East Asian Trends in Malaysia: Negotiating Youth Identities, Culture and Citizenship Via Social Media

Situations 7.1 Winter 2013/14

East Asian Trends in Malaysia: Negotiating Youth Identities, Culture and Citizenship via Social Media

Joanne Lim (University of Nottingham, Malaysia)

Abstract The reception and re-appropriation of East Asian cultural forms by young Malaysians through social media have significant political stakes in multi-ethnic Malaysia. These take place alongside very critical conversations among youths in relation to discourses on citizenship, censorship and culture. Based upon interviews and focus group discussions with young enthusiasts of popular texts—namely Japanese manga-anime-cosplay and the Korean Hallyu—this paper discusses the implication of these texts in terms of negotiating and (re-)defining a common national identity, while highlighting the relative contradictions by the state in its attempt to forge a “common culture.” Ultimately, this paper argues that the process of consuming and reproducing East Asian popular culture is more significant than the actual forms that are reproduced; that is, the fact that the increasing number of young Malaysian adults are participating in this process via social media suggests that a (potentially) emancipatory space has been opened for the formation of new individual, social, cultural, and national identities in Malaysia, as well for the nation to more fully become part of a “Trans-Asia.”

Keywords: citizenship, censorship, identity, Malaysia, nationhood, participation, social media, trans-Asia, youth culture

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Introduction A parody of the South Korean Gangnam-style video dubbed ‘Gangnam Sabah Style’ that went viral in August 2012 attracted over 500,000 views within four days (currently 5,130,035 views). The video was produced and uploaded onto YouTube by a group of 30 Malaysian teenagers in conjunction with the National Day celebrations who used the video to voice their “love and concern for Malaysia,”1 waving the Jalur Gemilang (national flag) at the end: “the message is basically that we Sabahans are one family” claimed 31-year-old videographer Jack Wong. In line with the Muslim Eid celebrations, a separate video entitled “Suasana Gangnam Raya” was uploaded and attracted 2,345,639 views. An additional 13 Gangnam Style parodies by Malaysians, “Super Kampung Style” featured radio deejays dressed in traditional Malay costumes garnered over 3 million views, albeit with 1,754 dislikes from those who did not appreciate the humour. The sudden popularity of Psy’s “Gangnam Style” in Malaysia occurs at a time when there continue to be unresolved struggles and contradictions concerning various attempts by the state and the broader Malaysian society to define national identity.2 Nonetheless, the strong affiliation with East Asian cultures has long existed, mainly rooted in Japanese pop cultures such as anime (animation) and manga (comic books), being translated into the local language as early as the 1990s. The subsequent Korean Wave phenomenon has since dominated the local entertainment scene with an influx of cultural texts comprising various entertainment forms, including K-pop and Korean dramas. From the onset, the flow of East Asian cultures has been deemed to promote cultural familiarity or has been regarded as successful models for economic development.3 However, there is an underlying narrative that moves beyond theories of familiarization and exoticism to offer a possibility of (re-)imagining trans-Asia or the trans-Asianness of these cultural forms, regardless of whether they are borrowed, copied, adapted, or in the case of “Gangnam Style,” parodied. In trying to negotiate between outdated regionalistic/nationalistic concepts such as the Look East Policy,4 Asian values5 and the widely contested Bangsa Malaysia (Malaysian Race),6 the possibility of a new

East Asian Trends in Malaysia 23 and alternative trans-Asian construct offers an understanding of how Malaysian society—especially the youths—engage with various East Asian cultural forms. While it does not remove the ongoing political underpinnings imposed by the state and its policies on local/foreign cultural forms and content (including definitions of nationhood and national identity), the idea of trans-Asia or the re-imagining of Asia as a cultural crossroads may open up alternative spaces to (re)discover the national and the trans-national through popular cultural forms. As part of a research project on Social Media and Youth Agency in Malaysia, funded by the Ministry of Higher Education’s Fundamental Research Grant Scheme (FRGS), an extensive range of case studies has been collected via Facebook, Twitter, blogs and video-sharing sites such as YouTube and Vimeo. As an extension of the case studies, a series of in-depth interviews conducted with over 60 young Malaysians from three states across Peninsular and East Malaysia shed light on the politics of social media and, indeed, everyday life in Malaysia whilst illuminating how youths consume and create (in most cases, concomitantly). When individuals were asked to articulate their thoughts on what constitutes “agency,” many spoke about agency in relation to their own identity and their role in affecting other members within specific youth communities. Interviewees range from political and environmental activists to organizers of flash mobs and cosplay events, from advocates of business start-ups to popular video bloggers. These interviews further enabled insights into the processes of communication and transmission, eventually leading to the mobilization of fans, friends, groups and networks to execute a physical event, participate in a live activity, or attend informal gatherings. There also seems to be very significant conversations among youths in relation to what might be categorized as the three Cs—citizenship, censorship and culture. These responses provide an initial overview of the relationship between the three Cs and several highly popular East Asian cultural forms among young Malaysians, namely Japanese manga-anime-cosplay and K-pop (Psy, BigBang, Girls Generation, G-Dragon). The responses also seem to affirm how the use of social media has become vital in the creation, development and

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maintenance of the popularity of these forms. Prior to addressing these specific cultural forms, it is necessary to consider how the state responds to the notion of cultural hegemony in East Asia whilst constructing its own hegemonic practices within ethno-national boundaries.

