Vol. 27, May 2021 L INS EL TIT CH U IT T E MITCHELL INSTITUTE M f s o e r i Ae ud Policy Paper rospace St Key Points Command and Control Imperatives The drive for relevant command and control lies for the 21st Century: The Next Areas with a simple goal: empowering highly effective aerospace combat power. of Growth for ABMS and JADC2 By Douglas A. Birkey A command and control design must be effective Executive Director, The Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies across the spectrum of operational environments. Abstract Creating a successful approach to Advanced The Air Force is at a major juncture in the development of command and Battle Management System (ABMS) and Joint control (C2) capabilities. Under the aegis of the Advanced Battle Management System All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2) (ABMS) and Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2) programs, the Air Force is pushing ahead with efforts to modernize its C2 architecture by capitalizing on will require the Air Force to harness advanced emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence and machine learning. Faced with technologies like fifth-generation aircraft fusion the heightened threat environment created by America’s adversaries, these investments and machine learning. are critical to the Air Force’s ability to operate and win in future conflicts. However, this progress demands a holistic risk mitigation approach that blends innovation, High-speed, high-altitude manned command operationally mature systems, and backup redundancies. and control, intelligence, surveillance, and Over the past two decades, technological advances in the field of networked reconnaissance (C2ISR) sensor platforms could connectivity, high-fidelity sensors, persistent overwatch by remotely piloted aircraft (RPA), and huge gains in computing power saw seismic advances in combat edge provide supplementary “look-in” and network- situational awareness and decision-making. The ABMS promises to build on these sourced decision-making insights. gains by harnessing machine learning and automation to rapidly process, filter, and direct information from distributed networks of sensors to shooters, creating An appropriately tiered layer of command must partnerships designed to deliver optimal effects at the right place and at the right time. ensure actions taken will result in optimal desired In its drive to modernize, the Air Force cannot risk overlooking the valuable effects to achieve a commander’s intent. role that air battle managers play within the C2 architecture. While connectivity, automation, and processing power are crucial tools, a requirement still exists for human judgement and engagement, especially in highly complex, dynamic missions where accurate insight is essential for managing risk. Indeed, the Air Force should examine ways of elevating human C2 operators within the ABMS construct. It could do so by extending the life of existing C2ISR aircraft such as JSTARS and AWACS or by replacing these aging platforms with a new class of supersonic aircraft currently under development in the commercial sector. It should also study the potential afforded by alternate aerial operating locations, i.e., onboard aerial tankers, for air battle managers to ensure that they are appropriately staged throughout the operating space. These approaches will mitigate the risks of becoming over reliant on extended communication networks. To maximize the advantages yielded by new technologies, the Air Force must develop a tiered strategy for modernizing its C2 capabilities, one in which the human professional remains at the core. Introduction control. The notion of what distributing The warfighting potential measure of information at machine speeds, connectivity, merit for the Air Force is often intertwined and C2 mean to future operations is rapidly with the size of its aircraft inventory. evolving thanks to new technologies and However, while numbers certainly matter, the demands of increasingly lethal threat airplanes alone do not yield airpower. It environments. Air Force leaders are rightfully takes a combination of sound strategy, calling for a broad range of new systems effective operational concepts, and an to maximize opportunities afforded by accurate execution of commander’s intent to emerging information technologies to give turn the potential of these tools into actual U.S. warfighters decision dominance in the mission accomplishment. This is precisely future battlespace. The technical means of why information advantage, connectivity, this effort is known as the Advanced Battle and command and control (C2) stand as one Management System (ABMS), with Joint All- of the U.S. Air Force’s top modernization Domain Command and Control (JADC2) priorities. As former Air Force as the broader force management construct. it is time for the Air Force Chief of Staff General (ret.) In the rush to modernize its activities in this to broaden the conversation Dave Goldfein explained, area, the Air Force risks focusing too much “Victory in future combat on the technical aspects of its future networks past specific technologies will depend less on individual without giving the same consideration to and decide where the C2 capabilities and more upon the fundamentals that underpin effective centers of gravity will integrated strengths of a decision making in warfare—commanding connected network for and controlling. Air Force leadership’s reside within this new coalition leaders to employ.”1 overriding focus on network technology system, what they will look Said another way, success all when they discuss this endeavor reflects this comes down to understanding imbalance. It is not enough to buy a new like, and how warfighters the operating environment and tool and expect a specific outcome without will effectively employ employing the right set of assets considering broader mission parameters. at the proper time and place This policy paper contends that it them across the spectrum to best achieve desired results, is time for the Air Force to broaden the of conflict. while minimizing one’s own conversation past specific technologies and vulnerabilities. This requires decide where the C2 centers of gravity will U.S. forces to secure battlespace situational reside within this new system, what they will awareness more rapidly and more accurately look like, and how warfighters will effectively than what an adversary can achieve, employ them across the spectrum of conflict. maintain robust and reliable connectivity, C2 is predominantly a human endeavor that and the ability to promptly translate can be assisted by technology but cannot yet information into appropriate actions. It also be replaced by it. Building better networks necessitates proactive leadership at each level and harnessing new capabilities like artificial of an operation to ensure the commander’s intelligence (AI), automation, and machine mission intent is achieved within the realities learning alone will not yield effective C2. of a dynamic combat environment. It takes an ecosystem of operational level Today the Air Force is at a major commanders, air battle managers to bridge juncture in realizing these capabilities: the operational and tactical divide, and air balancing the push for innovation and crews empowered with relevant information technology with the need for command and to net mission results. These are specific

Mitchell Policy Papers 2 functions that must be appropriately tiered available from training squadrons to backfill throughout the battlespace to ensure they casualties.2 Despite these overwhelming can connect effectively with their mission odds, the British forces prevailed. While partners and execute respective mission there were a variety of factors shaping this functions. Current Air Force C2 plans lack outcome, three proved essential in ensuring a clear concept of operations (CONOP) that the RAF’s incredibly limited supply regarding this construct. of fighters were employed in the most On top of this, in its haste to develop decisive method possible: a robust sensor new systems, the Air Force must not trade network in the form of radar and observers; one set of vulnerabilities for another. Progress a voice communications network; and a demands a holistic risk mitigation approach highly integrated C2 enterprise whereby that blends innovation, operationally trained personnel gathered federated sensor mature systems, and backup redundancies. inputs, fused this data, and communicated A strategy built primarily around too many actionable information to fighter pilots. To aggressive technological efforts that depend put it bluntly, information, connectivity, and on near-term, ambitious, and concurrent C2 helped save England when the chips were innovations is a perilous one. The situation down. is even more challenging given uncertainties It is encouraging that the Air Force in the future budget climate--resources to lists programs like ABMS and JADC2 as top bail out a program mired in unanticipated priorities, for it reflects an acknowledgement problems will likely be unavailable. Solutions regarding the criticality of information, must also speak to the full range of probable connectivity, and C2. However, this success mission scenarios, not just one portion of the demands a holistic approach that extends threat spectrum. past networks. The importance of operationally relevant information, communication C2 Design Principles to Meet Tomorrow’s systems, and effective C2 is not a new Challenges idea. These elements have long stood as a The drive for effective, relevant C2 foundational aerospace power imperative. lies with a simple goal: highly effective History underscores that this is something aerospace combat power. The United States the Air Force must get right. Air Force (USAF) finds itself in a similar Anyone questioning this should position to the British in the summer of reflect upon the summer of 1940, when 1940—equipped with too few resources Germany, having just occupied France, was and facing a burgeoning set of threats. As set on invading the United Kingdom. An former Secretary of the Air Force Barbara air offensive was the first component of the Barrett explained, “The Air Force as attack. The Royal Air Force (RAF) was in an currently constituted is too small to do what exceedingly challenging position, possessing the nation expects of it.”3 In fact, today 446 operational fighters against Germany’s the USAF has never fielded such a small 3,500 combat aircraft amassed across the and old aircraft force since its founding in English Channel. When the Luftwaffe raids 1947. Whether looking at over two-thirds commenced, the RAF’s relative strength of the bomber force predating the 1962 eroded rapidly. In the 10 days between Cuban Missile Crisis, or a fighter inventory August 8 and August 18, 1940, the RAF predominantly acquired before the world lost 154 pilots, with only 63 green airmen wide web was invented in 1989, the

Mitchell Policy Papers 3 USAF lacks the capacity and capabilities for mission success. Stated in a more holistic increasingly required in modern high-end fashion: conflict. Capable airframes with sufficient stealth capacity and the information- This concept can be envisioned age attributes required to challenge peer as a “combat cloud”—an operating competitors are in incredibly short supply— paradigm where information, data just 20 B-2s, 186 F-22s, and approximately management, connectivity, and 300 F-35s are presently fielded. The rest command and control (C2) are core of the USAF’s combat forces consist of mission priorities. The combat cloud several thousand non-stealth, industrial- treats every platform as a sensor, as age airframes with outdated information- well as an effector, and will require centric attributes.4 a C2 paradigm enabling automatic This shortfall in capacity and capability linking, seamless data transfer matters a great deal because the global threat capabilities, while being reliable, environment presents an incredibly broad set secure, and jam proof. The combat of hazards where optimal force employment cloud inverts the paradigm of will prove crucial. China and Russia are combined arms warfare—making pressing the United States at the top end information the focal point of of the threat spectrum; middle-weight military operations, not operational regional powers like North Korea and Iran domains. This concept represents are presenting an outsized threat due to an evolution where individually their nuclear programs; and non-state actors networked platforms—in any like the Islamic State (ISIS) and al Qaeda domain—transform into a “system are continuing to destabilize key regions of systems” enterprise, integrated around the globe. by domain and mission-agnostic Lacking an adequate toolkit, leaders may linkages.5 have an insufficient range of policy options to deal with these threats. Acknowledging the It also involves building multiple unfunded mandate that has been levied on pathways of achieving desired effects and airmen for far too long, in 2018 the Air Force presenting the adversary with a highly announced the need to grow to 386 operational disaggregated kill-chain enterprise where squadrons. There comes a point where security there are no central points of vulnerability. requirements necessitate sufficient numbers Recognizing this imperative, the Air of aircraft and space systems to provide core Force actively seeks to harness the latest numerical capacity in the face of numerous, developments in sensor technology, data concurrent global threats. processing, machine-aided decision tools, These force structure shortfalls increase and connectivity in ABMS and JADC2. the need for the Air Force to create an enterprise These efforts stand as the service’s top goals. of information systems, connectivity, and Former Air Force Chief of Staff General C2 capabilities that maximize the combat David Goldfein who charted this new potential of each of its weapon systems. vector, explained: This will require a highly interdependent, complementary approach to maximize What I am talking about is mission effects. It is like a three-legged stool, a fully networked force where each where each leg of the enterprise is required platform’s sensors and operators are

