Darfur Genocide

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Darfur genocide

Berkeley Model United Nations

Welcome Letter

Hi everyone!
Welcome to the Darfur Historical Crisis committee. My name is Laura Nguyen and I will be your head chair for BMUN 69. This committee will take place from roughly 2006 to 2010. Although we will all be in the same physical chamber, you can imagine that committee is an amalgamation of peace conferences, UN meetings, private Janjaweed or SLM meetings, etc. with the goal of preventing the Darfur Genocide and ending the War in Darfur.
To be honest, I was initially wary of choosing the genocide in Darfur as this committee’s topic;

ꢀꢁꢂꢃꢂꢄꢅꢆꢁꢇꢈꢄꢆꢁꢉꢊꢋꢋꢃꢆꢆꢌꢌꢁꢆꢊꢁꢍꢎꢃꢏꢈꢐꢁꢊꢑꢆꢁꢊꢒꢁꢉꢊꢄꢆꢏꢊꢐꢁꢊꢏꢁꢂꢃꢍꢏꢌꢍꢎꢌꢉꢆꢁꢆꢓꢌꢁꢓꢊꢏꢏꢃꢔꢉꢁꢌꢕꢎꢌꢏꢃꢌꢄꢉꢌꢍꢁꢊꢒꢁꢆꢓꢊꢑꢍꢈꢄꢂꢍꢁꢊꢒꢁ

people in Darfur. I also understood that in order for this to be educationally stimulating for you all, some characters who committed atrocious war crimes had to be included in debate.
That being said, I chose to move on with this topic because I trust you are all responsible and intelligent, and that you will treat Darfur with respect. The War in Darfur and the ensuing genocide are grim reminders of the violence that is easily born from intolerance. Equally regrettable are the

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in Africa and the Middle East are woefully inadequate for what Darfur truly needs. I hope that understanding those failures and engaging with the ways we could’ve avoided them helps you all grow and become better leaders and thinkers.
My best advice for you is to get familiar with the historical processes by which ethnic

ꢚꢊꢑꢄꢂꢈꢏꢃꢌꢍꢙꢁꢝꢃꢊꢐꢌꢄꢉꢌꢙꢁꢈꢄꢂꢁꢕꢌꢄꢊꢎꢓꢊꢚꢃꢈꢁꢂꢌꢝꢌꢐꢊꢎꢌꢂꢁꢃꢄꢁꢞꢈꢏꢒꢑꢏꢟꢁꢠꢐꢍꢊꢙꢁꢎꢐꢌꢈꢍꢌꢁꢚꢌꢁꢉꢈꢏꢌꢒꢑꢐꢁꢆꢊꢁꢈꢝꢊꢃꢂꢁ ꢂꢌꢍꢌꢄꢍꢃꢆꢃꢡꢃꢄꢢꢁꢊꢏꢁꢋꢈꢛꢃꢄꢢꢁꢐꢃꢢꢓꢆꢁꢊꢒꢁꢎꢌꢊꢎꢐꢌꢅꢍꢁꢌꢕꢎꢌꢏꢃꢌꢄꢉꢌꢍꢁꢇꢃꢆꢓꢁꢇꢈꢏꢁꢈꢄꢂꢁꢢꢌꢄꢊꢉꢃꢂꢌꢟꢁꢠꢄꢂꢁꢊꢒꢁꢉꢊꢑꢏꢍꢌꢙꢁꢚꢌꢁ

brave, be creative, and have fun! A little bit about me (she/her) — I’m currently a third-year at Cal majoring in Sociology and minoring in Data Science. I care about the ways that justice, human rights, and data intersect. This is my seventh year in MUN (wow!) and third year in BMUN. Outside of BMUN, I’ve written for the Daily Californian and community organized with the Cal ACLU. Right now, I work for Planned Parenthood Advocacy Fund and do undergraduate research on reproductive justice. In my free time, I love to write, make quirky Spotify playlists, and harass my co-chairs. You can read more about them below!

BERKELEY MODEL UNITED NATIONS

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  • ꢣꢈꢏꢈꢄꢁꢖꢆꢓꢈꢘꢈꢛꢑꢋꢈꢏꢁꢤꢓꢌꢥꢆꢓꢌꢋꢦꢁꢃꢍꢁꢃꢄꢁꢓꢃꢍꢁꢔꢄꢈꢐꢁꢘꢌꢈꢏꢁꢈꢆꢁꢖꢧꢁꢨꢌꢏꢛꢌꢐꢌꢘꢁꢇꢏꢃꢆꢃꢄꢢꢁꢓꢃꢍꢁꢩꢃꢍꢆꢊꢏꢘꢁꢆꢓꢌꢍꢃꢍꢁꢊꢄꢁ

communal justice courts in Rwanda following the genocide. He concentrates on 1990s human rights history, and hopes to apply historical knowledge to restructure judicial approaches towards forms of

ꢏꢌꢍꢆꢊꢏꢈꢆꢃꢝꢌꢁꢪꢑꢍꢆꢃꢉꢌꢟꢁꢫꢓꢃꢍꢁꢇꢃꢐꢐꢁꢚꢌꢁꢓꢃꢍꢁꢍꢌꢝꢌꢄꢆꢓꢁꢘꢌꢈꢏꢁꢊꢒꢁꢬꢊꢂꢌꢐꢁꢖꢗꢟꢁꢭꢑꢆꢍꢃꢂꢌꢁꢊꢒꢁꢨꢬꢖꢗꢙꢁꢘꢊꢑꢁꢉꢈꢄꢁꢔꢄꢂꢁꢓꢃꢋꢁ

supporting clients as a grievance caseworker or listening to Donald Glover while picking out nice curtains. He also indulges in hummus in his free time.
Ryan Fiorito (he/him) is a third-year at Cal studying Political Science and Psychology. He believes that there is an intersection between behavioral psychology and political ideologies, and

ꢇꢈꢄꢆꢍꢁꢆꢊꢁꢚꢌꢆꢆꢌꢏꢁꢑꢄꢂꢌꢏꢍꢆꢈꢄꢂꢁꢓꢊꢇꢁꢆꢓꢌꢘꢁꢃꢄꢜꢑꢌꢄꢉꢌꢁꢌꢈꢉꢓꢁꢊꢆꢓꢌꢏꢟꢁꢫꢓꢃꢍꢁꢇꢃꢐꢐꢁꢚꢌꢁꢓꢃꢍꢁꢍꢌꢝꢌꢄꢆꢓꢁꢘꢌꢈꢏꢁꢊꢒꢁꢬꢊꢂꢌꢐꢁꢖꢗꢟꢁ

Besides BMUN, Ryan is in an international relations fraternity and acts a fool for two improv teams,

ꢈꢄꢂꢁꢘꢊꢑꢁꢉꢈꢄꢁꢊꢒꢆꢌꢄꢁꢔꢄꢂꢁꢓꢃꢋꢁꢒꢏꢌꢮꢑꢌꢄꢆꢃꢄꢢꢁꢆꢓꢏꢃꢒꢆꢁꢍꢆꢊꢏꢌꢍꢙꢁꢎꢏꢈꢉꢆꢃꢉꢃꢄꢢꢁꢚꢏꢊꢛꢌꢄꢁꢯꢏꢌꢄꢉꢓꢙꢁꢈꢄꢂꢁꢆꢈꢛꢃꢄꢢꢁꢉꢈꢏꢌꢁꢊꢒꢁꢓꢃꢍꢁ

many, many plant babies. He also loves talking smack about our head chair, Laura, to her face.
Deepak Ragu (he/him) is a second-year at UC Berkeley double majoring in Computer Science and Political Science, and loves the intersection of technology, politics, and crisis committees. This

ꢃꢍꢁꢓꢃꢍꢁꢍꢌꢝꢌꢄꢆꢓꢁꢘꢌꢈꢏꢁꢊꢒꢁꢬꢊꢂꢌꢐꢁꢖꢗꢰꢁꢓꢃꢍꢁꢎꢈꢍꢆꢁꢌꢕꢎꢌꢏꢃꢌꢄꢉꢌꢁꢆꢏꢈꢝꢌꢐꢃꢄꢢꢁꢆꢊꢙꢁꢎꢈꢏꢆꢃꢉꢃꢎꢈꢆꢃꢄꢢꢁꢃꢄꢙꢁꢈꢍꢁꢇꢌꢐꢐꢁꢈꢍꢁꢏꢑꢄꢄꢃꢄꢢꢁ

MUN conferences has fostered his passion for international politics. He looks forward to passing

ꢊꢄꢁꢓꢃꢍꢁꢌꢕꢎꢌꢏꢃꢌꢄꢉꢌꢁꢆꢊꢁꢘꢊꢑꢙꢁꢆꢓꢌꢁꢒꢑꢆꢑꢏꢌꢁꢐꢌꢈꢂꢌꢏꢍꢁꢊꢒꢁꢆꢓꢃꢍꢁꢇꢊꢏꢐꢂꢱꢁꢭꢑꢆꢍꢃꢂꢌꢁꢊꢒꢁꢨꢬꢖꢗꢙꢁꢞꢌꢌꢎꢈꢛꢁꢍꢌꢏꢝꢌꢍꢁꢈꢍꢁꢁꢆꢓꢌꢁ ꢲꢕꢆꢌꢏꢄꢈꢐꢁꢳꢴꢁꢊꢒꢁꢣꢃꢢꢋꢈꢁꢠꢐꢎꢓꢈꢁꢗꢑꢙꢁꢈꢁꢎꢏꢌꢵꢐꢈꢇꢁꢒꢏꢈꢆꢌꢏꢄꢃꢆꢘꢙꢁꢈꢄꢂꢁꢃꢄꢆꢌꢄꢂꢍꢁꢊꢄꢁꢌꢝꢌꢄꢆꢑꢈꢐꢐꢘꢁꢈꢆꢆꢌꢄꢂꢃꢄꢢꢁꢐꢈꢇꢁꢍꢉꢓꢊꢊꢐꢟꢁ

In his free time, he loves to play Yu-Gi-Oh!, watch BTS meme videos, and get babied by the rest of his dais.