Culture and Censorship: Situating Ethno-national Boundaries Culture and cultural forms in Malaysia are often subjected to certain pre-existing boundaries that are either vaguely conceptualized or tightly monitored. Ceaseless attempts by the powers-that-be to (re- )define national identity and emphasize racial/ethnic differences create further margins in society. The “common culture” set up by the state (commonly known as Bangsa Malaysia and 1Malaysia) does little to encourage positive relationships between most young people and are more exclusionary than socially inclusive. Furthermore, such official cultures have no real connection with the lives of youth. In her study of youth cultures, Virginia Caputo found that, “culture portrayed in terms of a unified system of meaning, privileges the voices of the powerful. In turn, cultural meanings that may be held by the groups that oppose dominant interpretations continue to be excluded in order to uphold this representation of culture.”7 A space for culture is more often found in “everyday life, everyday creativity and expression—even if it is sometimes invisible, looked down on or spurned.” Indeed, most young people’s lives are “full of expressions, signs and symbols through which individuals and groups seek creatively to establish their presence, identity and meaning.”8 Given this, social media spaces constitute one of the more “liberal” spaces for youths to creatively establish their presence and identity. As one interviewed cosplayer states, “Social media right now is evolved to a point where everybody is a star in their own reality TV show. They put down what they ate, pictures, what they dreamt last night.”9 Nonetheless, there are boundaries that extend beyond merely ensuring privacy in a public domain. Control over the media (and culture, more generally) has been explicitly enforced in Malaysia for decades through draconian laws

East Asian Trends in Malaysia 25 such as the Internal Security Act, the Official Secrets Act, and the Printing Presses and Publications Act, amongst others, all of which are commonly used to legally justify decisions to censor, ban or remove certain cultural forms from entering the country. Nonetheless, a set of guidelines drawn up by the Film Censorship Board in Malaysia (a government agency), often at an ad-hoc level, was established to censor or ban films infringing any religious, cultural and moral values that were felt to be typical of Malaysian society, prior to public viewing. These guidelines were also more generally applied to other media and cultural forms.10 The guidelines were tightened in 2003 as a result of rising Islamic conservatism: kissing and cleavage were censored; nudity and sex scenes were cut; and where extensive levels of violence and sex were present, there were outright bans.11 It was unsurprising then that anime, manga, cosplay and Korean pop (K-pop) were also subjected to negative remarks from various parties.12 Influences of cross-dressing13 (often in cosplay) and K-pop’s kkotminam (꽃미남) phenomenon (literally ‘flower-beautiful-man’), as a source of transgender issues, leading to identity crisis among youth were cited in these negative remarks.14 Further contradictions lie in the fact that these are East Asian influences and if the Look East Policy, along with previously established ties with South Korea,15 held any further implications on Malaysian economy and cultural values after its former Prime Minister Mahathir’s reign, then these cultural forms should be embraced whole-heartedly. K-pop dance cover group (Epsilon) member Dayana Anith states, “People often view K-pop negatively but it has a lot of good too. For example‚ a K-pop fan is always willing to help out another fan regardless of his or her nationality and race.”16 The group’s videos17 have been viewed over 1.2 million times in two years, in addition to having won a bronze prize in the second UCC (User Created Content) YouTube competition organized by South Korean English entertainment channel Arirang TV in 2012. In a country like Malaysia which has an Internet penetration of more than 67% amongst its population of 2.9 million, and with the popularity of Facebook, Twitter and social/community blogs growing

