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Home , Eisenhower Doctrine, Monroe Doctrine

Dwight David “” Eisenhower was a five star general and the military commander of the allied forces in Europe during World Two. Eisenhower would ride his wartime success to become the leader of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. In ardent opposition of isolationism, he would enter the race for the presidency in 1952. Eisenhower once said, “The only way to win World War Three is to prevent it.”1 This sentiment would guide his foreign policy in office as he extended American ties around the globe and worked to avoid another major conflict in the world, while also aggressively promoting democracy.

Eisenhower would likely not have assumed the presidency had it not been for his pledge to rebuke isolationism. In the 1952 Republican Primary, Eisenhower’s main opponent was

Senator Robert Taft of Ohio, who came from the wing of the Republican party that had preached isolationism in the decade following World War II. In his speech accepting the Republican nomination in Chicago in 1952 Eisenhower said, “... you have summoned me on behalf of millions of your fellow Americans to lead a great crusade -- for freedom in America and freedom in the world.”2 After unpopular incumbent Democratic President Harry Truman decided not to seek office again, Eisenhower defeated the Democratic nominee Adlai Stevenson in the 1953

General Election. He further denounced isolationism in his inaugural address, stating, “To produce this unity, to meet the challenge of our time, destiny has laid upon our country the responsibility of the free world’s leadership.”3 Eisenhower had won the presidency due in part to his opposition to isolationism and had set the stage for his administration’s foreign policy to engage around the world in fights for freedom.

1 Evan Thomas, “The Only Way to Win World War III is to Prevent It” (HistoryNet) ​ ​ 2 Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, Dwight D. Eisenhower, Address Accepting the Presidential ​ Nomination at the Republican National Convention in Chicago (The American Presidency Project) ​ 3 Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, Dwight D. Eisenhower, Inaugural Address (The American ​ ​ Presidency Project) On July 27, 1953 the demilitarized zone between North and South Korea was agreed to by the two nations, China, and the United Nations. The supported the democratic regime of the South, going so far as to proclaim an ‘Aid to Korea’ Week in 1953 “as a practical demonstration of our friendship and sympathy for the people of the Republic of Korea.”4

Eisenhower had promised an end to the conflict in the peninsula during his campaign and succeeded when the Korean Armistice was signed. His Secretary of State, , claimed that the threat of using nuclear weapons ended fighting and prevented a larger conflict.

This was the first time Eisenhower threatened the use of nuclear weapons, and thus the birth of

Brinkmanship.5 Pointing out that “only courage and sacrifice can keep freedom alive upon the earth” he emphasized that “we have won an armistice on a single battleground--not peace in the world.”6 While happy that conflict had ended in one corner of the world, Eisenhower would not hesitate to secure freedom elsewhere.

Eisenhower, wanting to avoid other direct conflict, would turn to covert operations early in his administration in order to further America’s interests abroad. For example, in Iran in

1953, Eisenhower’s CIA overthrew the Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh whom the

United States feared could be a potential ally of communists as well as undermining the power of the American’s puppet leader, Shah Mohammed Reza.7 The next year, Eisenhower would again call on the CIA to overthrow the democratically elected president of Guatemala, Jacobo Arbenz

Guzman, a Marxist whom the Eisenhower administration viewed as a potential communist

4 Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, Dwight D. Eisenhower, Proclamation 3018 - Aid to Korea Week ​ (The American Presidency Project) 5 Department of State, Foreign Policy under President Eisenhower (Office of the Historian) ​ ​ 6 Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, Dwight D. Eisenhower, Radio and Television Address to the ​ American People Announcing the Signing of the Korean Armistice (The American Presidency Project) ​ 7 Chester J. Pach, Jr., Dwight D. Eisenhower: Foreign Affairs (University of , Miller Center) ​ ​ threat. After Eisenhower had cut off military supplies to the country, they received weapons from communist Czechoslovakia.8 This was the final straw leading to the CIA’s aid to revolutionaries which succeeded in a regime change. The United States showed its willingness to prop up a , in Iran, and overthrow a fairly elected ruler, in Guatemala, in the name of countering .

