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Home , Ahmed Haroun, Darfur genocide, Emmanuel Karenzi Karake, Minni Minnawi, Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, Musa Hilal

Darfur

Berkeley Model Welcome Letter

Hi everyone! Welcome to the Historical Crisis committee. My name is Laura Nguyen and I will be your head chair for BMUN 69. This committee will take place from roughly 2006 to 2010. Although we will all be in the same physical chamber, you can imagine that committee is an amalgamation of peace conferences, UN meetings, private or SLM meetings, etc. with the goal of preventing the and ending the . To be honest, I was initially wary of choosing the genocide in Darfur as this committee’s topic; people in Darfur. I also understood that in order for this to be educationally stimulating for you all, some characters who committed atrocious war crimes had to be included in debate. That being said, I chose to move on with this topic because I trust you are all responsible and intelligent, and that you will treat Darfur with respect. The War in Darfur and the ensuing genocide are grim reminders of the violence that is easily born from intolerance. Equally regrettable are the in and the Middle East are woefully inadequate for what Darfur truly needs. I hope that understanding those failures and engaging with the ways we could’ve avoided them helps you all grow and become better leaders and thinkers. My best advice for you is to get familiar with the historical processes by which ethnic brave, be creative, and have fun! A little bit about me (she/her) — I’m currently a third-year at Cal majoring in Sociology and minoring in Data Science. I care about the ways that justice, , and data intersect. This is my seventh year in MUN (wow!) and third year in BMUN. Outside of BMUN, I’ve written for the Daily Californian and community organized with the Cal ACLU. Right now, I work for Planned Parenthood Advocacy Fund and do undergraduate research on reproductive justice. In my free time, I love to write, make quirky Spotify playlists, and harass my co-chairs. You can read more about them below!

BERKELEY MODEL UNITED NATIONS 1 communal justice courts in following the genocide. He concentrates on 1990s human rights history, and hopes to apply historical knowledge to restructure judicial approaches towards forms of supporting clients as a grievance caseworker or listening to Donald Glover while picking out nice curtains. He also indulges in hummus in his free time. Ryan Fiorito (he/him) is a third-year at Cal studying Political Science and Psychology. He believes that there is an intersection between behavioral psychology and political ideologies, and Besides BMUN, Ryan is in an international relations fraternity and acts a fool for two improv teams, many, many plant babies. He also loves talking smack about our head chair, Laura, to her face. Deepak Ragu (he/him) is a second-year at UC Berkeley double majoring in Computer Science and Political Science, and loves the intersection of technology, politics, and crisis committees. This MUN conferences has fostered his passion for international politics. He looks forward to passing In his free time, he loves to play Yu-Gi-Oh!, watch BTS meme videos, and get babied by the rest of his dais. particularly passionate about the organ donation aspect of healthcare, hoping to bridge disciplines of data analysis and technology to decrease the number of people on the waitlist for transplants. has been competing since she was 13 years old. She also loves listening to music, scrolling through Pinterest, and trying out new places to eat! The Darfur Crisis committee will run according to BMUN crisis procedure. You can read more about crisis procedure here and send us an email at [email protected] if you have any questions about the topic, procedure, or committee. One more thing: Don’t forget to regularly check your BERKELEY MODEL UNITED NATIONS 2

Laura Nguyen

Genocide and Conflict in Darfur

Topic Background

The Darfur genocide shows us how an incredibly small group of combatants—“probably just a few thousand soldiers, rebels and so-called Janjaweed combined, mostly armed with little more than what might be found in a National Guard armory”—could wreak such devastation that more than a as if the ease by which they were able to do so implies that there is a simple solution to ending the War in Darfur, it is in fact quite the opposite. As a reminder, this historical committee will take place from roughly 2006 to 2010.

The Republic of the

Sudan is the largest and most ethnically diverse country in Africa, bordering nine other countries, including , , Kenya and Ethiopia. During the , it was home to a population of about 35 million. In the 19th century, Sudan was colonized by both the and the . Like Map of Sudan

BERKELEY MODEL UNITED NATIONS 3 and state structure are informed by its past subjection to European meddling (de Waal 2005:63). of native administration, which essentially created a hierarchy of tribal administrators that allowed tribal leaders to settle disputes among their subjects. Importantly, the native administration system organized people into tribal units. Britain hoped this would quash revolutionary nationalism and tidy the late twentieth century, native administration had a critical effect on establishing legal territories for ethnic groups. Some reproductions of native administration systems that allowed tribal leaders to allocate land and modern guns continued into the ; these policies later laid the Before the region of Darfur gained international attention, Sudan was thought of as comprising two geographic and cultural regions: the north and the south. Northern Sudan is for contrast, southern Sudan contains a variety of different ethnic groups, and many individuals are Christian. Southerners are also usually considered ‘African’ for retaining traditional customs. During colonization, the Southern Sudanese were seen as inferior to the more modern northerners and or governance responsibilities. Thus, when Sudan gained independence in 1956, power remained concentrated in the capital, , where resources were controlled by uninterested in In 1983, broke out in Sudan when the government began to impose Sharia law as Christians in the south. This civil war became known as the Second Sudanese Civil War, during which the Sudan People’s Liberation Army led insurrections in the south (PBS Frontline World). The war ended with the independence of around 2005. Notably, the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), known today as the South Sudan People’s Defense Forces, is the army of the Republic of South Sudan. First rising in tandem with the increasing “” and Islamization of Sudan, the SPLA was primarily composed of non-Arab Christians who rejected the imposition of sharia law Army (SLM/A), which adopted South Sudanese revolutionary leader ’s philosophy of a BERKELEY MODEL UNITED NATIONS 4 “New Sudan” (de Waal 2005). During the Second Sudanese Civil War in 1989, a compromise between the ruling government in Khartoum and the Sudan People’s Liberation army seemed hopeful until Omar al- World). Indeed, the 1989 Coup accomplished bringing into power General Omar Hassan al- democratically elected once in 1996, Omar al-Bashir remained in power until he was ousted in 2019 (BBC 2019). However, in this committee, al-Bashir is still operating at the height of his power.

The Region of Darfur

the region of Darfur. Unlike in southern Sudan, the African tribes of the west were not bothered by comprises three main ecological zones: the northern arid zone, the central mountain range with rich soil and plentiful resources, and the southern semi-arid zone. Generally, landscapes in Darfur are posed problems for non-Arab peoples in Darfur by dividing the region into North, West, and in order to ensure that the Fur were a minority in each of the states (Reyna 2010:1231). Using the scheme of “moral geographies” can help us conceptualize the ways that these ecological zones become socially distinct. Moral geography refers to the relationships among place, Islamic group of cultivators in the central Jebel Marra mountain range. For many decades, Darfur was neglected by a central government in Khartoum that knew little and cared less about whatever occurred in Darfur. Even during the Second Sudanese Civil War, the position of Darfur was almost Thus, the incorporation of the region of Darfur into Sudan was almost an afterthought. The result was the total neglect and historical marginalization of thousands of Darfurians who appeared to lack a BERKELEY MODEL UNITED NATIONS 5 common identity. boundaries between tribes and clans who then began to identify themselves as either ‘Arab’ or ‘non- under the system of native administration, indigenous people could manage their own affairs but only under colonial overseers. Native administration left Darfur unfortunately isolated from the rest of the country, which did not have native administration but was governed largely by Britain (Nielsen from outside Darfur to migrate into the region in search of arable land. The formation of ethnic wars of the 1980s that launched Darfur into a period of political, economic, and ecological changes

An Ethnic Dichotomy: Arabs and non-Arab Africans

Ethnic Groups in Darfur

While the meaning of “” takes on different connotations based on culture, an BERKELEY MODEL UNITED NATIONS 6 ethnic groups of Darfur and the greater Sudan, but it’s important to be familiar with them in order to movements such as the Masalit, Fur, and Zaghawa were overwhelmingly targeted in violent campaigns ( 2005).

