sudanHuman Security Baseline Assessment issue brief Small Arms Survey Number 11 May 2008 Allies and defectors An update on armed group integration and proxy force activity
ribal groups, pastoralists, para- Groups (OAGs) into the SPLA1 and This is likely to continue at least militaries, and SPLA splinter post-CPA violence between armed until the referendum on South Suda- factions, among other armed groups and SPLA forces during civilian nese independence in 2011. T 2 entities, were key combatants in the disarmament campaigns. The current second Sudanese civil war as allies of Brief updates the state of knowledge the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) or about the status of armed groups in ‘Other Armed Groups’ in the Sudan People’s Liberation Army South Sudan as of March 2008, and (SPLA). Under the terms of the Com- focuses on the lingering problems that context prehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) of they pose, the challenges remaining to The term ‘armed group’ is considerably 2005, these groups, many of which their dissolution and demobilization, elastic in the Sudanese context. Through- had deep roots in local political, ethnic, and their possible impact on CPA imple- out the second Sudanese civil war and economic conflicts in South Sudan, mentation. It finds that: (1983–2005), tribal groups, pastoralists, were suddenly required to disband paramilitaries, and other collectives and their members to join the SAF, the The South Sudan Defence Forces played a significant role; many acted SPLA, or one of a small number of (SSDF), by far the most threatening as proxy forces and waged much of the government institutions. Not surpris- South Sudanese collection of armed fighting, especially during the 1990s. ingly, this process has been neither groups during the civil war, has In the case of the SSDF, an SAF-aligned smooth nor rapid. largely shifted its allegiance to the umbrella group comprising more than Three years later, a wide range of SPLA, with far fewer remnant SSDF 40,000 men, the group engaged in fight- ex-combatants find themselves in a remaining unaligned or allied to ing throughout Upper Nile, Jonglei, kind of administrative limbo, at varying the SAF. Eastern Equatoria, and Northern Bahr levels of ‘integration’ and ‘demobili- The integration of these former el Ghazal. They fought the SPLA directly zation’. Some former armed group SSDF combatants into the SPLA, in rural areas and were an important members may be part of either the however, remains minimal or non- reinforcement for the SAF in the be- SAF or the SPLA only as a name on a existent. sieged garrison towns of South Sudan. roster, while continuing to answer to SAF-aligned Misseriya tribesmen Other, less developed local groups their former commanders. In many clashed violently with the SPLA in became involved in the wider conflict cases, tribal and personal loyalties carry the South Kordofan–Bahr el Ghazal only when it benefited their local aims, more weight than their new affiliations. border regions from December needs, or tribal concerns, as in the case Looming over the entire post-CPA 2007 until April 2008, threatening of the ‘white army’ in Jonglei.3 realignment process is the knowledge to destabilize the area. Worryingly, With the end of the civil war, these that for most former fighters, armed Sudanese president Omar al-Bashir groups were required to disband. The group membership is the only sustain- has remobilized paramilitary Pop- Comprehensive Peace Agreement of able way of life. ular Defence Forces in the area. January 2005—to which only the SPLA At the same time, the Government The SPLA-aligned Debab and Abu and the Government of Sudan (GoS) of National Unity (GNU) and the Matrig Forces (primarily Misseriya were party—declared that ‘no armed Government of South Sudan (GoSS) and Rizeigat armed forces, respec- groups allied to either party shall be continue to rely on armed groups as tively), as well as the continued allowed to operate outside the two proxy forces in contentious areas, result- presence of several SAF-aligned forces’.4 The CPA referred to all these ing in increased tensions, jockeying for SSDF remnant militias, are gener- collectives as Other Armed Groups the support of different groups, and ating significant tensions in Abyei. (OAGs) and required that they declare fighting. This is in direct violation of The competition for allied forces their allegiance to, and then incorpo- the peace agreement, and is part of an in the border ‘Transitional Areas’ rate into, either the SAF or the SPLA escalating crisis between the parties. suggests that both the SPLA and no later than 9 March 2006, or be de- Previous Sudan Issue Briefs have SAF are intent on keeping allied clared illegal. Technically, as far as the reviewed the process of integration armed groups in the field to support GoS and the SPLA are concerned, of important so-called Other Armed their efforts to control strategic areas. OAGs ceased to exist after that date—
