DOCSLIB.ORG

The Fragmentation of Darfur's Rebel Groups

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
The Fragmentation of Darfur's Rebel Groups 6 Divided They Fall: The Fragmentation of Darfur’s Rebel Groups By Victor Tanner and Jérôme Tubiana Copyright The Small Arms Survey Published in Switzerland by the Small Arms Survey The Small Arms Survey is an independent research project located at the Grad- uate Institute of International Studies in Geneva, Switzerland. Established in © Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva 2007 1999, the project is supported by the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, First published in July 2007 and by sustained contributions from the Governments of Belgium, Canada, Finland, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. The All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a Survey is also grateful for past and current project support received from the retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior Governments of Australia, Denmark, France, Germany, New Zealand, and the permission in writing of the Small Arms Survey, or as expressly permitted by United States, as well as from different United Nations agencies, programmes, law, or under terms agreed with the appropriate reprographics rights organi- and institutes. zation. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the above should be sent to the Publications Manager, Small Arms Survey, at the address below. The objectives of the Small Arms Survey are: to be the principal source of pub- lic information on all aspects of small arms and armed violence; to serve as a Small Arms Survey resource centre for governments, policy-makers, researchers, and activists; Graduate Institute of International Studies to monitor national and international initiatives (governmental and non- 47 Avenue Blanc, 1202 Geneva, Switzerland governmental) on small arms; to support efforts to address the effects of small Copyedited by Michael Griffin arms proliferation and misuse; and to act as a clearinghouse for the sharing of information and the dissemination of best practices. The Survey also sponsors Cartography by MAPgrafix field research and information-gathering efforts, especially in affected states Typeset in Optima and Palatino by Richard Jones, Exile: Design & Editorial and regions. The project has an international staff with expertise in security Services ([email protected]) studies, political science, law, economics, development studies, and sociology, and collaborates with a network of researchers, partner institutions, non- Printed by nbmedia in Geneva, Switzerland governmental organizations, and governments in more than 50 countries. ISBN 2-8288-0083-0 Small Arms Survey Graduate Institute of International Studies 47 Avenue Blanc, 1202 Geneva, Switzerland Phone: +41 22 908 5777 Fax: +41 22 732 2738 Email: [email protected] Web site: www.smallarmssurvey.org 2 Small Arms Survey HSBA Working Paper 6 Tanner and Tubiana Divided They Fall 3 The Human Security Baseline Assessment Contents The Sudan Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA) is a multi-year research Acronyms and abbreviations ................................................................................................................................................. 7 project (2005–08) administered by the Small Arms Survey. It has been devel- About the authors ...................................................................................................................................................................................... 8 oped in cooperation with the Canadian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), the UN Development Programme, and a wide array Acknowledgements ................................................................................................................................................................................ 9 of international and Sudanese NGO partners. Through the active generation and dissemination of timely empirical research, the HSBA project works to A note on transliteration from Arabic ................................................................................................................... 10 support disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR), security sector Abstract ..................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 11 reform (SSR), and arms control interventions to promote security. I. Historical roots of the Darfur insurgency ................................................................................................ 13 The HSBA is being carried out by a multidisciplinary team of regional, security, Marginalization and resistance in Darfur ......................................................................................................... 13 and public health specialists. It reviews the spatial distribution of armed vio- lence throughout Sudan and offers policy-relevant advice to redress insecurity. A time of growing violence (1987–2002) ............................................................................................................. 14 HSBA Working Papers are timely and user-friendly reports on current research II. The Sudan Liberation Army before the Abuja peace talks ................................. 17 activities in English and Arabic. Future papers will focus on a variety of issues, Early efforts and the Darfur Liberation Front ........................................................................................... 17 including victimization and perceptions of security, armed groups, and local Seeking support outside Darfur ....................................................................................................................................... 20 security arrangements. The project also generates a series of Issue Briefs. From all-out war to the DPA (2003–05) ................................................................................................................. 23 The HSBA project is supported by Canada, the UK Government Conflict Pre- III. The Justice and Equality Movement vention Pool, and the Danish International Development Agency (Danida). before the Abuja peace talks .............................................................................................................................................. 