Spanish-American Relations from the Perspective of 2009

CIDOB INTERNATIONAL YEARBOOK 2009

KEYS TO FACILITATE THE MONITORING OF THE SPANISH FOREIGN POLICY AND THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN 2008

U.S.-Spain Relations from the Perspective of 2009.

Adrian A. Basora

Elisabets, 12 - 08001 Barcelona, España - Tel. (+34) 93 302 6495 - Fax. (+34) 93 302 6495 - [email protected] of the Annuario CIDOB as an important reference work US-Spain relations from for understanding Spain’s overall international rela- the perspective of 2009 tions, this article will examine the bilateral relationship not only from the vantage point of recent history, but also from a longer-term perspective, so as to assess the potential for growth, or for regression, in the foreseea- ble future. We will start with a brief look at a few of the “legacy issues” that affect relations between Washing- ton and Madrid and the two societies more broadly.

Divergent histories and a period of enmity

From the perspective of many Spaniards, the relationship with what is now the United States began in 1513 when Juan Ponce de Leon landed in Florida Ambassador Adrian A. Basora, and claimed the territory for the Spanish crown. Saint Senior Fellow and Director of the Project on Augustine was founded in 1565, 55 years before the Democratic Transitions at the Foreign Policy first British colonial settlement. For most Americans, 1 Research Institute of Philadelphia however, the first four centuries of the relationship are part of a distant past that is generally given limited attention. There is little recognition of fact that Spain supported the American colonists in their war of in- dependence – albeit based on alliance with France and enmity for Great Britain, rather than any enthusiasm for republican democracy. Also forgotten is that Spain was among the first European powers to establish diplomatic relations with the United States (in 1785), and it facilitated America’s westward expansion by “grace- The advent of the Obama Administration in Wash- fully” ceding vast territories west of the Mississippi via ington on January 20, 2008 was greeted with wide- the Transcontinental Treaty of 1819. spread enthusiasm in Spain, with many commentators In contrast, what many Americans do retain from on both sides of the Atlantic suggesting a new era of their high school history is a largely negative image of closer bilateral relations. Others have warned, how- 19th century Spain as a declining monarchy and an un- ever, that these high expectations could easily be disap- welcome colonial power. U.S. textbooks highlight the pointed, given the asymmetry between U.S. needs and Monroe Doctrine of 1823, which declared that Europe- Spanish inclinations. an powers like Spain were not welcome in the Western In this author’s judgment, there is in fact considerable Hemisphere. They also stress Spain’s quick defeat in potential for closer relations. This might be dismissed the Spanish-American War of 1898, after the U.S. press as the natural bias of a former American diplomat who whipped up jingoist sentiment against Spain’s “tyran- has served with pleasure in Spain. However, the au- nical” presence in Cuba and Puerto Rico. During the thor personally experienced one of the more difficult first part of the 20th century, most Americans thought stretches in U.S.-Spanish relations and is fully aware of Spain as a reactionary, not very relevant power in that harmony in the relationship is by no means pre- which the United States no longer had much interest. ordained. One has only to recall the recent dramatic For Spain, however, the U.S. loomed large as the only low point in 2004, when Prime Minister Rodriquez country with which it had fought a recent war – a war Zapatero abruptly pulled all Spanish troops out of Iraq that stripped away the last vestiges of a once-glorious – to an extremely frigid reaction in Washington. This Latin American empire. contrasted sharply with the euphoria of 2003, when The next events of major consequence in shap- Prime Minister Aznar joined with President Bush and ing American attitudes towards Spain centered on Prime Minister Blair at the Azores Summit to launch the Spanish Civil War and relations with the Franco the “Coalition of the Willing” and Spain dispatched regime. President Franklin Roosevelt publicly con- 1,300 peacekeeping troops to Iraq. demned General Franco’s uprising against the Repub- These are by no means the only major oscillations in lican government (1936-39). Despite official U.S. neu- U.S.-Spain relations in recent decades. Given the role trality, most Americans were inclined against Franco