EXAMPLES OF ETHNIC GROUPS, TRIBES IN DARFUR (de Waal 2005)

Ethnic Group or Description Grouping Fur A non-Arab, Islamic group of cultivators located in the central Jebel Marra mountain range. Their agricultural production is oriented towards local markets and traders. One of the three largest tribes in Darfur.

Historically, the nomadic southern Baggara and the sedentary central Fur maintained a symbiotic relationship where the Fur left their cattle in the care of the Baggara. By contrast, the Fur had little interaction with the northern Abbala. Masalit, Gama, and Non-Arab cultivators that inhabit the central farming belt. The Masalit are Tama one of the three largest tribes in Darfur. Zaghawa Non-Arab historically privileged group. One of the three largest tribes in Darfur. Although they make up less than 8 percent of the Darfur population, with other tribes. Zayyadiyya An Arab group. Baggara and Abbala Nomadic groups that comprise much of the Arab population in Darfur. They carry an important tradition of herding livestock between Lake Chad and the River. Many are located in northern and southern Darfur. The Janjaweed that were supported by the Sudanese government in 2003 were overwhelmingly made up of the Abbala.

Most of the Arab groups involved in activities like land grabbing began with the Abbala, whereas most southern were initially between tribes and ethnic groups; the Baggara Rizeigat are the largest and most powerful tribe in Darfur, more recently joining Janjaweed forces to quash rebels.

BERKELEY MODEL UNITED NATIONS 7 “Arabs” and “non-Arabs”

In Sudan, “Arab” is both an ethnic and cultural term, typically “referring to those who can trace their ancestry to the original inhabitants of the Arabian peninsula and whose mother tongue is that is radically inadequate for capturing the diverse ethnic identities of Darfur. Polarization is so entrenched that community leaders for whom the term ‘African’ might have been out of place now readily identify themselves as such (de Waal 2005). Despite its uselessness, the Arab vs. African dichotomy survives in powerful ways that are particularly alarming amid the concurrent militarization trauma not only for the women victims but for the communities that they belong to (Nielsen 2008). Modern notions of Arab supremacy in Sudan date back to colonial rule, where or Arabized groups like the Jellaba were distinguished by their style of clothes, housing, and standard of living (Nielsen 2008). As a state, Sudan champions Arabism, uses Arabic as a language of instruction in schools and in the media, and promotes Islam as a state ideology. Its political discourse around independence concerned whether Sudan would “opt for unity with Egypt,” and subsequent part of the Arab or African world” (de Waal 2005). The scattered human rights reports about Darfur that emerged in 2003 pointed to evidence of Sudanese military and ‘Arab’ militia forces called the Janjaweed attacking and destroying many tribal villages in the homeland of ‘non-Arab’ insurgent groups known as the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) (Human Rights Watch 2005).

War in Darfur (Land Cruiser War): February 2003 - present

and southern Sudan that began in 1956. That is to say, “the notions of ethnicity that have been BERKELEY MODEL UNITED NATIONS 8 employed in Darfur are uniquely different from those in the rest of the country” (Nielsen 2008). Darfur inhabitants felt that new Arabization policies were increasingly marginalizing them. In April 2003, the Sudan Liberation Army and the Justice and Equality Movement, backed by the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army, incited a major offensive against the government of Sudan by attacking and capturing government property, including El Fasher airport (Responsibility to Protect). In response to these events — a product of pushback against the government for sidelining non-Arabs — Sudan teamed up with forces known as the Janjaweed hoping to squash rebel sentiments. Rather than looking for rebels, however, state-sanctioned paramilitary forces “simply widespread or systematic attack on a civilian population, whether during peacetime or war,” while war crimes are “serious violations of international humanitarian law and the laws of war that incur individual criminal responsibility” (Human Rights Watch 2005). and war crimes committed by the Sudanese military along with state-sanctioned militia forces have included theft of millions of livestock, and the of more than two million people” (Human Rights Watch 2005). In addition, livestock is the main economic target; it is estimated that non-Arab groups lost 50 to 90 percent of their livestock to the Janjaweed, who typically redistributed it to other Arab pastoralists (Nielsen 2008). Notably, in some places, Arab villages ended up suffering from retaliatory strikes led by African militias or the SLA, demonstrating that no one’s hands are conferences in 1989 and 1990 demonstrate that native administration is not a solution in itself, but BERKELEY MODEL UNITED NATIONS 9 Chad, was ultimately repeatedly violated by all parties. Janjaweed forces, backed by the Sudanese government, continued military operations against rebel forces and continued attacking civilians, and looted government facilities (Human Rights Watch 2005).

Residents waiting for peacekeeper visit.

Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A)

Although originally formed as an alliance between the Fur and Zaghawa tribes, the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) is somewhat of a guerrilla group that represents a coalition of communities in arms. Its leadership is composed mostly of members of the Zaghawa tribe who feel that Darfur has been neglected by the government in Sudan, and that African tribes are particularly on an airport in El Fasher in 2003, where the SLM/A killed about 100 soldiers by shooting up military Compared to the JEM, the SLM/A does not have a swift political plan, instead largely reacting to events. They generally believe that international intervention is the best course of action of the Agreement, otherwise known as the . The Sudan Liberation Movement/Army-Minnawi (SLM/A-MM), composed largely of Zaghawa, accepted the agreement, while the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army-al-Nur (SLM/A-AW), composed largely of Fur, rejected in the peace process. Although the two groups have ideological differences, they remain BERKELEY MODEL UNITED NATIONS 10 willing to cooperate with one another, but remain critically weakened due to the split (“Darfur Rebel

many smaller splinter groups outside of the aforementioned SLM/A-MM and the SLM/A-AW.

Justice and Equality Movement (JEM)

The Justice and Equality Movement is the SLM/A’s sister guerrilla group, believing that southern Africans and western Arabs have been disenfranchised by a northern Arab-controlled government ( 2010). The JEM apparently has a more tangible strategy for regime change, aiming to position the atrocities of Darfur such that the Khartoum government is internationally in the region of Darfur that borders Chad (Al Jazeera 2010). The government in Khartoum remains distrustful of JEM because they have close ties with former National Islamic Front leader Hassan al-Turabi, who originally backed al-Bashir’s coup but advocated for the inclusion of non-Arabs and western Arabs in decision making and was later ousted by al-Bashir (Al Jazeera 2010). The JEM’s philosophy is believed to be the Black Book, an anti-separatist, anonymous manifesto that condemned the marginalization of Darfuris and demanded a social democracy, constitutional reform, and regional empowerment (Sudan Tribune). While the SLM/A demands a liberal, secular state, the JEM remains skeptical of secularism and has historically opted for non-secularism (Sudan Tribune).

Group of JEM soldiers.

