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GCC - Iran: Operational Analysis of Air, SAM and TBM Forces Abdullah Toukan and Anthony H. Cordesman Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy

August 20, 2009 Slide

Introduction 4

Summary & Recommendations 15

Geostrategic Importance of the Gulf Region 22

GCC and Iran Order of Battle 32

Part I: U.S. Air Force Doctrine; Definition of Functions and Missions 38

Offensive Counterair Missions (OCA) 41

Air to Ground Mission Profiles and Weapons Systems 44

SAM Air Defense Systems and SEAD 54

Defensive Counterair Missions (DCA) 62

Air to Air Mission Profiles and Weapon Systems 67

Counterspace: Offensive and Defensive Operations 76

Information Operations 77

Intelligence Surveillance &Reconnaissance (ISR) Doctrine 78

Unmanned Air Vehicles (UAV’s) 80

Defensive Counterair Operations (DCA) 86

2 Slide

Missions and Force Effectiveness 91

OCA Airfield Attack Analysis 94

Air Defense and SEAD Analysis 101

Counterland Operations Analysis (CAS & AI) 108

MRAAM Engagement Analysis 113

GCC-Iran Force Allocation Matrices 118

Theater Ballistic Missiles 121

Part II: Iran Asymmetric Warfare 135

Appendix I: Air to Air Missiles 145

Appendix II: Medium Range SAM Systems Kill Envelopes 150

Appendix III: Air to Air BVR Combat Analysis 163

Appendix IV: Characteristics of High Explosives 167

Appendix V: Probability of Kill vs CEP and Lethal Range 172

Appendix VI: Notes on Security Arrangements 177 (Common, Collective, Cooperative, Comprehensive)

3 Introduction

4 Perceptions of the Iranian Threat

• It is in the view of many analysts that with the occupation of Iraq, Iran now sees new opportunities to enhance its strategic interests and to reemerge as the key power in the Arabian Gulf region. They have enumerated five threats to the region posed by Iran:

o Ambition to acquire nuclear weapons and long-range ballistic missiles; o Support for International Terrorism; o Opposition to the Middle East peace process and its rising political influence there; o Offensive military buildup; o Threat to the stability of the Gulf States. Iran has also annexed the islands of Abu Musa, which dominate the entrance to the Straits of Hormuz.

• Iran looks upon Nuclear Weapons and Ballistic Missiles as:

o attractive alternatives to expensive modern conventional weapons for Power Projection and Deterrence purposes;

o a means to increase so-called status and prestige.

• As a response, the U.S. policy objective has been not to allow the Arabian Gulf region to be dominated by a hegemonic Iran. The United States believes that Iran cannot try to dominate the Gulf region as long as a U.S. military power is present. Iran maintains that the U.S. is actually positioning itself to confront Iran, and is building military bases to be used as launching pads for a possible strike against it.

5 How Iran views its National Security

• Many believe that a confrontational approach to Iran will drive it to justify the pursuit of a nuclear capability as a deterrent. The Iranian National Security Doctrine is based on the perceptions that:

o Iran as having a leadership role in the Arab and non-Arab Muslim world, and to have a dominant role in the Arabian Gulf region especially in any GCC security arrangements; o The occupation of Iraq by the U.S. and the presence of the U.S. Fifth Fleet offshore in the waters of the Gulf, and the past U.S. declared policy for “regime change” in Iran, as a grave threat to its National Security; o Israeli intentions to destabilize Iran and attack its nuclear facilities, which Iran claims to be for the purpose of producing nuclear power; o Iran is worried about unfriendly neighbors surrounding it, including a nuclear armed Pakistan.

U.S. - Russia

• The U.S. – Russia nuclear agreement, July 6, 2009, is considered by many as a first step in a broader effort to reduce the threat of Nuclear Weapons and to prevent their further spread. President Obama in his remarks hailed the arms agreement as an example for the world as he pursued a broader agenda aimed at countering – and eventually eliminating the spread of Nuclear Weapons.

• President Obama views Russia as an influential partner willing to help fight the proliferation of nuclear weapons mainly in Iran and North Korea. It has become clear that more collaboration between the US and Russia on nuclear non-proliferation could increase pressure on Iran, which has always taken advantage and benefitted from any disagreements between the two countries.

• It is believed that Russia could be a key player in preventing Iran from having a nuclear weapons program. However, Russia seems to have a different perception of the threat and has not shown any interest so far in applying pressure on Iran. Obama managed to link the BMD in Eastern Europe with the emerging Iranian Nuclear Threat and Long Range Ballistic Missile capability.

6 U.S. Position

• The Obama Administration has been sending messages to Iran trying to dissuade it from pursuing Nuclear Weapons. The message is that the Iranian Nuclear Weapons program will:

o not advance its security; o not achieve its goal of enhancing its power both regionally and globally; o spark an arms race in the region; o cause Iran to become more insecure.

• The current U.S. position towards Iran is based upon the choice of:

o Further sanctions and containment if Iran continues its pursuit of Nuclear Weapons or ; o Start a dialog with wider economic incentives if it abandons its nuclear weapons program.

• In the event that Iran continues to pursue Nuclear Weapons the U.S. Secretary of State outlined how the U.S. might deal with a such a policy:

o Washington would arm allies in the region, and extend a “defense umbrella”; o Iran possessing nuclear weapons would be unacceptable to the U.S.; o Iran crossing the Nuclear Threshold would not make Iran safe; o By extending assistance and a defense umbrella, Iran will not be able to intimidate and dominate its neighboring countries in particular the GCC, as Iran believes it can, once it possesses nuclear weapons.

7 Iranian Response

• Iran has a 2,500 km coastline along the waters of the Arabian Gulf and the Arabian Sea, which is the only route to export oil, and around 95 percent of its foreign exchange revenues comes from exporting oil.

• In addition to viewing itself a regional power, Iran’s aim is to keep the waters free from any foreign military presence and prevent outside countries from playing a role in shaping the future political and security architecture of the Gulf region.

• Iran has recently been active diplomatically trying to convince the GCC States, with regard to the U.S. and other Western Powers, that their security would be better ensured by signing mutual security agreements with it. Iran has been stressing that for longer term regional security and stability, Iran and the GCC states should replace the reliance on foreign military presence and intervention.

• With regard to a possible Israeli or U.S. attack on Iranian nuclear facilities, the following is what has been written on the possible Iranian military response:

o Immediate retaliation using its ballistic missiles on Israel. Multiple launches of Shahab-3 including the possibility of CBR warheads against Tel Aviv, Israeli military and civilian centers, and Israeli suspected nuclear weapons sites; o Using proxy groups such as Hezbollah or Hamas to attack Israel proper with suicide bombings, covert CBR attacks, and rocket attacks from southern Lebanon; o Give rise to regional instability and conflict as well as terrorism; o Destabilizing Iraq through the Shia against US occupation, further arming insurgency groups when possible; o Support and upgrade Taliban capabilities in Afghanistan; o Increase the threat of asymmetric attacks against American interests and allies in the region; o Target U.S. and Western shipping in the Gulf, and possibly attempt to interrupt the flow of oil through the Gulf. Danger is not simply a cut-off in the supply of oil from Iran, the GCC, or the closing of the Strait of Hormuz, but a prolonged threat to the wider Gulf region.

8 Israel and U.S. Position on a Military Strike against Iranian Nuclear Facilities

• The Israeli time frame as to when Iran would have a Nuclear Weapon is between 2009 and 2013, whereas the U.S. time frame is after 2013. Israel further states that Iran should not be allowed to obtain any nuclear capabilities that could eventually allow it to produce nuclear weapons.

• Israel views Iran as an Existential Threat and must be dealt with in the immediate future with a Military Strike against it’s main nuclear facilities. Israel would rather see the U.S. join it in preventing Iran from developing the capability rather than the U.S. arming its allies in the region and providing a defense umbrella.

• In the month of March, Haaretz Service on March 12 reported the following statements by U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates:

“The current American administration as well as those that follow it will exercise extreme caution before launching a pre-emptive military strike against an enemy state.”

“I think one of the biggest lessons learned in this is, if you are going to contemplate preempting an attack, you had better be very confident of the intelligence that you have” Gates further said “They’re (Iran) not close to a stockpile, they’re not close to a weapon at this point, and so there is some time.”

Gate’s concludes in other interviews that any military option to force Iran to abandon its controversial nuclear program would have merely temporary ineffective results, and that imposing sanctions on Iran made more sense.

• The United States has given Iran until September, 2009, during the convening of the U.N. General Assembly to respond to President Obama’s offer of dialogue.

9 What could accelerate a confrontation with Iran

• There is the suspicion that Iran could start an open ended dialog plus negotiations with no commitments to terminate its pursuit of nuclear weapons. The following general concerns could drive the region into conflict:

o By 2010 Iran could pose a serious threat to it’s neighbors and Israel. Enough of an inventory of nuclear weapons that can serve as a deterrent against U.S. and Israeli strikes.

o Having in it’s possession highly accurate short, medium and long range ballistic missiles, capable of carrying Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD).

o A modern SAM air defense system, such as the Russian S-300PMU2 “Favorit”, giving Iran an advanced Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) capability in addition to an advanced SAM Air Defense System.

o A maritime capability that can threaten commercial shipping and Naval Forces in the Gulf , and possibly interrupt the flow of oil through the Straits of Hormuz.

o Train and control a number of Counter Insurgency groups to Increase the threat of asymmetric attacks against American interests and allies in the region and even beyond the region.

o Should Iran acquire the above capabilities the question is “would Iran become over confident to the point that it is convinced it can impose it’s own political and military conditions in the Arabian Gulf region that will serve its own interests?”

10 • How then, should the U.S. enhance the military capabilities of the Arab Gulf states to counter any likelihood of an Iranian military aggression. The requirement would be to enhance the conventional military ability for the GCC states to achieve a specified wartime objective (win a war, or destroy a target set). It includes four major components:

o Force Structure; o Modernization; o Readiness; o Sustainability.

o In addition it would include developing an asymmetric warfare capability.

GCC Strategic Depth Vulnerability

• The Arab Gulf states have been investing heavily in the modernization and upgrading of their force structures. The United States, France and United kingdom have been the major weapons suppliers.

• They also recognize that the assistance of outside regional powers will be required to deal with any military aggression in the region. As a result they have signed bilateral defense agreements with their Western allies - United States, Britain and France.

• Two main considerations underlying the choice of a Military Doctrine by the GCC states have been: Balance of Forces and Strategic Depth. In particular for the Arabian Gulf “front line states” Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, UAE and Oman, the main concern would be strategic depth to an Iranian attack.

• Lack of Strategic Depth results in limitations on the area of operational maneuverability during conflict, time to respond, and an increase in the vulnerability of vital strategic economic centers due to the proximity to the borders. Saudi Arabia would be the only state that has strategic depth.

11 • Saudi Arabia is looked upon to play a pivotal role in the Security Arrangements of the Gulf and the Arab Israeli conflict. Saudi Arabia’s oil resources, population and strategic depth make it a major and essential participant in any regional security arrangements or conflict in the Gulf region.

• In 2002 the GCC made a major security shift from a Common Security arrangement to a Joint Defense Pact which essentially is a Collective Security arrangement. Joint Defense Pact or Collective Security is directed against an aggressor coming from outside one’s sphere (see Appendix VI).

• Agreement entails a commitment by each member to join the coalition and if one is attacked that implies an attack on the other partners. This being based either on defense in it’s traditional sense, or upon deterrence.

• In the foreseeable future the GCC has to plan it’s defenses so as to deter Iran or any other adversary. What they can do is to build their collective and national assets so as to provide a military deterrent sufficient to make any direct confrontation as costly as possible to Iran or any other adversary.

• It is in this deterrent role that lies the ultimate rationale for any GCC Joint Defense Pact and Cooperation.

• When transformed into an operational doctrine, the GCC states would base their Force Structure Planning on:

o Defensible Borders. Borders which can be defended without a pre-emptive initiative. o In parallel the capability to take the war to the enemy, fight on enemy territory.

(See Military Technology. MILTECH 11/2005. Interview with Maj. Gen. Khaled Abdullah Al-Buainain, Commander of the UAE Air Force and Air Defense)

12 Time lines

• Israel believes that Iran will have a nuclear weapon capability between 2009 to 2013 • U.S. believes this will be beyond 2013. • During this time frame 2009-2013, the GCC will need to :

o Decide as early as possible what Objective Force Level can the GCC states build their military capabilities up to. A level of military forces that needs to be attained within a finite time frame and resource level to accomplish approved military objectives, missions and tasks.

o Develop a Flexible Response capability in the military forces for effective reaction to any threat or attack with actions appropriate and adaptable to the existing circumstances.

o Upgrade and modernize conventional military capability and start improving capability in Asymmetric Warfare.

o Further strengthen and update Defense Pact with Western Allies; U.S., France and Britain . o Further develop the recently U.S. proposed “Defense Umbrella” concept, with all associated Security Guarantees.

13 Aim and Methodology of Study:

• This study addresses and compares the Balance of Forces and operational fighting capabilities of the Air Power, SAM Defense and Theater Ballistic Missile (TBM) forces of the GCC States and Iran.

• The study consists of two parts, Part I analyses the conventional war fighting capability, Part II briefly addresses Asymmetric Warfare that Iran has been developing a fighting doctrine and a force structure for. We leave it to the reader to refer back to a number of more in-depth publications by Anthony Cordesman, CSIS, analyzing Asymmetric Warfare. (See http://www.csis.org/burke/reports)

• Each of the GCC States has its own Fighting Doctrine and subsequently its own technical requirements for the weapon systems procured which are somewhat different in specifications to what the USAF has on its platforms. To avoid going into this level of depth in Part I of the study, we use as a guideline for the analysis, the U.S. Air Force Doctrine, which defines and outlines the specific functions required to achieve Strategic, Operational and Tactical-level objectives.

• For instance two of these functions are Offensive and Defensive Counterair Operations, and with each of these functions we review what operational missions would be required then compare the availability and effectiveness of the military resources of the GCC and Iran.

• Care must be taken that referring back to the USAF Doctrine definition of Functions and Missions does not imply that the study is using the actual fighting and operations doctrine of the USAF, but in defining what these functions and missions are and how they fall under the overall Air Force plans to shape and control the battlespace. Definition of terminology is important as the study throughout refers to the various functions and missions.

• With respect to the analysis of missions and weapon systems it should be noted that there exists an extensive literature of higher resolution models that address the weapons systems in this study from Design and Performance Evaluation up to Mission, Force and Campaign Levels.

• We have left the calculations as simple as possible and just up to a first order level. The purpose being to give us a general idea on the capabilities and mission performance outcome of the GCC and Iranian Forces.

• We believe that simple analysis procedures can produce substantial insights which are sufficient to compare the Operational Fighting Capabilities of the GCC and Iran, and give a general direction for the doctrine and to the next generation weapon systems requirements. 14 Summary & General Recommendations

15 GCC Iran

• Concerns determining doctrine: • Concerns determining doctrine:

o Balance of Forces o Balance of Forces. As the Balance of Forces is unfavorable then adopt As the Balance of Forces is unfavorable then:  Technological Edge  Since Iran presently does not have access  Quality vs Quantity to modern technology weapon systems, it will need to Develop all ranges of Ballistic o Strategic Depth. None and therefore the need to Missiles to compensate for deficiencies in take war to enemy territory. conventional forces capabilities.

• Force Structure Planning based on: o No problem with Strategic Depth, can be an advantage fighting in and over familiar terrain. oDefensible Borders oTake the war to the enemy, fight on enemy • Force Structure Planning based on: territory. Needs excellent C4ISR, near-real time o High attrition rate inflicted on adversary civilians. situation awareness of the hostile and friendly o In depth defense, as Iran has the strategic depth. military developments in the area, and their operational levels. • Continue developing Asymmetric Warfare capabilities.

• Need to upgrade and further modernize conventional • As Iran sees it, the need and capability to develop military capability to carry out such operational functions. Nuclear Weapons to further enhance Deterrence.

• The need to develop an Asymmetric Warfare capability.

16 • The total GCC Air Power is 491 combat aircraft, we assumed only 75% are operationally ready (full-mission capable). The total available force will then be 368 and with a sortie rate of 3 per aircraft per day the total number of sorties generated will be 1,105.

• Whereas for Iran, a total of 158 aircraft with an operational readiness rate of 60%, the available combat force will be 95 combat aircraft, and with 2 sorties per aircraft per day the total sorties generated will be 190.

• By following the guidelines of the USAF Doctrine manuals in the missions needed for Offensive Counterair, Defensive Counterair as well as Counterland Operations, an operational analysis is then conducted, over a 7 day conflict period, to determine possible Force Allocation requirements among the various missions. Force Allocation Requirements

Mission GCC Iran

Combat Air Patrol (CAP) 60 24

Strip Launched Interceptors (SLI) 55 38

Closure of 5 Airfields for 7 days. 56 No Capability

Suppression of Enemy Air 10 15 Defense (SEAD) -5 Radars (2 per radar site) (3 per radar site)

Escort of Strike Aircraft 40 No Capability

Fighter Sweep 35 No Capability

Total Force Allocated 266 77

Total Left for other missions 102 18

17 •The remaining 18 to 20 Iranian aircraft can be allocated for counterland operations (Close Air Support and Air Interdiction Missions). Based upon the advancement in weapons technology and overall survivability of GCC vs Iranian aircraft, we can safely assume the following in a 7 day conflict duration:

• GCC Daily Loss Rate is 1.5%, Sortie rate of 3 per aircraft per day, Single Shot Target Kill 75% Iran Daily Loss Rate is 5%, Sortie rate of 2 per aircraft per day, Single Shot Target Kill 40%

7 Day Conflict Cumulative Sortie Rates Cumulative Single Target Aircraft Remaining Kills Iran : 20 combat aircraft 200 131 12

GCC: 20 combat aircraft 360 340 15

GCC: 50 combat aircraft 906 850 38

• Over a 7 day conflict during Counterland Operations:

o GCC: 5 combat aircraft lost o Iran: 8 combat aircraft lost • In the Air to Air Combat the total estimated Losses are:

o GCC: 27 combat aircraft o Iran: 62 combat aircraft

•The above estimates project the weakness of the Iranian Air and SAM Power vs the GCC countries in a 7 day campaign. Throughout we find that on the average there is a substantial advantage in favor of the GCC States in all missions studied.

