sign in sign up
<<
Home , Bandung Conference, Colombo Plan, Foss Shanahan, George Laking, Kashmir Princess

東南亞研究中心 Research Centre

Andrew LIM

University of Auckland

Bandung and the limitations of New Zealand foreign policy

Working Paper Series

No. 177 July 2016

Bandung and the limitations of New Zealand foreign policy

Andrew Lim University of Auckland, New Zealand

Abstract

This paper looks at New Zealand's response to the of 1955. The

Holland Government's Western-aligned foreign and security policies, along with New Zealand's

"self-identity" as a Western country, led it to oppose any New Zealand participation at the Asian-

African Conference. In line with its policies and close attachment to “Mother Britain”,

New Zealand policy-makers viewed Bandung as a potential hot bed for Communist propaganda

and anti-White agitation.

Besides the government response, this paper looks at public discourses towards the

Bandung Conference in New Zealand; focusing on the mainstream newspapers and left-wing

groups like the Communist Party and the New Zealand Peace Council. This paper makes an

original contribution to the literature on the Bandung Conference by examining New Zealand’s

response or “lack of response” to that historic event.

Key words: Bandung conference, Cold War, New Zealand, Western alignment

Southeast Asia Research Centre Working Paper Series, No. 177, 2016 1

Introduction

The Bandung Conference was a major gathering of newly-independent Asian and

African countries held in 18-25 . The Conference had originated as a joint initiative by

the governments of , Ceylon (), , Burma (), and

(known collectively as the Five) to promote better cooperation and understanding

among countries. It hosted several prominent Asian and African leaders including

the Indonesian President , the Indian Prime Minister , the Chinese

Premier , the Burmese Prime Minister , and the Egyptian President Gamal

Abdel Nasser. The Bandung Conference produced a ground-breaking communique advocating

peaceful economic and cooperation among Afro-Asian countries, human rights, world peace,

and the elimination of and nuclear weapons. It was held at a time of rising Cold War

tensions between the Western “Free World” led by the and the Communist Bloc

led by the and the People’s Republic of (PRC). The Colombo Five had

organized the Bandung Conference in opposition to American efforts in 1954 to corral Asian

countries into the South East Asian Treaty Organisation (SEATO), a Western military alliance

aimed at containing the PRC. Rejecting the bipolar international system, the Conference’s

organisers sought to promote closer cooperation among Third World countries while

simultaneously lessening their dependence on the West and Communist Bloc. While the

Bandung Conference failed to end tensions within the Third World, it gave rise to the modern

Non-Aligned Movement (NAM).1

1 For a longer discussion of the Bandung Conference, please see Kahin, G 1956, The Asian-African Conference, Bandung, Indonesia, April 1955, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY; Mackie, J 2005, Bandung 1955: Non-Alignment and Afro-Asian Solidarity, Editions Didier Millet, ; Agung, IAAG 1973, Twenty Years Indonesian Foreign Policy 1945-1965, Mouton, The Hague: Mouton, pp. 193-247; McDougall, D & Finnane, A (eds.) 2010, Bandung 1955: little histories, Press, Melbourne.

Southeast Asia Research Centre Working Paper Series, No. 177, 2016 2

Due to their strategic interests in Southeast Asia, the White-dominated countries of

Australia and New Zealand naturally took an interest in the proceedings of the Bandung

Conference. As former British settler colonies which had since evolved into self-governing

countries, and New Zealand were considered to be the isolated “white tribes” of a

predominantly non-White region. Despite their close proximity to Asia, invitations were not

extended to Australia and New Zealand due to two main factors: first, because they fell outside

the “Afro-Asian area”; and second, because Indonesia was incensed with Canberra and

Wellington’s support for the Dutch claim to West New Guinea, which regarded as an

inalienable part of Indonesia.2 The Holland National Government believed that New Zealand’s attendance at the Bandung Conference could be a “source of embarrassment” since its organisers’ non-aligned agenda clashed with New Zealand’s Western aligned foreign and security policies.3 Despite Wellington’s indifference towards Bandung, it drew some interest from certain

left-wing political and academic quarters which saw it as presenting an alternative vision to New

Zealand’s Western Cold War alignment.4 These left-wing voices foreshadowed the growing

dissension with New Zealand’s foreign and security policies that came to fore during the

Vietnam War.

While there is some literature on official Australian, British, and American responses to

the Bandung Conference, the New Zealand response has not been studied until now.5 This

2 Waters, C 2010, ‘Lost opportunity: Australia and the Bandung conference’, in D McDougall and A Finnane (eds.), Bandung 1955: little histories, Monash University Press, Melbourne, p. 75; Agung, Twenty years Indonesian foreign policy, p. 217. 3 McKinnon, M 1993, Independence and Foreign Policy: New Zealand in the World Since 1935, Auckland University Press, Auckland, p. 135. 4 Nash, W 1955, ‘External Affairs – Adjournment’, New Zealand Parliamentary Debates (NZPD) 305, 24 March, pp. 33-34; ‘Findings of the Christchurch Convention on International Relations’ 1956, in International Relations: A New Zealand Group Study on the Commonwealth, the , and South East Asia, Organising Committee, Christchurch, pp. 94-99. 5 Waters, C 2010, ‘Lost opportunity,’ pp. 75-87; Tarling, N 1992, ‘Ah-ah: Britain and the Bandung Conference of 1955’, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, vol. 23, issue 1, pp. 74-111; Ampiah, K 2007, The Political and Moral Imperatives of the Bandung Conference of 1955: The Reactions of the US, UK and , Global Oriental, Kent, UK.

Southeast Asia Research Centre Working Paper Series, No. 177, 2016 3

article looks at an overlooked chapter in the history of New Zealand’s Asian engagement. It

addresses several questions. First, how did New Zealand’s aversion towards Bandung reflect its

contemporary foreign and security policies and view of its own “place in the world”? Second,

how was New Zealand’s position on the Bandung conference influenced by its ties to Britain,

Australia, and the United States? Thirdly, to what extent did New Zealand’s response to

Bandung reflect the limits of its foreign policy towards Southeast Asia? Finally, what were non-

governmental media and left-wing responses to the Bandung Conference?

This article draws upon several archival records from Archives New Zealand and the

National Library of New Zealand. It also consults several Government publications: namely, the

New Zealand Parliamentary Debates (NZPD), the Annual Reports of the Department of External Affairs

(NZDEA), and the NZDEA’s official journal, External Affairs Review. To sample public opinion,

this article consults several newspapers including The Dominion, New Zealand Herald (NZH),

Evening Post, Otago Daily Times (ODT), and the Communist Party of New Zealand (CPNZ)’s

official organ, The People’s Voice (PV) along with the proceedings of the Christchurch Convention

on International Relations held in August 1955.

New Zealand’s search for security

New Zealand’s indifference towards Bandung was influenced by the Holland National

Government’s Cold War foreign and security policies; which were linked to New Zealand’s

identity as a Western Anglophone offshoot. In 1955, New Zealand was governed by the

conservative National Party led by Sidney Holland, a successful businessman who had unified

the political right into a formidable political force. Holland had earlier established his credentials

as a Cold War Prime Minster by closing down New Zealand’s Legation in Moscow in 1950 and

Southeast Asia Research Centre Working Paper Series, No. 177, 2016 4

confronting militant watersiders during the 1951 Waterfront Lockout.6 Under the Holland

Government, New Zealand pursued a staunchly anti-Communist, Western-aligned foreign policy

which prioritised New Zealand’s relations with the and the United States.

Contemporary New Zealand foreign and security policies were shaped by its strong political and

economic ties with the “Mother Britain,” its sibling relationship with Australia, and American

global Cold War security considerations. Like their Western counterparts, New Zealand policy-

makers and strategists viewed as a totalitarian ideology bent on world domination.

Communist activities in China, Korea, , and Malaya were seen as manifestations of a

Communist “domino effect” engulfing Southeast Asia; which Wellington regarded as its “Near

North.” In this uncertain international climate, New Zealand’s “search for security” led the

Holland Government to embed the country within a web of Western “collective security”

alliances including the 1951 ANZUS (Australia, New Zealand and the United States) security

treaty, SEATO, and the highly secretive UK-USA/Five Eyes intelligence-sharing network.7

Thus by 1955, New Zealand had a clear view of “its place in the world” as a member of the

Western “Free World”.