BERKELEY MODEL UNITED NATIONS 11 Working with other groups is key to Darfurians’ ability to mobilize a strong rebel movement. In 2011, with both factions of the SLM/A, the JEM formed the Sudan Revolutionary Front, or SRF, SRF aims to further unify all opposition forces in Darfur and more generally Sudan. The National Redemption Front (NRF) is another coalition that includes the Justice and Equality Movement, and it rejects the Abuja Agreement. However, it only includes the SLM-AW, who did not sign the Darfur

Janjaweed

“Janjaweed” means “devils on horseback.” Rather than being a centralized organization, the tracing the ’s Janjaweed militia” 2019). They are widely believed to be the principal drivers of the genocide in Darfur. The Janjaweed originated during the mid-1980s when Darfur was going through a tumultuous period of chronic marginalization from Khartoum, severe drought administration and indigenous dispute-resolving mechanisms. As of around 2010, the Sudanese government has largely denied its ties to Janjaweed forces. organizing, equipping, and training Janjaweed militias.

Rapid Support Forces (RSF)

The (RSF) are a paramilitary force that grew out of the Janjaweed in 2003 (“Who are Sudan’s RSF and their commander Hemeti?” 2019). They report directly to President al-Bashir and operate under the Sudanese Army. The RSF employs the same scorched-earth tactics

BERKELEY MODEL UNITED NATIONS 12 Darfur Genocide and Ethnic Cleansing

The government of Sudan contends that the situation in Darfur is less about a dichotomy the racial and ethnic components of the Darfur genocide could effectively negate accusations of genocide, thus serving Khartoum’s interest in continuing to primarily persecute non-Arabs and of the international community charge Khartoum with genocide, Khartoum shifts culpability over to tribes, who they claim are merely acting under conditions of ecological stress like drought and famine (Reyna 2010). In general, attacks against civilians in Darfur usually follow a pattern that begins with the government bombing villages and Janjaweed forces riding into these bombed villages to pillage, rape, and (PBS Frontline World). underestimated. Susan Brownmiller notes that the motivation behind the systematic wartime rape often conducted during ethnic cleansing campaigns is to both terrorize, demoralize, and humiliate entire communities and reward troops (Cohen). In the case of , perpetrators aim to disrupt the ethnic lineage of genetic offspring.

BERKELEY MODEL UNITED NATIONS 13 THE EIGHT STAGES OF GENOCIDE (Holocaust Explained)

1 CLASSIFICATION: All cultures have categories to i.e. Separate one group from “distinguish people into ‘us and them’ by ethnicity, race, another, making a clear difference religion, or nationality” between one and another. 2 SYMBOLIZATION: “We give names or other symbols i.e. Placing labels on a group to set them apart from the others. are universally human and do not necessarily result Calling them names, making them wear something to separate them, dehumanization. When combined with hatred, symbols making them stand out from the may be forced upon unwilling members of pariah others in a negative light. groups.” 3 DEHUMANIZATION: One group denies the humanity of i.e. When one group is treated as the other group. Members of it are equated with animals, less than human and human rights vermin, insects or diseases. Dehumanization “overcomes are stripped away. the normal human revulsion against murder.” ORGANIZATION: Genocide is always organized, “usually i.e. When a group of people take by the state, though sometimes informally or by terrorist the liberty of others away, usually groups. Special army units or militias are often trained by force, with plans to harm them. and armed. Plans are made for genocidal killings.” 5 i.e. When people use hate, groups broadcast polarizing propaganda.” violence, , and any other means to keep people separated. 6 i.e. When humans become victims because of their ethnic or religious identity. Death lists and that group keeps being are drawn up. Members of victim groups are forced to victimized over and over. There is wear identifying symbols. They are often segregated into no mistake over the treatment of the victim. a famine-struck region and starved.” i.e. When members of a targeted becomes the legally called “genocide.” It group are killed at will. believe their victims to be fully human. 8 DENIAL: The perpetrators of genocide dig up the mass i.e. The group that commits graves, burn the bodies, “try to cover up the evidence crimes against another group but and intimidate the witnesses. They deny that they doesn’t think that it is wrong and committed any crimes, and often blame what happened will not admit to any wrongdoing. on the victims.”

BERKELEY MODEL UNITED NATIONS 14 Drought and Famine

Other than escalating ethnic tensions, one often neglected root cause of the Darfur genocide relationships between farming and nomadic communities; because water is scarce during droughts, are unable to freely herd their animals, turning instead to establishing semi-permanent or natural resources and farmland. The mingling of large numbers of northerners in southerners’ lands only stressed an already fragile land tenure system (Reyna 2010). Further complicating matters is the dismantlement of the intercommunal negotiation system, a form of native administration. Previously, farmers and nomads allowed their respective tribe elders to settle disputes. By the 1980s, coinciding with the rise in droughts, Sudan’s government, seeking forced civilians to push disputes through the state bureaucracy. Because farmers are typically from African tribes while nomads are Arab, a predominantly Arab-controlled government often takes the side of nomadic or semi-pastoral groups. As a result, Arabs and non-Arabs alike are equally culpable

Areas in Darfur have arable land. It’s important to note that many Arab tribal leaders do not allow their communities to support the Janjaweed. They did not want to risk their already fragile relationships with African farmers, on whom they depend for fodder in the dry season (Lindijer). The Arab population in Darfur should not be conceived as a monolith. BERKELEY MODEL UNITED NATIONS 15 Past United Nations/Nongovernmental Organization Response

Darfur Peace Agreements (DPAs)

In both 2006 and 2011, the Government of Sudan and Darfur-based rebel groups signed Darfur Peace Agreements with intentions to resolve the Darfur Crisis (Corissajoy 2016).

Abuja Agreement

The Abuja Agreement, also known simply as the Darfur Peace Agreement, was signed in 2006 by al-Bashir’s Sudanese Government and the faction of the SLM/A headed by Minni Minnawai (Nathan 2006). However, this agreement was rejected by JEM and the other faction of the SLA, headed by Abdul Wahid al Nur. The agreement was broad, ranging from power-sharing and demilitarization to wealth-sharing and humanitarian assistance. The agreement stipulated that Sudan was to demilitarize its Janjaweed militia by 2006 and restricted and downsized other defence forces (Nathan 2006). A new democratic process was formulated to allow the people of Darfur to democratically elect their new leaders and determine the balance of power, as well as decide their status as a region. Economic assistance was to come from international donors, who had been committed to hold a conference to raise additional funds for Darfur. Finally, to address displaced persons and enable humanitarian assistance, buffer zones were to be placed around camps. Negotiations for the accord were led by chief negotiator Salim Ahmen Salim, who was working on behalf of the , US Deputy Secretary of State , various AU representatives, and other foreign representatives (Nathan 2006).

Leaders sign the Doha Document.

BERKELEY MODEL UNITED NATIONS 16 presence of violent protests as well as the joint formation of an offensive military by the Sudanese Government and the Minnawai-headed SLA faction intended on forcefully destroying the rebellion (Nathan 2006). , the UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative in Sudan, warned in 2006 of the weaknesses of the DPA and the likelihood of failure, highlighting that while it was a reasonable and fair compromise, it was not widely accepted by the people of Darfur and additionally faced resistance by internally displaced peoples (IDPs) (Nathan 2006). Due to a lack of agreement between negotiating parties, a rushed decision by the AU of deadline diplomacy, and ineffective mediation, the 2006 DPA ultimately did not succeed. For the purposes of this committee, the Abuja Agreement has been recently signed.

