American Foreign Policy Milestones

This activity has students analyzing 11 significant milestones and policies from America’s history. There are several ways you can use this in your classes:

Expert Groups: break students up into 11 groups/pairs and give each group a different article and give them 7- 10 minutes to become experts on that topic. They then have to teach the class either through a butcher paper board or PowerPoint. As each group presents, the students fill in the chart.

Station Activity: Paste the readings up around the room and have students in groups of 2-3 move through the stations. They should read about the policy, briefly discuss it together so that they all understand it, then take notes and complete the chart.

Groups: Go over the 1st (Washington’s Farewell) together. Then, place students in groups of 5 and give each student 2 readings. They get 10 minutes to read and take notes on theirs. then they have to teach the other 4 people in their group about what they read.

Whole Class: A final option for a class that needs more structure is to give everyone the chart and one reading at a time. Read each one together and fill in the chart before moving on to the next one.

Google Doc: You can access a Google version here. This can be used to make this a homework assignment or digital version of any of the above activities.

I didn’t include a key since all the info is right here from the readings and most students will have similar but slightly different takeaways from the policies. Best of luck!!

Washington’s Farewell Address, 1796 To announce his decision not to seek a third term as President, presented his Farewell Address in a newspaper article September 17, 1796.

Frustrated by French meddling in U.S. politics, Washington warned the nation to avoid permanent alliances with foreign nations and to rely instead on temporary alliances for emergencies. Washington’s efforts to protect the fragile young republic by steering a neutral course between England and France during the French Revolutionary was made extremely difficult by the intense rhetoric flowing from the pro-English Federalists, led by , and the pro-French, personified by .

In his farewell address, Washington exhorted Americans to set aside their violent likes and dislikes of foreign nations, lest they be controlled by their passions: “The nation which indulges toward another an habitual hatred or an habitual fondness is in some degree a slave.” Washington’s remarks have served as an inspiration for American isolationism, and his advice against joining a permanent alliance was heeded for more than a century and a half. The Monroe , 1823

In his , 1823, address to Congress, President articulated America’s policy on the new political order developing in the rest of the and the role of in the .

The statement, known as the , was little noted by the Great Powers of Europe, but eventually became a longstanding tenet of U.S. foreign policy. Monroe and his Secretary of State Adams drew upon a foundation of American diplomatic ideals such as disentanglement from European affairs and defense of neutral rights as expressed in Washington’s Farewell Address. The three main concepts of the doctrine—separate spheres of influence for the Americas and Europe, non-colonization, and non- intervention—were designed to signify a clear break between the and Europe. Monroe’s administration forewarned the imperial European powers against interfering in the affairs of the newly independent Latin American states or potential territories.

As Monroe stated: “The American continents … are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers.” Monroe outlined two separate spheres of influence: the Americas and Europe. The independent lands of the Western Hemisphere would be solely the United States’ domain. In exchange, the United States pledged to avoid involvement in the political affairs of Europe, such as the ongoing Greek struggle for independence from the Ottoman , and not to interfere in the existing European colonies already in the Americas.

By the mid-1800s, Monroe’s declaration, combined with ideas of , provided precedent and support for U.S. expansion on the American continent. In the late 1800s, U.S. economic and military power enabled it to enforce the Monroe Doctrine.

John Hay and the , 1899–1900

Secretary of State first articulated the concept of the “Open Door” in China in a series of notes in 1899–1900. These Open Door Notes aimed to secure international agreement to the U.S. policy of promoting equal opportunity for international trade and commerce in China, and respect for China’s territorial integrity. British and American policies toward China had long operated under similar principles, but once Hay put them into writing, the “Open Door” became the official U.S. policy towards the Far East in the first half of the 20th century.

The idea behind the Open Door Notes originated with British and American China experts who felt their interests in China would be best protected and promoted by a formal agreement among the European powers on the principle of maintaining an Open Door for trade and commercial activity. Under their influence, Secretary Hay sent the first of the Open Door Notes on September 6, 1899, to the other great powers that had an interest in China, including Great Britain, France, Russia, Germany, and Japan. These nations maintained significant physical and commercial presences in China, and were protective of their various spheres of influence and trading privileges there.

Hay proposed a free, open market and equal trading opportunity for merchants of all nationalities operating in China. Hay argued that establishing equal access to commerce would benefit American traders and the U.S. economy, and hoped that the Open Door would also prevent disputes between the powers operating in China. The Open Door Notes served the important purpose of outlining U.S. policy toward China and expressing U.S. hopes for cooperation with the other foreign powers with a stake in the region. to the Monroe Doctrine, 1904 President ’s assertive approach to and the has often been characterized as the “Big Stick,” and his policy came to be known as the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine.

Although the Monroe Doctrine of 1823 was essentially passive (it asked that Europeans not increase their influence or recolonize any part of the Western Hemisphere), by the 20th century a more confident United States was willing to take on the role of regional policeman. In the early 1900s Roosevelt grew concerned that a crisis between and its creditors could spark an invasion of that nation by European powers.