Mitchell Policy Papers 4 connected not by point-to-point making network—from the strategic, circuits, but in a mesh network to the operational, to the tactical level that is highly resilient and self- of operations—to ensure commander’s healing. And they are not just intent is met. Connectivity, automation, connected either—they are part and processing power are crucial tools in of a command and control system this regard, but a requirement still exists that automatically pairs the right for human judgement and engagement. sensors to the right targets, fusing This is especially true in highly complex, data from all platforms and sensors dynamic missions where accurate and identifying and refining insight is essential for managing risk. targets automatically and allocating C2 actors must be tiered effectively weapons to targets, allowing us to throughout the battlespace in alignment converge effects in a synchronized with their assigned responsibilities. This and simultaneous manner.6 will bolster the chances for assured connectivity to relevant data flows and What General Goldfein described, and mission partners. what his successor General Charles “CQ” Brown continues to pursue, is non-negotiable 2. A command and control design must if the Air Force is going to remain a viable, allow the Air Force to carefully manage relevant, and competent combat power. Just the operational risks of overly aggressive as technologies like radar and processing innovation as it rapidly assimilates power reshaped combat aviation, so too will high-leverage systems and processes. this highly networked aerial command and The Air Force today is innovating on control construct. As 25th Secretary of the a scale not seen in decades. Given the Air Force Barrett explained, “Modernizing is post-Cold War procurement holiday, all about being connected, being able to have an overwhelming focus on low-end instant access to usable information.”7 technology threats in the wake of However, for this new vector to 9/11, and the deleterious impacts of succeed, the conversation needs to move the 2011 budget control act, the recent past its focus on connectivity. Networks push to embrace the potential of new are obviously crucial tools, but they are not technologies and concepts is essential warfighting ends in and of themselves, nor for the Air Force to competently face will they magically manifest C2. For it to growing threats now and over the next meet the future threat environment, the several decades. However, it is crucial Air Force must consider three overarching not to confuse technological potential principles for its ABMS and JADC2 visions: with guaranteed operational reliability in the near- to mid-term. Viable fallback 1. A command and control design capabilities must exist if results fail to strategy must integrate technology and meet schedule or functionality goals. human intellect to ensure command New solutions must also seek to provide intent is translated into desired action. alternate courses of action to achieve The rapid flow of raw data or the existence mission goals in case adversaries are of potentially actionable information does able to defeat the revised approaches. not manifest mission accomplishment; it One vulnerability should not be takes an appropriately tiered decision- exchanged for another—the goal must

Mitchell Policy Papers 5 focus on broad improvement. This of operations, key operational performance is a commonsense risk management parameters, or a system specification for strategy, where one solution set does not the contractor.”8 The TBMCS program sunset until the other is tested under the sought to build one software tool of most demanding stressors and proves its federated subroutines that would effectively operational prowess. software code the air component into a new automated age. The human interface 3. A command and control design must was a secondary concern. It was difficult to be equally effective across the spectrum understand, hard to train new users, and of operational environments. While exceedingly challenging to use. It was also the peak demands of great power built around a model of high-end operations conflict must drive investment priorities that would stick to a rigid air tasking order and associated concepts of operation, planning cycle. the resulting capability design choices This was the exact opposite set of must also be flexible to achieve mission circumstances that unfolded in Afghanistan results throughout the full range of and Iraq, which involved highly dynamic operational environments. A significant operating situations where rapid processing number of military operations still of information drove time sensitive occur at the mid-tier and low-end of targeting.9 Many TBMCS sub-components the threat spectrum. Solutions must be proved wholly deficient during these able to scale across the threat spectrum operations. For example, the U.S. tanker without a loss of speed and effectiveness planning cell located in Qatar supporting in command and control. People do joint operations found the TBMCS fuel not drive to grocery stores in F1 race planning routine unusable and regressed to cars—a variety of options must exist arduous manual computations to determine to match the mission requirements to the tanker plan. They then had to manually available tools. enter their calculations into the system to get it to appear in daily air tasking orders.10 This Such design principles have not was an egregious example of technology, not been at the forefront of current public pragmatic mission requirements, driving conversations, and, instead, attention is processes. focused on a purely technology architecture A MITRE study evaluating the program applied to narrow operational scenarios. said it well: “The acquisition community had a Form must follow function and failing to utopian vision of a single modern, integrated, pursue this balanced approach could result joint C2 system, but had no operator in a highly suboptimal system. requirements to support it and no CONOPS DOD’s Theater Battle Management that described how the system would work Core System (TBMCS) experience stands as as single integrated capability.”11 a cautionary tale in this regard. Designed in ABMS and JADC2 must not risk the late 1990s and early 2000s to automate the same fate. A recent GAO report on planning and control of the air component, ABMS sounded this concern, especially the TBMCS program violated all three of over the notion of well-understood these design principles. As one Air Force program requirements: “The only existing Institute of Technology assessment declared, documentation of ABMS’s requirements “The government did not produce a concept resides in the ABMS Initial Capabilities

Mitchell Policy Papers 6 Document from 2018, which generally more responsive, agile fashion with a given focuses on the capabilities needed to replace number of aircraft. AWACS. That document does not address Including supersonic battle management the expanded JADC2 requirements and aircraft as part of the Air Force’s ABMS capabilities ABMS is expected to eventually would help the service fill its information, fulfill.”12 This suggests there is room for connectivity, and C2 capability shortfalls. growth based on time-tested tenets of It would provide a degree of redundancy information, connectivity, and C2. in the ABMS construct by ensuring that command and control benefit from battle Presence at the Combat Edge: An Enduring managers that can operate in critical areas of Requirement for Air Battle Management the battlespace. A battle management aircraft Creating a successful ABMS and with an expanded operational envelope JADC2 approach will require the Air Force complements the information attributes to harness advanced technologies like 5th that 5th generation aircraft like the F-22, generation aircraft fusion, machine learning, F-35, and B-21 bring to the battlespace— and seamless system teaming. It will also especially highly contested areas where require the service’s tactical C2 experts—its only they can safely operate. Add in next- air battle managers—to operate throughout generation unmanned sensor-shooters along the battlespace, including at its leading edge. with space-based sensors, and the ABMS Current C2ISR aircraft like AWACS and vision for the future looks very strong but JSTARS have continually demonstrated the still allows for elements to be pulled away value of the air battle manager in complex, for lower-level contingencies or unexpected highly dynamic, large-scale missions. pop-up challenges. The USAF’s next-generation air battle At the end of the day, the success of managers should reside on mission-specific the USAF’s ABMS and JADC2 vision will aircraft that have an open mission system come down to the system’s ability to gather architecture, highly modular sensors that information, process it, and manage team can be swapped as demands require, high levels of onboard processing, organic sensors, DOD definitions of C2 and advanced networked connectivity. Command: The authority that a commander Added to this, the aircraft should seek to in the armed forces lawfully exercises over harness promising developments in the field subordinates by virtue of rank or assignment. of supersonic flight. Supersonic aircraft are being designed by multiple firms that Command and Control: The exercise of would allow for the carriage of mission authority and direction by a properly designated systems and air battle management crew. commander over assigned and attached forces These aircraft will have significant speed, in the accomplishment of the mission. altitude, and survivability advantages that Command and Control System: The facilities, should expand the types of mission profiles equipment, communications, procedures, and they can fly, increase the reach of their personnel essential for a commander to plan, sensors, and markedly reduce their risk of a direct, and control operations of forces pursuant shoot-down. In addition to reducing transit to the missions assigned. times in a large region such as the Pacific, flight at sustained supersonic speeds will Source: DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated allow ABMS effects to be delivered in a Terms (as of 2021), p. 40.

Mitchell Policy Papers 7 Early 2000s WWI Opening of WWII Early WWII Early Cold War Mid-Cold War ABMS and JADC2 to present day

Early networked Aircraft-based Increasingly complex Distributed sensors, operations sensors paired sensor networks, The transition of processing power empowered by with ground-based advanced control Represent the next Basic C2 measures the C2 controlling and connectivity ground-based sensors, sensors stations, and step in this evolution function to the sky creating sensor- controllers, and radio and associated increasingly automa- shooter complexes communication C2 functions ted data transfer