Doha Agreement

The Doha Agreement, also known as the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur, was signed in 2011 by the Sudanese Government and the Liberation and Justice Movement (UNAMID 2015). The main stipulations of this agreement consisted of a compensation fund for the victims of the the national level, and established a Darfur Regional Authority to oversee the region until its status as a region had been decided by referendum to decide its place in the state of Sudan (UNAMID BERKELEY MODEL UNITED NATIONS 17 2015). That being said, this document faced severe limitations in the groups it represented (“Sudan’s two million displaced persons and Arab communities that felt the government was not representing and riddled with controversy, as international actors that drafted the agreement claimed upwards of 600 civil society groups endorsed the document; in reality, these groups had not even seen Perhaps the greatest controversy was the role in the South Sudanese government when it came to the Liberation and Justice Movement (LJM), a new group with dissenters of both the SLA faction this committee, the Doha Agreement has not been signed; delegates should act as if the agreement

Continued Issues

threatened to impose sanctions on Sudan if the state failed to comply with its obligation to disarm and prevent human rights abuses in Darfur. This resolution also established an international inquiry to Council had invoked the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide Although no country voted against the resolution, it is worthwhile to note that four abstentions came Non-signatories are still being reached out to and intensive efforts to get them to sign and commit to peace agreements are still currently underway. There are numerous recommendations for how to bring both sides to the table and have them sign a peace agreement in the future, including BERKELEY MODEL UNITED NATIONS 18 proper and rapid deployment of UNAMID to improve human security, mediators initiating cross-

African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID)

instatement of an A.U. observer mission known as the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) the UN Department of Operations (DPKO) as part of a plan to reform and improve resolve the situation, and as such was to be reborn as a part of a joint-deployment peacekeeping was to be reviewed yearly to discuss its results and continued feasibility, and with the passage of UNAMID’s basic tenets are to protect civilians, facilitate humanitarian assistance, serve as uniformed peacekeepers, making it one of the world’s largest peacekeeping operations. (UNAMID issues include logistical, security, and infrastructure problems as well as a lack of resources, but with

BERKELEY MODEL UNITED NATIONS 19 UNAMID Peacekeepers.

which reduced the police strength on the ground in Darfur by withdrawing troops from the region, humanitarian issues, such as mass displacement of civilians and attacks on UNAMID itself, had arisen. This, along with other operational and political challenges, prompted the UNSC to reduce to 11,000 by 2018 (UNAMID 2018). Peacekeeping would now be focused in , while Peacebuilding and enhancing rule of law would be emphasized in other regions. The status of UNAMID is reviewed yearly by the UNSC, and as of June 2020, the UNAMID mission deployment

United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS)

UNITAMS is a relatively recent development in the UN’s actions in attempting to resolve June, 2020, established a new political mission in Sudan to assist its transition towards democracy by supporting peace negotiations and maintaining accountable institutions based on rule of law (UN 2020). UNITAMS will further assist in the process of drafting a new Constitution and ensuring 2020). Essentially, UNITAMS will serve as a peacebuilding measure while the Darfur crisis is resolved BERKELEY MODEL UNITED NATIONS 20 economic support and stability as well. UNITAMS will be focused largely in the Darfur region, as well as the Southern and areas (UN 2020). The Security Council advised that UNITAMS be implemented immediately, to come into fruition by October 21st, and should be fully deployed no later than January 21st (this plan, unfortunately, was delayed due to Coronavirus, in preparation for the eventual deployment of UNITAMS) (UN 2020). As of the timeline for this

Humanitarian from Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs)

Since the start of the Darfur crisis in 2003, humanitarian assistance has been provided by various nations and organizations, including NATO and USAID (GAO 2006). From October 2003 aid, helping reduce malnutrition and mortality rates. However, these organizations face numerous obstacles in providing assistance due to problems such as the continued insecurity in the region, restricted access to communities in need placed by the Sudanese government, and an inability to monitor and report usage of funds (GAO 2006). Additionally, while organizations such as AMIS Furthermore, structural issues within AMIS, such as bad organization, mismanagement, not enough AMIS to provide aid (GAO 2006). In 2006, the Sudanese Government passed a law that restricted NGO access to Sudan, thus hampering humanitarian aid (United Nations High Commissioner for 2006). On February informally known as the NGO Law. Included in this law was a measure that required all NGOs to register with the government’s Humanitarian Aid Commission, which thus allowed the HAC to regulate which (if any) NGOs were allowed to work in Sudan. This law received widespread backlash from other nations such as the US and France, as well as UN bodies such as UNICEF for trying to BERKELEY MODEL UNITED NATIONS 21 restrict access to humanitarian aid. However, while the Sudanese government promised to cover the reduced the access of 1.5 million persons to healthcare; 1.16 million to water, sanitation, and hygiene; and 1.1 million to food aid” (HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT 2009). Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere (CARE) recently began the South Darfur SDEARP provides humanitarian aid with a special focus on reproductive care, and provides additional support for healthcare, nutrition, agriculture, food security, water, hygiene, and sanitation (CARE 2020). UNICEF has also been taking measures to secure the safety of children in this region million children with health and nutritional interventions, such as the measles vaccine and other common vaccinations (UNICEF 2018). While NGOs are still largely restricted by the Sudanese government and their efforts to provide humanitarian aid are blocked by the government, the NGOs continue to work with other nations and the UN to provide help to the people of Darfur (CARE 2020).

Refugee camp for Darfur refugees.

BERKELEY MODEL UNITED NATIONS 22 International Action and Response

Intervention from Foreign Nations

Sudan had placed on foreign relief agencies in order to allow supplies and personnel to enter Darfur. When the United Nations places pressure on countries to adhere to demands, they usually do so to Algeria, Pakistan, , and as the “Darfur Four.” By that, they mean that each of these countries maintains major oil investments in Sudan, opposing U.N. Security Council calls for arms and oil embargoes. Indeed, the South Sudan People’s Defence Forces describes oil as a “legitimate military target,” arguing that oil revenue has directly funded Khartoum’s hundreds of human rights Oil revenue is just one variable that would cause international actors to drag their feet. With respect to genocide, the international community is often reluctant to label events as genocide countries like the U.S. to actually do something” (PBS NewsHour). During the , Rohingya in Myanmar as genocide because Obama did not want to undermine Myanmar’s transition from military rule to democracy and destabilize UN relief efforts in the country. Even though the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine says that the international community must intervene if a state is unable to protect its population from war crimes and crimes against humanity, politics African press. When most people think of the war in Darfur, they think of bands of government- backed, light-skinned ‘Arabs’ terrorizing peaceful, non-Arab ‘Africans.’ In other words, Darfur’s Arabs are terrorizers and Darfur’s Africans are victims. From the point of view of the central Sudanese government in Khartoum, these labels are tactically useful. De Waal argues that the media spectacle of the War in Darfur allows them to turn the “moral loading” of the term ‘Arab’ to their advantage

BERKELEY MODEL UNITED NATIONS 23 because it allows them to appeal to fellow members. To some leaders in the Arab world, Darfur may represent another attempt by the west — particularly the — to implies “global victimhood” (de Waal 2005). This dimension is one reason why Khartoum has been able to shield itself from a western condemnation of what they count as genocide.

The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide

In the United States, a broader interpretation of the is legally correct and therefore actionable, but it is unfortunately still one that diplomats have been avoiding for decades. Confronting such a broad interpretation would mean confronting intervention in the vast, indeterminate grey areas of atrocities in foreign countries. This means that if Darfur is genocide, then so is “Congo, , , , and a host of others” (de Waal 2005).