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exponentially, cyberspace control and monitoring may be seen as a counter-productive step by the State to discourage the spread of information and the speed of mobilization. To further complicate matters, Information Communications and Culture Minister Rais Yatim claimed in a Twitter post on April 2012 that no censorship would be imposed on the portrayal of LGBT (lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender) characters on state-owned TV channels, including the portrayal of effeminate men. Nonetheless, he stressed that the ministry has the right to select content “suitable” for the Malaysian public.18 Increasingly, many youths have learnt to negotiate such taboos and censorship. An interview with a local social media activist revealed that he did not support censorship laws. However, when asked if he self-censors online, he replies: Yes, I do self-censor. I don’t encourage censorship from the authority. I think there’s no point for you (authorities) to censor anything. My self-censorship is more towards not wanting to offend certain people, get into senseless (arguments), and not get sued over certain things.19 What becomes clear is a shift from explicit paranoia over so-called contamination of local cultural values to a more seemingly open platform which places the responsibility on society to self-censor and self-regulate, akin to Foucault’s notion of the panopticon and governmentality (discussed later). This also ups the ante on how much more control and censorship such paranoia creates. Whereas in the past, Cantopop Hins Cheung’s ‘Feat’ (壮举) was banned for the quick gasping sound in the song presumed to be sexual, Malaysians are now expected to make “informed” decisions based on past experiences of guilt, fear and trauma linked to issues of violence, sex, gender, and identity. Increasingly, the subtleties of hegemonic control by the state are transmitted via the abolition of repressive policies and replaced with ideas of freedom and unity—the very ideas that had been pre- defined and constructed by the state. With the Internet, particularly social media, becoming the most popular space (especially among the youths) to post, disseminate and consume culture, the state has become more concerned about the online platform, while at the same time exercising more caution in their proposals to censor.20 What gets

East Asian Trends in Malaysia 27 transmitted, reworked and shared on social media then becomes a necessary focus point in attempting to understand the way youth identities are constructed and lived via a more democratic space, whilst struggling to (re)define, resist or advocate the practice of (self-) censorship. Online activities such as surfing, posting reviews and information, and subsequent conversations within a social media group may seem somewhat pedestrian on the surface. Nonetheless, the interviewees expressed concerns about online monitoring when discussing the extent of information being posted or the videos being shared, even though the content is generally categorized as entertainment. One interviewee stated: “I will see if I need to filter what I want to post. Usually when I voice out, I would try not to offend people … when posting online, I try to avoid profanity and racist remarks and also posting religious matters. These are the things that need to be filtered.”21 A young entrepreneur (in an interview) added: “Text should also be censored. Maybe on sensitive issues such as race and religion that can anger people. You need to type politely.”22 Michel Foucault’s use of the panoptic metaphor in his analysis of modernity is crucial to understanding how individuals become the “principle of their own subjection,” as he contends that discipline is internalised and the fear of punishment motivates people to conform.23 By bringing his theory of governmentality into the age of social media, especially in the context of Malaysia, it is possible to question how agency is disciplined and how authority and power are displaced via the workings of the Internet, and to understand the changing relations between self and society. Foucault’s notion of power over the self illuminates social life in the current era, where the self is constantly trapped in between, negotiating its identity, struggling with the notion of identity, and caught in the process of becoming. Building on the concepts of governmentality and biopower, it is possible to analyse the exercise of power by exploring how Malaysian youths by their own means act on their thoughts, pleasures, conduct and ways of being—power as both liberating and restrictive at the same time.24 Social media thus stands as a new tool for the

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anatomical focus and embodiment of power, a materiality that acts as both a source and a target of power, whether expressed politically, sexually, juristically, or in discourse. What, we must now ask, are the implications of young people using social media sites in the processes of integration and disintegration, globalization and localization? How are these sites projected as spaces of culture and identity, as platforms to establish localized arenas for public debate and cultural expression and to function, more importantly, as meaningful local public spheres?

Culture and/or Participation: Traversing Territorial Nationalisms Willis makes a very crucial statement about youth culture: “There is work, even desperate work, in their play.”25 Without being overly optimistic about youth “play” nor too caught up with trying to gauge the level of youth participation, there are several key intersections between play and participation that reveal how youth draw from cross- national cultures and negotiate with these to make sense of their lives. Research has shown that by their own accounts many young Malaysians discover Japanese media products through the Internet, and that the extensive circulation of Japanese popular culture products like anime, manga, television dramas and films are made available through online communities.26 It may be useful at this juncture to consider how Asian-ness is increasingly de-familiarized through the flurry of globalization. While Arjun Appadurrai may not have envisioned the extent to which media would intersect with cultures and nationalisms in his notion of mediascapes, it is through such intersections and blurred boundaries that such cultural forms become, or are intentionally made, unfamiliar in order to allow for new forms of appreciation to take place, and to prolong the process of experiencing the artfulness of a cultural form; the form itself being less important.27 Thus, the concept of defamiliarization28 in juxtaposition with Paulo Freire’s pedagogy of knowledge challenges us to appreciate the wisdom and creativity of ordinary people.29 Defamiliarization and/or ‘estrangement’ may indeed be the underlying principles of online/offline practices. When applied to