91 92 CIDOB International Yearbook 2009 U.S."in the influence cultural and political of centers other Washingtonwith and with relationship positive a incentive tocultivate clear a have will "Spain United States, Country Profile gemn hd en opee. h “at f Ma of “Pact The completed. been had agreement with Madrid. relationship a Washington’s in became quickly consideration thus dominant country basing a as Spain’s potential Force. Air U.S. the for facilities training staging and and bases rear-echelon as potential standing Moron, at bases air out Torrejónhad and Madrid) Zaragoza outside (just the and Mediterranean, the into was the perfect location from which to project naval power Rota at from base possible Spanish as The front. away eastern far NATO’s as Europe in bases secure As of 1950, the Franco regime was cast into the role of a 1948. in launched was it when Plan Marshall the barred from was it as just Nations, United the from cluded as Franco rules” (Chislett, 2006). Spain was initially ex long as Spain] [with association cordial and full “no be would – there France saying and Declaration Tripartite Britain the signing Great States, United the – ers pow victorious principal the with 1946 in culminated This image. Spain’s damaged further powers Axis the towards tilt facto de Franco’s II, War World in ment perspective. Republican ish TollsBell Hemmingway’s Ernest all, above and, like Books literature. temporary con and press the of through hold images took Spain NegativeFranco’s side. Republican the on volunteers fought American individual which in Brigade,” he forces anti-democratic “Lincoln the of formation the to led the This represented. as saw they what and U.K. and France. This warming of relations between between relations of warming the This of France. and reluctance U.K. continuing the despite U.N., the to admission Spain’s supported U.S. the 1955, In rability. regime’sdu Franco the of acknowledgement implicit and – assistance economic significant for exchange in bases four these of use forces American granted drid,” pariah and most Americans saw it as a poor, backward were essential to Western defenses, and they required required they and defenses, Western to essential were y 93 ngtain fr US-pns basing U.S.-Spanish a for negotiations 1953, By With Hitler’s ascendance in Europe and U.S. engage country oflittleinterestorpromise. tary confrontation. American sea and air power power air and sea American confrontation. tary

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became the primary prism prism primary the became During the 1950’s and 1960’s, 1960’s, and 1950’s the During hs ngtv American negative these hne Te od War Cold The change. perspectives on Spain Spain on perspectives rdal bgn to began gradually Farewell to Catalonia to Farewell o Wo the Whom For ------

bilization and liberalization plan. By 1966, U.S. firms U.S. 1966, By plan. liberalization and bilization after1959, significantly sta economic IMF U.S.-backed a adopted Spain when accelerated trend The ment. an Spain made increasingly attractive Pact, location for U.S. business invest Madrid the by reinforced bility sta political of perception the and recovery economic gradual Spain’s with combined assistance, This ments. agree base the to thanks assistance, economic recipient U.S. of third-largest the became Spain 1961 to 1953 from 1940’s, late the in Plan Marshall the of out kept been had Madrid Whereas closer. gradually two countries the draw to beginning were front economic the focal points forenduringanti-Americanism. major became agreements base ongoing the and visit Eisenhower the left, political the for particularly and Spain, in forces anti-Franco for But government. dictatorial its despite normalcy, of aura an with Spain bestowed “Ike” by visit the opinion, public American by President Dwight Eisenhower to Spain in 1959. For visitofficial an Washingtonin culminated Madrid and sequently made clear its condemnation of the coup and and coup the of condemnation its clear made sequently tempt “an internal matter.” Although at Washington sub the called initially Haig Alexander General State of Secretary U.S. then the support democracy, new Spain’s in of unambiguously coup. out coming attempted than an Rather in parliament Spanish the tered en officers Civil Guardia of group a when however, blossoming. be to seemed relations 1980, by sum, In grow. to also continued Spain in investment U.S. exchanges. cultural and professional educational, accelerating further and ance alli bilateral full-fledged a to commitment a bolizing a Treaty of Friendship, Defense and Cooperation sym Atlantic community. In 1976, the U.S. and trans-Spain signed the of member full-fledged a as welcomed ally NATOgener join and to invited promptly was Spain democratic other European allies. Washington with also helped to ensure that those on patterned ernments, gov post-Franco initial Spain’s with relationships ing work bilateral normal establishing towards promptly moved U.S. The followed. that democracy consoli of rapiddation the and 1975 in regime Franco the of in amorepositivedirection. evolve to continued thus opinion public U.S. living. of cost low and climate sunny its seeking retirees of sands More thou of tens including Spain, 2005). know to got Americans (Chislett, exports increasing rapidly and recovery economic Spain’s to significantly contribute FDI, total of 79.5% for accounted At the same time, however, parallel developments on on developments parallel however, time, same the At There was a significant setback in February 1981, 1981, February in setback significant a was There end the welcomed Americans of majority great The relations tonormal Thebumpyroad