Genocide Ethnic cleansing According to the Convention on the Preven- tion and Punishment of the Crime of Geno- of a group from a certain area. cide, genocide is done “with the intent to destroy an ethnic, national, racial or reli- Without provable intent, a group or indi- gious group”: vidual can still be guilty of “crimes against 1. “Killing members of the group humanity” or “ethnic cleansing” but not 2. Causing serious bodily or mental genocide. Ethnic cleansing is currently not harm recognized as a crime under international 3. law. life calculated to bring about the group’s physical destruction in whole or in part genocide is that “tribunals have historically Imposing measures intended to pre- struggled to establish a legal standard for vent births . Few perpetrators, with the 5. Forcibly transferring children” eradicate groups.”

BERKELEY MODEL UNITED NATIONS 24 Darfur Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)

across the border to neighboring Chad (Responsibility to Protect) By 2005, much of the targeted population in Darfur was already displaced from the most fertile arable land. The fact that hundreds and thousands of native Darfurians were displaced from their homes within just two to three years of In camps temporarily housing percent of the people were women and children role in displacing Darfurians, the government in Sudan has acknowledged that it is the government’s top priority to return refugees to their homes in Darfur (Anderson 2005). This is likely the result of threats of sanctions from the United Nations, who can deny Sudan critical access to world markets (Human Rights Watch). For some period of time, Khartoum demonstrated that it could respond positively to demands from bodies like the United Nations, showing that they can protect refugee camps from further policemen in Darfur and allowed some African Union observers to monitor the situation (Anderson

BERKELEY MODEL UNITED NATIONS 25 Case Studies

CASE STUDY 1: Learning from the Lebanese Civil War

off of their successes while avoiding their mistakes. Such is the case with Lebanon; the country was The root causes of the Lebanese Civil War can be traced to ethnic tensions, as well as intervention from outside actors. Because of its location, Lebanon was unwillingly dragged into opposing factions. The division was made mainly on religious grounds, as the minority Muslim Lebanese supported Palestinian forces whereas the majority Christian Lebanese opposed them (Sune, “The Historiography and the Memory of the Lebanes Civil War” 2011). Despite this, This caused a turning point in the relations between Lebanon and Israel with the latter performing a full scale invasion of the former. Syria also decided to join the fray, partially occupying the southern parts of the country in hopes of curbing Palestinian attacks (Sune 2011). The two Lebanese groups, ideas about the country’s leadership and religious identity. The stage had been set for a massive, country-wide reformation, paving the way for the Taif Agreement. The Taif Agreement was only made possible through diplomatic negotiations and oversight from outside countries, but allowed for systemic change in the way Lebanon was governed. Surviving political leaders from opposing military sects met in Taif, to negotiate the

BERKELEY MODEL UNITED NATIONS 26 terms of a peace agreement. The goals were clear, as negotiations “primarily aimed to end the decades-long Lebanese Civil War, reform the Lebanese political system, reassert Lebanese authority in Southern Lebanon, which was then occupied by Israel, and prompt the complete withdrawal of Syrian forces from the country” (Yassine, “Everything You Need To Know About the Infamous Taif Agreement” 2020). Negotiations were overseen by outside actors, mainly Saudi Arabia, France, Egypt, and the US, who helped develop some of the terms. It is important to note, however, that the agreement was only strengthened through outside intervention - as much as it was written law, the Taif negotiations helped foster an environment that was conducive to debate and compromise. Therefore, the document provided outlines for more long term solutions, whereas the process tenets were not realized immediately, but were gradually accomplished in the years following the document’s creation (Krayem). The Taif Agreement is notable for its accomplishments in restructuring Lebanese Parliament, paving the way for future changes. Krayem notes, “The intention of this agreement was to eradicate as it was ensured by the old formula and to allow for equitable participation of Christians and Muslims in the sect (Peace Accords Matrix). This equitable division is further observable in the roles given to certain parliament positions, as traditionally Muslim roles (like Prime Minister and Speaker for Parliament) were strengthened, with responsibilities being divested and retistributed from the Christian presidential position. This redistribution of powers was integral in transitioning partially from a semi-presidential system A breakdown of the goals and to a parliamentary system, giving more representation limitations of the Taif Agreement BERKELEY MODEL UNITED NATIONS 27 to all identities within the country (Krayem). This restructuring of the government also led to a sense be a space for ALL Lebanese to live in regardless of religious identities (Peace Accords Matrix 1999). Through this mindset, the government was able to realize its Arab identity and strengthen ties to other Arab countries (Krayem). In terms of longevity, the provisions listed in the Taif Agreement took time to realize, and removal of Israeli troops. Up until 2005, Syria was integral in quelling disputes between Sunni and Shia Muslims, but upon pulling out, tensions between the two groups heightened once more and peaked again during the (Bahout, “The Unraveling of Lebanon’s Taif Agreement 2016). Because of its reliance on outside forces in restructuring the country, Lebanon was under and in political deadlock from 2013-2016, demonstrating the potential drawbacks of implementing such a system (Bahout 2016). how political negotiations and peaceful reform are a plausible solution - but at the same time, this route can be a double edged sword that can heighten tensions within a country. The process of agreeing upon the Taif Accords can serve as a model for resolving some of the underlying issues in Darfur, but delegates must understand the riddled past of the region and its differences from attention to how this and other factors differentiate Lebanon from Sudan. Simply replicating the region and its background must be employed in order to develop appropriate routes of action. When developing political solutions, keep this in mind; the Taif Agreement and its process What is stated in the Taif Agreement is important, but understanding how and why is essential. How can political processes be replicated in a way that displays regional sensitivity and BERKELEY MODEL UNITED NATIONS 28 systemic tensions in Darfur? A successful solution will research these points and understand how

CASE STUDY 2: Sexual Violence in Darfur as an Act of Genocide

According to various human rights watchdog organizations such as and rape as a tool of war against various communities where rebel groups were entrenched within Darfur. From a UCSF study on “Rape as a Weapon of War in Darfur,” academic Fardowsa Abdullahi describes, “rape as a weapon of war is a strategy of ethnic cleansing.” She notes that rape is described in by Janie Leatherman “as ‘a weapon and strategy (Report in the government military’s attacks the consideration of “whether or not acts of genocide have occurred.” This is a part of the UN’s high standard to determine which acts were violations of humanitarian and human rights law versus pervasive effects and genocidal acts that could only result from an intent to destroy (Report of the “gendered” violence, but it rarely has risen to the surface as an issue that is a stand-alone genocidal the Rwandan Genocide. The Genocide in Rwanda however shifted attitudes internationally away violation of international human rights including acts of genocide. As stated within the Law and Social Inquiry Journal, (Hagan, Brooks, Haugh, 2010). While the 1990s were thereby a breakthrough in the prosecution of BERKELEY MODEL UNITED NATIONS 29 and developing. As mentioned in the Hagan and Brooks article, “In Rwanda, the widespread rape of women comprised a form of genocide, according to the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda,” but a similar conclusion about the situation in Darfur, was not reached by the Commission set up by the UN (Haugh, 2010).