The Roosevelt Corollary of December 1904 stated that the United States would intervene as a last resort to ensure that other nations in the Western Hemisphere fulfilled their obligations to international creditors, and did not violate the rights of the United States or invite “foreign aggression to the detriment of the entire body of American nations.”

As the corollary worked out in practice, the United States increasingly used military force to restore internal stability to nations in the region. Roosevelt declared that the United States might “exercise international police power in ‘flagrant cases of such wrongdoing or impotence.’” Over the long term the corollary had little to do with relations between the Western Hemisphere and Europe, but it did serve as justification for U.S. intervention in , Nicaragua, , and the .

Dollar Diplomacy, 1909–1913 From 1909 to 1913, President and Secretary of State Philander C. Knox followed a foreign policy characterized as “.”

Taft shared the view held by Knox, a corporate lawyer who had founded the giant conglomerate U.S. Steel, that the goal of diplomacy was to create stability and order abroad that would best promote American commercial interests. Knox felt that not only was the goal of diplomacy to improve financial opportunities, but also to use private capital to further U.S. interests overseas.

“Dollar diplomacy” was evident in extensive U.S. interventions in the Caribbean and Central America, especially in measures undertaken to safeguard American financial interests in the region. In China, Knox secured the entry of an American banking conglomerate, headed by J.P. Morgan, into a European-financed consortium financing the construction of a railway from Huguang to Canton. In spite of successes, “dollar diplomacy” failed to counteract economic instability and the tide of revolution in places like , the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, and China.

World 1 & Wilsonian Diplomacy, 1914–1920: During his tenure as President, encouraged the country to look beyond its economic interests and to define and set foreign policy in terms of ideals, morality, and the spread of democracy abroad. The United States continued its efforts to become an active player on the international scene. It engaged in action both in its traditional “” in the Western Hemisphere and in Europe during the First World War. The Wilsonian vision for collective security through U.S. leadership in international organizations, like the newly established League of Nations, appealed to the public. However, the United States ultimately declined membership in the League due to Article X of its charter that committed the United States to defend any League member in the event of an attack. In voting down U.S. participation, Congress challenged the informal tradition of the executive branch determining U.S. foreign policy.

Good Neighbor Policy, 1933 President Franklin Delano Roosevelt took office determined to improve relations with the nations of Central and South America. Under his leadership the United States emphasized cooperation and trade rather than military force to maintain stability in the hemisphere. In his inaugural address on March 4, 1933, Roosevelt stated: “In the field of world policy I would dedicate this nation to the policy of the good neighbor—the neighbor who resolutely respects himself and, because he does so, respects the rights of others.” Roosevelt’s Secretary of State, , participated in the Conference of December 1933, where he backed a declaration favored by most nations of the Western Hemisphere: “No state has the right to intervene in the internal or external affairs of another”. In December Roosevelt stated, “The definite policy of the United States from now on is one opposed to armed intervention.” In 1934 at Roosevelt’s direction the 1903 treaty with Cuba (based on the ) that gave the United States the right to intervene to preserve internal stability or independence was abrogated. Although domestic economic problems and World War II diverted attention from the Western Hemisphere, Roosevelt’s represented an attempt to distance the United States from earlier interventionist policies, such as the Roosevelt Corollary and military interventions in the region during the 1910s and 1920s.

The , 1947

With the Truman Doctrine, President Harry S. Truman established that the United States would provide political, military and economic assistance to all democratic nations under threat from external or internal authoritarian forces. The Truman Doctrine effectively reoriented U.S. foreign policy, away from its usual stance of withdrawal from regional conflicts not directly involving the United States, to one of possible intervention in faraway conflicts. The Truman Doctrine arose from a speech delivered by President Truman before a joint session of Congress on March 12, 1947. The immediate cause for the speech was a recent announcement by the British Government that, as of March 31, it would no longer provide military and economic assistance to the Greek Government in its against the Greek Communist Party. Truman asked Congress to support the Greek Government against the Communists. He also asked Congress to provide assistance for Turkey, since that nation, too, had previously been dependent on British aid. At the time, the U.S. Government believed that the supported the Greek Communist war effort and worried that if the Communists prevailed in the Greek civil war, the Soviets would ultimately influence Greek policy. In fact, Soviet leader Joseph Stalin had deliberately refrained from providing any support to the Greek Communists. However, a number of other foreign policy problems also influenced President Truman’s decision to actively aid Greece and Turkey. In light of the deteriorating relationship with the Soviet Union and the appearance of Soviet meddling in Greek and Turkish affairs, the withdrawal of British assistance to Greece provided the necessary catalyst for the Truman Administration to reorient American foreign policy. Accordingly, in his speech, President Truman requested that Congress provide $400,000,000 worth of aid to both the Greek and Turkish Governments and support the dispatch of American civilian and military personnel and equipment to the region. Truman justified his request on two grounds. He argued that a Communist victory in the Greek Civil War would endanger the political stability of Turkey, which would undermine the political stability of the Middle East. This could not be allowed in light of the region’s immense strategic importance to U.S. national security. Truman also argued that the United States was compelled to assist “free peoples” in their struggles against “totalitarian regimes,” because the spread of authoritarianism would “undermine the foundations of international peace and hence the security of the United States.” In the words of the Truman Doctrine, it became “the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.” Truman argued that the United States could no longer stand by and allow the forcible expansion of Soviet totalitarianism into free, independent nations, because American national security now depended upon more than just the physical security of American territory. Rather, in a sharp break with its traditional avoidance of extensive foreign commitments beyond the Western Hemisphere during peacetime, the Truman Doctrine committed the United States to actively offering assistance to preserve the political integrity of democratic nations when such an offer was deemed to be in the best interest of the United States.