  • ꢬꢈꢂꢂꢘꢁꢶꢈꢄꢢꢁꢤꢍꢓꢌꢥꢓꢌꢏꢦꢁꢃꢍꢁꢈꢁꢔꢏꢍꢆꢵꢘꢌꢈꢏꢁꢈꢆꢁꢖꢧꢁꢨꢌꢏꢛꢌꢐꢌꢘꢁꢂꢊꢑꢚꢐꢌꢁꢋꢈꢪꢊꢏꢃꢄꢢꢁꢃꢄꢁꢴꢑꢚꢐꢃꢉꢁꢩꢌꢈꢐꢆꢓꢁꢈꢄꢂꢁ

ꢞꢈꢆꢈꢁꢣꢉꢃꢌꢄꢉꢌꢁꢈꢍꢁꢈꢁꢋꢌꢈꢄꢍꢁꢆꢊꢁꢔꢄꢂꢁꢈꢄꢁꢃꢋꢎꢈꢉꢆꢒꢑꢐꢁꢃꢄꢆꢌꢏꢍꢌꢉꢆꢃꢊꢄꢁꢚꢌꢆꢇꢌꢌꢄꢁꢓꢌꢈꢐꢆꢓꢉꢈꢏꢌꢁꢈꢄꢂꢁꢆꢌꢉꢓꢄꢊꢐꢊꢢꢘꢟꢁꢣꢓꢌꢁꢃꢍꢁ

particularly passionate about the organ donation aspect of healthcare, hoping to bridge disciplines of data analysis and technology to decrease the number of people on the waitlist for transplants.

ꢫꢓꢃꢍꢁꢃꢍꢁꢓꢌꢏꢁꢔꢒꢆꢓꢁꢘꢌꢈꢏꢁꢊꢒꢁꢬꢊꢂꢌꢐꢁꢖꢗꢟꢁꢠꢍꢃꢂꢌꢁꢒꢏꢊꢋꢁꢨꢬꢖꢗꢙꢁꢬꢈꢂꢂꢘꢁꢃꢍꢁꢊꢄꢁꢆꢓꢌꢁꢧꢈꢐꢁꢲꢮꢑꢌꢍꢆꢏꢃꢈꢄꢁꢆꢌꢈꢋꢁꢈꢄꢂꢁ

has been competing since she was 13 years old. She also loves listening to music, scrolling through Pinterest, and trying out new places to eat!
The Darfur Crisis committee will run according to BMUN crisis procedure. You can read more about crisis procedure here and send us an email at [email protected] if you have any questions about the topic, procedure, or committee. One more thing: Don’t forget to regularly check your

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ꢌꢋꢈꢃꢐꢍꢁꢒꢊꢏꢁꢑꢎꢂꢈꢆꢌꢍꢁꢊꢄꢁꢎꢊꢍꢃꢆꢃꢊꢄꢁꢎꢈꢎꢌꢏꢍꢁꢈꢄꢂꢁꢊꢑꢏꢁꢚꢐꢊꢢꢟꢁꢶꢌꢁꢈꢏꢌꢁꢈꢐꢐꢁꢍꢊꢁꢌꢕꢉꢃꢆꢌꢂꢁꢆꢊꢁꢋꢌꢌꢆꢁꢘꢊꢑꢁꢃꢄꢁꢯꢌꢚꢏꢑꢈꢏꢘꢱ

Laura Nguyen

Genocide and Conflict in Darfur

Topic Background

The Darfur genocide shows us how an incredibly small group of combatants—“probably just a few thousand soldiers, rebels and so-called Janjaweed combined, mostly armed with little more than what might be found in a National Guard armory”—could wreak such devastation that more than a

ꢋꢃꢐꢐꢃꢊꢄꢁꢎꢌꢊꢎꢐꢌꢁꢓꢈꢝꢌꢁꢚꢌꢌꢄꢁꢎꢑꢍꢓꢌꢂꢁꢆꢊꢁꢆꢓꢌꢁꢌꢂꢢꢌꢁꢊꢒꢁꢌꢕꢆꢃꢄꢉꢆꢃꢊꢄꢁꢤꢠꢄꢂꢌꢏꢍꢊꢄꢁꢷꢸꢸꢹꢦꢟꢁꢠꢐꢆꢓꢊꢑꢢꢓꢁꢃꢆꢁꢋꢈꢘꢁꢍꢌꢌꢋꢁ

as if the ease by which they were able to do so implies that there is a simple solution to ending the War in Darfur, it is in fact quite the opposite. As a reminder, this historical committee will take place from roughly 2006 to 2010.

The Republic of the Sudan

Sudan is the largest and most ethnically diverse country in Africa, bordering nine other countries, including Egypt, Chad, Kenya and Ethiopia. During the 2000s, it was home to a population of about 35 million. In the 19th century, Sudan was colonized by both the Ottoman Empire and the British Empire. Like
Map of Sudan

ꢋꢈꢄꢘꢁꢠꢒꢏꢃꢉꢈꢄꢁꢄꢈꢆꢃꢊꢄꢍꢙꢁꢣꢑꢂꢈꢄꢅꢍꢁꢉꢑꢏꢏꢌꢄꢆꢁꢉꢊꢄꢜꢃꢉꢆꢍꢁ

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BERKELEY MODEL UNITED NATIONS

and state structure are informed by its past subjection to European meddling (de Waal 2005:63).

ꢯꢊꢏꢁꢌꢕꢈꢋꢎꢐꢌꢙꢁꢃꢄꢁꢆꢓꢌꢁꢺꢻꢷꢸꢍꢙꢁꢣꢑꢂꢈꢄꢌꢍꢌꢁꢄꢈꢆꢃꢊꢄꢈꢐꢃꢍꢋꢁꢌꢋꢌꢏꢢꢌꢂꢟꢁꢀꢄꢁꢏꢌꢍꢎꢊꢄꢍꢌꢙꢁꢨꢏꢃꢆꢈꢃꢄꢁꢃꢄꢍꢆꢃꢆꢑꢆꢌꢂꢁꢈꢁꢎꢊꢐꢃꢉꢘꢁ

of native administration, which essentially created a hierarchy of tribal administrators that allowed tribal leaders to settle disputes among their subjects. Importantly, the native administration system organized people into tribal units. Britain hoped this would quash revolutionary nationalism and tidy

ꢑꢎꢁꢆꢓꢌꢁꢉꢊꢄꢒꢑꢍꢃꢊꢄꢁꢊꢒꢁꢌꢆꢓꢄꢃꢉꢁꢃꢂꢌꢄꢆꢃꢆꢃꢌꢍꢁꢃꢄꢁꢣꢑꢂꢈꢄꢁꢤꢂꢌꢁꢶꢈꢈꢐꢁꢷꢸꢸꢼꢽꢾꢹꢦꢟꢁꢠꢐꢆꢓꢊꢑꢢꢓꢁꢒꢊꢏꢋꢈꢐꢐꢘꢁꢈꢚꢊꢐꢃꢍꢓꢌꢂꢁꢃꢄꢁ

the late twentieth century, native administration had a critical effect on establishing legal territories for ethnic groups. Some reproductions of native administration systems that allowed tribal leaders to allocate land and modern guns continued into the 21st century; these policies later laid the

ꢒꢊꢑꢄꢂꢈꢆꢃꢊꢄꢁꢒꢊꢏꢁꢐꢊꢉꢈꢐꢵꢐꢌꢝꢌꢐꢁꢌꢆꢓꢄꢃꢉꢁꢉꢐꢌꢈꢄꢍꢃꢄꢢꢁꢤꢂꢌꢁꢶꢈꢈꢐꢁꢷꢸꢸꢼꢽꢾꢹꢦꢟ

Before the region of Darfur gained international attention, Sudan was thought of as comprising two geographic and cultural regions: the north and the south. Northern Sudan is for

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contrast, southern Sudan contains a variety of different ethnic groups, and many individuals are Christian. Southerners are also usually considered ‘African’ for retaining traditional customs. During colonization, the Southern Sudanese were seen as inferior to the more modern northerners and

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or governance responsibilities. Thus, when Sudan gained independence in 1956, power remained concentrated in the capital, Khartoum, where resources were controlled by Arabs uninterested in

ꢢꢃꢝꢃꢄꢢꢁꢌꢉꢊꢄꢊꢋꢃꢉꢙꢁꢎꢊꢐꢃꢆꢃꢉꢈꢐꢙꢁꢊꢏꢁꢉꢑꢐꢆꢑꢏꢈꢐꢁꢉꢊꢄꢉꢌꢍꢍꢃꢊꢄꢍꢁꢆꢊꢁꢆꢓꢌꢁꢍꢊꢑꢆꢓꢁꢤꢗꢃꢌꢐꢍꢌꢄꢁꢷꢸꢸꢾꢽꢹꣀꣁꢦꢟ

In 1983, civil war broke out in Sudan when the government began to impose Sharia law as