Rape as a weapon of war

acts of genocide like the violence committed by perpetrators against Tutsi women in the Rwandan case, remain uncertain, but the government coordination with the Janjaweed, and their subsequent degree of removal from the Janjaweed may have played into blurring the line. Having the government orchestrate the genocide while incentivizing militias to commit acts of genocide individual units in the Janjaweed militias and the Sudanese army. This degree of separation that down hierarchy, was argued in the defense case for Omar Al Bashir’s acquittal from crimes against BERKELEY MODEL UNITED NATIONS 30 international jurisprudence. In Omar Al Bashir’s trial for instance, the charge of rape was counted as a crime against humanity but not a genocidal act. The lack of pursuit from the ICC of these charges at an elevated degree of crimes of genocide, boils down to the lack of information and According to former High Commissioner of Human Rights, Navi Pillay, “the international community and politicians.” The “tip of the iceberg” that is emphasized more often therefore often prevents violence ought to be treated as a genocidal act, rather than a minor offense amongst the politicized crimes in international justice systems and courts like the ICC (Haugh, 2010). that the broad term “crimes against humanity” considers, as posed in Rape, Genocide, and Women’s Human Rights. The author, Catherine MacKinnon writes, “It is rape as an instrument of “a. imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group, and b. Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group.” The impacts of rape on survivors of the Janjaweed’s in international charters and commission reports. But the impacts are severe and continue to mentally and emotionally traumatize the women and children who were forced to face the brunt of violence, 2020). According to a recent study regarding survivor support services during the pandemic, support and recognition of the trauma survivors face as well have been deprioritized. According to BERKELEY MODEL UNITED NATIONS 31 a UN Press Release, “services needed by survivors risk being deprioritized in many settings” (Impact the other impacts of armed combat. The reasoning behind deprioritization of survivor support underreported, the lack of reported cases cannot be equated with the absence of violence. It deeply saddened me to hear interlocutors in Sudan doubting and questioning victims as well as the appalling nature of these crimes. The pervasive culture of denial is the most serious obstacle to eradicating this heinous crime” (Patten, 2018). Given the culture of denial often in the communities impacted societies has been less understood and drastically under-recognized when considering the international standards that prioritze its categorization as a crime against humanity, ultimately deterring justice for survivors who are intimidated and not considered in international structures of justice that prioritize politicians and their voices. The results of this system have led to discounting pursuit of a broad cause of justice over the immediate trauma-informed judicial and social responses that would better meet the needs of survivors and help restore and heal communities that were

BERKELEY MODEL UNITED NATIONS 32 CASE STUDY 3: The International Criminal Court on Darfur The Genocide in Darfur, was one of the most controversial at the international stage, beyond the lack of acknowledgment of certain crimes, as crimes against humanity or acts of genocide. The primary point of contention at the international level in the years following the beginning the International Criminal Court, when the ICC had increasingly been scrutinized as being ‘anti- African’ by the African Union and various national governments across the continent. Much of President . Kenyatta was investigated by a prosecutor recommendation from ICC head prosecutor at the time, Luis Ocampo. The allegations that his government had conducted post-election violence in certain opposition-held districts brought the current head-of-state to a cross comment from Uhuru at an AU meeting in 2013, would shift the recommendations around the status of President Omar Al-Bashir’s case in the ICC that has repeatedly been shelved and moved forward

Sudanese region of Darfur. Pointing to the Security Council’s lack of support in enforcing arrest warrants issued in the case, including the one against Sudan’s President Omar Al-Bashir, she argued that she was “left with no choice but to hibernate investigative activities in Darfur” and BERKELEY MODEL UNITED NATIONS 33 “shift resources to other urgent cases” (Security Council inaction on Darfur ‘can only embolden decision marks the culmination of “long-standing controversies about the Sudanese government’s obstruction of investigations, other African states’ lack of cooperation with the Court and the ICC’s alleged anti-African bias, a noncommittal Security Council, and negative implications that investigations and arrest warrants might have for peace negotiations in Darfur” (Security Council, by African leaders for its multiple persecutions of African leaders and former generals, but also other nations notably, the United States. The Americans at the time of the Darfur Genocide concluded that the crimes and events that had transpired in the nation at that time, were in fact acts of genocide. But there was also a fading faith in the ICC as a mode of jurisprudence for the individuals who orchestrated the genocide, especially from the American perspective, which deemed the ICC not as by the State Department, the American role in the determination of supporting the ICC prosecution of Omar Al-Bashir was complicated by “the tension between the U.S. belief in accountability for genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, on one hand, and the U.S. policy of active opposition to the ICC, on the other” (The Darfur Dilemma: U.S. Policy Toward the ICC, 2006). While the US belief in “accountability for genocide and war crimes” is highly scruitanble because of the USA’s role in perpetuating acts of genocide through their own war crimes in countless countries where they have intervened in militarily, the American government did have Darfur on their radar, but saw Bashir’s case as too risky to the American control in the Sudanese region, especially if they were to assign the justice proceeding’s responsibility to the Hague entirely. As a major security council BERKELEY MODEL UNITED NATIONS 34 power with the authority to recommend a case to the ICC and veto power as a permanent member, the US pressured the ICC prosecutor to shelve the proceedings against the former president of Sudan and make it an AU-mediated process that could have a court similar to the tribunal in Rwanda (The Darfur Dilemma: U.S. Policy Toward the ICC, 2006). With a lack of support from the other P5 members, the US instead negotiated the resolution that originally referred the Sudan case to the ICC to continue the investigation back in 2005 and the Obama administration. As the case has resurfaced with the new regime in Sudan pressuring Bashir to face charges since he was deposed, the ICC will continue to remain under scrutiny until for its hasty proceedings when concerningAfrican leaders in the past. The degree to which these criticisms remain validated by the international community as well however remains complicated. For one, while the ICC has implicated more African leaders than leaders from any other continent, the vast majority of these cases were internally referred by new regimes that took power in selective African countries compared to a UNSC recommendation or prosecutorial investigation and motions (Keppler, Ellis, 2012). In addition, a majority of African countries continue to remain parties to the treaty unlike many Western and P5 powers, including the United States and China, which have not depicting or arguing that the intentions behind the ICC are neo-colonial or particularly detrimental to African countries and the trials of certain former leaders (Ibid, 2012). As such, the ability of human rights investigations to remain unpursued on an international level, such as in the current sluggish progress in Omar Al-Bashir’s prosecution, reveals the tensions between the political statements of the Security Council, the anti-ICC perspective shared by certain prominent African leaders, but infrastructure to hold war criminals and abusers of human rights accountable. Therfore, delegates may remain cautious of the will to use the ICC to proceed with upholding international jurisprudence in modern cases such as Bashir’s, but thinking back to the genocide, delegates must think critically violence that were propagated under Bashir’s regime (Ibid, 2012).

BERKELEY MODEL UNITED NATIONS 35 Character Profiles Janjaweed, RSF, and Khartoum

Abdel Raheem Muhammed Hussein is the Minister of National Defense in Sudan and a special presidential representative to the region of Darfur. He is considered a senior politician and is closely allied with President Omar al-Bashir (Simons 2011). • Played major role in coup that brought President al-Bashir to power and likely has greater Islamist beliefs than any other member of the current military (Sudan Tribune). • Hussein continues to make “essential contributions to the formulation and implementation of the common plan” of crimes against humanity “through his overall coordination of national, state and local security entities through the recruitment, arming, and funding of the police forces and the military and Janjaweed in Darfur” (Sudan Tribune). • Nations meddling with Sudanese affairs (Sudan Tribune). • Faces controversy and criticism among his peers for his failure as defense minister to provide adequate security protections after ’s JEM attack on Obdurman in 2008 (Sudan Tribune).