In addition, New Zealand sent military forces to fight in Cold War “hot conflicts” like the and the . By 1955, Southeast Asia had become the main focus of New Zealand’s defence policy but this interest was limited to the British colonies of

6 Gustafson, B 1985, The First 50 Years: a history of the New Zealand National Party, Reed Methuen, Auckland, pp. 38-62; Department of External Affairs 1950, ‘New Zealand’s Representation Overseas,’ Annual Report of the Department of External Affairs, A-1, 31 March, Appendix to the Journal of the House of Representatives (AJHR), pp. 89-90 & p. 96. 7 McIntyre, WD 1995, Background to the ANZUS Pact: Policy-Making, Strategy and Diplomacy, 1945-55, Cambridge University Press, Christchurch, New Zealand, pp. 368-94; The UK-USA agreement was a highly-secretive intelligence-sharing network consisting of the United States, Britain, , Australia, and New Zealand. See Hager, N 1996, Secret Power: New Zealand’s Role in the International Spy Network, Craig Potton Publishing, 1996, Nelson, New Zealand, pp. 57-73; Farrell P 2013, ‘History of 5-Eyes – explainer’, The Guardian, 2 December 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/02/history-of-5-eyes- explainer; “Appendix J: Annexure J1: UKUSA Arrangements affecting Australia and New Zealand,” in New UKUSA Agreement – 10 May 1955, National Security Agency/Central Security Service, https://www.nsa.gov/public_info/_files/ukusa/new_ukusa_agree_10may55.pdf.

Southeast Asia Research Centre Working Paper Series, No. 177, 2016 5

Malaya (modern ) and Singapore; a process initiated by the previous Fraser Labour

Government. 8 Trade was not the main priority for the Holland Government’s increased

engagement with the region but rather a desire to help prop up the British presence there.9

Holland publicly justified New Zealand’s involvement in the Malayan Emergency by presenting

Malaya as the last place where New Zealand could help Britain “draw the line” against

Communist expansion. This rationale arguably marked the introduction of the “Forward

Defence” doctrine into New Zealand’s foreign and security policies towards Southeast Asia.10

In addition, New Zealand also participated in the , a socio-economic development

plan initiated by the United Kingdom in June 1950 to promote friendly relations between the

wealthy “White Commonwealth” and Asian countries and to contain the spread of Communism

in Asia.11 Thus under the Holland Government, the , the Collective Security and Forward Defence doctrines, and the Colombo Plan were firmly established as the four main pillars of New Zealand’s Cold War foreign and security policies towards Asia. Since New

Zealand’s conservative, Western-aligned foreign policies clashed with the Bandung spirit of non- alignment and , Wellington was naturally suspicious of the upcoming

Conference.

The Holland Government’s policy towards the Bandung Conference was also influenced by its stance on colonialism. In 1955, New Zealand administrated several Pacific Island trust

8 In 1949, the outgoing Labour Prime Minister Peter Fraser had made New Zealand a party to the ANZAM (Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom in the Defence of Malaya) agreement and sent New Zealand airplanes to support British counter-insurgency efforts at the onset of the Malayan Emergency. See McIntyre, Background to the ANZUS Pact, pp. 140-43. 9 Until Britain’s entry into the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1968, New Zealand’s main trading partners were Western Europe, the United States, and Japan. See McKinnon, Independence and Foreign Policy, pp. 173. 10 Rolfe, J 2004, “New Zealand Defence Policy During the Cold War,” in Alexander Trapeznik and Aaron Fox (eds.), Lenin’s Legacy Down Under: New Zealand’s Cold War, Press, , New Zealand, pp. 35-52; Holland, S 1955, ‘Conference of Commonwealth Prime Ministers, Broadcast by Prime Minister’, 18 January, External Affairs Review, vol. V, nos. 1 and 2, pp. 2-4. 11 The White Commonwealth consisted of Britain and the former settler colonies of Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa (until 1961). McKinnon, Independence and Foreign Policy, pp. 134-35.

Southeast Asia Research Centre Working Paper Series, No. 177, 2016 6

territories: Western Samoa, the Cook Islands, Niue, and Tokelau.12 In addition, the conservative

National Party sought to maintain New Zealand’s close ties to the United Kingdom and the

British Commonwealth. It viewed the Commonwealth as an instrument for Britain to block the

spread of Communism and radical within both its colonies and former colonies.

While the National Party acquiesced to the “winds of change”, it sought to ensure that friendly

pro-Western governments emerged in colonial dependencies being prepared for self-rule like

Malaya, Singapore, and New Zealand’s own trust territory of Western Samoa. While the left-

leaning opposition Labour Party was more supportive of decolonisation and self-rule, it also

opposed Communism and supported close ties with Britain.13 In addition, New Zealand’s

Bandung stance reflected its origins as a British “settler colony” where British settlers had subjugated and assimilated the indigenous Māori tribes following the Land Wars of the 19th

century. While New Zealand claimed to have the “best race relations in the world” and Māori

did enjoy the same legal rights and protections as European New Zealanders, they still lagged

behind socio-economically.14 While New Zealand did not officially pursue a racially-exclusive

policy like the , Wellington still actively discouraged immigration by

Asians, Africans, and southern European nationalities. Reflecting these sentiments, a

Department of External Affairs (NZDEA) memorandum published in 1953 reiterated that New

Zealand “should remain a country of European development.” Though New Zealand

accommodated a substantial number of Asian students under the Colombo Plan, it did not

welcome large-scale Asian immigration until 1974. 15 Thus, New Zealand’s national identity as a

12 Scott J 1991, ‘Getting Off the Colonial Hook’, in M McKinnon (ed.), New Zealand in World Affairs Volume II, 1957-1972, New Zealand Institute of International Affairs, Wellington, pp. 122-44. 13 New Zealand National Party 1954, A Record of Progress: Policy General Election 1954, self-published, Wellington, pp. 1, pp. 16; McKinnon, Independence and Foreign Policy, pp. 127-37. 14 Orange, C 2012, Treaty of Waitangi, Te Ara - the Encyclopedia of New Zealand, last updated 9 November 2012, http://www.TeAra.govt.nz/en/treaty-of-waitangi; Consedine, R, & Consedine, J 2005, Healing our History: The Challenge of the Treaty of Waitangi, updated edition, Penguin Books, Auckland, pp. 78- 102, pp. 132-50. 15 Sinclair, K 1957, “Report on the Government’s Foreign Policy: Independence and Morality,” Here & Now, issue 61, pp. 14-15; Beaglehole, A 2012, ‘Immigration regulation - 1946–1985: gradual change’, Te Ara - the Encyclopedia of New Zealand, last updated 13 July 2012,

Southeast Asia Research Centre Working Paper Series, No. 177, 2016 7

European “offshoot” along with its Western-aligned foreign and security policies would

influence its stance towards the Bandung Conference, a topic discussed below.

The Western alliance and New Zealand’s decision-making process

Most of New Zealand’s dealings with the Bandung Conference were conducted through

the Department of External Affairs (NZDEA), the country’s foreign ministry which had been

established by the Fraser Labour Government in 1943 to give New Zealand a voice in Allied

decision-making during World War II. The nascent NZDEA was still attached to the Prime

Minister’s Department (PMD) with the Prime Minister traditionally occupying the External

Affairs portfolio. However, Sidney Holland had little interest in foreign affairs and instead

delegated that role to a succession of three different ministers. By 1955, Thomas Macdonald was

New Zealand’s Minister of External Affairs, having been appointed after the November 1954

general election. Meanwhile, the NZDEA’s functional operations were run by a senior civil

servant named Alister D. McIntosh, who served concurrently as the Secretary (official head) of

External Affairs and Permanent Head of the PMD.16 Reflecting New Zealand’s subordinate

relationship with Britain, the NZDEA was named “external affairs” rather than “foreign affairs”

in deference of Whitehall’s leading role in conducting foreign policy on behalf of the

Commonwealth.17 While New Zealand expanded its diplomatic contacts with Asia during the

1950s, the “Near North” was still seen as “somewhere to keep away from: different, exotic, and

dangerous.”18 This attitude would guide Wellington’s policy towards Bandung. New Zealand

http://www.TeAra.govt.nz/en/immigration-regulation/page-4; Rolfe, J 2005, ‘Coming to Terms with Regional Identity’, in A.L. Smith (ed.), Southeast Asia and New Zealand: A History of Regional and Bilateral Relations, Victoria University Press, Wellington, pp. 34-35. 16 Thomas Macdonald’s predecessors were Frederick Doidge and Thomas Clifton Webb. See McKinnon, Independence and Foreign Policy, pp. 114-15. 17 Lim, A 2015, ‘The Kiwi and the Garuda: New Zealand and Sukarno’s Indonesia, 1945-1966,” MA Thesis, University of Otago, Dunedin, New Zealand, pp 20-21. 18 Capie, D 2009, ‘New Zealand and the World: Imperial, International, and Global Relations,’ in Gisselle Byrnes (ed.), The New Oxford History of New Zealand, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 588.