ꢎꢈꢏꢆꢁꢊꢒꢁꢈꢁꢎꢊꢐꢃꢉꢘꢁꢆꢊꢁꣂꢀꢍꢐꢈꢋꢃꢉꢃꢡꢌꣃꢁꢣꢑꢂꢈꢄꢟꢁꢲꢕꢎꢌꢉꢆꢌꢂꢐꢘꢙꢁꢆꢓꢃꢍꢁꢎꢊꢐꢃꢉꢘꢁꢂꢃꢂꢁꢄꢊꢆꢁꢒꢈꢏꢌꢁꢇꢌꢐꢐꢁꢇꢃꢆꢓꢁꢆꢓꢌꢁꢠꢄꢃꢋꢃꢍꢆꢍꢁꢈꢄꢂꢁ

Christians in the south. This civil war became known as the Second Sudanese Civil War, during which the Sudan People’s Liberation Army led insurrections in the south (PBS Frontline World). The war ended with the independence of South Sudan around 2005. Notably, the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), known today as the South Sudan People’s Defense Forces, is the army of the Republic of South Sudan. First rising in tandem with the increasing “Arabization” and Islamization of Sudan, the SPLA was primarily composed of non-Arab Christians who rejected the imposition of sharia law

ꢈꢆꢁꢆꢓꢌꢁꢚꢌꢢꢃꢄꢄꢃꢄꢢꢁꢊꢒꢁꢆꢓꢌꢁꢇꢈꢏꢟꢁꢫꢓꢌꢁꢣꢴ꣄ꢠꢁꢓꢈꢂꢁꢈꢁꢉꢏꢃꢆꢃꢉꢈꢐꢁꢃꢄꢜꢑꢌꢄꢉꢌꢁꢊꢄꢁꢆꢓꢌꢁꢣꢑꢂꢈꢄꢁ꣄ꢃꢚꢌꢏꢈꢆꢃꢊꢄꢁꢬꢊꢝꢌꢋꢌꢄꢆꢥ

Army (SLM/A), which adopted South Sudanese revolutionary leader John Garang’s philosophy of a

BERKELEY MODEL UNITED NATIONS

4

“New Sudan” (de Waal 2005).
During the Second Sudanese Civil War in 1989, a compromise between the ruling government in Khartoum and the Sudan People’s Liberation army seemed hopeful until Omar al-

ꢨꢈꢍꢓꢃꢏꢙꢁꢈꢁꣂꢎꢊꢐꢃꢆꢃꢉꢈꢐꢐꢘꢁꢈꢄꢂꢁꢏꢌꢐꢃꢢꢃꢊꢑꢍꢐꢘꢁꢌꢕꢆꢏꢌꢋꢌꢁꢋꢃꢐꢃꢆꢈꢏꢘꢁꢐꢌꢈꢂꢌꢏꢙꣃꢁꢐꢌꢂꢁꢈꢁꢍꢑꢉꢉꢌꢍꢍꢒꢑꢐꢁꢉꢊꢑꢎꢁꢤꢴꢨꢣꢁꢯꢏꢊꢄꢆꢐꢃꢄꢌꢁ

World). Indeed, the 1989 Coup accomplished bringing into power General Omar Hassan al-

ꢨꢈꢍꢓꢃꢏꢟꢁꢠꢍꢁꢆꢓꢌꢁꢄꢌꢇꢁꢓꢌꢈꢂꢁꢊꢒꢁꢍꢆꢈꢆꢌꢙꢁꢈꢐꢵꢨꢈꢍꢓꢃꢏꢁꢌꢕꢎꢈꢄꢂꢌꢂꢁꢆꢓꢌꢁꢑꢍꢌꢁꢊꢒꢁꢠꢏꢈꢚꢁꢆꢏꢃꢚꢈꢐꢁꢋꢃꢐꢃꢆꢃꢈꢍꢁꢃꢄꢁꢍꢊꢑꢆꢓꢌꢏꢄꢁ ꢣꢑꢂꢈꢄꢙꢁꢃꢄꢉꢏꢌꢈꢍꢃꢄꢢꢁꢆꢓꢌꢁꢂꢌꢈꢆꢓꢁꢆꢊꢐꢐꢁꢊꢒꢁꢆꢓꢌꢁꢇꢈꢏꢁꢆꢊꢁꢊꢝꢌꢏꢁꢆꢇꢊꢁꢋꢃꢐꢐꢃꢊꢄꢁꢤꢠꢄꢂꢌꢏꢍꢊꢄꢁꢷꢸꢸꢹꢦꢟꢁꢠꢐꢆꢓꢊꢑꢢꢓꢁꢊꢄꢐꢘꢁ

democratically elected once in 1996, Omar al-Bashir remained in power until he was ousted in 2019 (BBC 2019). However, in this committee, al-Bashir is still operating at the height of his power.

The Region of Darfur

  • ꢞꢈꢏꢒꢑꢏꢁꢃꢍꢁꢆꢓꢌꢁꢇꢌꢍꢆꢌꢏꢄꢋꢊꢍꢆꢁꢎꢏꢊꢝꢃꢄꢉꢌꢁꢊꢒꢁꢣꢑꢂꢈꢄꢟꢁꢀꢄꢁꢷꢸꢸꢼꢙꢁꢈꢚꢊꢑꢆꢁꣅꢁꢆꢊꢁꣁꢁꢋꢃꢐꢐꢃꢊꢄꢁꢎꢌꢊꢎꢐꢌꢁꢐꢃꢝꢌꢂꢁꢃꢄꢁ

the region of Darfur. Unlike in southern Sudan, the African tribes of the west were not bothered by

ꢆꢓꢌꢁꢃꢋꢎꢊꢍꢃꢆꢃꢊꢄꢁꢊꢒꢁꢀꢍꢐꢈꢋꢁꢚꢘꢁꢆꢓꢌꢁꢍꢆꢈꢆꢌꢟꢁꢫꢓꢌꢁꢝꢈꢍꢆꢁꢋꢈꢪꢊꢏꢃꢆꢘꢁꢊꢒꢁꢞꢈꢏꢒꢑꢏꢅꢍꢁꢃꢄꢓꢈꢚꢃꢆꢈꢄꢆꢍꢁꢈꢂꢓꢌꢏꢌꢁꢆꢊꢁꢣꢑꢔꢍꢋꢙꢁꢈꢁ ꢚꢏꢊꢈꢂꢌꢏꢁꢒꢊꢏꢋꢁꢊꢒꢁꢀꢍꢐꢈꢋꢃꢉꢁꢋꢘꢍꢆꢃꢉꢁꢇꢊꢏꢍꢓꢃꢎꢁꢆꢓꢈꢆꢁꢉꢓꢈꢋꢎꢃꢊꢄꢍꢁꢆꢊꢐꢌꢏꢈꢄꢉꢌꢁꢈꢄꢂꢁꢎꢈꢉꢃꢔꢍꢋꢁꢤꢣꢎꢌꢉꢃꢈꢁꢷꢸꢺꣁꢦꢟꢁꢞꢈꢏꢒꢑꢏꢁ

comprises three main ecological zones: the northern arid zone, the central mountain range with rich soil and plentiful resources, and the southern semi-arid zone. Generally, landscapes in Darfur are

ꢓꢃꢢꢓꢐꢘꢁꢝꢈꢏꢃꢌꢂꢟꢁꢣꢊꢋꢌꢁꢉꢊꢄꢆꢈꢃꢄꢁꢌꢕꢎꢈꢄꢂꢃꢄꢢꢁꢂꢌꢍꢌꢏꢆꢁꢈꢄꢂꢁꢍꢎꢈꢏꢍꢌꢁꢝꢌꢢꢌꢆꢈꢆꢃꢊꢄꢙꢁꢇꢓꢃꢐꢌꢁꢊꢆꢓꢌꢏꢍꢁꢓꢈꢝꢌꢁꢋꢑꢉꢓꢁꢋꢊꢏꢌꢁ ꢐꢑꢍꢓꢁꢌꢄꢝꢃꢏꢊꢄꢋꢌꢄꢆꢍꢁꢉꢊꢄꢂꢑꢉꢃꢝꢌꢁꢆꢊꢁꢒꢈꢏꢋꢃꢄꢢꢁꢤꢗꢃꢌꢐꢍꢌꢄꢁꢷꢸꢸꢾꢽꢹꢷꣀꢦꢟꢁꢭꢄꢉꢌꢁꢃꢄꢁꢎꢊꢇꢌꢏꢙꢁꢈꢐꢵꢨꢈꢍꢓꢃꢏꢁꢃꢋꢋꢌꢂꢃꢈꢆꢌꢐꢘꢁ

posed problems for non-Arab peoples in Darfur by dividing the region into North, West, and South Darfur in order to ensure that the Fur were a minority in each of the states (Reyna 2010:1231).
Using the scheme of “moral geographies” can help us conceptualize the ways that these ecological zones become socially distinct. Moral geography refers to the relationships among place,

ꢍꢎꢈꢉꢌꢙꢁꢈꢄꢂꢁꢢꢌꢊꢢꢏꢈꢎꢓꢘꢁꢤꢂꢌꢁꢶꢈꢈꢐꢁꢷꢸꢸꢼꢽꣀꣁꢦꢟꢁꢞꢈꢏꢁꢯꢑꢏꢙꢁꢃꢄꢁꢎꢈꢏꢆꢃꢉꢑꢐꢈꢏꢙꢁꢋꢌꢈꢄꢍꢁꣂꢐꢈꢄꢂꢁꢊꢒꢁꢆꢓꢌꢁꢯꢑꢏꢙꣃꢁꢈꢁꢄꢊꢄꢵꢠꢏꢈꢚꢙꢁ

Islamic group of cultivators in the central Jebel Marra mountain range. For many decades, Darfur was neglected by a central government in Khartoum that knew little and cared less about whatever occurred in Darfur. Even during the Second Sudanese Civil War, the position of Darfur was almost

ꢌꢄꢆꢃꢏꢌꢐꢘꢁꢈꢚꢍꢌꢄꢆꢁꢒꢏꢊꢋꢁꢂꢃꢍꢉꢊꢑꢏꢍꢌꢁꢈꢚꢊꢑꢆꢁꢇꢓꢈꢆꢁꢆꢓꢌꢁꢍꢆꢈꢆꢑꢍꢁꢇꢃꢆꢓꢁꢆꢓꢌꢁꢣꢊꢑꢆꢓꢁꢍꢓꢊꢑꢐꢂꢁꢚꢌꢁꢤꢂꢌꢁꢶꢈꢈꢐꢁꢷꢸꢸꢼꢽꢹꢷꢦꢟꢁ

Thus, the incorporation of the region of Darfur into Sudan was almost an afterthought. The result was the total neglect and historical marginalization of thousands of Darfurians who appeared to lack a

5

BERKELEY MODEL UNITED NATIONS

common identity.