www.smallarmssurvey.org/sudan 1 any remnant unaligned groups were As of mid-2008, more than two years had capitulated and formally aligned to be labelled criminal and dealt with since the signing of the Juba Declara- with the SPLA: Ismael Konye (a Murle) accordingly.5 tion and three since the CPA, armed in Jonglei in October 2006 and Sultan Despite the CPA’s clear instruction group activity continues. The two Adbel Bagi (a Dinka) in Northern Bahr on the fate of the OAGs,6 the reality categories of armed groups that call for el Ghazal in August 2007.8 Konye’s on the ground has always been more examination in this Brief are the SAF- forces redeployed from Pibor to Juba complicated. Because of the important aligned remnants of the SSDF that in mid-April 2007,9 and he became a constituencies that some OAGs repre- continue to operate in South Sudan, ‘peace and reconciliation’ adviser to sented, it was subsequently recognized and tribal groups, some of whose GoSS president Salva Kiir. His troops that they could not simply be dealt with members are also operating as pro- are in the process of being incorporated 10 as criminal entities. As a consequence, government paramilitaries. Even into the SPLA or being demobilized. a special agreement was required to though, as far as the parties to the The troops of Sultan Abdel Bagi, while deal with the SSDF, many of whose CPA are concerned, ‘OAGs’ have all historically active in South Kordofan commanders wielded considerable been officially absorbed and therefore around Meiram, are now mostly located local authority. The Juba Declaration no longer exist, this is a technicality in SPLA bases in Aweil and Tonj, Bahr of January 2006 between the SPLA that should not obscure the more el Ghazal. No further major changes and the SSDF set the terms for the complicated reality on the ground. in realignment of remnant-SSDF mili- group’s official dissolution and absorp- tias have taken place since. tion, primarily into the SPLA; in the As the SSDF effectively collapsed, process, SSDF commander Paulino however, some SSDF militia members Matieb became the SPLA’s Deputy The SSDF: the final chapter? detached from their leadership and Commander-in-Chief. Some other Following Matieb’s transition to the became involved in local, informal SSDF commanders held their options SPLA, only a handful of SSDF com- tribal-based forces. Their former com- open for as long as possible, returned manders and their men refused to manders, unable to continue to sup- to the SAF, or remained uncommitted.7 follow him. By late 2006 two of these ply and motivate them, had little hold
GEDAREF Selected Armed Groups of Concern in South Sudan WHITE SINNAR and Border Areas, March 2008 NILE SOUTH KORDOFAN el-Damazin SOUTH Renk DARFUR SUDANRenk faction Kadugli Abu Sofifa BLUE Abu Matrig NILE Abu Matrig Forces Debab Forces Kaka Kharasana Meiram PPeaceeace and DeDevvelopment DeDeffence Forccee (PDDF) Pariang El NasserNasser facactiontion Akoka Safaha Abyei Rom Abyeiyei Forccees NORTHERN UPPER Al Fursan Bentiu Malakal NILE Forces Raja BAHR EL GHAZAL Mading Forccees Division Mading Raja Aweil Fangak Fangak Forces NasseNasserr Quwat Al Fursan El NasserNasser factionaction PeacePeace DeDeffence WARAB UNITY ETHIOPIA FoForrceces (PDF) Warrap WESTERN BAHR Wau EL GHAZAL Tonj JONGLEI CENTRAL PPeaceeace DeDeffence Forccees (PDF) AFRICAN RRumbekumbek REPUBLIC LAKES Bor
International boundary North–South boundary WESTERN State boundary EQUATORIA EASTERN Juba EQUATORIA State capital Yambio CENTRCENTRALAL Renk Armed group aligned with: EQEQUUAATORIA Torit SPLA D E M O C RA T I C KENYA SAF R E P U B L I C O F T H E Former SSDF groups C O N G O Other armed groups 0km200 UGANDA