Figure 1: Timeline of the changes in the relationships and interfaces between C2, ISR, and connectivity over the past 110 years. Source: Mitchell Institute

members to best meet mission goals in a surveillance, and reconnaissance, or ISR)) highly dynamic environment. These are are inappropriately mashed up as if they are the very same goals that have been in play one—C2ISR—and connectivity is generally since the early days of combat aviation. assumed to be a silent part of this construct. Technology is evolving the way in which These three components are, however, these functions are achieved, but the distinct features of modern military fundamentals largely remain the same. The operations. They should not be considered as elements of information, connectivity, and locked into a fixed, uniform model, since the C2 must be understood as separate and rate of innovation and the demands of the individual, albeit highly interrelated, mission modern operating environment will see their assets and managed as such—with balance. parameters rapidly evolve. Fundamentally, Future success will demand embracing the it all comes down to exploiting whatever proven components of the mission, while method will maximize situational awareness using advancements to take the function to to place mission assets at the right time and a new level of effectiveness, efficiency, and place to best net desired command objectives, resiliency. while not projecting undue vulnerability. This requires insight, judgement, and Information, Connectivity, and C2—An decision making. Changes over time in the Evolutionary History relationships and interfaces between C2, Understanding the USAF’s forward- ISR, and connectivity have centered on the looking ABMS and JADC2 vision is often scale, scope, and speed of decision-making as best contextualized by recognizing the technology advanced the art of the possible. way in which information, connectivity, This can best be summarized through seven and C2 evolved throughout the history of main eras, as illustrated in the figure above. aerospace power. This journey has seen an Nothing illustrates the notion of mass evolutionary set of approaches ranging from making up for shortfalls in information, aircraft in the pioneering days of combat connectivity, and effective C2 than World aviation roaming through the sky with War I combat aviation. Lacking any form of minimal decision-quality information to real-time intelligence regarding the position overwhelming situational awareness and of enemy aircraft, fighter pilots had to rely interconnectivity from the most forward on chance that they would visually spot edge of the battlespace and senior echelons their opponent in the sky. The term “dawn of leadership. patrol” became synonymous with the idea Often the distinct entities of C2 and of aircraft flying in search of the opposition. information (in the guise of intelligence, Even when pilots found their opponents,

Mitchell Policy Papers 8 they lacked the means, such as radios, to to the sky. British aircraft aloft could readily call for friendly support. Commanders be distinguished from enemy planes thanks to had to use large numbers of aerial forces a special transponder known as “Identification to make up for their lack of knowledge Friend or Foe” (IFF). Able to distinguish RAF regarding when and where to employ forces fighters from opposing aircraft, controllers to attain their desired effects. The same was would vector air defense assets to intercept true for early bomber aircraft operations. German bombers with real-time position As World War I combat aviator and future locations.16 This enterprise was a far cry from Royal Air Force (RAF) air commander the mass dawn patrols of World War I. John Slessor explained, “Our method and Ground-based electronic aids proved technique, even at the end of the war, were beneficial for bombing crews on both sides really primitive. In the early days there was of the conflict, each of whom used radio- not even such thing as a bombsight and direction methods to guide their respective bombing was done by the ‘chuck and chance crews to assigned targets and signaled it’ method.”13 An aircraft’s value will always when to release their bombs over the aim be compromised unless it is brought to bear point.17 Absent such systems, British analysts at the right time in the right place. This left confirmed that the vast majority of the airmen largely reliant upon mass numbers to RAF Bomber Command night strikes were increase the odds that they would stumble dropping their bombs within a huge radius, upon their desired mission objectives. upward of five miles of their intended targets.18 Innovation: Rudimentary information Innovation: Aircraft-based sensors. networking. The need for better decision- The third major iteration in aerial information making information was not lost upon gathering and C2 occurred when radar was airmen. In the years after WWI, they installed onboard night fighter aircraft due to developed sensors, data fusion centers, and the need for further information fidelity than information networks to bring effective what could be delivered from ground-based situational awareness and C2 to the sky.14 This stations alone—the beginnings of a weapons investment proved invaluable during WWII, system. C2 centers vectored the defending most famously during the famed 1940 Battle fighters close to their targets, then aircraft- of Britain. Stretched thin by austere interwar installed radar provided the last measure of year budgets, the Royal Air Force possessed too guidance for attack.19 A pilot’s focus was now few fighters and trained pilots to guard against shaped by something other than his own eyes German airstrikes through sheer numbers. or ground-based sensors. This also yielded The Royal Air Force had to ensure it could a nascent networked system, where ground judiciously concentrate what few defensive capabilities, aircraft sensors, and the pilot as assets it had at the right times and places to the fusion center collaborated to yield desired counter German air assaults. Radar stations results. Initial applications were expanded along the southeastern British coastline by all sides during the war, including radar detected German bomber formations as they guiding bombers at night and overcast crossed the English Channel.15 Information conditions.20 fusion centers would interpret this data, Innovation: The advent of ground- combine it with additional reports provided by based sensor networks and early ground observes, map the German formation automation. As the United States found positions on a plotting board, and then order itself facing the Soviet Union in the early specific Royal Air Force fighter units to take days of the Cold War, air defense systems

Mitchell Policy Papers 9 Figure 2: A U.S. Air Force EC- 121D Warning Star aircraft conducting an Airborne Early Warning and Control mission over Thailand in 1972. Photo: U.S. Air Force

yielded the fourth major development in ground control units could connect to an aerial C2. Fast-moving threats traveling over air defense fighter’s autopilot and direct it large areas demanded rapid detection and toward the targets.22 The rapid processing of tightly coordinated interception. Massive raw data to desired outputs gave air defense ground-based radar systems were built along actors the benefit of decision speed—rapidly the most likely routes that nuclear weapon- focusing available assets at the right time and equipped Soviet bombers would take on place against very fast, dynamic adversaries. their way to strike the United States. These Manual systems of WWII, while similar in radars flowed data to the Massachusetts theory to their Cold War successors, could Institute for Technology-developed semi- not function fast enough in continent- automatic ground environment (SAGE) air spanning scenarios involving jet speeds.23 defense system, which included multiple Innovation: Transition to airborne centralized control facilities that processed C2. This value of rapid decision-making the raw inputs into actionable information.21 yielded a fifth era of C2 evolution. Aircraft like These centers then connected directly to the Air Force’s EC-121 Warning Star and the air defense fighter units They comprised a Navy’s WF-2 Tracer integrated surveillance far larger, faster, and more complex system radar, communications, and a trained crew than what existed in WWII. Automation to provide flexible sensor coverage, onboard increasingly took over functions previously information fusion capabilities, and command executed by humans due to the need and control guidance for air defense assets— for speed and the number of complex aircraft now known as a command, control, calculations that had to take place in rapid intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance order to yield time-relevant direction. (C2ISR) systems.24 These aircraft focused on As part of this need for speed and expanding the CONUS defense net, placing precision, controllers sent information over sensors and C2 in remote areas, like over automated data links. These electro-magnetic the ocean, or in forward operating locations. means to transfer radar plots, targeting These systems were also deployable in times of information, and basic navigational inputs war. allowed for automated data transfer between These C2ISR aircraft defined their new distributed assets and largely supplanted role under fire over Southeast Asia between radio voice communications. By the late 1965 and 1972. Air Force and Navy EC- 1950s, datalinks were so advanced that 121s were able to track both friendly and

Mitchell Policy Papers 10 enemy aircraft thanks to their large radar markedly, but data was being thrown apertures. Onboard technicians were able at the air crews in a highly haphazard to interrogate and track enemy aircraft mode. Federated systems totally separated identification friend or foe transponders, from one another in their function and which provided valuable position data. transmission were literally drowning air Linguists onboard the aircraft were also crews in too much data, flowed to them able to listen to enemy radio transmissions through disjointed audio and primitive and provide further relevant data that could visual means. There is simply only so help U.S. fighter pilots successfully engage much data that a human crew member and destroy enemy MiGs.25 Comparing this can absorb, process, and act upon in a fused airborne C2ISR technology to older concurrent manner. Col Richard Borowski, detection methods, an Air Force EC-121 an Air Force F-4 Phantom pilot and veteran crew member explained, “We were able to of 151 combat missions over Vietnam, detect aircraft we had not previously seen. It explained the challenge he confronted with was somewhat frightening to realize in the data saturation on a mission that nearly cost past there had been so many aircraft that we him his life: had not seen.”26 This era also saw the development There were a lot of things of a multi-domain C2 effort between going on. The radar warning aircraft and Navy ships in the Tonkin equipment was letting us know that Gulf gathering, fusing, and passing along enemy missiles were being launched important threat data.27 At Nakhon against us. I had intelligence coming Phanom Air Base in Thailand, the United from an agency in real time that was States operated a C2 system known as “Tea telling us that MiGs were coming Ball,” which could process mass data flows up from behind us that were going of signals intelligence, electronic emissions to attack. We had ground control data, and radar intercepts. It could then from a carrier in the Tonkin Gulf combine them to provide a real-time picture telling us where the MiGs were that helped inform command and control approximately in relation to us. decisions in the unfolding air war.28 We were listening to the people Nor was all the decision-making that we were escorting. There were progress occurring within C2ISR-specific other people that were suppressing systems. Combat aircraft like the F-4 AAA and the SAMs—all on the Phantom, A-6 Intruder, and later the F-111 same frequency or on various Aardvark, F-15 Eagle, and F-14 Tomcat were frequencies that we were listening defined by their increased use of sophisticated to. I could hear the growl from my onboard sensors and computing power.29 This air-to-air missiles—the heat seekers technology, paired with a broader C2ISR had a distinctive sound…and of enterprise, saw aircrews able to execute far course all the noise coming from more complex, demanding missions with a the radar warning equipment. As higher success rate. it happened, a MiG came up from However, information’s ascent in the behind me, and my wingman saw battlespace had a downside. The power of him and tried to warn me of the the sensor and C2 construct was increasing MiG. I never heard the warning,

