Nicholas Tarling. Britain, Southeast Asia and the Onset of the Cold War 1945-1950. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. x + 488 pp. $69.95, cloth, ISBN 978-0-521-63261-4.
Reviewed by Mark T. Berger
Published on H-Asia (March, 2001)
The 'Ofcial Mind' of Late-Colonialism: the main weakness of Britain, Southeast Asia and Britain, Decolonization and the Cold War in the Onset of the Cold War 1945-1950. Southeast Asia 1945-1950 Turning frst to its strength. The book is well Nicholas Tarling is one of the most prominent organized: each chapter focuses on a specifc historians of modern Southeast Asia writing in year, or years. Chapters are then divided into a English. Based for over thirty years at the Univer‐ number of sections which deal in some detail sity of Auckland he has produced numerous with the British government's ofcial interaction books on the history of Southeast Asia, particular‐ with virtually all of the colonies and/or emergent ly the history of British imperialism in the region. nation-states in Southeast Asia. At the same time, [1] He is also editor of The Cambridge History of relations with the United States, France and the Southeast Asia.[2] His most recent book, Britain, Netherlands, as well as the Indian government, Southeast Asia and the Onset of the Cold War and other Commonwealth governments are cen‐ 1945-1950, follows directly on from an earlier vol‐ tral to the overall narrative. The frst chapter ume Britain, Southeast Asia and the Onset of the deals with Britain's "Wartime Plans for Post-War Pacifc War.[3] Like the earlier volume, this study Southeast Asia, 1942-1945". This is followed by a of the period between the end of World War II chapter on "Southeast Asia after the Japanese Sur‐ and the start of the Korean War refects a life-time render, 1945-1946" and a chapter on "The Re-es‐ of detailed archival work on British imperial poli‐ tablishment of Colonial Régimes in Southeast cy in nineteenth and twentieth century Southeast Asia, 1946". The fourth chapter is entitled "Conces‐ Asia. Like much of his earlier work, it also focuses sion and Confict, 1947", while chapter fve ad‐ (to use Robinson and Gallagher's now famous for‐ dresses "The Impact of Communism, 1948". The mulation) on the "Ofcial Mind" of British imperi‐ sixth and closing chapter is "Commonwealth and alism.[4] This focus is both the main strength and Colombo, 1949-1950". The overall result, as with H-Net Reviews earlier work, is a thorough and empirically rich generally associated, "spurred" the leadership of study. the MCP to "follow a course it was already dis‐ For example, the density of his description for posed to adopt" (pp. 310-311). the period 1945-1950 makes clear that the British The British government attempted to counter government did not pursue a single policy in the China "threat" by encouraging a U.S.-support‐ Southeast Asia, instead following "an aggregation ed regional economic development programme, of policies" towards both specifc countries and which emphasized "economic development" and the region. After 1945 British plans for what, as "good government" as the "answer to internation‐ the author points out, had only recently started to al communism". It was hoped that such a combi‐ be identifed as Southeast Asia were only coordi‐ nation would not only provide a focus for the In‐ nated to a "limited extent". There were interde‐ dian and other Commonwealth governments, partmental government committees put in place with a stake in Southeast Asia, but also increase and "common ideas" were apparent; however, the US "component" in British policy in the region boundaries between various departments were (p. 316). This led to the Colombo Conference in strong and the "consultation" of one department January 1950. In Tarling's view the Colombo Con‐ with another over various issues was viewed at ference and the resulting Colombo Plan, was "in times as "an obstruction to an efective policy" (p. many ways a striking success for British policy". 45). Tarling makes what might seem to be an obvi‐ At the conference the British government ensured ous, but is also an important point: the British that the emphasis was on economic development, government's policies towards Southeast Asia technical assistance and a "regional approach", were constantly "re-shaped in response to the which it thought would distract attention from conditions" in the region, while the "experience in "political diferences". What was also important, one area infuenced its handling of others". from the British government's point of view, was British policies were also "continually re-shaped" that the Colombo Plan "attract" U.S. "support" and in response to events outside Southeast Asia (p. facilitate the combination of US "fnancial re‐ 132). sources" with "British political wisdom". To this On this latter score, the author criticises the end the US was soon made aware of the proposals "tendency" of both the British government and which had resulted from the Colombo conference. the US government to "exaggerate the role of in‐ It was only with the outbreak of the Korean war ternational communism in Asia". He notes that in in mid-1950 that the US joined the Colombo Plan, 1948 the rise of the Chinese Communist Party at the same time as it became more supportive of (CCP) "seemed to relate to a world-wide shift in in‐ the French government's war in Indochina, and ternational communism"; however, "whether" also entered into a military assistance pact with this was a "cause or efect was less clear" (p. 265). the government of Thailand. Although the U.S. For example, in the