31 For more information contact: Punching above its weight ........................................................................................................................................................ 31 The Turabi link .............................................................................................................................................................................................. 31 Claire Mc Evoy HSBA Project Coordinator Ethnic politics .................................................................................................................................................................................................. 34 Small Arms Survey, 47 Avenue Blanc A national programme ..................................................................................................................................................................... 35 1202 Geneva, Switzerland Relations between the JEM and the SLA ............................................................................................................. 35 E-mail: [email protected] IV. Tactics of the SLA and the JEM ........................................................................................................................... 37 Web site: www.smallarmssurvey.org (click on Sudan) Military tactics ................................................................................................................................................................................................ 37 HSBA Working Paper series editor: Emile LeBrun Popular support .......................................................................................................................................................................................... 37 4 Small Arms Survey HSBA Working Paper 6 Tanner and Tubiana Divided They Fall 5 V. Abuja and the withering of SLA-Minni .................................................................................................. 40 Acronyms and abbreviations The Darfur Peace Agreement ................................................................................................................................................ 40 SLA-Minni: hurtling towards irrelevance ........................................................................................................ 40 Other pro-DPA groups: GoS proxy militias? ................................................................................................ 45 VI. Non-signatory groups ......................................................................................................................................................... 48 CFC Ceasefire Commission CPA Comprehensive Peace Agreement Non-signatory SLA factions .................................................................................................................................................... 48 DLF Darfur Liberation Front The JEM after Abuja ............................................................................................................................................................................. 51 DPA
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Darfur Genocide
    Darfur genocide Berkeley Model United Nations Welcome Letter Hi everyone! Welcome to the Darfur Historical Crisis committee. My name is Laura Nguyen and I will be your head chair for BMUN 69. This committee will take place from roughly 2006 to 2010. Although we will all be in the same physical chamber, you can imagine that committee is an amalgamation of peace conferences, UN meetings, private Janjaweed or SLM meetings, etc. with the goal of preventing the Darfur Genocide and ending the War in Darfur. To be honest, I was initially wary of choosing the genocide in Darfur as this committee’s topic; people in Darfur. I also understood that in order for this to be educationally stimulating for you all, some characters who committed atrocious war crimes had to be included in debate. That being said, I chose to move on with this topic because I trust you are all responsible and intelligent, and that you will treat Darfur with respect. The War in Darfur and the ensuing genocide are grim reminders of the violence that is easily born from intolerance. Equally regrettable are the in Africa and the Middle East are woefully inadequate for what Darfur truly needs. I hope that understanding those failures and engaging with the ways we could’ve avoided them helps you all grow and become better leaders and thinkers. My best advice for you is to get familiar with the historical processes by which ethnic brave, be creative, and have fun! A little bit about me (she/her) — I’m currently a third-year at Cal majoring in Sociology and minoring in Data Science.
    [Show full text]
  • CHAPTER ONE Introduction 1.0 Overview: the Term Daju Or Dadjo
    CHAPTER ONE Introduction 1.0 Overview: The term Daju or Dadjo in French is the most widely used name the Daju people use it to refer to themselves linguistically "bike" means Daju in Daju language. Historically the name comes from Ahmad el-Daj as they believe. The Daju People are a group of several distinct ethnicities speaking related languages living on both sides of the Chad-Sudan border and in the Nuba Mountains. Separated by distance and speaking different dialects. Daju people have come from the mountains of Fazoghli; South of Sennar and settled in a long belt stretching from South Kurdufan westward through Darfur and into Chad. It is assumed that, Daju came originally from the North of Africa, having been expelled from that part of Africa to Darfur. The traditional locations of the Daju were at one time the predominant race in central Darfur, the earliest known founders of a monarchy there, and that they were supplanted by the Tunjur about the sixteenth century and they came from the east and were joined in Darfur by the African Beygo from the South-east and that the Beygo borrowed the language of the Daju. Another point of view, that Daju has lived for at least a century in the West. Their settlement ranged from Tagali to Wadai and tell stories that indicate they came from the East (e.g. Gebel Qedir ). They first attained power during the fifteenth century in Darfur. From the rise of the Tungur until the present day their central point was in Darsila, and most likely the Kordofan colony originated there.