Mitchell Policy Papers 11 and I saw a missile go by—which Recognizing this problem, the Air was his first shot, which he missed. Force and Navy spent the years after I tried to turn out of the way…the Vietnam fielding next-generation C2ISR second missile shot only managed to aircraft that could focus more on processing damage my aircraft, and I brought flows of data such that aircrew were only the airplane back. But I never heard presented with what they needed to know my wingman calling me trying to to meet commander’s intent. The resulting tell me there was a MiG behind me. aircraft included the Air Force’s E-3 When I got back to base, I listened AWACS and the Navy’s E-2 Hawkeye.32 to the tape of the mission, and clear Then-Commander of Air Force Tactical Air as day, he told me that a MiG was Command Gen Robert Dixon explained there and what I should do to avoid the value afforded by a system like AWACS: the attack. I didn’t hear it. I was totally saturated.30 The extension of the surveillance horizons for warning Borowski was not alone in dealing and control with survivability, far with this deluge of data. Famed WWII ace beyond the limits of ground-based and commander of the 8th Tactical Fighter systems, through the employment Wing during Vietnam, Brig Gen Robin of the E-3, can provide civil and Olds, described a similar challenge and an military leaders, as well as battle improvised means of managing the data managers, with a never-before- flow: available view of the battle arena— potential or actual—and on a real- Going up the Red River…we time basis. For the first time in had a procedure where we started history a man can have an instant, turning off things like the detection real, certain view of air and, if gear for the SAMs. It made noises, desired, ground and sea operations, it bothered you. We turned off before or during a conflict.33 guard channel because there was always someone screaming in an The value of this knowledge is emergency. We’d turn off the growl essential, for as Dixon further elaborated, of the sidewinders. I’d usually put “The perfect vision of potentially hostile the kid in the back seat [weapons air activity will enable a commander to system operator] on cold mic so I position his forces with economy and mass could not hear him…and so I’d at the proper time to deter, or to fight. We turn off all the noise so I could will have time to think, reason, and act, concentrate on the matter at hand.31 rather than just react.”34 Data, transformed to information and harnessed as actionable There was only so much someone knowledge, was the key to making the could hear, view, process, and competently best use of available forces to meet mission act upon at a given moment. Data could intent. only be useful if it could readily be The E-3 and the E-2 were not the transformed into actionable knowledge. only new information-focused assets

Mitchell Policy Papers 12 developed in the years after Vietnam. The The systems that grew out of Vietnam ground-focused portion of this network offered significant advancements, but still was constructed in the late 1980s and ran into challenges in 1991 during Operation early 1990s with the E-8 Joint Surveillance Desert Storm. The command center—then Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS)—a known as the Tactical Air Control Center plane carrying a powerful ground-focused (TACC)—was where the Desert Storm radar able to track vehicles, ships, and other air campaign was orchestrated. Multiple items of interest; analyze data onboard; and ground-based C2 systems, combined pass key points of interest to individuals with aerial C2ISR nodes like AWACS through the strategic, operational, and and JSTARS who also provided real-time tactical construct.35 Just to give an idea guidance at the tactical and operational regarding the power of these systems, the level of command, fed information to the E-8’s radar can view 19,000 square miles on TACC. Individual combat aircraft also used a given mission, with its radar able to detect their onboard sensors and processing power targets at over 120 miles.36 to maintain their situational awareness. The Air Force complemented these two The C2 processes and procedures in systems with ground-based control systems, place in the TACC at the time were out of which combine sensors and links to airborne date and not able to keep up with the rapid C2ISR aircraft for an expanded vantage. pace of the conflict. This necessitated ad hoc These assets provide situational awareness procedures and workarounds to optimize and guidance in regions where forces will the air campaign. Information was still remain in place over an extended period hard to access, with much of it locked away and access is allowed. They are particularly from operational and tactical users—for useful in rear echelon operating locations as example, timely space imagery. These actors a layered part of the C2 enterprise. In many at the operational and tactical levels lacked ways, they are like an AWACS stationed on tasking authority over relevant intelligence the ground. satellites due to a bureaucratic decision Beyond the AWACS, JSTARS, and process designed to support possible Cold ground control stations in the C2 hierarchy War-era engagements such as Warsaw Pact is a senior operational command-level center, forces invading Western Europe through now known as the Air Operations Center the Fulda Gap. Dynamic adjustments based (AOC), which executes mission planning days upon evolving mission requirements and in advance and provides real-time inputs when information sharing were not prioritized necessary for live events. It is the senior element in this construct. Most missions were still of the Air Force’s Theater Air Control System executed based on pre-planned taskings, (TACS), and it is where the Commander, Air appointed times, and lanes of engagement. Force Forces (COMAFFOR) provides the Real-time, dynamic tasking was rare. Joint Forces Air Component Commander Innovation: Transition to distributed (JFACC) a facility for planning and executing sensor-shooter complexes. Recognizing theater-wide aerospace forces. When the the crucial importance of command and COMAFFOR is also the JFACC, the AOC is control during fast-paced operations like also the Joint Air Operations Center (JAOC). Desert Storm, the Air Force embarked on In cases of Allied or Coalition (multinational) a modernization of its C2 structures after operations, the AOC is also a Combined Desert Storm and throughout the 1990s. Aerospace Operations Center (CAOC).37 In the early 2000s the Air and Space

Mitchell Policy Papers 13 Figure 3: A U.S. Air Force This was largely realized by the E-3 of the 963rd Airborne Air Control Squadron in 2012. sixth major development in information, Photo: U.S. Air Force connectivity, and C2. Technological advances in the field of networked connectivity, high-fidelity sensors, persistence in overwatch by RPA, and huge gains in computing power saw seismic advances in combat edge situational awareness and decision-making. These technologies also helped blur the different levels of command, since they enabled senior leaders to “reach into” a cockpit or watch what was going on in the battlespace Operations Center (AOC) was given its in real-time and direct decisions at the most own designation, AN/USQ-163 Falconer, tactical levels. This centralization slowed the as a weapon system unto itself.38 Advanced pace of C2 as actors sought to maximize space-based sensors and those on remotely information to guide flawless, nearly piloted aircraft (RPA) also gradually entered immaculate, kinetic operations. Striving for this layered system thanks to technology perfection proved a far different and more and associated concepts of operation that difficult goal to achieve than striving to win. transitioned these feeds past the intelligence Poor force coordination resulting from community to the operational realm. To anachronistic organizational procedures this latter development, the introduction resident in the AN/USQ-163 Falconer of persistent overwatch provided by armed, AOCs was another trend. For instance, sensor-equipped, and highly connected the AOC system used separate planning RPA resulted in a truly unified, integrated procedures for ISR aircraft and strike sensor-shooter construct. This was aaircraft. Segregated planning for these two fundamental game changer in the evolution capabilities yielded missed opportunities of the interplay between information, and mission suboptimization at the very connectivity, and C2. moment technology allowed for the notion In the aftermath of the attacks of of sensor-shooter aircraft and highly September 11, 2001, a different kind of war integrated teaming. In other words, “ISR” against terrorists and a range of non-state aircraft could perform strike missions, and actors drove new information, connectivity, “strike” aircraft could perform ISR, but the and C2 demands. These counterterrorism established planning procedures did not operations introduced two divergent trends: allow for this kind of tasking, and that led the desire to target fleeting aim points to missed coordination and employment while doing everything possible to limit opportunities.39 According to one Air Force collateral damage. This not only drove asset C2 professional, missed opportunities micromanagement but ushered in a shift created by suboptimized C2 were both in traditional Air Force C2 doctrine from routine and frustrating: centralized control/decentralized execution to a practice of centralized control/ A C-130 might air-drop centralized execution. Not making the supplies to a drop zone plagued by wrong decision became the overriding goal. small-arms anti-aircraft fire. The

Mitchell Policy Papers 14 drop might occur immediately shooter contract. Technology has rendered beneath an MQ-1 Predator orbit, the traditional AOC organizational but the Predator crew would not structure obsolete. It requires a change know that the airdrop is planned, to a consolidated planning and tasking much less scan for threats to the process for all aircraft—and at some point, C-130—unless the supported spacecraft as well. unit happens to task it to do so. In reviewing this history of change and Simultaneously, one regional innovations, it is important to view them command over, an F-16 provides through the lens of the three core elements armed reconnaissance along a route in play—information, connectivity, and C2. that friendly forces will patrol the Advancements in elements like processing following day, oblivious to the fact power radically impacted the speed and that an MC-12—in an overlapping scale of the enterprise, but the core elements orbit—has found and fixed a high- remained the same. That strongly suggests value target, hoping that a strike building tomorrow’s system will continue to asset arrives in the area before demand equal and integrated developmental collateral concerns preclude an effort between these three facets. attack. An HH-60 takes fire during Successful force employment is a casualty evacuation mission, not highly reliant upon C2 appropriately knowing that a Sandy-qualified tiered throughout the system to best meet A-10 is in the next kill box. These desired objectives in a rapidly evolving set of are fundamental breakdowns.40 circumstances. To achieve this, analyzing, planning, and designing force employment The cause of these kinds ofshould occur at the operational level breakdowns—that persist today—is through the creation of master air attack the result of the design of the current plans and their administrative transmission Falconer air and space operations center. documents—the air tasking orders— This design was built around separate at the air operations center. The AOC tasking procedures for ISR that use a should then guide assets real time with system known as the Planning Tool for the execution elements of the theater air Resource Integration, Synchronization, control system, ensuring the commander’s and Management (PRISM), and force intent is maintained. Finally, combat forces applications that use the TBMCS.41 It should make the most of their situational reflects an outdated paradigm of mission awareness and engage as best possible, execution that must be fixed in ABMS understanding that intent. As the Vietnam and JADC2. U.S. forces cannot afford to conflict experience revealed, performance operate like this in future battlespaces where will degrade if forward actors are pummeled they will be stretched to the limit from both with too many disparate information inputs. a capacity and capabilities perspective. The It is crucial to filter information to ensure risk of high force attrition adds further each actor receives what is needed, but not stress to the situation. The planning and what is irrelevant and distracting. However, tasking process should be merged to ensure part of this involves drawing lines, or the a unified and optimized effort regardless system will slow with too many actors of aircraft categorization. This reflects the bogging down the process, as was clear from reality of an integrated, collaborative sensor- Afghanistan and Iraq. It may also grow