Southeast Asia Research Centre Working Paper Series, No. 177, 2016 8

also developed its policy towards Bandung in consultation with its three main allies: Australia,

Britain, and the United States.

From the onset, Australian and New Zealand foreign affairs officials were monitoring the planning of the Bandung Conference and discussing the question of their attendance.19 In

October 1954, McIntosh received a letter from Charles Craw, the head of the NZDEA’s Far

Eastern Section, who had been in contact with the Australian Department of External Affairs

(ADEA) and was aware of their dilemma about Australian attendance at Bandung. The

Australian High Commission in had suggested that Canberra attend the conference

to prevent the discussion of subjects which Australia did not like such as the West New Guinea

dispute. In light of this situation, Craw advised his superior to “steer clear of embroilment in this

and similar conferences.”20 In response to Craw’s letter, McIntosh instructed the New Zealand

High Commission in Canberra to tell his ADEA counterparts that New Zealand had no interest in participating in the conference as an “Asian country” or otherwise.21 In response to press

coverage about Nehru’s outspoken support for Australasian attendance, Macdonald opined that

Australian and New Zealand attendance could be a “source of embarrassment” because neither

country was an “Asian state” and the Conference’s potentially anti-Western agenda. He argued

that it would be better for the two antipodean governments to discuss colonialism and economic

assistance at a more “representational forum” like the United Nations rather than the proposed

19 “Afro-Asian Conference,” Secret savingram, 11 November 1954, Australian foreign source document, PM 440/9/3, Archives New Zealand (ANZ), Wellington; “Colombo Powers Meeting – Proposals for an Afro-Asian Conference,” Australian foreign source document, 10 January 1955, PM 440/9/3, Part 1, ANZ, Wellington, pp. 1-2. 20 Mr Craw to Mr McIntosh, Digest of Dispatches No. 49, 18 October 1954, PM 440/9/3, Part 1, ANZ, Wellington; Charles Craw served as the Head of the NZDEA’s Far Eastern Section in 1954. See Rabel, R 2005, New Zealand and the : Politics and Diplomacy, Auckland University Press, Auckland, pp. 22- 23. 21 A.D. McIntosh, “Afro-Asian Conference in Indonesia,” Memorandum for the Official Secretary, Office of the High Commissioner for New Zealand, Canberra, 18 November 1954, PM 440/9/3, Part 1, ANZ, Wellington.

Southeast Asia Research Centre Working Paper Series, No. 177, 2016 9

Bandung Conference, which he termed an “Asian pressure group.”22 Besides reflecting the close

sibling relationship between the two antipodean governments, these exchanges showed that New

Zealand did not consider itself to be part of Asia; a stance which harked back to the Fraser

Labour Government’s reluctant participant in the Inter-Asian Conference of 1949.23 In addition,

these correspondences showed that the Holland Government’s stance towards Bandung was

influenced by the advice of NZDEA officials.

In contrast to Wellington’s blank refusal to send any official delegation to the Bandung

Conference, their ADEA counterparts considered attending the conference due to Australia’s

greater interest in Asian affairs. However, the ADEA’s desire to attend the Bandung Conference was motivated by a pro-Western agenda which involved: firstly, preventing the conference from passing unfavourable resolutions against the Colombo Plan and SEATO; secondly, diluting the resolutions condemning South Africa’s policy, and British and Dutch colonialism in

Malaya and West New Guinea respectively; and thirdly, preventing China and India from dominating the smaller “neutralist countries.” In an NZDEA briefing paper prepared for the

Prime Minister’s Conference in January 1955, an NZDEA official concluded that their

Australian counterparts’ motivation for attending the Bandung Conference was “to infiltrate a pressure group of Asian and Middle East States.” Since he reasoned that Australia and New

Zealand did not belong in Asia, the NZDEA analyst surmised that it was better for the two antipodean countries to stay away from the conference and to instead let “responsible” Asian countries such as the , , and influence the conference in a “moderate direction.”24 Ultimately, the question of Australian attendance was finally resolved when Jakarta

22 Minister of External Affairs Wellington to New Zealand High Commissioner Canberra, “Afro-Asian Conference,” Telegram No. 2, 5 January 1955, PM 440/9/3, Part 1, ANZ, Wellington. 23 Minister of External Affairs Wellington to Austcom New Delhi, Telegram, No. 2, 19 January 1949, PM 59/2/135, Part 1, ANZ, Wellington; O’Brien, A 1994, ‘New Zealand and Indonesia, 1945-1962: A clear though indirect interest’, MA Thesis, University of Auckland, New Zealand, pp 39-49. 24 “Prime Ministers’ Conference, London, January 1955: Afro-Asian Conference,” secret briefing paper, 13 January 1955, PM 440/9/3, Part 1, ANZ, Wellington, pp 1-3

Southeast Asia Research Centre Working Paper Series, No. 177, 2016 10

formally excluded Australia.25 The ADEA’s stance on Bandung differed from that of the

Coalition Menzies Government which viewed the Conference’s neutralist and pro-disarmament

agenda as a threat to its Western-aligned foreign and security policies towards Southeast Asia.26

The above diplomatic exchanges probably reflected some measure of disagreement between the

ADEA and the Menzies Government.

Another government that influenced New Zealand’s attitudes and policies towards the

Bandung Conference was the United Kingdom. Due to New Zealand’s extensive political,

military, and economic ties to the “Mother Country”, Whitehall still exerted a substantial

influence over Wellington’s foreign and security policies towards Southeast Asia. Thus, New

Zealand sought to keep in step with the “Mother Country.” After some considerable unease

among British foreign, commonwealth and colonial policy-makers, Whitehall finally opted for a

two-pronged policy of allowing their colonial subjects to send delegates to the Conference while

simultaneously working indirectly with friendly governments like Turkey to promote a

favourable view of the West.27 British policy towards Banding was conveyed to Wellington in a

letter received by , the Deputy Secretary of External Affairs, in mid-January

1955.28 Consequently, Whitehall’s decision merely reinforced New Zealand’s decision to stay

aloof from the Bandung Conference.

25 New Zealand High Commission Canberra, “Afro-Asian Conference,” Memorandum for the Secretary of External Affairs, 18 January 1955, PM 440/9/3, Part 1, ANZ, Wellington. 26 For a longer discussion, see Waters, “Lost opportunity,” pp-76-81. 27 Tarling, “Ah-ah: Britain and the Bandung Conference,” pp. 74-111; Letter from C.M. Maclehose, United Kingdom High Commission Wellington to Foss Shanahan, Prime Minister’s Department, 18 January 1955, PM 440/9/3, Part 1, ANZ, Wellington; G.D.L. White, “Afro-Asian Conference,” Memorandum for the Secretary of External Affairs, 23 March 1955, PM 440/9/3, Part 1, ANZ, Wellington, pp. 1-5. 28 Letter from C.M. Maclehose, United Kingdom High Commission Wellington to Foss Shanahan, Prime Minister’s Department, 18 January 1955, PM 440/9/3, Part 1, ANZ, Wellington;

Southeast Asia Research Centre Working Paper Series, No. 177, 2016 11

Last but not least was the United States; New Zealand’s other major ally. As a global

superpower, the Eisenhower Administration saw the Bandung Conference through Cold War

lens. The United States had engineered the creation of SEATO in September 1954 to contain

Communist expansion in Southeast Asia following the .29 Since the

Colombo Five had organized the Bandung Conference in opposition to Washington’s efforts to corral Asian countries into an anti-China alliance, State Department officials feared that the

Conference preceded a leftward ideological shift among the newly independent Afro-Asian countries that would benefit Beijing’s ambitions.30 American wariness towards Bandung was

reflected in diplomatic correspondence between the New Zealand Embassy in Washington, D.C.

and their NZDEA superiors in Wellington. According to the New Zealand Ambassador George

Laking, the State Department had opted for a policy of “damage control” by encouraging

friendly Asian countries like Thailand, the Philippines, and Pakistan to attend the Conference in

order to draft resolutions favourable to SEATO and to offset anti-Western criticisms.31 In a

responding telegram posted on 10 February 1955, the External Affairs Minister Macdonald

observed that Washington’s policy to Bandung was similar to the British policy. However,

Macdonald and his NZDEA colleagues disagreed with the American proposal of using these

friendly Asian states to manipulate the proceedings in favour of Western security interests;

reasoning that such tactics could provide the Communists with evidence of Western subterfuge.

