World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1971·1980 UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL and DISARMAMENT AGENCY
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World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1971·1980 UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY Acknowledgments This edition was prepared under the direction of William B. Staples, Chief, De fense Program and Analysis Division. Dr. Byron F. Doenges was responsible for planning, development, and organization of the edition. Data in the statistical tables were compiled by Daniel Gallik and Matthew R. Ozburn. Data This publication is based on information on hand as of August 31, 1982. Although the data are the best available, it should be noted that they are of varying reliability. Some of the data, or estimates used in the absence of reliable national data, may be subject to considerable margins of error, particularly for countries having restrictive data disclosure policies or developing national statistical systems. Comments and questions regarding this publication are welcome. They may be directed to: Defense Program and Analysis Division U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Washington, D.C. 20451 ATTN: Daniel Gallik Telephone: (202) 632-0816 ACDA Publication 115 Released March 1983 World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1971·1980 U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency FOREWORD This report is the fourteenth edition of a series begun in 1965 by the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. It encompasses the most reliable available information over a ten-year period of each of 145 countries on their military expendi tures, arms transfers, and complementary economic and demographic data. It also contains a compendium of quotations from public speeches by Administration leaders on the general subject of US security requirements and two essays related to the cen tral purpose of the report, a reference guide on the worldwide use of resources for military purposes. The statistics reveal the continued upward trend in world military expenditures and, for many countries, the continued increase in arms imports. Once again, the Soviet Union led all nations in the magnitude of military spending. In 1980 world arms spending-in 1979 US dollars-approximated $600 billion, an indication of continued insecurity of many nations throughout the world. Mitigating that security is a vital objective of US foreign policy. President Reagan's statements quoted in the compendium essay in Part A concern the expansionist nature of Soviet foreign policy, the massive and sustained build-up of Soviet military power, and the necessity for and structure of the US military re sponse. Quotations from Secretaries Schultz and Weinberger, and National Security Advisor Clark expand on the themes projected by the President. The essay on efforts to develop an acceptable international military expenditure reporting program and to seek limitations on military spending provides insight into the complexities of negotiating reductions in military budgets. Soviet secrecy and Soviet and other Warsaw Pact country refusals to cooperate in UN military budget reporting exercises have been leading causes for the lack ofprogress in this area. The essay on Libya's excessive arms acquisition program, supported primarily by the Soviets, sheds light on the highly destabilizing impact such acquisitions can have on regional stability. It is hoped that this report will inspire others to investigate the causes of military force expansion and to recommend measures for controlling such expansion. /-~ 11 CONTENTS Foreword . ii Part A Essays. 1 Administration Perspective on US Security Requirements . 3 Military Expenditure Reporting and Limitations-an Update by Daniel Gallik . 11 Arms Imports-The Libya Experience by I. William Zartman .......... ... .. .. .. .. ... .. ......... 15 Part B Military Expenditure and Arms Transfer Statistics, 1971-1980 ......... 23 Highlights . 25 Table I ............. .... ... ......... ....... ... ... .. 33 Military Expenditures, Armed Forces, GNP, Central Government Expenditures, and Population, 1971-1980, By Region, Organization, and Country. Table II .................... .. .. ...... ... .............. 75 Value of Arms Transfers and Total Imports and Exports, 1971-1980, By Region, Organization, and Country. Table III .. ...... ... ....................... ....... .. ...... 117 Value of Arms Transfers, Cumulative 1976-1980, By Major Supplier and Recipient Country. Table IV ....... .. ... ... .......... ...................... 121 Number of Arms Delivered, Cumulative 1976-1980, By Selected Supplier, Recipient Developing Region, and Major Weapon Type. Statistical Notes and Sources . ...... ................... ..... 