and had begun to to begun had and ------its full support of democracy, Haig’s much-publicized The Spanish proposed a face-saving timetable for this gaffe reinforced pre-existing beliefs on the Spanish and other withdrawals, which made it a bit easier for left regarding U.S. intentions. Given that the Socialist the American side to accept them without severe dam- party (PSOE) would win the next year’s parliamentary age to the bilateral relationship. elections, this incident significantly delayed the full Although the base negotiations were often tense, with normalization of U.S.-Spanish relations, perhaps by as Spanish frustration and impatience at times leaking much as a decade. into the press, a mature dialog did develop at senior The triumph of the PSOE in 1982 thus opened a dif- levels in the course of time. This laid the groundwork ficult new phase in bilateral relations. The new Prime for the beginnings of better understanding and trust Minister, Felipe Gonzalez, had been formed as a politi- between top U.S officials on the one hand, and Prime cal leader during the Franco years, at a time when the Minister Gonzalez and his key ministers and advisers U.S. Embassy was having little to do with the opposi- on the other. This increased trust, in turn, set the stage tion underground. Alfonso Guerra, initially Gonzal- for important breakthroughs during years that fol- ez’s second in command, was an avowed admirer of lowed the historic base agreement. Che Guevara, with all of the romantic anti-Ameri- can symbolism that this implied. Both Gonzalez and Spain becomes a normal ally Guerra shared an initial distrust of the U.S. based on suspicion that Washington’s interest in Spain’s military bases might override its commitment to their country’s The 1988 base agreement removed a critical source of fledgling democracy. Washington, for its part, was discord in the U.S.-Spain relationship by eliminating wary of the new government because the PSOE had what the Spanish left had seen since the early 1950’s U.S.-Spain Relations from the perspective of 2009 of the perspective from Relations U.S.-Spain campaigned against Spanish membership in NATO as a major grievance. The next year, with the fall of and favored a sharp reduction in U.S. military pres- the Berlin Wall, the entire context of the relationship ence at Spain’s bases. The 1982 elections thus ushered began to change. Mikhail Gorbachev’s glasnost and per- in a period of significant bilateral tensions. estroika sharply reduced the threat of military confron- Once in power, however, the Gonzalez government tation and the Cold War mentality that it had created. began to see that its ambition to become an influential The military aspects of NATO began to seem less over- member of the European Union and of other Western riding, and Spain and the U.S. were in agreement as to “clubs,” and to develop into an advanced industrial the eastward expansion of what seemed an increasingly economy, would be better served by Spain’s remain- political alliance. ing inside NATO. Gonzalez thus called for a referen- In 1990, Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait and threat- dum that reversed the previous PSOE position against ened to annex the northern oil fields of Saudi Arabia. In NATO membership. However, the political “bargain” response, U.S. President George H.W. Bush declared through which Gonzalez won the referendum (with that the invasion “would not stand” and secured both 52.5% vs. 39.8% of the vote) included an explicit pledge a UN mandate and a European consensus in favor of to drastically reduce the U.S. military presence at Span- military action to push Saddam’s armies out of Kuwait. ish bases. Politically, these reductions, and particularly After a series of direct communications between the the removal of the F-16 fighter wing at Torrejón right White House and the Prime Minister’s office, Gonzalez outside of Madrid, took on critical importance for the agreed to grant the U.S. unprecedented use of the bases Gonzalez government. For the U.S., however, the Cold in Spain as a transit point and logistical back-up for War was still unresolved, and Washington was deter- the massive movement of American troops and equip- mined not to cede. ment to the Gulf region in preparation for war. Spain The ensuing negotiations for the renewal of U.S. bas- also contributed forces to the combined military effort ing rights in Spain were prolonged and difficult, drag- to liberate Kuwait. All of this would previously have ging on throughout much of 1986-88. The Gonzalez been unthinkable, given Spain’s long-standing policy government was determined to hold firmly to its cam- of developing close relations with the Arab states and paign pledge for a dramatic reduction in U.S. forces, of thus prohibiting the use of its bases for U.S. military particularly at Torrejón. But Washington was strongly operations in the Middle East. From the viewpoint of committed to retaining military assets invaluable to Washington, Spain was proving to be very much “a NATO’s leverage in a Cold War that still seemed far friend in need.” from over. Ultimately, Spain’s manifest determination An important additional factor in bringing Wash- to invoke its sovereign rights – which included a threat ington and Madrid closer during this period was the to end the base agreement entirely if satisfactory terms personal chemistry and open communication between could not be reached – forced the U.S. side to give up the first President Bush and Prime Minister Gonzalez. far more than it had hoped. This included removal of This started with a Bush invitation for Gonzalez to visit the highly strategic F-16 wing stationed at Torrejón. the White House in October 1989, a visit that not only