While Wellington accepted the American suggestion that they discuss with their Asian SEATO

partners about what stance they would take at Bandung, they rejected the assumption that

29 Office of the Historian, ‘Milestones: 1953-1960 – Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), 1954’, United States Department of State, last accessed 6 November 2015, https://history.state.gov/milestones/1953-1960/seato. 30 Office of the Historian, ‘Milestones: 1953-1960 – Bandung Conference, 1955’, United States Department of State, last accessed 6 November 2015, https://history.state.gov/milestones/1953- 1960/bandung-conf. 31 New Zealand Ambassador Washington to Minister of External Affairs Wellington, Telegram No. 58, 1 February 1955, PM 440/9/3, Part 1, ANZ, Wellington.

Southeast Asia Research Centre Working Paper Series, No. 177, 2016 12

SEATO should naturally be antagonistic to the Asian-African Conference’s activities. 32 During

the SEATO meeting held at Bangkok in February 23-25, the New Zealand delegate, at the

suggestion of the Americans, sponsored a resolution inviting the Thai, Filipino, and Pakistani

members (whose governments would be participating at the Bandung Conference), to extend

greetings to the other “free countries” there and urge them to share SEATO’s dedication to the

Pacific Charter. This resolution was intended to allay suspicions that SEATO was mutually

hostile to the Bandung’s aspirations.33 By early March 1955, the State Department had opted for

a policy of providing “friendly countries” attending the Conference with information about

Communist excesses and atrocities to counteract pro-Communist propaganda.34 These

diplomatic correspondences showed New Zealand’s growing status as a junior ally of the United

States and how Wellington’s subscription to Washington’s Cold War worldview; two things that

would have serious ramifications for New Zealand’s relationship with the United States during

the Vietnam War.

A Distant Observer

Despite Indonesia’s avowed opposition to any Australian and New Zealand attendance

at Bandung, reported on 18 February that the Indian and Indonesian embassies

in Washington were telling American newsmen that their governments desired Australia and

New Zealand’s attendance. Laking suggested that the Indians and Indonesians wanted to send

press messages to Canberra and Wellington in the hope of getting the Australasian foreign

ministers to state that their countries had not been invited, thus enabling the Colombo Five to

32 Minister of External Affairs Wellington to New Zealand Ambassador Washington, Telegram No. 50, 10 February 1955, PM 440/9/3, Part 1, ANZ, Wellington; ‘SEATO Council Meeting, Bangkok, Feb. 1955: Afro-Asian Conference’, secret NZDEA briefing paper, 11 February 1955, PM 440/9/3, Part 1, ANZ, Wellington, pp. 1-4. 33 NZDEA, “Report on the First Council Meeting of the South East Asia Collective Defence Treaty, Bangkok, 23-25 February 1955,” PM 440/9/3, Part 1, ANZ, Wellington, 7. 34 New Zealand Embassy Washington, “Afro-Asian Conference,” memorandum for the Secretary of External Affairs, 3 March 1955, PM 440/9/3, Part 1, ANZ, Wellington.

Southeast Asia Research Centre Working Paper Series, No. 177, 2016 13

rectify this omission. While Indian and Indonesian diplomats in Washington stated that Australia

and New Zealand were welcome to attend since they were geographically near Asia, Laking

mentioned the US State Department believed that this was merely a ploy to justify inviting the

Soviet Union to Bandung. In the end, Laking surmised that inviting Australia and New Zealand

would open the door to inviting the “Big Four” powers – the Soviet Union, Britain, the United

States, and France; an unwelcome prospect for the Colombo Five organizers. Given the political complexities involved, Laking’s telegram insinuated that it would be politically unwise for New

Zealand and Australia to accept any invitations to the Bandung Conference.35

On 24 March 1955, the Australian media carried a press statement by an Indonesian

diplomat in Washington stating that Jakarta would welcome Australian and New Zealand

observers provided that they apply for accreditation with the five-nation Steering Committee

(which comprised the Colombo Powers). In response, the NZDEA conceded that it would be

difficult for Wellington to turn down a formal invitation to participate as an observer given New

Zealand’s recent resolution at the February SEATO conference in Bangkok. The NZDEA

decided to persuade their Australian counterparts to limit their participation to an observer

role.36 That same day, Walter Nash, the leader of the opposition Labour Party, talked about the

upcoming conference during an address to the New Zealand House of Representatives. Citing

the tide of decolonisation sweeping through Asia and Africa, he inquired whether the

Government would be sending observers to monitor the Afro-Asian talks.37 Nash’s stance on

Bandung was paralleled by the Australian Labor Party (ALP) which took a more sympathetic stance to the Conference than the Menzies Coalition Government and even advocated sending

35 Laking, GR 1955, ‘Afro-Asian Conference’, Memorandum for the Secretary of External Affairs, 18 February, PM 440/9/3, Part 1, ANZ, Wellington. 36 External Wellington to Kauri Canberra, “Secret and Immediate” Draft Telegram, 24 March 1955, PM 440/9/3, Part 1, ANZ, Wellington. 37 Nash 1955, ‘External Affairs – Adjournment’, NZPD 305, 24 March, pp. 33-34; ‘NZ should be at this vital conference’ 1955, People’s Voice, 30 March 1955, p. 8.

Southeast Asia Research Centre Working Paper Series, No. 177, 2016 14

an unofficial Australian delegation to observe the conference proceedings.38 In response to the

print media and Nash’s inquiries about whether New Zealand should seek observer status at the upcoming Conference, the External Affairs Minister Tom MacDonald issued a press statement that New Zealand had been issued no official invitation in Bandung but would consider any such opportunity.39 However, in private, the Government was opposed to any form of New Zealand

participation at Bandung.40 Ultimately, the question of New Zealand participation at Bandung in

any form was rendered moot when Wellington received no official invitation to participate as an

observer.

While no Western officials attended the Bandung Conference in any official capacity, several

Western embassies in Jakarta sent personnel to Bandung.41 In addition, several Western private

citizens including the Greek-Cypriot Archbishop Makarios, the African-American Congressman

Adam Clayton Powell, the African-American ex-Communist writer , the Cornell

University Professor George Kahin, the ALP member and Australian diplomat John Burton, and

the Australian National University Professor C.P. Fitzgerald attended the proceedings as

observers.42 Following a query by an interested Mosgiel resident named J.N. Stephens,

Macdonald reiterated in late April that New Zealand had not been invited to participate or

observe the Bandung Conference. Unlike other countries like Australia, New Zealand was unable

to send diplomats to monitor the proceedings since it lacked any diplomatic representation in

Indonesia; New Zealand’s interests in Indonesia were represented by the British embassy in

38 In Australia, the word “labour” is spelled “labor”. Waters, ‘Lost opportunity’, pp. 80-83. 39 ‘NZ, Australian Observers Welcome at Afro-Asian Talks’ 1955, The Dominion, 24 March; Editorial 1955, ‘White Observers at Bandoeing [sic]’, Otago Daily Times, 25 March; ‘Press Statement: Afro-Asian Conference’ 1955, Office of the Minister of External Affairs, Wellington, 24 March, PM 440/9/3, Part 1, ANZ, Wellington. 40 Minister of External Affairs Wellington to New Zealand High Commission Canberra, ‘Afro-Asian Conference’, Telegram No. 2, 5 January 1955, PM 440/9/3, Part 1, ANZ, Wellington. 41 New Zealand Ambassador Washington to Minister of External Affairs Wellington, Telegram No. 81, 15 February 1955, PM 440/9/3, Part 1, ANZ, Wellington, pp. 1-2; Waters, “Lost Opportunity,” p. 83. 42 Mackie, Bandung 1955, p. 69; Wright, R 1956, The Colour Curtain: a report on the Bandung Conference, D. Dobson, London.

Southeast Asia Research Centre Working Paper Series, No. 177, 2016 15

Jakarta until 1961.43 Despite the NZDEA’s disengaged stance on Bandung, its in-house journal

External Affairs Review still reproduced the Conference’s final communique in its April 1955 issue.

But the journal’s decision to allocate more space to New Zealand’s Malayan and SEATO

commitments reflected the country’s Western-aligned foreign and security policies.44 In short,

New Zealand’s refusal to send any official delegation or observers to the Bandung Conference

reflected its adherence to Western collective security agreements, suspicion of non-alignment,

and its limited diplomatic presence in Asia.