    [Show full text]
  • Unpacking Ethnic Stacking: the Uses and Abuses of Security Force Ethnicity in Sudan
    Unpacking Ethnic Stacking: The Uses and Abuses of Security Force Ethnicity in Sudan Nathaniel Allen National Defense University June 2019 1 Abstract African elites commonly recruit co-ethnic soldiers into state security institutions, a practice known as ethnic stacking. Ethnic stacking has recently received considerable attention from scholars and been linked to an array of outcomes, including repression, high levels of political violence and poor democratization outcomes. This article employs evidence from Sudan under Omar Al Bashir to argue that ethnic stacking is not one coherent tactic but several, and that its effects are mediated by the processes through which security force institutions are ethnically stacked. Within the leadership of state security institutions, ethnic stacking in Sudan served as a coup-proofing measure to ensure that leaders bound by ties of kinship and trust maintain oversight over the most sensitive functions of the security apparatus. In Sudan’s militia groups, ethnic stacking of militia groups and rank-and-file soldiers was used as a means of warfare and repression by altering overall composition of security forces with respect to the civilian population. The militia strategy itself was a product of the failure of the regime’s traditional security forces to function as effective counterinsurgents, and, by keeping the periphery of the country in a near-constant state of conflict, prolonged Bashir’s regime. World Count: 9,816 words Keywords: Ethnicity, Sudan, civil-military relations, civil wars, coups 2 Introduction For thirty years, Sudan was ruled by Al Bashir, an army officer who was the longest serving leader of the longest running regime in Sudanese history.
    [Show full text]
  • How to Implement Sudan's New Peace Agreement
    The Rebels Come to Khartoum: How to Implement Sudan’s New Peace Agreement Crisis Group Africa Briefing N°168 Khartoum/Nairobi/Brussels, 23 February 2021 What’s new? A peace agreement signed on 3 October 2020 paves the way for armed and unarmed opposition groups in Sudan to join the transitional government, dra- matically expanding representation of the country’s peripheries during the interim period before elections. The two most powerful rebel movements remain outside the accord, however. Why does it matter? Clinching the agreement was necessary for the country’s transition but implementation poses challenges. The agreement risks bloating the military and sets up a prospective political alliance between the rebels and Sudanese security forces, which could further sideline the government’s civilian cabinet and threaten to bury its reform agenda. What should be done? The interim government should negotiate with holdout rebels to bring them into the transition. Sudan’s international partners should press for security sector reform that decreases the size and political dominance of a newly expanded military while funding and supporting the authorities’ spending commit- ments in the peripheries. I. Overview Sudan’s October 2020 peace agreement, involving the interim government and rebel movements in Darfur and the Two Areas, among others, is an important step in the country’s transition after the ouster of former President Omar al-Bashir. The deal allows for representatives from armed groups in the country’s peripheries to take government posts and for significant public money to go to these areas. It is a way to rebalance the Nile Valley elites’ decades-long domination of Sudan’s political system.