case of the Malayan Commu‐ was drawn into a more signifcant role in South‐ nist Party (MCP), Tarling argues that "little inter‐ east Asia by 1950, in part as a result of British ef‐ national stimulus" was required to "prompt" the forts, the ability of the British government to in‐ organization to launch its insurgency in 1948. In fuence U.S. policy fell well short of earlier expec‐ relation to the much debated question of the role tations (pp. 336-339, 342). of the decisions of the Calcutta Youth Conference As is clear the book provides a detailed explo‐ in early 1948, Tarling argues that the shift to‐ ration of the "ofcial mind" of British imperialism wards armed struggle in Soviet and Cominform in late-colonial and early Cold War Southeast Asia. policy, with which the conference in Calcutta is The author also ties this complex tale together
2 H-Net Reviews with an overarching argument about the way in to nation-states in Southeast Asia. He concludes which the post-1945 British government had to that, in contrast to earlier decades, Southeast Asia "balance" its "interests" in Southeast Asia and be‐ has now "emerged as a zone of peace, of stability, yond. Tarling emphasizes the interaction between and of prosperity", arguing that this situation is the British concern for good relations with the not only a result of the signifcant, "albeit painful major Western European governments and the exertion of US power" and the "investment of the United States, as well as with colonies and the Japanese", but that it also "owes something to the emerging nations in Southeast Asia and else‐ British statesmanship of the post-war period, where. He argues that Britain attempted to "retain which conceived of and worked towards a region a European presence" in Southeast Asia, but pre‐ in which East and West collaborated" (pp. vious experience also encouraged British ofcials 411-412). to realize that the achievement of this goal in‐ Tarling's view that Southeast Asia by the end volved "coming to terms with nationalism". Fur‐ of the 1990s had "emerged as a zone of peace, of thermore, while, Britain "hoped" to play a role in stability, and of prosperity", and that British ensuring that Southeast Asia emerged as "a zone statesmen of the late-colonial and early Cold War of peace and prosperity in itself", it also wanted it period (along with the U.S. government and Japa‐ to be "an exemplar to other regions". Tarling says nese investors) deserve some credit for this out‐ that this was in contrast to US policy which had come, is contentious. First of all, even if this state‐ no particular interest in the retention of Euro‐ ment was accurate before mid-1997 (and it can be pean infuence in the region prior to 1950, nor presumed that the book went to press before the any regional conception of Southeast Asia. As has onset of the Asian fnancial crisis), it has been already been noted, the author emphasizes that overtaken by events. In the wake of the Asian f‐ Britain, was aware that in order to achieve its nancial crisis, Southeast Asia hardly appears to be post-1945 goals U.S. assistance was required, in a zone of peace, stability and prosperity. Howev‐ Southeast Asia and the Middle East as well as Eu‐ er, even before 1997, viewing Southeast Asia as a rope (pp. 410-411). zone of peace, stability and prosperity entailed a As is also emphasized, the case for, and the selective defnition of 'Southeast Asia' and a selec‐ receipt of this, assistance were both conditioned tive reading of the region's post-1945 history. Bur‐ by the onset of the Cold War. Although British im‐ ma can hardly be included in such an assessment, perial policy had been infuenced for many years while it is not clear that Cambodia, or Laos (or by a "distrust of international communism", Tar‐ even Vietnam) are prosperous or even particular‐ ling argues that the anticommunism that increas‐ ly stable, even if the former constituent elements ingly guided the US was viewed by the British gov‐ of French Indochina are no longer torn by the ernment as "impatient and unsubtle". While, the war, which the U.S. played a large role in starting early hope that British diplomacy could be united and prolonging, as they were in previous decades. with US resources proved "too ambitious", the There were already signs of instability in many outbreak of the Korean war "did not dislodge" parts of Indonesia before the fnancial crisis trig‐ Britain's efort to accommodate nationalism and gered the wider political and social crises into regionalism" in Southeast Asia, nor its eforts to which the former Dutch colony has now plunged. ensure that independent India remained a The 'stability' imposed during the Suharto years "source for British policy". Tarling clearly sympa‐ contributed signifcantly to post-Suharto instabili‐ thises with the British diplomats and ofcials who ty. Nor does the Philippines ft this generalisation. sought to ensure that Britain played as much of a In fact the image of Southeast Asia as a stable, role as possible in the transition from colonialism prosperous and peaceful region by the 1980s and