18 Iran’s Current Air/Missile Defenses

• U.S. never delivered integrated system before fall of Shah. • Only modern short-range point defense system is TOR-M. • Other short-range systems mix of older Russian system, SHORADs, and aging – possible inactive British and French systems. • Medium to long-range systems are low capability or obsolescent. • HAWKS and IHAWKs do not have capable ECM. Date back to 1960s and 1970s. • Various versions of SA-2 obsolete. • Radar sensor and battle management/C4I systems have major limitations. • Less than 30 export versions of MiG-29, some not operational. • F-14s do not have ability to use primary air defense missile since 1979-1980. (Source: Anthony Cordesman Security Challenges and Threats in the Gulf: A Net Assessment. September 2008)

Tactical Ballistic Missiles Threat:

• Iran’s ballistic missiles cover the complete spectrum range from150 km up to 5,500 km, the Short, Medium, and Intermediate Ranges of Ballistic Missiles. Iran believes that these will compensate for any deficiencies in its Air Power.

• Deploying Ballistic Missiles against military targets would require a number that is very likely to be beyond what the Inventory in Iran is. For instance to close one airfield 9000ft in length and 200 ft in width (leaving 3000ft of Minimum Clear Length and 50ft Minimum Clear Width), using a Shahab II class missile with a range of 500km and a 700kg warhead would require some 250 missiles.

• For Suppression of Enemy Air Defense (SEAD) Missions, just to destroy 1 radar, 18 missiles would be required. This is not taking into consideration that the tactical radar site could be mobile which would then require near real time intelligence information on the exact location and definitely more missiles will have to be allocated.

• On the other hand, Ballistic Missiles can be used with success against Soft Targets, in open areas and cities to inflict maximum human casualties and create terror. In essence what is considered as a major component in Asymmetric Warfare in the form of high civilian casualties. 19 General Recommendations for GCC Force Structure Planning

With regard to Balance of Forces and Defensible Borders, these would require the GCC to maintain its technological and qualitative edge, mobility and the strength of the Air Power. The following are some general criteria that would be required:

• Aircraft: . Multi-mission capability. . High Operational Readiness/Full Mission Capable state and high sortie rates. . All weather day / night operational capability . Quick response / ground launched interceptors against incoming intruders. . High Endurance. . Airborne Electronic Warfare (ESM/ECM/ECCM) survivability . Detect track and engage multiple mobile ground targets as well as Hard and Deeply Buried Targets (HDBTs). . Rapidly destroy advanced air defense systems. . Capable of carrying out deep strike missions.

• Air to Air Missiles: . Aircraft to be capable of multiple target engagement. Fire and Forget/Launch and leave with high single shot kill capability. . Good target discrimination and enhanced resistance to countermeasures. . Increase in range of firing missile at the same time shortening the flight time to the target.

• Air to Ground: . Weapons that serve as an effective force multiplier. . Stand-off capability, operating from ranges outside enemy point defenses. . Low and high altitude launches. . Preserve crew and aircraft survivability . Effective against a wide array of land and sea targets with high single shot kill probability. . Weapons that employ launch and leave with high accuracy (small CEP). . Capable of day/night and adverse weather conditions

20 Ballistic Missile Defense System, C4ISR & Battlefield Management.

• The Challenge for the GCC States is to design an effective multi-layered Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) to counter the Short, Medium and Intermediate Ballistic Missiles.

• Due to the very short time window in the defense against Ballistic Missiles, they will have to be engaged automatically, which requires intercept authorization and rules of engagement to be agreed upon in advance. All part of an effective C4ISR / BM system in both peace time and war. This will also act as a Force Multiplier.

• Evident that the key to an effective BMD lies in regional cooperation, which can take a range of forms from coordination and cooperation between command centers and defense systems for BMD purposes - while enabling each state to control its own defenses. Similar to the “Cooperation Belt” that links together all the operations command centers in the GCC states, which produces a Common Operational Picture.

• Cooperation to be comprehensive in nature, leading to a near-real time situation awareness of the military developments in the area, hostile and friendly military capabilities and their operational levels. This would also be in the form of cooperation into BMDs and NBC threat assessment. This requires an C4ISR capability in all it’s components.

• Unmanned Air Systems (UAS’s) / Unmanned Air Vehicles (UAV’s).

• As the Front Lines will be over the Arabian Gulf region, the Navy will have to play a role in Air Defenses and in a Ballistic Missile Defense Network. Sea based systems will provide an efficient and highly mobile defense against Theater Ballistic Missiles.

• The Naval System will allow the BMD command to move its defense capabilities close to the enemy sites and serve as a forward deployed sensor and will have the Long Range Engagement and Tracking Capability. This will extend the battle space of the BMDs and contribute to an integrated layered defense.

21 Enduring Geostrategic Importance of the Gulf

22 Oil and Gas Fields in the Gulf Region

23 Gulf States

Total Oil Supply 2008 (Thousand Barrels Per Day)

15000 10782 10000 4149 2369 2741 3046 5000 1207 48.5 0 Iraq Kuwait Bahrain Qatar UAE Saudi Iran Arabia

OPEC Total Oil Supply 2008 (Million Barrels Per Day)

15 10.782 10 4.149 3.046 5 2.227 2.014 2.369 2.741 1.854 2.169 2.642 0.505 1.207 0

(Source: www.eia.doe.gov)

24 Gulf States

Crude Oil Proved Reserves 2009 (Billion Barrels )

266.71 300

200 136.15 115 104 97.8 100 0.12 15.21 0 Iraq Kuwait Bahrain Qatar UAE Saudi Iran Arabia

OPEC Crude Oil Proved Reserves 2009 (Billion Barrels)

300 266.71

200 136.15 115 104 97.8 99.38 100 43.66 36.22 12.2 9.04 4.66 15.21 0

(Source: www.eia.doe.gov)

25 Gulf Oil and Gas as % of World

Gulf % of OPEC % of World Gulf OPEC World World Crude Oil Proved Oil Reserves 1342 735 55% 940 70% (Billion Barrels) Total Oil Supply (Million Barrels 85.5 24.3 28% 35.7 42% per Day) Proved Reserves of Natural Gas 6,254 2,535 41% 3,110 50% (Trillion Cubic Ft)

(Source: www.eia.doe.gov)

26 •The Suez Canal/Sumed Pipeline: • Oil Flow: 4.5 million bbl/d

•The Strait of Hormuz: • Oil Flow: 16.5 million bbl/d

•Bab el-Mandab: • Oil Flow: 3.3 million bbl/d

(Source: http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Persian_Gulf/images/pg_map.pdf) 27 Strait of Hormuz

• Strait of Hormuz is the world's most important oil chokepoint due to its daily oil flow of 16.5-17 million barrels (first half 2008E), which is roughly 40 percent of all seaborne traded oil (or 20 percent of oil traded worldwide). Oil flows averaged over 16.5 million barrels per day in 2006, dropped in 2007 to a little over 16 million barrels per day after OPEC cut production, but rose again in 2008 with rising Gulf supplies.

• At its narrowest point the Strait is 21 miles wide, and the shipping lanes consist of two- mile wide channels for inbound and outbound tanker traffic, as well as a two-mile wide buffer zone. The majority of oil exported through the Strait of Hormuz travels to Asia, the United States and Western Europe. Currently, three-quarters of all Japan’s oil needs pass through this Strait. On average, 15 crude oil tankers passed through the Strait of Hormuz daily in 2007, along with tankers carrying other petroleum products and liquefied natural gas (LNG).

• Closure of the Strait of Hormuz would require the use of longer alternate routes at increased transportation costs. Alternate routes include the 745 miles-long Petroline, also known as the East-West Pipeline, across Saudi Arabia from Abqaiq to the Red Sea. The East-West Pipeline has a capacity to move five million-bbl/d. The Abqaiq-Yanbu natural gas liquids pipeline, which runs parallel to Petroline to the Red Sea, has a 290,000-bbl/d capacity. Other alternate routes could include the deactivated 1.65-million bbl/d Iraqi Pipeline across Saudi Arabia (IPSA), and the 0.5 million-bbl/d Tapline to Lebanon. Oil could also be pumped north to Ceyhan in Turkey from Iraq.

(Source: http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/World_Oil_Transit_Chokepoints/Hormuz.html)

28 Bab el-Mandab

• The Strait of Bab el-Mandab is a chokepoint between the horn of Africa and the Middle East, and a strategic link between the Mediterranean Sea and Indian Ocean. It is located between Yemen, Djibouti, and Eritrea, and connects the Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden and the Arabian Sea. Exports from the Gulf must pass through Bab el-Mandab before entering the Suez Canal. In 2006, an estimated 3.3 million bbl/d flowed through this waterway toward Europe, the United States, and Asia. The majority of traffic, around 2.1 million bbl/d, flows northbound through the Bab el-Mandab to the Suez/Sumed complex.

• Bab el-Mandab is 18 miles wide at its narrowest point, making tanker traffic difficult and limited to two 2-mile-wide channels for inbound and outbound shipments. Closure of the Strait could keep tankers from the Gulf from reaching the Suez Canal or Sumed Pipeline, diverting them around the southern tip of Africa. This would effectively engage spare tanker capacity, and add to transit time and cost.

• The Strait of Bab el-Mandab could be bypassed through the East-West oil pipeline, which crosses Saudi Arabia with a 4.8 million bbl/d capacity. However, southbound oil traffic would still be blocked. In addition, closure of the Bab el-Mandab would block non-oil shipping from using the Suez Canal, except for limited trade within the Red Sea region.

• Security remains a concern of foreign firms doing business in the region, after a French tanker was attacked off the coast of Yemen by terrorists in October 2002.

(Source: http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/World_Oil_Transit_Chokepoints/Bab_el-Mandab.html)

29 Suez/Sumed

• The Suez Canal is located in Egypt, and connects the Red Sea and Gulf of Suez with the Mediterranean Sea. The Canal is one of the world’s greatest engineering feats covering 120 miles. Oil shipments from the Gulf travel through the Canal primarily to European ports, but also to the United States. In 2006, an estimated 3.9 million bbl/d of oil flowed northbound through the Suez Canal to the Mediterranean, while 0.6 million bbl/d travelled southbound into the Red Sea.

• Over 3,000 oil tankers pass through the Suez Canal annually, and represent around 25 percent of the Canal’s total revenues. With only 1,000 feet at its narrowest point, the Canal is unable to handle large tankers. The Suez Canal Authority (SCA) has discussed widening and deepening the Canal to accommodate VLCCs and Ultra Large Crude Carriers (ULCC).

• The 200-mile long Sumed Pipeline, or Suez-Mediterranean Pipeline, also provides a route between the Red and Mediterranean Seas by crossing the northern region of Egypt from the Ain Sukhna to the Sidi Kerir Terminal. The pipeline provides an alternative to the Suez Canal, and can transport 3.1 million bbl/d of crude oil. In 2006, nearly all of Saudi Arabia’s northbound shipments (approximately 2.3 million bbl/d of crude) were transported through the Sumed pipeline. The pipeline is owned by Arab Petroleum Pipeline Co., a joint venture between EGPC, Saudi Aramco, Abu Dhabi’s ADNOC, and Kuwaiti companies.

• Closure of the Suez Canal and the Sumed Pipeline would divert tankers around the southern tip of Africa, the Cape of Good Hope, adding 6,000 miles to transit time.

(Source: http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/World_Oil_Transit_Chokepoints/Suez.html)

30 Important World Oil Transit Chokepoints

Width at 2006E oil Primary Name Narrowest Oil Source Origin Past Disturbances Alternative Routes flow (bbl/d) Destination Point

The Strait of Hormuz 16.5 – 17 21 miles Gulf Nations including Japan, The United Sea mines were installed 745 miles long East- million Saudi Arabia, Iran and States, Western during the Iran-Iraq War in West Pipeline through UAE Europe, other Asian the 1980s. Terrorist threats Saudi Arabia to the Red countries post September 11, 2001 Sea The Strait of 15 million 1.7 miles Gulf Nations, West All Asia/Pacific Disruptions from pirates are Reroute through the Malacca Africa consumers including a constant threat, including Lombok or Sunda Strait Japan and China a terrorist attack in 2003. in Indonesia. Possible Collisions and oil spills are pipeline construction also a problem. Poor between Malaysia and visibility from smoke haze. Thailand. The Suez 4.5 million 1,000 feet Gulf Nations Europe and The Suez Canal was closed for Reroute around the Canal/Sumed especially Saudi United States. eight years after the Six Day southern tip of Africa Pipeline Arabia, and Asia. War in 1967. Two large oil (the Cape of Good tankers ran aground in 2007 Hope) additional 6,000 suspending traffic. miles.

Bab el-Mandab 3.3 million 18 miles The Gulf Nations Europe and The USS Cole attack in 2000; Northbound traffic can United States French oil tanker in 2002, use the East-West oil both attacks off the coast of pipeline through Saudi- Aden, Yemen. Arabia; Reroute around the southern tip of Africa (the Cape of Good Hope) additional 6,000 miles

The Turkish Straits 2.4 million 0.5 mile Caspian Sea Region Western and Numerous past shipping No clear alternative; Southern Europe accidents due to the straits potential pipelines sinuous geography. Some discussed including a terrorist threats were made 173 mile pipeline after September 11, 2001 between Russia, Bulgaria, and Greece. The Panama Canal 0.5 million 110 feet The United States The United States, Suspected terrorist target. Reroute around Straits and other Central of Magellan, Cape Horn American countries and Drake Passage; additional 8,000 miles.

(Source: http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/World_Oil_Transit_Chokepoints/Background.html) 31 GCC and Iran Order of Battle

32 Air Bases and Air Force Order of Battle (2009) Combat A/C Attack Helo's

Iran 319 95 TURKEY Caspian Iraq - 37 Tabriz Sea Kuwait 50 45 Mehrabad Kermanshah Tehran Bahrain 33 16 Hamadan Natanz Mediterranean Syria Arak IRAN Qatar 18 25 Sea IRAQ Esfahan Masjed UAE 184 67 Dezful Suleiman Umidiyeh Oman 64 41 Jordan Bushehr Zahedan Saudi Arabia 278 67 Al-Jouf KUWAIT Shiraz Yemen 79 18 Bandar Abbas King Faisal King Khaled MC Chahbahar Hail King Abdulaziz Iran Airbases BAHRAIN Gulf of Oman King Abdulaziz MA Riyadh QATAR Al Dhafra Tabriz F-5E/F, UAE EGYPT Al Musana’a MiG-29 Al Kharj Al Safran Seeb Prince Sultan Hamadan F-4E/D Taif Masirah Su-24 Sulayel SAUDI-ARABIA SUSAN OMAN Dezful F-5E/F Thumrait King Khaled Salalah Bushehr F-4E/D Nejran F-14 YEMEN San’a Riya Arabian Sea Bandar 2 Helicopter Hadaydeh Aden Abbas Wings Al Anad Shiraz Su-25 Three Main Iranian Nuclear Facilities Su-24 • Natanz: Uranium Enrichment Facility Esfahan F-5E • Arak: Heavy Water Nuclear Reactor and Possible Future Plutonium Production Reactor Su-24 • Esfahan: Nuclear Research Center. Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) Tehran MiG-29 Su-24 Air Bases Source: Global Security.org Zahedan F-7M Order of Battle Source: Anthony Cordesman and Adam Seitz CSIS “Iranian Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Birth of a regional Nuclear Arms Race”. Feb 14, 2009. Kermanshah F-5E/F

33 300 Combat Aircraft Order of Battle 262 (2008) 250

200

158 150 142

100

50 39 21 12 12 0 Iran Saudi Arabia Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar UAE MiG-29 25 Su-25 13 Su-24 30 F-14 25 F-4E/D 65 Tornado ADV 22 Tornado IDS 85 F-15S 71 F-15C/D 84 F-16C/D 21 12 80 F-18 39 M2000 12 62

(Source: Anthony Cordesman CSIS) 34 25 AWACS & Reconnaissance Aircraft 22 Order of Battle 2008

20

16

15

10

7 6 5

0 Iran Saudi Arabia Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar UAE SB7L-360 8 Cessna 208B 3 CH-2000 6 M2000 RAD 7 RF-4E 6 PC-9 12 Hawk 203 4 E3A AWACS 5