The , 1957 President Dwight D. Eisenhower announced the Eisenhower Doctrine in January 1957, and Congress approved it in March of the same year. Under the Eisenhower Doctrine, a country could request American economic assistance and/or aid from U.S. military forces if it was being threatened by armed aggression from another state. Eisenhower singled out the Soviet threat in his doctrine by authorizing the commitment of U.S. forces “to secure and protect the territorial integrity and political independence of such nations, requesting such aid against overt armed aggression from any nation controlled by international communism.” The Eisenhower Administration’s decision to issue this doctrine was motivated in part by an increase in Arab hostility toward the West, and growing Soviet influence in Egypt and Syria following the Suez Crisis of 1956. The Suez Crisis, which had resulted in military mobilization by Great Britain, France, and Israel—as well as United Nations action—against Egypt, had encouraged pan-Arab sentiment in the Middle East, and elevated the popularity and influence of Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser. President Eisenhower believed that, as a result of the Suez conflict, a power vacuum had formed in the Middle East due to the loss of prestige of Great Britain and France. Eisenhower feared that this had allowed Nasser to spread his pan-Arab policies and form dangerous alliances with Jordan and Syria, and had opened the Middle East to Soviet influence. Eisenhower wanted this vacuum filled by the United States before the Soviets could step in to fill the void. Because Eisenhower feared that radical would combine with international communism in the region and threaten Western interests, he was willing to commit to sending U.S. troops to the Middle East under certain circumstances. The first real test of the Eisenhower Doctrine came in 1958 in Lebanon, where the threat was not armed aggression or a direct Soviet incursion. Lebanon’s President, Camille Chamoun, requested assistance from the United States to prevent attacks from his political rivals, some of whom had communist leanings and ties to Syria and Egypt. Eisenhower responded to the request by sending U.S. troops into Lebanon to help maintain order. Although Eisenhower never directly invoked the Eisenhower Doctrine, the American action in Lebanon was meant not only to help Chamoun’s Government against its political opponents, but also to send a signal to the Soviet Union that it would act to protect its interests in the Middle East.

Détente, 1969–1979 Between the late 1960s and the late 1970s, there was a thawing of the ongoing between the United States and the Soviet Union. This détente took several forms, including increased discussion on arms control. Although the decade began with vast improvements in bilateral relations, by the end of the decade events had brought the two back to the brink of confrontation. The ongoing nuclear arms race was incredibly expensive, and both nations faced domestic economic difficulties as a result of the diversion of resources to military research. The United States faced an increasingly difficult war in Vietnam, and improved relations with the Soviet Union were thought to be helpful in limiting future conflicts. With both sides willing to explore accommodation, the early 1970s saw a general warming of relations that was conducive to progress in arms control talks. Détente led to formal agreements on arms control with the signing of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in 1968. In 1972, the first round of Strategic Arms Limitations Talks yielded the Antiballistic Missile Treaty along with an interim agreement setting caps on the number of intercontinental ballistic missiles each side could develop. In 1975, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe emerged from two years of intense negotiations to sign the Helsinki Final Act, which recognized political borders, established military confidence building measures, created opportunities for trade and cultural exchange, and promoted human rights. By the end of the decade, however, cracks had begun to form in the U.S.-Soviet relationship. The leadership of the two countries signed a second SALT agreement but did not ratify it, although both nations voluntarily adhered to the provisions for reduced limits on strategic weapons for years thereafter. Ultimately, the United States and the Soviet Union had different visions of what détente meant and what its pursuit would entail.

The War on Terror, 2001

Within hours of the September 11, 2001 terror attacks on New York and Washington D.C., American commentators were already comparing the event to a “new Pearl Harbor.” The comparison of September 11 with Pearl Harbor was natural because both were surprise attacks that killed many Americans, but most interesting about it was its implication: that an age of innocence and isolation had passed, and that American invulnerability was gone. Just as was the case after the Japanese attack, September 11 seemed to change the degree to which, and the way in which, the United States engaged with the rest of the world.

The most obvious affect on U.S. foreign policy were the tradeoffs that a “war on terrorism” required. Stopping terrorism became the country’s top priority in the way that stopping Communism once was There was now a new premium on Russian and Chinese cooperation. Also important was securing the support of moderate Arab states like Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia, whose populations could oppose cooperation with the United States so long as Washington maintains strong support for Israel and sanctions on Iraq. Name ______American Foreign Policy Milestones

Policy Years Significance