1800 K Street, NW Suite 400 Washington, DC 20006 Phone: 1.202.775.3270 Fax: 1.202.775.3199 Email: [email protected] Web: www.csis.org/burke/reports GCC - Iran: Operational Analysis of Air, SAM and TBM Forces Abdullah Toukan and Anthony H. Cordesman Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy August 20, 2009 Slide Introduction 4 Summary & Recommendations 15 Geostrategic Importance of the Gulf Region 22 GCC and Iran Order of Battle 32 Part I: U.S. Air Force Doctrine; Definition of Functions and Missions 38 Offensive Counterair Missions (OCA) 41 Air to Ground Mission Profiles and Weapons Systems 44 SAM Air Defense Systems and SEAD 54 Defensive Counterair Missions (DCA) 62 Air to Air Mission Profiles and Weapon Systems 67 Counterspace: Offensive and Defensive Operations 76 Information Operations 77 Intelligence Surveillance &Reconnaissance (ISR) Doctrine 78 Unmanned Air Vehicles (UAV’s) 80 Defensive Counterair Operations (DCA) 86 2 Slide Missions and Force Effectiveness 91 OCA Airfield Attack Analysis 94 Air Defense and SEAD Analysis 101 Counterland Operations Analysis (CAS & AI) 108 MRAAM Engagement Analysis 113 GCC-Iran Force Allocation Matrices 118 Theater Ballistic Missiles 121 Part II: Iran Asymmetric Warfare 135 Appendix I: Air to Air Missiles 145 Appendix II: Medium Range SAM Systems Kill Envelopes 150 Appendix III: Air to Air BVR Combat Analysis 163 Appendix IV: Characteristics of High Explosives 167 Appendix V: Probability of Kill vs CEP and Lethal Range 172 Appendix VI: Notes on Security Arrangements 177 (Common, Collective, Cooperative, Comprehensive) 3 Introduction 4 Perceptions of the Iranian Threat • It is in the view of many analysts that with the occupation of Iraq, Iran now sees new opportunities to enhance its strategic interests and to reemerge as the key power in the Arabian Gulf region. They have enumerated five threats to the region posed by Iran: o Ambition to acquire nuclear weapons and long-range ballistic missiles; o Support for International Terrorism; o Opposition to the Middle East peace process and its rising political influence there; o Offensive military buildup; o Threat to the stability of the Gulf States. Iran has also annexed the islands of Abu Musa, which dominate the entrance to the Straits of Hormuz. • Iran looks upon Nuclear Weapons and Ballistic Missiles as: o attractive alternatives to expensive modern conventional weapons for Power Projection and Deterrence purposes; o a means to increase so-called status and prestige. • As a response, the U.S. policy objective has been not to allow the Arabian Gulf region to be dominated by a hegemonic Iran. The United States believes that Iran cannot try to dominate the Gulf region as long as a U.S. military power is present. Iran maintains that the U.S. is actually positioning itself to confront Iran, and is building military bases to be used as launching pads for a possible strike against it. 5 How Iran views its National Security • Many believe that a confrontational approach to Iran will drive it to justify the pursuit of a nuclear capability as a deterrent. The Iranian National Security Doctrine is based on the perceptions that: o Iran as having a leadership role in the Arab and non-Arab Muslim world, and to have a dominant role in the Arabian Gulf region especially in any GCC security arrangements; o The occupation of Iraq by the U.S. and the presence of the U.S. Fifth Fleet offshore in the waters of the Gulf, and the past U.S. declared policy for “regime change” in Iran, as a grave threat to its National Security; o Israeli intentions to destabilize Iran and attack its nuclear facilities, which Iran claims to be for the purpose of producing nuclear power; o Iran is worried about unfriendly neighbors surrounding it, including a nuclear armed Pakistan. U.S. - Russia • The U.S. – Russia nuclear agreement, July 6, 2009, is considered by many as a first step in a broader effort to reduce the threat of Nuclear Weapons and to prevent their further spread. President Obama in his remarks hailed the arms agreement as an example for the world as he pursued a broader agenda aimed at countering – and eventually eliminating the spread of Nuclear Weapons. • President Obama views Russia as an influential partner willing to help fight the proliferation of nuclear weapons mainly in Iran and North Korea. It has become clear that more collaboration between the US and Russia on nuclear non-proliferation could increase pressure on Iran, which has always taken advantage and benefitted from any disagreements between the two countries. • It is believed that Russia could be a key player in preventing Iran from having a nuclear weapons program. However, Russia seems to have a different perception of the threat and has not shown any interest so far in applying pressure on Iran. Obama managed to link the BMD in Eastern Europe with the emerging Iranian Nuclear Threat and Long Range Ballistic Missile capability. 