Two developments that caught the interest of New Zealand diplomats and policy-makers

were the Bandung debates around Communism and the involvement of participants in Western

collective security pacts like SEATO and the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO). From

Washington, Laking reported that his State Department counterparts thought that the Western-

aligned Asian states had succeeded in turning the Bandung Conference to the advantage of the

United States and its allies; citing the vigorous attacks on Communism and the “relatively

satisfactory nature of the final communique.” In his view, the presence of these Asian allies

moderated anti-Western sentiment at the conference and prevented the passage of resolutions

harmful to Anglo-American strategic interests. In addition, Laking regarded the inclusion of the

clause allowing membership in defence pacts as a triumph for the United States and its Western

allies since it allowed their Asian allies like Pakistan, Thailand, and the Philippines to continue

participating in Western security pacts like SEATO and CENTO. Laking regarded this

favourable development as a setback for Nehru, Zhou, and the other neutralist leaders; who

were opposed to such Western collective security pacts. However, Laking also conceded that

43 Letter from T.L. Macdonald to Reverend Mr. Carr (MP), 28 April 1955, PM 440/9/3, Part 1, ANZ, Wellington; Kember, James 2009, ‘New Zealand Diplomatic Representation in Southeast Asia: The and 1960s’, New Zealand Journal of Asian Studies, vol. 11, no. 1, pp. 397-99. 44 ‘Asian-African Conference’ 1955, EAR, vol. V, no. 4, pp. 27-38; For examples, see: ‘New Zealand’s Contribution to Malaya’s Strategic Reserve’, Statement by Commissioner-General for the United Kingdom in South East Asia, 1955, EAR, vol. V, no. 4, pp. 10-11; ‘SEACDT: Broadcast by New Zealand Commissioner in South East Asia over Radio Malaya’, 1955, EAR, vol. VIII, no. 8, pp. 18-20.

Southeast Asia Research Centre Working Paper Series, No. 177, 2016 16

Bandung was a diplomatic triumph for Zhou and Communist China; citing Zhou’s friendly

demeanour and avowed willingness to resolve disputes through diplomacy.45

Meanwhile, G.D.L. White, the Official Secretary at the New Zealand High Commission

in London, reported there was a strong anti-colonial sentiment at Bandung; citing the discussion

of colonial issues like West New Guinea, French colonialism in North Africa, and the Arab-

Israeli conflict. While acknowledging the success of Premier Zhou’s diplomacy, White contended

that “the conference as a whole showed no sign of falling for Communist lures in spite of his

adroit conciliatory lures.” Despite the bickering, he concluded that the conference succeeded

with its main purpose of consolidating Afro-Asian relations. 46 The cautiously optimistic tone of

Laking and Whites’ reports were echoed by other Australian and British diplomatic reports.47

The vocal attacks on Communism by several delegates dispelled initial fears that the conference

would degenerate into an anti-Western Communist propaganda platform. The compromise

clause allowing Afro-Asian countries to participate in collective security alliances was seen as a

safeguard for Western security pacts in Asia and the Middle East.

In a more negative tone, , New Zealand’s Permanent Representative to the

UN, surmised that Communist China’s diplomatic triumph at Bandung would renew its efforts

to secure a seat in the United Nations; a development which threatened Washington’s support

for General Chiang Kai Shek’s Republic of China (ROC) regime in Taiwan. The pessimistic tone

of Munro’s report was influenced by a meeting with one of the Bandung delegates, the pro-

45 Laking, GR, ‘Asian/African Conference’, Memorandum for the Secretary of External Affairs, 28 April 1955, PM 440/9/3, Part 1, ANZ, Wellington, pp. 1-3. 46 White, GDL ‘The Afro-Asian Conference’, Memorandum for the Secretary of External Affairs, 3 May 1955, PM 440/9/3, Part 2, ANZ, Wellington, pp 1-5. 47 Australian Embassy Washington, Cablegram 487, 28 April 1955, Australian foreign source document, PM 440/9/3, Part 2, ANZ, Wellington, pp 1-2; Mr Morland to Mr Macmillan, ‘The Afro-Asian Conference at Bandung’, Confidential no. 40, 28 April 1955, British foreign source document, PM 440/9/3, Part 2, ANZ, Wellington, pp. 1-7.

Southeast Asia Research Centre Working Paper Series, No. 177, 2016 17

Western Lebanese Ambassador Charles Malik. In his report, Munro reiterated Malik’s views that

Australia and New Zealand were isolated Christian Western outposts in Southeast Asia and

suggested that the two Anglophone countries had been excluded due to their restrictive

immigration policies.48 While Munro’s report perpetuated the dominant view within NZDEA

circles that New Zealand was not part of Asia, it also reflected his own hawkish, pro-Western

Cold War outlook. These reports showed how New Zealand’s security priorities around

containing Communism and upholding the Western security alliance system guided its

perceptions of Bandung. Most importantly, they revealed the extent to which New Zealand’s

Western allies influenced its foreign and security policies.

Following the Bandung Conference, the External Affairs Minister Macdonald issued a

press statement on 26 April 1955 praising the cordial atmosphere of the conference proceedings

which he hoped would dispel fears that the Conference would become a “propaganda forum”

for Communist China to threaten “democratic and peace-loving peoples.” Macdonald also

hoped that the conference discussions would remove misunderstandings between the various

Afro-Asian countries and make “a positive contribution to international goodwill.” However, in

the absence of official information about the conference other than media coverage, the Minister

admitted he was in no position to make any substantial comment. Macdonald also recalled that

the New Zealand SEATO delegation had proposed a successful resolution asking the three

Asian SEATO members to convey the organisation’s cordial greetings to the other “free

countries” there and to defend freedom and liberty at the Bandung Conference. While

acknowledging the conference participants’ strong objection to colonialism, Macdonald urged

supporters of decolonisation to recognise the good that colonial powers had done. In

Macdonald’s view, Britain was the colonial power with the best record in dealing with its colonial

48 Munro, LK ‘The Bandung Conference’, Memorandum for the Secretary of External Affairs, 4 May 1955, PM 440/9/3, Part 2, ANZ, Wellington, pp 1-2.

Southeast Asia Research Centre Working Paper Series, No. 177, 2016 18

subjects; citing Whitehall’s policy of granting various measures of self-rule to its Asian and

African dependencies. Finally, the Minister reiterated his Government’s commitment to support self-government and decolonisation in accordance with the South East Asian Collective Defence

Treaty’s Pacific Charter.49 Macdonald’s remarks on decolonisation reflected Wellington’s

preference for peaceful “political evolution” over violent “armed revolution.” Most importantly,

his press statement shed light on contemporary New Zealand foreign policy priorities. New

Zealand was still closely tied culturally, politically, and economically to “Mother Britain” while

Communism (represented in this case by Communist China) was viewed as a threat to both

regional and New Zealand’s own security. Rather than engaging with Asian regional

organizations, Wellington still preferred to work with organizations that had been established by

the Western powers such as the Colombo Plan and SEATO.50

Media coverage

Despite the Holland Government’s objections to New Zealand’s attendance at the

Bandung Asian-African Conference, media coverage of the upcoming conference between

December 1954 and early April 1955 fuelled some public speculation about whether New

Zealand would be attending the Bandung Conference in any official or unofficial capacity.51

Media commentary was largely pessimistic with several mainstream newspapers disparaging the

Conference as a reverse “colour-bar” club that excluded White people and a potential forum for anti-Western propaganda.52 There were concerns that the Bandung Conference’s proposal to

49 NZDEA, ‘Press Statement: Bandung Conference’, 26 April 1955, PM 440/9/3, Part 1, ANZ, Wellington. 50 Rolfe, ‘Coming to Terms with Regional Identity’, pp. 33-37 51 ‘Why NZ Has Not Been Invited To Afro-Asian Talks’ 1955, The Dominion, 4 January; Editorial 1955, Evening Star (Dunedin), 6 January; ‘South Pacific Concern with Afro-Asian Talks’ 1954, The Dominion, 31 December. 52 Editorial 1954, ‘Conference with a Colour Bar’, The Hawke’s Bay Herald-Tribune, 30 December; Editorial 1954, ‘An Asian Conference’, Taranaki Herald, 30 December; ‘Will Afro-Asians Meet or Clash?’ 1955, Evening Post, 18 January.

Southeast Asia Research Centre Working Paper Series, No. 177, 2016 19

discuss West New Guinea would have implications on both Australia and New Zealand’s

policies to that dispute.53 By contrast, George Jackson, the Communist Party’s National

Chairman, gave a favourable view of the Bandung Conference in the People’s Voice and decried

New Zealand’s involvement in Western defence pacts. 54 The CPNZ’s views were however in

the minority since its staunch opposition to New Zealand’s pro-Western alignment went against

the tide of mainstream public opinion during the 1950s, which still supported the Government’s

foreign and security policies.