East Asian Trends in Malaysia 29 popular culture, the process of (re)producing and/or consuming these cultural forms becomes more important than the actual outcome (i.e. the edited sequence of “Gangnam Sabah Style” or the Cosplay Conference). Taking the dance moves of “Gangnam Style” out of its original context and into the streets, shopping malls and kampungs (villages) hardly replicate the experience of watching the original music video. It creates a different experience that calls upon collective cultural action, inadvertently making people aware of their social condition, their creativity, their ability to express, and their potential as a group. Similarly, cosplay enthusiasts do not participate in costume play because of its familiarity to an existing subculture; instead, it offers a platform for Cosplayers to interact whilst creating an alternative subculture centered on role play and interpretation, again taking the performance away from its original source (i.e. manga, anime, comic books, video games, and films). So do these cultural products exemplify Iwabuchi’s notion of “cultural odour” in the sense that consumers associate them with the image of Japan or Korea? Or have they become instead “culturally odourless” from being so closely embedded in contemporary everyday life?30 Considering this alongside the notion of defamiliarization offers yet another reading which suggests how cultural products are so extensively consumed globally that elements of their origin no longer appear relevant: [Cosplay conference participants] are acting like their normal selves in someone else’s costume … it’s not really cosplay. You’re not being the character. You’re just being yourself in somebody else’s costume;31 I tend to notice that most cosplayers with original characters don’t get much attention.32 Within the context of cultural participation, there are two significant aspects to consider—meanings and connections; how meanings inform relevant/existing constructions and how social connections are forged with diverse audiences. As discussed below, data obtained from the interviews reveal strategies employed to create, develop and maintain various East Asian popular forms. The Internet has enabled one interviewee to create social networks and a website featuring cosplay activities. Cosplay communities

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actively participate in forums that allow them to share stories, photographs, news and tips. More importantly, social media has been used to disseminate and gather members for the annual Asia Cosplay Meet, World Cosplay Summit, Malaysian Anicom Cosplay Competition, Japanese Autumn Festival Cosplay Competition, Anime Festival Asia, and Taylor’s Asaban Festival, among others. A group called the Anime, Comics and Games set up by one interviewee uses the online platform to proliferate members.33 He states:

[T]he committee in Malaysia, we call it the ACG committee. I am still a fan and I really like it, I really love animation, especially Japanese animation/anime…because of that I joined a few committees, I researched a lot and I’m starting a plan on how to build maybe almost the same industry as the Japanese industry (here in Malaysia) that promotes anime, comics and games. ACG needs a good PR—spread the word, the solid information for it and to really make the people understand this is not a sinking industry, it is a very popular industry, it changes Japan in a big way–they have developed a new culture, it’s called the ‘Moy/Moi’ culture or in a way called Japanese pop culture and I think Malaysia has that potential and we just need to work for it.… being part of the Anime group, I check information, I do anime reviews, I’ll post information for them, where to download and get information (cool stuffs) also to help them decide what to watch and what to read. I like to post something that will spark a conversation, and eventually if you want to get more details, that is where you have to go to a blog or website. So that’s how I see the ladder of information.34

What becomes clearer is the intentional blurring of online/offline spaces, in tandem with the idea of “defamiliarization.” Malaysian K- pop dance group Epsilon uses the Internet to recruit additional dancers to their ensemble, akin to a group of Pokémon (card) enthusiasts who compete in world championships.

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In Malaysia, it’s [Pokémon’s] fully focused mainly in Kuala Lumpur and the other states they don’t really have a tournament or such things … so basically we are using social media to connect with everyone else so we can further spread Pokémon in Malaysia.35

[W]e have a few [Facebook groups]. Basically there are groups for the places that we play at so that they can arrange meets much easier. That way it’s much easier for people who are interested to come because before this we just announce it through word of mouth, or just posters at the shop, but now since we have Facebook it has become so much more easier to get people to join us.36

[M]ost people in Malaysia they would be shy to admit that they play Pokémon and I honestly used to be shy as well, such as what if people will laugh at me but over the years I realize that … you should be proud of it instead of just hiding it … I don’t necessarily promote Pokémon cards, but … if I see anything cute or anything that I want to share with my friends I will just share it, I wouldn’t worry about making it into something private.37

Participation is motivated by less individualistic factors, particularly for socializing purposes, further building on ideas of community and challenging the stigmatism of citizenship.