2 Sudan Issue Brief Number 11 May 2008 on them. This is the case with a cadre of Murle officers under Ismael Konye, The vast majority of the former SSDF have defected who declined to follow him into the SPLA, choosing instead to remain in from the SAF into the SPLA camp. their home area of Pibor County in Jonglei State. Similarly, in Bahr el Ghazal a number of Sultan Bagi’s former forces remained There is circumstantial evidence SAF redeployment from the South to in the Meriam area, seemingly inde- 19 11 that this is not the case, however. At the North, but they could still be used pendent of him. Furthermore, at least least one former powerful ex-SSDF as proxy forces in the future.20 one of his sons has refused to align with commander, Gabriel Tang-Ginya, As mentioned above, a few remnant the SPLA. Another example of this trend claimed in November 2007 that he SSDF militias have already been demo- is the break-up of Atom Al-Nour’s maintained personal control over forces bilized and disarmed by SAF, such as SSDF-affiliated Peace Defence Forces in South Sudan.17 Problematically, the the Dolieb Forces of Thomas Mabior.21 (PDF, not to be confused with the para- SAF has also engaged in unilateral In practice this means that the forces military Popular Defence Forces or the ‘demobilization’ of former SSDF troops have been sent back to their home areas, Pibor Defense Force of Ismael Konye) aligned with it, which has had no UN and official ties with them have been into four major groupings in three monitoring. The possibility remains cut. It is notable that, despite this, separate locations (Wau, Raja, and that the SAF continues to support these Thomas Mabior himself remains a Tonj), some of which aligned with the SSDF remnant militias or is holding political agitator against the SPLM/A; SPLA and others with the SAF.12 them as ‘reserves’ for the future, as his supporters in the area of Lankien In general, however, the post-CPA 18 the SPLA consistently claims. County, Jonglei State have made de- period has seen the vast majority of Thus, while the SSDF seems to have mands that he, or one of his supporters, the former SSDF drawn away from the 22 been broken as an overall force, the on- be given the post of Commissioner. SAF into the SPLA camp; as of March going presence of remnant constituents Political stand-offs of this nature can 2007 approximately 47,440 were re- is still an important consideration in easily escalate into armed violence as ported to have joined the SPLA, with the security and political calculus of firearms remain in plentiful supply 10 400 13 only , joining the SAF. Part of South Sudan. The largest remnant even after supposed ‘disarmament’. the explanation for this is the ‘South– SSDF militias are those led by: Some remnant-SSDF commanders South dialogue’ that the GoSS initiated remain steadfast against SPLA rap- Major-General Gabriel Tang-Ginya, in late 2005, in an effort to promote prochement due to historical and who commands the Fangak Forces reconciliation among the many South- ideological grievances. Some insist based in north-west Jonglei State ern factions and groups that had been that the 1997 Khartoum Agreement, around Fangak town and upstream enemies. Another is the death in July which formed the SSDF umbrella, su- at Phom el-Zeraf. The approximate 2005 of former SPLA leader and GoSS persedes the CPA and that the SPLA size of the Fangak Forces is 1,200 President, John Garang. Resentment should be disbanded and replaced by to 1,500 men, who are dispersed in over Garang’s divisive policies and a ‘South Sudan Army’. Others cling to small groups throughout the region. tactics had kept many commanders tribal or ethnic enmity. Some maintain Major-General Gordon Kong, who from joining the SPLA. When Salva grievances dating to the first civil war commands the Nasser faction in Kiir (a Dinka like Garang but from a and fighting between various southern eastern Upper Nile State centred different clan and region, and with a guerrilla forces in the late 1970s and around El Nasser, with most of different background and temperament) early 1980s, particularly those who his armed forces based in nearby succeeded Garang, many reconsidered associated themselves with Anyanya 2.23 Ketbek. The approximate size of their options. Moreover, and probably Still others are bitter about the lack of the Nasser faction is 500 to 1,000. most importantly, most former OAG GoSS posts available to them through Major-General Atom Al-Nour, members from South Sudan had no the Juba Declaration, or the lack of who commands the Peace Defence desire to relocate to the North, a require- other more general peace dividends Forces in Western and Northern ment if they aligned with the SAF. that they expected.24 Bahr el Ghazal in the towns of Wau, The outcome of this enormous shift This anti-SPLA sentiment is unlikely Raja, Diem Zubeir, Bazia, Mboro, of allegiances was the effective folding to change in the near future. However, and Bigare. The approximate size of the SSDF as an independent fighting there does not appear to be any desire of the Peace Defence Forces is 400. force in June 2007, leaving a small cadre among remnant SSDF commanders to of former SSDF leaders and intellectu- In addition to these three groups, return to open conflict with the SPLA als to form a political party under the there are at least 11 other