(Source: Anthony Cordesman CSIS) 35 Gulf Land-Based Air Defense Systems in 2008

Country Major SA Light SAM AA Gun

Bahrain (8) IHAWK (60) RBS-70 (26) Guns (18) FIM 92A Stinger (15) Orlikon 35mm (7) Crotale (12) L/70 40mm Iran (16/150) IHAWK SA-7/14/16 HQ-7 (1,700) Guns (3/10) SA-5 (29) SA-15; Some QW-1 Misaq ZSU-23-4 23mm (45) SA-2 Guideline (29) TOR-M1; Some HN-5 ZPU-2/4 23mm (30) Rapier; Some FM-80 (Ch Crotale) ZU-23 23mm 15 Tigercat; Some FIM-92A Stinger M-1939 37mm S-60 57mm Kuwait (4/24) IHAWK Phase III (6/12) Aspide 12 Oerlikon 35mm (5) Patriot PAC-2 (48) Starbust Oman None Blowpipe; (2) Mistral SP (26) Guns (34) SA-7; (6) Blindfire (4) ZU-23-2 23mm (20) Javelin; (40) Rapier (10) GDF-(x)5 Skyguard 35mm S713 Martello (12) L-60 40mm

Qatar None (10) Blowpipe (12) FIM-92A Stinger (9) Roland II (24) Mistral (20) SA-7 Saudi Arabia (16/128) IHAWK (40) Crotale (1,220) Guns (4-6/16-24) Patriot (500) Stinger (ARMY) (92) M-163 Vulcan 20mm (17/141) Shahine Mobile (500) Mistral (ADF) (30) N-167 Vulcan 20mm (NG) (2-4/160) PAC-2 Launchers (500) FIM-43 Redeye (ARMY) (850) AMX-30SA 30mm (17) ANA/FPS-117 Radar (500) Redeye (ADF) (128) GDF Orlikon 35mm (73/68) Crotale Shahine (73-141) Shahine Static (150) L-70 40mm (store) (500) FIM-92A Stinger (ARMY) (130) M-2 90mm (NG) (400) FIM-92A Avenger (ADF)

UAE (2/31) IHAWK 20+ Blowpipe (62) Guns (20) Mistral (42) M-3VDA 20mm SP Some Rapier/Crotale/ RB-70/Javelin/SA- (20) GCF-BM2 30mm 18

(Source: Iranian Weapons of Mass Destruction. Anthony Cordesman SCIS) 36 SRBM MRBM IRBM ICBM < 1000 km 1,000 – 3,000 km 3,000 – 5,500 km > 5,500 km States with Nuclear Weapons Shahab-1 Shahab-3 Shahab-5 Shahab-6 Iran Shahab-2 Shahab-4 - - Israel Pakistan India (Potential)

Mushak-120 Ghadr-101 - - Iran Mushak-160 Ghadr-110 - - Turkey

Mushak-200 IRIS - -

- Sajil - - Syria Iraq Afghanistan SRBM MRBM IRBM ICBM Jordan Iran < 1000 km 1,000 – 3,000 km 3,000 – 5,500 km > 5,500 km Kuwait SCUD-B - - -

SCUD-C - - - Saudi Bahrain Syria Qatar India SCUD-D - - - Arabia UAE SS-21b - - - Oman SRBM MRBM IRBM ICBM < 1000 km 1,000 – 3,000 km 3,000 – 5,500 km > 5,500 km

- Jericho II - Jericho III Yemen Israel Arabian Sea

SRBM MRBM IRBM ICBM < 1000 km 1,000 – 3,000 km 3,000 – 5,500 km > 5,500 km Shaheen I Shaheen II - - Hatf I Ghauri I - - Iran is the only state between the four that has signed and ratified the NPT Treaty.

Hatf II Ghauri II - - Iran has been heavily investing in:

Pakistan Hatf III Ghauri II - - • Precision Strike Munitions M-11 - - - • Naval-anti-ship weapons such as the Chinese C802 that hit the Israeli Navy ship during the 2006 war in Lebanon and the Ra’ad 350 km anti-ship missile. SRBM MRBM IRBM ICBM • Ballistic Missiles < 1000 km 1,000 – 3,000 km 3,000 – 5,500 km > 5,500 km • Cruise Missiles such as the Kh55 Russian land attack cruise missile, effective against Oil Platforms. Agni I Agni II Agni III Surya

India Prithvi I

Prithvi II 37 Part I U.S. Air Force Doctrine Definition of Functions and Missions

38 • Air Force forces employ air and space power globally through the following specific functions to achieve Strategic-, Operational-, and Tactical – level objectives.

o Strategic Attack o Counterair o Counterspace o Countersea o Information Operations o Combat Support o Command & Control o Airlift o Air Refueling o Spacelift o Special Operations o Intelligence o Surveillance & Reconnaissance o Combat Search & Rescue o Navigation & Positioning o Weather Services

• These battle proven functions can be conducted at any level of war and enable the Air Force to shape and control the battlespace.

(Source: US Air Force Basic Doctrine AFDD 1, 2003)

39 Strategic Attack

• Strategic attack is defined as offensive action conducted by command authorities at generating effects that most directly achieve our national security objectives by affecting the adversary’s leadership, conflict-sustaining resources, and strategy.

Military forces are highly interconnected entities. Through strategic attack, military commanders can directly affect adversary leadership perceptions (either by isolation, deception, or exploitation) and cut off their fielded forces from their leadership and societies, as well as directly attack the adversary’s capacity to sustain military forces in the field.

• Air and space power is inherently a strategic force and an offensive weapon. Unlike other forms of military power, air and space power may simultaneously hold all of an enemy’s instruments of power at risk – military, economic, and diplomatic.

Employed properly, it offers the capability of going to the heart of the enemy sources of strength, avoiding prolonged attrition-based surface combat operations as a precursor.

• Strategic attack, as envisioned today, is more than just a function—it is also a different approach for thinking about war. It is the manifestation of the airman’s perspective: thinking about defeating the enemy as a system.

(Source: Strategic Attack USAF AFDD2-1.2, June 12, 2007)

40 Offensive Counterair Missions (OCA)

CAP

 Attack Operations • Attack operations are intended to destroy, disrupt, or degrade counterair targets on the ground. Attack •These missions are directed against enemy: Operations . Missile Sites . Airfields . Command Control and their support infrastructure: o Launch Sites o Launchers o Fuel Supplies (POL) o Runways

 Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD) SEAD is an OCA mission designed to neutralize, destroy, or degrade enemy surface- based air defenses by destructive or disruptive means. En Route SEAD  Fighter Sweep: An offensive mission by fighter aircraft to seek and destroy enemy aircraft or targets of opportunity in a designated area.

 Escorts: Escorts are aircraft assigned to protect other aircraft during a mission. Escort missions are flown over enemy territory to target and engage enemy aircraft and air defense systems.

(Source: Counterair Operations USAF AFDD 2-1.1 October 1, 2008)

41 The effectiveness of OCA operations depends on the availability of certain resources. System capabilities are influenced by the situation, threats, weather, and available intelligence. The following are some of the resources used to conduct OCA:

Aircraft: Fighter and bomber aircraft provide the bulk of the weapon systems for OCA operations. Other types of aircraft and weapon systems are often critical enablers of counterair operations (e.g., electronic attack, electronic protection, and air refueling aircraft).

Missiles: These weapons include surface-to-surface, air-to-surface, and air-to-air missiles, as well as air-, land-, and sea-launched cruise missiles. Many of these weapons have long ranges and some have very quick reaction times. These weapon systems can eliminate or reduce the risk of harm to friendly forces by destroying enemy systems in the air and on the ground.

ISR Systems: ISR systems and resources may be used in counterair operations to provide intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, deception, and other effects against enemy forces and air defense systems. These activities include the use of airborne, space-borne, and ground (e.g., human intelligence) assets.

Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS): UAS may be used in counterair operations to provide ISR, deception, jamming, harassment, or destruction of enemy forces and air defense systems. These systems may be preprogrammed or remotely piloted. They provide valuable intelligence to friendly forces and may now be used to attack some targets either too dangerous or risky for manned aircraft or where manned aircraft are not present or available to respond. They may also be used to help provide persistent air presence over enemy forces in situations where this may have important psychological effects upon an adversary (as part of OCA or other operations) if synergistically tasked to help provide persistent presence over adversary forces.

Special Operations Forces (SOF): SOF can conduct direct action missions, special reconnaissance, and provide terminal guidance for attacks against valuable enemy targets. Planners in the AOC coordinate with the special operations liaison element to coordinate the use of special operations assets in support of the counterair mission.

C2 Systems: These systems enhance OCA operations by providing early warning, intelligence, identification, and targeting data, as well as C2 of friendly forces.

42 Counterland Countersea  Counterland is defined as air and space operations against enemy land  Countersea operations are those operations conducted to attain and force capabilities. maintain a desired degree of maritime superiority by the destruction, disruption, delay, diversion, or other neutralization of threats in the • The main objectives of counterland operations are to dominate the maritime environment. surface environment and prevent the opponent from doing the same. Counterland provides the Joint Force Commander (JFC) two discrete air The main objective of countersea operations is to secure and dominate operations for engaging enemy land forces: the maritime environment and prevent opponents from doing the same.

. Air interdiction (AI), in which air maneuver indirectly supports The countersea function entails Air Force operations in the maritime land maneuver or directly supports an air scheme of maneuver, environment to achieve, or aid in the achievement of, superiority in that and medium.

. Close air support (CAS), in which air maneuver directly The identified Air Force specialized collateral functions are: supports land maneuver. • Surface Sea surveillance and anti surface ship warfare through air and space operations.  Air interdiction is air and space power’s application of interdiction. Air • Antisubmarine warfare and anti-air warfare operations to interdiction is a form of aerial maneuver that destroys, disrupts, diverts, protect sea lines of communications. or delays the enemy’s surface military potential before it can be used • Aerial mine-laying operations effectively against friendly forces, or otherwise achieve its objectives. • Air-to-air refueling in support of naval air operations.

AI is directed against enemy land force capabilities and associated Many of these collateral tasks translate to primary functions of air and infrastructure that contribute directly to or are maneuvering to reinforce space forces such as interdiction, counterair, and strategic attack. the ground battle. As with the air and space functions, countersea operations are designed  Close Air Support (CAS): to achieve strategic-, operational-, or tactical-level objectives in the CAS provides direct support to help friendly surface forces in contact with pursuit of joint force objectives. enemy forces carry out their assigned tasks. The objective is to gain control of the medium and, to the extent possible, CAS can halt attacks, help create breakthroughs, cover retreats, and dominate operations either in conjunction with naval forces or guard flanks. independently.

 Counterland Operations require an integrated, flexible, and responsive Command & Control structure to process Air and Space Power requirements, and a dependable, interoperable, and secure communications architecture to exercise control.

(Source: Counterland Operations USAF AFDD 2-1.3 , 11 September 11 2006) (Source Countersea Operations: USAF AFDD 2-1.4 September 15, 2005) 43 Air to Ground Mission Profiles and Weapon Systems

44 Air to Ground Ranges of GCC Aircraft Lo-Lo-Lo-Lo Profile (External Fuel Tanks Dropped on Combat)

Sea Level Cruise

Sea Level Cruise Sea Level Dash Combat Climb at Landing with Military Power Fuel Reserve

2 Mk84 (4,000 lbs) Payload 480 nmi Mirage 2000 320

350 nmi 350 F-16C

F-15 300 300 nmi

Tornado IDS 480

0 100 200 300 400 500 Nautical Miles

•Tornado IDS/F-15 Launched from King Abdulaziz Air Base • F-16C/Mirage 2000 Launched from UAE 45 Air to Ground Ranges of GCC Aircraft Hi-Lo-Lo-Hi Profile (External Fuel Tanks Dropped on Combat)

Optimum Cruise

Optimum Cruise

Climb at Military Power Combat

Landing with Fuel Reserve Sea Level Dash

750 nmi

2 Mk84 (4,000 lbs) Payload 720 nmi Mirage 2000 620

720 F-16C

F-15 600

Tornado IDS 750

0 200 400 600 800 Nautical Miles •Tornado IDS/F-15 Launched from King Abdulaziz Air Base 46 • F-16C/Mirage 2000 Launched from UAE Air to Ground Ranges of Iranian Air Force

Mediterranean Sea Mission Profile: Hi-Lo-Hi

F-4E (Bushehr): (4) MK83 1000lb Bombs (1) 600 Gallon Fuel Tank 10 Minutes loiter time Bushehr Shiraz Range = 400 nmi

SU-24 (Shiraz): (4) 500 kg/1000 lb Bombs (1) 400 gallon tank 10 minutes loiter time Range = 590 nmi

SU-25 (Shiraz): (4) 500kg/1000lb Bombs (1) 400 gallon tank (2) 10 minutes loiter time Range = 600 nmi

47 • Old weapons provided good capability against most targets at moderate cost, particularly with appropriate weapon/target matching and with automated bombing system (5 to 10 mil CEP). Typically the first pass attack is a low altitude run, pop-up to a couple of thousand feet, CCIP delivery at 30 to 45 degrees dive.

•This would increase exposure to ground based SAM/AAA air defense systems in the target area, increasing aircraft loss rate, decreasing survivability thereby lowering number of sorties, eventually target kills.

• Old weapons mainly consist of:

. Conventional Iron Bombs (MK-80 Series Low Drag and Retarded) . Canister Weapons (Rockeye, CBU’s) . Guided Weapons (TV Maverick)

• Current weapons provide large increases in targets killed per sortie, without dependency on heavy payloads, flexible delivery profile and standoff which also improve aircraft survivability.

. Advanced Canister Weapons (Tactical Munitions Dispensers) with various submunitions including mines for efficient runway cratering and multiple armor kills. . Improved Guided Weapons, Such as the GPS/INS for mid course navigation and Imaging Infra Red for terminal homing. Current and Future Weapons Systems Operational Requirements resulting in:

• High single-shot kill probability • Weapons that serve as an effective force multiplier • Stand-off capability, Operating from ranges outside enemy point defenses. • Low and High altitude launch, outside the lethal ranges of current and future SAM systems. • Preserving crew and aircraft survivability • Being effective against a wide array of Land and Sea targets • Weapons that employ Launch and Leave with high accuracy, such as . Coupled GPS/INS for mid course navigation . Imaging Infra Red and data link for Terminal Homing • Capable of Day/Night and Adverse Weather conditions

48 Weapon System Guidance Mission Warhead Range & CEP

Joint Direct Attack Munition Accurate delivery of General Close Air Support (CAS) Warhead: Up to 15 nautical (JDAM) Purpose Bombs. Guidance Air Interdiction BLU-109 Penetrator MK84; miles Variants: consists of an INS/GPS in the tail Offensive Counterair GBU-29 : 25lb MK80 section. Suppression of Enemy Air Defense Warhead: 13 m using integrated GBU-30 : 500lb MK81 (SEAD) 535 lbs Tritonal (BLU-109) GPS/INS unit GBU-31 : 1000lb MK83 JDAM Product Improvement Naval Anti-Surface Warfare 945 lbs Tritonal (MK 84) 30 m using INS only GBU-32 : 2000lb MK84 Plan PIP GPS/INS mid-course Amphibious Strike with a terminal seeker to provide Hard Target penetrators: a CEP of 3m BLU-109 2000lb Blu-110 1000lb

GBU-10 Paveway II Laser Guided Bomb. Air Interdiction Warhead: Up to 8 nmi The operator illuminates a target Bridges, SCUDS, C4I Nodes and BLU-109 Penetrator GBU-10E/B : MK84 2000lb with a laser designator and then Bunkers MK84 lb; CEP= 9m GBU-12D/B : MK82 500lb the bomb is guided to a spot of Blast/Fragmentation GBU-16B/B : MK83 1000lb laser energy reflected from the MK13 / 18 : 1000lb target. Explosive: 535 lbs Tritonal (BLU-109) 945 lbs Tritonal (Mk 84)

GBU-15 Unpowered Glide Weapon. Offensive Counterair MK84 GP Bombs Greater than 5 nmi The weapon is remotely Close Air Support BLU-109 Penetrating Bombs controlled by a data link system, Air Interdiction and operator locates the target Naval Anti-Surface Warfare Explosive: area and the specific aim point 535 lbs Tritonal (BLU-109) by observing the video 945 lbs Tritonal (Mk 84) transmitted from the weapon. Weapon Video is either Electro- Optical (TV Camera) or Infra- Red.

GBU-24 Paveway III LLLGB Low Level Laser Guided Close Air Support (CAS) MK84 GP Bombs Up to 10nmi Developed in response to Air Interdiction BLU-109 Penetrating Bombs sophisticated enemy air Offensive Counterair Designed for low defenses, poor visibility and to Naval Anti-Surface Warfare Explosive: altitude delivery and counter limitations in low ceilings. Mobile Hard, Fixed Hard and Soft 535 lbs Tritonal (BLU-109) with a capability of Targets. 945 lbs Tritonal (Mk 84) improved standoff ranges to reduce exposure.

GBU-27/28 GBU-27 : Penetrates 1.8 to 2.4 GBU-27 : BLU-109 2000lb meters of concrete hard targets. Class warhead. 550 lbs explosive GBU-28 : Bunker Buster. Penetrates at least 6 meters of GBU-28 : BLU-113 4000lb concrete (reinforced) and 30 m of Class warhead. 630 lbs of earth. explosive. 49 Airfield Attack Current Weapons and Methods

JP 233 The JP 233 was a British submunition delivery system used on the Tornado IDS. Each JP 233 was divided into a rear section with 30 SG-357 Runway Cratering Submunitions and the front section carrying 215 HB-876 anti-personnel mines. Both types were retarded by small parachutes.

