Darfur Genocide

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Darfur Genocide Darfur genocide Berkeley Model United Nations Welcome Letter Hi everyone! Welcome to the Darfur Historical Crisis committee. My name is Laura Nguyen and I will be your head chair for BMUN 69. This committee will take place from roughly 2006 to 2010. Although we will all be in the same physical chamber, you can imagine that committee is an amalgamation of peace conferences, UN meetings, private Janjaweed or SLM meetings, etc. with the goal of preventing the Darfur Genocide and ending the War in Darfur. To be honest, I was initially wary of choosing the genocide in Darfur as this committee’s topic; people in Darfur. I also understood that in order for this to be educationally stimulating for you all, some characters who committed atrocious war crimes had to be included in debate. That being said, I chose to move on with this topic because I trust you are all responsible and intelligent, and that you will treat Darfur with respect. The War in Darfur and the ensuing genocide are grim reminders of the violence that is easily born from intolerance. Equally regrettable are the in Africa and the Middle East are woefully inadequate for what Darfur truly needs. I hope that understanding those failures and engaging with the ways we could’ve avoided them helps you all grow and become better leaders and thinkers. My best advice for you is to get familiar with the historical processes by which ethnic brave, be creative, and have fun! A little bit about me (she/her) — I’m currently a third-year at Cal majoring in Sociology and minoring in Data Science. I care about the ways that justice, human rights, and data intersect. This is my seventh year in MUN (wow!) and third year in BMUN. Outside of BMUN, I’ve written for the Daily Californian and community organized with the Cal ACLU. Right now, I work for Planned Parenthood Advocacy Fund and do undergraduate research on reproductive justice. In my free time, I love to write, make quirky Spotify playlists, and harass my co-chairs. You can read more about them below! BERKELEY MODEL UNITED NATIONS 1 communal justice courts in Rwanda following the genocide. He concentrates on 1990s human rights history, and hopes to apply historical knowledge to restructure judicial approaches towards forms of supporting clients as a grievance caseworker or listening to Donald Glover while picking out nice curtains. He also indulges in hummus in his free time. Ryan Fiorito (he/him) is a third-year at Cal studying Political Science and Psychology. He believes that there is an intersection between behavioral psychology and political ideologies, and Besides BMUN, Ryan is in an international relations fraternity and acts a fool for two improv teams, many, many plant babies. He also loves talking smack about our head chair, Laura, to her face. Deepak Ragu (he/him) is a second-year at UC Berkeley double majoring in Computer Science and Political Science, and loves the intersection of technology, politics, and crisis committees. This MUN conferences has fostered his passion for international politics. He looks forward to passing In his free time, he loves to play Yu-Gi-Oh!, watch BTS meme videos, and get babied by the rest of his dais. particularly passionate about the organ donation aspect of healthcare, hoping to bridge disciplines of data analysis and technology to decrease the number of people on the waitlist for transplants. has been competing since she was 13 years old. She also loves listening to music, scrolling through Pinterest, and trying out new places to eat! The Darfur Crisis committee will run according to BMUN crisis procedure. You can read more about crisis procedure here and send us an email at [email protected] if you have any questions about the topic, procedure, or committee. One more thing: Don’t forget to regularly check your BERKELEY MODEL UNITED NATIONS 2 Laura Nguyen Genocide and Conflict in Darfur Topic Background The Darfur genocide shows us how an incredibly small group of combatants—“probably just a few thousand soldiers, rebels and so-called Janjaweed combined, mostly armed with little more than what might be found in a National Guard armory”—could wreak such devastation that more than a as if the ease by which they were able to do so implies that there is a simple solution to ending the War in Darfur, it is in fact quite the opposite. As a reminder, this historical committee will take place from roughly 2006 to 2010. The Republic of the Sudan Sudan is the largest and most ethnically diverse country in Africa, bordering nine other countries, including Egypt, Chad, Kenya and Ethiopia. During the 2000s, it was home to a population of about 35 million. In the 19th century, Sudan was colonized by both the Ottoman Empire and the British Empire. Like Map of Sudan BERKELEY MODEL UNITED NATIONS 3 and state structure are informed by its past subjection to European meddling (de Waal 2005:63). of native administration, which essentially