smaller mili- prior to the 2011 referendum on south- name of the South Sudan Democratic tias geographically dispersed across ern self-determination. Even Gabriel Front.14 Khartoum claimed around the South Sudan, as well as around Abyei Tang-Ginya, one of the more trouble- same time that all SAF-aligned OAGs (see Map and Table 1). Most are still some OAG commanders in the eyes of in South Sudan had been incorporated coherent as local militias but relatively the SPLA and United Nations Mission into the SAF in the North, incorporated small in numbers of armed combatants. in Sudan (UNMIS), supposedly ordered into the SAF and employed in the Joint Few present serious challenges to the his followers to wait for the referendum Integrated Units (JIUs)15 in the South, overwhelming SPLA presence in these and not to provoke the SPLA in the or disarmed and demobilized.16 areas, especially after the substantial meantime.25
www.smallarmssurvey.org/sudan 3 Table 1 Selected Armed Groups operating in South Sudan/South Kordofan
Name Leader(s) Alignment Stated Areas of operation State Ethnic Remarks strength group
Remnant SSDF groups
Peace and Col. Hassan SAF 1,100 Meiram South 469 have incorporated Development Deng Malon Kordofan into the SAF; 258 are in Defence Force Deng the Aweil JIU
Fangak Forces Maj.-Gen. Gabriel SAF 1,200—1,500 Fangak Jonglei Nuer Tang Shan
El Nasser Maj.-Gen. Gordon SAF 500—1,000 Ketbek, Olang, El Doma, Upper Nile Nuer faction Kong Chol El Nasser, Akoka, Fanmadid, Rom
Renk faction Brig. Mohamed SAF 650 (old figure, Renk, Shomdi, Al Mansura, Upper Nile Dinka Chol Al-Ahmar no current data) Goy Fammi, Wadakona, Al Tuba Al Ghabsha, Matimar, Kaka, Fayiwar
Mading Forces Lt.-Col. Peter SAF 300 (old figure, Mading, Baljok, Mayor, Upper Nile Nuer Tuaj no current data) Forinang
Abyei Forces Thomas Thiel SAF Unknown Abyei South Appears to be working Kordofan with the SAF unit north of Abyei (not verified)
Other armed groups
Quwat Al Hamden Ahmed SAF 1,250—1,475 Raja Western Bahr Arabic According to SAF not Fursan Almunin El Ghazal speaking OAG; SPLA disagrees groups from South Darfur
Peace Defence Maj.-Gen. Atom SAF 300—400 Wau, Tonj, Raja Western Bahr Fertit and Two groups (Dalil’s and Forces Al-Nour, Col. El Ghazal Balanda Zein’s) reported by OAG Peter Beaku CC SC in November 2007, 153 and 150 respectively in Raja area, SAF aligned— participated in SAF disarmament
Al Fursan Al-Haj Basheer SPLA 2,025 Raja, Babelo Western Bahr Arabic Aligned with SPLA in Forces Raja Mawein El Ghazal speaking April 2007 Division groups from South Darfur
Debab Forces Brig. Hassan SPLA 1,511 out of 2,121 Debab, Kharasana, South Misseriya Former Popular Defence Hamid Saleh, verified by Bajayea, Dandur, Abu Kordofan Forces (PDF); some have Col. Albatel UNMIS in Sofifa, Takona (Unity reportedly redeployed Kabro September State) to Pariang but UNMIS 2007 has not verified this. Recruting from former PDF, mostly rural/ nomadic Misseriya 571 troops verified by UNMIS as having redeployed to Kharasana
Abu Matrig SPLA 611 out of Abu Matrig, Safaha South Darfur South Darfur 837 troops verified by Forces stated forces groups and UNMIS as having strength 2,500 some from redeployed to Safaha verified by South UNMIS in Kordofan October 2007
4 Sudan Issue Brief Number 11 May 2008 Ongoing OAG incorporation Favouritism. In the view of the rank- are receiving support and direction from and-file former OAG members, their Khartoum, although this is extremely challenges officers are being well treated, having hard to quantify. While the CPA and the Juba Declara- become senior GoSS or SPLA members, In late December 2007 major fight- tion forced former OAGs to join either while they themselves are sidelined. ing erupted in the disputed Abyei area the SAF or the SPLA, in reality their Those officers and commanders who between SPLA forces and Misseriya new hosts were in many ways unpre- have not received high-level posts, tribal militias who remained loyal to pared to receive them. At the same whether military or civilian, remain Khartoum after the end of the war. At time, although most OAG members frustrated, with both their former com- issue is the border demarcation process agreed to abide by the agreements rades and new leaders. that will determine whether oil-rich rather than fight, they were not particu- Fear of DDR. The formal disarma- areas, which are also prime cattle- larly inclined towards integration. The ment, demobilization, and reintegration grazing areas, are administered by the (DDR) process for the SAF, the SPLA, following are among the most serious GNU or GoSS. In July 2005 the Abyei and aligned groups has been beset with challenges facing the integration process: Boundaries Commission (ABC), a problems, but remains a key part of Finance issues. The burden on the CPA-mandated authority, placed a the CPA-mandated peace process. As SPLA of absorbing and accommodat- portion of the disputed areas clearly part of this, many former OAG mem- 30 ing tens of thousands of former OAG in the South. The SPLM accepted bers will be expected to return to civil- members has stretched its finances to this determination, while Khartoum ian life, but confidence is low in their breaking point. Ex-SSDF members in rejected it. In a dangerous escalation, ability to ‘reintegrate’ into communi- Juba rioted in December 2006 when the SPLM withdrew from the GNU in ties where economic opportunities are October 2007, partly over this stalemate, salaries had not been paid for many 29 extremely poor. 31 months. While some commanders have returning in mid-December. Inter- In brief, both sides of the integra- mittent fighting has continued in the enjoyed more consistent supplies, no- tion process (the hosts—the SAF and tably those closest to Malakal, others Abyei region since. the SPLA—and the former OAGs) are The initial spark that led to the fight- have suffered from a lack of even basic experiencing resistance and frustration. foodstuffs.26 ing was the December 2007 appoint- Many former OAG members feel that ment of a Ngok Dinka, Edward Lino, Rank assignments. Problems related the parties have engaged disrespect- to rank assignments, skills, and expe- as SPLM Chairperson in Abyei. Salva fully with them, in particular by declar- Kiir made it known that he wished Lino rience of the new members have per- ing them illegal. In light of this, it is 27 to be appointed Chief Administrator sisted. For instance, Paulino Matieb’s safe to assume that they may be very of the area. In response, a group of forces consisted of exceedingly large susceptible to alternatives to integration, Misseriya tribesmen calling themselves numbers of over-promoted senior such as rearming and remobilization, the Abyei Liberation Front announced officers who have proven difficult for should the opportunity arise. This situ- that they had appointed a new gover- the SPLA to place as it is already top- ation will be particularly problematic nor, Mohamed Omar al-Ansari. They heavy in terms of its previously existing in the political environment of the up- 28 demanded that the SPLM stand down officer corps. coming elections scheduled for 2009 and withdraw, or face attack.32 Redeployment issues. Many former and the 2011 referendum. Since these A tense stand-off persists today OAG members routinely refuse to re- (former) armed groups in many cases with the Misseriya frequently block- deploy out of their home areas. They represent political constituencies, by ing the road into Abyei and the SPLA prefer to stay in places where they have not effectively co-opting them the preventing Misseriya from moving a support structure and influence— SPLM, in particular, will face serious south along their traditional cattle- and where they can also provoke local political challenges. The current prob- grazing routes.33 A peace pact was tensions. At the same time, those troops lematic integration process exacerbates secured between the Misseriya and the that do redeploy often have to wait a this lack of trust and frustration. Dinka Ngok communities on 3 March considerable time for their equipment 2008.34 However, fighting erupted and supplies to reach them. The SAF again on 9 March, and there are indi- has arguably been more consistent in Armed proxies: tribal militias cations that the recent violent confron- the provisioning of former OAGs. and paramilitary forces tations have spread into adjacent Unity Mutual suspicion. SPLA soldiers and 35 State. The SPLA continues to claim mid-ranking officers often lack respect Abyei / South Kordofan that SAF officers are directing the for the former OAG members being 36 Tribal groups in the border ‘Transitional fighting. UNMIS has been unable to incorporated, in part due to their illit- Areas’ probably pose a greater threat verify this, being denied access to the eracy and low levels of education. At to the CPA than the remnant SSDF in areas of concern by both the SPLA and the same time, many former OAG the South. Many observers believe they the SAF. members do not wish to mix with their new SPLA colleagues, who are often from ethnic groups that are traditional enemies. This results in a mutual lack of trust and constitutes a security risk Tribal groups in the border areas probably pose a for the SPLA as it is enhancing and exacerbating already existing tensions greater threat than the remnant SSDF in the South. within its rank-and-file.