The SG-357 weighed 26 kilograms and was a two-stage munition – a shaped charge in the front blasted a hole in the runway’s concrete. A second charge fell into the hole and exploded, producing a large crater. The HB-876 (2.4 kg) anti-personnel mines would lie scattered on the surface, making rapid repair of the runways nearly impossible. They would explode at preset intervals or if disturbed were capable of disabling bulldozers or other earth-moving equipment.

Durandal • Released in horizontal flight: o At very low level of 180 feet with aircraft speed between 280 to 600 knots. • Terminal Impact Speed: 250 m/sec • Warhead: 30 lb explosive (TNT Tolite) • Crater Dimensions: o Diameter: 20 ft o Depth: 10 ft

50 BAP 100 mm MBDA France

BAP 100 is a lightweight air launched runway attack bomb designed in the 1970s as an alternative to the BLU-107 Durandal Antirunway Weapon.

Bomb Length 1.8 m Bomb Weight 36 kg Adapter of 6: 240 kg Adapter of 18: 760 kg Parachute Dragging For Safety 320 m A/C at 560 knots For verticality 45 degrees Z = 50m and time = 3.25 seconds 70 degrees Z = 80m and time = 4.25 seconds Booster Acceleration Penetration Speed 220 m/sec Area damaged by one bomb 50 square meters Fuze Has a fuze delay action allowing an explosion delay after the bomb strikes the target.

51 Cluster Munitions

Weapon Targets Submunitions Release & Footprint Notes

CBU-97 Sensor Tanks and Support Vehicles 10 Submunitions which are Weapon can be delivered in all The primary components of this Fuzed Weapon parachute stabilized. weather conditions, day and 1,000lb class weapon are the (SFW). night, from altitudes of 200 ft to SUU-66/B Tactical Munitions Each of the BLU-108/B 20,000 ft at speeds between Dispensor, 10 BLU-108/B submunitions contains 4 armor 250 to 650 knots. submunitions, and 40 “hockey penetrating projectiles with puck” shaped skeet infrared infrared sensors to detect Each CBU-97/B can cover an sensing projectiles. armored targets, prioviding 40 area of about 500 x 1200 ft. weapons total. Wind Corrected Munition Dispensor (WCMD) tail kit on SFW redesigned as a CBU-105, the delivery increases up to 40,000 ft and stand off ranges up to 12 miles can be achieved.

BL 755 Cluster Bomb Primary targets are Armored Vehicles and 147 Submunitions At 200 ft release altitude and Tanks with secondary soft targets (ant- 450 knots speed, pattern personnel) capabilities. dimensions 500 length x 100 ft width. BLU-97/B Combined Armor, Personnel and Material. A total of 202 bomblets are Approximately 650 x 1300 ft Effects Bomb (CEB) loaded in each dispensor.

Beluga General Purpose (with fragmentation 151 grenades Area Covered: In the case of low level release Grenade Dispensor grenades): 40 x 120 m short carpet against tanks, the grenade is Bomb Convoy of vehicles, POL, Parked Aircraft. Grenade mass : 1.3 kg 40 x 240 m long carpet capable of piercing up to Diameter : 66mm 300mm of steel plates, landing Anti Tank (with shaped charge grenades): Can be released from altitudes on the top part of the tank Tanks (stopped or slowed down), Armored of 60m (200 ft) and above, at thereby enhancing the kill Troop Carriers. speeds between 350 to 550 probability. knots. Interdiction (with delayed explosion grenades): Port and Harbour areas, Roads.

MK 20 Rockeye Tanks and Armored vehicles 247 piercing MK 118 bomblets. Release from 500ft and speed Each bomblet contains 100lbs 550 knots, Dispersal Pattern: of high explosive. 200ft length x 425ft width.

52 AGM-65 Maverick Air to Ground Missile

AGM-65 A/B TV Guidance

Laser Guidance AGM-65C Specifically designed for Close Air Support

AGM-65D Imaging Infra Red Seeker Head

AGM-65E Has a large penetrator warhead 300lb

AGM -65F Deployed by the Navy. Identical to AGM-65D except that it has a larger 300lb warhead

AGM-65G Deployed by the USAF, IIR seeker and a 300lb warhead

Anti Ship Missiles

Missile Guidance Maximum Range (nmi) Platform

AM-39 Exocet Inertial and Active 38 Air Launched Homing AGM 84D Harpoon Active Radar 90 + Air Launched

AS 15TT Radar & Radar 9.2 Helicopter Launched Altimeter

53 SAM Air Defense Systems and SEAD

54 Surveillance Radars:

• An effective surveillance radar system in a conflict environment must have the capability to deal with all types of air vehicles:

o Combat Aircraft and Bombers oTankers, AWACS, Signal Intelligence Gathering Platforms…. o Cruise Missiles o Helicopters o Unmanned Air Systems/Unmanned Air vehicles o Tactical Ballistic Missiles o Civilian Aircraft

• A ground based surveillance radar platform performs the functions of Detection, Tracking and Identification of the Air Vehicle.

• Combat aircraft and bombers are the traditional targets on which the information is required. This can be obtained by a number of ways. For instance if information is required to support Defensive Counterair Operations (Combat Air Patrol and Strip Launched Interceptors CAP/SLI).

• This might require that the radar coverage range extend some distance (usually 100nmi) in front of the friendly combat aircraft. However, this is dependent on how much Early Warning time does the overall Air Defense System of a defending Country need to effectively respond and to maximize the number of scrambled strip launched interceptors.

• Similarly in determining the surveillance-radar system needed to confront Ballistic Missiles and Stand-Off Missiles will depend on the requirement:

o How much National Defense is required to accomplish specific Political and Military Objectives, assuming a given level of technical performance for the defense system / surveillance radar.

55 • One can imagine several plausible objectives for instance: o Completely blocking an attack of a given size. o Attenuating an attack by a certain percentage. o Protecting some target set so that a specified fraction of the defended targets survive a given attack.

(Source: A Simple Model for Calculating Ballistic Missile Defense Effectiveness. Dean Wilkening. Science and Global Security 1999, Volume 8.2, pp. 183-215)

Iran’s Current Air/Missile Defenses

• U.S. never delivered integrated system before fall of Shah.

• Only modern short-range point defense system is TOR-M.

• Other short-range systems mix of older Russian system, SHORADs, and aging – possible inactive British and French systems.

• Medium to long-range systems are low capability or obsolescent.

• HAWKS and IHAWKs do not have capable ECM. Date back to 1960s and 1970s.

• Various versions of SA-2 obsolete.

• Radar sensor and battle management/C4I systems have major limitations.

• Less than 30 export versions of MiG-29, some not operational.

• F-14s do not have ability to use primary air defense missile since 1979-1980.

(Source: Anthony Cordesman Security Challenges and Threats in the Gulf: A Net Assessment. September 2008)

56 TOR-M Short Range Air Defense

• Russia has delivered an undetermined number –- possibly 29 --Tor-M1 systems (originally built for Greece) to the Islamic Republic of Iran, along with service contracts with an approximate value of $700,000,000.

• The Tor is low- to medium-altitude, short-range surface-to-air missile system designed for engaging airplanes, helicopters, cruise missiles, precision guided munitions, unmanned aerial vehicles and ballistic targets. NATO reporting names are SA-15 Gauntlet and SA-N-9 Gauntlet. It is designed to protect targets from attack day or night in any weather, not only by shooting down attacking aircraft but also by destroying any munitions before they reach their target.

• From the start the Tor system was designed to provide air defense against modern and future threats equipped with precision guided weapons like the AGM-86 ALCM.

• Tor missile system was accepted into service on the 19th March 1986. The Tor-M1 air has an additional fire control channel allowing two targets to be engaged at once, an improved optical channel, computer, ECM protection and warhead The Tor-M1-1 or Tor-M1V has improved network connectivity and ECM functions. The latest variant -- the Tor-M2E—has improved fire control radar coverage and four guidance channels allowing four missiles to be guided at any one time, plus a new wheeled chassis as well as a new digital computer system and a new all weather optical tracking system.

• Each 9K331 vehicle is a completely autonomous transporter, launcher, and radar unit TLAR that carries a modern phased array radar and 8 missiles stored vertically, ready to fire.

• Target tracking range is 24 km (15 miles), engagement range is up to 12 km (1-7.5 miles) with minimum range varying between 100-2000 m (328-5,621 feet), depending upon version. Effective Altitude is 10-6000m (33-20,000 ft).

• The digital computers allow for a high degree of automation, similar to the US Patriot missile system. Target threat classification is automatic. The system can be operated with little operator input, if desired. It is equipped with NBC (nuclear, biological and chemical) protection.

• The missiles utilize command guidance and their detonation is via a radar proximity fuze. The missiles can maneuver at up to 30Gsand can engage targets flying at up to Mach 2.

(Source: Anthony Cordesman Security Challenges and Threats in the Gulf: A Net Assessment. September 2008) 57 Medium to Long Range Surface To Air Missile Systems

Air Defense System Associated Early Associated Tracking & Guidance Missile Ranges (km) In Service Date Warning/Acquisition Radars Radars Altitude (ft)

SA-2 Spoon Rest D (P-18) Fansong A/B Max (km): 40 1971 Flat Face A (P-15) Min (km) : 8 Upgraded Altitude (ft): 3,000 to 90,000

SA-3 Flat Face B (P-19) Low Blow Max (km) : 30 1971 Squat Eye Min (km) : 6 Altitude (ft): 150 to 160,000

SA-6 Long Track (P-40) Straight Flush Max (km): 24 1973 Height Finder: Min (km) : 4 Thin Skin B (PRV-9) Altitude (ft): 50 to 45,000

SA-8 Flat Face B (P-19) Land Roll Max (km) : 15 1982 Long Track (P-40) Min (km) : 0.2 Height Finder: Altitude (ft): 40 to 40,000 Thin Skin B (PRV-9) SA-5 Back Trap (P-80) Square Pair Max (km) : 250 1983 Tall King C (P-14) Min (km) : 20 Spoon Rest D (P-18) Altitude (ft): 1,500 to 130,000 Height Finder: Odd pair (PRV-13) Odd Group (PRV-16)

IHAWK AN/MPQ-50 AN/MPQ-57 (PIP II)/61 (PIP III) Max (km): 35 1971 AN/MPQ-55(PIP II)/62 (PIP III) Min (km): 3 Range only Radar Altitude (ft): 0 to 55,000 ft

Patriot PAC-2 AN/MPQ-53 Phased-Array Radar AN/MSQ-104 Engagement Control Max (km): 70 1990 Carries out Search, target Station (ECS) Min (km): 3 detection, track and identification, Altitude (ft): 80,000 missile tracking and ECCM functions

• For SAM kill envelopes See Appendix II 58 AS 37 Air to Ground Anti Radar Missile

Mission Suppression of Enemy Air Defense (SEAD)

Target Surveillance, Tracking, Fire Control Radars. L, S and C Bands L : 900 – 1400 MHz S : 2700 – 3300 MHz C : 5000 – 5800 MHz

Fire and Forget Warhead 140 kg Blast Type capable of putting antennas or structures out of action from distance up to 16m. Blast pressure between 40 to 50 psi. Accuracy CEP up to 12 meters

Range Maximum Firing Distance at M 0.9 = 30 km Minimum Firing Distance at Low Altitude = 15 km

At 9,000 meters altitude: M 0.9 Range = 70 km M 1.2 Range = 80 km

12,000 meters altitude: M 1.2 Range = 95 km

59 Western Anti - Radar Missiles

Missile Guidance Maximum Range (nmi)

AGM-88 HARM Passive Radar Homing 60 +

SHRIKE 45A (ARM) Passive Radar Homing 7 to 9

AGM 780 Standard ARM Passive Radar Homing 13.5 to 30

AS 30 L Air to Ground Laser Guided Missile (MBDA France)

Propulsion 2 Stage Mach 09 Supersonic on Target

Navigation Proportional Navigation in Final Guidance

Guidance Laser reflection from target

Warhead Blast Fragmentation.

Range Maximum Range 10 km Stand off maneuver 7.5 km 4 G with illuminator Minimum Range 3.5 km

60 Russian Air To Surface Missiles

Missile Designation Guidance System Range (km) Platform

Zvezda / AA-7 Radio Command 10 MiG-23

Anti-Radiation Homing Raduga / AS-9 120 Su-24 (Anti – Radar) Radio Command / Anti Zvezda / AS-10 20 MiG-23 / Su-24M Radiation Homing

Raduga / AS-11 Anti-Radiation Homing 120 MiG-23 / Su-24M

Zvezda Kh-27 / AS-12 Anti-Radiation Homing 60 MiG-23

Semi Active Laser Guidance / Molinya / AS-14 10 MiG-23 / Su-24M Electro Optical

61 Defensive Counterair Operations DCA

62 Defensive Counterair Operations Mission : Defense of Border from Enemy Intrusion. Objective : Provide Airspace Surveillance over selected corridor and Intercept.

Combat Air Patrol

AWACS

Strip Launched Intercept

Ground Control Intercept Radar

Active Air and Missile Defense Passive Air and Missile Defense Active defense is defensive action taken to destroy, nullify, or reduce • Detection and Warning the effectiveness of air and missile threats against friendly forces and • Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) assets. It consists of two broad categories: Defenses • Air Defense • Camouflage, Concealment & Deception Defensive measures designed to destroy attacking enemy • Hardening combat aircraft or unmanned air vehicles, or to nullify or • Reconstitution reduce the effectiveness of such an attack. • Dispersion • Redundancy • Missile Defense • Mobility Defensive measures designed to destroy attacking enemy • Electronic and Infrared Countermeasures missiles, or to nullify or reduce the effectiveness of such • Low Observable (Stealth) Technology attack.

(Source: Counterair Operations USAF AFDD 2-1.1 October 1, 2008)

63 Airborne Warning & Control System (AWACS)

Attack Aircraft Iran Attack Aircraft

Early Warning CAP/ Radar SLI Saudi Arabia CAP/ Saudi Arabia SLI E-3 AWACS

Early Warning Radar The E-3 offers Surveillance Capabilities and Command, Control and Communications. AWACS Saudi Arabia Radar can separate targets from the ground E-3 AWACS clutter returns that limit other present-day radars. It’s radar “eye” has a 350-degree view on the horizon, and at operating altitudes can observe targets more than 320 km (200 miles) away. It also can detect and track both air and sea targets simultaneously. Saudi Arabia has 5 in its inventory. (Source: Boeing Integrated Defense Systems)

64 Saudi E-3 Specifications E-2C+

Primary Function Airborne Surveillance and Command, Control and Early Warning and Control Aircraft Communications Power Plant Four CFM-56-2 turbofan engines, 24,000 lb thrust Two Allison T56-A-427 engines-each has approximately 5,1000 horsepower Dimensions Airframe: span 44.43 meters; Length 46.62 meters; height Wing Aspect Ratio: 8.94m; Length 12.5 meters; Rotodome 9.1 meters diameter; w.8 meters overall:17.54; Height Overall: 5.58 m; Diameter thick; 3.35 meters mounted above fuselage. of Rotodome: 7.32m; Propeller Diameter: 4.11m; Wings Gross Area: 5.76 square meters. Speed More than 800 km/hour Max 350 knots, 650 km/hr

Endurance More than 11 hours (without refueling) 4 hr 24 minutes at 175 nmi from base

Aircraft Ceiling More than 10,670 meters (35,000 ft) 11,275 / 37,000 ft

Range More than 9,250 km (5,000 nmi) 1,500 nmi

Crew 17 (four flight crew, 13 AWACS specialists) 5, 2 pilots and 3 operators

Maximum takeoff weight 151,955 kg 5,624 kg / 54,426 lbs

• Any lack of coordination and cooperation between friendly firing units, the distribution of the fired salvos over targets is a Random Process i.e. many may fire at a single target so in effect we might have two aircraft firing on the same target rather than distributing themselves between the targets.

• E-3 AWACS with it’s Command, Control, and Communications can ensure that there is a more uniform distribution between weapons and targets thereby avoiding a random distribution.

•The AWACS serves as a Force Multiplier in this role.

65 Saudi Arabia E-3 AWACS

• The Peace Sentinel program for Saudi Arabia began in 1981. It included five AWACS aircraft and six E-3 derivative (KE-3) inflight refueling tanker aircraft, along with spare parts, trainers and support equipment. In 1984, the Saudi government exercised an option to increase the tanker order to eight. The first Saudi E-3 was delivered in June 1986, with deliveries of the remaining E-3s and tankers completed by September 1987.

• In August 2001, Boeing began installing new mission computers and other hardware and software on the Royal Saudi Air Force (RSAF) AWACS fleet, as part of a contract worth $60 million. Under the contract, Boeing upgraded the aircraft's mission computer and software to the same level currently in use by the U.S. AWACS fleet and provide RSAF operator training. Upgrading the five AWACS aircraft was completed in 2003.

• In 2008, Boeing completed a major communications upgrade on the first of five Saudi E-3 Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft. Installation and checkout of the aircraft were performed at the Boeing Military Flight Center in Seattle. The enhancement, known as Link 16, is a secure, jam-resistant, digital data link that allows military aircraft, ships and ground units to exchange tactical pictures in near real time. Link 16 also supports the exchange of text messages and imagery data and provides additional channels for digital voice. The Link 16 AWACS upgrade is the first in a series of anticipated technology upgrades to the Saudi AWACS fleet.