While the New Zealand Government maintained a low profile during the Bandung

Conference, the conference proceedings elicited some mixed but not unfriendly reactions from

the mainstream New Zealand print media. While the conservative Auckland morning paper New

Zealand Herald reflected on the challenges and possibilities facing the Bandung Conference, the more liberal evening paper, the Auckland Star, lamented that New Zealand had failed to send observers to a Conference which had the potential to “affect the course of history.” 55 The

Wellington morning paper The Dominion commented on the irony that a gathering of anti-

colonial Afro-Asian countries used English as their medium of communication and surmised

that English had become the international lingua franca.56 Meanwhile, the Wellington Evening Post

argued that the Bandung Conference marked an important turning point in history where

Western nations would have to relate to Asian and African countries on equal terms. The Post’s

editor welcomed the Indian Prime Minister Nehru’s final appeal for Australia and New Zealand

to become more closely associated with Asia. The Post also editorialised that New Zealand’s

destiny would be linked to events in Asia and surmised that New Zealand needed to expand

53 ‘Radio Comment: Extract on the Afro-Asian Conference from Lookout Broadcast by Mr E.V. Dumbelton, 9 January’, Extract from Bulletin A55/2, filed on 19 January 1955, PM 440/9/3, Part 1, ANZ, Wellington. 54 Jackson, G 1955, ‘NZ needs peace with Asian neighbours,’ People’s Voice, 30 March. 55 Editorial 1955, ‘Africa and Asia Meet’, NZH, 18 April; Editorial 1955, ‘Bandung could affect course of history’, Auckland Star, 18 April. 56 Editorial 1955, ‘They Say It In English’, Dominion, 23 April.

Southeast Asia Research Centre Working Paper Series, No. 177, 2016 20

relations with that continent. He added the New Zealanders could help their Asian neighbours to

solve their many problems “without being charged with seeking domination and our own self-

interest.” 57 On a less optimistic note, the Dunedin morning paper Otago Daily Times described

the Bandung Conference as a “conference without unity” due to the irreconcilable differences

between the pro-Western, neutralist, and Communist countries. The ODT editorialist also argued

that a significant anti-Western current dominated the proceedings; citing the unwillingness of

many of the delegates to condemn Soviet “colonialism” on the same terms as Western

colonialism.58 In spite of such harsher views, the mainstream print media recognised that

Bandung was a pivotal event that foreshadowed Asia’s growing importance in New Zealand’s

strategic considerations.

One issue that dominated New Zealand newspaper coverage of Bandung was

Communist China’s participation in the conference. Toeing Washington’s line, Wellington had

adopted a policy of non-recognition towards the PRC regime in Beijing; instead recognising the

ROC regime in Taiwan as the legitimate government of China. At the time, New Zealand and its

Western allies viewed Communist China as a security threat. 59 Despite initial fears that the PRC

would turn the Conference into an anti-Western platform and bully its smaller Asian neighbours,

The Press (Christchurch) and Evening Post were mollified by the Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai’s

conciliatory tone throughout the conference proceedings.60 During his inaugural speech, Zhou

stressed that the Chinese delegation had come to Bandung “to seek unity and not to quarrel” and

took great pains to assure his Southeast Asian neighbours that the PRC respected the religious

57 Editorial 1955, ‘East Seeks Changed Relations With The West’, Evening Post, 26 April. 58 Editorial 1955, ‘Conference Without Unity’, Otago Daily Times (ODT), 26 April. 59 Brady, AM 2003, ‘The War That Never Was: New Zealand-China Relations in the Cold War’, in A Trapeznik and A Fox (eds.), Lenin’s Legacy Down Under: New Zealand’s Cold War, University of Otago Press, Dunedin, New Zealand, pp. 131-51. 60 Editorial 1955, ‘Africa-Asia Conference’, Press, 18 April; Editorial 1955, ‘Key Personalities at Bandung Talks’, Evening Post, 19 April; ‘Mild Speech by Chou: Bandung Address Conciliatory’ 1955, Press (Christchurch), 21 April.

Southeast Asia Research Centre Working Paper Series, No. 177, 2016 21

liberties of its minorities and harboured no aggressive tendencies towards the region.61 While

praising the Chinese Premier’s tactful diplomacy and expressed interest in seeking a diplomatic

solution to the First Taiwan Straits Crisis with the Americans, the ODT and the NZH surmised

that Beijing had to put its words into actions given its past “aggression”.62 On a dissenting note,

the Auckland Star argued that the Americans should not dismiss Zhou’s Bandung offer and

instead faulted Washington’s hard-headed policy towards Beijing for stoking the Taiwan Straits

Crisis.63 Ultimately, the Eisenhower Administration declined to respond to Zhou’s offer; leaving

Sino-American tensions to simmer until Richard Nixon’s landmark trip to Beijing in 1973 facilitated Washington’s recognition of the PRC in 1979.64 Newspaper editorial commentary

showed that the mainstream media shared the New Zealand Government’s threat perceptions

towards Communist China, which stemmed from Wellington’s opposition to the expansion of

Communism in Asia. Due to New Zealand’s bipolar worldview of international relations, the

Cold War was never absent from newspaper discourses of the Bandung Conference.

Newspaper cartoons tended to take a dim view of the Bandung Conference. The ODT

cartoonist Sid Scales penned a cartoon disparaging Afro-Asian delegates for not recognising the

positive aspects of European colonialism. The image of an exhausted White colonial official

bearing the weight of the world on his shoulders while gleeful Afro-Asian delegates looked on,

accompanied by the caption “Perhaps now we can share the white man’s burden,” implied that

former colonial subjects should be grateful for the social and economic development introduced

by their “hated” former White colonial masters. While reflecting contemporary New Zealand

61 Mackie, Bandung 1955, pp. 83-85; Kahin, The Asian-African Conference, pp. 14-16. 62 Editorial 1955, ‘Conference without Unity’, ODT, 26 April; Editorial 1955, ‘Astute Chinese Diplomacy’, NZH, 26 April; The First Taiwan Straits Crisis (1954-55) was sparked by the presence of Republic of China (ROC) troops in the islands of Quemoy and Matsu, which lay outside the shield provided by the US Seventh Fleet. See Mackie, Bandung 1955, pp. 49-50. 63 Editorial 1955, ‘Chinese offer should not be dismissed’, Auckland Star, 26 April. 64 Mackie, Bandung 1955, pp. 49-50; Office of the Historian 2013, ‘Milestones: 1960-1976: Rapprochement with China, 1972’, United States Department of State, last modified 31 October 2013, https://history.state.gov/milestones/1969-1976/rapprochement-china.

Southeast Asia Research Centre Working Paper Series, No. 177, 2016 22

society’s sympathies towards “Mother Britain”, Scales’ cartoon conveniently ignored the

violence, , and exploitation created by British colonialism.65 The conservative NZH also

published a cartoon by the liberal British Guardian newspaper which mocked the Bandung

organizers’ goal of keeping newly independent Asian countries out of the Cold War. The sight of

Asian delegates huddling on an island in the midst of an artillery barrage between China and a

US warship (a reference to the ongoing First Taiwan Straits Crisis66) insinuated that the Bandung

Spirit of non-alignment and peaceful coexistence was doomed to have little impact in easing

Cold War tensions.67 These two cartoons conveyed the West’s dismissive attitudes towards the

Bandung Conference as either a hotbed of anti-Western sentiment or a naïve, idealistic attempt

to end the Cold War. Such attitudes ignored the fact that Afro-Asian countries wanted to

determine their own political destinies free of Western or Communist interference. In short, the

mainstream newspapers’ coverage of Bandung reflected their acceptance of the Holland

Government’s Western-aligned foreign and security policies and their paternalistic, colonialist

attitudes towards Asian peoples.

Left-wing responses

The Bandung Conference also attracted substantial interest from left-wing elements in

New Zealand, most notably the Communist Party of New Zealand and the left-wing New

Zealand Peace Councils (NZPC), as well as well-informed individuals like W.H. Youren.

Founded in 1919, New Zealand’s Communist Party (CPNZ) was mainly supported by trade

unionists and left-wing intellectuals. Throughout its history, it remained politically marginalised

and failed to capture any seats in New Zealand’s unicameral Parliament. In a time of escalating

Cold War tensions, the CPNZ were often viewed as apologists and proxies for the Soviet Union

65 Scales, S 1955, ‘Perhaps now we can share the White Man’s Burden’, cartoon, ODT, 21 April. 66 Mackie, Bandung 1955, pp. 49-50. 67 ‘Important Observers’ 1955, cartoon, NZH, 19 April.