created a hierarchy of tribal administrators that allowed tribal leaders to settle disputes among their subjects. Importantly, the native administration system organized people into tribal units. Britain hoped this would quash revolutionary nationalism and tidy the late twentieth century, native administration had a critical effect on establishing legal territories for ethnic groups. Some reproductions of native administration systems that allowed tribal leaders to allocate land and modern guns continued into the 21st century; these policies later laid the Before the region of Darfur gained international attention, Sudan was thought of as comprising two geographic and cultural regions: the north and the south. Northern Sudan is for contrast, southern Sudan contains a variety of different ethnic groups, and many individuals are Christian. Southerners are also usually considered ‘African’ for retaining traditional customs. During colonization, the Southern Sudanese were seen as inferior to the more modern northerners and or governance responsibilities. Thus, when Sudan gained independence in 1956, power remained concentrated in the capital, Khartoum, where resources were controlled by Arabs uninterested in In 1983, civil war broke out in Sudan when the government began to impose Sharia law as Christians in the south. This civil war became known as the Second Sudanese Civil War, during which the Sudan People’s Liberation Army led insurrections in the south (PBS Frontline World). The war ended with the independence of South Sudan around 2005. Notably, the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), known today as the South Sudan People’s Defense Forces, is the army of the Republic of South Sudan. First rising in tandem with the increasing “Arabization” and Islamization of Sudan, the SPLA was primarily composed of non-Arab Christians who rejected the imposition of sharia law Army (SLM/A), which adopted South Sudanese revolutionary leader John Garang’s philosophy of a BERKELEY MODEL UNITED NATIONS 4 “New Sudan” (de Waal 2005). During the Second Sudanese Civil War in 1989, a compromise between the ruling government in Khartoum and the Sudan People’s Liberation army seemed hopeful until Omar al- World). Indeed, the 1989 Coup accomplished bringing into power General Omar Hassan al- democratically elected once in 1996, Omar al-Bashir remained in power until he was ousted in 2019 (BBC 2019). However, in this committee, al-Bashir is still operating at the height of his power. The Region of Darfur the region of Darfur. Unlike in southern Sudan, the African tribes of the west were not bothered by comprises three main ecological zones: the northern arid zone, the central mountain range with rich soil and plentiful resources, and the southern semi-arid zone. Generally, landscapes in Darfur are posed problems for non-Arab peoples in Darfur by dividing the region into North, West, and South Darfur in order to ensure that the Fur were a minority in each of the states (Reyna 2010:1231). Using the scheme of “moral geographies” can help us conceptualize the ways that these ecological zones become socially distinct. Moral geography refers to the relationships among place, Islamic group of cultivators in the central Jebel Marra mountain range. For many decades, Darfur was neglected by a central government in Khartoum that knew little and cared less about whatever occurred in Darfur. Even during the Second Sudanese Civil War, the position of Darfur was almost Thus, the incorporation of the region of Darfur into Sudan was almost an afterthought. The result was the total neglect and historical marginalization of thousands of Darfurians who appeared to lack a BERKELEY MODEL UNITED NATIONS 5 common identity. boundaries between tribes and clans who then began to identify themselves as either ‘Arab’ or ‘non- under the system of native administration, indigenous people could manage their own affairs but only under colonial overseers. Native administration left Darfur unfortunately isolated from the rest of the country, which did not have native administration but was governed largely by Britain (Nielsen from outside Darfur to migrate into the region in search of arable land. The formation of ethnic wars of the 1980s that launched Darfur into a period of political, economic, and ecological changes An Ethnic Dichotomy: Arabs and non-Arab Africans Ethnic Groups in Darfur While the meaning of “ethnic group” takes on different connotations based on culture, an BERKELEY MODEL UNITED NATIONS 6 ethnic groups of Darfur and the greater Sudan, but it’s important to be familiar with them in order to movements such as the Masalit, Fur, and Zaghawa were overwhelmingly targeted in violent ethnic cleansing campaigns (Human Rights Watch 2005). EXAMPLES OF ETHNIC GROUPS, TRIBES IN DARFUR (de Waal 2005) Ethnic Group or Description Grouping Fur A non-Arab, Islamic group of cultivators located in the central Jebel Marra mountain range.
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