Citizenship and nationalism is simple, it is the love of a nation, but it goes deeper than that. It does not mean you love the nation and support everything—but it means that you have to go beyond the mainstream because sometimes the mainstream might not be right and for me love is bittersweet (of a definition).38

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Nationalism and being a good citizen is wanting the best for your country for the people to do well economically. What I mean by economically is a high standard of living all around, not just for the selected few and the top.39

In rethinking Foucault’s notion of governmentality, the ethical (or justified) formation of sub-cultures is read as an extension of the individual/community desire to construct an ethical life akin to ideas of “good” civic participation. Nonetheless, young people tend to make decisions based on what they perceive as ethical, which is not necessarily in line with the more dominant constructs. A Pokémon enthusiast states: “I would say that Pokémon is a really good game that should be encouraged among Malaysians because it encourages thinking outside of the box…no offence but something that I see in a lot of people is that they lack a lot of thinking skills.” 40 More importantly, this leads to the construction of new values, practices and cultural forms that are (re)introduced in society. The following section highlights subsequent stages of cultural adaptation and negotiation with these East Asian cultural forms. What becomes apparent is that the argument no longer revolves around wholesale acceptance, conformity or rejection of the subculture practices, but an adaptation into everyday life, which further informs how young people continue to develop (new) identities, proliferating a culture of change that construct new forms of patriotism.

Youth Identities: Self-Other/Local-Foreign? A recent study by Rahman et al. examining the emerging cosplay subculture in Hong Kong found a more individualized experience, one which allows cosplayers to escape from reality momentarily and to enter into imaginative worlds, in addition to self-gratification and personal fulfilment. They argue that this represents a form of role/identity-transformation from an “ordinary person” to a “super hero,” from a “game player” to a “performer,” and from “adulthood” to “childhood.”41 However, the Malaysian cosplayers interviewed in this

East Asian Trends in Malaysia 33 project, who are part of a social media group, often articulate their experiences in terms of communal rather than individual gratification:

We meet a lot of great people. I think anything that you do, [you make] a lot of good friends (like online gaming) that they just don’t want to let go … so that’s what keeping me to stay— Cosplay.42

They [K-pop dance competitions] are a good way for us to meet like-minded people and see if we have really improved on our dancing—Epsilon.43

Of course the more the merrier. I mean because if there are more people you don’t always have to play with the same person and then you can meet more people as well … you can find many types of people, I have seen people from places like Klang [laughs], Malik he’s from Setiawangsa, and I am from Bangsar, our environment is very different and the way we grow up is also different, in a way I get to like see how other people grew up—Pokémon.44

The ultimate aim and gratification comes from representing the country in various competitions and conferences abroad.

We have a lot of potential in Malaysia, we have a lot of bright minds, and I don’t like to see it go to waste because we are not able to go for the competitions, the internationals, because when we go for the internationals we are not only representing ourselves but our country name so in a way that is how you are representing the country. And if you do well, your country will be known rather than just you alone—Cosplay.45

We are not the first dance cover group in Malaysia but we are the only one to have an international outlook. We make sure

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that fans know we are Malaysians and that Malaysian talents are of international standard—Epsilon.46

Winning the Arirang TV contest had been a motivation for Epsilon to “work harder to put Malaysia on the K-pop map.”47 Unfortunately many fail to achieve this due to the lack of support from the local authorities. One interviewee gave an account of how his team of Pokémon gamers barely raised enough funds to purchase air tickets and had to withdraw their participation due to the lack of sponsors for meals and accommodation. The Malaysian K-pop dance group encountered problems obtaining special visas to perform in Seoul alongside some of the biggest names in the K-Pop scene: it was a “lost opportunity as we were the only Malaysian group invited.”48 Although Puustinen suggests that different audiences produce different meanings and this allows them to create their own identity based on personal judgments, it is more relevant to consider Kim’s view of how ideas and opinions are based on previous experiences and knowledge in everyday life. People’s experiences in daily life are structured by their engagements with social and cultural environments that provide a framework for connecting commonsensical meanings and views of the world.49 Nonetheless, the notion of identification and the relationship between text and audience remains a misnomer and its importance is debatable. Previous work emphasizing “identification” considers “localization strategies” in terms of recognizing the popularity of Japanese popular culture in Malaysia being driven by its attractiveness and cultural value. Iwabuchi suggests that the Asian audiences of Japanese drama feel culturally proximate and empathize with Japanese people. He adds, “Japan is perceived as similar but different, different but common,”50 suggesting that similar physical structures and cultural resemblance bring the audience to become more receptive towards Japanese dramas because it is easier to relate to oneself.51 Chua offers another perspective in arguing that audiences identify with the narrative, themes and characters within the text in order to look at the differences between the two different identities (in his case,

East Asian Trends in Malaysia 35 between Japanese and Singaporean identities).52 One interviewee—a Malaysian-Japanese culture moderator of Facebook—attempts to negotiate between his devotion to Japan (a culture which he promotes via social media) and his patriotism towards Malaysia:

About Japan ... I am not sure about that because every time I see a Malaysian doing something on a big scale, or taking Malaysia to a new level and to give Malaysia an accomplishment, the first thing I feel is the Malaysian pride—I focus most on this local aspect. But the Japanese side I only, maybe support the upbringing of the culture, not so to the point where if the Japanese go to the moon, not that sort of pride. But if a Malaysian went to the moon, then yes definitely I will be proud by all means.53