Eisenhower had been a strong supporter of reuniting East and West Germany in an effort to rid Western Europe of communist influence. Thus, Eisenhower was supportive of West

Germany joining NATO in May of 1955. His belief was “that only through cooperative strength developed in the free world could we really face up to this threat that the communist dictatorship posed to all free men.”9 Mere weeks after West Germany joined NATO, the Soviets, fearing a newly rearmed West Germany and united Europe, formed the with communist

Eastern European nations.10 The pact centralized nations under Moscow and guaranteed mutual defense in the event of an attack on any member. The pact was also used to suppress anti-communist dissent, such as in Hungary in 1956.

When the citizens of Hungary took to the streets to protest their communist regime,

Eisenhower expressed support for them, saying, “The United States considers the development in

Hungary as being a renewed expression of the intense desire for freedom long held by the

Hungarian people.”11 However, the Soviet military arrived in the country to quell discontent and return order. Though claiming they were mobilizing in order to prevent an invasion from foreign

8 Chester J. Pach, Jr., Dwight D. Eisenhower: Foreign Affairs (University of Virginia, Miller Center) ​ ​ 9 Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, Dwight D. Eisenhower, Remarks of the President During ​ Secretary Dulles’ Television Report on His European Visit (The American Presidency Project) ​ 10 Department of State, The Warsaw Treaty Organization, 1955 (Office of the Historian) ​ ​ 11 Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, Dwight D. Eisenhower, Statement by the President on the ​ Developments in Hungary (The American Presidency Project) ​ nations it was clear that the Soviets had been sent in to assure that the citizens would not overthrow the communist government. The Eisenhower administration condemned this as “an occupation of Hungary by the forces of an alien government for its own purposes.” However, the United States would not intervene in the affair, not wanting to risk a full scale conflict that could cause potential nuclear war.

While Eisenhower declined against engaging in a full scale conflict in Hungary, having resolved a conflict in Korea already, he would set the table for a full scale conflict in Vietnam after his administration had ended. The Indochina War, fought by the French in an effort to keep their regional colonies began in 1946; Eisenhower decided against sending troops but bankrolled as much as 75% of the cost of war by 1954.12 After the Geneva Conference that year Vietnam was split into a pro-communist North and a Western-friendly South. The next year aid began to

Ngo Dinh Diem’s South Vietnamese government. Though the salvaging of the anti-communist

South was seen as a victory at the time, the partioning of the country and the United States’ political involvement in the region stemming from this administration would lead to America’s further involvement in the region, namely the .

Elsewhere in Asia, Eisenhower was even more determined to deter communist influence.

The communist government of the People’s Republic of China had by 1954 taken control of all of mainland China and focused their sights on Taiwan; the chain of islands east of the Taiwan

Strait were the last foothold of territory controlled by the anti-communist Chinese Nationalists.

The communists began shelling the islands with artillery and preparing for a full-scale invasion of the islands. Asked what would his response would be in the event of a communist Chinese

12 Chester J. Pach, Jr., Dwight D. Eisenhower: Foreign Affairs (University of Virginia, Miller Center) ​ ​ invasion of Taiwan, Eisenhower pledged support to the nationalists, saying that “any invasion would have to go through the 7th fleet.”13 Emboldened by a nearly unanimous vote of approval on a Joint Resolution to defend the area in the event of a conflict, Eisenhower went as far as to threaten the use of nuclear weapons before the communists backed off and both sides were able to avoid a major conflict.14 This was a prime example of , despite not directly involving the , as the threat of nuclear weapons halted the territorial advancement of a communist regime.

Tensions in the flared up in 1956 when the Egyptian President Gamal Abdel

Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal in retaliation for the United States cutting off economic aid, an action taken after Egypt had recognized the People’s Republic of China as sovereign. The

British saw this as a vital loss to the economy of their Asian colonies and, along with the French, opposed Nasser’s brash rhetoric of anticolonialism. They were joined by Israel, insecure about their position surrounded by Muslim nations, in a military conflict on the Sinai Peninsula.15

Eisenhower, unaware of their plans, was upset as he feared that Nasser’s influence in the region would increase. Eisenhower resolved the conflict before it got out of hand by forcing the three invading nations to withdraw and recognize Egypt’s sovereignty. Though upsetting to the