ꢞꢈꢏꢒꢑꢏꢁꢌꢕꢎꢌꢏꢃꢌꢄꢉꢌꢂꢁꢒꢊꢑꢏꢁꢋꢈꢪꢊꢏꢁꢌꢝꢌꢄꢆꢍꢁꢊꢒꢁꢋꢈꢍꢍꢃꢝꢌꢁꢍꢊꢉꢃꢈꢐꢁꢈꢄꢂꢁꢎꢊꢐꢃꢆꢃꢉꢈꢐꢁꢑꢎꢓꢌꢈꢝꢈꢐꢁꢃꢄꢁꢣꢑꢂꢈꢄꢅꢍꢁ
ꢋꢊꢂꢌꢏꢄꢁꢓꢃꢍꢆꢊꢏꢘꢟꢁꢫꢓꢌꢍꢌꢁꢓꢃꢍꢆꢊꢏꢃꢉꢈꢐꢁꢌꢝꢌꢄꢆꢍꢁꢒꢑꢏꢆꢓꢌꢏꢁꢍꢊꢐꢃꢂꢃꢔꢌꢂꢁꢈꢄꢂꢁꣂꢌꢝꢌꢄꢆꢑꢈꢐꢐꢘꢁꢋꢃꢐꢃꢆꢈꢏꢃꢡꢌꢂꣃꢁꢌꢆꢓꢄꢃꢉꢁ

boundaries between tribes and clans who then began to identify themselves as either ‘Arab’ or ‘non-

ꢠꢏꢈꢚꢅꢁꢤꢗꢃꢌꢐꢍꢌꢄꢁꢷꢸꢸꢾꢽꢹꢼꢼꢦꢟꢁꢫꢓꢌꢁꢔꢏꢍꢆꢁꢌꢝꢌꢄꢆꢁꢇꢈꢍꢁꢆꢓꢌꢁꢈꢄꢄꢌꢕꢈꢆꢃꢊꢄꢁꢊꢒꢁꢞꢈꢏꢒꢑꢏꢁꢃꢄꢆꢊꢁꢉꢊꢐꢊꢄꢃꢈꢐꢁꢣꢑꢂꢈꢄꢁꢃꢄꢁꢺꢻꢺꣅꢰꢁ

under the system of native administration, indigenous people could manage their own affairs but only under colonial overseers. Native administration left Darfur unfortunately isolated from the rest of the country, which did not have native administration but was governed largely by Britain (Nielsen

ꢷꢸꢸꢾꢽꢹꣅꢸꢦꢟꢁꢫꢓꢌꢁꢍꢌꢉꢊꢄꢂꢁꢌꢝꢌꢄꢆꢁꢇꢈꢍꢁꢆꢓꢌꢁꢌꢋꢌꢏꢢꢌꢄꢉꢘꢁꢊꢒꢁꢆꢓꢌꢁꢉꢈꢎꢃꢆꢈꢐꢃꢍꢆꢁꢋꢊꢄꢌꢘꢁꢌꢉꢊꢄꢊꢋꢘꢙꢁꢇꢓꢃꢉꢓꢁꣂꢑꢍꢌꢂꢁ ꢌꢆꢓꢄꢃꢉꢁꢚꢊꢑꢄꢂꢈꢏꢃꢌꢍꢁꢈꢍꢁꢌꢉꢊꢄꢊꢋꢃꢉꢁꢚꢊꢑꢄꢂꢈꢏꢃꢌꢍꢁꢚꢌꢆꢇꢌꢌꢄꢁꢍꢌꢉꢆꢊꢏꢍꢁꢊꢒꢁꢎꢏꢊꢂꢑꢉꢆꢃꢊꢄꣃꢁꢤꢗꢃꢌꢐꢍꢌꢄꢁꢷꢸꢸꢾꢽꢹꣅꢷꢦꢟꢁꢫꢓꢌꢁ ꢆꢓꢃꢏꢂꢁꢌꢝꢌꢄꢆꢁꢇꢈꢍꢁꢆꢓꢌꢁꢂꢏꢊꢑꢢꢓꢆꢁꢈꢄꢂꢁꢏꢌꢍꢑꢐꢆꢈꢄꢆꢁꢒꢈꢋꢃꢄꢌꢁꢒꢏꢊꢋꢁꢺꢻꢾꢷꢁꢆꢊꢁꢺꢻꢾꢹꢙꢁꢇꢓꢃꢉꢓꢁꢉꢈꢑꢍꢌꢂꢁꢝꢈꢏꢃꢊꢑꢍꢁꢢꢏꢊꢑꢎꢍꢁ

from outside Darfur to migrate into the region in search of arable land. The formation of ethnic

ꢚꢊꢑꢄꢂꢈꢏꢃꢌꢍꢁꢇꢈꢍꢁꢌꢍꢎꢌꢉꢃꢈꢐꢐꢘꢁꢝꢑꢐꢄꢌꢏꢈꢚꢐꢌꢁꢆꢊꢁꢔꢌꢏꢉꢌꢁꢉꢊꢋꢎꢌꢆꢃꢆꢃꢊꢄꢟꢁꢫꢓꢌꢁꢒꢊꢑꢏꢆꢓꢁꢌꢝꢌꢄꢆꢁꢇꢈꢍꢁꢆꢓꢌꢁꢧꢓꢈꢂꢃꢈꢄꢵ꣄ꢃꢚꢘꢈꢄꢁ

wars of the 1980s that launched Darfur into a period of political, economic, and ecological changes

ꢂꢑꢌꢁꢆꢊꢁꢍꢎꢃꢐꢐꢊꢝꢌꢏꢁꢒꢏꢊꢋꢁꢄꢌꢃꢢꢓꢚꢊꢏꢃꢄꢢꢁꢉꢊꢄꢜꢃꢉꢆꢍꢁꢤꢗꢃꢌꢐꢍꢌꢄꢁꢷꢸꢸꢾꢦꢟ
ꢺꢾꢻꣁꢁꢐꢃꢆꢓꢊꢢꢏꢈꢎꢓꢁꢂꢌꢎꢃꢉꢆꢃꢄꢢꢁꢬꢈꢓꢂꢃꢍꢆꢁꢶꢈꢏꢟ

An Ethnic Dichotomy: Arabs and non-Arab Africans

Ethnic Groups in Darfur

While the meaning of “ethnic group” takes on different connotations based on culture, an

ꢌꢆꢓꢄꢃꢉꢁꢢꢏꢊꢑꢎꢁꢉꢈꢄꢁꢚꢌꢁꢢꢌꢄꢌꢏꢈꢐꢐꢘꢁꢂꢌꢔꢄꢌꢂꢁꢈꢍꢁꢈꢁꢉꢊꢋꢋꢑꢄꢃꢆꢘꢁꢊꢏꢁꢎꢊꢎꢑꢐꢈꢆꢃꢊꢄꢁꢆꢓꢈꢆꢁꢍꢓꢈꢏꢌꢍꢁꢉꢑꢐꢆꢑꢏꢈꢐꢁꢚꢈꢉꢛꢢꢏꢊꢑꢄꢂꢁ ꢊꢏꢁꢂꢌꢍꢉꢌꢄꢆꢁꢤꢨꢌꢄꢌꢆꢵꢬꢈꢏꢆꢃꢄꢌꢡꢁꢷꢸꢺꢹꢦꢟꢁꢨꢘꢁꢄꢊꢁꢋꢌꢈꢄꢍꢁꢇꢃꢐꢐꢁꢂꢌꢐꢌꢢꢈꢆꢌꢍꢁꢚꢌꢁꢏꢌꢍꢎꢊꢄꢍꢃꢚꢐꢌꢁꢒꢊꢏꢁꢛꢄꢊꢇꢃꢄꢢꢁꢈꢐꢐꢁꢊꢒꢁꢆꢓꢌꢁ

BERKELEY MODEL UNITED NATIONS

6

ethnic groups of Darfur and the greater Sudan, but it’s important to be familiar with them in order to

ꢢꢌꢆꢁꢈꢁꢒꢑꢐꢐꢌꢏꢁꢎꢃꢉꢆꢑꢏꢌꢟꢁꢞꢑꢏꢃꢄꢢꢁꢆꢓꢌꢁꢞꢈꢏꢒꢑꢏꢁꢢꢌꢄꢊꢉꢃꢂꢌꢙꢁꢆꢏꢃꢚꢌꢍꢁꢆꢓꢈꢆꢁꢍꢓꢈꢏꢌꢂꢁꢎꢏꢊꢕꢃꢋꢃꢆꢘꢁꢆꢊꢁꢆꢓꢌꢁꢆꢇꢊꢁꢋꢈꢃꢄꢁꢏꢌꢚꢌꢐꢁ

movements such as the Masalit, Fur, and Zaghawa were overwhelmingly targeted in violent ethnic cleansing campaigns (Human Rights Watch 2005).