While on the one hand identification theories may serve as a useful framework to understand identity and identity construction, it cannot be applied to the online sphere without further deliberation. The politics of technology offers an alternative purpose for participation in the global village and its system of chaos.54 Thus, the question of why young people participate in various cultural activities online such as videogaming, Cosplay and “Gangnam Style” may be less relevant to identification or exoticization, but instead motivated by the very nature of how networks and groups function on social media via networked participation. We continue to ask if young Malaysians are less concerned about issues and more attracted to the idea of participation, be it actual or virtual. Do they participate in a particular cultural form simply because it received 60 million views on YouTube and gained 100 million likes on Facebook; because they are more attracted to the notion of participation rather than the actual reason for participation? The awareness that on a social media network, everyone is linked and are able to “follow” or involuntarily track other people’s online activities not only problematizes the notion of anonymity on the Internet, but further imposes a situation of participating because “everyone else is doing it” without placing much

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thought on the actual content itself. And if we take on board the theory of defamiliarization, we are then seeing a further distance between the text and the audience. Increasingly, there seems to be optimism about cultural content transcending or being disseminated widely, beyond Asia. Social media, which has been regarded as alternative, activist, oppositional and radical 55 has now become the dominant culture or the new mainstream, and is crucial in ensuring the fluidity of cultural connections. However, the question should really be focused on whether cultural content can meaningfully transcend Asia. Because it is only through meaningful participation that content within cultural texts can continue to exist, be shared, and encourage thoughtful responses rather than being subjected to meaningless parodies, or resulting in hoards of young Malaysians treating the cosplay event as a mere “costume party.” The counter argument lies in the notion that even costume play and “empty” parodies can offer meaning—the anchor of youth agency/identities being contingency, which is an alternative to the more common need to gauge participation levels based on knowledge and action. The more pertinent question then is this: upon being shared via social media, what are the roles of various East Asian cultural forms in opening up complex processes which shape our taste and forge individual and collective identities? Or does Pierre Bourdieu’s notion of consumption and taste become less relevant in forging such identities?56 Perhaps it becomes even less relevant to seek to categorize or classify what is culturally foreign/local within a cultural text when attempting to understand the construction of identities formed via social media.

Conclusion There is no doubt that East Asian popular cultures have greatly influenced global markets. Many researchers have argued that transnational media can transcend borders and be interpreted across different cultures. However, these discussions have in the past focused

East Asian Trends in Malaysia 37 on the consumption of East Asian cultural products by dominantly homogenous societies (i.e. Japanese media consumed mainly by Taiwanese, South Koreans, and Hong Kong audiences as opposed to multicultural communities such as Malaysia, Thailand or Indonesia), and mostly cite the cultural proximity paradigm. As Chua suggests, audiences identify with the ‘foreign’ characteristics because they derive pleasures from “looking at a different world,” so the question now is how such distinctions between foreign and local, exotic and familiar are increasingly problematized in multicultural South East Asian societies such as Malaysia.57 In the midst of the contradictions encountered in trying to define Malaysian culture and identity, what we are witnessing is the use of new technology and social media by young people, which potentially opens up space for independence from traditional structures and policies, even while potentially preserving and supporting those same structures. Thus far, it appears that social media is becoming paradigmatic and a fundamental part of contemporary discourses of gender, ethnicity, nationalism, and surveillance. Returning to the earlier notion of defamiliarization and Freire’s pedagogy of the oppressed, the open yet concealing, liberating yet limiting, conditions of social media may be argued as a way in which social, political, and cultural issues tend to be approached in public today. Its capacity to interrupt or de-centre the political landscape of the nation makes it an essential tool in the project of social, cultural and political restructuring. In addressing the possibility of imagining trans-Asia through cultural forms, it is necessary first to consider how and whose culture is transmitted. There is a need to question why Malaysian films, music, and dramas produced by local artists continue to be displaced in the wider trans-Asian market and even amongst Malaysians themselves, despite being distributed free-of-charge on YouTube, whereas Malaysian parodies of Korean culture or Malaysian’s cosplaying J-pop seem to garner more attention from the local and East Asian public. What does trans-Asia mean to a nation that continues to (self-)censor in its struggle to define a national identity? There are clearly two