    [Show full text]
  • Darfur and the Battle for Khartoum
    Institute for Security Studies Situation Report Date Issued: 04 September 2006 Author: Mariam Bibi Jooma1 Distribution: General Contact: [email protected] Darfur and the Battle for Khartoum Sudan’s western region of Darfur has frequently featured in the headlines since Introduction the outbreak of major violence there in 2003. Indeed, it often seemed that international interest would remain focused upon Darfur, given the scale of human suffering and the immensity of the challenges facing the African Union’s (AU) peacekeeping operations in that vast area. It was little surprise, then, that the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) on 5 May this year between the Government of Sudan and the Minni Arkoi Minnawi faction of the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) was greeted with such relief in the media. Developments since the signing of the DPA, however, suggest that the political commitment to implementing its terms remains extremely weak, and there is a continued polarisation of affected ethnic communities, particularly within displacement camps, sometimes with fatal consequences. This has happened despite the appointment on 7 August of Minni Arkoi Minnawi, as the Special Assistant to the Sudanese President. Moreover, the period between May and July 2006 has seen the highest number of fatalities among aid workers since the beginning of 2003.2 This is quite aside from the continuing killing of Darfurians on a daily basis. In this unpredictable environment, the local population has become increasingly cynical of the potential peacekeeping role of the African Union Mission (AMIS) deployed to observe the implementation of the 2004 ceasefire agreement. A growing number of fatalities suffered by AMIS troops themselves in Darfur suggests that the African Union’s role as mediator and guarantor for the implementation of the DPA is being overtly challenged.
    [Show full text]
  • The Chad–Sudan Proxy War and the 'Darfurization' of Chad: Myths and Reality
    12 The Chad–Sudan Proxy War and the ‘Darfurization’ of Chad: Myths and Reality By Jérôme Tubiana Copyright The Small Arms Survey Published in Switzerland by the Small Arms Survey The Small Arms Survey is an independent research project located at the Grad- uate Institute of International Studies in Geneva, Switzerland. It serves as the © Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva 2008 principal source of public information on all aspects of small arms and as a First published in April 2008 resource centre for governments, policy-makers, researchers, and activists. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a Established in 1999, the project is supported by the Swiss Federal Department retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior of Foreign Affairs, and by contributions from the Governments of Belgium, permission in writing of the Small Arms Survey, or as expressly permitted by Canada, Finland, France, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and the UK. The law, or under terms agreed with the appropriate reprographics rights organi- Survey is also grateful for past and current project-specific support received zation. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the above should from Australia, Denmark, and New Zealand. Further funding has been pro- be sent to the Publications Manager, Small Arms Survey, at the address below. vided by the United Nations Development Programme, the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, the Geneva International Academic Net- Small Arms Survey work, and the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining. The Graduate Institute of International Studies Small Arms Survey collaborates with research institutes and NGOs in many 47 Avenue Blanc, 1202 Geneva, Switzerland countries, including Brazil, Canada, Georgia, Germany, India, Israel, Jordan, Copyedited by Emily Walmsley Norway, the Russian Federation, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Sweden, Thailand, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
    [Show full text]
  • 04-10-06 DPA.Indd
    Institute for Security Studies Situation Report Date Issued: 04 September 2006 Author: Mariam Bibi Jooma1 Distribution: General Contact: [email protected] Darfur and the Battle for Khartoum Sudan’s western region of Darfur has frequently featured in the headlines since Introduction the outbreak of major violence there in 2003. Indeed, it often seemed that international interest would remain focused upon Darfur, given the scale of human suffering and the immensity of the challenges facing the African Union’s (AU) peacekeeping operations in that vast area. It was little surprise, then, that the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) on 5 May this year between the Government of Sudan and the Minni Arkoi Minnawi faction of the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) was greeted with such relief in the media. Developments since the signing of the DPA, however, suggest that the political commitment to implementing its terms remains extremely weak, and there is a continued polarisation of affected ethnic communities, particularly within displacement camps, sometimes with fatal consequences. This has happened despite the appointment on 7 August of Minni Arkoi Minnawi, as the Special Assistant to the Sudanese President. Moreover, the period between May and July 2006 has seen the highest number of fatalities among aid workers since the beginning of 2003.2 This is quite aside from the continuing killing of Darfurians on a daily basis. In this unpredictable environment, the local population has become increasingly cynical of the potential peacekeeping role of the African Union Mission (AMIS) deployed to observe the implementation of the 2004 ceasefire agreement. A growing number of fatalities suffered by AMIS troops themselves in Darfur suggests that the African Union’s role as mediator and guarantor for the implementation of the DPA is being overtly challenged.