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1990s was always centred on Singapore, Malaysia tarian political structures which are implicated in and Thailand (with Indonesia being included in the very instability they seek to prevent. the early 1990s by infuential observers such as At the same time, although decolonization the World Bank on the relatively superfcial basis was generally supported by the British and the of impressive economic growth rates). Certainly U.S. governments as a means for stabilising the re‐ relative to the period stretching from the 1940s to gion, the process was also resisted and desta‐ the 1970s, parts of Southeast Asia in the 1990s bilised, especially by the Dutch government in the may be viewed as peaceful, prosperous and sta‐ 1940s and the French Government up to 1954, but ble, but not the region as a whole. also by the British and the U.S. government, if the The idea that Southeast Asia has now become particular type of nation-state (such as a Vietnam a zone of peace, prosperity and stability and that under Ho Chi Minh) was viewed as unacceptable. this fows in part from the eforts of British diplo‐ Apart from Ho's Vietnam, the U.S., at least, also mats and colonial ofcials is connected to what sought to help breakup Indonesia in the late 1950s this reviewer regards as the main weakness of the because Sukarno was seen to be aligning himself book. This is the way in which the author's tight with 'international communism'. Furthermore, focus on the "ofcial mind" of British imperialism the British government and the U.S. government in Southeast Asia between 1945-1950 leads to the overlooked the instability inherent in many of the neglect of the wider forces at work in the rise of new nations, while the legitimacy of these nations nationalism, decolonization and nation building has been reinforced by British and U.S. ofcials in the early Cold War era. The highly contingent who have accepted implicitly or explicitly that na‐ process of creating nation-states out of the com‐ tional elites speak for all the people who live with‐ plex and variegated former Western European in the boundaries of the various nation-states of and U.S. colonies in Southeast Asia (Thailand, Southeast Asia even when there is considerable which was never formally colonized of course, be‐ evidence to the contrary. Peace, stability and pros‐ ing the one exception to formal colonial rule in perity in Indonesia or Burma, to take the most ex‐ the region) was at once both stabilising and desta‐ treme examples, as well as in Southeast Asia more bilising. For example, the instability of countries generally, may only be possible following a such as Burma and Indonesia is directly linked to searching and critical re-examination of the na‐ way in which the sovereign territory of these new tional boundaries and administrative arrange‐ nations was taken to be coterminous with most of ments arrived at in the late-colonial and early their former colonial boundaries. With decoloni‐ Cold War era. Despite these criticisms this is an sation, the nationalist movements in the region impressive piece of research and an invaluable turned the former colonial states into the institu‐ study of a crucial period in the history of tional and territorial embodiment of the new na‐ post-1945 Southeast Asia. It can be recommended tions and the many contradictions of the new na‐ to all those interested in the modern history of the tion-states were contained but not erased by insti‐ region, the history of British policy in this period, tutions, boundaries and practices grounded in the or the history of the Cold War in Southeast Asia. colonial era. Challenges to nation-states whose le‐ Notes: gitimacy and sovereignty rests on the boundaries [1]. Nicholas Tarling, Anglo-Dutch rivalry in drawn in the colonial era continue to emerge and the Malay world, 1780-1824 [Cambridge: Cam‐ following decolonization national elites in South‐ bridge University Press, 1962]. Nicholas Tarling, east Asia have conjured with the threat of 'insta‐ Piracy and politics in the Malay world : a study of bility' to justify the maintenance of often authori‐ British imperialism in nineteenth-century South-
4 H-Net Reviews east Asia [Melbourne: Cheshire, 1963]. Nicholas Tarling, Southeast Asia: past and present [Mel‐ bourne: Cheshire, 1966]. Nicholas Tarling, British policy in the Malay Peninsula and Archipelago, 1824-1871 [Singapore : Oxford University Press, 1969]. Nicholas Tarling, Britain, the Brookes and Brunei [London: Oxford University Press, 1971]. Nicholas Tarling, The fourth Anglo-Burmese war : Britain and the independence of Burma [Gaya: Centre for South East Asian Studies, 1987]. Nicholas Tarling, The fall of Imperial Britain in South-East Asia [Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1993]. Nicholas Tarling, Nations and States in Southeast Asia [Cambridge: Cambridge Univer‐ sity Press, 1998]. [2]. Nicholas Tarling, ed., The Cambridge His‐ tory of Southeast Asia two volumes [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992]. [3]. Nicholas Tarling, Britain, Southeast Asia and the Onset of the Pacifc War [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996]. Tarling is cur‐ rently working on a third volume which carries the story into the 1950s. Meanwhile, two more general works by Tarling are due to appear later this year. Nicholas Tarling, Southeast Asia: A Modern History [Singapore: Oxford University Press, 2001]. (forthcoming). Nicholas Tarling, Im‐ peralism in Southeast Asia: A Fleeting Passing Phase [London: Routledge, 2001]. (forthcoming). [4]. Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher (with Alice Denny), Africa and the Victorians: The Official Mind of Imperialism [London: Macmillan, second edition 1981; frst published 1961].
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Citation: Mark T. Berger. Review of Tarling, Nicholas. Britain, Southeast Asia and the Onset of the Cold War 1945-1950. H-Asia, H-Net Reviews. March, 2001.
URL: https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=4998
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