93 94 CIDOB International Yearbook 2009 technologies" new and investment new economy require that U.S. the of areas in firms Spanish leading-edge of involvementfrom the benefit only can economy U.S. "The United States, Country Profile solidarity into strong Spanish support for the U.S. in U.S. the for support Spanish strong into solidarity to step forward leaders in active solidarity, and he translated that European first the among was Aznar 2001, 11, September on Center TradeWorld the on attack terrorist massive its out carried Al-Qaeda When 2001. June in Europe to trip initial his on stop first the Spain making of honor the Aznar paid Bush President U.K. that intense Washington had with most any European ally and other than the warmest the of one into somed inclinations. ideological his shared largely who partner U.S. enthusiastic more even an found Aznar later, days reciprocated fromtheSpanishperspective. was view this and ally,viewed European “normal” a as Americans Spain most office, in years 13 Gonzalez’ Felipe of end the at 1996, by Thus Spain. democratic modernizing rapidly a with Americans familiar becoming more were many exchanges, other and travel increased With America. Latin with trade growing to and immigration Hispanic heavy to partly thanks U.S., the in taught language foreign predominant the far by becoming was Spanish Also, U.S. the in invest to ning ness investment; and leading Spanish firms were begin busi U.S. for environment hospitable a providing and response. common urgent an discuss to leaders two the between contacts telephone direct productive highly for laid been already had groundwork the 1990, of summer the in erupted crisis Gulf Persian the when Thus, relations. personal of terms in successful proved also but attention media positive considerable attracted the previous eight years could credibly have said that said have credibly at could years back eight previous the looking historian a 2004, February of As ing. counter-terrorism, anti-narcotics and intelligence shar including concern, common of issues of variety wide a on grow to continued cooperation period, Aznar-Bush the Throughout Iraq. and Afghanistan in terventions The U.S.-Spain official relationship quickly blos quickly relationship official U.S.-Spain The At the same time, the Spanish economy was prospering tion of the George W. Bush Administration just a few few a just W.Administration George Bush the of tion

h Citn diitain Wt te inaugura the With Administration. Clinton the The ary 2001, one of the last high-profile actions of actions high-profile last the of one 2001, ary and its seemingly abrupt ending and itsseeminglyabrupt Special Relationship

of a “Joint Political Declaration” in Janu in Declaration” Political “Joint a of

cooperation symbolized by the signing signing the by symbolized cooperation

When José Maria Aznar became became Aznar Maria José When which which led to a further deepening of Prime Minister in 1996, he he 1996, in Minister Prime by by the Clinton Administration, quickly set out to build fur build to out set quickly interest was reciprocated reciprocated was interest ther upon an already already an upon ther strong relationship. His relationship. strong

------however, major portions of the bilateral relationship relationship bilateral the of portions major however, level, presidential the below and headlines the Beyond progress. of decades after point low a reached suddenly had relations U.S-Spanish crash. a with end to seemed U.S. politicalcircles. hawkish more in least at damaged was ally reliable a as Spain’sreputationand House, White 43” “Bush the to visit individual an for invited not leader European jor least at the presidential at level. Zapatero became the only ma frigid, relations bilateral turned suddenly and Willing” the of to “Coalition Administration’s blow Bush the severe a dealt This Iraq. from forces Spanish all withdrew abruptly Zapatero – war the against set ly campaign pledge – his and a Spanish public opinion that was strong with keeping PSOE In the office. into and swept were Zapatero Rodriquez later. Minister days three Prime elections parliamentary by followed liance toitsmostintensepointinhistory. al U.S.-Spain the brought had government Aznar the both sides. on leadership capable assuming sustainable, eminently be should that ground middle positive a towards ally gradu moving been has relationship The term. longer the over diminishing been has oscillation this of extent the inpast, even therecent swings pendulum significant relations. fruitful and close of period a new to both lead will countries, facing challenges unprecedented the with bined com top, the at personalities new the whether thus is question The ideologically. and personally both leader, U.S. new the with ground common considerable sees he that it clear made has Zapatero Minister Prime 2009, January in Obama President of inauguration the since And, initiatives. other and visits high-level of series a viarelations bilateral in chapter” new “a open to try systematically to began government Zapatero the – tion Administra Obama the of arrival the before well and European allies. other numerous and Italy of ahead well Spain putting thus 2007, in billion $26.6 to 2000 in billion $5 from ing dramatically,accelerated U.S. the in investment jump direct Spanish importantly, Very investment. business and exchanges educational and cultural did as tinued, con ministries Spanish corresponding the and ments Spain in 2007. Cooperation between other U.S. depart Moratinos visited who Rice, State of Minister Secretary with Foreign regularly met preserved. fact in were Aznar’s attempt to build a “Special Relationship” thus 2004, 11, March on bombing Atocha the came Then Although U.S.-Spanish bilateral relations have seen seen have relations bilateral U.S.-Spanish Although relationship U.S.-Spain the for Prospects – 2008 March, in PSOE the of re-election the After