6 U.S. Position • The Obama Administration has been sending messages to Iran trying to dissuade it from pursuing Nuclear Weapons. The message is that the Iranian Nuclear Weapons program will: o not advance its security; o not achieve its goal of enhancing its power both regionally and globally; o spark an arms race in the region; o cause Iran to become more insecure. • The current U.S. position towards Iran is based upon the choice of: o Further sanctions and containment if Iran continues its pursuit of Nuclear Weapons or ; o Start a dialog with wider economic incentives if it abandons its nuclear weapons program. • In the event that Iran continues to pursue Nuclear Weapons the U.S. Secretary of State outlined how the U.S. might deal with a such a policy: o Washington would arm allies in the region, and extend a “defense umbrella”; o Iran possessing nuclear weapons would be unacceptable to the U.S.; o Iran crossing the Nuclear Threshold would not make Iran safe; o By extending assistance and a defense umbrella, Iran will not be able to intimidate and dominate its neighboring countries in particular the GCC, as Iran believes it can, once it possesses nuclear weapons. 7 Iranian Response • Iran has a 2,500 km coastline along the waters of the Arabian Gulf and the Arabian Sea, which is the only route to export oil, and around 95 percent of its foreign exchange revenues comes from exporting oil. • In addition to viewing itself a regional power, Iran’s aim is to keep the waters free from any foreign military presence and prevent outside countries from playing a role in shaping the future political and security architecture of the Gulf region. • Iran has recently been active diplomatically trying to convince the GCC States, with regard to the U.S. and other Western Powers, that their security would be better ensured by signing mutual security agreements with it. Iran has been stressing that for longer term regional security and stability, Iran and the GCC states should replace the reliance on foreign military presence and intervention. • With regard to a possible Israeli or U.S. attack on Iranian nuclear facilities, the following is what has been written on the possible Iranian military response: o Immediate retaliation using its ballistic missiles on Israel. Multiple launches of Shahab-3 including the possibility of CBR warheads against Tel Aviv, Israeli military and civilian centers, and Israeli suspected nuclear weapons sites; o Using proxy groups such as Hezbollah or Hamas to attack Israel proper with suicide bombings, covert CBR attacks, and rocket attacks from southern Lebanon; o Give rise to regional instability and conflict as well as terrorism; o Destabilizing Iraq through the Shia against US occupation, further arming insurgency groups when possible; o Support and upgrade Taliban capabilities in Afghanistan; o Increase the threat of asymmetric attacks against American interests and allies in the region; o Target U.S. and Western shipping in the Gulf, and possibly attempt to interrupt the flow of oil through the Gulf. Danger is not simply a cut-off in the supply of oil from Iran, the GCC, or the closing of the Strait of Hormuz, but a prolonged threat to the wider Gulf region. 8 Israel and U.S. Position on a Military Strike against Iranian Nuclear Facilities • The Israeli time frame as to when Iran would have a Nuclear Weapon is between 2009 and 2013, whereas the U.S. time frame is after 2013. Israel further states that Iran should not be allowed to obtain any nuclear capabilities that could eventually allow it to produce nuclear weapons. • Israel views Iran as an Existential Threat and must be dealt with in the immediate future with a Military Strike against it’s main nuclear facilities. Israel would rather see the U.S. join it in preventing Iran from developing the capability rather than the U.S. arming its allies in the region and providing a defense umbrella. • In the month of March, Haaretz Service on March 12 reported the following statements by U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates: “The current American administration as well as those that follow it will exercise extreme caution before launching a pre-emptive military strike against an enemy state.” “I think one of the biggest lessons learned in this is, if you are going to contemplate preempting an attack, you had better be very confident of the intelligence that you have” Gates further said “They’re (Iran) not close to a stockpile, they’re not close to a weapon at this point, and so there is some time.” Gate’s concludes in other interviews that any military option to force Iran to abandon its controversial nuclear program would have merely temporary ineffective results, and that imposing sanctions on Iran made more sense.