Southeast Asia Research Centre Working Paper Series, No. 177, 2016 23

and Communist China.68 The New Zealand Peace Council was a left-wing peace and anti-nuclear

organization that had been formed in 1950 from the Peace and Anti-Conscription League, which

had emerged to oppose the growing militarism in New Zealand leading up to World War I.69

The NZPC was affiliated with the World Peace Council (WPC), a Stockholm-based organization

which had been established by several intellectuals in 1950 to promote world peace and nuclear

disarmament. Like the more militant CPNZ, the NZPC was criticized for its alleged pro-Soviet

leanings.70 The Communist Party and the Peace Council disseminated their arguments and

reports through their official organs: the weekly newspaper People’s Voice and the monthly

newsletter Peace respectively.

Reflecting their ideological opposition to Wellington’s staunchly pro-Western foreign

policy, both the People’s Voice and Peace welcomed the Bandung Conference as an alternative to

Western militarism in Southeast Asia. Giving substantial coverage to the Bandung Conference,

the People’s Voice published several reports and editorials presenting the Conference as an

alternative to the “imperialist” American-led SEATO alliance, a peaceful meeting of Asian and

African countries, and a “cry for freedom” against the twin devils of Western and

.71 In addition, the PV hailed the Bandung Conference as a blow against American and

British imperialism. It also accepted Chinese and Indian assertions that the 1955

airplane disaster had been an act of sabotage by the British authorities in Hong Kong and the

68 ‘Communist Party’, from An Encyclopaedia of New Zealand, A. H. McLintock (ed.), originally published in 1966. Reproduced on Te Ara - the Encyclopedia of New Zealand, updated 22 April 2009, http://www.TeAra.govt.nz/en/1966/political-parties/page-2. 69 Weitzel, RL 1973, ‘Pacifists and Anti-militarists in New Zealand, 1909-1914’, New Zealand Journal of History, vol. 7, no. 2, pp 128-47. 70 Letters 1957, ‘The Peace Council,’ Here & Now, issue 60, pp. 2-4; New Zealand Peace Council, ‘For a World Without War,’ advertisement, circa 1950s, New Zealand Peace Council Records, Herbert Otto Roth Papers, MS-Papers-82-213-12, Alexander Turnbull Library, Wellington. 71 ‘Colonialism is an evil, Bandung delegates told’ 1955, People’s Voice, 15 June; Burchett, W 1955, ‘Asians Won’t Fight Asians’, People’s Voice, 4 May; Parker, R 1955, ‘Chou’s PS on unity changed the tone’, People’s Voice, 4 May.

Southeast Asia Research Centre Working Paper Series, No. 177, 2016 24

ROC regime.72 The CPNZ’s General Secretary Victor G. Wilcox also described the Bandung

Conference as a “milestone” in the road to achieving world peace through peaceful negotiation

and mutual understanding.73 In a similar but more moderate tone, the NZPC’s monthly organ

Peace hailed the Bandung Conference as a sign that the Afro-Asian peoples, who comprised the

majority of the world’s population, genuinely supported the principles of peaceful coexistence,

negotiation, and opposition to nuclear weapons.74 Like the CPNZ, the NZPC opposed New

Zealand’s involvement in the Malayan Emergency and participation in Western “collective

security” pacts like ANZUS and SEATO.75 In their attitudes to the Bandung Conference, both the CPNZ and NZPC viewed newly-independent Afro-Asian anti-colonial leaders as fellow allies

against the twin devils of Western imperialism and capitalism.

Last but not least, the Bandung Conference drew the interest of the Christchurch

Convention on International Relations held in August 1955, which was well attended by 300

academics, trade unionists, peace activists and interested members of the public. The

Christchurch Convention dealt with three broad themes: the Commonwealth, the United

Nations and Southeast Asia. It came up with three main planks which condemned all forms of

racism and discrimination in the Commonwealth, urged New Zealand to work more through the

72 Editorial 1955, ‘US retreats before public opinion’, People’s Voice, 4 May; ‘Time-bomb cause wreck of plane bound for Bandung’ 1955, People’s Voice, 15 June; The Kashmir Princess was an plane chartered to fly the Chinese delegation from Hong Kong to Jakarta on 11 Apr. 1955 that crashed near Natuna Island in Indonesian waters. All crew and passengers aboard were killed and sabotage was suspected on the part of the Western powers and the ROC regime. Declassified records have since indicated that the ROC secret service had planted a time-bomb on the plane in an attempt to kill Premier Zhou Enlai. In addition, opponents of the PRC regime have alleged that Zhou had foreknowledge of the planned plane bombing but had allowed the incident to take place to gain political capital against the Western powers and ROC regime. See ‘China marks journalists killed in premier murder plot 50 years ago’ 2005, Xinhua, 4 November, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2005-04/11/content_2815170.htm; Finnane, A 2010, ‘Zhou Enlai in Bandung: film as history in the People’s Republic of China,’ in D McDougall and A Finnane (eds.), Bandung 1955: little histories, Monash University Press, Melbourne, pp. 116-18. 73 Wilcox, V 1955, ‘Bandung conference shows the way’, People’s Voice, 4 May. 74 Airey, W 1955, ‘Hope is on the wing’, Peace, vol. II, no. 6, p. 3. 75 ‘NZ Peace Council confers National Meeting’ 1955, Peace, vol. II, no. 6, p. 2; ‘We Don’t Need Troops in Malaya’ 1955, Peace, vol. II, no. 11, p. 1.

Southeast Asia Research Centre Working Paper Series, No. 177, 2016 25

United Nations, and lastly condemned colonialism and supported decolonisation. While

Bandung was not a major topic at the Christchurch Convention, the Convention’s organisers

urged New Zealand to take notice of the Bandung Conference in their findings and also

published the final communique of the Asian-African Conference. 76

One speaker Harold Wilfred Youren, a prominent Hawke’s Bay lawyer, farmer, and

NZPC member, presented a paper arguing that the Bandung Conference represented: firstly, an

explicit rejection of Western assumptions of moral superiority; and secondly; a resurgence of the

historical Asian cultural and trading connections which had been severed by the advent of

European colonialism. There was also renewed sense of pride in Asian culture and thinking.

Due to their vast size, Youren argued that China and India would be able to exert a substantial

influence over the other Afro-Asian countries; adding that the two countries practised different

political models. The Indian model, advocated by Prime Minister Nehru and his Foreign

Minister Krishnan Menon, sought to avoid Cold War entanglements by creating a bloc of “non-

aligned” Asian countries. Meanwhile, the Chinese were developing a political governance model

that was a fusion of Marxist ideas and traditional Chinese culture and traditions. The Chinese

had rejected Western forms of governance due to its association with the political anarchy,

warlordism, corruption, and civil war of the past forty years. While there was potential for

conflict between the Indian and Chinese models, Youren hoped that a “new synthesis of foreign

and domestic values” would emerge out of “the present ferment of ideas.” He cited Burma’s

nation-building policies of reconciling Buddhism with as a potential success story.77

76 ‘Conference on International Relations: A New Zealand Group Study on The Commonwealth, the United Nations, Southeast Asia’, August 1955, Christchurch Convention on International Relations, Organising Committee, 1956, pp. 5-9, pp. 93-99 & pp. 101-06; Locke, E 1992, Peace People: A History of Peace Activities, Hazard Press, Christchurch, pp. 152-153. 77 Youren, HW 1955, ‘Western Policies in South East Asia,’ Christchurch Conference on International Relations, pp. 85-88; H.W. Youren was also a humanitarian, civil libertarian, and peace advocate who participated in the New Zealand Peace Council, an affiliate of the pro-Soviet World Peace Council. He was also a vocal critic of the New Zealand Government’s policies towards China and involvement in the Vietnam War. Fluent in several languages, he regularly wrote letters to journals and

Southeast Asia Research Centre Working Paper Series, No. 177, 2016 26

Youren’s sympathetic views towards Bandung reflected those of the NZPC.78 While Youren

rightfully foresaw the growing geopolitical influence of India and China, his hopes for Burma to

develop into a “success story” proved unrealised due to the country’s ethnic and political

conflicts which led to a military coup in 1962.79

Ultimately, the New Zealand Government took little notice of the Bandung Conference

due to its disagreement with Indonesia over the West New Guinea dispute and its steadfastly

pro-Western foreign policy alignment. Despite Youren’s optimism, the Bandung vision for

peaceful cooperative relations among Third World countries faltered due to the emergence of a

split within the Afro-Asian bloc between a “moderate faction” led by India and and a

radical faction led by Indonesia and China. These tensions culminated in the failed Second

Asian-African Conference at Algiers in November 1965.80 Subsequent Asian conflicts like the

Sino-Indian War of 1962, the Indonesian-Malaysian Confrontation, the Vietnam War, and the various Indo-Pakistani conflicts also undermined the Bandung spirit of peaceful coexistence and cooperation.