    [Show full text]
  • Allies and Defectors an Update on Armed Group Integration and Proxy Force Activity
    sudanHuman Security Baseline Assessment issue brief Small Arms Survey Number 11 May 2008 Allies and defectors An update on armed group integration and proxy force activity ribal groups, pastoralists, para- Groups (OAGs) into the SPLA1 and This is likely to continue at least militaries, and SPLA splinter post-CPA violence between armed until the referendum on South Suda- factions, among other armed groups and SPLA forces during civilian nese independence in 2011. T 2 entities, were key combatants in the disarmament campaigns. The current second Sudanese civil war as allies of Brief updates the state of knowledge the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) or about the status of armed groups in ‘Other Armed Groups’ in the Sudan People’s Liberation Army South Sudan as of March 2008, and (SPLA). Under the terms of the Com- focuses on the lingering problems that context prehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) of they pose, the challenges remaining to The term ‘armed group’ is considerably 2005, these groups, many of which their dissolution and demobilization, elastic in the Sudanese context. Through- had deep roots in local political, ethnic, and their possible impact on CPA imple- out the second Sudanese civil war and economic conflicts in South Sudan, mentation. It finds that: (1983–2005), tribal groups, pastoralists, were suddenly required to disband paramilitaries, and other collectives and their members to join the SAF, the The South Sudan Defence Forces played a significant role; many acted SPLA, or one of a small number of (SSDF), by far the most threatening as proxy forces and waged much of the government institutions.
    [Show full text]
  • No. ICC-02/05-02/09 24 September 2009 1 Original
    ICC-02/05-02/09-91-Red 25-09-2009 1/33 EO PT Original: English No .: ICC-02/05-02/09 Date: 24 September 2009 PRE-TRIAL CHAMBER I Before: Judge Sylvia Steiner, Presiding Judge Judge Sanji Mmasenono Monageng Judge Cuno Tarfusser SITUATION IN DARFUR, THE SUDAN IN THE CASE OF THE PROSECUTOR V. BAHAR IDRISS ABU GARDA Public Redacted Version of Prosecution’s “DOCUMENT CONTAINING THE CHARGES SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 61(3) OF THE STATUTE” filed on 10 September 2009 Source: Office of the Prosecutor No. ICC-02/05-02/09 1 24 September 2009 ICC-02/05-02/09-91-Red 25-09-2009 2/33 EO PT Document to be notified in accordance with regulation 31 of the Regulations of the Court to: The Office of the Prosecutor Counsel for the Defence Karim A. A. Khan Legal Representatives of Victims Legal Representatives of Applicants Unrepresented Victims Unrepresented Applicants for Participation/Reparation The Office of Public Counsel for Victims The Office of Public Counsel for the Defence States Representatives Amicus Curiae REGISTRY Registrar Defence Support Section Ms Silvana Arbia Victims and Witnesses Unit Detention Section Victims Participation and Reparations Other Section No. ICC-02/05-02/09 2 24 September 2009 ICC-02/05-02/09-91-Red 25-09-2009 3/33 EO PT I. THE PERSON CHARGED................................................................................................................ 5 II. STATEMENT OF FACTS .................................................................................................................... 6 A. BACKGROUND ................................................................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • The Phonology and Morphology of the Dar Daju Daju Language
    THE PHONOLOGY AND MORPHOLOGY OF THE DAR DAJU DAJU LANGUAGE by Arthur J. Aviles Bachelor of Arts, Moody Bible Institute 1997 A Thesis Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the University of North Dakota in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts Grand Forks, North Dakota December 2008 This thesis, submitted by Arthur J. Aviles in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts from the University of North Dakota, has been read by the Faculty Advisory Committee under whom the work has been done and is hereby approved. ___________________________________ Chairperson ___________________________________ ___________________________________ This thesis meets the standards for appearance, conforms to the style and format requirements of the Graduate School of the University of North Dakota, and is hereby approved. __________________________________ Dean of the Graduate School __________________________________ Date ii PERMISSION Title The Phonology and Morphology of the Dar Daju Daju Language Department Linguistics Degree Master of Arts In presenting this thesis in partial fulfillment of the requirements for a graduate degree from the University of North Dakota, I agree that the library of this University shall make it freely available for inspection. I further agree that permission for extensive copying for scholarly purposes may be granted by the professor who supervised my thesis work or, in his absence, by the chairperson of the department or the dean of the Graduate School. It is understood that any copying or publication or other use of this thesis or part thereof for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission. It is also understood that due recognition shall be given to me and to the University of North Dakota in any scholarly use which may be made of any material in my thesis.