EXAMPLES OF ETHNIC GROUPS, TRIBES IN DARFUR (de Waal 2005) Ethnic Group or Grouping
Description

  • Fur
  • A non-Arab, Islamic group of cultivators located in the central Jebel Marra

mountain range. Their agricultural production is oriented towards local markets and traders. One of the three largest tribes in Darfur.

Historically, the nomadic southern Baggara and the sedentary central Fur maintained a symbiotic relationship where the Fur left their cattle in the care of the Baggara. By contrast, the Fur had little interaction with the northern Abbala.

Masalit, Gama, and Non-Arab cultivators that inhabit the central farming belt. The Masalit are

  • Tama
  • one of the three largest tribes in Darfur.

  • Zaghawa
  • Non-Arab historically privileged group. One of the three largest tribes in

Darfur. Although they make up less than 8 percent of the Darfur population,

ꢆꢓꢌꢘꢁꢉꢊꢋꢋꢈꢄꢂꢁꢃꢋꢋꢌꢄꢍꢌꢁꢇꢌꢈꢐꢆꢓꢁꢈꢄꢂꢁꢃꢄꢜꢑꢌꢄꢉꢌꢙꢁꢇꢓꢃꢉꢓꢁꢓꢈꢍꢁꢉꢈꢑꢍꢌꢂꢁꢆꢌꢄꢍꢃꢊꢄꢍꢁ

with other tribes.

  • Zayyadiyya
  • An Arab group.

Baggara and Abbala Nomadic groups that comprise much of the Arab population in Darfur.
They carry an important tradition of herding livestock between Lake Chad and the Nile River. Many are located in northern and southern Darfur. The Janjaweed militias that were supported by the Sudanese government in 2003 were overwhelmingly made up of the Abbala.

Most of the Arab groups involved in militia activities like land grabbing began with the Abbala, whereas most southern Baggara Arabs were initially

ꢑꢄꢃꢄꢝꢊꢐꢝꢌꢂꢁꢃꢄꢁꢆꢓꢌꢁꢉꢊꢄꢜꢃꢉꢆꢟꢁꢀꢄꢁꢈꢂꢂꢃꢆꢃꢊꢄꢙꢁꢃꢆꢅꢍꢁꢃꢋꢎꢊꢏꢆꢈꢄꢆꢁꢆꢊꢁꢄꢊꢆꢌꢁꢆꢓꢌꢁꢂꢃꢒꢒꢌꢏꢌꢄꢉꢌꢁ

between tribes and ethnic groups; the Baggara Rizeigat are the largest and most powerful tribe in Darfur, more recently joining Janjaweed forces to quash rebels.

7

BERKELEY MODEL UNITED NATIONS

“Arabs” and “non-Arabs”

In Sudan, “Arab” is both an ethnic and cultural term, typically “referring to those who can trace their ancestry to the original inhabitants of the Arabian peninsula and whose mother tongue is

ꢠꢏꢈꢚꢃꢉꣃꢁꢤꢴꢨꢣꢁꢯꢏꢊꢄꢆꢐꢃꢄꢌꢁꢶꢊꢏꢐꢂꢦꢟꢁꢀꢄꢁꢏꢌꢉꢌꢄꢆꢁꢂꢌꢉꢈꢂꢌꢍꢙꢁꢆꢓꢌꢁꢏꢃꢉꢓꢁꢈꢄꢂꢁꢉꢊꢋꢎꢐꢌꢕꢁꢓꢃꢍꢆꢊꢏꢃꢌꢍꢁꢊꢒꢁꢃꢂꢌꢄꢆꢃꢆꢘꢁꢒꢊꢏꢋꢈꢆꢃꢊꢄꢁ ꢃꢄꢁꢞꢈꢏꢒꢑꢏꢁꢓꢈꢝꢌꢁꢚꢌꢌꢄꢁꢃꢄꢉꢏꢌꢈꢍꢃꢄꢢꢐꢘꢁꢊꢝꢌꢏꢍꢃꢋꢎꢐꢃꢔꢌꢂꢙꢁꢏꢌꢍꢑꢐꢆꢃꢄꢢꢁꢃꢄꢁꢈꢁꢎꢊꢐꢈꢏꢃꢡꢌꢂꢁꢠꢏꢈꢚꢵꢠꢒꢏꢃꢉꢈꢄꢁꢂꢃꢉꢓꢊꢆꢊꢋꢘꢁ

that is radically inadequate for capturing the diverse ethnic identities of Darfur. Polarization is so entrenched that community leaders for whom the term ‘African’ might have been out of place now readily identify themselves as such (de Waal 2005). Despite its uselessness, the Arab vs. African dichotomy survives in powerful ways that are particularly alarming amid the concurrent militarization

ꢊꢒꢁꢞꢈꢏꢒꢑꢏꢟꢁꢣꢊꢋꢌꢁꢇꢈꢘꢍꢁꢆꢓꢈꢆꢁꢠꢏꢈꢚꢁꢍꢑꢎꢏꢌꢋꢈꢉꢃꢍꢋꢁꢆꢈꢛꢌꢍꢁꢎꢐꢈꢉꢌꢁꢈꢏꢌꢁꢆꢓꢏꢊꢑꢢꢓꢁꢏꢈꢉꢃꢍꢆꢁꢝꢊꢉꢈꢚꢑꢐꢈꢏꢘꢁꢈꢄꢂꢁꢍꢌꢕꢑꢈꢐꢁ ꢝꢃꢊꢐꢌꢄꢉꢌꢟꢁꢬꢈꢍꢍꢁꢌꢆꢓꢄꢊꢍꢌꢕꢑꢈꢐꢁꢝꢃꢊꢐꢌꢄꢉꢌꢁꢆꢓꢈꢆꢁꢊꢉꢉꢑꢏꢍꢁꢃꢄꢁꢞꢈꢏꢒꢑꢏꢁꢃꢄꢆꢏꢊꢂꢑꢉꢌꢍꢁꢃꢋꢋꢌꢈꢍꢑꢏꢈꢚꢐꢌꢁꢎꢈꢃꢄꢁꢈꢄꢂꢁ

trauma not only for the women victims but for the communities that they belong to (Nielsen 2008).

ꢲꢆꢓꢄꢊꢍꢌꢕꢑꢈꢐꢁꢝꢃꢊꢐꢌꢄꢉꢌꢁꢃꢍꢁꢎꢈꢏꢆꢃꢉꢑꢐꢈꢏꢐꢘꢁꢃꢄꢍꢃꢂꢃꢊꢑꢍꢁꢃꢄꢁꢆꢓꢌꢁꢉꢊꢄꢆꢌꢕꢆꢁꢊꢒꢁꢞꢈꢏꢒꢑꢏꢁꢚꢌꢉꢈꢑꢍꢌꢁꢃꢆꢁꢉꢈꢄꢁꢂꢃꢍꢆꢊꢏꢆꢁꢌꢆꢓꢄꢃꢉꢁ ꢚꢊꢑꢄꢂꢈꢏꢃꢌꢍꢁꢚꢘꢁꢉꢈꢑꢍꢃꢄꢢꢁꢑꢄꢇꢈꢄꢆꢌꢂꢁꢎꢏꢌꢢꢄꢈꢄꢉꢃꢌꢍꢁꢈꢄꢂꢁꢂꢌꢍꢆꢏꢊꢘꢃꢄꢢꢁꢒꢈꢋꢃꢐꢘꢁꢐꢃꢄꢌꢈꢢꢌꢍꢁꢤꢩꢊꢐꢊꢉꢈꢑꢍꢆꢁꢲꢕꢎꢐꢈꢃꢄꢌꢂꢦꢟ

Modern notions of Arab supremacy in Sudan date back to colonial rule, where Arabic or
Arabized groups like the Jellaba were distinguished by their style of clothes, housing, and standard of living (Nielsen 2008). As a state, Sudan champions Arabism, uses Arabic as a language of instruction in schools and in the media, and promotes Islam as a state ideology. Its political discourse

ꢈꢄꢂꢁꢈꢑꢆꢊꢄꢊꢋꢘꢁꢏꢌꢝꢊꢐꢝꢌꢍꢁꢈꢏꢊꢑꢄꢂꢁꢇꢓꢈꢆꢁꢠꢐꢌꢕꢁꢂꢌꢁꢶꢈꢈꢐꢁꢉꢈꢐꢐꢍꢁꣂꢗꢃꢐꢊꢉꢌꢄꢆꢏꢃꢍꢋꢙꣃꢁꢊꢏꢁꢆꢓꢌꢁꢈꢎꢎꢐꢃꢉꢈꢆꢃꢊꢄꢁꢊꢒꢁꢆꢓꢌꢁ ꢗꢃꢐꢌꢁꢳꢈꢐꢐꢌꢘꢁꢆꢊꢁꢞꢈꢏꢒꢑꢏꢟꢁꢯꢊꢏꢁꢌꢕꢈꢋꢎꢐꢌꢙꢁꢑꢎꢁꢑꢄꢆꢃꢐꢁꢆꢓꢌꢁꢌꢄꢂꢁꢊꢒꢁꢆꢓꢌꢁꢉꢃꢝꢃꢐꢁꢇꢈꢏꢁꢃꢄꢁꢆꢓꢌꢁꢷꢺꢍꢆꢁꢉꢌꢄꢆꢑꢏꢘꢙꢁꢂꢌꢚꢈꢆꢌꢍꢁ

around independence concerned whether Sudan would “opt for unity with Egypt,” and subsequent

ꢂꢌꢚꢈꢆꢌꢍꢁꢊꢄꢁꢄꢈꢆꢃꢊꢄꢈꢐꢁꢃꢂꢌꢄꢆꢃꢆꢘꢁꣂꢓꢈꢝꢌꢁꢚꢌꢌꢄꢁꢒꢏꢈꢋꢌꢂꢁꢈꢐꢊꢄꢢꢁꢆꢓꢌꢁꢗꢊꢏꢆꢓꢵꢣꢊꢑꢆꢓꢁꢈꢕꢃꢍꢁꢊꢒꢁꢇꢓꢌꢆꢓꢌꢏꢁꢣꢑꢂꢈꢄꢁꢃꢍꢁ

part of the Arab or African world” (de Waal 2005). The scattered human rights reports about Darfur that emerged in 2003 pointed to evidence of Sudanese military and ‘Arab’ militia forces called the Janjaweed attacking and destroying many tribal villages in the homeland of ‘non-Arab’ insurgent groups known as the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) (Human Rights Watch 2005).