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different albeit not necessarily separate strands of power affecting the engagement of any given cultural form in Malaysia—one that is social and another that is political. And in the case of “Gangnam Style,” the social becomes the political when Prime Minister Najib Razak asks via his Twitter handle, “Been hearing about “Gangnam Style” all of last week, even in the news. What’s your view that makes it so popular?” Here, the notion of defamiliarization is once again evident through the intentional blurring of online/offline practices adopted by the State, which further affirms Foucault’s theory of governmentality. What persists here is the suggestion that social media may facilitate the exploration of self-identity and the formation of social and national identity to influence political allegiances among young people. The examples of Malaysian engagement with K-pop and J-pop are evidence that struggles, conflicts and contradictions between nation and the state can be produced, projected and negotiated through social media. Nonetheless, this does not suggest a reading of the popularity of East Asian cultural forms among Malaysians as allegorical or symbolic of discourses on ethnicity, multiculturalism and gender. Instead, it poses a challenge to understanding how different youth communities contend to fix their own meanings and alternative definitions in the construction of national and self-identity. Through further comparative study of how young people engage with social media based on their social and political determinisms, it may be possible to perceive social media and the various cultural products transmitted via this platform as what Bourdieu has described as “cultural intermediaries” in relation to the restructuring of their social, cultural and political projects. In reflecting on how Malaysian citizenship, censorship and culture are (re)shaped and (re)negotiated, one is led to the thought that it may only be by meaningfully embracing the notion of trans-Asia and positively embracing a culture of change that Malaysia can begin working towards being ‘truly Asia.’58

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Notes 1 The Star, August 31 2012. 2 As put forth by the 1Malaysia manifesto, Malaysian national identity is arguably not a single entity. The 1Malaysia programme was implemented by current Prime Minister Najib Razak in 2010, in his attempt to address/resolve the issue of unity and multiculturalism within the country. See www.1malaysia.com. my/en/manifesto/. 3 See Youna Kim, Media Consumption and Everyday Life in Asia (New York: Routledge, 2008). 4 Many local consumers have looked favourably towards Asian products and cultural influences as part of the Look East Policy enacted in 1982. This policy became a platform for Malaysians to look favourably towards Japan for guidance for nation development. 5 The concept of ‘Asian values’ was initially set up as a political tool in the 1990s by former Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad and former Singapore Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew to advocate the notion of collectivism and to reflect a set of institutions and political ideologies which constituted the region’s culture and history, differentiating between East/West ideas, philosophy and religion. 6 Bangsa Malaysia was coined by former Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad in an effort create a sense of social identity, loyalty and belonging. 7 Virginia Caputo, “Anthropology’s Silent ‘Others’: A Consideration of Some Conceptual and Methodological Issues for the Study of Youth and Children’s Cultures,” in Youth Cultures, ed. Vered Amit-talai and Helena Wuff (London: Routledge, 1995), 19. 8 Paul Willis, Common Culture (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1990), 1. 9 Anonymous, interview by Joanne Lim, interviewee C10. 10 Wan Amizah WM, P. K. Chang, and J. Aziz address evolution of film censorship in Malaya/Malaysia, discussing several examples of Malay films censored or banned on the grounds that they were contrary to the religious, cultural and moral values set by the Board. 11 In 2011, the country’s Home Affairs ministry announced its decision to abolish the Censorship Board on the basis that “now filmmakers need to practice self-censorship when it comes to their works,” Malaysian Insider, last modified December 30, 2011, http://www.themalaysianinsider.com/opinion/article/no- more-film-censorship-board.-yay-or-nay.

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12 See Sharon Kinsella, “Japanese Subculture in the 1990s: Otaku and the Amateur Manga Movement,” Journal of Japanese Studies 24, no. 2 (1998): 289-316. 13 It is not unusual to see genders switched at Cosplay events, with women playing male roles and vice versa. A subset of Cosplay culture, which centers around sex appeal, requires cosplayers to choose characters known for their attractiveness and/or explicit costumes. 14 See Anne Peirson-Smith, “Fashioning the Fantastical Self: An Examination of the Cosplay Dress-up Phenomenon in Southeast Asia,” Fashion Theory: The Journal of Dress, Body & Culture 17, no. 1 (2013): 77-112; Osmud Rahman, Liu Wing-sun, Brittany Hei-man Cheung, “Cosplay: Imaginative Self and Performing Identity,” Fashion Theory: The Journal of Dress, Body & Culture 16, no. 3 (2012): 317-42; Donnalyn Pompper, “Masculinities, the Metrosexual, and Media Images: Across Dimensions of Age and Ethnicity,” Sex Roles 63, no. 9-10 (2010): 682-96. 15 These ties were established before President Park Chung-hee’s assassination in 1979 [Cho Chul Ho, “Jurnal Pengajian Media Malaysia Jilid 12,” Malaysian Journal of Media Studies 12, no. 1 (2010): 1-14]. 16 Epsilon has 3,209 subscribers on YouTube and 3,614 “likes” on Facebook [News Straits Times, 2012]. 17 The five-member group performs songs by South Korean bands SHINee, Girls’ Generation, Wonder Girls and B2ST. 18 “Rais Says No Ban On LGBT Characters On Government TV Channels,” Bernama, last modified November 9 2012, http://www.bernama.com.my/bernama/ v6/newsindex.php?id=657502. 19 Anonymous, interview by Joanne Lim, interviewee C16. 20 The most recent exercise was the amendment to Section 114A of the 1950 Evidence Act which was passed without debate in parliament. The section on “Presumption of fact in publication” states that any owner, admin, host, editor, subscriber of a network or website, or owner of computer or mobile device is presumed to have published or re-published its contents. 21 Anonymous, interview by Joanne Lim, interviewee A5. 22 Anonymous, interview by Joanne Lim, interviewee C3. 23 Michel Foucault, Discipline & Punish: The Birth of the Prison, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Vintage, 1975), 202-203. 24 Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000). 25 Willis, 1-2.