Mitchell Policy Papers 15 too fragile if connectivity between all the the People’s Republic of China highlights, actors cannot be maintained in a constant, “China’s leaders [think] that achieving assured means—something of increasing information dominance and denying concern given future high-end threats. It adversaries the use of the electromagnetic is no longer about deconfliction, modern spectrum is necessary to seize and maintain reality demands collaborative, responsive the strategic initiative in a conflict.”42 integration. These lessons have stood the This brings us to the current state test of time because smart teamwork yields of play. The Air Force recognizes these better mission results. challenges and has long been aware of its ABMS represents the next step in shortcomings. This is a primary reason this evolution. Throughout history, levels it is changing its current approach to of available information, connectivity, and information, connectivity, and C2 to a far C2 played a crucial role in shaping military different model—ABMS and JADC2. operational concepts and strategies. A force Today’s ABMS and JADC2 vision that lacks these attributes requires the use largely ties back to the middle of the 2000s, of far more mass to achieve operational when Air Force leaders were increasingly objectives. In other words, it is a process aware of the airframe age of the E-8 involving levels of certainty—the more JSTARS. This triggered a broader set of commanders know, the better they can considerations as replacement options were focus their efforts to achieve their objectives. reviewed. While these aircraft were fielded in the inventory in the late 1980s and Next Step in the Evolution of Information, early 1990s, the JSTARS airframes were Connectivity, and C2: ABMS and JADC2 originally constructed in the 1960s. Long- The United States now finds itself in term serviceability was a rising concern. The a “back to the future” type scenario as peer Air Force had already pursued one effort to competitors define battlespace priorities. recapitalize the aircraft and its associated Instead of the permissive environments mission systems through the E-10 program, that airmen experienced in the skies which was later canceled. During the over Afghanistan and Iraq, they must same timeframe, technologies were also be prepared for incredibly complex, fast, rapidly changing. As early as 2008, Lt Gen dangerous, and dynamic operations against Deptula, then the Air Force chief of ISR, far more advanced adversaries. Their success initiated efforts to look at different means will be defined by their ability to conduct of hosting ground moving target indicator operations concurrently throughout the radars (GMTI) beyond simply putting it on battlespace in a coordinated fashion that an updated replacement aircraft. Later, he out-paces the adversary. Opponents will consolidated his ideas into a description of be targeting every element that is critical a concept that connected sensors, shooters, to generating U.S. combat airpower—U.S. and effectors into a notion of a “combat theater operating bases, mission aircraft, cloud,” that was the precursor to what logistics, and information networks. To this became ABMS and JADC2.43 latter point, top adversaries now consider In 2010 the Air Force launched an denying information, connectivity, and C2 analysis of alternatives (AOA) regarding as their primary military objective. As the how to best execute the aerial C2ISR Department of Defense’s 2020 report on The mission with the JSTARS GMTI.44 This Military and Security Developments Involving eventually evolved into a requirement for a

Mitchell Policy Papers 16 new manned aircraft, with the C2 crew and not a single program of record but the ISR GMTI sensor co-located onboard a capability that is provided by the same airframe in a method like the multiple integrated systems and E-8. The main areas for growth were newer programs and will be horizontally sensors, processing power, connectivity, and managed by the ABMS Architect. automation that would offset some of the ABMS will develop sensors, battle air battle manager crew.45 Industry offerings management and command took shape in the form of large business jet and control systems, and type aircraft carrying an onboard GMTI communications through a three sensor and air battle management crew.46 phased strategy.50 In 2017, Air Force leadership signaled they were considering a different vector to The first ABMS phase is designed to recapitalize the JSTARS system. Air Combat harness existing programs of record to net Command Commander General Mike desired effects. Phases two and three are Holmes explained, “The world is changing; supposed to use increasingly disaggregated the threats are changing. We are going to approaches that will largely rely on new take a look at all the threats we are facing.”47 technologies—the vast majority of which Service leaders increasingly grew concerned remain highly classified. This does not just that a large, sensor emitting aircraft like impact the E-8; as then-Assistant Secretary the JSTARS, or its proposed replacements, of the Air Force for Acquisition, Technology, were not going to survive in the anticipated and Logistics Dr. Will Roper explained in high-end threat environments surrounding congressional testimony, “ABMS will be adversaries like China or Russia. To this end, able to perform the mission sets associated the Air Force harnessed an AOA originally with both the JSTARS and AWACS focused on AWACS recapitalization to look platforms and possibly assume other roles of at the broader C2 and ISR mission set. This the Theater Air Control System.”51 effort was branded the Advanced Battle This leaves the ABMS networked Management System.48 approach as the current program of record With the submission of the Air Force’s that will eventually replace aircraft like FY 2019 budget request, the service leaders the E-3 AWACS and E-8 JSTARS. It officially terminated its planned JSTARS is the ecosystem of sensors, processing recapitalization effort and proposed the power, fusion, artificial intelligence, and networked ABMS vision as the preferred data transfer networks that will empower solution.49 Budget justification documents modern C2: a concept that DOD now calls from this decision explained the essence of Joint All-Domain Command and Control.52 the new approach: Words matter when it comes to military concepts, and the phrase “joint all-domain” The Advanced Battle refers to the notion of mission systems Management System (ABMS) is partnering real-time in a domain-agnostic a family of systems construct that manner. The composition of ABMS and provides battle management and JADC2 teams will be based on creating the command and control capability best partnerships at given times and places by networking, ingesting, fusing, to achieve desired effects better than what and prioritizing data from any single asset could do individually. Data disaggregated sensors. ABMS is gathered by systems in one domain will

Mitchell Policy Papers 17 be processed and drive actions of actors task objectives. Of course, this is just one elsewhere in the system if those actors are vignette among many potential combinations in a better time and place to net the desired enabled by ABMS. There will be times when goal. As one Air Force document explains, multiple effectors from different platforms “Joint all-domain command and control might combine to yield a single result. To connects distributed sensors, shooters and this point, an F-35 could jam enemy defenses data from and in all domains to all forces located around a target, while a B-21 launches to enable distributed mission command at a munition using information provided by the scale, tempo, and level to accomplish space-based sensors to successfully penetrate commander’s intent—agnostic to domains, the disrupted defenses and impact the target platforms, and functional lanes.”53 ABMS with great precision. This is an example of is the technical means by which that an advanced level of coordination made partnering occurs. possible by ABMS that will yield major new The scale and scope of this effort is a advantages in a peer conflict. As former whole-of-Air Force enterprise that extends Air Force Chief of Staff General Goldfein far past recapitalizing a given aircraft like explained on the ABMS construct enabling JSTARS or AWACS. As Dr. Will Roper the future force, “If we connect them, we’re explained, “What we want to do is ensure going to have options available that we can machine-to-machine data transfers occur throw at the adversary that today are not everywhere, so that if any sensor sees available.” something, that data is available to a shooter 54 anywhere without impediments.” Air Force Fifth-Generation Aircraft and C2ISR ABMS Chief Architect Preston Dunlap for Modern Combat believes this effort really comes down to “making these platforms better than they Fifth-generation combat aircraft are key actors in the would be individually through integration.”55 new operating environment. The F-22, F-35, and A short scenario can help illustrate eventually the B-21 harness stealth technology and the Air Force’s vision. ABMS could give an electronic means of survivability to bring their sensor F-35 and a B-21 that expended their weapon suites, processing power, and ability to collaboratively payloads the ability to collaboratively provide engage with other combat systems behind enemy lines. high fidelity target aim point information to Unlike the Vietnam-era fighters that saw crews a Navy or allied ship located offshore. The bombarded with too much disparate information, 5th combined actions of these geographically generation processing uses technology to transform separated aircraft brought together as a team mass quantities of data gathered both onboard and by the ABMS network could enable the ship offboard the aircraft to decision quality information. to launch its weapons at one or multiple They can observe things and make operational-level targets. By partnering, these very different assessments—once the sole purview of large scale weapon systems could create effects in the C2ISR. There are times when a 5th generation aircraft battlespace that exceed what any one of them can actually serve as a C2 and ISR node. could have achieved alone. It all comes down to gathering disparate flows of information, The limiting factor in this equation is how much fusing them into a whole that reveals more information and C2 duties a combat pilot may be able knowledge of the battlespace than can be to handle amidst primary mission responsibilities, provided by any individual source, and avoiding threats, and the rapid decision-making that tasking effectors that can meet the desired occurs in a highly dynamic environment.

Mitchell Policy Papers 18 While the technology in this enterprise also inform members of Congress who is new, the overarching intent and macro seek to better understand ABMS. As one construct is time-tested. The Battle of House Armed Services Committee staffer Britain had its network of sensors and explained, “Over the past two and half to communications systems. C2 experts three years since it was first rolled out, the could direct fighter pilots as the kinetic concept of what ABMS was supposed to be, actualizers of their directives. Fighters has changed significantly. The committee is could team through radio communications still looking for some additional information and practiced tactics. ABMS and JADC2 and better clarity on where all that money is expands this model in scale, scope, and intended to go.”56 speed. However, the benefits remain One thing is certain, however—this the same, as is the basic approach of journey toward ABMS and JADC2 will making the best use of available assets not succeed if the dominant focus is only to achieve information and decision on improving connectivity. History has superiority. The ability for machines to illustrated that mass information flows share data automatically without human do not yield improved decision scenarios. engagement, to seamlessly collaborate, As a 1999 RAND C2 study highlighted, and to net objectives together is simply “In the age of abundant, almost limitless, the next phase of growth in the construct information and communications thanks to advances in technology. Given capabilities, decision makers are increasingly the realities of a force stretched thin amidst faced with the problem of too much a burgeoning threat environment, the Air information, rather than too little.” RAND’s Force must pursue this approach. report points out the obvious solution: With ABMS standing as the technical “Understanding what information is most means of information exchange—the essential for decision-making—so that electronic infrastructure through which the the information being communicated, data flows—and JADC2 serving as the higher processed, or displayed can be bounded echelon tasking, aligning commander’s intent [emphasis added]—is now a major issue to operational and tactical level actions, some in the design of computer-aided decision key questions emerge: support systems.”57 The problem of too much information is similar to the problem 1. How are massive amounts of data faced by pilots in the Vietnam conflict. It gathered by such a large enterprise also occurred in the 2000s and 2010s when system being filtered and fusedRPAs gathered data at rates never seen productively to prevent saturation; and before in the history of warfare. Their ability 2. Who or what is exercising C2? to collect information scaled far past the established means to effectively harness the Answering these questions will prove resulting information. It led to meltdowns vital to delivering a set of capabilities and when it came to the processing, exploitation, an operating construct that will function in and dissemination (PED) process. At one an operationally responsive, relevant, and point, Airmen in the PED field saw a 5,000 resilient fashion. This is what will make percent increase in the amount of sensor the ABMS program a success instead of a data produced.58 The chief of Air Force simple update of a technology investment ISR at the time coined the phrase, “we are program like TBMCS. The answers would swimming in sensors, so we need to ensure