www.smallarmssurvey.org/sudan 5 Table 2 Misseriya militia strengths and redeployment from Abyei significant presence in Western Bahr el Ghazal. Of particular significance are Claimed UNMIS verified UNMIS verified Total UNMIS the SAF-aligned Quwat Al Fursan remaining redeployed verified Forces based in Raja under the com- around Abyei mand of Hamden Ahmed Almunin. Debab Forces 2,121 940 571 1,511 The stated size of the Quwat Al Fursan Force is 5,000, but UNMIS estimates it Abu Matrig Forces 2,500 289 812 1,101 at between 1,250 and 1,475.46 This force Sources: 20th Report of CJMC to CPC, dated 17 February 2008; CPC meeting agenda for 18 February 2008. is opposed by the Al Fursan Forces Raja Division, previously a sister militia of the Quwat Al Fursan. It boasts 2,000 As in Upper Nile, the SPLM has armed groups represents a major shift members dispersed around Raja and tried to reach out to its enemies, playing in power dynamics away from Khar- Babelo, in the far north of Western to the frustrations of the Misseriya— toum in favour of Juba. Bahr el Ghazal, under the command and to a lesser extent of the Rizeigat— Sudanese president Omar al-Bashir of Alhaj Beshir Mawin. The Raja Divi- over the failure of Khartoum to deliver has responded to the realignment of the sion of the Al Fursan Forces aligned on its development promises. The strat- Misseriya by remobilizing, in Novem- with the SPLA in April 2007, purport- egy seems to be working. Some former ber 2007, the paramilitary Popular edly over a lack of material support SAF-aligned militia tribesmen have Defence Force in the area.41 The core of from Khartoum and the government’s formed the pro-SPLA Debab Forces these PDF forces consisted of the sol- failure to deliver on promises made (mainly Misseriya) and Abu Matrig diers used to back up the authority of over the long years of civil war.47 Forces (mainly Rizeigat), drawing on the National Islamic Front and Bashir The growing, factionalizing militia disaffected Popular Defence Force during the war, who were sent to con- presence in northern Western Bahr el paramilitaries.37 The Misseriya have duct warfare in rural areas along the Ghazal and increasing conflict in South long interacted, often violently, with border between Bahr el Ghazal and Kordofan are particularly worrisome the Dinka of Northern Bahr el Ghazal. South Kordofan.42 Some of these para- as they provide potential linkages be- Fighting between the two groups was militaries are reported to have been tween South Sudan tensions and the a significant feature of the war in the involved in the fighting with the SPLA conflict in Darfur. Increased numbers area along the Bahr el Jebel Arab (also in Meirem in December 2007 and Febru- of Darfur rebels—from the Justice and known as the River Kiir), which began ary 2008.43 Overall, with the Popular Equality Movement (JEM) and the as confrontations over grazing and Defense Forces, the remaining loyal Sudan Liberation Army (SLA)—have water access. (The Rizeigat have similarly Misseriya tribal militias, and other been moving between South Darfur taken part in armed conflict further to local groups such as the Peace and into south-western South Kordofan the west in Darfur and Bahr el Ghazal.) Development Defence Force,44 the SAF and at times further south into Bahr el By mid-2007 significant numbers of still has formidable allies in the region. Ghazal.48 SPLM/A outreach to previ- Misseriya were encamped north of The SAF and the National Congress ously SAF-aligned armed groups could Abyei at Debab and appeared to be Party (NCP) claim that these forces also allow it greater influence in the awaiting incorporation into the SPLA, are not armed groups but government Darfur conflict, which the SPLM/A while the Abu Matrig Forces were col- entities, and hence legitimate bodies; has long been involved with in various lected to the west similarly awaiting the SPLM/A naturally disagrees, and capacities. This is a likely concern of SPLA and GoSS direction.38 claims that its new Debab Forces allies the SAF and the NCP given historical On 1 November 2007, the Ceasefire are not an armed group either. The OAG linkages between the Darfurians and Political Commission (CPC), the high- 45 Collaborative Committee, which last armed groups from Kordofan.49 est Sudanese political body governing met in September 2007, has yet to The above developments present the CPA’s implementation, called on convene to discuss the Abyei tensions; significant challenges to CPA imple- both the Debab and Abu Matrig Forces a meeting planned for January 2008 did mentation in both South Kordofan and to redeploy to South Sudan, since they not take place. It appears that neither Western and Northern Bahr el Ghazal were understood to be part of the Khartoum nor Juba is keen to officially states. In this context, the continued SPLA.39 Both militias appear to have resolve the question of whether their presence of armed groups in both areas, complied, though to differing degrees. respective allied forces are armed as well as potential linkages to the UNMIS found that the Debab Forces groups. Neither are they willing to stem ongoing Darfur conflict, are extremely moved about 38 per cent of their veri- the ongoing proxy fighting. Indeed, dangerous. fied troops to Paraing, Unity State, given the