• This powerful capability provides the Saudi fleet with a secure data and voice link, allowing direct communication between their AWACS aircraft and forward-positioned fighter aircraft. The fleet upgrade is scheduled to be completed in December 2009. The Royal Saudi Air Force is also pursuing a multi phase Radar System Improvement Program (RSIP) similar to other AWACS users. Phase 1 is the design and long lead parts initiative with Phase 2 as the production program. The Phase 1 contract was awarded in 2008. A Phase 2 contract will be awarded in the 3rd quarter of 2009. This will bring the Saudi AWACS configuration in line with the rest of the world-wide AWACS fleets for secure data links and radar enhancements.

(Source: Boeing Integrated defense Systems – AWACS)

66 Air to Air Mission Profiles and Weapon Systems

67 Air to Air Ranges of GCC Aircraft Air Superiority Mission (External Fuel Tanks Dropped)

Optimum Cruise

Optimum Cruise Dwell Combat Climb at Military Power Landing with Fuel Reserve

Mirage 2000 820

820 nmi 900 nmi 900 F-16C 4 AAMs Payload Zero Dwell Time

F-15 800

650 Tornado ADV

0 200 400 600 800 1000 •Tornado ADV/F-15 Launched from King Abdulaziz Air Base Nautical Miles • F-16C/Mirage 2000 Launched from UAE 68 Air to Air for GCC Aircraft Combat Air Patrol Mission (External Fuel Tanks Dropped on Combat)

Optimum Cruise

Optimum Cruise Optimum Loiter Combat Climb at Military Power Landing with Fuel Reserve

Mirage 2000 2.8

F-16C 3.6

2.5 4 AAMs Payload F-15 Range 200 nmi

Tornado ADV 2.6

0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4

Loiter Time (hrs)

69 Time to Climb From Brake Release F-16C Supersonic Intercept Maximum Thrust From Brake Release 40,000ft, 1.8 Mach

Aircraft Payload Time in Minutes F-15C 4 AIM 7 2.5 2 AIM 9

Mission Configuration Tornado 2 SRAAM 2.7 (300 Gal Tank Retained) ADV 180 nmi @ 1.4M Mirage 2 Magic 3.7 14.9 min 2000 F-16C 2 AIM 9 3.6 140 nmi 215 nmi @ 1.6M @ 1.2M 11.1 min 20.1 min

200 nmi @ 1.3M 17.2 min

160 nmi @ 1.5M 12.8 min

70 Air Superiority/CAP Ranges of Iranian Air Force

TURKEY Caspian Tabriz Sea Mehrabad Kermanshah Tehran Hamadan Natanz F-4E (Bushehr): Mediterranean Syria Arak IRAN Sea (2) AIM-7E IRAQ Esfahan Masjed (4) AIM-9 Dezful Suleiman Umidiyeh (2) 370 Gallon Fuel Tank Jordan 30 Minutes loiter time Bushehr Zahedan Range = 300 nmi Al-Jouf KUWAIT Shiraz 80 Minutes loiter time Bandar Abbas King Faisal Range = 100 nmi King Khaled MC Chahbahar Hail King Abdulaziz BAHRAIN Gulf of Oman King Abdulaziz MA Riyadh QATAR Al Dhafra UAE MiG-29 (Bushehr EGYPT Al Musana’a Al Kharj Al Safran Seeb (2) R-27 (AA-10) Prince Sultan (4) R-73 (AA-11) Taif Masirah (1) 400 Gallon Fuel Tank Sulayel 15 Minutes Loiter Time SUSAN OMAN Range = 350 nmi SAUDI-ARABIA Thumrait King Khaled Salalah Nejran YEMEN San’a Riya Arabian Sea Hadaydeh Aden Al Anad

Air Bases Source: Global Security.org Order of Battle Source: Anthony Cordesman CSIS

71 Current AAMs Operational Requirements

Within Visual Range AAMs (SRAAM) Beyond Visual Range AAMs (MRAAM)

• IIR Seeker head capable to discriminate the • Capable of multiple target engagement target even in the presence of strong counter- when linked to a track-while-scan radar. measures. • Guidance system: • When Interlaced to a Head Mounted Sight . Inertial Navigation + Update (HMS) the new all aspect high off-bore sight Command via data link during the mid- capability for engagement can reach +/- 90 course phase degrees, plus high maneuverability. . Active radar homing in the terminal phase. • The ASRAAM to be cued by not only the sensor on board the fighter aircraft (fire • Good target discrimination and enhance control radar or infra-red search and track resistance to countermeasures. IRST), but also mainly by the pilot via the HMS. • Increase in Range while also Shortening the flight time to the target. • ASRAAM to be fully compatible with all the interface of the AIM-9 missile family.

• More details on Current Air to Air Missiles can be found in Appendix I

72 Russian Air To Air Missiles

Missile Designation Guidance System Range (km) Platform

K-13 / AA-2D Infra Red 7.5 AIM-9 Equivalent

R-40TD / AA-6 Semi Active Radar Homing 50 MiG-25 / 31

K-23 / AA-7 Semi Active Radar Homing 50 MiG-23 ML

MiG -23/29/31 R-60 / AA-8 Infra Red 10 SU-24 / 27

K-60 / AA-10 Semi Active Radar Homing 80 MiG-29, Su-27/35

Replacement of the current AA-2. R-73 / AA-11 Infra Red 30 on MiG-23ML/MiG-29/Su-27

73 Short Range AAMs

Missile Country Guidance Warhead Fuze Type Range (km) In Service

Kentron 17 kg South Africa IIR Laser 20 2008 A-Darter Fragmentation B GT Germany IIR 11.4 kg Laser 25 2005 IRIS-T MBDA Blast U.K. IIR Laser 20 2002 ASRAAM Fragmentation Raytheon 10.2 kg USA IIR Laser 10 2003 AIM-9X Fragmentation Rafael 11 kg Israel IIR Laser 30 2005 Python-5 Fragmentation Vympel 7.4 kg Russia IR + Inertial Laser 30 1996 R-73 M2 Fragmentation

IIR: Imaging Infra Red IR + I: Infra Red + Inertial

(Source : Military Technology MILTECH 7/2006)

74 Medium Range AAMs

Missile Country Guidance Warhead Fuze Range (km) In Service

MBDA France R (J Band) 12 kg Blast Contact/Radar 60 1998 MICA IR (Dual Band) Fragmentation MBDA International R (Ku-Band) Blast Contact/Radar >100 2012 Meteor Fragmentation Vympel R-77 Russia R (J Band) 22.5 kg Blast Contact/Radar 80 2002 (RVV-AE) Fragmentation Raytheon USA R (I Band) 20 kg Directed Contact/Radar >50 1991 AIM-120C-5 Fragmentation CATIC China R(I Band) Blast Proximity 70 2007 PL-12 Fragmentation Rafael Israel R 11 kg Blast Proximity >60 2002 Derby Fragmentation Kentron South Africa RI - Proximity > 60 - R-Darter

Guidance Type: R: Inertial Guidance with Mid-Course Updating + Active Radar Terminal Seeker IR: Inertial Guidance with Mid-Course Updating + Imaging Infra Red terminal Seeker RI: Inertial Guidance + Active Radar Terminal Seeker

MICA is available in two versions: MICA EM with terminal active pulse Doppler Radar Seeker MICA IR with terminal imaging dual-band infrared seeker

(Source : Military Technology MILTECH 7/2006) 75 Counterspace

 US Air Force counterspace operations are the ways and means by which the Air Force achieves and maintains space superiority. Space and Air Superiority are crucial first steps in any military operations

 Effective counterspace operations depend on space situational awareness to provide an understanding of global space operations and is derived from C2, ISR, and Environmental Information. Like counterair, counterspace operations have an offensive and a defensive component.

Offensive Counterspace (OCS) Operations Defensive Counterspace (DCS) Operations

Consist of operations that deny, degrade, Consist of operations that preserve space disrupt, destroy, or deceive an adversary’s capabilities, withstand enemy attack, space capability or the service provided by a restore/recover space capabilities after an third-party’s space asset(s) to the adversary at a attack, and reconstitute space forces. time and place of our choosing through attacks on the space nodes, terrestrial nodes, or the DCS operations should be proactive in nature to links that comprise a space system. protect our capabilities and prevent the adversary from disrupting overall friendly These operations range from dropping operations. Suppression of threats to friendly ordnance on terrestrial nodes of space systems space capabilities is a key of DCS operations. to jamming enemy satellite uplink or downlink frequencies. OCS operations initiated early in a An example of DCS operations from Operation contingency can result in an immediate IRAQI FREEDOM was the destruction of advantage in space capabilities and control of adversary, ground-based global positioning the space medium. system (GPS) jammers to preserve freedom to employ GPS-aided munitions by friendly forces.

(Source: Space Operations USAF AFDD 2-2, November 27, 2006) 76 Information Operations

Information operations (IO) are actions taken to influence, affect, or defend information, systems, and/or decision-making to create effects across the battle space. IO must be integrated into air and space component operations in the same manner as traditional air and space capabilities. IO can create effects across the entire battle space and provide advantages to a commander assigned an operational mission.

. Electronic warfare operations are those military actions involving the use of electromagnetic and directed energy to control the electromagnetic spectrum or to attack the enemy across the electromagnetic battle space.

. Network warfare operations are the integrated planning and employment of military capabilities to achieve desired effects across the digital battle space. Network warfare operations are conducted in the information domain, which is composed of hardware, software, data, and human components.

(Source: Information Operations USAF AFDD 2-5, January 11, 2005)

77 Intelligence, Surveillance & Reconnaissance (ISR):

Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) is defined as an activity that synchronizes and integrates the planning and operation of sensors, assets, processing, exploitation, and dissemination systems in direct support of current and future operations. This is an integrated intelligence and operations function.

Goal: The goal of ISR operations is to provide accurate, relevant, and timely intelligence to decision makers. Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) are often referred to as a collective whole, though the capabilities are distinctive and each fulfills a different purpose. These distinctive capabilities are defined below:

 Intelligence is the product resulting from the collection, processing, integration, analysis, evaluation, and interpretation of available information concerning foreign countries or areas; it is the information and knowledge about a topic obtained through observation, investigation, analysis, or understanding. (JP 1-02)

 Surveillance is the systematic observation of aerospace [sic], surface or subsurface areas, places, persons, or things, by visual, aural, electronic, photographic, or other means. (JP 1-02).

 Reconnaissance is a mission undertaken to obtain, by visual observation or other detection methods, information about the activities and resources of an enemy or potential enemy, or to secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a particular area. (JP 1-02).

The information derived from surveillance and reconnaissance, converted into intelligence by exploitation and analysis, is used to formulate strategy, policy, and military plans; to develop and conduct campaigns; guide acquisition of future capabilities; and to protect, prevent, and prevail against threats and aggression aimed at the US and its interests. Air Force surveillance and reconnaissance assets are not inherently strategic, operational, or tactical in nature; they can be used to gather information to meet requirements at all levels of warfare. ISR operations are conducted across the range of military operations from peace, to war, to conflict resolution.

(Source: Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance Operations USAF AFDD 2-9, July 17 2007)

78  STRATEGIC, OPERATIONAL, AND TACTICAL ISR ISR supports strategic, operational, and tactical operations by providing intelligence and services to a diverse set of consumers, to include national agencies; geographic, functional, or Service components; and unit-level decision makers.

 ISR PRINCIPLES

ISR operations provide intelligence information to commanders and decision makers at all levels, helping them reduce uncertainties in the decision-making process. To be effective, ISR products must be responsive to the commander’s or decision maker’s needs. Intelligence products must enable strategic, operational, and tactical users to better understand the operational environment systematically, spatially, and temporally, allowing them to orient themselves to the current and predicted situation to enable decisive action. By adhering to the principles listed below, ISR personnel and systems can maximize intelligence support to consumers.

• Integrated • Accurate • Relevant • Timely • Fused • Accessible • Secure • Survivable, Sustainable, and Deployable • Unified Effort • Persistent and Global Reach • Network Centric

79 UAS’s / UAV’s

80 Unmanned Air Vehicles/Systems (UAVs/UAS’s)

• UAV’s/UAS’s where initially employed in a range of conventional missions such as:

o Intelligence, Surveillance & Reconnaissance (ISR) o Target Acquisition o Signal Intelligence (COMMINT and ELINT)

• UAV’s/UAS’s where further developed with the capability to carry Air to Surface missiles, and to attack targets autonomously. This gave the UAV’s/UAS’s the ability to carry out Strategic and Tactical Missions:

o Strategic Missions which require more endurance and weapons payload o Tactical Missions which require a reduction in size.

• Both missions require a weaponization capability for the destruction of enemy forces and Air Defense systems. UAV’s/UAS’s have the advantage of being low risk for the missions and have become an indispensable weapon of war. UAV’s/UAS’s survivability against heavily defended targets is higher than that in manned aircraft

• Tactical UAV/UAS Missions cover:

o ISR o SEAD o Electronic Attack (Deception/Jamming….) o Mobile Network Node/Communications Relay. UAV’s/UAS’s can be utilized as nodes in a mobile communications network for the maneuvering forces.

81 (Source: Headquarters U.S. Air Force. Air Force Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) Flight Plan 2009-2047. Lt. Gen Dave Deptula, Deputy Chief of Staff Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance; Colonel Eric Mathewson AF UAS Task Force).

82 (Source: Headquarters U.S. Air Force. Air Force Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) Flight Plan 2009-2047. Lt. Gen Dave Deptula, Deputy Chief of Staff Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance; Colonel Eric Mathewson AF UAS Task Force).

83 (Source: Headquarters U.S. Air Force. Air Force Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) Flight Plan 2009-2047. Lt. Gen Dave Deptula, Deputy Chief of Staff Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance; Colonel Eric Mathewson AF UAS Task Force).

84 85 Defensive Counterair Operations

Combat Air Patrol (CAP) and Strip Launched Interceptors (SLI)

86 Central Factors in Threat Engagement Analysis:

. C4I (Command Control Communications Computing and Intelligence) and the maximum Air Defense engagement force . The Operational Readiness of the forces resulting in the combat forces available as Full Mission Capable. . The maximum usable Ground/Strip Launched Interceptor force and Combat Air Patrol operations.

The total available combat aircraft at the start of a conflict is the: (Total Assets) – (Number of Aircraft not Operational Ready)

In the Alert Phase of air operations, the combat ready assets are assigned to the Ground Launched Intercept and Combat Air Operations (CAP).

Maximum Strip Launched Interceptors • C4I delay time is assumed to be the time taken by the Early Warning Radars in detecting the Intruders, threat assessment and transmission of the data/ information to the various Air Defense sectors and airbases. This time interval has to be minimized and optimized and is dependent on the type of C4I hardware and software that are in place.

• The response time is assumed to begin after airbases are put on alert, and is the scramble time for combat aircraft to be in the air (wheels up). This time interval has also to be minimized and is very dependent on aircraft type.

• At the end of the response time we assume two interceptors are launched and two more are launched every 30 seconds after until the interceptors can no longer intercept the intruders outside of the “keep out range”.

• The Maximum Strip Launched Interceptors is highly sensitive to the C4I time delay and the response time.