    [Show full text]
  • Chad: a New Conflict Resolution Framework
    CHAD: A NEW CONFLICT RESOLUTION FRAMEWORK Africa Report N°144 – 24 September 2008 TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS.................................................I I. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................... 1 II. A CRISIS OF THE STATE ........................................................................................... 2 A. 1990-2000: MISSED OPPORTUNITIES FOR RECONCILIATION......................................................2 B. OIL, CLIENTELISM AND CORRUPTION........................................................................................3 1. Clientelism and generalised corruption ..............................................................................3 2. The oil curse .......................................................................................................................4 C. MILITARISATION OF THE ADMINISTRATION AND POPULATION ..................................................5 D. NATIONAL AND RELIGIOUS DIVIDES .........................................................................................6 III. THE ACTORS IN THE CRISIS................................................................................... 8 A. THE POLITICAL OPPOSITION .....................................................................................................8 1. Repression and co-option ...................................................................................................8 2. The political platform of
    [Show full text]
  • Sudan's North
    Concordis International Sudan Report September 2010 MORE THAN A LINE: SUDAN’S NORTH - SOUTH BORDER SEPTEMBER 2010 02 Concordis International Sudan Report Contents Contents 04 Acknowledgements 50 Abyei 1.1 Snapshot Summary 1.2 Conflict Drivers 05 Glossary 1.2.1 National Political Context 1.2.2 Border Demarcation and the 08 Executive Summary Abyei Referendum 1.1 General Findings 1.2.3 Physical Demarcation 1.2 Thematic Findings 1.2.4 Land 1.3 Conflict Prone Areas 1.2.5 Militarisation 14 Introduction 1.3.6 Additional Factors 1.1 General Findings 1.4 Conflict Management 1.2 Thematic Findings 1.3 Conflict Prone Areas 67 Southern Kordofan/Unity 1.1 Snapshot Summary 28 South Darfur-Western Bahr al Ghazal 1.2 Conflict Drivers 1.1 Snapshot Summary 1.2.1 Transhumance 1.2 Conflict Drivers 1.2.2 Political Marginalisation 1.2.1 Border demarcation 1.2.3 Hardening Conflict Memory 1.2.2 Militarisation 1.2.4 Land/Oil and Demarcation 1.2.3 SPLA-Rezeigat Clashes 1.2.5 Community Land 1.2.4 Other Armed Groups 1.2.6 Militarisation 1.2.5 Wider Regional Instability 1.2.7 Community Conflict Management 1.2.6 Conflict Trends 1.3 Conflict Trends and Mitigation 1.3 Conflict Mitigation 79 Southern Kordofan 38 South Darfur-Northern Bahr al Ghazal 1.1 Snapshot Summary 1.1 Snapshot Summary 1.2 Conflict Drivers 1.2 Conflict Drivers 1.2.1 National Political Context 1.2.1 Contested Rights Along the 1.2.2 Land Grazing Area 1.2.3 Socio-economic Underdevelopment 1.2.2 Transportation of Arms 1.2.4 Integration of Adminstration 1.2.3 Militarisation 1.2.5 Security Integration and
    [Show full text]