ongoing political dispute while the Abu Matrig Forces moved over border demarcation and the erup- 74 per cent of their men southwards tion of violence between the SPLA and to the Safaha area (not technically in Misseriya tribesmen, Abyei is the ‘line Closing reflections South Sudan; the forces are spread in the sand’ on which neither Khartoum The majority of OAG ex-combatants out in an area that straddles the dis- nor Juba is willing to compromise. who took part in the civil war remain puted border area south of the town only marginally integrated into the of Safaha).40 These developments have SPLA and the SAF. These ex-OAG exacerbated broader national tensions Bahr el Ghazal members, such as the many SSDF who as the SPLM/A rapprochement with In addition to areas of Abyei and South have switched allegiances, must deal previously SAF-aligned South Kordofan Kordofan, armed entities also have a with a range of challenges, including
6 Sudan Issue Brief Number 11 May 2008 the mistrust of their colleagues and www.unmis.org/English/documents/ SPLA in 1983. Some had arrived in Ethio- delayed salaries. In their current posi- cpa-en.pdf>. pia earlier than Garang and competed with 5 Note that the CPA had mandated a dead- Garang for the support of Ethiopia’s former tion, they will certainly look to keep line of 9 January 2006 but this was extended ruler, Mengistu Haile Mariam (and lost). their options open, and to remain sus- until 9 March 2006 and has since been 24 Arnold (2007), p. 498. ceptible to whatever other opportuni- extended for ‘special cases’ that have 25 Interview with Gabriel Tang-Ginya, ties may arise. Even among the pool emerged since the CPA was signed, in par- Khartoum, 20 November 2007. Tang-Ginya of ex-fighters who have shown a will- ticular the Debab and Abu Matrig Forces. said: ‘I have told them to be calm and we 6 Note that the OAGs themselves were not will be quiet until the referendum and ingness to cooperate, their patience a party to the agreement and, therefore, elections when we’ll decide what to do cannot last forever. had no say in the matter. next’. Outside this pool of former OAG 7 See Young (2006). 26 Arnold (2007), p. 505. members who are complying with the 8 The OAG Collaborative Committee con- 27 See Young (2006). cluded that about 2,000 of Ismael Konye’s 28 Even as late as late 2007, some of Paulino integration process are those who re- men had been ‘out of existence’ on 1 Matieb’s generals were yet recognized by main unaligned or retain their ties with August 2007; 1,470 of Sultan Abdul Bagi’s the SPLA. The SPLA demanded that they Khartoum, technically operating ille- men were confirmed on 28 August 2007 go through an extended acceptance pro- gally in South Sudan. For now they as having ‘joined’ the SPLA. See Arnold cess, which Matieb rejected as contrary to and Alden (2007). the terms of the Juba Declaration. do not present a significant security 9 UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) working 29 A forthcoming HSBA publication will threat but could easily become one in document obtained from confidential focus exclusively on DDR of combatants the future. Most threatening of all are source. in North and South Sudan. the forces being used by both sides to 10 This follows an agreement between Konye 30 Abyei Boundaries Commission (2005), engage in proxy fighting in disputed and the SPLA/GoSS and is not part of pp. 20–23. formal disarmament, demobilization, and 31 For more on the SPLM’s withdrawal areas. It is clear that they are being reintegration (DDR). from the GNU, see Vuni (2007). supported in one way or another by 11 UNMIS internal report ‘Present Situation 32 Sudan Tribune (2008c). either side, and that their continued of OAGs as of January 2007’. The presen- 33 Sudan Tribune (2008a). use as proxies is a disturbing sign—a tation details the split in Bagi’s forces. 34 ‘Report of Meeting Between The Dinka 12 Reports from UNMIS Area Joint Monitor- and Misseriya’, Annex to ‘UNMIS AJMC return in many ways to the patterns of ing Committee (AJMC) and others indi- Meeting Decision Points Sector 6’, 4 March the civil war. Indeed, there is an active cate that some have been incorporated 2008. struggle between the two armies for into the SAF Joint Integrated Unit (JIU) 35 Sudan Tribune (2008d). the allegiance of new potential allies; component while others have become 36 Sudan First Vice President Salva Kiir 2006) accused the National Congress Party (NCP) and many unemployed ex-combatants SPLA-aligned. See also Young ( , pp. 22–23. and the SAF of direct involvement (Sudan are willing to fight and to switch sides, 13 UNMIS presentation to the Ceasefire Tribune, 2008b). depending on who is offering more Political Commission (CPC), ‘Overview 37 For more on the Popular Defence Forces, support. of Security and CPA Implementation in see Salmon (2007). How this contest unfolds in the Ceasefire Zone’. From CJMC meeting on 38 (ICG, 2007, p. 6). 5 March 2007. 