87 Combat Aircraft Required for CAP Mission

1400 1200 Airborne Radar 1000 Ranges 800 • A/C Sortie Rate : 3 R= 60 nmi • Length of Operational Day : 18 hours 600 • Airborne Radar Search Sector = 120 degrees 400

• 50% Overlap between two CAP Aircraft (nmi)Width Corridor R= 50 nmi • R : Airborne Radar Range in Search Mode (nmi) 200 0 R= 40 nmi 20 40 60 80 100 No. of A/C

Maximum Strip Launched Interceptors

60 • Keep out Range from Airbase : 40 km • Strike Aircraft Speed : 0.85 Mach at Sea Level 50 C4I + Aircraft • 2 A/C launched in pairs every 30 seconds Response Time •C4I + Response Time : 120 sec, 180 sec, 240 sec. 40

Increase SLI Interceptors by: 30 • Minimizing C4I Time 120 sec

• Minimizing Aircraft Scramble Time A/C of No. 20 180 sec 10 240 sec 0 100 150 200 250 300 Commit Range (km)

88 Required Aircraft for CAP Mission

700

600

500

Higher Sortie Rate 400 Longer Loiter Time Sortie Rate = 3,Loiter Time = 2 hrs Longer Radar Range 300 Sortie Rate = 1,Loiter Time = 2 hrs 200 Number of AircraftRequired of Number Sortie Rate = 3,Loiter Time = 3 hrs

100 Sortie Rate = 1,Loiter Time = 3 hrs

0 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55

Radar Range

Decreasing the Number of A/C required for CAP:

• High Sortie Rate in return higher Operational Readiness is required • Longer Loiter Time capability • Longer Radar Range with high probability of detection

89 Assumptions regarding Iranian Aircraft:

CAP: SLI (Strip Launched Intercept): Aircraft Sorties Rate : 2 per day Keep out range : 40 km 18 hour operational day Strike A/C Speed : 0.85 Mach Airborne radar sector search : 120 degrees Response Time : 360 seconds Radar Range : 60nmi

Aircraft Allocated CAP Maximum SLI

GCC 60 55 (Corridor Width:800 nmi) Iran 24 38 (Corridor Width: 200 nmi)

Weakness in the Operational Performance of the Iranian Air Force • Long C4I Early Warning delay time due to antiquated System, semi-automated man in the loop. • Long Response / Scramble Time by Combat Aircraft • Low Operational Readiness Rate of Combat Aircraft o Need Improvement in maintenance operations o Need Improvement in supply of spare parts • Low Combat Aircraft Sortie Rates, Sustained and Surge. • High Loss Exchange Ratio in a Closing / BVR Environment and Visual Engagement Environment. • Centralized Battle Management

90 Missions and Air Force Effectiveness Force Allocation Analysis

91 GCC Airforce Tactical Fighter Capabilities - 2009

Operational Force Postulated Type Order of Battle Force Available Ready % Sorties per Day Employment

Tornado ADV Saudi Arabia: 25 75 19 57 Deep Strike

FS, BAS, AD, Escort Tornado IDS Saudi Arabia: 85 75 64 192

UAE: 62 UAE: 46 UAE: 138 FS, BAS, AD, Escort Mirage 2000 Qatar: 12 75 Qatar: 9 Qatar: 27 (Total: 74) (Total: 55) (Total: 165) FS, BAS, AD, Escort, CAS, BI, F-18 Kuwait: 39 75 29 87 SEAD

Bahrain: 21 Bahrain: 16 Bahrain: 48 FS,BAS, AD, Oman: 12 Oman: 9 Oman: 27 F-16C/D 75 Escort, CAS, BI UAE: 80 UAE: 60 UAE: 180 (Total: 113) (Total: 85) (Total: 255) FS, BAS, AD, F-15C/D Saudi Arabia: 84 75 63 189 Escort, CAS, BI Deep Strike, FS, F-15S Saudi Arabia: 71 75 53 160 AD, Escort, CAS, BI

Total 491 368 1,105

FS: Fighter Sweep, BAS: Battlefield Air Superiority, AD: Air Defense, CAS: Close Air Support (Air to Ground Role), BI: Battle Field Interdiction (Air to Ground Role) SEAD: Suppression of Enemy Air Defense Sustained Conditions : 12 hr Operational Day 18 hr Maintenance Day 3 Sorties per aircraft per day

92 Iran Airforce Tactical Fighter Capabilities - 2009

Operational Force Total Sortie Postulated Type No Readiness (%) Available Per Day Employment

MiG-29A 25 60 15 30 Air Defense/Escort/FS/BAS

Su-25 13 60 8 16 CAS/BI/Deep Strike

SU-24 30 60 18 36 CAS/BI/Deep Strike

F-14 25 60 15 30 Air Defense/FS CAS/BI/Deep

F-4E/D 65 69 39 78 Strike/SEAD

Total 158 95 190

BAS: Battlefield Air Superiority CAS: Close Air Suport BI: Battlefield Interdiction DS: Defense Suppression FS: Fighter Sweep

Sustained Conditions : 12 hr Operational Day 18 hr Maintenance Day 2 Sorties per Aircraft per day

93 Airfield Attack Offensive Counterair Operations Analysis

94 Runway Attack Operational Requirements:

• Pilots at the airbase under attack will try to take-off in the shortest possible Take-off Length (TOL) and Minimum Clear Width (MCW) required. For modern aircraft such as the F-16 it is safe to assume a a minimum TOL of 3,000 ft and a MCW of 50 ft.

• For runways that are 9,000 ft in length, it would then take 3 cuts each 3,000 ft long and 50 ft MCW to stop combat aircraft from taking off.

Runway Attack Old Weapons and Methods

Unguided Bombs • High altitude horizontal bombing or Diving attack • Large Dispersions Guided Bombs • Laser guided bombs, requiring high altitude approach and weapon release. • The target must be illuminated: o By the same target o By another aircraft Retarded Bombs • Military runways have hard concrete surfaces. • Retarded bombs usually arrive at end of flight with a very low Kinetic Energy. • Attack aircraft must: o Keep a high altitude or o Climb and then perform a dive attack with stabilized aiming. This would increase the overall exposure of the aircraft to enemy point air defense systems.

95 The number of aircraft sorties required to attack a given airbase is determined by: • The number of surfaces to be closed i.e. a runway or both a runway and taxiway. • The aircraft payload • The number of required passes per cut • Criteria for the probability of closing a runway.

Number of Cuts to Close Runway = Runway length / Take off Length (TOL) = 9000 / 3000 = 3

Runway Length: 9000 ft

TOL : 3000ft

Strike Aircraft

Aircraft Shelters Threat Parked Aircraft

96 Air Base Runway Attack

• Survivability not taken into consideration from possible Ground SAM/AAA Air Defense Systems. • Required Probability of Interdiction = 0.8

Current Weapons Effects and Payload Comparisons

Durandal BAP-100 JP 233

A/C Weapon Load / Munitions per Cut per pass 8 36 60

Crater Damage Diameter (ft) 24 14 16

Probability of cut per pass 0.55 0.75 0.7

A/C Sorties per cut 2 1 1

Total Sorties per Airbase Strike 6 3 3

97 Runway Unguided Weapon Attack

Payload per Sortie: 4 MK83 (1,000 lb) Bombs Three Cuts

60 51 Probability of 50 42 Interdiction Required 36 36 40 33 27 27 30 21 23 0.7 18 15 20 12

Number of Sorties ofNumber 10 0.8 0 10 20 30 40 0.9 CEP (Mils)

Old Weapons Effects and Payload Comparisons

• First Pass Attack: Low Altitude Run, Pop-Up to 8,000 ft AGL, CCIP Delivery at 30 to 45 Degrees Dive. • Survivability not taken into consideration from possible Ground SAM/AAA Air Defense Systems. • Low Drag MK83 Bombs

98 Runway Closure Mission Planning Assumptions

Payload Mission Target(s) Desired Objective Aircraft Configuration

• Closure with 70% Confidence. (5) Airfields, each with • Closure for 3 days. TORNADO IDS Runway Closure BAP 100 runways 9000ft by 200 ft • Minimum Clearing Width:20 ft F-15S • Minimum clearing Length:3000ft

(3) Corridors each with 3 F-15E SAM Sites • Engage on H Hour AS-37 Enroute SEAD F-16C (5) Airfields with Short • Neutralize prior to Strike HARM MIRAGE 2000 Range SAM and AAA Guns F-15E/C AIM-120 F-16C Fighter Sweep CAP Aircraft Engage and Neutralize AMRAAM MIRAGE 2000 SRAAM TORNADO ADV F-15E/C AIM -120 Point and Area Defense Fighter Escort Protect the Strike Force F-16C AMRAAM Interceptors MIRAGE 2000 SRAAM

99 Aircraft Required for Airfield Closure

Required Sorties Number of Aircraft Required to Number of Aircraft Required to Payload per Airbase Strike close 5 Airfields for 3 days close 5 Airfields for 7 days Bap-100 (36) 3 27 56 Durandal (8) 6 55 112 JP-233 (60) 3 27 56 MK-83 (4) 12 110 225 CEP = 10 mils MK-83 (4) 21 192 393 CEP = 20 mils

Bases attacked per Sortie = 1 Attrition per Sortie = 1.5% Probability of Closure Criteria = 70% Estimated Closure Time of Runway = 12 hours Strike Aircraft Operational Readiness = 85% Sorties per Aircraft per Airfield Closure Time = 3

100 Air Defense and SEAD Operations Analysis

101 •Criteria for evaluating SAM systems: o SAM defense system completely destroying all attack aircraft, with a required probability, or o Attenuating an attack by a certain percentage.

Expected aircraft loss in a raid of 20 aircraft over target area 20 n : the grouping of SAM defense systems in a complex 18 n=5 IHAWK n = 3, PK = 0.75, Aircraft Destroyed : 10 16 n=4 SA-2 n = 3, PK = 0.40, Aircraft Destroyed : 6 14 n=3 IHAWK n = 5, PK = 0.75, Aircraft Destroyed : 13 Destroyed 12 n=2 SA-2 n = 5, PK = 0.40, Aircraft Destroyed : 7 10

8

6 n=1 4

Number of Aircraft of Number 2

0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1

SAM Probability of Kill

. Aircraft Raid Density: 4 A/C per Minute . Average value of the time required by the AD system to fire (1 or 2 missiles) on a single target = 0.5 minutes . Probability of target detection prior to the time when the missile complex is still in a position to fire on the target = 0.9 . Rules of Engagement: 1 or 2 missiles launched per target

102 Typical Suppression of Enemy Air Defense Mission Profiles (SEAD)

60 degree dive High Altitude 65 km Range

Low Altitude 40 km Range

AS-37 Anti-Radiation Missile (ARM)

103 Estimated Kill Probability vs SAM Site in a SEAD Mission 6

5 For a probability of kill of 85%: • 2 Aircraft Sorties each carrying 1 AS-37 ARM is required. • 3 Aircraft Sorties each carrying 1 AS-11 ARM is required 4

Sorties 3 AS-37 2 AS-11

1

0 0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5 0.55 0.6 0.65 0.7 0.75 0.8 0.85 0.9 0.95

Single Pass Kill Probability

Payload: (1) Anti-Radiation Air to Surface Missile per Aircraft Sortie

104 Maverick AGM-65B Kill Probability vs SAM site Standard Maverick Release Envelope

Payload Probability of Kill

1 Maverick / pass 0.67

2 Mavericks / pass 0.88

3 Mavericks / pass 0.95

AS-7 Kerry Anti-Radar Missile vs SAM site

Payload Probability of Kill

1 AS-7 / pass 0.42

2 AS-7 / pass 0.66

3 AS-7 / pass 0.81

105 Short Range Surveillance System Survivability vs ARM Attack

GCC Iran Desired Probability of destruction of ground target: 0.85 0.85

Probability of single target kill by aircraft: 0.75 0.4

Probability of Aircraft Kill by Air Defense System with Cueing: SA-2: 0.4 IHAWK: 0.75

In the absence of any Air Defenses the Sortie Size needed to achieve a desired Probability of 1 4 target destruction is: The effective result of the defense is to reduce the strike kill probability per sortie to: 0.45 from 0.10 from 0.75 0.4

When A/D system responds (no ARM attack yet) the necessary strike sortie rate size becomes: 3 from 1 18 from 4

Probability of a single ARM to destroy a sensor it is attacking (from slide 104): 0.70 0.55

Number of Aircraft attacking each Radar Site: 2 3 Probability of damage on each radar site by aircraft attacking: 0.91 0.91 Number of Radar Sites: 5 5 Effective kill probability of the Defense with No Cueing: 0.20 0.40 Resulting Defense Effectiveness Reduced to: 0.30 0.58 From 0.40 From 0.75

Therefore total Aircraft Sorties required for Air to Ground Mission resulting from the defense 2 from 1 9 from 4 effectiveness and ARM attack.

(Reference: Mathematical Model based on Air Defense Artillery. Summer 1983. “SHORAD Surveillance System Survivability vs Enemy ARM Strategies”) 106 Effectively what we have is the following for a single target attack, and 5 radars along the route:

Without Air Defenses With Air Defenses Present With Air Defenses and ARM Present Attack GCC Iran GCC vs Iran vs GCC vs Iran vs SA-2 IHAWK SA-2 IHAWK (AS-37) (AS-11) Number of Sorties Required for 1 4 3 18 2 9 Counterland Operation (CAS & AI)

GCC will have to allocate 10 Aircraft for SEAD Operation and 2 Aircraft for single target attack in Counterland Operation to produce a 91% probability of overall damage to the target. For 10 targets then require 20 aircraft,

Iran will have to allocate 15 Aircraft for SEAD Operation and 10 Aircraft for single target attack in Counterland Operation to also produce a 91% probability of overall damage to the target. For 10 targets then require 90 aircraft.

107 Counterland Operations Analysis CAS and AI

108 Number of Sorties Required with an 85% Desired Probability of Kill For various Ground Targets

Target Number of Payload PK Number of Weapons Sorties POL Storage Tank 4 MK 83 0.5 3 12 MK 83 (60 ft radius, 40 ft high) 4 GBU-31 JDAM 0.7 1.5 6 GBU-31

Aircraft Shelters 4 LDGP MK 830 0.35 4.5 18 (100x50x25 ft) Shelter Dimensions 4 GBU-31 JDAM 0.85 1 4 GBU-31 JDAM

Aircraft Parked 8 MK 82 Snakeye 0.6 2 16 MK 82 Snakeye Dispersed over an area 1500 x 500 ft. 8 GBU-30 0.85 1 8 GBU-30

Highway Bridge 8 MK 82 0.38 4 32 MK 82 8 GBU-30 0.62 2 16 GBU-30

Frigate 8 MK 82 0.65 2 16 MK 82 Patrol Boat Missile Patrol Boat 8 GBU-30 0.85 1 8 GBU-30

Column of Tanks 8 MK 82 Snakeye 0.25 6.6 53 MK 82 Snakeye (10 tanks in 2000ft by 70ft) 8 GBU-30 0.50 3 24 GBU-30

Old Conventional Weapons Delivery: Survivability not considered from possible ground SAM/AAA environment First Pass Attack: Low altitude run, pop-up to 8000 ft AGL, CCIP delivery at 30 to 45 degrees dive.

109 AGM-65C/D Maverick Effectiveness

Tank APC ZSU (AAA)

5,000 ft 0.75 0.80 0.85

Expected Tank Kills Column of 10 Tanks, 50 meters Spacing (Total Area: 2000 ft x 60 ft)

Weapon Number of Targets Attacked Tank Kills Passes per Sortie Weapons TV Maverick 4 4 3 4

ROCKEYE 4 1 Tank Column 2 4

110 Counterlad Operations Sortie Rate / Survivability relationship through Day 7 GCC Air Force

20 20 Combat Aircraft: Cumulative Sorties per Aircraft 15 Loss Rate : 1.5% Cumulative Sortie Rate : 360 10 Cumulative Single Target Kills : 340 Aircraft Remaining : 15 Aircraft remaining from an initial of 20 5

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Mission Loss Rate (%) 800 700 600 Cumulative Weapons Delivered 500 400 Cumulative Single Target Kills 300 200 100 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Mission Loss Rate (%) Number of Aircraft : 20 F-15S Sortie Rate: 3 per Aircraft per Day Payload : 2 GPU-10 or 2 GPU-24 Paveway II/III (2,000 lb Bombs) Hi-Lo-Lo-Hi Mission Profile Range : 600 nmi Probability of Target Kill = 75%

111 Counterland Operations Sortie Rate / Survivability relationship Through Day 7 Iran Air Force

20 20 Combat Aircraft: Aircraft remaining from an initial of 20 Loss Rate : 5% 15 Cumulative Sortie Rate : 200 Cumulative Single Target Kills : 131 10 Aircraft Remaining : 12

5 Cumulative Sorties per Aircraft

0 Mission Loss Rate (%) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 600

500

400 Cumulative Weapons Delivered

300 Cumulative Single Target Kills 200

100

0 Mission Loss Rate (%) 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20

Number of Aircraft : 20 F-4E/SU-24 Sortie Rate: 2 Sorties per A/C per Day Payload : (2) 2,000 lb Bombs Hi-Lo-Lo-Hi Mission Profile Range 380 nmi Probability of Target Kill = 40%

112 MRAAM Engagement Analysis

113 • When analyzing a Medium Range Air to Air Missile (MRAAM) Engagement, the expected kills are limited by the number of weapons and by the number of firing opportunities.

• Firing opportunities depend on: o Maximum launch range (and hence on launch aircraft energy), o Weapon guidance system (Semi-active radar (SAR), or Launch and Leave ), o Retargeting delays (single target track (SST) or Track While Scan (TWS)), o Target size and formation.

• Typical inputs are: o Airborne radar detection capability o Missile Time – Distance Data o Missile Probability of Kill o Firing Doctrine o Altitude and Airspeed

• The Outputs are: o Friendly Aircraft Probability of Kill o Adversary Aircraft Probability of Kill o These then give us the Loss Exchange ratio which is the number of Adversary Aircraft Losses to the number of Friendly Aircraft Losses.