War in Darfur (Land Cruiser War): February 2003 - present

  • ꢫꢓꢌꢁꢇꢈꢏꢁꢆꢓꢈꢆꢁꢌꢏꢑꢎꢆꢌꢂꢁꢃꢄꢁꢣꢑꢂꢈꢄꢁꢃꢄꢁꢷꢸꢸꣀꢁꢃꢍꢁꢝꢌꢏꢘꢁꢂꢃꢒꢒꢌꢏꢌꢄꢆꢁꢒꢏꢊꢋꢁꢆꢓꢌꢁꢉꢊꢄꢜꢃꢉꢆꢁꢚꢌꢆꢇꢌꢌꢄꢁꢄꢊꢏꢆꢓꢌꢏꢄꢁ

and southern Sudan that began in 1956. That is to say, “the notions of ethnicity that have been

BERKELEY MODEL UNITED NATIONS

8

employed in Darfur are uniquely different from those in the rest of the country” (Nielsen 2008). Darfur inhabitants felt that new Arabization policies were increasingly marginalizing them. In April 2003, the Sudan Liberation Army and the Justice and Equality Movement, backed by the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army, incited a major offensive against the government of Sudan by attacking and capturing government property, including El Fasher airport (Responsibility to Protect). In response to these events — a product of pushback against the government for sidelining non-Arabs — Sudan teamed up with counterinsurgency forces known as the Janjaweed hoping to squash rebel sentiments. Rather than looking for rebels, however, state-sanctioned paramilitary forces “simply

ꢐꢈꢃꢂꢁꢇꢈꢍꢆꢌꢽꢁꢍꢓꢊꢊꢆꢃꢄꢢꢁꢂꢊꢇꢄꢁꢇꢓꢊꢌꢝꢌꢏꢁꢉꢏꢊꢍꢍꢌꢂꢁꢆꢓꢌꢃꢏꢁꢎꢈꢆꢓꢙꢁꢆꢊꢏꢉꢓꢃꢄꢢꢁꢓꢊꢋꢌꢍꢙꢁꢐꢊꢊꢆꢃꢄꢢꣃꢁꢤꢠꢄꢂꢌꢏꢍꢊꢄꢁꢷꢸꢸꢹꢦꢟꢁ ꢲꢝꢌꢄꢁꢇꢓꢌꢄꢁꢞꢈꢏꢒꢑꢏꢁꢆꢊꢊꢛꢁꢆꢓꢌꢁꢃꢄꢆꢌꢏꢄꢈꢆꢃꢊꢄꢈꢐꢁꢍꢆꢈꢢꢌꢁꢌꢈꢏꢐꢃꢌꢏꢁꢃꢄꢁꢆꢓꢌꢁꢉꢊꢄꢜꢃꢉꢆꢙꢁꢆꢓꢌꢁꢢꢊꢝꢌꢏꢄꢋꢌꢄꢆꢁꢃꢄꢁ꣆ꢓꢈꢏꢆꢊꢑꢋꢁ ꢄꢊꢆꢁꢊꢄꢐꢘꢁꢉꢐꢈꢃꢋꢌꢂꢁꢄꢊꢁꢉꢊꢄꢄꢌꢉꢆꢃꢊꢄꢁꢆꢊꢁ꣇ꢈꢄꢪꢈꢇꢌꢌꢂꢁꢒꢊꢏꢉꢌꢍꢙꢁꢚꢑꢆꢁꢈꢐꢍꢊꢁꢈꢏꢢꢑꢌꢂꢁꢆꢓꢈꢆꢁꢆꢓꢌꢏꢌꢁꢇꢈꢍꢁꢄꢊꢁꢉꢊꢄꢜꢃꢉꢆꢁꢈꢆꢁꢈꢐꢐꢁ ꢤꢠꢄꢂꢌꢏꢍꢊꢄꢁꢷꢸꢸꢹꢦꢟ

  • ꢀꢄꢆꢌꢏꢄꢈꢆꢃꢊꢄꢈꢐꢁꢐꢈꢇꢁꢂꢌꢔꢄꢌꢍꢁꢉꢏꢃꢋꢌꢍꢁꢈꢢꢈꢃꢄꢍꢆꢁꢓꢑꢋꢈꢄꢃꢆꢘꢁꢈꢍꢁꣂꢉꢏꢃꢋꢃꢄꢈꢐꢁꢈꢉꢆꢍꢁꢉꢊꢋꢋꢃꢆꢆꢌꢂꢁꢈꢍꢁꢎꢈꢏꢆꢁꢊꢒꢁꢈꢁ

widespread or systematic attack on a civilian population, whether during peacetime or war,” while war crimes are “serious violations of international humanitarian law and the laws of war that incur individual criminal responsibility” (Human Rights Watch 2005). Crimes against humanity and war crimes committed by the Sudanese military along with state-sanctioned militia forces have included

ꢆꢈꢏꢢꢌꢆꢁꢛꢃꢐꢐꢃꢄꢢꢍꢙꢁꢍꢑꢋꢋꢈꢏꢘꢁꢌꢕꢌꢉꢑꢆꢃꢊꢄꢍꢙꢁꢈꢍꢍꢈꢑꢐꢆꢁꢈꢄꢂꢁꢏꢈꢎꢌꢙꢁꣂꢆꢓꢌꢁꢂꢌꢍꢆꢏꢑꢉꢆꢃꢊꢄꢁꢊꢒꢁꢓꢑꢄꢂꢏꢌꢂꢍꢁꢊꢒꢁꢝꢃꢐꢐꢈꢢꢌꢍꢙꢁꢆꢓꢌꢁ

theft of millions of livestock, and the forced displacement of more than two million people” (Human Rights Watch 2005). In addition, livestock is the main economic target; it is estimated that non-Arab groups lost 50 to 90 percent of their livestock to the Janjaweed, who typically redistributed it to other Arab pastoralists (Nielsen 2008). Notably, in some places, Arab villages ended up suffering from retaliatory strikes led by African militias or the SLA, demonstrating that no one’s hands are

ꢈꢐꢐꢁꢉꢊꢋꢎꢐꢌꢆꢌꢐꢘꢁꢉꢐꢌꢈꢄꢁꢤꢠꢄꢂꢌꢏꢍꢊꢄꢁꢷꢸꢸꢹꢦꢟꢁꢠꢍꢁꢈꢄꢁꢈꢍꢃꢂꢌꢙꢁꢋꢊꢍꢆꢁꢎꢏꢊꢎꢊꢍꢈꢐꢍꢁꢒꢊꢏꢁꢆꢓꢌꢁꢍꢌꢆꢆꢐꢌꢋꢌꢄꢆꢁꢊꢒꢁꢉꢊꢄꢜꢃꢉꢆꢁ ꢃꢄꢁꢞꢈꢏꢒꢑꢏꢁꢃꢄꢉꢐꢑꢂꢌꢁꢆꢓꢌꢁꢏꢌꢝꢃꢝꢈꢐꢁꢊꢒꢁꢆꢓꢌꢁꢄꢈꢆꢃꢝꢌꢁꢈꢂꢋꢃꢄꢃꢍꢆꢏꢈꢆꢃꢊꢄꢁꢃꢄꢁꢍꢊꢋꢌꢁꢒꢊꢏꢋꢟꢁꢩꢊꢇꢌꢝꢌꢏꢙꢁꢠꢐꢌꢕꢁꢂꢌꢁꢶꢈꢈꢐꢙꢁꢈꢄꢁ ꢌꢕꢎꢌꢏꢆꢁꢊꢄꢁꢉꢊꢄꢜꢃꢉꢆꢁꢈꢄꢂꢁꢎꢌꢈꢉꢌꢚꢑꢃꢐꢂꢃꢄꢢꢁꢃꢄꢁꢣꢑꢂꢈꢄꢁꢈꢄꢂꢁꢆꢓꢌꢁꢩꢊꢏꢄꢁꢊꢒꢁꢠꢒꢏꢃꢉꢈꢙꢁꢄꢊꢆꢌꢍꢁꢆꢓꢈꢆꢁꢆꢓꢌꢁꢒꢈꢃꢐꢑꢏꢌꢁꢊꢒꢁꢎꢌꢈꢉꢌꢁ

conferences in 1989 and 1990 demonstrate that native administration is not a solution in itself, but

