduced mobility and opportunities but also in the form of social sanctions, in which the person will be repeatedly confronted with stigmatization and the loss of social interactions. Firstly, the problem with the joint sanctioned policy ”trust-breaking here, restrictions everywhere” is that the punishment is disassociated with the original violation, if one violates rules such as ”spreading rumors online” the punishment of restricting upward mobility and social integration can result in people feeling abused by an unfair or subjective judgement and ultimately force a new class in society of blacklisted individuals. An

37 “untrustworthy group” in society that is physically, emotionally, and socially disconnected. Reports have also shown that blacklisting targeted groups in society can also result in an increased non-conformists actions (Kelley & Simpson, 2019). The problem of dislocating groups in society can be seen in the caste system in India that has high caste norms associated with moral values in which the lower caste norms are associated with immorality (Sankaran et al., 2018). The result in India has been a high degree of stigmatisation, public humiliation, and limited choice architecture which have been deeply rooted in the political and social life in most parts of India.

The Blacklist in the SCS is vastly different to similar models of blacklisting in the West but evidence has not supported neither compliance nor behavioral changes in public blacklisting. For example, in the USA there exists a similar blacklist but for sexual offenders, which are publicly available and notifies nearby residents of their crimes. In a study from 1990-1995 on the U.S. blacklist, highlighted that sex offenders on the list are more likely to recidivist than sex offenders not on the list due to social isolation, lack of romantic encounters, increased drug addiction, and is more likely to commit crimes against strangers (Wacquant, 2009).

Another problem of requiring a morally righteous or “trustworthy” society is the assumption that certain groups are automatically or naturally “untrustworthy”, ultimately creating social polarization in society. The SCS is still new in the Chinese society and it is difficult to state the potential polarization at this stage, but the political propaganda of the system has previously been abused in historical contexts for justifying structural violence. For example, the Nazi Germany ideal of a “moral purification in the body public” in combination with a “conflict-free community for the people” was the first step of justifying social outcasting of minority groups (Gellately et al., 2003:p 4). Social harmony and strict law and order was closely connected in Nazi Germany and resulted in restricting “social outsiders” (jews, communists, dissidents) in social (employment, marriage, welfare, mobility, and network) and physical (displacement in Ghettos, symbolization,) spheres (Gellately et al., 2003). The polarization of “us” (trustworthy) and “them” (untrustworthy) is a standardized protocol in structural violence and this form of labelling have been used in the Apartheid in South Africa, Hutus and Tutsies in Rwanda, and in Nazi Germany. The SCS does not use the severity of tools presented in the above mentioned conflicts but ringtones signaling nearby blacklisters, the loss of friends and family due to a social credit score, billboards, news programmes, and travel restrictions are all symbolizations of

38 polarization. The biasing in labeling is also what Farrington and Murray (2014) describes as one of the most dangerous factors in labeling, since it automatically shuns certain religions, ethnicities, and nationalities into secondary citizens. A normal reason for being blacklisted is by behaving poorly on trains or flights and dishonest behavior in public (Schaefer, 2018) which can easily be manipulated into biased decisions. When exercising justice based on subjective evaluations it can easily be used to stigmatize minority groups. However, no research shows the ethnicity or nationality of blacklisted individuals, which makes it difficult to state if there is a bias in the subjective evaluation. However, the labeling included the system can easily be manipulated to stigmatise and outcast minority groups such as the Uyghurs in Xinjiang. A Muslim ethnic group that have been suffering social and economic discrimination for decades are now experiencing strict surveillance though comprehensive facial recognition cameras gathering biometrical data (Mistreanu, 2018). According to Liu (2018;p.31) is there a big risk for this community to be disproportionately labeled as ”troublemakers” and in return reinforce the bias against targeted ethnic groups.

The idea that a person will change their conduct if they are associated with the discredited act might have some prominent effects in regards to people that have the potential to change their association but for the people placed on the Blacklist the label offers a major obstacle in changing their status. From the perspective of human rights is the labelling a potential concern to the Freedom of Speech, since the labelling can be used to silence journalists critical to the state but also to discredit resistance groups. This has happened on multiple occasions according to Nathan Vanderklippe (2018) who quotes a Beijing lawyer on administrative proceedings named Zhu Xiaodig, who highlights the case of journalist Liu Hu that was put on the Blacklist due to being arrested in 2013 for “fabricating and spreading rumors”. Xiaoding described it as "I can't say that Liu Hu's outspokenness led directly to his troubles. But we have to admit that Liu's is not a rare case. Many people who are, like him, similarly controversial are very likely to endure the same ordeal”. The problem with the social labelling system is that it is not built on a consensus basis, which makes subjective interpretations and discrimination a serious problem since people have no way of changing their behavior.

39 8. Conclusion

The SCS is a highly complex system that incorporates punishment and rewards for behavior in accordance with a credit system. Punishments includes; transportation, communication, internet activities, air travels, vacationing abroad, stigmatisation and public humiliation by being placed on the Blacklist. Meanwhile, the rewards involve further privileges in society such as VIP lounges on trains, housing, education and much more. The system functions from different MoUs that are responsible for publishing separate Blacklist records on individual sectors that are all released on a central database.

The SCS have managed to fill gaps in the judicial system and foremost create trust for the financial sector, government action, and individuals which have been highlighted in public opinion surveys. The system has also portrayed major possibilities in treating the Covid-19 pandemic including social distancing rules and financial responsibilities. However, the extensive surveillance and monitoring, in combination, with the lack of transparency for who is rewarded on the Redlist makes it a potential tool for targeting minority groups and dissidents. The SCS is definitely increasing the central governments influence over the public and private sectors but also increases rule-of-law. The behavioural guidelines of the system is targeting both legal and norm-based activities, which have both positive and negative consequences. The positive side have been highlighted in the amount of successful court proceedings and compliant behavior, meanwhile, the negative side is the potential polarization of “us” and “them” which have historically caused a great abuse of structural violence. In addition, the targeting of minority groups that have previously occurred with Muslim minority groups in China and the discrediting of acitvitsts, journalists, and dissidents has already been reported. The potential polarization and subclasses in society is a big threat connected to the social labelling that has in historical events caused major conflicts. It is a suppressive form of asserting negatively derived labels to minority groups and opposition groups, which the subjects can’t change. This is supported in the literature on social labels to increase criminal networks but also non-compliance and resistance.

The future of the SCS is still uncertain due to it still being in its initial phase and more domestic and international coverage is needed to fully understand the complexity and aftermath of China's

40 new potentials in domestic governance and social control. One thing for certain, the introduction of wise new computers will drastically change the social control of tomorrow.

As mentioned, is the SCS in its first stages and in combination with an insufficient amount of research on the topic (especially in English) still leaves many research gaps on the subject. More research should and will be done on SCS and topics such as human rights, regional spillovers, minority rights, power structures, and infrastructural consequences is still heavily unexplored. The SCS has the potential to radically change the output on governance and privacy, which further highlights the reason for the system to gain even more coverage in the future in order to aid policy-makers, justice systems, and the financial market to either enforce regulations, restrictions, or approval for similar systems in the West.

41

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