• Appendix III displays the Head-On Intercept Dynamics

114 Combat Aircraft Radars

Search Scanning Aircraft Radar Range (nmi) Azimuth +/- Degrees Saphir 29 Search: 54 nmi MiG-29A 67 (Slot Back) Track: 38 Westinghouse Search: 38 F-16A 60 APG-66 Track: 29 Westinghouse Search: 50 F-16C 60 IAPG-66 Track: 40 Thomson Search: 50 Mirage 2000 60 RDM Track: 35 Search: 80 F-15E AN/APG-70 60 Track: 40

115 Air-to-Air Combat Effectiveness BVR Combat

MiG-29 40 NMI F-16C Altitude : 15,000 ft

(Mach 1.2) (Mach 1.2)

5 4 3 F-16C (2) AMRAAM 2 1 F-15C (2) AMRAAM

0 Number of AircraftLost ofNumber F-4E MiG-29 M2000 (2) Super 530D (2) AIM-7E (2) AA-10

(4 ) F-4E for (1) F-16C (1.15) MiG-29 for 1 F-16C

Loss Exchange Ratio = (5) F-4E for 1 F-15C (1.25) MiG-29 for (1) F-15C

(4) F-4E for (1) M2000 (1) MiG-29 for (1) M2000

116 GCC Fighter Sweep vs Iran CAP Loss Exchange Ratio

(5) F-18 (6) F-14 (6) F-14 Loss vs (4) F-18

(10) Tornado ADV (6) F-14 (6) F-14 vs (3) Tornado

(20) F-15C vs (12) MiG-29A (12) MiG-29 Loss vs (10) F-15C

GCC Escort vs Iran Max SLI Loss Exchange Ratio

(20) F-15C vs (3) MiG-29 (3) MiG-29 vs (2) F-15C

(10) F-16C vs (32) F-4E (32) F-4E vs (8) F-16C

(10) F-18 vs (3) F-14 (3) F-14 vs (3) F-18

Total Estimated Losses in Air to Air Combat

GCC Iran

27 62

Estimated Aircraft Losses Over a 7 day conflict during Counterland Operations

GCC Iran (1.5% Loss Rate) (5% Loss Rate)

5 8 117 GCC – Iran Force Allocation Matrices

118 GCC Force Allocation Matrix Left for Combat Order of Force Total Airfield Fighter Country CAP SLI SEAD Escort other Aircraft Battle Available Sorties Closure Sweep Mission

Tornado Saudi 25 19 57 10 9 ADV Arabia

Tornado Saudi 85 64 191 27 37 IDS Arabia

Total 74 56 167 11 Mirage Qatar 12 9 27 5 5 4 2000 UAE 62 47 140 20 20 7

F-18 Kuwait 39 29 88 10 10 4

Total 113 85 254 10 Bahrain 21 16 47 5 5 5 1 F-16 C/D Oman 12 9 27 5 4 UAE 80 60 180 15 15 20 5 5

Saudi F-15 C/D 84 63 189 15 20 20 8 Arabia

Saudi F-15S 71 53 160 29 24 Arabia

Total 491 368 1,106 60 55 56 20 40 35 102

Aircraft Operational Readiness Rate: 75% Sorties per Aircraft per Day: 3 Closure of 5 airfields for 7 days. 119 Iran Force Allocation Matrix

Force Left for Order of Total Maximum Runway A/C Availabl CAP SEAD Escort FS other Battle Sorties SLI Strike e Mission

MiG-29 25 15 30 12 3 0

SU-25 13 8 16 8

SU-24 30 18 36 8 10

F-14 25 15 30 12 3 0

F-4E/D 65 39 78 32 7 0

Total 158 95 190 24 38 15 18

Aircraft Operational Readiness Rate: 60% Sorties per Aircraft per Day: 2

120 Theater Ballistic Missiles

121 Shehab 3/3A Range (km) Payload (kg)

1,350 1,158

1,400 987

1,500 760

1,540 650

1,560 590.27

1,580 557.33

1,600 550

1,780 240

2,000 -

(Source: Missile Defense Program Overview for the European Union, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Security and Defense. Dr. Patricia Sanders. Executive Director. Missile Defense Agency) 122 Utilizing Ballistic Missiles with 500 – 1000kg warheads and ranges up to 300 km in:

• Runway Closure • SEAD Mission (Radars)

Runway Closure: • For runways that are 9,000 ft in length and 200 ft in width, it would take 3 cuts each 3,000 ft in length and Minimum Clear Width of 50 ft to stop any modern day aircraft, such as an F-16 from taking off.

• With a CEP of 300m minimum, and a warhead of 600 – 700 kg a unitary missile would cause, in a 6 to 12 in Concrete Runway, a crater of 50 ft in width and 15 ft in depth. It would take around 80 Shehab II type missile with 80% confidence to produce 1 cut. Therefore for an airfield it would take some 240 missiles.

• Even if Iran had the capability of developing warheads with 3 to 5 submunitions, and each capable of producing a 50 ft shallow crater, which should prove to be more effective than a unitary warhead which would create one large crater, the following table was calculated:

CEP (m) P (damage) No of Missiles per cut Airfield Closure with 3 cuts 50 0.219 12 36 100 0.132 21 63 150 0.089 32 96 250 0.046 64 192 300 0.035 84 252

(Source: Brining Prithvi Down to Earth: The Capabilities and Potential Effectiveness of India’s Prithvi Missile. Science & Global Security, 1998, Volume 7, pp, 333-360). 123 The number of missiles required is definitely very large and not cost effective. For 5 airfields for instance, up to 1,160 missiles would be required just for the first day of a conflict. The airbase can be fixed within a 24 hour period and back to being operational for aircraft to land and take-off. This number of missiles of the Shehab II class could be very much higher than the present Iranian inventory of Ballistic Missiles.

SEAD Missions (Radars):

We can assume that the same missile carrying submunitions, a 5 psi blast pressure would be required to damage a typical radar, and with a desired probability of damage of 75% the required missiles to damage 1 radar would be:

CEP (m) Rd (radar dispersal radius) P (damage) N (missiles)

50 90 0.7856 2

100 125 0.4385 3

150 155 0.2648 6

250 195 0.1237 13

300 220 0.0918 18

(Source: Bringing Prithvi Down to Earth: The Capabilities and Potential Effectiveness of India’s Prithvi Missile. Science & Global Security, 1998, Volume 7, pp, 333-360).

124 A Comparison between Aircraft and Ballistic Missiles Required for the Missions

Number of Missiles Required Mission Number of A/C Required (Shahab II) Airfield Closure 3 252 (Payload Bap 100) (see slide 100) SEAD Anti-Radar 2 18 (Payload AS-37 ARM) (see slide 104)

Iran has also been heavily investing in:

• Precision Strike Munitions • Naval-anti-ship weapons such as the Chinese C802 that hit the Israeli Navy ship during the 2006 war in Lebanon and the Ra’ad 350 km anti-ship missile. • Ballistic Missiles • Cruise Missiles such as the Kh55 Russian land attack cruise missile, effective against Oil Platforms. • Nuclear Program

This arsenal of Ballistic Missiles possessed by Iran has been declared to be for defensive purposes against any foreign invasion, in particular against the U.S. However, it has become very clear that it is an arsenal that is intended to inflict maximum casualties and damage against soft targets such as cities, in essence a major component for Asymmetric Warfare in the form of high attrition and defenses in depth.

125 The Arabian Gulf will turn into the front line in the event Space Sensor of an Iranian conflict with Israel and the U.S.

Defense Support Program in Boost Phase Iranian Shahab 3 Launched against Israel Early Warning & Long Range Search & Track Capabilities IRAQ IRAN against Iranian MRBMs

KUWAIT Midcourse & Terminal Missile Defense

BAHRAIN

QATAR

Sea-Based EW & SAUDI-ARABIA Terminal Defense

Gulf of Air Defense Oman UAE PAC-3 Early Warning THAAD Radar OMAN AWACS

126 Typical Trajectories of Theatre Ballistic Missiles (TBMs)

Burn-out Range Boost Phase Flight Time Class velocity (Km) (sec) (min) (km/sec) 120 SRBM 1.0 16 2.7 500 SRBM 2.0 36 6.1 1,000 SRBM 2.9 55 8.4 2,000 MRBM 3.9 85 11.8 3,000 MRBM 4.7 122 14.8

127 Missile Defense Challenge

Detect Assess Authorize Engage

Aircraft ~ 22 Min

Cruise Missile ~ 11 Min

Ballistic ~ 4 Min Missile

Time to Target*

* Based on Approximate Range of 320 Km Responsive Missile Defense System is Crucial

(Dennis Cavin, “Counterforce Capabilities Against Cruise and Ballistic Missiles”. MEMAD 14 & 15 December, 2008) 128 Components of a multi-layered integrated Ballistic Missile Defense System Sensors

Defense Support In Mid - Course Program in Boost Phase Phase

Standard Missile-3 Air Launched Concepts

129 Russian ANTEY-2500 Mobile System/S-300VM (SA-12 Giant)

The Russian Antey‐2500 Mobile SAM system is considered as the progressive development of the S‐300V (SA‐12, Giant) long range SAM system. It was designed to protect against air‐strikes, including combat aircraft and ballistic missiles of short and medium range. It has been reported that Iran has been negotiating with Russia over this air defense system and the upgraded model the S-200PMU2 for some time.

Radar Detection Unit: . Range of up to 320 km. . Targets with speed 4500 km/sec. . Tracking the trajectories of up to 70 destructive prioritized targets. . The Antey‐2500 can operate either under the Command and Control of higher level command post or autonomously.

. Area protected by one fire unit against: o Medium range Ballistic Missiles with 2500 km range: 1000‐1750 square km oTheater Ballistic Missiles with 1100 km range : 2000‐2500 square km o Tactical Ballistic Missiles with 600 km range: 2500 square km o Piloted air strike up to: 12,500 square km

. Number of Targets simultaneously engaged by one fire unit: 6 . Number of missiles guided at one target: . One launcher fires: up to 2 . Number of launchers firing: up to 4 . Launching rate from one launcher: 1.5 sec. . The standard combat crew of an Antey‐2500 SAM battalion consisting of four SAM sites (6 launchers, 3 loader/launchers) is 139 personnel. The full crew complement for a SAM battalion is 180.

130 . Command Post of Antey‐2500 SAM System oThe Command Post provides for the Command and Control of all combat assets of the SAM system. It also prioritizes and distributes the targets among the SAM batteries. o Number of targets processed : 200 o Number of target trajectories tracked simultaneously : 70 o Number of target designations simultaneously transmitted to fire units: 24

. Launcher Vehicle o Number of missiles on a launcher : 4 o Pre‐launch prepara2on of SAM : 7.5 sec o Interval between launched : 1.5 sec o Weight with missile : 47.5 tons o Crew : 2 to 3

. Surface‐To‐Air Missiles o The 9M83ME SAM is designed for destroying aerodynamic targets, including low‐flying ones, and those maneuvering up to 12‐g loads, in addition to intercepting aero‐ballistic and tactical missiles in a heavy ECM environment. o The 9M82ME SAM is designed for destroying of medium range, theater, tactical and aero‐ballistic missiles, as well as all aircraft types operating at ranges of up to 200 km. o The design of both missiles is highly unified, and they differ only in the starting boosters (initial firing stage). o Type of engine: solid propellant o Launching mode: vertical o Weight of missile 9M83ME: 2345 kg o Weight of warhead: 150kgType of warhead: HEF with direct blast o Type of fuse: proximity, semi‐active radar o Maximum speed: • 9M83ME SAM: 1700m/sec • 9M82ME SAM: 2600m/sec

131 Combat Characteristics Vs Attacking Ballistic Missiles S-300PMU2 Antey 2500 “Favorit” S-300V

Number of SAM complexes to one firing unit 6 4

Missile Guidance Illumination & Radar SAR during last leg of Command flight Maximum Range (km) 40 40

Minimum Range (km) 5 5

Minimum Altitude (meters) 20 25

Maximum Altitude (km) 25 30

Rate of Fire (sec) 3 1.5

Reaction Time (sec) 7 to 8 7.5

Missile Maximum Speed (meters/sec) 2,000 2,600

Number of Guided Missiles by one Launcher 4 2

Missile Warhead (kg) 180 150 Illumination and Guidance Radar:

• Maximum Tracking Range (km) 200 200

• Number of simultaneously tracked BM targets 36 24

• Number of simultaneously guided missiles 72 70

• Maximum Speed of Tracked Target (meters/sec) 2,800 4,500

Time to deploy launcher (minutes) 5 5 132 Comparative Chart between PAC-3 and the S-300 BMD Systems

PAC-3 S-300

Maximum Firing Range (km) 150 200

Maximum Range for Destruction of BM (km) 40 40

Maximum Launching Range of BM Destroyed (km) 1,000 2,500

Upper Limit of Destruction Zone (km) 30 30

Area Covered Against BM Strike (km^2) 1,200 2,500

Maximum Speed of Destroyed Target (meter/sec) 3,000 4,500

Maximum Scattering RCS of Destroyed Target (m^2) 0.05 - 1 0.02

133 (Option II)

Iran BMD

Jericho III

134 Part II Iran Asymmetric Warfare

135 Iranian Response to an Israeli or US Attack

The following is what has been written by analysts regarding Iran’s possible response to an attack by Israel or the United States or both:

• Immediate retaliation using its ballistic missiles on Israel. Multiple launches of Shahab-3 including the possibility of CBR warheads against Tel Aviv, Israeli military and civilian centers, and Israeli suspected nuclear weapons sites. • Using proxy groups such as Hezbollah or Hamas to attack Israel proper with suicide bombings, covert CBR attacks, and rocket attacks from southern Lebanon. • Give rise to regional instability and conflict as well as terrorism. • Destabilizing Iraq through the Shia against US occupation, further arming insurgency groups when possible. • Support and upgrade Taliban capabilities in Afghanistan. • Increase the threat of asymmetric attacks against American interests and allies in the region. • Target U.S. and Western shipping in the Gulf, and possibly attempt to interrupt the flow of oil through the Gulf. Danger not simply a cut-off in the supply of oil from Iran, the GCC, or the closing of the Strait of Hormuz, but a prolonged threat to the wider Gulf region.

Operational Readiness Rate •In estimating the Operational Readiness it can be assumed that a conflict can initiate with relatively short warning. Under such conditions, it can be further assumed that the Armed Forces would not have sufficient time to boost Operational Readiness Rate of it’s Combat Forces much higher than Peacetime or Training Operations.

. How is Iran preparing for any conflict with Israel and the United States, and what will its fighting doctrine and Operating Readiness be?

. One can get a fair idea by analyzing large scale Peacetime Military Exercises over the past couple of years.

(Source: Israeli and US Strikes on Iran: A Speculative Analysis. Anthony Cordesman CSIS. March 5, 2007) 136 Date Iranian Military Exercises

January 27, Iran completes major military exercise that testes Teheran's ability to attack Gulf shipping and Arab oil 2006 facilities. The exercise was meant to show the West that Iran could stop all oil shipments in the Gulf and destroy numerous oil facilities in Gulf Arab countries August 19, Iran launches a series of large-scale military exercises aimed at introducing the country's new defensive 2006 doctrine: Ballistic Missiles and Asymmetric Warfare (Defiance, Deception, Deterrence, Demonstration). November 3, Iran began the 10 days of maneuvers in the Gulf by test firing dozens of missiles, including the long-range 2006 Shahab-3 (estimated range: 2000 km or 1,240 miles), and the Shahab-2, which Iran says can carry a cluster warhead that can deliver 1,400 bomblets at once. Aim is to show our deterrent and defensive power to trans- regional enemies. March 23- Iran’s regular Navy launches week-long war-games on its southern shores. The military exercises are being 30, 2007 carried out in the Gulf by Iran's regular Navy January 7, US ships harassed by Iran. Iranian boats approach three U.S. Navy ships in the strategic Strait of Hormuz, 2008 threatening to explode the American vessels. U.S. forces are reported to be on the verge of firing on the Iranian boats, when the boats - believed to be from the Iranian Revolutionary Guard's navy - turn and move away. July 7, 2008 Iran's elite Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps launch large-scale, five-day war-games, dubbed “Exercise Stake Net”, was carried out in the Straits of Hormuz and the Sea of Oman, where an assortment of new weapons were brought into play. Iran later test-fires nine missiles including what is claims is an upgraded version of Shahab-3 ballistic missile with a one-ton warhead capable of destroying targets within a 2,000- kilometer (1,245- mile) range

(Source: Anthony Cordesman , CSIS “Threats, Risks and Vulnerabilities: Terrorism and Asymmetric Warfare”)

137 Date Iranian Military Exercises

October 10, The Islamic Republic Air Force tests Iran's domestic-made warfare in a joint military exercise with the IRGC, 2008 the Defense Ministry says. The joint aerial maneuver is aimed at boosting Iran's defensive capabilities and operational tactics. December 2- Iran says it will seek to accomplish objectives that include defense against an Israeli and US threat, closing the 7, 2008 Strait of Hormuz to local and international shipping, and the testing of new and improved military equipment and tactics. December 1- Kayhan quotes Admiral Habibollah Sayyari, commander of the navy as saying "In this six-day long maneuver 7, 2008 there will be more than 60 combat vessel units," and it will include destroyers, missile-equipped battleships, submarines, special-operations teams, helicopters, and fighter planes.

An Iranian naval commander says a week earlier that the country's navy could strike an enemy well beyond its shores and as far away as Bab al-Mandab, the southern entrance to the Red Sea that leads to the Suez Canal. Iran test-fires a new surface-to-surface missile from a warship in a strategic shipping route, as part of the war games in the Sea of Oman and the Gulf region: State radio reports, "The surface-to-surface Nasr-2 missile was tested in the (Sea of) Oman operational region,". IRNA reports that, "The Nasr-2 was fired from a warship and hit its target at a distance of 30 km (19 miles) and destroyed it," adding it was the first test of the new, medium-range missile.

(Source: Anthony Cordesman , CSIS “Threats, Risks and Vulnerabilities: Terrorism and Asymmetric Warfare”)

138 IRGC Commander and Asymmetric Strategy

• On September 1, 2007, Khamenei promoted Mohammad Ali Jafari, then coordinator of the IRGC Research and Command Center, to the rank of major general and the post of commander in chief of the IRGC. Jafari has outlined the strategy he means to promote as IRGC commander, reiterating his commitment to developing Iran's ballistic missile capabilities and the asymmetrical warfare capacities of the IRGC:

• Asymmetrical warfare... is [our] strategy for dealing with the considerable capabilities of the enemy. A prominent example of this kind of warfare was [the tactics employed by Hizbullah during] the Lebanon war in 2006... Since the enemy has considerable technological abilities, and since we are still at a disadvantage in comparison, despite the progress we have made in the area of equipment, [our only] way to confront [the enemy] successfully is to adopt the strategy [of asymmetric warfare] and to employ various methods of this kind."

Some Tangible Examples

• Iranian tanker war with Iraq • Oil spills and floating mines in Gulf. • Use of Quds force in Iraq. • Iranian use of UAVs in Iraq. • Missile and space tests; expanding range of missile programs (future nuclear test?). • Naval guards seizure of British boat, confrontation with US Navy, exercises in Gulf. • Development of limited “close the Gulf” capability.