United States’ allies, Eisenhower took great pride in this conflict resolution, saying, “There

(Egypt) a situation that looked as if it could cause us a great difficulty--[and] all the free world--seems to be amicably settled, and with the protection of all the interests of the Western

13 Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, Dwight D. Eisenhower, The President’s News Conference (The ​ ​ American Presidency Project) 14 Chester J. Pach, Jr., Dwight D. Eisenhower: Foreign Affairs (University of Virginia, Miller Center) ​ ​ 15 Chester J. Pach, Jr., Dwight D. Eisenhower: Foreign Affairs (University of Virginia, Miller Center) ​ ​ World.”16 Thus, Eisenhower had avoided yet another larger conflict while also significantly increasing his reputation in the Middle East.

The lasting impact on foreign policy that Eisenhower had in the Middle East came via an ideology with his namesake. The Eisenhower offered economic and military assistance to any Middle Eastern nation threatened by foreign aggression. The administration specifically singled out the Soviet Union, stating the authorization of US forces “to secure and protect the territorial integrity of political independence of such nations, requesting such aid against overt armed aggression from any nation controlled by international communism.”17 Just as the

Monroe Doctrine had protected from colonization and the protected Turkey and Greece from communist threats, the protected the

Middle East from communism. Eisenhower saw that a power vacuum had been opened up in the region after the British left following the and intended for his offers of aid to dissuade the formation of a pan-Arab nation and/or disincentivize Soviet communist influence.

Again signalling his Brinkmanship flair, Eisenhower was aggressive in threatening military action to ensure that communist expansion would be halted in a region of the world.

If Eisenhower was worried about communist expansion in Europe, Southeast Asia, and the Middle East, then he was certainly concerned about possible communist expansion in the

Western Hemisphere, specifically Latin America. His administration had already proven that opposition to communism was the primary concern in the region after the US-backed coup of the democratically elected Marxist president of Guatemala. In the same year as this coup, 1954, thirteen of the twenty Latin American nations were led by dictatorships. In fact, dictators

16 Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, Dwight D. Eisenhower, Address at the Iowa State Fair at Des ​ Moines (The American Presidency Project) ​ 17 Department of State, The Eisenhower Doctrine, 1957 (Office of the Historian) ​ ​ Manuel Odría of Peru and Pérez Jiménez of were awarded Legion of Merit honors by the United States government.18 So long as these dictators opposed communism they were viewed in a favorable light by the United States, regardless of any anti-democratic transgressions committed in their own countries such as political prisoners or a lack of elections.

The was, then, an enormous breakthrough for communism considering

Moscow’s lack of influence in the hemisphere prior. The location of , just over 100 miles south of the southern tip of Florida, made the situation much more alarming for the Eisenhower administration. ’s revolutionaries defeated the government forces of the dictator

Fulgencio Batista in 1959. Castro, visiting the United States after coming to power, declined an aid offer from Eisenhower, wishing to show national strength. The next year Castro would begin trading with the Soviet Union, significantly expanding communist influence in the hemisphere19.

Eisenhower, disillusioned by this decision, began planning for a CIA operation to remove Castro from power. It was the hope of the administration that this coup could be as successful as the one in Guatemala five years before. It would not be until the next administration, under

President John F. Kennedy, that the operation would be approved for engagement, resulting in the failure of the .

Although stopping international communism was clearly the primary objective of

Eisenhower’s foreign policy, the Soviets were enemy number one not just for their ideology, but also their nuclear weapon capabilities. Still in the process of forming the nuclear triad and guaranteeing Mutually Assured Destruction, Eisenhower’s nuclear foreign policy focused around halting the proliferation of weapons to other nations. In his mind, any nation that gained nuclear

18 Stephen G. Rabe, Eisenhower and Latin America: The Foreign Policy of Anti-Communism (University ​ ​ of North Carolina Press) 19 Chester J. Pach, Jr., Dwight D. Eisenhower: Foreign Affairs (University of Virginia, Miller Center) ​ ​ weapons capabilities would soon be able to guarantee Mutually Assured Destruction as well.