------Spain is committed to continuing to build its role as a should revert to the tensions that have at times char- respected and influential member of the trans-Atlantic acterized relations in the past. In sum, with enlight- community and of other international groupings in ened leadership from the top in both Washington and which the United States plays a leading role. Spain has Madrid, plus the skilful use of diplomacy at all levels also in recent decades carved out an increasingly im- when inevitable differences do arise, the U.S.-Spanish portant economic and political role in Latin America. relationship should indeed prosper rather than decline- Despite the daunting challenges that it currently faces, over the coming decade and beyond. the U.S. will almost certainly continue to play a major role globally, in Europe and in Latin America. On the likely assumption that Spain will continue to pursue a foreign policy along its current lines, it will have a clear incentive to cultivate a positive relationship with Washington and with other centers of political and cultural influence in the U.S. Culturally, the increasing Notes importance of Spanish as a second language and the fast-growing Hispanic population offers new opportu- nities to interest Americans in Spain. There is also con- 1. During his prior diplomatic career he had several siderable potential for growth on the economic front, postings in Europe and Latin America, including an as major Spanish corporations such as Banco Santander assignment in Madrid in 1986-1989 as Deputy Chief of and BBVA have begun to demonstrate in banking, and Mission and Deputy U.S. Base Negotiator, and subse- others in the fields of highway and other infrastructure quently as Chargé d’Affaires. He then served as Direc- U.S.-Spain Relations from the perspective of 2009 of the perspective from Relations U.S.-Spain construction and renewable energy.3 tor for European Affairs at the White House/National From the viewpoint of American interests, there are Security Council 1989-1991, where his responsibilities strong reciprocal reasons to continue working to deep- included Spain. en the relationship. The U.S. economy can only benefit from the involvement of leading-edge Spanish firms in 2. The author has drawn heavily on this excellent areas of the U.S. economy that require new investment work as well as its even more comprehensive anteced- and new technologies. In geopolitical terms, Spain re- ent, “Spain and the United States: the Quest for Mutual mains strategically placed as an overall gateway to the Rediscovery.” Mediterranean and the Middle East. Even though the specific military considerations that proved so power- 3. See the previously cited works by William Chislett ful during the Cold War have become a less dominant for an extensive discussion of recent trends in Span- factor, the bases at Rota and Moron continue to pro- ish investment in the U.S., and of the participation of vide invaluable logistical support for U.S. and NATO Spanish firms in highway building, renewable energy operations in Afghanistan and elsewhere. Spain is also and other important areas of U.S. infrastructure devel- one of the few countries in the Europe Union with a opment. growing population and a dynamic interest in other re- gions of the world. In terms of U.S. interests in Europe, in Latin America and globally, therefore, continuing to build a strong relationship with a democratic and Bibliography increasingly outward-looking Spain continues to have major advantages. After the aborted Aznar-Bush experiment in at- CHISLETT, William (2006). “Spain and the Unit- tempting to build something akin to the British-U.S. ed States [on line]: So Close Yet So Far.” Working “special relationship,” it would be imprudent for lead- Paper (Real Instituto Elcano) 23/2006, p. 3. www. ers either in Washington or Madrid to try to recreate www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano/ as close embrace anytime soon. Any major movement contenido?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/Elcano_ in this direction would require a considerable change es/Zonas_es/EEUU-Dialogo+Trasatlantico/DT23- in Spanish public opinion, which is currently consid- 2006. [Checked on: 04.15.09] erably more pacifist and “welfare-state”-oriented than American opinion. On the other hand, the negative bi- CHISLETT, William(2005). Spain and the United lateral issues of the past have long since buried, and a States: The Quest for Mutual Rediscovery [on line].[Ma- solid level of confidence and wide-ranging interactions drid]: Real Instituto Elcano, 2005. p. 27 have now been established between these two democ- www.www.realinstitutoelcano.org/publicaciones/ racies that face many similar challenges. There is thus libros/ChislettEsp-EEUU-ingles.pdf . [Checked on: no intrinsic reason why Spain and the United States 04.20.09]