139 140 141 142 143 (Source: Anthony Cordesman CSIS)

144 Appendix I Air to Air Missiles

145 Sparrow AIM-7F Matra Super 530

Guidance: Semi Active Radar Homing (SAR) ZF (Fighter Altitude) : 20,000 ft Minimum Range: 3 km ZT (Target Altitude) : 10,000 ft Maximum Range: 22 km Minimum Range : 1,000ft MF: 1.2 Mach Maximum Range: MT: 0.9 Mach 21 nmi for 2 meter squared target NT: 1g 29 nmi for a 5 meter squared target 53 nmi Aero Range at 40,000ft Mach 2.0 ZF (Fighter Altitude) : 30,000 ft Minimum Range: 3 km ZT (Target Altitude) : 30,000 ft Maximum Range: 24 km 40,000 ft, ML=0.9 Mach, MT=0.9 Mach, Heading MF: 1.4 Mach Zero Degrees, Head On Range = 37 nmi MT: 1.2 Mach NT : 1g 90 lbs warhead Multiple Target Capability Reliability 95%

146 Magic 550 AAM

Magic 550 AAM Magic 550 II AAM (Improved)

• Seeker look angles +/- 30 degrees and 3 to 4 microns • Range, Gimbal, and Sensitivity are the only factors that the Magic • Lateral Acceleration close to 35g 550 II is different from the Magic 550. • Maximum Guided Flight Time: 25 secs • Seeker is a multi-element detection giving all aspect firing • Minimum closing speed : 80 m/sec capability (4 to 4.5 microns) • Homing Head Passive Infra Red • Propulsion is 10% greater than Magic 550 • Gimbal +/- 45 degrees • Lateral acceleration 35 g Altitude (ft) ML MT Range (km) • Fuze changed from IR to Proximity (EM) Active Radar. • Lock on time less than 1.3 seconds 0 0.8 0.5/0.8/1.05 4.35/2.3/1.45 ZL=ZT=15,000 ft MT=0.8 Mach, ML=0.9 Mach, NT=1G Head-on 0.9 0.6/0.9/1.05 3.6/2.12/1.6 Maximum Range: 17.5 km Minimum Range: 1.5 km 20,000 0.9 0.6/0.9/1.2 6.8/4.2/2.6 With No Target Afterburner (Military Thrust): NT=1G 1.2 0.9/1.2/1.45 5.1/3.35/2.25 Altitude (ft) Rear Range (km) Frontal Range (km)

1,000 ft 3 6

10,000 ft 9 14

147 Medium Range Skyflash AMRAAM Skyflash II

• Threat: Low level Multiple Targets ECM Environment • Airframe retains key features of Skyflash to minimize the aircraft • Missile: Medium Range Air to Air Radar Guided all Weather Capability interface changes and the integration tasks. day and night. • New Features: • Warhead Weight: 32 kg Continuous Rod . Multiple target Engagement and Multi-Shot Capability • Missile Lateral Acceleration up to 25 g’s. . ECCM in a high threat Counter Measures Environment • Seeker: Semi-Active Radar (SAR) design of the Monopulse type, uses . Increase in Range and higher average velocity which will angle tracker 45 degrees from axis. reduce missile flight time. . Off-Boresight Capability, seeker +/- 60 degrees. • Snap-Down . Guidance: Mid-course up-dated Inertial Navigation & Fire Launch Altitude 15,000 ft, M=0.9 and Forget. Target Altitude 500 ft, M=0.95 . Terminal: Active Pulse Doppler Radar Range: 12.5 km . All Weather capability, day and night. • Lateral Acceleration up to 37g’s • Range up to 50 km.

Altitude ML MT G Range • Snap-Up (Launch Aircraft Sea Level): (ft) (km) Target Altitude 20,000 ft, ML=0.9, MT=0.9, Range= 45 km Sea Level 0.9 1.2 1 17 • Snap-Down (Target Aircraft Sea Level): Launch Altitude 20,000 ft, M=0.9, MT=0.9, Range = 30 km 10,000 0.9 1.4 1 22 Altitude ML MT G Range Fire & (ft) (km) Forget 20,000 0.9 1.7 1 25 Boundary (km) 300 0.9 0.9 1 50 30

148 British Aerospace Short Range Air to Air Missile (SRAAM)

SRAAM was developed as a close combat air-to-air missile with the capability to intercept highly maneuverable targets. Designed to have the following operational characteristics:

All aspect day and night capability Fire and forget Performance within the launch and target envelope of 50 meters to 15km altitude and between 0.9 to M2.0 speeds. Launcher and Target aircraft maneuvers greater than 7g Lock before launch Fast reaction time (< 1 sec) Has high ECCM capability High reliability and lethality

Gimbal seeker : +/- 60 degrees Fuze: Passive IR Proximity Fuze which triggers at ranges up to 3 meters. Warhead: 6.9kg with a lethal radius of 3m.

Maximum Range Minimum Range

Head On Beam On Tail On Head On Beam On Tail On (km) (km) (km) (km) (km) (km) Low Altitude 100 ft 3.2 (i) 3.5 2.2 1 1 0.3 7.5 (ii) Medium Altitude 10,000 ft 3.2 (i) 4.1 2.5 1 1.2 0.3 7.9 (ii) High Altitude 35,000 ft 3.2 (i) 5.2 3.6 1.5 1.5 0.5 8.2 (ii)

(i) : Head On Military Power (ii) : Head On Full Thrust

149 Appendix II Medium Range SAM Systems

150 SA-2 Guideline

151 SA – 2 (Guideline) SAM

Associated Radar Frequency (MHz) PRF (pps) Pulse Width Power (KW) Radar Range (microsecond)

Spoon Rest D (P-18) 150 - 157 300 – 400 4 – 7 200 per beam 185 – 231 km

Tracking/Guidance 2950 – 3065 1000 – 1250 0.3 – 1.0 600 Acquisition: 120 km (2 sq m) (1) Fansong A/B Tracking: Low PRF 92 – 110 km Tracking : High PRF 55 – 75 km Optical Range: 28 – 37 km Missile Uplink Command 705 – 850 2260 – 2660 0.3 – 0.5

Missile Beacon 2950 – 3065

(2) Fansong C/E 4950 – 5050 900 – 1020 0.4 – 1.2 600 Acquisition: 160 km (2 sq m) 1750 – 2070 0.2 – 0.9 Tracking: Low PRF 130 km Tracking : High PRF 110 km Optical Range: 28 – 37 km Missile Uplink Command 715 – 820 1720 - 2070 0.3 – 0.5

Missile Beacon 4950 – 5050

152 SA-2 Target Intercept

153 154 The SA-5 Gammon (Soviet Designator S-200)

 At each SA-5 the following radars are deployed: .For Early Warning: Backtrap Radars, Tall King Radar .Height Finders: Odd pair (PRV-13)/Odd Group (PRV-16) .Acquisition: Spoon Rest D Radars/ Clam Shell Radar .Tracking & Guidance: Square Pair Radars

 Because the SA-5 is essentially a long range high altitude system (250 km), each site has a combination of SA-6/8/9/7 surface to air missiles and ground troops with AAA guns to protect the site from very low altitude penetrating targets.

 Two Soviet Command and Control Centers were integrated into the system:  Vozdukh – 1M  Vector System. A semi-automated system, with the man in the loop design.

155 SA-5 (Angara/Vega) SAM

Pulse Width (micro- Associated Radar Frequency (MHz) PRF (pps) Power (kw) Radar Range second)

Early Warning: 366 2000 Back Trap (P-80) 2050 – 2550 480 km 185 – 210 2000 Tall King C (P-14) 162 – 177 1 – 15 550 – 750 km 93-100

Height Finder: 2620 – 2625 - Odd Pair (PRV – 13) 2710 – 2712 278 - 366 2.8 – 4.2 350 2823 – 2830

Guidance/Tracking: Square Pair 6800 - 6950 - - 2.0 -

Command & Control:

• Vozdukh -I M System: This is an improved version of the system, it is less vulnerable to jamming.

• Vektor System: This is a more up-to-date Command & Control Center. The Vektor system is apparently not fully automated, i.e. is a semi-automated system, still with the man in the loop design. The roles and rules of the man in the loop are unknown.

The system gives a projected video of speed, azimuth, direction, and altitude to the operator who in return determines the optimum intercept zone of the target. It is understood that besides the high power early warning radars that pass data to the center, the Vektor system obtains data from the SA-5/ SA-2/SA-3 systems.

156 . The SA‐5 is essentially a long range high altitude system (250 km), each site should have a combination of SA‐6/8/9/7 surface to air missiles and ground troops with AAA guns to protect the site from very low altitude penetrating targets. Deployed mostly to protect its major ports and oil facilities along the coast of the Gulf.

. What is known about the Iranian Air Defense system clearly shows how it has become largely obsolescent even though some SA‐2 upgrade has been reported to have taken place. So it has become easy to apply ECM against them and destroying them using anti‐radiation air to surface missiles.

. Iran lacks the modern weapon systems, integration and C4I Battle Management to reduce the potential destructive effectiveness of any offensive interdiction missions by the GCC. One can predict a very low attrition rate to an GCC Strike.

. Long C4I Early Warning delay time due to antiquated system, semi-automated man in the loop. . Long Response / Scramble Time by Combat Aircraft . Low Operational Readiness Rate of Combat Aircraft . Need Improvement in maintenance operations . Need Improvement in supply of spare parts . Low Combat Aircraft Sortie Rates, Sustained and Surge. . High Loss Rates in a Closing / BVR and Visual Engagement Air to Air Combat Environment. . Centralized Battle Management

. There have been reports that Russia secretively supplied Iran with the ANTEY-2500 Mobile SAM System/ S-300V (SA-12 Giant). If this is the case then the whole analytic model beginning from C4I Early Warning to Response and Scramble times in the engagement of GCC combat aircraft with this integrated mobile air defense system will have to be recalculated.

(Source: Israeli and US Strikes on Iran: A Speculative Analysis. CSIS. March 5, 2007) 157 158 SA-8

159 160 Improved Hawk Battery

Information Coordination Centre Continuous Wave Power Acquisition Radar Acquisition Radar IHAWK SSPK Intercept Contours

Battery Control Centre Range Only Radar

Illuminator Illuminator Altitude (km) Altitude

Launchers and Missiles Launchers and Missiles Downrange (km)

161 162 Appendix III Air to Air BVR Analysis

163 Head-On Intercept Dynamics

Radar Detect

Target Penetration Distance

Missile Impact

Distance Radar Detection Radar Airborne Intercept Airborne Engagement Zone

Missile launch

CAP Station Time or Ground Alert

164 Missile Duel Kinematics

AWACS

Enemy Missile Time Margin: Time for AA-10 missile Launch Friendly to impact at friendly missile impact. Missile Impact Killing Enemy Aircraft terminates AA-10

Semi Active Radar (SAR) Guidance. Distance

Enemy Missile Impact

Friendly Missile Time Launch Margin

Time

165 Effect of Launch and Leave BVR Missile

AWACS

Enemy Aircraft Launch Missile Friendly Missile

Impact Distance

Enemy Missile Anticipated Launch Impact Friendly Aircraft Aircraft Maneuver Launch Missile

Time

166 Appendix IV Characteristics of High Explosives

167 Source: The Effects of Nuclear Weapons. Compiled and edited by Samuel Gladstone and Philips J. Dolan. 3rd Edition.

168 High Explosive Bombs Physical Characteristics

Operational High Explosive High Explosive Munition Type Weight (lbs) Filling Type Filling Weight (lb)

250 lb Unretarded GP 260 H-6 or Tritonal 139.00 Mk 81 Mod1 500 lb H-6 or Tritonal Unretarded GP 531 277.00 Mk 82 Mods 1,2 750 lb GP 799 H-6 Minol 2 562.00 M117 Series 1000 lb Unretarded GP H-6 or Tritonal 985 607.00 Mk 83 Mods 3,4 2000 lb Unretarded GP H-6 or Tritonal 1970 1395.00 MK 84 Mods 1,2 GBU-27 2000 lb Penetrating 2000 Tritonal 800.00 BLU-109 GBU-28 5000 lb Penetrating 5000 Tritonal 1000.00 BLU-113

GBU-10 2000 lb Non-Penetrating 2000 Tritonal 1400.00

169 Military Targets Blast Effects

Peak Overpressure Typical Blast Effects

5 psi Light Housing Destroyed

10 psi Brick Housing/Commercial Building Destroyed

20 psi Reinforced Concrete Structures Destroyed

100-500 psi Nuclear Weapon Storage Bunkers

100-1,000 psi Command Bunkers

500-10,000 psi Missile Silos

1,000 – 10,000 psi Deep Underground Command Facilities

(Source: Alexander Glaser Princeton University February 12, 2007. Adapted from Physical Vulnerability Handbook)

170 Lethal Miss Distance (meters)

Warhead kg 3 psi 5 psi 7 psi 10 psi 15 psi 20 psi

10 11 8 6.5 5.35 4.35 3.77 50 19 13.71 11.2 9.15 7.45 6.45 100 24 17.1 14.1 11.6 9.35 8.1 150 27 19.65 16.1 13.2 10.7 9.3 200 30 21.5 17.6 14.5 11.75 10.2 350 36 26 21.2 17.5 14.2 12.35 500 42 29.5 24 19.75 16 13.9 750 47 33.74 27.5 22.75 18.3 15.9 1000 51 37 30.4 24.9 20.15 17.5 1500 59 49 35 28.5 23 20 2000 65 46.5 38.3 31.35 25.4 22

Lethal Miss Distance: Is The maximum distance from the periphery of the target at which a weapon detonation will inflict the necessary damage for a kill for that weapon-target combination.

171 Appendix V Probability of Kill vs CEP and Lethal Range

172 In any encounter the Kill Probability is dependent on:

• Probability of mission survival going to target and egress. • Probability of target acquisition • Probability of weapon reliability • Probability of target single shot kill probability (might need more than 1 missile to destroy the target)

•Probability of mission survival depends on: o ISR o Location of target o Self Protection Electronic Equipment o Aircraft has a self escort defense capability o Successful SEAD operations along the way to target o C4I

• Probability of Target Acquisition depends on: o Radar and other sensors on Aircraft.

• Probability of weapon reliability depends on: o Technology involved in weapons design and Aircraft systems reliability.

• Probability of single shot kill probability depends on: o Accuracy of targeting system on weapon (CEP) o Lethal range of weapon warhead.

173 CEP (m) 160

70 m 140

60 m 120

50 m 100

40 m 80

60 30 m Lethal Range (meters) Range Lethal

40 20 m

20 10 m

5 m 0 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5 0.55 0.6 0.65 0.7 0.75 0.8 0.85 0.9 0.95

Single Shot Probability of Kill

174 700 CEP (m)

300 m 600

250 m 500

200 m 400

150 m

300 Lethal Range (meters) Range Lethal

200 100 m 90 m 80 m

100

0 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5 0.55 0.6 0.65 0.7 0.75 0.8 0.85 0.9 0.95

Single Shot Probability of Kill

175 12

10

Desired Probability of Damage 8 0.6

0.65

6 0.7

0.75

0.8 4

0.85 Number of Shots Required ofShots Number 0.9

2 0.95

0 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5 0.55 0.6 0.65 0.7 0.75 0.8 0.85 0.9 0.95

Single Shot Probability of Kill

(Number of Shots Required : Number of Aircraft Passes, Sorties, or Missiles Fired) 176 Appendix VI Notes on Security Arrangements (Common, Collective, Cooperative, Comprehensiv e)

177 SECURITY “Absence of the Threat of War”

Political Stability Military Stability

Implies that there is no incentive for armed Implies that no state can hope to gain conflict on the political level, be it because no reasonable results by employing military force major tensions exist which could induce their i.e. offensive force as a military doctrine has military solutions, or be it because peaceful ceased to be an instrument of politics. solutions of conflicts has become a regular and accepted pattern of International Relations.

Security

Both Political & Military Stability are complementary to each other and Security will be enhanced if both Political and Military Stability are high.

Comprehensive Cooperative Collective Common

178 Common Security:

Seeks security with other countries rather than against them. It is predicated on the assumption that States share a common interest in avoiding war, and that war avoidance is best pursued through strategies which emphasize cooperation and reassurance and reduce the emphasis on confrontation and deterrence.

Common Security attempts to find an appropriate and stable balance between the requirements of deterrence and reassurance.

Collective Security:

Directed against an aggressor coming from outside. Participation in a Collective Security organization entails a commitment by each member to join a coalition, being based either on defense in its traditional sense, or upon deterrence.

Collective Security is relevant because it helps generate the domestic support to go to war and the international legitimacy to win the peace.

Cooperative Security:

Refrains from the very idea of enforcing stability in a confrontational way. It exclusively aims at promoting cooperation in order to prevent: o The emergence of conflicts in a political sphere, or o To reduce the danger of armed confrontation. More specifically, Cooperative Security Policy aims at preventing emerging conflicts from escalating into larger proportions – in this sense it depends on the cooperation of all.

Comprehensive Security:

Emphasizes on non-military means of achieving and maintaining security. Comprehensive security stresses the importance of the non-military instruments of security policy.

179 Security Assurances

Positive Security Assurances:

U.N. Security Council whose Nuclear Weapon States will provide assistance to any non-nuclear weapons state (party to the NPT) that is a victim of an act of aggression or an object of a threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used.

Negative Security Assurances:

A commitment by Nuclear Weapons States that they would not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states.

180