Mitchell Policy Papers 19 that we don’t drown in data.”59 Knowing generation aircraft employment also possess how to recognize what mattered, make a vastly superior view of the battlespace sense of it through informed analysis, fuse surrounding them that was previously it with other important feeds, and pass reserved only for AWACS or JSTARS actionable knowledge to the relevant actors aircraft. Their onboard sensors, their ability in a timely fashion proved exceedingly to automatically fuse offboard data into difficult. DOD’s initial response was to their organic situational display, and their simply throw manpower at the problem, ability to constantly assess the environment but that solution proved cumbersome, for pop-up threats is incredible. costly, and too slow relative to meeting real- However, these airmen are also flying time mission demands. Efforts to improve very fast in contested airspace juggling the process through technology has since a myriad of mission tasks. Their focus is helped, but the growth of data still far on a specific mission within a bounded outpaces the means available to transform it geographic space. They are often not to actionable information. able to look at the operation as a holistic This experience stands as a warning enterprise. Pilots must also focus their to ABMS and JADC2 architects. The attention on controlling their aircraft, not challenge of processing, filtering, and just dealing with a large influx of fused, directing information flows appropriately actionable information. To this point, aligned to a broader C2 vision across the a 5th generation combat force will still battlespace will escalate to levels previously need air battle managers that assimilate unimaginable given the number of nodes battlespace data and call the plays similar that will comprise the system. In the past, to football quarterbacks. As the RAND C2 data flows were limited simply because report explained that “command is both there were not that many collectors and an organizational function and a cognitive stovepipes limited the effective reach of the function, and that technology, by itself, is information. Now, anyone will have the not a panacea.”60 potential to see anything, which would be AI, automation, and machine like watching all your cable TV stations learning are also part of the solution. at once. Theoretically there would be a lot ABMS and JADC2 will expand the of information in play, but realistically it information net considerably. Machine would be unusable. ABMS and JADC2 learning, automation, and artificial must include an effective automated means intelligence will no doubt assist further in that understands which platform, unit, or this process, but there must be a deliberate individual in the battlespace needs what plan in place to ensure that concepts information, when, and for how long. of operation are able to scale to a level Fifth-generation technologies are that allow for the full exploitation of the part of the solution. Modern technology, potential that new technologies offer. This especially 5th generation processing, fusion, ties to the notion of C2 and appropriately and displays, have made significant progress tiered decision makers. Success in warfare toward this end—especially when it comes depends upon translating the commander’s to transforming mass data into actionable intent into operational and tactical actions information. However, those systems across the battlespace. A combat action are still operating in a defined regional against a peer adversary could see thousands context. Modern airmen experienced in 5th of major movements and tens of thousands

Mitchell Policy Papers 20 of smaller movements occurring each day. intent and broader political and military The Air Force has not had to think on objectives is not a mechanical act tied to a this scale and at the inherent concurrency predetermined set of decisions. It involves of decision-making needed for peer-on- juggling numerus factors—many far from peer conflict scenarios since the end of the clear and exercising best judgement in Cold War. Counterinsurgency operations rapid order. Things get tricky when lead-in are far smaller, slower, and less intense, assumptions prove incorrect and mission given political and operational constraints, conditions are far different than what compared to a major war where thousands was anticipated. Although automation of actions will be executed every single day will narrow down the pairing process and and rear-echelon locations will be under aid decision-making, at some point, an attack. Additionally, during post-9/11 appropriately tiered layer of command must counterterrorism and counterinsurgency ensure actions taken will result in the best operations, U.S. forces could almost always desired effect to achieve a commander’s count on total information connectivity, intent. According to one air battle manager which encouraged strategic reach down commander, “Arguably, we have developed into operational and tactical situations on a the most powerful ISR capabilities in the real-time basis. There is no way large-scale history of the world. Additionally, 5th peer adversary scenarios would ever allow generation aircraft present their own source for this sort of an approach. Events will of SA [situational awareness] in new ways. move too fast, they will be too complex, and Without the unifying force that is C2, connectivity will be under constant assault. these amazing technical advances may AI, automation, and machine processing realize only individual success or localized can transform a certain tier of data into advantage rather than broader operational- immediately actionable information that is level advances.”61 relevant and value-added in a frontline cockpit. Nor is this thinking wholly discordant Consider a threat warning detecting a surface- from the vector taken by Air Force leaders. to-air missile site and suggesting an alternate Dr. Will Roper recently explained, “I think flight path. The automated systems could leading [battlespace] edge systems are going also track how a mission is progressing and to have to be quarterbacked by people prioritize mission objectives based upon real- that are standing back ready to make the time developments. For example, if targeting calls.”62 These C2 actors will need to be a command center was the overarching relatively forward in the battlespace, given objective of the day’s activities, and the strike that connectivity often grows more fragile package originally tasked with this mission with distance. This means being onboard was aborted on the way to the target, this a mission aircraft equipped with sensors, action could be detected. The responsibility processing power, and connectivity. Basic for the strike could be reallocated to another physics dictates that there will be times set of aircraft with the appropriate mission when physical proximity to the battlespace attributes, physical proximity, and fuel status will yield communicative advantages. This to execute the mission. does not mean that the notions of C2 and AI, automation, and machine ISR must be indivisibly linked. If active learning will not replace human battle sensing poses too much risk, air battle managers. The effective projection of managers can rely on offboard data sources airpower in alignment with command gathered from the broader network. That

Mitchell Policy Papers 21 is the entire point of ABMS. C2 and ISR of artificial intelligence, automation, and were previously hard-linked due to the machine learning. Our adversaries are also technological requirements of a past era. pursing these advantages, and whomever Co-location of C2 and ISR has advantages holds the edge in them will own an in certain circumstances because that hard- extremely important competitive advantage. wired connection is extremely difficult for The RPA data flood is a cautionary an enemy to defeat, which affords broader experience in this regard. Tackling that mission resiliency, but it is no longer the tsunami of information with manual means sole way the system must function. alone was simply unworkable. ABMS The value that a tiered approach promises data flows exponentially higher. to the battlespace presents also speaks However, while technology must be to the importance of taking a proactive part of the solution, going all-in on AI, risk mitigating strategy when it comes automation, and machine learning does to relying on new forms of technology. not mean abandoning proven methods that ABMS faces risk in this area because the offer redundancies and complementary program demands so much innovation strengths. As Dr. Roper further elaborated, and will be employed against adversaries “We are not ready to pull people out of the seeking to defeat it in the no-holds-barred fight, we are not ready to AI everything. environment of combat. A 2020 GAO R2D2 is great in the movies, but R2D2 in report assessing the program highlighted the real world gets really confused when an this risk: “Since the Air Force has not adversary is trying to mess with the data they identified what the technology needs for are ingesting to make decisions.”64 To this ABMS are, it cannot yet determine if those point, proof of AI’s fallibility unexpectedly technologies are mature or will be mature emerged with the onset of the COVID-19 when needed.” The assessment further crisis. AI algorithms were written based observed, “We have previously found upon human behavior patterns nearly that starting development without first everyone thought were immutable norms. identifying and assessing the maturity of Lockdown orders injected disruptions few technologies increases the likelihood that could have imagined, with the net result those technologies are not mature when seeing AI confused in a world that no longer needed, which often results in cost overruns conformed to its programmed assumptions. and schedule delays.”63 Risk mitigation Just ask anyone from the retail sector who will be crucial if ABMS and the broader used AI to assist managing inventory—sales JADC2 initiatives are to succeed. Too many figures often departed expected patterns aggressive technological leaps demanding with wide variance.65 high levels of assured performance invite If the United States is overly reliant ultimate program failure. A middle path is on AI and machine learning without a far more dependable approach, balancing prudent oversight and redundancies, innovation with proven methods of mission adversaries will be incentivized to pursue execution. operational concepts and tactics that There is no question that gathering, undermine algorithms through embracing processing, fusing, and distributing the unexpected. Human C2 engagement massive amounts of information to support with professionals well-versed in resolving networked teaming operations will require challenges in dynamic situations helps machine-derived assistance in the form manage that risk. Air battle managers

Mitchell Policy Papers 22 appropriately positioned within the sensors, connectivity, and C2. Mission- battlespace will be a key part of this based affordability and practicality are redundant, complementary enterprise. real things. It is one thing to rely on a Raw technology does not equate to the highly disaggregated, high-end network of realization of C2. As one airman explained, sensing and processing nodes in a major “[Individuals] are led to believe that the theater conflict, but it is likely imprudent meaning of C2 is maintaining networks in against lower-tier threats given that such the cyber age. Yet, in terms of grasping C2, assets are normally in limited supply and networks do not explain that concept any their readiness must be guarded for major more than missiles explain air superiority or conflicts. There is utility in considering a bombs define global strike.”66 “daily driver” plan-b force. An integrated Finally, there is another important mission aircraft able to take off and self- reality to balance—one not making a deploy anywhere in the world in a matter of lot of headlines at present. While China hours affords unique advantages. is certainly DOD’s pacing threat and Above all, the solutions pursued Russia is not too far behind, America will must be flexible and adaptable. They must undoubtedly engage in numerous operations be oriented on solving problems in the in far fewer threating regions of the world rapid, complex combat environment. It is where mid-tier and low-end threats are about speeding decisions, bringing order the predominant concern. While America to a complex set of events, and producing focuses to prepare for the most significant desired effects. As one Air Force officer with and likely threats, the reality is that global a deep bench of experience highlighted, circumstances past its control often throw “The critical minimum infrastructure of a unanticipated challenges into play that holistic C2 system cannot be determined must be addressed. This demands options generically or agnostically; rather, it is that are rapidly deployable, sustainable, and entirely dependent upon the commander’s affordable but do not degrade capabilities requirements, given specific missions to and capacity that are necessary for high- accomplish under specific conditions.”67 end operations tied to core U.S. interests. The key to that sort of flexibility demands In many ways, this is where the proven a range of tools that have varying levels of forms of C2ISR in the forms of AWACS capability, adaptability, and cost sensitivity. and JSTARS excel. They can project specific mission effects into certain geographic A Forward Vector for Information, regions in rapid order. Their presence can Connectivity, and C2 be sustained for an extended period, allies The ABMS and JADC2 constructs and partners can easily integrate into their under development by the Air Force make a C2 construct, and their operating paradigm lot of sense. Information has always been the does not break the bank. key to fighting and winning, especially when ABMS either needs to meet these mass was not a guaranteed option. Advances same criteria, or the Air Force needs to in technology also promise to help manage pursue a complementary C2ISR system that the onslaught of unfiltered data, ensuring will add value across the full operational that AI, automation, and machine learning spectrum—from high-end operations to help add decision clarity to the process. lower-tier engagements. This involves the That said, there appears to be a void in the core attributes of information-gathering new construct—the operating location for