Epilogue

Firstly, New Zealand pursued a disengaged policy towards the Bandung Conference since the conference’s agenda conflicted with New Zealand’s contemporary foreign and security

newspapers, took part in radio broadcasts, discussions, seminars, lectures, and also wrote texts for Asian studies courses. Reflecting his affinity for Asia, he and his wife hosted Asian students at their farm in Waiti and also travelled widely. See. Curham, B. D 2014, ‘Youren, Harold Wilfred’, from the Dictionary of New Zealand Biography, Te Ara - the Encyclopedia of New Zealand, updated 19 March 2014, http://www.TeAra.govt.nz/en/biographies/5y3/youren-harold-wilfred. 78 Airey, W 1955, ‘Hope is on the wing’, Peace, vol. II, no. 6, p. 3. 79 In 1989, the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) renamed Burma as “Myanmar”; a policy that has not been universally accepted by all quarters. Aung-Thwin, M, & Aung-Thwin, M 2013, A Since Ancient Times: Traditions and Transformations, second edition, Reaktion Books, London, pp 235-94; Smith, M 1991, Burma: Insurgency and Politics of Ethnicity, Zed Books, London. 80 Mackie, Bandung 1955, pp. 103-123; For a longer discussion, see Agung, Twenty years Indonesian foreign policy, pp. 313-55.

Southeast Asia Research Centre Working Paper Series, No. 177, 2016 27

policies and perceived view of its place in the world. As of 1955, New Zealand’s foreign and

security policies sought to preserve a significant Anglo-American presence in Southeast Asia in

order to contain the spread of Asian Communism into Australasia. Since New Zealand policy-

makers shared their Anglophone counterparts’ anti-Communist security concerns, they naturally

distrusted anything that questioned their traditional Cold War assumptions. Hence, alarm bells

were raised at the presence of Communist China and at the Bandung

Conference. Such considerations also led New Zealand and its Western allies to collaborate with

friendly Asian states like Thailand, the Philippines, and Pakistan in countering anti-Western and

pro-Communist propaganda.81 In addition, New Zealand’s aversion towards Bandung reflected

its own origins as a British settler colony. New Zealand saw itself as a Western country that was

still closely tied to “Mother Britain.” The following year, New Zealand was one of the few

countries to support Britain during the ; a stance that put it strongly at odds with

many Afro-Asian and Communist countries, and even the United States.82 New Zealand’s

Western-aligned policies and identity would later entail its involvement in the Indonesian-

Malaysian Confrontation and the Vietnam War; wars that were fought to protect British and

American interests in Southeast Asia.

Secondly, the Holland Government’s dismissive attitude towards the Bandung

Conference was little different from that of its three major Anglophone allies and security

partners; countries whose vested strategic interests in Asia clashed with the Bandung spirit of

peaceful coexistence, non-alignment, and self-determination. Due to its closer proximity to

Southeast Asia, Australia was compelled to take a greater interest in Bandung than Wellington;

81 New Zealand High Commissioner Canberra to Minister of External Affairs Wellington, Telegram No. 43, 11 February 1955, PM 440/9/3, Part 1, ANZ, Wellington. 82 Sinclair, ‘Independence and Morality’, p. 13; ‘The Suez Crisis’, Statement by the Right Honourable S.G. Holland, 1 November 1956, External Affairs Review, vol. VI, no. 11, p. 2; ‘Speech by Leslie Munro at the First Emergency Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly’, 1 November 1956, in Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1972 (ed.), New Zealand Foreign Policy: Statements and Documents, 1943-1957, A.R. Shearer Government Printer, Wellington, pp 452-54.

Southeast Asia Research Centre Working Paper Series, No. 177, 2016 28

which could take a more detached interest from a “safe distance.” Unlike the NZDEA, the

ADEA toyed with the idea of attending Bandung in order to prevent the Conference from

passing resolutions that were hostile to Australian security policies. Only Jakarta’s firm objections

to any Australasian participation put an end to this “pipe dream.” Meanwhile, Britain and the

United States’ preoccupation with combating Communism led these two governments to view

the Bandung Conference as a Cold War battleground. Thus, Washington, with the connivance of

Whitehall and Wellington, tried to influence the conference proceedings by using friendly Asian

states as proxies. Despite initial fears, Bandung did not devolve into a forum for bashing the

West and propagating Communist propaganda. Instead, it represented an idealistic call by Asian

and African leaders for greater cooperation among Third World countries.

Thirdly, Bandung revealed the absolute limits of New Zealand’s foreign policy in Asia.

While the Holland Government had shown a growing appreciation of New Zealand’s close

proximity to Southeast Asia, its interests in that region were mainly limited to the Colombo Plan,

support for the British position in Malaya and Singapore, and the backup to both provided by

the US-inspired SEATO alliance. Despite the NZDEA’s efforts to increase New Zealand’s

diplomatic and economic presence in Southeast Asia, the “Near North” was still regarded as a

foreign exotic place. The Department’s relatively small manpower also limited its ability to

project a meaningful presence there. New Zealand’s lack of a diplomatic presence in Indonesia

prevented the NZDEA from sending personnel to monitor the Conference’s proceedings.

Instead, Wellington had to make up for that shortfall by relying on information from its overseas

diplomatic network and its three Anglophone allies. Contemporary New Zealand diplomatic

reports reiterated Wellington’s ongoing preoccupation with containing Communism and

safeguarding the Western security alliances that were the pillars of its security policies.

Southeast Asia Research Centre Working Paper Series, No. 177, 2016 29

Finally, the New Zealand print media’s coverage of the Bandung Conference was

influenced by the wider public debate around colonialism and the Cold War. While many

newspapers rightfully viewed the Conference as a watershed moment in both the histories of

Southeast Asia and Afro-Asian relations, their coverage still reflected contemporary Cold War

anxieties about Communism and China. There was also a patronising pro-colonialist discourse within elements of the mainstream print media which exaggerated the positive qualities of British colonialism. While New Zealand was coming to terms with the “winds of change” sweeping the

Third World, it would not fully come to terms with its own colonial past and racist immigration policies until the 1970s. Meanwhile, left-wing groups like the Communist Party and the New

Zealand Peace Council viewed Bandung’s proposed international order based on peaceful

coexistence and non-alignment as an alternative to the bipolar Cold War . The CPNZ and NZPC criticized New Zealand’s close ties with to Britain and the United States, which they regarded as imperialist powers oppressing the Third Word. While H.W. Youren rightfully recognized that Bandung had sparked a renewed sense of pride and confidence among Asian countries, his hopes for a peaceful Asian order were dispelled by the harsh realities of .

While left-wing voices remained at the margins of New Zealand during the Bandung

Conference, they gathered greater traction during the Vietnam War; which split New Zealand’s bipartisan foreign policy consensus, sparked the emergence of a vocal anti-war movement, and

forced Wellington to reappraise its relationship with its “Near North.” 83

83 See Rabel, New Zealand and the Vietnam War, pp. 348-65; Clements, KP 1993, ‘The Influence of Individuals and Non-Governmental Organisations on New Zealand Foreign Policy Making, 1943-1993’, in A Trotter (ed.), Fifty Years of New Zealand Foreign Policy Making, University of Otago Press, Dunedin, pp. 111-29.

Southeast Asia Research Centre Working Paper Series, No. 177, 2016 30

The Southeast Asia Research Centre (SEARC) of the City University of Hong Kong publishes SEARC Working Papers Series electronically

© Copyright is held by the author or authors of the Working Paper.

SEARC Working Papers cannot be republished, reprinted, or reproduced in any format without the permission of the author or authors.

Note: The views expressed in each paper are those of the author or authors of the paper. They do not represent the views of the Southeast Asia Research Centre, its Management Committee, or the City University of Hong Kong.

Southeast Asia Research Centre Management Committee Professor Mark R Thompson, Director Dr Thomas Patton, Associate Director Professor William Case Dr Bill Taylor Dr Nankyung Choi

Southeast Asia Research Centre City University of Hong Kong Tat Chee Avenue Kowloon Hong Kong SAR Tel: (852) 3442-6330 Fax: (852) 3442-0103 http://www.cityu.edu.hk/searc