ꣂꢏꢈꢆꢓꢌꢏꢁꢈꢁꢉꢊꢋꢎꢊꢄꢌꢄꢆꢁꢊꢒꢁꢔꢄꢂꢃꢄꢢꢁꢈꢄꢂꢁꢃꢋꢎꢐꢌꢋꢌꢄꢆꢃꢄꢢꢁꢈꢁꢍꢊꢐꢑꢆꢃꢊꢄꣃꢁꢤꢂꢌꢁꢶꢈꢈꢐꢁꢷꢸꢸꢼꢦꢟꢁ
ꢠꢐꢆꢓꢊꢑꢢꢓꢁꢆꢓꢌꢁꢠꢒꢏꢃꢉꢈꢄꢁꢖꢄꢃꢊꢄꢁꢒꢊꢏꢋꢌꢂꢁꢆꢓꢌꢁꢧꢌꢈꢍꢌꢔꢏꢌꢁꢧꢊꢋꢋꢃꢍꢍꢃꢊꢄꢁꢤꢧꢯꢧꢦꢁꢆꢊꢁꢋꢊꢄꢃꢆꢊꢏꢁꢊꢚꢍꢌꢏꢝꢈꢄꢉꢌꢁ
ꢊꢒꢁꢆꢓꢌꢁꢉꢌꢈꢍꢌꢔꢏꢌꢙꢁꢆꢓꢌꢁꢷꢸꢸꢹꢁꢞꢈꢏꢒꢑꢏꢁꢩꢑꢋꢈꢄꢃꢆꢈꢏꢃꢈꢄꢁꢧꢌꢈꢍꢌꢔꢏꢌꢁꢠꢢꢏꢌꢌꢋꢌꢄꢆꢙꢁꢚꢏꢊꢛꢌꢏꢌꢂꢁꢚꢘꢁꢆꢓꢌꢁꢆꢓꢃꢏꢂꢁꢎꢈꢏꢆꢘꢁꢊꢒꢁ

9

BERKELEY MODEL UNITED NATIONS

Chad, was ultimately repeatedly violated by all parties. Janjaweed forces, backed by the Sudanese government, continued military operations against rebel forces and continued attacking civilians,

ꢍꢎꢌꢉꢃꢔꢉꢈꢐꢐꢘꢁꢆꢈꢏꢢꢌꢆꢃꢄꢢꢁꢄꢊꢄꢵꢠꢏꢈꢚꢁꢢꢏꢊꢑꢎꢍꢁꢤ꣈ꢌꢍꢎꢊꢄꢍꢃꢚꢃꢐꢃꢆꢘꢁꢆꢊꢁꢴꢏꢊꢆꢌꢉꢆꢦꢟꢁ꣈ꢌꢆꢈꢐꢃꢈꢆꢃꢄꢢꢙꢁꢏꢌꢚꢌꢐꢁꢒꢊꢏꢉꢌꢍꢁꢈꢆꢆꢈꢉꢛꢌꢂꢁ

and looted government facilities (Human Rights Watch 2005).
Residents waiting for peacekeeper visit.

Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A)

Although originally formed as an alliance between the Fur and Zaghawa tribes, the Sudan
Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) is somewhat of a guerrilla group that represents a coalition of communities in arms. Its leadership is composed mostly of members of the Zaghawa tribe who feel that Darfur has been neglected by the government in Sudan, and that African tribes are particularly

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    منظمة حقوق اﻻنسان والتنمية Human Rights and Development Organization (HUDO) South Kordufan / Nuba Mountains Monthly Report (January 2014) Introduction: In this month Sudan government become very much repressive by reinforcing all rejected Laws, for the first time it has reinforced the Armed Forces Law amended in June last year, this laws allows prosecution of civilians before military courts. It has also activated other laws of the Voluntary Work Act for the year 2006 which gives the Minister the right to do whatever suits him. Under these laws the minister suspended the activities of the International Committee of Red Cross (ICRC), this move band more than 1.5 million people from the service of ICRC mostly in Darfur. Despite the crimes they committed in Darfur and their participation in the fighting in Southern Kordofan recently, the Janjaweed militias are now terrorizing civilians in Al Obeid before those who created them in Darfur and brought them to Kordofan. Security Situation: Sudanese authority continues air bombardment in the Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile, Kauda area (SPLA control) has been aggressively bombarded during January this year. The security situation is worsening in Kordofan Al Obeid due to the presence of the Janjaweed after being chased from battle field in Southern Kordofan. Currently they are rapping women, looting civilians’ properties and attacking people on daily bases in Al Obeid. Political Development: The President’s recent statement which people had been optimistically awaiting for was very disappointing; it was expected to bring new changes in Sudanese politics but was sarcasm instead. Peace talks between Sudan Government and SPLM- N is due to resume in February with a hope of pushing the implementation of the previous agreements and opening the paths for relief to reach the war affected people in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile pending for the final and comprehensive settlement of the conflict.
  • Outreach Report 2010 Public Information and Documentation Section | Outreach Unit Foreword

    Outreach Report 2010 Public Information and Documentation Section | Outreach Unit Foreword

    Outreach Report 2010 Public Information and Documentation Section | Outreach Unit Foreword This is the fourth Outreach Report published by my office since the Outreach Unit of the International Criminal Court (ICC) was established in 2007. It presents the work carried out from 1 October 2009 to 1 October 2010 by ICC Outreach Unit staff members at the seat of the Court in The Hague, and in Uganda, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), the Central African Republic (CAR), and Kenya. It also includes the work of the Outreach Unit in Chad and other countries where large groups of Sudanese populations are currently residing. The report outlines many of the activities conducted during this period and the results achieved, as well as the contextual judicial and other factors influencing our work, challenges faced along the way, and the plans for going forward. The report is also a demonstration of the hard work and dedication of my staff, both at headquarters and in the field. They have contributed to further advance our plans ICC Registrar Silvana Arbia ©ICC-CPI/Max Koot to make justice meaningful among communities affected by the crimes in situations and cases brought before the Court. Over the past reporting period, the Registry has responded to a series of emerging challenges while maintaining its efforts to counter misconceptions, make proceedings accessible, and create realistic expectations of the Court’s work among affected communities. Our rapid response capacity was once again tested this year in explaining and clarifying certain judicial decisions. My office was able to deploy an interdisciplinary team in Kenya before Pre-Trial Chamber I decided to grant the Prosecutor approval to investigate alleged crimes committed in the territory of that country in relation with the post-election violence of 2007 and 2008.
  • The Rwanda Catastrophe : Its Actual Root-Cause and Remedies to Pre

    The Rwanda Catastrophe : Its Actual Root-Cause and Remedies to Pre

    The International Centre for Le Centre International pour les Peace and Conflict Reconciliation Initiatives de Paix et de Initiative for Africa Résolution des Conflits en Afrique (ICPCRIA) (ICPCRIA) THE RWANDA CATASTROPHE: Its Actual Root-Cause and Remedies to Pre-Empt a Similar Situation in Rwanda , 1 A MEMORANDUM Submitted to: H.E. DR. BOUTROS BOUTROS - GHALI SECRETARY-GENERAL THE UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION NEW YORK H.E. DR. SALIM A. SALIM SECRETARY-GENERAL T HE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY ADDIS ABABA H.E. CHIEF EMEKA ANYAOKU SECRETARY-GENERAL THE COM MONWEALTH SECRETARIAT LONDON AND Other World Leaders: HEADS OF STATE And HEADS OF INTERNATIONAL NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS WITH INTEREST IN PEACE AND HUMAN RIGHTS FOR NATIONAL RECONCILIATION AND RECOVERY IN RWANDA BY The International Centre for Peace and Conflict Reconciliation Initiative for Africa (ICPCRIA), P.O. Box 47288, Tel. Nos.565366, Fax No. 214127, Nairobi. Prof. Agola Auma-Osolo PRESIDENT/ICPCRIA 2 TABLE OF CONTENTS PREAMBLE PAGE CHAPTER ONE: PURPOSE AND METHODOLOGY OF THE MEMORANDUM.............................................6 I. PURPOSE .....................................................................................................................................................6 II. METHODOLOGY........................................................................................................................................6 CHAPTER TWO: IS THE RWANDA CATASTROPHE ALSO GENOCIDE?......................................................8 I. GENOCIDE DEFINED................................................................................................................................8
  • Sudan's Spreading Conflict (II): War in Blue Nile

    Sudan's Spreading Conflict (II): War in Blue Nile

    Sudan’s Spreading Conflict (II): War in Blue Nile Africa Report N°204 | 18 June 2013 International Crisis Group Headquarters Avenue Louise 149 1050 Brussels, Belgium Tel: +32 2 502 90 38 Fax: +32 2 502 50 38 [email protected] Table of Contents Executive Summary ................................................................................................................... i Recommendations..................................................................................................................... iii I. Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 1 II. A Sudan in Miniature ....................................................................................................... 3 A. Old-Timers Versus Newcomers ................................................................................. 3 B. A History of Land Grabbing and Exploitation .......................................................... 5 C. Twenty Years of War in Blue Nile (1985-2005) ........................................................ 7 III. Failure of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement ............................................................. 9 A. The Only State with an Opposition Governor (2007-2011) ...................................... 9 B. The 2010 Disputed Elections ..................................................................................... 9 C. Failed Popular Consultations ...................................................................................
  • Sudan in Crisis