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26 Eriko Yamato, Steven Eric Krauss, Ezha Tamam, Hamisah Hassan, and Mohd Nizam Osman, “It’s Part of Our Lifestyle: Exploring Young Malaysians’ Experiences with Japanese Popular Culture,” Keio Communication Review 33 (2011): 199-223. 27 Arjun Appadurai, Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996). 28 See Victor Scklovsky, “Art as Technique,” in Russian Formalist Criticism: Four Essays, eds. Lee T. Lemon and Marion J. Reis (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1917), 3-24. 29 In general, Freire’s pedagogy challenges Western concepts of education in which knowledge “is a gift bestowed by those who consider themselves knowledgeable upon those whom they consider to know nothing” [Paulo Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed (New York: Continuum, 1993)]. 30 Koichi Iwabuchi, Recentering Globalization: Popular Culture and Japanese Transnationalism (Durham: Duke University Press, 2002), 27. 31 Anonymous, interview by Joanne Lim, interviewee A13. 32 Anonymous, interview by Joanne Lim, interviewee A11. 33 See http://www.mycosplaytoshokan.com. 34 Anonymous, interview by Joanne Lim, interviewee A14. 35 Anonymous, interview by Joanne Lim, interviewee Focus group participant– FGD1A. 36 Anonymous, interview by Joanne Lim, interviewee Focus group participant– FGD3A. 37 Anonymous, interview by Joanne Lim, interviewee FGD6A. 38 Anonymous, interview by Joanne Lim, interviewee A12. 39 Anonymous, interview by Joanne Lim, interviewee B13. 40 Anonymous, interview by Joanne Lim, interviewee C10. 41 Rahman et al, 2012. 42 Anonymous, interview by Joanne Lim, interviewee A14. 43 News Straits Times, February 19 2012. 44 Anonymous, interview by Joanne Lim, interviewee C10. 45 Anonymous, interview by Joanne Lim, interviewee A12. 46 News Straits Times, February 19 2012. 47 Suzieana Uda Nagu, “The Performing Arts,” News Straits Times, 2012. 48 Ibid. 49 Kim, 2008. 50 Iwabuchi, 301.

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51 Yu-fen Ko argues that the high consumption of Japanese television dramas are mainly due to the way narratives are packaged and presented. Japanese television dramas are said to be appealing because of their modern urban settings, stories of individuals in pursuit of success, struggles, hardships encountered in love, and how the challenges develop into achievements. In a very similar way, this embodies the narrative of Gangnam Style which highlights the upscale district in Seoul, and Psy’s song being a critique of Koreans aspiring to the pretentious lifestyle of the rich [“The Desired Form: Japanese Idol Dramas in Taiwan” in Feeling Asian Modernities: Transnational Consumption of Japanese TV Dramas, ed. Koichi Iwabuchi (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2004), 107-28]. 52 Beng Huat Chua, “East Asian Pop culture: Layers of Communities,” in Media Consumption and Everyday Life in Asia, ed. Youna Kim (New York: Routledge, 2008). 53 Anonymous, interview by Joanne Lim, interviewee A15. 54 See Ien Ang’s reading of James Curran’s notion of “new revisionism” [Living Room Wars: Rethinking Media Audience (New York: Routledge, 1996)]. 55 Leah Lievrouw, Alternative and Activist New Media (Cambridge: Polity, 2011). 56 Pierre Bourdieu, Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste, trans. Richard Nice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984), 6. 57 Beng Huat Chua, “Transnational and Transcultural Circulation and Consumption of East Asian Television Drama,” in Patterns of Middle Class Consumption in India and China, ed. Christophe Jaffrelot and Peter Van Der Veer (New Delhi: Sage Publications India Pvt. Ltd., 2008), 197. 58 Malaysia Truly Asia is a multi-million dollar tourism campaign by the Malaysian Ministry Of Culture, Arts And Tourism which puts a claim in its tourism ads that Malaysia is ‘Truly Asia” due to its rich multicultural and ethnic background. This has become an identity marker since its introduction in 2006; its presence on Facebook garnering 42,904 likes.