Mitchell Policy Papers 23 Figure 4: Various supersonic aircraft design concepts, like Boom’s XB-1 supersonic demonstrator, embody the technologies that could prove useful for the Air Force’s C2ISR mission. Photo: Courtesy of Boom

human-executed C2, a job traditionally are readily available and have been used executed by air battle managers. repeatedly with a high degree of success in The entire premise for moving from exercises with U.S. forces. These aircraft large scale C2ISR platforms is based on the certainly meet the mission functionality fact they are no longer survivable in regions and affordability criteria for medium- and where threats are pronounced. Protecting low-end operations. The Air Force could aircrews, while seeking alternate means of also look at extending the life of its JSTARS secure desired effects, is both responsible and AWACS aircraft. However, concerns and smart. However, a place still exists regarding their survivability against high- for a manned C2 platform given the need end actors are legitimate. for appropriately tiered C2 actors in the This points to the potential afforded battlespace, the connectivity advantages by a new class of aircraft—large scale of executing C2 in a proximate location supersonic aircraft under development to forward-employed forces, the desire in the commercial sector.69 The U.S. to have fallback options should primary Department of Defense has already signaled solutions fail, and the need for a force to interest in these aircraft for their senior swing elsewhere in the world, a place still leader transport fleet.70 However, mission- exists for a manned C2 platform. As one wise, they could also fulfill a role in the Air Force C2 expert explained, “By means realm of C2ISR. In fact, language in the of mobility, airborne C2 offers range, reach FY 2021 NDAA instructs the Air Force to and adaptability—coupled with unique investigate this application. communications and surveillance feeds The advantages are straightforward unmatched from space—to provide in situ and speak to many of the Air Force’s problem solvers who align understanding of concerns regarding the long-term viability commander’s intent to the chaos of actual of its legacy C2ISR fleet. From an conflict.”68 operational perspective, supersonic cruise On the one hand, technologies like at extended range, a capability all of the the proven E-7 Wedgetail aircraft that proposed jets in this class purport to achieve Australia and Great Britain are procuring by virtue of their civil mission goals, would

Mitchell Policy Papers 24 allow a C2ISR aircraft of this class to deploy modularity. If a new modular system works with utmost speed and rapidly cover vast well, then it could be scaled. If it failed to operational ranges. This would allow more meet expectations, simply pull it off and go time on station by spending far less time back to proven options—or try something transiting to and from basing locations. else. Either way, the aircraft’s functionality This would also allow the use of bases far is not held hostage to incredibly complex, removed from the reach of enemy offensive costly upgrades in the traditional model. systems, while not placing further demands Finally, there is still tremendous utility on finite ramps in key operational centers of to the C2ISR integrated model. Not only gravity. Locations like Anderson Air Force does this afford a rapidly deployable mission Base in Guam have limited room. package for lower-tier operations but co- This risk reduction does not simply locating sensors with C2 experts mitigates tie to basing. An aircraft operating at the risk posed by an entirely disaggregated supersonic speeds adds complexity to an sensor-C2 construct. Hard wires and optical adversary’s ground-to-air and air-to-air fibers connecting sensors to C2 workstations defenses. Add this to the high altitude at are very difficult to defeat. This is not to say which these aircraft operate—over 60,000 that the mesh network of distributed systems feet—and the size of the effective enemy proposed by the Air Force is a bad concept. defensive threat rings reduce markedly. In fact, certain threat scenarios might see The threats do not go away, but they are the aircraft turn off its onboard sensors and far smaller compared to what an airframe execute C2 using information derived from derived from a subsonic airliner would face. the broader ABMS network. There is utility Sensors operated at high altitude can also to alternate pathways of achieving mission see further, which is basic physics regarding goals. It affords a fallback that mitigates sightlines. the vulnerabilities posed by an exceedingly On top of these mission profile high reliance on connectivity links. It also advantages, these new aircraft could be complicates an adversary’s calculus because designed with open mission systems and U.S. forces would be pursuing a C2ISR modular mission payloads. For a C2ISR solution set with a wide breadth of technical aircraft to be truly useful, the ability approaches. The net effect is a resilient, to rapidly modernize mission systems robust system. is essential. The ability to swap sensors, As for crew size, the previous JSTARS processors, and other mission systems recapitalization effort, focused on business in rapid fashion in response to specific jet class aircraft, demonstrated that operational goals would also prove technological advancements were able to exceedingly useful. What if a jet knew it automate many functions previously executed was going to face certain threats and be by human operators. Such trendlines will asked to gather specific types of information continue, which would afford a streamlined on a given sortie? Modularity could see approach to onboard air battle manager mission systems specifically customized to manning requirements. Certain functions meet those goals. An entirely different suite could also be disaggregated to air battle of systems could be uploaded for the next managers elsewhere in the battlespace, with task. This approach is not science fiction; it the Air Force exploring concepts that include has already been harnessed by aircraft like dual-tasking aerial refueling aircraft as C2 the U-28, which afford tremendous mission nodes.71 While a positive idea, it is important

Mitchell Policy Papers 25 to recognize that an aircraft like the KC-46 bigger than all the parts.”72 That statement will have primary mission duties—namely holds true today more than ever. Technology refueling. C2 will require airmen in the will prove essential in ensuring combat assets right time and place to net desired effects. will be employed effectively and efficiently This emphasizes the value yielded by a in alignment with the commander’s intent. dedicated C2ISR platform. Supplementary However, it is crucial to pursue a balanced additions provide value, but they are also approach when it comes to developing the not dealbreakers should their primary task next-generation construct. functions degrade their C2 functionality. Networks, AI, automation, and The net effect of this proposed C2ISR machine learning will prove essential in construct would yield a layered vision whereby yielding an enhanced, robust system that C2 in high threat environments sees a speaks to the needs of tomorrow’s operating collaborative, integrated three-phase approach: environment. The Air Force is on track in this regard. However, these technologies 1. Penetrating, highly survivable sensor do not obviate the importance of C2 tiered nodes, paired with space-based systems, appropriately throughout the battlespace. linked to C2 operators providing real- Professionals will still need to be positioned time decision-making inputs. appropriately throughout the C2 decision 2. High speed, high altitude manned structure. Additionally, options must C2ISR sensor platforms able to provide afford redundancies and flexibility that can supplementary “look-in” and network- enhance high-end operations and allow sourced decision-making insights, as assets to be employed elsewhere in the well as extensive, survivable C2ISR threat spectrum when required. coverage over moderate risk regions This requires a new model for 3. Stand-off C2 and ISR systems able to positioning air battle managers throughout gather and process data into decision- the battlespace so that they will be poised quality outputs. to connect to and support defined forces in circumstances where adversaries will be The advantage of this construct seeking to defeat communications links. is simple: to guide force employment An overreliance on extended network decision-making in a timely, encompassing connections only introduces new levels of manner with a high level of prioritization vulnerability. Air battle managers staged for redundant capabilities, sufficientthroughout the operating space ensure a capacity, and mission-based affordability. greater chance of connectivity. Innovative Most importantly, it relies on a balanced concepts like supersonic C2ISR aircraft approach to information, connectivity, and should be a key part of the consideration, as C2. Each of these facets are represented should alternate aerial operating locations— proportionately. like on aerial refueling and other mission type aircraft that will be occupying relevant Conclusion positions in the battlespace for extended Upon reviewing the state of C2 in the periods of time. Such concepts speak to the years immediately following the Cold War, power of disaggregating C2 from ISR, while the 18th Secretary of Defense Les Aspin still holding options for integrated C2ISR remarked, “We know how to orchestrate should networked solutions find themselves [technology] in a way that makes the sum immobilized due to enemy interference.

Mitchell Policy Papers 26 The investment for this sort of conflict, Prime Minister Winston Churchill solution—one that will push significant visited an air defense command and control advances in network technology, processing center responsible for directing RAF fighters ability, automation, AI, machine learning, against the attacking German forces. and new aircraft designs—will be Watching the waves of incoming German considerable. However, given what is at attackers on the center’s plotting boards, stake, the question should be reversed: what Churchill asked “What other reserves have is the cost of not pursuing this approach? we?” Air Vice Marshal Keith Park replied, The Air Force is simply too small, too old, “There are none.”73 Decades later, the story and too fragile to meet its taskings through is often romanticized as an example of stoic pure numbers superiority. Even if the airmen defending their nation against the requirement for 386 operational squadrons odds. In actuality, it portrays a country is realized, pressing mission demands teetering on the brink of disaster. Britain will necessitate the effective and efficient won that fight in no small measure thanks employment of this force. to information, connectivity, and C2. The The Battle of Britain stands as a same will be true in future wars for which cautionary tale for today’s leaders. On our nation’s air force must be prepared. The September 15, 1940, with Britain facing one U.S. Air Force’s investment in the modern of the largest German attacks of the entire equivalents must stand as top priorities.