    Sudan in Crisis

    Loyola University Chicago Loyola eCommons Faculty Publications and Other Works by History: Faculty Publications and Other Works Department 7-2019 Sudan in Crisis Kim Searcy Loyola University Chicago, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://ecommons.luc.edu/history_facpubs Part of the History Commons Recommended Citation Searcy, Kim. Sudan in Crisis. Origins: Current Events in Historical Perspective, 12, 10: , 2019. Retrieved from Loyola eCommons, History: Faculty Publications and Other Works, This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications and Other Works by Department at Loyola eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in History: Faculty Publications and Other Works by an authorized administrator of Loyola eCommons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 License. © Origins: Current Events in Historical Perspective, 2019. vol. 12, issue 10 - July 2019 Sudan in Crisis by Kim Searcy A celebration of South Sudan's independence in 2011. Editor's Note: Even as we go to press, the situation in Sudan continues to be fluid and dangerous. Mass demonstrations brought about the end of the 30-year regime of Sudan's brutal leader Omar al-Bashir. But what comes next for the Sudanese people is not at all certain. This month historian Kim Searcy explains how we got to this point by looking at the long legacy of colonialism in Sudan. Colonial rule, he argues, created rifts in Sudanese society that persist to this day and that continue to shape the political dynamics.
  • Democratic Republic of Congo Crisis: an Assessment of African Union's Principle of Non-Indiference

    Democratic Republic of Congo Crisis: an Assessment of African Union's Principle of Non-Indiference

    European Scientific Journal August 2015 edition vol.11, No.22 ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print) e - ISSN 1857- 7431 DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO CRISIS: AN ASSESSMENT OF AFRICAN UNION'S PRINCIPLE OF NON-INDIFERENCE. John Danfulani,PhD Department of Political Science, Kaduna State University- Nigeria Abstract Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has a troubling history of civil wars since gaining political independence from Belgium in 1960. All DRC's civil wars had external dimensions who got involved to either defend ideological client or protect economic or strategic interests. The 1998 unsuccessful attempt to oust President Laurent Kabila attracted two blocks of opposing multi-national forces into DRC. It was an instance of interference in internal affairs of DRC by neighbouring states and their allies. The status of pro-Kinsasha forces was clear in international law because they were invited by a legitimate government. While that of anti-Kinsasha group cannot be situated within the ambit of any international law hence making their presence in DRC at the time of the civil war illegitimate. Activities of anti-Kabila forces were not covered by AU's July 2000 principle of non- indifference. Interference by foreign forces on the side of the rebel was a brazen act of aggression and flagrant disrespect for the territorial integrity of DRC. AU must act to safeguard abuse of the non-indifference clause by member states and stiffer sanctions imposed on belligerent actors. Their involvement prolonged the civil war and caused collapse of every state institution in DRC. Keywords: AU, Non-indifference, Aggression, Sanction, Territorial integrity Introduction Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is one political entity in continental Africa with a troubling history of many civil wars and sundry forms of skirmishes with disastrous internal and trans-borders consequences.
  • The Economics of Ethnic Cleansing in Darfur

    The Economics of Ethnic Cleansing in Darfur

    The Economics of Ethnic Cleansing in Darfur John Prendergast, Omer Ismail, and Akshaya Kumar August 2013 WWW.ENOUGHPROJECT.ORG WWW.SATSENTINEL.ORG The Economics of Ethnic Cleansing in Darfur John Prendergast, Omer Ismail, and Akshaya Kumar August 2013 COVER PHOTO Displaced Beni Hussein cattle shepherds take shelter on the outskirts of El Sereif village, North Darfur. Fighting over gold mines in North Darfur’s Jebel Amer area between the Janjaweed Abbala forces and Beni Hussein tribe started early this January and resulted in mass displacement of thousands. AP PHOTO/UNAMID, ALBERT GONZALEZ FARRAN Overview Darfur is burning again, with devastating results for its people. A kaleidoscope of Janjaweed forces are once again torching villages, terrorizing civilians, and systematically clearing prime land and resource-rich areas of their inhabitants. The latest ethnic-cleans- ing campaign has already displaced more than 300,000 Darfuris this year and forced more than 75,000 to seek refuge in neighboring Chad, the largest population displace- ment in recent years.1 An economic agenda is emerging as a major driver for the escalating violence. At the height of the mass atrocities committed from 2003 to 2005, the Sudanese regime’s strategy appeared to be driven primarily by the counterinsurgency objectives and secondarily by the acquisition of salaries and war booty. Undeniably, even at that time, the government could have only secured the loyalty of its proxy Janjaweed militias by allowing them to keep the fertile lands from which they evicted the original inhabitants. Today’s violence is even more visibly fueled by monetary motivations, which include land grabbing; consolidating control of recently discovered gold mines; manipulating reconciliation conferences for increased “blood money”; expanding protection rackets and smuggling networks; demanding ransoms; undertaking bank robberies; and resum- ing the large-scale looting that marked earlier periods of the conflict.
  • Activist Brief: Sudan’S New Army of War Criminals

    Activist Brief: Sudan’S New Army of War Criminals

    Activist Brief: Sudan’s New Army of War Criminals The first six months of 2014 have brought devastating death and destruction in Sudan, on par with the height of the genocide in Darfur from 2003-2005. Despite the United Nations Security Council mandating that the Sudanese government disarm its Janjaweed militias a decade ago, it never did. Now, as the International Criminal Court’s chief prosecutor says, a new iteration of the Janjaweed have taken the country by storm. A new Enough Project Report, “Janjaweed Reincarnate,” traces the movements of these fighters -- newly trained, heavily armed, and re-branded as “Rapid Support Forces.” Who are the Rapid Support Forces? The Rapid Support Forces (RSF) is a “new security force” launched by the Sudanese government. Many of the same men who were once a part of the Janjaweed are now members or leaders within this new force. The Sudanese government says these forces are tasked with defeating rebels. However, in the past nine months, the RSF has been spotted around the country burning civilian areas to the ground, raping women, and displacing non-Arab civilians from their homes. Many of their attacks have been committed in tandem with aerial bombardments by the national army, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF). These lethal combinations have directly targeted life-saving medical facilities, schools, humanitarian infrastructure, and entirely civilian areas where no rebels were present. How do the RSF differ from the Janjaweed? The RSF are an upgraded version of the Janjaweed that the world came to fear in Darfur during the height of the genocide.
  • Selected Practice of the UN Security

    Selected Practice of the UN Security

    SELECTED PRACTISE OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL IN RELATION TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND THE ROME STATUTE SYSTEM (1998-2012) 3nd Update: 10 October 2012 Contents: 1. Highlights on the fight against impunity through referrals by the Security Council under Article 13 of the Rome Statute ........................................................................................................................ 3 1.1 Côte d’Ivoire .................................................................................................................................... 3 1.2 Darfur, Sudan ................................................................................................................................... 4 1.3 Democratic Republic of the Congo .................................................................................................. 5 1.4 Gaza ................................................................................................................................................. 5 1.5 Kenya ............................................................................................................................................... 5 1.6 Libya ................................................................................................................................................ 6 1.7 Mali .................................................................................................................................................. 6 1.8 Myanmar/Burma .............................................................................................................................
  • How to Implement Sudan's New Peace Agreement

    How to Implement Sudan's New Peace Agreement

    The Rebels Come to Khartoum: How to Implement Sudan’s New Peace Agreement Crisis Group Africa Briefing N°168 Khartoum/Nairobi/Brussels, 23 February 2021 What’s new? A peace agreement signed on 3 October 2020 paves the way for armed and unarmed opposition groups in Sudan to join the transitional government, dra- matically expanding representation of the country’s peripheries during the interim period before elections. The two most powerful rebel movements remain outside the accord, however. Why does it matter? Clinching the agreement was necessary for the country’s transition but implementation poses challenges. The agreement risks bloating the military and sets up a prospective political alliance between the rebels and Sudanese security forces, which could further sideline the government’s civilian cabinet and threaten to bury its reform agenda. What should be done? The interim government should negotiate with holdout rebels to bring them into the transition. Sudan’s international partners should press for security sector reform that decreases the size and political dominance of a newly expanded military while funding and supporting the authorities’ spending commit- ments in the peripheries. I. Overview Sudan’s October 2020 peace agreement, involving the interim government and rebel movements in Darfur and the Two Areas, among others, is an important step in the country’s transition after the ouster of former President Omar al-Bashir. The deal allows for representatives from armed groups in the country’s peripheries to take government posts and for significant public money to go to these areas. It is a way to rebalance the Nile Valley elites’ decades-long domination of Sudan’s political system.
  • Darfur and the Battle for Khartoum

    Darfur and the Battle for Khartoum

    Institute for Security Studies Situation Report Date Issued: 04 September 2006 Author: Mariam Bibi Jooma1 Distribution: General Contact: [email protected] Darfur and the Battle for Khartoum Sudan’s western region of Darfur has frequently featured in the headlines since Introduction the outbreak of major violence there in 2003. Indeed, it often seemed that international interest would remain focused upon Darfur, given the scale of human suffering and the immensity of the challenges facing the African Union’s (AU) peacekeeping operations in that vast area. It was little surprise, then, that the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) on 5 May this year between the Government of Sudan and the Minni Arkoi Minnawi faction of the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) was greeted with such relief in the media. Developments since the signing of the DPA, however, suggest that the political commitment to implementing its terms remains extremely weak, and there is a continued polarisation of affected ethnic communities, particularly within displacement camps, sometimes with fatal consequences. This has happened despite the appointment on 7 August of Minni Arkoi Minnawi, as the Special Assistant to the Sudanese President. Moreover, the period between May and July 2006 has seen the highest number of fatalities among aid workers since the beginning of 2003.2 This is quite aside from the continuing killing of Darfurians on a daily basis. In this unpredictable environment, the local population has become increasingly cynical of the potential peacekeeping role of the African Union Mission (AMIS) deployed to observe the implementation of the 2004 ceasefire agreement. A growing number of fatalities suffered by AMIS troops themselves in Darfur suggests that the African Union’s role as mediator and guarantor for the implementation of the DPA is being overtly challenged.