Ahmed Haroun is governor of this region by the Khartoum government led by al-Bashir, he allegedly is taking an active role in the violence in Darfur. Allegations against Haroun include leading many of the operations involving the Janjaweed by operating from behind the desk, strategizing the attacks in Darfur (, 2019). • Currently serves as the manager of the Darfur Security Desk for the government that oversees the government forces, national intelligence, along with the Janjaweed • • The International Criminal Court claims that Haroun is a war criminal and also committed or orchestrated crimes against humanity and genocide during his time overseeing the security

BERKELEY MODEL UNITED NATIONS 36 desk

Amin Hassan Omar Abdullah is a top negotiator for Khartoum. He is currently the Minister of State, chairing the government negotiating team and serving as the Government of Sudan’s chief negotiator for all peace agreements in Darfur (Sudan Embassy). • Currently leading discussions within the Government of Sudan to arrange plans for displaced refugees to return to Darfur (UPI). • Also serves as an advisor to President Omar al-Bashir, though he often urges the President not to stretch beyond presidential powers and violate the constitution (Middle East Eye).

Hamid Dawai is an Emir of the Arab Awlad Rashed Tribe and a member of the Janjaweed militia located along the border of Chad (HRW). • Dawai and Abdullah Abu Shineibat have been accused of allying with the Sudanese government and being responsible for the violence that occurs near Adré. The two have been reported as the most violent Janjaweed forces by the Human Rights Watch (HRW). • Dawai is claimed to be a war criminal and involved in many human rights violations, including genocide, rape, and torture (HRW).

Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo is the Deputy head of the Transitional Military Council from the in Darfur. He became a leader of Janjaweed in 2003. • Under his leadership, he led Rizeigat militias in the Adwa massacre, systematically killing 126 violent acts in correspondence with Janjaweed (Foreign Policy 2019). • According to the United Nations, Dagalo and the Janjaweed soldiers under his command have not committed genocide, but they are guilty of mass rape, torture and (Foreign Policy 2019).

Musa Hilal is listed in a Security Council resolution as ‘paramount chief’ in the Northern Darfur BERKELEY MODEL UNITED NATIONS 37 Security Council 2006). • There are allegations from the UN that is targeting internally displaced populations and vulnerable groups. (Ibid 2006) • Musa Hilal is a proponent of Arab/Northern Darfuri supremacy and actively represses groups in Darfur’s South through the campaigns he is taking charge of, against groups that are non- Arab or not aligned with the Jalul people Ibid 2006). • Hilal will continue to coordinate with Khartoum in working with them on their strategy in Darfur.

Salah Gosh is currently the chief of Sudan’s intelligence service and serves as a Presidential Security Advisor (Sudan Tribune). • • while in college to help support Islamic Movement with political information (Sudan Tribune). • After Omar al-Bashir’s coup in 1989, served as director of operations in the intelligence bureau; notable actions while he was in this role include providing with economic & military infrastructure to make Sudan and al-Qaeda base of operations (Sudan Tribune). • crimes committed in Darfur region since outbreak in 2003 (Sudan Tribune). • Acts as liaison between American and Sudanese governments in intelligence sharing operations (Sudan Tribune). • Currently Marginalized in the NCP for showing over-conciliatory tendencies (Sudan Tribune).

SLM/A, JEM, and NRF

Abdul Wahid al-Nur AW, a faction that split off due to disagreement over the Abuja Agreement. • Widely regarded as the most popular rebel leader in Darfur, but currently has a damaged BERKELEY MODEL UNITED NATIONS 38 • al-Nur largely believes that relying on international recourse is good. • Allegedly, Wahid has ordered the killing of political dissidents. Fur elders and formerly loyal commanders say that he even ordered attacks on another rival faction that supported the Doha peace process (Sudan Tribune).

technically commands his own faction of the Sudan Liberation continues to work closely with the larger SLM/A rebel group (Small Arms Survey Sudan). • One of the earliest founders and members of the SLM/A, and widely considered to be its most strategic thinker. • Member of the Fur ethnic group but split from Wahid’s SLM/A-AW. Nonetheless, he has a strong interest in unifying and reconciling the many rebel movements in Darfur in order to facilitate peace talks (). • Seeks to secure more political power at the regional level, stronger guarantees for Janjaweed disarmament, and better compensation for victims of state-sanctioned violence (Small Arms Survey Sudan).

Ahmed Diraige is the current leader of the NRF since its formation in 2006, following the Abuja Accords. The NRF represents much of the opposition within Sudan, but Diraige is notably in charge of the Sudan Federal Democratic Alliance (SFDA), which he commands from his residence in Europe (Sudan Tribune). • Member of the Fur ethnic group, and served as its chief before studying politics in the United in Darfur from the previous Khartoum government in Sudan (Sudan Tribune). • • He believes that Darfur should remain a part of Sudan, noting that Darfuris are in all parts of BERKELEY MODEL UNITED NATIONS 39 Sudan; he believes that since the people in Darfur rebelled against the formation of South Sudan, they should remain a part of Sudan (Sudan Tribune). • Asserts that some of the key issues that need to be addressed in Darfur include marginalisation of the region as well as restitution and provisions for the internally displaced and refugees (Sudan Tribune).

Al-Hadi Idris Yahya is the SLM/A faction’s secretary who led part of the reunion movement with the wider SLM faction (Sudan Tribune, 2011) • A member of the Juba faction engaged in dialogue since 2010 with the wider SLM leaders in order to reach a compromise that was inclusive of the Juba region’s Unity movement as well • unifying leader amongst the rebels negotiating with the government in the Doha talks (Sudan Tribune)

Khalil Ibrahim is the leader of the Justice and Equality Movement, one of the most coherent and capable rebel groups in Darfur. He was born in the village of Tine, now a ghost town, and is from the Zaghawa tribe (Sudan Tribune). • Previously worked for the Sudan government after al-Bashir’s coup, but left at the same dismissed by al-Bashir (Sudan Tribune). • Ibrahim has suggested that Sudan should have a rotational democracy in which presidents are elected in a rotation from different ethnic groups or regions (Sudan Tribune). • Under Khalil, the JEM has no problems with factionalism, even as Khalil’s Zaghawa tribesmen dominate leadership of the group (Sudan Tribune). • Rejected the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2005 and Abuja Agreement of 2006, arguing that neither provide enough for Darfur’s minorities (Sudan Tribune). Ibrahim continues

BERKELEY MODEL UNITED NATIONS 40 faction that has accepted the Abuja Agreement of 2006 and is largely composed of the Zaghawa. • Wants to overthrow the National Congress Party and establish a liberal, secular state, disagreeing with the JEM’s desire to establish a non-secular state (Sudan Tribune). • After signing the 2006 Abuja Agreement, Minnawi became senior assistant to President Omar al-Bashir and chairman of the Transitional Darfur Regional Authority (Sudan Tribune). These • Trying to reduce defections from the SLM-MM to the JEM (Sudan Tribune). • Residents of Darfur fear that the abusive behavior of Minnawi’s forces mean that Minnawi is trying to establish Zaghawa supremacy in Darfur (Flint 2006). • Agreement with the 2006 DPA (i.e. the Abuja Agreement) has provided the SLM-MM with Minnawi currently remains unsure of whether to return to the armed opposition and rejoin the inside of the Khartoum bureaucracy.

Mohamed Bahr Hamadein serves as the deputy chairman and head of the Kordofan sector of the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) (ReliefWeb 2010). • His main role is as negotiator and representative of the JEM, often moving around blocs and parties, such as transitioning to an SRF alliance, to achieve the JEM’s goals. • Planning on meeting with other parties to discuss negotiations and peace treaties in Doha (ReliefWeb 2010).