Thus, the goal was to keep nuclear weapons out of the hands of nations that had not already developed them. This was achieved by not sharing technology having to do with centrifuges, which were necessary to enrich uranium so that it could be used for atomic bombs. Even

European allies could become harder to deal with if they gained access to nuclear weapons, justifying Eisenhower in not sharing technology with the French, much to their chagrin.20 The

Eisenhower administration viewed the proliferation of nuclear weapons technology as so dangerous that they barred even their allies from access to the technology.

Later in his administration Eisenhower showed an increased willingness to negotiate with the Soviet Union on issues involving arms control. The administration thought that halting proliferation of nuclear technology would be successful for only a period of time and that nuclear peace in the world could be accomplished only by disarmament. In fact, in 1957, Eisenhower changed his disarmament policy by offering a “suspension of testing of nuclear weapons for a period of up to two years under certain conditions and safeguards.”21 The two sides actually moved fairly close to signing an agreement, as the Soviet Union feared a decrease in global military power as China’s interpretation of communism diverged. Following successful meetings in Geneva and at , in addition to a visit of the United States by the leader of the Soviet Union, Nikita Kruschev, optimism abounded despite no formal agreement being signed.22 It appeared that the only obstacle in the way of a nuclear test ban treaty was agreement

20 Keith W. Baum, Two’s Company, Three’s a Crowd: The Eisenhower Administration, France, and ​ Nuclear Weapons (Presidential Studies Quarterly) ​ 21 Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, Dwight D. Eisenhower, Statement by the President After ​ Authorizing Inclusion of Nuclear Test Suspension Among Disarmament Proposals (The American ​ Presidency Project) 22 Chester J. Pach, Jr., Dwight D. Eisenhower: Foreign Affairs (University of Virginia, Miller Center) ​ ​ on on-site inspections. US-Soviet relations at this time appeared to be improving; tensions were thawing and Eisenhower eyed a shift from Brinkmanship to Detente.

All of this goodwill would be dashed before Eisenhower was able to sign an agreement with the Soviets. Kruschev had refused to agree to an “Open Skies” initiative offered by the

United States which would have allowed surveillance planes of both nations to gather intelligence by flying over the other country. Undeterred, in 1956 Eisenhower had greenlit the usage of new U-2 reconnaissance planes to be flown over the Soviet Union. On May 1, 1960, an

American U-2 plane was shot down by a Soviet surface-to-air missile.23 Initially believing the pilot died in the crash, the Eisenhower administration issued lies about a weather plane straying into Soviet airspace and crashing. However, the pilot, spy Francis Gary Powers, survived and was produced by the Soviet Union, demonstrating to the world that the United States had been covertly gathering intelligence. The U-2 incident provided the backdrop for the summit between

Kruschev and Eisenhower in as Kruschev walked out after demanding and not receiving an apology from the Americans. Eisenhower would later state that the summit had been spoiled by

“that stupid U-2 business,” and had given the Soviets an opportunity to avoid an agreement at the conference as well as powerful domestic propaganda against the United States.24

The embarrassment of the U-2 incident would come to overshadow the totality of

Eisenhower’s foreign policy legacy as it prevented him from substantive progress with the

Soviets. However, Eisenhower’s policy in whole actually resulted in one of the least tense decades of the entire Cold War. The 1950s saw the shift from to Brinkmanship and the budding of a shift to Detente. These years were after the beginning of the nuclear age, but

23 Chester J. Pach, Jr., Dwight D. Eisenhower: Foreign Affairs (University of Virginia, Miller Center) ​ ​ 24 Lori Lynn Bogle, The Cold War (Routledge), 104 ​ ​ ​ before the crises of the 1960s. Eisenhower orchestrated ceasefires in Korea and Indochina, authorized coups in Iran and Guatemala, grew globalist alliances such as NATO, averted crisis in both Egypt and Taiwan, and extended a hand of aid to the Middle East. He befriended dictators in Latin America, making it clear that communism was the enemy regardless of if democracy was the solution. Later in his administration, Eisenhower focused on the threat of nuclear war by attempting to halt centrifuge technology proliferation and nearly reaching a nuclear test ban agreement with the Soviets. Overall, Eisenhower slightly diffused Cold War tensions in a decade of stalemate and eliminated isolationism as a prevalent ideology in American foreign policy.