Mitchell Policy Papers 27 Endnotes 1 Air Force Association, "2019 Air, Space & Cyber Force Weapons Development from Vietnam to Desert Conference - General David Goldfein," video speech, Storm (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution September 17, 2019. Press, 2003), p. 195. 2 Denis Richards, Royal Air Force 1939-1945 (London, 25 Werrell, Chasing the Silver Bullet, pp. 192–193. UK: Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1953), pp. 156, 26 Alfred Price, War in the Fourth Dimension—US 158. Electronic Warfare, from the Vietnam War to the 3 SECAF Twitter, September 12, 2017. Present (London: Greenhill Books, 2001), p. 69. 4 "Air Force 2020 Almanac," Air Force Magazine, June, 27 Lon Nordeen, Air Warfare in the Missile Age 2020 (Aircraft Inventory as of September 30, 2019). (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 5 David A. Deptula, Evolving Technologies and Warfare 2002), p. 57. in the 21st Century: Introducing the "Combat Cloud,” 28 Wayne Thompson, To Hanoi and Back—the US Air Mitchell Institute Policy Paper 4 (Arlington, VA: Force and North Vietnam, 1966–1973 (Washington, September 2016). DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 2000), pp. 239– 6 Shepherd Media "Podcast: Five Eyes Connectivity - 240. Tactical data links," September 26, 2019. 29 Nordeen, Air Warfare in the Missile Age, p. 13. 7 Valerie Insinna, "Air Force Secretary Barbara Barrett 30 Nova, “Top Gun and Beyond,” PBS, January 19, chats about her top four priorities," Defense News, 1988. February 27, 2020. 31 Nova, “Top Gun and Beyond.” 8 John M. Griffin and John M. Colombi, "Application 32 Werrell, Chasing the Silver Bullet, p. 198. and Analysis of the Friedman-Sage Framework 33 Maj Gen Lawrence Skantze, “How the E-3A Gives for Case Studies of Systems Engineering and the Big Battle Picture,” Air Force Magazine, July Management," Air Force Institute of Technology 1977, p. 59. briefing, 2007, slide 22. 34 Skantze, “How the E-3A Gives the Big Battle 9 Patrick Tucker, "What’s Wrong With the Air Force’s Picture.” ‘Connect Everything’ Project," Defense One, April 16, 35 Werrell, Chasing the Silver Bullet, p. 205. 2020. 36 John Tirpak, "The JSTARS Recap," Air Force 10 Mark Wallace. "The U.S. Air Force learned to code— Magazine, January 27, 2015. and saved the Pentagon millions," Fast Company, July 37 Discussion with Lt Gen David A. Deptula, USAF 5, 2020. (Ret.) in October 2020. Gen Deptula was the 11 Josiah R. Collens Jr. "Theater Battle Management primary offensive air campaign planner during Core System: Lessons for Systems Engineers," Desert Shield and Desert Storm in 1990/91, and he MITRE case study, October 14, 2005, p. 7. was involved with the design and evolution of C2 in 12 GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Action Is Needed to Provide the USAF. Clarity and Mitigate Risks of the Air Force's Planned 38 Ibid. Advanced Battle Management System (Washington, 39 Ibid. DC: GAO, April 2020), p. 11. 40 Maj Matt Gaetke, “Crossing the Streams: Integrating 13 John Slessor, Airpower and Armies (Oxford: Oxford the Stovepipes with Command and Control,” Air University Press, 1936), p. 130. and Space Power Journal, July–August 2014, Page 14 Alfred Price, The History of US Electronic Warfare 151–152. (Alexandria, VA: Association of Old Crows, 1984), p. 41 Discussion with Lt Gen Deptula. 8. 42 OSD, Military and Security Developments Involving 15 Len Deighton, Battle of Britain (London: George the People’s Republic of China 2020, annual report Rainbird Ltd, 1980), pp. 62–63. to Congress (Washington, DC: OSD, August 21, 16 Len Deighton, Fighter—The True Story of the Battle of 2020), p. 86. Britain (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1977), pp. 93–96. 43 Deptula, Evolving Technologies and Warfare in the 21st 17 Alfred Price, Instruments of Darkness—the History Century. of Electronic Warfare (New York: Charles Scribner’s 44 Steve Trimble, "Budget outlook clouds decisions in Sons, 1978), pp. 21–22. JSTARS wars," Flight Global, October 24, 2011. 18 Stephen McFarland, America’s Pursuit of Precision 45 Tirpak, "The JSTARS Recap." Bombing, 1910–1945 (Washington, DC: 46 Tirpak, "The JSTARS Recap." Smithsonian Institution Press, 1995), p. 166. 47 Colin Clark, "Eyes On Vulnerable AWACS, Rivet 19 Price, Instruments of Darkness, p. 69. Joint, Etc.," Air Force Studies replacements," 20 Price, Instruments of Darkness, p. 126. Breaking Defense, February 22, 2018. 21 Norman Friedman, Network Centric Warfare—How 48 GAO, Defense Acquisitions, p. 3. Navies Learned to Fight Smarter through Three World 49 Steve Trmible, "JSTARS replacement cancelled in Wars (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2009), new USAF budget plan," Flight Global, February 12, p. 71. 2018. 22 Friedman, Network Centric Warfare, p. 72. 50 U.S. Air Force, Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 23 Friedman, Network Centric Warfare, pp. 65 – 67. 2020 Budget Estimates, Justification book Volume 3a 24 Kenneth Werrell, Chasing the Silver Bullet—US Air of 3, Research, Development, Test & Evaluation, Air

Mitchell Policy Papers 28 Force (Washington, DC: DOD, March, 2019), p. 93. 60 Builder, Bankes, and Nordin, Command Concepts, p. 51 Dr. William B. Roper, Jr. Assistant Secretary of the 17. Air Force (Acquisition, Technology & Logistics); 61 Col Henry Cyr, “Describing the Elephant: Framing Gen. James M. Holmes, USAF Commander, Air a Discussion on Command and Control,” Air and Combat Command; and Maj Gen David S. Nahom, Space Power Journal, July–August 2014, p. 21. USAF Director of Programs (Deputy Chief of Staff, 62 AFWERX, "Dr. Will Roper ABMS 'Ask Me Plans and Programs), "Department of the Air Force Anything'." Acquisition and Modernization Programs in the 63 GAO, Defense Acquisitions. Fiscal Year 2020 National Defense Authorization 64 AFWERX, "Dr. Will Roper ABMS 'Ask Me President’s Budget Request," Presentation to the Anything'." House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on 65 Will Douglas Heavan, “Our weird behavior during Tactical Air And Land Forces United States House of the pandemic is messing with AI models,” MIT Representatives, April 2, 2019, p. 26. Technology Review, May 11, 2020. 52 "Joint All Domain Command and Control," In Focus, 66 Lt Col Paul Maykish, “C2 Rising: A Historical View Congressional Research Service, August 25, 2020. of Our Critical Advantage,” Air and Space Power 53 AFWIC, "Cross-Functional Teams." Journal, July–August 2014, p. 27. 54 AFWERX, "Dr. Will Roper ABMS 'Ask Me 67 Lt Col David Lyle, “The Rest of the C2 Iceberg,”Air Anything'," video session, August 25, 2020. and Space Power Journal, July–August 2014, p. 59. 55 AFWERX, "Dr. Will Roper ABMS 'Ask Me 68 Col Cyr, “Describing the Elephant,” p. 20. Anything'." 69 Various companies are developing large-scale 56 Theresa Hitchens, "ABMS In Trouble: Rep. Smith supersonic transport aircraft with mission Wants $85M Cut," Breaking Defense, Junw 25, 2020. applicability focused on the business jet segment of 57 Carl Builder, Steven Bankes, and Richard Nordin, the market. Command Concepts: A Theory Derived from the 70 "Exosonic developing low-boom supersonic jet Practice of Command and Control (Santa Monica, possibly to serve as ‘Air Force One’," Flight Global, CA: RAND Corporation, 1999), p. 1. August 31, 2020. 58 U.S. Air Force, RPA Vector: Vision and Enabling 71 Valerie Insinna, "What if Air Force tankers became a Concepts 2013–2038 (Washington, DC: U.S. Air communications node?" C4ISR.net, January 6, 2020. Force, 2014), p. 22. 72 Nejami Lambeth, The Transformation of American 59 “ISR Challenges In the 21st Century: User Airpower, Cornell series on Security Affairs (Ithaca, Expectations,” presentation by Lt Gen David A. NY: Cornell University Press, 2000), p. 152. Deptula, Deputy Chief of Staff ISR, USAF, at 73 Winston Churchill, Their Finest Hour (Boston, MA: Electronic Systems Command/MITRE C2ISR Houghton Mifflin Company, 1949), p. 336. Symposium, October 1, 2009.

Mitchell Policy Papers 29 About The Mitchell Institute About the Author

The Mitchell Institute educates about aerospace power’s Douglas A. Birkey is the executive director of the Mitchell Institute contribution to America’s global interests, informs policy and for Aerospace Studies. He is an expert on aerospace power budget deliberations, and cultivates the next generation of technology, history, and defense resourcing. An experienced thought leaders to exploit the advantages of operating in air, Capitol Hill staffer and government relations professional, Birkey space, and cyberspace. has authored numerous documents that have informed defense legislation and has also written extensively on aerospace and defense issues. Prior to becoming Mitchell’s executive director, Birkey was the director of government relations for the Air Force About the Series Association. Birkey holds an M.A. from Georgetown University.

The Mitchell Institute Policy Papers present new thinking and policy proposals to respond to the emerging security and aerospace power challenges of the 21st century. These papers are written for lawmakers and their staffs, policy professionals, business and industry, academics, journalists, and the informed public. The series aims to provide in-depth policy insights and perspectives based on the experiences of the authors, along with studious supporting research.

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