125 iii A ESSAYS Part A includes (1) a compendium of quotations by President Reagan, Secretaries Shultz and Wein berger, and National Security Adviser Clark on the impact of Soviet military expansion on US de fense requirements and arms control positions; (2) an essay by Mr. Daniel Gallik on military budget reporting and limitations; and (3) an essay by Prof /. William Zartman on the Libyan arms import ex perience. Each of these three papers has direct rel evance to specific material presented in Part B. While the statistical tables in Part B covered mili tary expenditure and arms transfer data for the ten year period, 1971-1980, the remarks by US officials in the compendium reflected in part on Soviet mili tary expansion during that period. The major theme throughout the selection of quotations concerned the necessity for the United States to rebuild its military forces in order to meet the threat posed by the Soviets. Mr. Gallik's essay explores the history of the ef forts to seek reductions in military forces through negotiations on the reduction of military budgets. His essay touches on all of the difficulties which create barriers to such a method of arms control, such as a common monetary unit, military pricing complexities, a mutually acceptable reporting in strument, and verification of data and military spending limitation agreements. Prof Zartman's essay is a case study of one of the largest importers of arms. He provides the his torical basis for Libya's build-up and illustrates the effects of Libya's explosive combination of oil generated wealth, low population, and military fanatacism on Libya's African neighbors and Mid dle East stability. Excessive imports of arms by one country and the resultant impact of those im ports on neighboring states are documented. Implicit in Prof Zartman's treatise is the subtle reminder that controlling the flow of arms from a number of suppliers to such an arms importer would be a very difficult task indeed. ADMINISTRATION PERSPECTIVES ON US SECURITY REQillREMENTS During the 1970s, the period of time analyzed in "As the Soviets' power grew, we still managed to this report, Soviet military expenditures increased maintain the peace. The United States had estab at an average annual rate of 2.93 percent while US lished a system of alliances with NATO as the center military expenditures increased at an average annual piece. In addition, we grew even more respected as rate of 0.19 percent. Over the past decade, Soviet a world leader with a strong economy and deeply total military expenditures are estimated to have held moral values. With our commitment to help been about $1,361 billion; US total military ex shape a better world, the United States always pur penditures, $974 billion. sued every diplomatic channel for peace. And for In response to the challenge to the West posed at least 30 years after World War II, the United by the Soviet military build-up, the United States States still continued to possess a large military ad has been engaged since early 1981 in a sustained vantage over the Soviet Union. Our strength de effort to bolster the strength of its armed forces terred-that is, prevented-aggression against us. while at the same time advancing bold proposals "This nation's military objective has always for verifiable arms reductions. Soon after his inau been to maintain peace by preventing war. This is guration, President Reagan proposed a program neither a Democratic nor a Republican policy. It's to enhance US military strength which would re supported by our allies. And most important of all, quire military expenditures to increase at an average it has worked for nearly 40 years. annual rate of 7.5 percent for the period 1983-1987. Nuclear Deterrence Following are a series of selected quotations by Administration leaders on the reasons for, and the "What do we mean when we speak of nuclear commitment to, strengthening United States mili deterrence? Certainly we don't want such weapons tary forces: for their own sake. We don't desire excessive forces, or what some people have called "overkill." Basi \ cally, it is a matter of others knowing that starting a conflict would be more costly to them than any \ PRESIDENT REAGAN thing they might hope to gain. And, yes, it is sadly An address to the nation by President Reagan on ironic that in these modern times it still takes weap Nuclear Strategy Toward the Soviet Union, ons to prevent war. I wish it did not. November 22, 1982 "We desire peace, but peace is a goal, not a policy. "The prevention of conflict and the reduction of Lasting peace is what we hope for at the end of our weapons are the most important public issues of journey; it doesn't describe the steps we must take, our time. Yet, on no other issue are there more mis nor the paths we should follow to reach that goal. conceptions and misunderstandings. You, the I intend to search for peace along two parallel American people, deserve an explanation from paths- deterrence and arms reductions. I believe your Government on what our policy is on these these are the only paths that offer any real hope issues. Too often the experts have been content to for an enduring peace. discuss grandiose strategies among themselves, "And, let me say, I believe that if we follow pru and cloud the public debate in technicalities no dent policies, the risk of nuclear conflict will be re one can understand. The result is that many Ameri duced. Certainly the United States will never use cans have become frightened and, let me say, fear its forces except in response to attack.