United Nations, African Union, and Foreign Diplomats

Andrew Natsios is the U.S. Special Envoy to Sudan. He initiated a USAID relief program for Sudan as early as 2003, and warned President Bush about the genocide (Sudan Tribune). • Fiercely rebukes both the Khartoum government and the Darfur rebel groups for every violation of the Darfur Peace Agreement and every deadline that they fail to meet (Flint 2006). • Believes that the immediate priority of the United States and European nations during BERKELEY MODEL UNITED NATIONS 41 negotiations is to weaken the military capacity of warring groups in Darfur and broker a • Maintains that no peace can be kept in Darfur without active cooperation of Sudan’s neighboring countries (Foreign Policy 2009).

Emmanuel Karenzi Karake is appointed the Deputy Commander of the AU peacekeeping force in • Has been accused of various war crimes in Rwanda, especially as head of the Directory Military Intelligence; notably, he is allegedly responsible for multiple massacres, arranged murders, and mistreatment of refugees in the DRC (Trial International). • The UN was prepared to dismiss Karake from his deputy position, but hesitated to do so when Rwandan President threatened to withdraw all Rwandan troops from Darfur should Karake • in the (New Times).

Jan Eliasson is the Swedish foreign minister and former General Assembly president from 2005- his post is meant to spearhead efforts to curtail humanitarian and security crises within the region (UN News). • His position serves the purpose of maintaining diplomatic relations, namely outside of Sudan, to ensure governments worldwide are engaged in Darfur (UN News). • than civilians that have come to be involved. However, he notes the sanctions in place in Darfur have been symbolic, instead putting pressure on international actors as well as the peace process to be equitable in their approaches (Conciliation Resources). BERKELEY MODEL UNITED NATIONS 42 • One of his goals is to establish some sort of unity among the rebel groups to facilitate the peace process, but recognizes that each group represents varied interests within Dafuri society. As such, he has encouraged IDPs, female groups, and tribal leaders to join the Peace Process to fully represent the interests groups in Darfur (Council on Foreign Relations). •

Martin Luther Agwai Chief of Army Staff (Iconic). He is currently the commander of the Commander of United Nations- African Union peacekeeping force in Darfur (Iconic). • Military Advisor for all of South Africa from 1993-1996 (Iconic). • Previously Deputy Military Advisor at UN HQ in New York (Iconic). • Chief of defense staff for Nigerian Armed forces in 2006 (Iconic). • Focused on ensuring Sudanese Government works with other parties peacefully (Iconic).

Rodolphe Adada is a former cabinet member under Congolese President Denis Sassou-Nguesso. • He later joined the Department of Mines and Energy and served as the minister of mines and and became the representative for Darfur in the African Union. Since 2009, he has helped promote industrial development and private sectors (Clark and Decalo, 2012). • He has been criticized for being ineffective in solving disputes. • Adada frequently communicates with diplomats in France still and enjoys Parisian culture.

Salim Ahmed Salim serves as the diplomat from Zimbabwe to the UN. He is a career diplomat and highly regarded in the international community for his somewhat radical stances on Africa and • However, due to some of these stances was infamously criticized by the BERKELEY MODEL UNITED NATIONS 43 Security Council powers, and he was not able to secure the nomination after being denied by veto. • In the Darfur situation, he was appointed as the AU liaison and held a belief in peaceful settlement through an African-led effort, the African Union Mission in Sudan. (Relief Web 2005)

Sultan Temuri 2010). • Termuri hopes to enforce any UN-mandated agreement in Darfur (UNAMID 2010). • He is primarily assuming leadership in the Darfur west sector where he will continue to serve as the implementation coordinator of the 2010-2011 phase of the Peace Accords (Ibid 2010).

Tom Eric Vraalsen serves as the UN Secretary-General Special Envoy for Humanitarian affairs for Sudan. • • • • Currently chairman of Task Force for International Cooperation on Holocaust Education,

Yanina Isakova is the daughter of a wealthy Russian oil mogul. She has been dispatched to the peace talks by the Russian government to secure resource contracts related to mining and oil drilling. • • initiatives protecting and assisting women and IDPs within Darfur. • Is allergic to PEANUTS and RATS BERKELEY MODEL UNITED NATIONS 44 • Has staunchly opposed arms and oil embargoes on South Sudan, noting the impact such sanctions would have on the Russian economy and political prowess should they be put in place.

Yifei Zhao is a trusted advisor to President Hu Jintao in China and is in charge of arms deals with the Sudanese government. She is also an important and highly regarded member of China’s Ministry of Economic Affairs. • • • Advocates for the unity of Sudan, encouraging peace through communication but has been criticized for being overly involved in Sudanese politics (Holte 2013).

Nonaligned

Altheir Ismail Ali and later became prominent among several neighboring camps as a community organizer and provider. He has been recognized by UNAMID and acts as a central liaison between refugees and the United Nations. Ali is trying to do the best he can even as the conditions for refugees in Kutum

Ibrahim Suleiman was previously a four-star general, minister of defense, and armed forces’ chief of the Governor General of , playing a pivotal role in events leading up to the destruction of the region. • In general, Suleiman is critical of the government in Khartoum, regrets the decisions dealing with Darfur that Khartoum has made, and aligns with neither the insurgents nor the counterinsurgents (). • Urged the Minister of Defense and the Sudanese government not to rely on military action to Sudan).

BERKELEY MODEL UNITED NATIONS 45 Problem Statement: How to form solutions

We understand that based on the character which you are assigned, your solutions might not even have the primary goal of bringing an end to genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. For those characters, it will undoubtedly be more challenging for you to navigate committee, since the stated goal is to bring an end to the genocide. But in MUN, we welcome a challenge! And remember: no one’s hands are all clean, not even those of the disenfranchised rebel groups. And, despite their atrocities, Khartoum and the Janjaweed are also critical to a lasting settlement. To navigate this challenge, we encourage you to look into the policies of not just your individual character, but the group they are a part of. What are the JEM’s demands? What are the SLM/A’s demands, and how are they different? What does Khartoum want, and why are they funding what the Janjaweed want? What might political representation from each (or some, or none) of these groups look like, and how might you help achieve that vision when you are working with different factions in committee? on tribal militias to enforce order because security forces were unequipped to service the whole nation (Responsibility to Protect). Knowing this, you can infer that suggestions for disarmament means of protection (Lindijer). However, there is another fact that can be used to modify the idea is a more realistic and viable solution. Notably, even if mere arms regulation does not, by itself, do enough, it does put us on the right track to do enough. When forming solutions, you may want to consider using this frame of mind. Tweak and modify your ideas to the unique socio-political needs of Sudan and Darfur.

BERKELEY MODEL UNITED NATIONS 46 Questions to Consider

1. being (1) Sudanese, (2) Arab, and (3) African? How has the geography of Darfur been identity? What role has colonialism played with respect to these variables?

2. Darfurians play the central role in carving out a space for their history and identity, but what role do humanitarians, human rights activists, and diplomats play in the often traumatic transformation of Darfurian identity? How do foreign actors both ameliorate and accelerate perspective?

3. Although Omar al-Bashir is no longer in power today, an attack on Fata Bornu carried out by Arab militiamen left 9 dead and 20 wounded in July 2020 (Walsh). Indeed, heavily armed groups continue to kill, plunder, and rape in Darfur with little to no government intervention. Clearly, al-Bashir was part of the problem, but not the root of it. What, then, is the root of the problem—of the War in Darfur? Does it lie in the bureaucracy of the government? In corruption? In the economy? How have past peace agreements failed to address the root of the problem?

BERKELEY MODEL UNITED NATIONS 47 Bibliography

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