39 (Sudan Tribune, 2007b). near future will be decisive for the 14 The South Sudan Democratic Front (SSDF) 40 Telephone interview with UNMIS official peace process, not only in and around was officially launched on 24 September in Khartoum, 9 March 2008. the North–South border areas, though 2007 in Khartoum out of the ‘political 41 AFP (2007). they are undoubtedly the hottest wings’ of the South Sudan Defence Force, 42 While the core of the force was made up namely, the South Sudan United Demo- of recruits from urban centres who had flashpoints, but throughout South cratic Alliance and the South Sudan Demo- not previously been involved in militia Sudan. The parties to the CPA as well cratic Front (Sudan Tribune, 2007a). Major activity, the PDF was also made up of as the international community must General Gordon Kong and David Chand, various militias from Northern Bahr el recognize the hazards in allowing this a South Sudanese academic who lives Ghazal, South Kordofan, and South Dar- situation to continue. Proxy fighting and works in the United States, are the fur. These included components of many primary organizers of the party. Inter- of the Debab, Abu Matrig, as well as other was a hallmark of the civil war, and view with David Chand, Khartoum, 18 Rizeigat militia such as the Al Fursan its recent escalation in the post-CPA November 2007. Forces from Ed Daien in Darfur and the period is a bad omen, not only for 15 See Small Arms Survey (2008). Fertit forces from Wau in Bahr el Ghazal. long-term implementation of the CPA 16 Assessment and Evaluation Commission The relationship between the PDF and (2007), p. 62. tribal militias has been relatively fluid but also for the security of communi- 17 Interview with Gabriel Tang-Ginya, over the years; they have worked along- ties across Sudan. Khartoum, 20 November 2007. side one another, as well as maintaining 18 Assessment and Evaluation Commission separate identities. See Salmon (2007), (2007), p. 62. p. 14. 19 As of March 2008, SAF had deployed 43 A UN Development Programme (UNDP) Notes 44,952 troops from South Sudan (including source interviewed on 6 March 2008 indi- This Issue Brief was based on research by 8,919 voluntarily demobilized soldiers), cated that PDF badges had been collected 97.8 per cent of the number originally on the battlefield and that the bodies of Matthew Arnold and Matthew LeRiche. stated to be located there. UNMIS had senior SAF and PDF officers were found, Matthew Arnold is a Ph.D. candidate at verified 10,490 SAF in South Sudan as both in December 2007 and in the last the London School of Economics; Matthew part of the JIUs; this will eventually rise week of February 2008. Fighting in Meirem LeRiche is a Ph.D. candidate at King’s to 12,000 (UNMIS, 2008, pp. 29, 31). was reported by the Area Joint Monitor- 20 Arnold (2007), p. 494. ing Committee (AJMC) Meeting Decision College London. 21 Interview with UNMIS monitor, Juba, Points. 14 November 2007. 44 Interestingly, the pro-Khartoum Peace and 1 See Small Arms Survey (2006a). 22 Interview with UNMIS monitor, Khartoum, Development Defence Force (Misseriya 2 See Small Arms Survey (2006b). 5 March 2008. Brigade) under Col. Hassan Deng, claim- 3 See Small Arms Survey (2006b). 23 Anyanya 2 refers to various rebel groups ing 1,100 troops, reportedly did not par- 4 See CPA, Chapter 6, Annexure I, Section who were opposing the GoS by force at the ticipate in the fighting. UNMIS Sector 6 11.3, page 100. Full text available at www.smallarmssurvey.org/sudan 7 45 The body established to oversee OAG —— and Chris Alden. 2007. ‘This Gun is Our mentation.’ 25 August. HSBA project summary The Sudan Human Security Baseline Assessment Pool, the Danish International Development Agency (HSBA) is a three-year research project (2005–08) (Danida), and the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. administered by the Small Arms Survey. It has been developed in cooperation with the Canadian Depart- ment of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, the UN Credits Mission in Sudan, the UN Development Programme, and a Series editor: Emile LeBrun wide array of international and Sudanese NGO partners. Design and layout: Richard Jones (rick studioexile.com) Through the active generation and dissemination of timely @ empirical research, the HSBA project works to support dis- Cartography: Jillie Luff, MAPgrafix armament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR), secu- rity sector reform (SSR), and arms control interventions to promote security. The assessment is being carried out by a Contact details multidisciplinary team of regional, security, and public health For more information or to provide feedback, contact specialists. It reviews the spatial distribution of armed vio- Claire Mc Evoy, HSBA project coordinator, at lence throughout Sudan and offers policy-relevant advice [email protected] to redress insecurity. Sudan Issue Briefs are designed to provide periodic snap- Sudan Human Security Baseline Assessment shots of baseline information. Future briefs will focus on a Small Arms Survey variety of issues, including the militarization of the Nuba 47 Avenue Blanc mountains region of South Kordofan. The HSBA also generates 1202 Geneva a series of timely and user-friendly working papers in English Switzerland and Arabic, available at www.smallarmssurvey.org/sudan. Tel.: +41 22 908 5777 The HSBA project is supported the Global Peace and Fax: +41 22 732 2738 Security Fund at Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, the UK Government Global Conflict Prevention Visit www.smallarmssurvey.org/sudan 8 Sudan Issue Brief Number 116 AprilMay 20082007